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
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HEADQUARTERS VIII CORPS AP) 3/8, U.S. Army, 30 C toher 1/44. wan i a soa SUBJECT: Report After Action Against Enemy. The Adjutant General, United States Army, Washington, D. C. THRU : Commanding General, Ninth U. S. Army, APO 339. 1. In compliance with Section III, Memorandum No. 56, Hq Ninth U. S. Army, dated 28 September 1944, and paragraph 10 (C-3) AR 345-105, the attached report, covering the action of the VIII Corps against forces of the German Army in Brittany, France, is submitted. The report covers the period 1 - 30 September 1944. 2. The report consists of three sections: The narrative describing the action of the VIII Corps in the reduction of the City of Brest; b. Seventy-four photographs of the German defenses of the City of Brest; taken during and after the siege of the port by the VIII Corps; c. Maps "A" to "H", inclusive, showing the dispositions of the troops of the VIII Corps at various times during the period covered by the report. For the Commanding General: 18 Incls: Incl # 1 - Report in quadruplicate
Incls 2-18 Staff Section Journals - 1004 Miles Achievant General 1st Ind 314.7 GNMAG Headquarters Ninth US Army, APO 339 U.S. Army : The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C. : Commanding General, European Theater of Operation US Army APO 887 THRU : Contents noted

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For the Commanding General:

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HEADQUARTERS VIII CORPS

APO 308, U. S. Army, 28 October 1944.

REPORT OF THE VIII CORDS AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY FORCES IN BRITTANY, FRANCE, FOR THE PERIOD 1 - 30 SEPTEMBER 44.

After the reduction of the port of St. Malo, on the north coast of Brittany, on 17 August 44, the VIII Corps concentrated its forces in front of Brest for the attack upon that port. Two divisions from the First Army, the 2nd and 29th Infantry Divisions, were attached for the operation and the Corps Artillery was increased from ten to eighteen battalions. A special task force, known as Task Force "B" was organized at this time and it consisted of RCT 38 from the 2nd Division, Task Force "A" and some elements of the 6th Armored Division. Task Force "A" was a composite force of cavalry, tank destroyers, engineers and infantry and up to this time had been engaged in sweeping the north coastal areas of Brittany and patrolling the entrances to the Plougastel and Crozon Peninsulas. The mission of Task Force "B" was to capture the Plougastel Peninsula in conjunction with the attack on Brest. Two battalions of Rangers, the 2nd and 5th, were made available to the Corps and they were attached to the 29th Division.

The city of Brest and its approaches were heavily fortified by an extensive system of defenses. The original fortifications, built by the French to guard their naval base, were designed to protect the port from both sea and land attacks. Heavy seacoast batteries lined the shore extending from LeConquet, on the western tip of Brittany, to the city itself, while on the Crozon and Plougastel Peninsulas, both heavy and medium calibers were mounted. To protect the city from attacks from the land side, an outer ring of forts had been constructed, the more formidable of these being situated to cover the approaches on the west, or Recouvrance side of the city. The terrain dominated by these forts was the typical heagerow country of Normandy and Brittany. Within the city itself and enclosing the installations of the Port Militaire, located on both sides of the Penfeld River, was an old for tress wall. This barrier varied in height up to 30 feet, and to 15 feet in thickness. The northeast and eastern section were the higher and were protected by a moat, in many places.

The Germans, during their long occupation, constructed new fortifications around the city and on sites covering the town's approaches. These works consisting of concrete casemates and pill-boxes, anti-tank ditches, road barricades and extensive minefields, were laid out in a well designed pattern and reflected the excellent technique of the Germans in a defensive warfare. Furthermore, the forts, and the ports and casemates of the old city wall were equipped with modern flat trajectory artillery pieces and extensive fields of fire were cleared for these weapons. The new system of defenses,

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superimposed on the old, presented a modern and formidable for tress to the attacker from the land side.

The French system of harbor defenses were also modified and augmented by the Germans. Many of the batteries on the south shore of the Brittany Peninsula were modernized and re-sited for allaround traverse, to support the defense of the city from an attack from the north. The batteries on the Crozon and Plougastel Peninsulas, not only covered the harbor entrance, but could support the fires laid down in front of the defensive perimeter of the city. The calibers of the heavy batteries varied up to 280mm.

Because of the importance of the naval base and its submarine shelter pens to the Germans during their long U-Boat campaign, against Allied shipping, Brest was heavily defended by anti-aircraft. These weapons varied in caliber up to 105mm, and, since the majority of them were dual-purpose and were permanently emplaced on sites suitable for terrestrial fire, they contributed in great measure to the network of ground defenses.

The defenses of Brest were manned by some 40,000 German troops. 21,000 of these were rated as crack line soldiers, while the remainder was composed of troops from static divisions, anti-aircraft battalions and neval personnel. The nucleus of the defense was the 2nd Paratroop Division, an organization of to ugh, young Germans who were fanatical in their zeal for Hitler and the Nazi cause. These paratroopers formed the centers of the defense groups and stiffened the resistance of the other troops organized about them. By this device, all the available personnel were integrated into a strong defensive force. Lieutenant General Ramcke, a paratrooper who gained prominence in the Crete operation and an outstanding soldier of thirty-four years experience, commanded the troops garrisoning the Brest Fortress.

The attack on Brest was led off by Task Force "B". This force, after concentrating near Landerneau, launched its offensive down the Plougastel Peninsula on 21st August and captured Hill 154 on the 23rd August. Hill 154, located at the southeast end of the central ridge of the peninsula, afforded observation on the city of Brest and the eastern side of the Crozon Peninsula, and its capture was contested bitterly by the Germans. Even after losing such a dominant terrain feature, the Germans resisted every step of the remaining ground on the peninsula. Task Force "B" kept up its drive and exhibiting considerable aggressiveness, cleaned up the peninsula on the 30th August.

The main attack against the city was launched at 1300 on the 25th of August, with three divisions abreast. The 29th Division on the West, the 8th Division in the center, and the 2nd on the East (See Map A). Because of adverse weather, heavy air missions were cancelled. Medium and fighter-bomber aircraft however were able to support the attack, and the mediums took over some of the heavy missions. HMS Warspite participated initially and used her 15"

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guns on the coastal batteries at LeConquet and-St. Mathieu.

The enemy's reaction to the attack was severe along the entire front and very little progress was made the first afternoon. During the night, the RAF bombed the city and the next day, American heavy air bombardment attacked the batteries on Crozon and the forts around the city.

The ground attack was resumed on the morning of the 26th August, but again stubborn resistance was encountered and few gains were made. The next day, the 29th Division succeeded in advancing its 175th Infantry to positions astride the Brest-LeConquet road. This completed the encirclement of the city, and cut enemy communications between the Brest forces and those in the batteries on the southwest coast.

The pace of the Corps attack now slowed materially, and, during the remainder of the month of August, the advances made through the outer defenses were small. The period of unfavorable weather which set in, with its fog and rain squalls, restricted the use of the air arm, but the factor which brought the attack virtually to a standstill at the end of the month was the critical ammunition situation.

In every operation in which the Corps participated so far, there never was sufficient artillery ammunition on hand, or definite assurance of a resupply in adequate amounts to conduct an attack without a great deal of anxiety. This was true of the attacks prior to the breakthrough in Normandy and the siege of St. Malo was definitely prolonged by the meager supply obtainable for that operation. It was regrettable that the Brest operation suffered for the same reason.

The mecessity for large amounts of field artillery ammunition, particularly when engaged in slege warfare against fortified cities, was evident in the operations in Normandy and in the St. Malo siege. Based upon these experiences and the realization that the Brest operation would be one of far greater magnitude, requirements which were considered adequate for the assault on Brest were submitted in mid-August. Unfortunately, these estimates were drastically cut down, resulting in a reduction of the initial stockage of ammunition for the attack.

This condition was aggravated by the failure of the supply lines to maintain an adequate flow of ammunition. It will be recalled that at this time the American Armies were sweeping rapidly toward the Seine and the supply lines to them as well as those to the Corps in Brittany were stretched over vast distances and severely strained. Trucks, trains and LST's bearing ammunition for the Corps either failed to arrive, or, if they arrived, they were late or lightly loaded. Levels in the ASP rapidly decreased and the situation became one of great concern.

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In view of the inadequate supply and the day to day uncertainty of replenishment, expenditures had to be severely reduced after the first two days of attack. The meager flow of ammunition barely sustained the counter-battery work, the support of local operations, and the defensive fires against counter-attack. Harassing and interdiction fires were naturally reduced to the minimum. The average expenditure of artillery ammunition for all calibers for this period, 24 to 31 August (both dates inclusive), amounted to three units of fire, an amount wholly inadequate to support an attack against a for tress as well defended as Brest.

The foregoing is a brief resume of events preceding the action covered by this report. A more detailed description of the operations conducted during the period 1 - 31 August 1944 will be found in a report previously submitted by this headquarters.

On the first of September, the dispositions of the VIII Corps for ces surrounding Brest are shown on Map. "A". Task Force "B", now reduced to a battalion of infantry, guarded the Plougastel Peninsula against possible infiltration from either Brest or the Crozon Peninsula. The Plougastel area was also occupied by a group of Corps Artillery, whose battalions could fire across the harbor and pound the enemy batteries on Crozon and the rear of the defenses around Brest. To the south, Task Force "A", now consisting of a tank destroyer battalion, a cavalry reconnaissance group and some engineer troops, was feeling out the defenses covering the approaches to the Crozon Peninsula. In the west of the Brittany Feninsula, the 29th Division organized a force known as Task Force "S", with the mission of clearing up the southwest corner of Brittany and reducing the seacoast fortifications located there. This force had a variable composition during the period of its existance and contained at various times the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions, the 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry, the 22th FA Battalion, Troops A & E, 86th Cav Ren Squadron, the division's reconnaissance troop, Co A, 86th Chemical Battalion, Co C, 480th AAA AW Battalion, and Co A, 121st Engr Combat Battalion. Task Force "S" was commanded by the Assistant Division Commander, 29th Division, Colonel Leroy H. Watson.

The Corps troops engaged outside the Brest area included the 83rd Infantry Division and the 6th Armored Division. At St. Malo, a combat team of the 83rd was preparing to launch an amphibious assault on the Ile de Cezembre, but that stronghold surrendered on 2nd September. The remainder of the division was occupied with patrol work along the line Redon-Nantes-Angers-Orleans. The 6th Armored continued to contain enemy forces in Lorient and St. Nazaire; to patrol the area around Vannes; and to sweep the north bank of the Loire River between Nantes and Orleans. These two divisions were relieved from the Corps on the 10th September and responsibility for the area covered was assumed by Ninth Army.

On the first day of September, the divisions' attacks on Brest commenced at 1000, in conjunction with an air attack by medium bombers. The enemy reacted strongly to this attack and very little progress was made anywhere along the front. On the front of the 8th Division,

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enemy counter-attacks against the 121st Infantry wiped out the small initial gains made by that unit.

Better progress was made on the next day. The 2nd Division, striking on its left, captured Hill 105. This hill, located southwest of Guipavas and south of the highway between Landerneau and Brest, was the first of two hills dominating the eastern approach to the city along this route. Since it was heavily fortified by dual purpose anti-aircraft guns, its capture was an important gain and it enabled the division to advance its flank along the Elorn River, some 3,000 yards. On the same day, the 8th Division also advanced, taking Hill 80 after an enemy withdrawal. Little progress was made by the 29th in its Brest attack, but the 2nd Ranger Battalion operating in the west as a part of Task Force "S" captured the small town of Trebabu, a small village just north of the St. Renan-LeConquet Highway and about 2,500 yards east of the latter place. place.

Task Force "A" made good progress on the Crozon Peninsula during the 1st and 2nd September. Hill 330, which dominated the terrain at the base of the peninsula was taken with little resistance and the force pushed forward to a line running generally north and south across the peninsula through the village of Telgruc.

The ammunition situation at this time was still far from satisfactory. Even though the expenditures were severely restricted, the rate of resupply was insufficient to warrant a full scale concerted attack by the Corps. Little information could be obtained on the amounts being shipped in, nor could definite assurance of the arrivals of LST's and ammunition trains be secured from the supply services. Attack plans had to be curtailed and the assaults which were made during this period were local affairs and limited by the restricted amounts of ammunition available.

While the ammunition build-up improved during the period 3 - 8
September, it was not until the latter date that there was sufficient on hand or on the way to permit a resumption of the attack with any certainty of success. During this period however, pressure was maintained on the enemy and with the aid of the air arm, particularly the excellent support given by the fighter-bombers, limited advances were achieved. The 2nd Division, exploiting its capture of Hill 105, managed to advance its lines about 1,000 yards. During the same period, the 8th Division gained some 500 yards while the 29th Division, using the 5th Rangers on its right flank, advanced that flank along the coast to Fort du Mengant, an old fortress 2,000 yards east of Pt. de Pit. Minoù. To the southwest, Task Force "S" advanced some three thousand yards in its thrust down the LeConquet Peninsula. On Crozon, Task Force "A" found itself up against a strong line of resistance at Telgruc. No attempt was made to penetrate this line, as no aid could be sent to them at that time, should they become involved in an engagement from which they could not extricate themselves. Active patrolling of this line was maintained however, until the 8th Division deployed for its assault on Crozon later in the month (See Map B).

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At 050600 Sept, the VIII Corps was attached to the Ninth United States Army, under the command of Lieutenant General William H. Simpson.

On the 7th September, ammunition stocks in the ASP were built up to an average level of two units of fire. While a level of three units was considered the minimum to sustain a large scale attack, assurance that sufficient ammunition ships were on the way was received. Orders were issued for the resumption of the assault on the 8th September.

The concerted attack jumped off at 1000 following an artillery preparation. Good progress was now made through enemy positions which previously had offered strong resistance. The 2nd Division captured Hill 90, the second major obstacle on the approach to the city from the east. Like Hill 105, the position was heavily fortified with dual purpose anti-aircraft weapons; The majority of these being 105mm in caliber and emplaced in concrete fortifications. 370 prisoners were taken in this position, including the battalion commander and staff of the 2nd Bn, 7th Paratroop Regt, and the commanding officers of two paratroop companies.

In the central sector, the 8th Division, with the 13th and 121st Regiments, advanced against stubborn resistance and by noon had made gains of 500-800 yards. By 1300, the 2nd Bn, 121st Regt, captured the Pontanezen Barracks and advanced by hand to hand fighting into the village of Mesmerien, which lies about 1,000 yards to the east of the barracks. In the west of the division sector and on the highway leading south to Lambezellec, the village of Les Coat and Hill 82 were captured by 1700. Meanwhile, the 29th Division advanced its left and center about 1,000 yards, but no gains were made on the right flank. The day's bag in prisoners was 988, while our casualties amounted to 252.

The additional artillery support afforded by the increasing flow of ammunition, plus the augmentation of the fighter-bomber support to six planes per division on air alert, gave much impetus to the attack. During the night; 8 LST's and two train loads of ammunition arrived and for the first time in the Corps' history there was enough ammunition to furnish adequate support to the infantry. The increased pressure now applied to the enemy continued and did not cease until his capitulation ten days later.

On the 9th, the attack was resumed at 0900 and again excellent progress, particularly in the east and north, was made. By 1700 the 2nd Division had reached the outskirts of the city and by nightfall, house to house fighting was going on. Over 1,000 prisoners were taken by this division in the day's operation. The 8th Division advanced through the town of Lambezellec with only moderate resistance, and launched a coordinated attack with two regiments abreast at 1500 against enemy positions to the south. An advance of 1,500 yards was

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made by this division and 185 prisoners were taken. The 29th Division advanced the 115th Infantry to Penfeld against little resistance, but made practically no progress towards Brest, elsewhere along the line. Things went a little better for this division in the west however. Task Force "S" captured LeConquet at 1300 and the 2nd Ranger Battalion took the Lochrist Batteries by 1400. The commanding officer and more than 1,000 prisoners were taken from this area, but there were many isolated pockets of resistance still holding out. The total take in prisoners for the Corps' operation during the day was 2,550.

The next day, the 2nd Division started its fight through the city towards the old for tress wall. The Germans contested every street, building and square. Because of the intense machine gun and anti-tank fire from every street corner and from well concealed positions in buildings and rubble, any attempt to advance down the streets was suicidal. Progress was gained only by advancing from house to house and this was accomplished by blasting a hole in the separating wall, clearing the house of enemy and then advancing thru the wall to the next one. The fight was waged with small groups such as the squad and platoon and in the words of the 2nd Division Commander, the battle through the city became a corporal's war.

Early in the afternoon of the 10th, the 8th Division reached the banks of the Penfeld River, near the old city wall, with the 13th Infantry. The 12lst Infantry also penetrated to the wall on its front and attempted to assault this barrier after a heavy artillery preparation. The assault was not successful because of the intense automatic and anti-tank fire from the wall. The next day, the Corps Artillery attempted to breach the wall with direct fire from heavy caliber weapons, but while gaps were torn in the upper part of the wall, the lower section remained intact and the breach was insufficient to permit an infantry assault through it.

In an effort to add more power to the attacks conducted by the 29th Division, the unit's area of responsibility was reduced on 10th September. This was accomplished by having the 28th Infantry of the 8th Division take over the sector occupied by the 115th Infantry (See Map C). This displacement gave the division an opportunity to concentrate its forces for its attacks on the Recouvrance side. On the same day that the displacement was made, the 29th Division attacked with two regiments abreast and made some limited gains. Task Force "S" cleaned up LeConquet Peninsula, and the next day the force was dissolved.

The assault of the wall at this time, either on the north or the east side, appeared as a costly undertaking and one of doubtful success, even if attempted with any force. It was therefore decided to contain the enemy forces within the old city and pound them into

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submission with artillery and air, at least until such time as the defense of the ramparts appeared to weaken or a more suitable site for breaching was disclosed.

The 8th Division, having reached the wall on its front; decision was now made to relieve the unit and send it over to Crozon for the reduction of the defenses on that peninsula. Consequently, on the night of the 11th September, the 13th and 121st Regiments were withdrawn and assembled in the vicinity of Plouvien, preparatory to the movement to the south. The 2nd Battalion of the 28th Infantry being in division reserve was moved down to the Crozon Peninsula during the night. The responsibility for containing the inner defenses on the north side of the city was now given to the 2nd Division and it displaced its 9th Infantry to the west, taking over the area east of the Penfeld River (See Map "D").

On the same night the 8th Division was withdrawn, the 29th Division launched an attack at 112400. This night attack was of sufficient depth and force that it was able to carry on through the next day. The anti-tank ditch west of St. Pierre was crossed by the 115th Infantry and advances were made on Hill 97 from the north. During the 12th September, the 2nd Division continued its house to house fighting while the 8th Division continued its assembly for the Crozon operation.

On the 13th, Colonel Reeves, the Corps G-2, was dispatched with a message to the German Commander, General Ramcks, asking for the surrender of the Brest Fortress and the enemy forces on Crozon. The message pointed out the futility of further resistance and the unnecessary waste of the lives of men who had already carried out their defensive mission. The request was rejected by the German Commander. These unsuccessful negotiations for the surrender were published to the troops of the Corps and they were instructed to take the Germans apart.

On the same day the surrender request was made, the 29th Division attacked with four battalions in the line and some substantial gains were made on the left of the division sector. The 2nd Battalion of the 175th Infantry assaulted Fort Keranroux and captured that strongpoint. In the 2nd Division area, the 9th Infantry consolidated its positions along the north of the city well, while the other two regiments continued with the house to house fighting on the eastern side of the city. Meanwhile the 8th Division moved the 121st Infantry and part of the 28th Infantry to Crozon.

On the 1/4th September, the 8th Division continued its move to the Crozon Peninsula and disposed its troops during the evening and night for an attack on the 15th. Task Force "A", which had been containing the enemy forces on Crozon on the Telgruc line, was attached to the 8th Division for the attack. In the eastern section

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of Brest, the 2nd Division continued its tough house to house fight outside the wall. As the battalions advanced, they uncovered tunnels and underground shelters which contained a considerable number of German and a few American wo unded. The usual filthy conditions, characteristic of German field hospitals and aid stations, prevailed in these places and evacuation to the American hospitals was initiated.

On the west, the 29th Division pushed its attack and made considerable progress on the left with the 175th Infantry. The high mound, forming the backing for the naval range, was captured and a counter-attack against Ft. Keranroux was repelled. "B" Squadron of the 1/1st Royal Armoured Corps, with 15 "Crocodiles" (Churchill tanks mounting flame throwers in addition to normal equipment) was attacked to the 116th Infantry and assisted in that unit's attack on Fort Montbarey. Four of the flame throwing tanks were used, but they did not fare well on their first employment. Although a passage through the minefield was cleared and marked for them, two of the tanks wandered off and struck mines. Another tank was destroyed by enemy fire while a fourth was unable to clear the starting line. On the division's right, the 115th Infantry captured Hill 99, northeast of the village of La Trinite. The resistance along the entire front was heavy but nevertheless over 700 prisoners were taken during the day. The enemy batteries on the Crozon Peninsula, in spite of heavy concentrations from the Corps Artillery and the air, continued to harass the right flank of this division with spasmodic fire throughout the day.

On the Crozon Peninsula, the 8th Division, with two regiments abreast, launched its attack at 0800 on the 15th September. The attack jumped off under cloudy skies and intermittent showers which precluded the use of air support until the afternoon. Little opposition was encountered at first, but by 1000, the main line of resistance of the enemy was reached and opposition stiffened sharply. New attacks were launched during the afternoon, but they were unable to breach the line at any point.

Over on the Brest side, the 2nd Division was still engaged in the tough house to house fighting which had signalized their activities since they reached the suburban areas. Their advances now enabled them to employ mortars against targets within the city wall and an intensive program of harassing fires was added to the artillery fires pounding the city. In the 29th Division's zone of action, the unfavorable weather in the moming prevented the use of eight fighter-unfavorable weather in the meming prevented the use of eight fighter-unfavorable weather in the meming prevented the use of eight fighter-unfavorable weather in the meming prevented the use of eight fighter-unfavorable weather in the memy garrison in Fort Montbarey was isolated but continued to hold out despite attacks made upon this fortification. In the vicinity of Le Cosquer, the strongpoints guarding the approaches to Fort du Portzic were attacked by the 5th Ranger Battalion and by nightfall, the enemy in this area was encircled.

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To the east of the division's zone, elements of the 115th and 116th Regiments penetrated to within 1,500 yards of the wall and a patrol of the 116th reached the bluff above the water near the submarine tens.

The softening effects of the terrific pounding by the artillery and the strafing and blasting by the fighter-bombers were now becoming evident. On the 16th, the 115th Infantry of the 29th Division captured the high ground north of Hildy, then swung south to advance towards the submarine pens. Hill 97 in the 116th and 175th areas was taken, and this commanding ground overlooked the city of Recouvrance. Fort Montbarey, which had been surrounded for two days, was captured at 1630 by the 116th Infantry. In the reduction of this stronghold, the Crocodile tanks were used with results more favorable than on the occasion of their first employment. The initial defense from the high ground outside the fort was crushed by a combined assault of infantry and the flame throwing tanks, after an intensive artillery preparation. Following this, the fortress was blanketed with smoke, while engineers cleared paths through the minefields to enable the tanks to approach close to the fort. Since the enemy within the fort had only small arms, the tanks were able to roam around scorching the weapon slits in the walls without interference. This permitted engineers to plant their charges and a breach was blown thru which the infantry gained entrance and forced the capitulation of the fort.

With Fort Montbarey secured, the way was opened through the main Recouvrance defenses. The 175th Infantry pressed in closely to the city wall and by 1900, the first combat patrols went over the wall into the old city. The 116th advanced to within 1,000 yards of the wall, but as their approach was through a built-up section, their progress was slower. On the extreme right, the 5th Ranger Battalion captured the strongpoint at LeCosquer and advanced down the ridge toward Fort du Portzic.

On the east side of Brest, the 2nd Division also made good progress. The 38th Infantry cleared all enemy resistance east of the wall. In the south section, however, stiff resistance was encountered by the 23rd Infantry, particularly from strong points around the railroad station.

In the Crozon area, the enemy main line of resistance was strongly defended and by noon, the 8th Division was only able to advance about 400 yards. During the remainder of the day, the progress was extremely slow and by nightfall, the total gain since the jump-off began, amounted to 1700 yards. The attack continued until 2000, at which time the positions gained were secured for the night.

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The next day, the 17th September, the 8th Division jumped off at 0700 and encountered little fire. It became apparent that the enemy had withdrawn to a second defensive position. The 28th Regiment advanced some 2000 yards and the 121st Regiment advanced some 3000 yards by noon. The enemy had not made a stand. In the early afternoon, the 121st advanced to a position astride the railread station at St. Guenole and were launching an attack on Hill 96, which lies just east of the town of Grozon. Task Force "A", which had been held back during the initial assault by the infentry, now moved up in the center of the peninsula along the main road to a position 1000 yards east of Guennatee, from which they moved west to mop up the valley between the two assault regiments. The 2nd Rangers were attached to the 8th Division at 0900 on the 17th, and moved foun to the Grozon Peninsula. The main force of the attack by the 8th brought them to the town of Grozon, with the enemy gradually withdrawing to further defensive positions. The total haul of prisoners of war in this sector netted 1333 on the 17th.

The same day, the Brest attack made good progress against deteriorating resistance. The 2nd Division to ok the strong point at the railway station during the morning and had cleared out everything outside the wall by 1800. During the late evening, the 9th Infantry got one battalion over the wall at the north, and they drove south inside the wall for about 1000 yards by midnight. A platoon from the 38th got through the wall, but was forced out by intensive small arms fire from well-covered positions. The 2nd Division took 360 prisoners during the day.

The 29th was able to exploit the entrance of the 2nd Battalion of the 175th into the city. A bridge over the Penfeld River was captured by noon of the 17th, and by 1700 all of Recouvrance between the old wall and the river had been cleared. Only the sub pens and Fort du Portzic were holding out by nightfall. These were taken by 180800, and all resistance west of the Penfeld was over. The two days operation netted 6800 prisoners for the 29th Division. On the east side of the river, the 2nd Division continued to meet resistance during the morning of the 18th, but it was from isolated groups, and by 1300 the whole area had been cleaned out. 2900 prisoners were taken by the 2nd Division on the 18th.

On Crozon Peninsula, the enemy continued to resist even after the fall of Brest, but the quality of the resistance was rapidly de teriorating. The 28th Infantry cleared the Cameret Peninsula by nightfall of 18 September. Task Force "A" swept up the Chevre Peninsula, while the 2nd Ranger Battalion cleaned up Ile Longue. The 13th Infantry probed the Fortress well across the throat of the Quelem Peninsula and prepared to assault this barrier to the last strongholds at Pointe des Espagnols the following morning.

At noon of the 19th September, the 13th Infantry scaled the Quelern wall and pushed on to the northern tip of the Crozon Penin-

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sula. White flags were flying over the forts in the late afternoon and the commender of the Brest Fortress, Lieutenant General Ramcke, and the remnants of his forces were taken prisoner.

On the 20th, Task Force "." was sent to capture a force of 325 Germans holding out on the Pont Croix Peninsula, west of Duarnenez. A demand for their surrender was refused, but a few rounds of artillery and the presence of a plane overhead quickly brought them to terms and they surrendered.

The siezure of the Crozon forts and the capture of the commander of the Brest garrison, General Remoke, marked the completion of the reduction of Brest and the destruction of a first-rate unit of the reduction of the 20 the 2 th

The destruction wrought in the city was appalling. The Germen's made a thorough job of wrecking everything which might be useful to the Americans in the way of port facilities. Bridges across the Pentfeld River were destroyed and the wreckase effectively blocked the channel. On the waterfront, wharves, drydocks, and cranes were demolished and the Germans even went to the extent of browing up the breaker waters surrounding the mayal basin and the Fort des Commerce. In addition, these basins, as well as the river, were littered with scuttled ships.

The siege operations of the Corps added materially to this damage the terrific pounding by the American sir and artillery, together with the use of white phosphorous and jelled gaseline, gutted and burned practically every building in the downtown section and the mavel base at hecouvrance. Rubble filled streets and collapsins valls nade at hecouvrance, the city a difficult and hazardous one, and the work of clearing traffic ways became a considerable engineering task.

The city was turned over to the Brittany Base Section of the Communications Zone on the evening of the 19th of September. Because of the extensive destruction, its use as a port in the immediate future was questionable. Preliminary surveys for reconstruction, made by the port authorities, were not very encouragin, and the impending capture of the channel ports might avoid the necessity for its use entirely.

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The immediate accomplishment, however, was the elimination of a potent force of the German Army and the freeing of the Corps for further work in the east.

With the conclusion of hostilities in the Brest area, the divisions and corps troops were moved into assembly areas in the general vicinity of Brest and Landerneau for a much-needed rest and refit. Winter clothing was drawn, armament and transport repaired, and preparations were made for movement to the eastern front.

The 29th Infantry Division was released to the First Army, and it moved out by rail and motor on the 24th September to join the KIX Corps, which was operating north of Aachen, Germany, as the left flank corps of the First Army. Task Force "A", which had done invaluable work during the Corps' campaign in Brittany, was dissolved and its components returned to their previous assignments.

Preparations for the Corps' movement east were finally completed and during the period 26 September - 2 October, the Corps Headquarters, Corps troops, and the 2nd and 8th Infantry Divisions moved by rail and motor to concentration areas in the rear of V Corps, First Army, in the general vicinity of Bastogne, Province of Luxemburg, Belgium (See Map H).


On the 29th September, the Corps CP was established in the vicinity of a chateau east of the Bastogne - Arlon Highway, and about 7,000 yards from Bastogne.

At the time of the movement to the east, an order was received to attach an infantry battalion from both the 2nd and 8th Infantry Divisions for use as line of communication troops with the Zone of Communications. The 2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry, from the 2nd Division, was dropped off at Paris, and the 3rd Battalion, 121st Infantry, from the 3th Division, was released at Rennes.


The plan was for the VIII Corps, composed of the 2nd and 8th Infantry Divisions and supporting troops, and operating under the Ninth Army, to take over the sector of the line held by the V Corps, composed of the 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions and the 5th Armored Division. These divisions, when relieved, were to be moved to the north flank of the VIII Corps, preparatory to participating in a concentrated drive by the First United States Army.

The 8th Division relieved the 5th Armored Division and elements of the 28th Infantry Division by 2 October, while the 2nd Division completed its relief of the 4th Division and the balance of the 28th by 4 October. VIII Corps took over responsibility for the sector at 041200 October 1944.


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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HEADQUARTERS VIII CORPS

APO 308, U. S. Army, 11 September 1944.

REPORT OF THE VIII CORPS AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY FORCES IN NORMANDY AND BRITTANY, FRANCE, FOR THE PERIOD 1 - 31 AUGUST 1944.

The Headquarters VIII Corps landed in France on the 14th June 1944 and was immediately assigned a defensive task by the CG, First Army. This task consisted of the protection of the rear of the VII Corps, while the latter thrust westward to cut off the Cotentin Peninsula. When the VII Corps turned north toward Cherbourg, the VIII Corps took over the defense of the southern flank, defending a line along the inundated areas and stretching from Carentan on the east to Portbail on the west coast of the peninsula. The Corps at that time consisted of the 101st Airborne Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 90th Infantry Division.

Because of the shock of the landings and the rapid penetration to the west, which cut a German division in two, the enemy on the Corps front was in a confused and disorganized state. A golden opportunity presented itself to hit him to the south before he could consolidate his forces and organize a defensive position around the dominating hill mass north of La Haye du Puits. Both the airborne divisions were reduced by heavy casualties resulting from their landings on D-Day, and the operations subsequently conducted in the neck of the Cotentin Peninsula, while the 90th Infantry Division had been badly hit in its initial engagements and was reorganizing under a new division commander and new regimental commanders. Time favored the enemy however, and any postponement of offensive operations, pending strengthening of the Corps, would have resulted in meeting a stronger enemy, well dug in behind organized positions. An attack was therefore planned to drive him to the south as far as the Ay River. This would have resulted in keeping the enemy off balance and shortening our defensive line, while the Corps built up its strength for the larger attack to the south which was being planned by First Army. The VIII Corps attack was scheduled for 22 June, but unfortunately severe storm conditions prevailed over the beaches, interrupting the landing of supplies and ammunition. Ammunition stocks became so low that both the Cherbourg operation and the VIII Corps attack could not be adequately supported, and the attack of the VIII Corps was cancelled.

After the fall of Cherbourg, the 79th Infantry Division, which had seen hard fighting in the Cherbourg campaign, was transferred to the VIII Corps. The Corps, consisting of the 79th, 8th and 90th Infantry Divisions, and the 82nd Airborne, launched an attack on 3 July, with Coutances as the objective. Bad weather, ammunition restrictions, and stubborn enemy resistance made the progress a slow and costly one. The enemy had taken advantage of the time afforded him, to strengthen his forces with troops from Brittany and the East,

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and he now presented a formidable front to the Gorps. After much bitter fighting from hedgerow to hedgerow, the line of the Ay River was finally reached on 14th July and the advance was halted by Army order.

Regrouping of the divisions was now undertaken in preparation for the Cobra operation, which was a large scale attack by First termy and designed to break out of Normandy. The attack was initiated by the VII Corps on the 25th June. It was preceded by an intensive air bombardment in the area west of St. Lo, and south of the St. Lo-Periers highway. A gap between Marieny and St. Cilles was opened up, through which the armored and infantry divisions poured rapidly to the south and west.

On the 26th July, the VIII Corps, carrying out its part of the Cobra plan, attacked to the south with the 79th, 8th, 90th and 83rd Infantry Divisions, and the 6th and 4th Armored Divisions. The infantry effected a break-through at Lessay and Periers, and on the 28th, the two armored divisions were passed through the 79th and 8th Infantry Divisions. The VII Corps turned to the west after their penetration, in accordance with the Cobra plan and pinched out the 90th and 83rd Divisions. These two divisions were subsequently attached to the XV Corps.

The Corps, now in two columns, each spearheaded by armor, rapidly increased the momentum of its drive southward against a disorgenized and confused enemy. On the west, the 6th Armored Division, followed by the 79th Infantry Division, proceeded down the coastal roads through Coutances and Brehal toward Avranches, while on the east, the 4th Armored Division, followed by the 8th Infantry Division, punched its way down the Periers-Coutances-Avranches Highway. The 4th Armored Division, exhibiting considerable aggressiveness, quickly got into the lead, and by the night of 31 July, it had captured Avranches, including the bridge over the See River, and had pushed on south to secure the crossings over the Selune River above Pontaubault.

Operations in Normandy up to the time of the break-through were severely hampered by wretched weather. An unseasonable amount of rain, fog, and cold prevailed during the latter part of June and most of July. Low ceilings and poor visibility more often than not prevented the full use of two valuable supporting weapons: artillery and air. With the break-through, the weather turned fair, and the last days of July were characterized by brilliant sunshine and warm temperatures, which materially aided the thrust southward.

The foregoing is a brief resume of events preceding the action covered by this report. A more detailed description of the operations conducted during the period 15 June - 31 July 1944 will be found in two reports previously submitted by this headquarters.

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On the first day of August, the leading elements of the Corps were advancing south and southwest of Avranches. The general plan was to thrust one column to the quiberon Bay Area, capture the city of Rennes on the way, and seal off the Brittany Peninsula; another column was to turn the corner below the Selune River, proceed to Dinan and thence down the backbone of the peninsula to invest the port of Brest; while a third column was to sweep along the north route, cleaning out pockets of resistance along the coast.

The immediate problem confronting the Corps was to get the divisions through the Avranches bottleneck so that the thrusts into Brittany could be accomplished as rapidly as possible. Two narrow, winding routes, filled with rubble, dead animals and wrecked vehicles, were opened; one through the city, and one just to the west of the town below the hills on which the city stands.

Enemy air activity, which had been confined to night operations, not only increased during darkness, but enemy planes ventured for the during the daylight hours to strafe and bomb our columns. This was particularly true over the roads leading in and out of Avranches and the town of Avranches itself. Here the enemy concentrated his night bombing attacks in an effort to get the bridges on the crowded approaches to the town. The anti-aircraft defenses around the city and the small caliber weapons in the columns exacted a relatively heavy toll in planes and the damage and delay inflicted by the enemy was negligible. After the bulk of the Corps passed through the Avranches bottleneck, enemy air decreased rapidly and, by the tenth of the month, it had vanished completely. Events in the east were now requiring what remained of the German air force, leaving Brittany unmolested for the remainder of the month.

On I August, the 4th Armored Division, pushing south of Avranches, captured Ducey and the dams on the Selune River, southeast of that town. Fortunately, these dams were captured intact; otherwise the Germans by blowing them and inundating the lower river valley, would have impeded the progress of the Gorps considerably. During the day, the division continued its push toward Rennes and reached the outskirts of the city by 1900.

On the same day, the oth Armored Division crossed the Selune giver and turned west, capturing Pontorson and establishing a bridge head across the Couesnon giver, just west of the town. The infantry divisions continued their advance in the rear of the armored columns. The Corps CP, which had been at Phillipe (T205489) was moved to an orchard in the vicinity of Sartilly (T230239).

At noon on the first, the Third U. S. Army, under the command of Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., became operational and the VIII Corps passed to its control.

The next day, the 4th armored Division, concentrated its forces in the vicinity of Rennes. The 13th Infantry, motorized, from the

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8th Division, moved down behind the armor and preparations were made for the attack upon the city. The balance of the 8th Division at this time was moving below Avranches toward Rennes.

The 6th Armored Division, heading west, drove around Dol de Bretagne to Dinan where some resistance was encountered about 021350. This resistance was by-passed and the division turned south to Evran, which was reached by the forward elements just before dark. On the east, the 106th Cavalry Group was ordered to protect the Corps' left flank and it reached the town of Fougeres at about 1800. The 79th Division started its advance through Avranches and headed for Fougeres. The 83rd Division was now attached to the VIII Corps and it took over the role of the 79th in following behind the 6th Armored.

It was intended that the 6th Armored Division secure St. Malo and Dinan before proceeding westward and orders were issued to that effect. They were diverted however, and sent on to Brest, leaving St. Malo to be cleaned up later. To assist in the accomplishment of this, a special force, known as Task Force "A" was organized under the command of Brigadier General Herbert L. Earnest. It was composed of the Headquarters, 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, the 15th Cavalry Group, the 705th TD Battalion (SP), Headquarters 6th TD Group, the 509th Engineer Lt. Pontoon Co. and the 159th Engineer Combat Battalion, and was made available to the Corps by Third Army.

On August 3rd, the 4th Armored Division passed elements around Rennes and moved on Chateau Briant, while the 6th Armored Division continued its advance on Brest. The 83rd Infantry Division advanced in stages in rear of the 6th Armored, while the 8th Infantry Division followed the 4th.

The 79th Infantry Division was attached to the XV Corps, and continued its advance on Fougeres, which was reached early in the day by their 313th Infantry. The XV Corps, now composed of the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions and the 5th Armored Division, thus became the left flank Corps of the Third U.S. Army, and shared with the VII Corps of the First U.S. Army the important task of broadening the bottleneck southeast of Avranches, and exploiting the breakthrough of the VIII Corps through the left flank of the German Seventh Army.

Task Force "A" moved out of its assembly area north of Avranches, passed south through the city and approached Dol de Bretagne about 031400. The 106th Cavalry Group, now attached to the XV Corps, patrolled the area between Fougeres and Rennes, protecting the left flank of the VIII Corps.

The period of 3 - 5 August was one of rapid progress. The 4th Armored Division pushed Combat Command. "A" through to Vannes, on the south coast, on the evening of 5th August, thus sealing off

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the Brittany Peninsula. The 6th Armored continued its advance on Brest. Combat Command "B" reached Loudeac on the evening of the 3rd August, was 20 miles west of Rostrenen at 050600, and reached Huelgoat the afternoon of the 5th August. Combat Command "A" reached Pontivy at 042400 and Gourin by the evening of the 5th August.

The 13th Infantry of the 8th Division took Rennes the morning of the 4th August, and the division, less one combat team in Corps reserve, was disposed in a general defensive position about the city. On the morning of the same day, the 330th Infantry of the 83rd Division captured Dol de Bretagne and proceeded northwest toward St. Malo. In the afternoon, the Corps CP was moved south of Avranches to Vergoncey (T245018), a small village southeast of Pontorson.

The Corps was now stretched over a vast area and moving rapidly. Signal communications, which were severely strained when the Corps was north of Avranches, now broke down almost completely. Wire was impossible to install or maintain over such distances and radio was rarely dependable. The expensive signal equipment at the disposal of the Corps was never designed apparently for a penetration and pursuit of the magnitude of the Brittany operation. Contact with the divisions was maintained by motor messenger but this was far from satisfactory because of the extended distances involved. Frequently messengers arrived with information or orders concerning situations which had radically changed during the time of transit of the bearers. In addition, many of these messengers had to go through countryside still occupied by enemy pockets of resistance, of ten resulting in the delay and sometimes in the loss of the communication.

Supply troubles began to mount rapidly as the columns extended. During the early part of the month, supply was based north of Avranches and gasoline and ammunition convoys added to the traffic complications in that city. As soon as dumps could be established south of the city, the gasoline and ration situation was ameliorated. The ammunition supply was still far from satisfactory.

Due to the hostile pockets of enemy resistance still existing on the lines of communication, convoys had to have armed escorts. Some 40mm anti-air craft batteries were used for this purpose until the 54th AA Brigade was made available for the guarding of the supply routes. The Forces Francaises de l'Interieur assisted in protecting some of the routes, particularly in the central part of the peninsula.

The immediate task of the Corps was the reduction of St. Malo. This port lies on the north coast of Brittany at the mouth of the Rance River. During the war, it was utilized by the enemy as a naval base for coastal operations and as a supply base for the Channel Isles. The harbor, with its docks and basins, could accommodate medium sized vessels and it had an estimated daily

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capacity of 1,000 tons. Its desired use as an auxiliary supply port for the Brittany operations dictated its early reduction.

There existed at this time a general impression that the capture of St. Malo would be an easy task. This was probably brought about by the rapidity of the other operations going on in the Brittany Peninsula at the same time. Such an impression was not justified by the facts. Studies made earlier in England indicated a formidable defense of this harbor and reconnaissance confirmed that the Germans would make a good stand in front of this objective. The core of the city's defenses was the Citable de St. Servan, a fortress of concrete and natural rock, situated on the west side of the city. This fortress was well equipped with artillery and automatic weapons, and dominated the harbor entrance, docks and basins. Its fires were supported by the artillery batteries in Dinard and the coastal batteries on Cezembre, an island lying some 4,000 yards off shore and opposite the entrance to the Rance.

In addition, the by-passing of this port and its approaches permitted enemy forces in the surrounding country to get into the city. The lack of naval patrols off shore also permitted reinforcements to get into the harbor from the Channel Isles. From an estimated 5,000 men, the garrison grew to about 15,000 and the reduction of the city became a major task.

The task was given to the 83rd Division, and the commander, Major General Macon, initiated his attack on the 5th August. Task Force "A" assisted in this attack, but was withdrawn on the evening of the 5th and, augmented by an infantry battalion combat team, it was sent west to sweep along the north coastal route. The division made fair headway against increasing resistance and by the evening of the 6th, had reached the outskirts of the city. Here resistance became stubborn and the pace of the attack slowed materially. To assist the division, the Corps reserve, RCT 121 from the 8th Division, was attached, with the mission of crossing the Rance at Dinar and proceeding north to capture Dinard, which lies on the west bank of the Rance at the river's mouth. The approaches to this town were also strongly held and the 121st Infantry's attack slowed up quickly.

The bulk of the Corps Artillery supported the St. Malo attack and ten battalions, including 8 inch gains and howitzers and 240mm howitzers pounded the defenses. Counter-battery on the Citadle and the Ile de Cezembre had little effect, as the gains at the se places were well protected by heavy casemates. Once again the inadequate supply of artillery ammunition severely hampered the operation, and, as the Corps could never be assured of a steady resupply, the fire plans of the battalions were severely curtailed. For several days, some of the heavy battalions were reduced to an expenditure of four rounds per gain per day.

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In every operation in which the Corps participated so far, there was never sufficient artillery ammunition on hand, or definite assurance of a resupply in sufficient amounts to go ahe ad with an attack without a great deal of anxiety. It was largely a hand-to-mouth existance and frequently operations had to be cancelled or modified to fit in with the restricted flow of ammunition. The attack on Brest was the next operation looming up ahe ad and based upon the tenacity with which St. Malo was defended, it was certain that the Germans would put up a bitter and stubborn resistance to hold this port. To avoid a repetition of the ammunition shortage, requests were made to Headquarters Third Army, during the St. Malo Operation, to lay down 3 units of fire prior to the attacks on Brest and set up channels of supply which would bring in 5 units for the first three days of the attack. These estimates were based on a four division operation. Unfortunately, these requirements were never met and the Brest operation suffered accordingly.

The push on St. Malo now settled down to a slugging match. Pill boxes, barricades and fortified areas were slowly hammered down and by the evening of the 7th August, the division was on the perimeter of the town. On the 8th, the heights in the northeast suburbs of the city were captured and the next day, after much nasty street fighting, the waterfront of the inner basin was reached. This left the Citadle and the Old City as the remaining strongholds to be taken and, as the attack on Dinard was still making little progress, a combat team was shifted over to the west, to assist. The take in prisoners was heavy, with well over 4,000 being captured within the past two days. Mopping up operations continued in the city and the next two days netted over 3,000 prisoners. The small German force in the Citadle still held out, although the fort was shelled constantly and was bombed on the evening of the 11th August by approximately 30 planes. The fortress itself was covered by the batteries in Dinard and Cezembre and they did not hesitate to bring fire down on the top of it when ever our troops attempted to assault.

On the 14th August, the 83rd Division pushed into Dinard, captured some 1,2000 prisoners and began mopping up the city. The Old City of St. Malo and its chateau surrendered, leaving the Citadle and the island off the harbor as the only spots of German resistance. The next day, Dinard yielded 3,600 additional prisoners. The prisoners included Colonel Bacherer, commanding officer of the Dinard garrison and the remainder of the staff of the German 77th Infantry Division. On the east side of the river, the 329th Infantry launched an assault on the Citadle, following an air bombardment with 250 pound bombs. The enemy reacted with strong machine gun and mortar fire from the Citadle and artillery fire from the island of Cezembre, stopping the American attack.

On the morning of the 17th August, two 8 inch guns were brought up to within 1,500 yards of the Citadle to positions from which

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they fired on the walls and apertures with direct laying with good effect. In the afterness, an air bombardment was planned for 1500, using P-38's to bomb the fortress with belly tanks containing jelled gasoline. However, the German garrison put up the white flag at 1445 and the planes, with the exception of one, were diverted to Cezembre. The German commander, his staff of 30 officers and 538 men surrendered. This brought the total number of prisoners taken in the St. Malo-Dinard operation to over 13,000.

The Ile de Cezembre continued to hold out. A combat team, less a battalion, of the 83rd Division was left to contain this place and to prevent infiltration of enemy troops into the St. Malo-Dinard area from the Channel Isles.

While the St. Malo operation was going on, the thrusts by the armored divisions to the south and southwest were continued and the sweeping operations along the north coast initiated. On the 6th August, Task Force "A" made rapid progress to the west, reaching St. Brieuc by nightfall. The 4th Armored Division advanced on Lorient, and the 6th Armored continued its advance on Brest, reaching Landivisiau. The 8th Division less RCT 121, remained in the vicinity of Rennes to protect the city, while the reconnaissance troop of that division took over Chateaubriant.

On the left flank of the VIII Corps, the XV Corps captured Mayenne with the 90th Division on 5 August and Laval with the 79th on 6th August. The 2nd French Armored Division closed into an area southeast of Avranches and was attached to the XV Corps.

The XX Corps, consisting of the 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions, and the 7th Armored Division, moved in between the VIII and XV Corps, and took over the task of covering the rear of the VIII Corps from Laval to Nantes.

On the 7th August, the 8th Division was engaged in cleaning up operations in the vicinity of Rennes and captured some 200 prisoners. The 6th Armored Division advanced to the northerm outskirts of Brest and prepared to invest the city. Likewise, the 4th Armored moved into the north of Lorient to contain that port. Task Force "A" advanced from St. Brieuc to Guingemp, meeting slight resistance. On the same day, the Corps CP was moved to Pleuguer, a village at the base of the St. Malo peninsula and 4 miles west of Dol de Bretagne.

Meanwhile on the front of the VII Corps which was operating as the right flank Corps of the First U.S. Army, a German Armored counter-attack was launched, with the evident object of driving through to Avranches and cutting the supply routes of the Third Army. The German forces consisted of the remnants of four panzer divisions, but in actual strength was probably equivalent to about

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one reinforced division. The Germans captured Mortain but here their advance was halted, with the Americans still in control of the high ground. The attack had been launched without air cover and Allied planes took a heavy toll of German armor. Further threat to our lines of communication never material ized and Mortain was retaken later by the Americans.

On 8 August, Task Force "A" advanced from Guingamp to about 12 kilometers beyond that town on the road to Brest. The railway bridge at Morlaix was captured intact. This bridge, a stone arch structure measuring some 1,000 feet in length and 200 feet in height, is the largest railway viaduct in France and carries the main double track line from Brest to the east. Had the Germans destroyed it to any extent, the use of Brest as a supply port would be seriously reduced, as the repair job would have been an extensive engineering project requiring many months.

To the east, the Third Army thrust its columns to the east and southeast, preparatory to its swing in the direction of Paris. As the right flank elements of the XX Corps were advancing on Angers, an extensive area north of the Loire, in the vicinity of Nantes, was not covered; consequently the VIII Corps was ordered to send a combat command of the 4th Armored Division to Nantes. As the bulk of the Third Army moved eastward, the VIII Corps had to gradually stretch out along the north bank of the Loire and at the end of the month, the area of responsibility extended as far east as Montargis.

On the front of Task Force "A", elements of the German 266th Infantry Division were falling back, attempting to beat their way into Brest, apparently not knowing that the 6th Armored was sitting in front of that port. Task Force "A" drove them into the rear of the 6th, and the Germans were badly mauled. Lieutenant General Karl Spang, the commander of the German division, was captured and most of his staff killed.

The period starting roughly on the 10th August marked a change in the type of action in which the VIII Corps was engaged. The Britteny Peninsula was now completely cut off and the force of the attack of the Third U. S. Army had shifted to the east, in a drive on Paris. In the peninsula itself, VIII Corps troops were containing or attacking German forces in Brest, Lorient, St. Malo and Dinard. Elements of the 4th Armored Division were near Nantes. There was no organized German resistance elsewhere in the peninsula, but there were numerous pockets of isolated enemy troops scattered through the area, particularly along the coast lines. The problem now was to mop up the scattered German forces inland, and to systematically reduce the strong points on the coast. Due to the tremendous distances involved, and the relatively few troops available for the task, this promised to be a time consuming operation.

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Task Force "A", after contacting the 6th Armored Division on the 9th August, moved northeast and succeeded in opening a beach for LST's at St. Michel en Greve, a cove some 15 miles northwest of Morlaix. Here three LST's landed on 12 August with supplies for the 6th Armored Division. This beach was developed and later in the month, much of the supplies and ammunition received for the Brest operation were moved over it. The cargoes handled there were never adequate however, and trains and trucks from Normandy were still required to augment the transportation for the requirements of the Corps.

On the 12th August, the 4th Armored Division was ordered relieved from VIII Corps, effective as soon as the 6th Armored Division could take over Lorient and Vannes. The 2nd Cavalry Group, previously attached to the 4th Armored Division, was to take over Nantes.

On the same day, Rennes was turned over to the Communications Zone, end the 8th Division started its move to Dinan on the morning of 13th August, leaving one battalion at Rennes to act as guard until sufficient Communication Zone troops were moved in to assure the protection of the city.

Operations of 13th August were a continuation of the mopping up actions. Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored reached Vannes and prepared to relieve troops of the 4th at that point. The reserve command of the 6th reached Gourin, en route to Lorient. The 8th Division completed its move to Dinan, leaving the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry at Rennes. The RCN troop of the 8th moved to Chateaubriant to check reports of German troops moving into that vicinity. None were found. Task Force "A" extended its clearing operations eastward to the general line Guingamp-Rostrenen. The 4th Armored Division occupied Nantes, without resistance.

On the north coast, two fair sized pockets of resistance now remained. One was located at Cap Frenel, a promontory midway between St. Malo and St. Brieuc. Another force of much larger strength was located in the vicinity of Paimpol, manning and protecting the coastal fortifications overlooking the western approaches to the Baie de St. Brieuc. The FFI offered to take the latter place, but their help never materialized. A reinforced combat team of the 8th Division was assigned the Cap Frehel task, while Task Force "A" undertook the Paimpol assignment.

On 14th August, the 4th Armored Division was relieved from the Corps and moved out, enroute to St. Calais, the reserve combat command of the 6th Armored Division having completed the relief of the remaining elements of the 4th at Lorient. The 2nd Cavalry Group took over Nantes, north of the Loire River, from elements of the 4th Armored there.

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The VIII Corps rear boundary was extended from Vivien sur Mer on the north coast to Dol-Combourg-Rennes-(exclusive)-Chateaubriant-Angers (inclusive). Thus the Corps took over control of the 319th Infantry of the 80th Division at Angers.

The next day, 15th August, the battalion task force from the 8th Division captured 300 prisoners near Cap Frenel after firing a few rounds of white phosphorus from 4.2" mortars. Task force "A" meanwhile cleaned out enemy forces near Lezardrieux, to the west of Paimpol, capturing 430 prisoners, and prepared to attack the main body of the enemy forces at Paimpol.

The 2nd Battalion of the 28th Infantry, which was at Rennes, was released to division control and joined the division at Dinan.

By noon of the 17th August, Task Force "A" cleared Paimpol of enemy resistance, capturing some 2,400 prisoners. The Force was then sent south to the area below Landerneau, where it siezed the approaches to the Plougastel Peninsula and patrolled to the south. Patrols from the Force operated as far south as Chateaulin and as far east as Sizun. The 6th Armored Division, during this period, continued its operations of containing the enemy forces in Brest and Lorient.

By the 17th August, the St. Malo operation was completed and the north coast, with the exception of the Ile de Cezembre was clear of any organized groups of resistance. The movement and concentration for the attack on Brest had already been initiated, with the 8th Division moving from Dinan to the vicinity of Plabennec on the 16th, 17th, and 18th. Upon arrival, the 8th Division relieved Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Division of the mission of containing Brest. To the west, and northwest of Brest, enemy forces still manned the coast defenses and his protective screen extended east of St. Renan. The 8th Division began to probe this area and clean out sufficient of it to permit the 29th Division to come into its concentration area unmolested.

The 2nd and 29th Infantry Divisions, having been pinched out in the First Army operations above Mortain, were attached to the Corps for the attack on Brest. The 2nd Division, under command of Major General Walter M. Robertson, closed in its assembly area northwest of Landerneau on the 19th August and the 29th Division, commanded by Major General Charles H. Gerhardt, arrived in an assembly area south of Lannilis on the 23rd. In addition, the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions were attached and they closed in on the 18th end 19th.

The Corps CP, which had been at Pleugeur, was moved on 18th August to a wood two kilometers south of Lesneven, a distance of over 120 miles.

Adjustments now had to be made in the forces stretched along the Loire. The 83rd Division, which left a regimental combat team,


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Brest, prominent in World War I days as one of the ports used by the AEF, is situated on the extremity of the Brittany Peninsula, and was the largest French naval base in northern France. During the German occupation, it was used as a base for extensive U-boat operations against the supply lines to England and the Mediterranean, and for a time sheltered two battleships and a cruiser of the German battle fleet. Due to the distance from the heart of France and the relative economic poverty of the Brittany Peninsula, the port itself had little commercial importance, and, consequently the facilities for handling cargoes were never developed to any extent. The port, however, possessed one feature which was of great military importance to the Americans, particularly at this time. It was the largest land-locked harbor in Europe.

Cherbourg, which had fallen to the Americans in the latter part of June, was still not handling the cargoes anticipated. The Germans had done an extensive amount of destruction to the port facilities and had so thoroughly mined the harbor that clearing and repair work became a time consuming undertaking. In the absence of full use of this port, the bulk of supplies for the american and Allied Armies had to come over the Omaha and Utah Beaches in Normandy. While these beaches were handling more tommage than was ever contemplated, the approach of the September gales threatened their continued use and the necessity for a large harbor where vessels could unload in sheltered waters became of increasing importance. Brest, with its excellent deep water roadstead, could furnish protection to a large number of discharging ships and its early capture was directed.

The city of Brest, situated on a gently rolling plateau, is roughly divided into two areas by the Penfeld River. The city proper and the Port de Commerce are on the east side of the river. The district on the west, known as Recouvrance, is occupied almost completely by the naval base. Extensive repair shops, drydocks, quays, naval barracks, storehouses and the U-boat shelter pens are located here. Some instal lations of the Port Militaire were also located on the east bank of the Penfeld River.

The old defenses of the city consisted of an outer ring of forts and an inner perimeter of ramparts. The latter had fallen into disuse however, and many had been converted into promenades. The Germans, during their long occupation constructed new fortifications around the city and on the approaches to it. These works consisted of concrete pillboxes, anti-tank ditches, road

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barricades and extensive mine fields. The old defenses of the city were woven into the pattern of the German defense system and the whole presented a modern and formidable for tress to the attacker from the land side.

The French system of harbor defenses were also modified and augmented. The coastal batteries on the south shore, extending from Le Conquet east to the city itself, were numerous and of heavy caliber. Many of these weapons, particularly those located at Lochrist, St. Mathieu and Portzic were capable of firing landward and could support the defense of the city from an attack from the north. The batteries on the Crozon and Plougastel Peninsulas not only covered the harbor entrance, but could support the fires laid down in front of the defensive perimeter of the city. In addition, the city was well defended by anti-aircraft weapons and as many of these were dual purpose guns, they too strengthened the land defenses.

To protect these installations, the approaches to the Plougastel and Crozon Peninsulas and to the coastal battery positions west of Brest were fortified and defended by mobile troops.

The estimated number of troops defending the city itself was 20,000 with some 3,000 on the Plougastel Peninsula and enother 5,000 on the Crozon Peninsula. These consisted of all types, including naval personnel and they were backed up by the 2nd Paratroop Division. Lieutenant General Ramcke, who gained fame in the airborne attack on Crete, commanded the defenses of Brest, as well as the paratroop division.

The plan for the assault on Brest was to attack with three infentry divisions abreast, driving south against the city. The divisions from west to east were the 29th, the 8th and the 2nd. The 8th Division was to make the main effort. The 29th had the additional mission of protecting the right flank of the Corps, from enemy forces on the west and southwest, and the 2nd Battalier of Rangers and Troops A and E of the 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron were attached to this division, to assist in that task. The division augmented these forces and designated the group as Task Force "S".

A special Task Force "B", consisting of one RCT from the 2nd Division, former Task Force "A", and some units of Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Division, all under command of Brigadier General James A. Van Fleet of the 2nd Division, was to concentrate near Landerneau and attack southwest to clear the Plougastel Peninsula. This action would protect the left flank of the 2nd Division and secure the excellent observation from the high hills along the central ridge of the peninsula.

To support the attack, fifteen battalions of medium and heavy artillery were employed. This was later increased to eighteen and

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together with the divisional artillery and the tank destroyer battalions, made a total of 34 battalions available to hammer the defenses of the city.

On the 21st August, the 8th Division, the 2nd Division, and Task Force "B" moved into attack positions, launching small limited objective attacks in order to obtain favorable terrain for the jump-off. The resistance to these preliminary movements was slight.

The 29th Division was delayed in its departure and movement from the east, and did not close into its assembly area until the night of the 23rd. The next day, this division disposed its forces for the attack and conducted strong reconnaissance to the west and so uthwest of its right flank. With the 29th in position, the attack was set for 1300 on the 25th August.

Arrangements were made for both heavy and medium air bombardment to open the attack by bombing targets in the Crozon and Recouvrance areas. In addition, four fighter bombers, some equipped with five inch rockets, were to be on air alert for each division. HMS "Warspite", with her 15 inch guns, was to assist in the attack by bombarding some of the heavy coastal batteries, paying particular attention to those on the west flank.

While preparations were being completed for the main attack, excellent progress was made by Task Force "B" operating on the Plougastel Peninsula. Hill 154, at the southwest end of the main Plougastel Peninsula. Hill 154, at the southwest end of the main ridge, dominated the end of the peninsula and afforded observation over the entire harbor with an excellent view of the city of Brest. This became the first objective for the Task Force, and they went after it aggressively. On the evening of the 21st, an outpost line 1,400 yards from the hill was secured. On the 22nd, three sides of the hill were taken and on the 23rd, the hill itself was captured after fierce fighting against a well organized enemy. The next day, the force advanced some 1,500 yards beyond the hill and prepared to attack the town of Plougastel. To the south of this town, Hill 63 was stoutly defended by the enemy and this, together with the town, were the main centers of resistance in front of the Task Force.

At this time, the rear boundary of the VIII Corps was extended along the Loire River to Orleans, thus giving the VIII Corps the additional task of protecting the right flank of the American Third Army. The Corps rear boundary, now stretching from Le Vivier Sur Mer on the north coast of the Brittany Peninsula to Angers on the Loire, and thence along the river to Orleans, measured roughly 400 kilometers.

The attack of the VIII Corps on Brest jumped off at 251300 as scheduled. Due to adverse weather at the bases, the high level bombing had been cancelled, and the medium bombing was postponed until about 1500. The mediums took over some of the heavy missions and bombed effectively, starting a large fire in the Recouvrance

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area. HMS "Warspite", hurling some 300 shells, worked over the coastal batteries at Le Conquet and St. Mathieu, and then shifted to the forts in the naval base area west of the Penfield River. The results were fair with some direct hits on the coastal guns. The results were fair with some direct hits on the coastal guns. Corps Artillery supported the action by counter-battery, excellent observation of many of the enemy installations being afforded from the observation of many of the enemy installations being afforded from the high ground held by our troops on the Daoulas Peninsula. Fighter high ground held by our troops on the Daoulas Peninsula. Fighter bomber support was active. Several small enemy ships in the harbor near the Crozon Peninsula were attacked and a number of them were sunk.

The enemy resisted strongly along the entire front and very little progress was made the first afternoon. The 2nd made a slight advance with its left, but very little on the right, while the 8th was held up on the left by prepared positions. The 29th Division advanced its right flank about 3000 yards. Task Force Division advanced its right flank about 3000 yards. Task Force "S" operated on the right flank of the 29th Division, protecting the Corps right flank, and covering the area to the coast on the west. On the Plougastel Peninsula, Task Force "B" only made slight local gains against highly organized resistance. Around midnight, the RAF bombed the city of Brest.

The attack was resumed at 260800 August. Determined resistance was encountered along the entire front. Task Force "B" made small gains on the Plougastel Peninsula, particularly on its right, and captured about 140 prisoners. As a result of this action, the enemy blew the Pont Albert Louppe, a reinforced concrete bridge over the Elorn River, connecting the Plougastel Peninsula with the eastern tip of the city of Brest. Elsewhere along the front, very limited gains were made. During the morning, heavy bombers operated on targets in the city and on Crozon Peninsula.

Unfavorable weather now set in with fog and rain squalls on most of the remaining days of the month. On the few good days when aircraft could operate over the battle area, the weather at the medium and heavy bases kept them on the ground. Some fighter medium and heavy bases kept them on the ground. Some fighter bomber support was able to operate on these days, however, and bomber support was able to operate on these days, however, and period of foul weather kept up and it was 6 September before heavy bombardment was able to operate again over the Brest battle area.

On the 27th, the day was spent in pounding enemy strong points with artillery fire. Few gains were made by the 2nd or 8th. The 29th Division was able to advance the 175th Infantry, with Task 29th Division was able to advance the 175th Infantry, with Task Force "S" in support, to positions astride the Brest-Le Conque t road on its right, thus completing the encirclement of the city of road on its right, thus completing the encirclement of the city of road on its right, thus completing the village of Lesquivic, employing Brest. Task Force "B" reduced the village of Lesquivic, employing flamethrowers to good advantage. Hill 63 was also captured after flamethrowers to good advantage. Hill 63 was also captured after stiff fighting, thus completely accounting for the 851st Infantry stiff fighting, thus completely accounting for the 851st Infantry stiff fighting, thus completely accounting for the 851st Infantry stiff fighting, thus completely accounting for the 851st Infantry stiff fighting, thus completely accounting for the 851st Infantry stiff fighting, thus completely accounting for the 851st Infantry stiff fighting, thus completely accounting for the 851st Infantry stiff fighting. The south, the Battalion, including the battalion commander. To the south, the 17th Cavalry Squadron extended reconnaissance across the base of the Crozon Peninsula.

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28 August marked a continuation of the attack. The 38th Infantry of Task Force "B" drove through the little village of Plougastel, capturing 810 prisoners. On the front of the 29th Division the 115th Infantry took over the combined frontage of the 115th and 116th Infantry. The 116th was assembled on the extreme right of the division, from which position it launched a strong attack at 1200, driving east along the coast road toward Brest. The maneuver apparently caught the Germans off balance and considerable progress was made. In the center of the line, the 8th Division and adjacent regiments of the 2nd and 29th were held up by determined resistance from the high ground in their immediate front.

On the same day, Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division was moved east from Lorient with the mission of clearing out any enemy north of the Loire between Nantes and Orleans, various reports having reached Corps that small enemy groups were operating along the river.

On 29th August, Task Force "B" pushed on down the Plougastel Peninsula, clearing it all except the very tip of Pointe de L'Amorique. 1,027 prisoners were taken, including 17 officers and the commander of the enemy forces on the peninsula.

In the 8th Division, a regrettable and somewhat puzzling incident occurred. The 28th Infantry had launched a night attack at 290200 which continued on into the morning. The 2nd Battalion reached its objective, but the 3rd Battalion experienced considerable resistance and was almost 1,000 yards to the left rear of the 2nd. A German medical officer requested a truce of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, to evacuate wounded. The truce was granted to end at 1145. Apparently, the Germans took this opportunity to infiltrate behind the 2nd Battalion, for at about 1245, approximately two companies of American' infantry were observed being marched toward Brest as prisoners. Not a shot had been fired, nor did anyone escape who could give a picture of what happened. All radio contact with the two companies of the 2nd Battalion on the ir forward position was lost at about 1220.

On the front of the 2nd and 29th Divisions, only limited progress was made, but Companies "A" and "C" of the 2nd Ranger Battalid captured an enemy strong point at Pte. de Corsen on the western tip of the Brest Peninsula. Fifty prisoners were taken.

Task Force "B" captured Pte. de L'Amorique on 30 August, taking 100 prisoners and completing the occupation of the Plougastel Peninsula. In all, approximately 2,700 prisoners had been taken of this peninsula. Task Force "B", having completed its mission with outstanding success, was dissolved. RCT 38 was returned to the command of the 2nd Division and moved to the north side of the Elom River in the division zone. The original Task Force "A",

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less the battalion of the 330th Infantry, was moved south to operate on the Crozon Peninsula, and captured 106 Russians on the morning of 31 August.

The month closed with the 2nd, 8th, and 29th Divisions continuing their assault on Brest in the face of determined resistance from the German outer defensive positions around the city. Very little progress had been made on 30 August, and the 31st was spent resting and regrouping for an attack on 1 September. Strong air support was planned for the 1st. Considerable artillery had been moved out on the Plougastel Peninsula in order to fire into the enemy positions from the rear and an intensive shoot with both direct and indirect fire was made from 1600 to 1630 on 31 August.

The 83rd Division at this time was making preparations for an assault on the Ile de Cezembre, meanwhile continuing its patrols of the Redon-Nantes area and along the Loire River to Orleans. The 6th Armored continued to contain Lorient, and was using Combat Command "B" to clear the north bank of the Loire from Nantes to Orleans.

The end of the month saw the attack on Brest virtually brought to a standstill in the face of extensive and well prepared field fortifications manned by a determined enemy and supported by heavy caliber artillery. The greatest factor contributing to this check in the advance of the Corps was the wholly inadequate amount of artillery ammunition supplied during the operation.

The need for large amounts of artillery, particularly in the medium and heavy calibers, was foreseen during the St. Malo siege. As early as 10th August, Third Army was notified that the ammunition requirements for the Brest operation would be heavy, particularly in the larger calibers. On the 17th August, as the St. Malo operation was drawing to a close, estimates for the ammunition requirements for the Brest attack were submitted. These estimates called for an initial stockage of 8,700 tons, plus a daily maintenance of 4,500 tons for each of the first amiseomid days after the operation began, and 2600 tons for the third day. It was planned to requisition additional maintenance as the need arose. These estimates were based upon the employment of three infantry divisions, an armored division, and some thirteen battalions of Corps artillery. The expected expenditures were computed upon the experience gained at St. Malo in that type of siege warfare.

These estimates were rejected by the Army Ordnance Officer as being excessive. He considered 5,000 tons sufficient for the Brest operation and would approve up to that amount, stating that only two divisions and ten Corps artillery battalions would be engaged in the Brest operation. Actually, there were three divisions, a task force, and eighteen Corps artillery battalions engaged in the task.

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Shortly after the requirements were presented, the Corps CP was moved to the western end of Brittany, while the Army CP kept moving rapidly to the east. Communication between the two headquarters was practically impossible, for it even required three hours by planes to make the trip. Because of the difficulty of conducting business over such a distance, the Corps was authorized to deal directly with the Brittany Base Section of the Communications Zone.

Immediately upon such authorization, a requisition setting forth the ammunition requirements of the Corps was presented to the Brittany Base Section, who transmitted it to the Headquarters Communications Zone. Nothing further was heard of this requisition until the 23rd, when a representative of the 12th Army Group informed this headquarters that the G-4 and the Ordmance Officer of Third Army had disapproved the requisition and that no steps were taken to fill it.

Headquarters Twelfth Army Group now stepped into the situation and informed this headquarters that it had authorized sufficient ammunition for six days' maintenance. This ammunition to be shipped as rapidly as possible.


On the morning of the 25th August, there was sufficient ammunition on hand to start the operation and reasonable assurance that sufficient resupply was on the way. In addition, Brest was wanted by the Army Group Commander by 1st September. Consequently, the attack was initiated. Unfortunately, the ammunition shipments did not arrive on time, nor in sufficient quantities to sustain the attack. The ammunition authorized by 12th Army Group began to arrive by rail and eleven LST's on the 27th. Many of the latter were lightly loaded, three bearing less than 100 tons apiece. Between the 27th and 30th August, both dates inclusive, the LST cargoes aggregated 2,590 tons and the total amount received under the authorization of Army Group amounted to 5,360 tons.

On the 27th, a requisition for 21,000 tons was approved, but none of this ammunition arrived prior to 1st September.


In view of this inadequate supply and the day to day uncertainty of replenishment, expenditures had to be severely reduced after the first two days of attack. The meager flow of ammunition barely sustained the counter-battery work, the support of local operations, and the defensive fires against counter-attack. Harassing and interdiction fires were naturally reduced to the minimum. The average expenditure of artillery ammunition for all call bers for this period, 24 to 31 August (both dates inclusive), amounted to three units of fire, an amount wholly inadequate to support an attack against a fortress as well defended as Brest.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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





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
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
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
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
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
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HEADQUARTERS VIII CORPS

APO 308, U. S. Army, 10 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Report After Action Against Enemy.

TO : The Adjutant General, United States Army, Washington, D.C.

THRU : Commanding General, First United States Army, APO 230.

1. In compliance with letter Headquarters First United States Army, File No. 319.1/401 (C), Subject: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports, dated 13 July 44, and Par. 10 (C3) AR 345-105, the attached report covering the action of the VIII Corps against forces of the German Army on the Cotentin Peninsula, Normandy, France, is submitted. The report covers the period 1 - 31 July 44.

2. Map references are to G.S., G.S. 4250, France, scale 1:50,000 and G.S., G.S. 4249, France, scale 1:100,000. Maps A and B refer to the report for the period 15 - 30 June 44, and were submitted with that report. Maps C, D and E are attached hereto. Time is indicated in British Double Summer Time.

TROF H. MIDDLETON,
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS VIII CORPS

APO 308, U. S. Army, 11 August 1944.

REPORT OF THE VIII CORPS AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY FORCES ON THE COTENTIN PENINSULA, NORMANDY, FRANCE, FOR THE PERIOD 1-31 JULY, 1944.

During the period 15-30 June, 1944, the VIII Corps gradually extended the line across the Cotentin Peninsula from Carentan to Port Bail on the west coast, with the mission of protecting the southern flank of the VII Corps, while the latter advanced north and captured Cherbourg. The extension of the VIII Corps line was accomplished by the successive acquisition of the 101st Airborne Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 90th and 79th Infantry Divisions. These divisions were disposed generally along the areas inundated by the Germans who, in the preparations of their defenses against the Allied landings, opened the locks of the Douve, Merderet and Taute rivers and permitted the sea to flood the river basins. Small bridgeheads across the inundated areas were established to facilitate the jump-off for an attack south, which was scheduled for the first day of July. Toward the end of June, the forces available to the Corps were grouped for the attack, and the artillery support built up to nine battalions of medium and heavy artillery, including two 240-mm howitzer battalions. In addition, four battalions of the VII Corps Artillery were made available to the VIII Corps for the initial support of the projected attack.

On the first day of July, the Corps consisted of the 79th Infantry Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 90th Infantry Division. The disposition of these divisions is shown on Map "C". The 83rd Division, which had been attached to the VIII Corps a few days before, was transferred at 012400 to the VII Corps on the east, and the left boundary of the Corps was adjusted accordingly. The 8th Infantry Division, which was due to complete its landing on 3 July, was to go into Corps Reserve in the vicinity of Montebourg.

The attack by the Corps, which was part of a piecemeal attack by First Army with four Corps abreast, was not launched until 3 July. On that day, the attack jumped off at 0530 in a downpour of rain. The jump-off was preceded by a 15-minute artillery preparation, but this was unobserved generally, as the cub planes could not leave the ground. The foul weather also prevented any air support, and no advantage could be taken of the large amount of aircraft made available by the Theatre Commander for this operation.

The general scheme of the operation was to attack south with three divisions abreast. The 79th and 90th Divisions were to pinch out the 82nd Airborne after the latter had obtained its objective. The flank divisions were then to join forces in the vicinity of La Haye du Puits and to proceed south and capture Coutances.

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It was evident by the evening of the 7th July that the attack was slowing down to such an extent that there was danger that it might come to a standstill. The 79th Division was tiring after nearly a month of continuous hedgerow fighting and its ranks were filled with about 40% replacements. The 82nd had already accomplished more than its intended tasks and it was so depleted that little more could be expected of it. On the east, the 90th Division's attack was virtually stopped by tough resistance on the part of the Germans. That night, decision was made to employ the Corps reserve to give impetus to the attack and consequently, it was passed through the 82nd Airborne and the 79th Infantry Divisions. Its mission was to secure a jump-off line through La Haye du Puits and the Toret de Mont Castre and attack south, making the main effort of the Corps. This operation was intended to subsequently pinch out the 90th Division.

The 8th Division had been rated as one of the best trained divisions prior to coming into this theater. Unfortunately, its initial performance did not reflect this. The division made exceedingly alow progress from the beginning. The 121st Infantry on the left of the division attacked from the hill line held by the 82nd Airborne and attempted to advance to the west nose of the Foret de-Mont Castre and relieve elements of the 90th Division, which were holding this high ground. Much confusion and loss of control was experienced by this regiment and it failed to advance. On the right of the division front, the 28th Infantry attempted to advance, but its attack soon bogged down. While this regiment failed to make any progress, at least some semblance of control was maintained. On the 9th of July, the Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Nelson M. Walker was killed while attempting to organize the leading elements of Company E, 121st Infantry, and the Chief of Staff, VIII Corps, Colonel Cyrus H. Searcy was sent down to take his place. The regimental commanders of the 28th and 121st Infantry Regiments were relieved and, as the command of the division failed to improve, the division commander was relieved on the 12th July. His place was taken by Brigadier General Donald A. Stroh.

The next few days saw slow progress along the entire Corps front. The 79th Division punched its way down west of La Haye du Puits and captured the high ground in the vicinity of Montgardon. The 8th Division captured Hill 92 and on the 13th July, this division advanced to about 2,000 yards southeast of Vesly. The 90th Division cleared the southern part of the Foret de Mont Castre of German forces on the 11th and the remainder of its sector by the 14th. On the 14th, the Corps was occupying a line generally along the north bank of the Ay River, where it held up its advance on First Army order. See Map "D".

The 82nd Airborne Division passed to the defensive after completing its mission on 5 July. Through the period of 5 July to 10 July, it remained in position, continuing active patrolling to its front and flanks, and rendering invaluable service as a badly needed Corps Reserve during the time when the Corps center was

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The Germans, with their masterful technique of hedgerow defensive tactics, stubbornly resisted the advance of the infantry divisions, and the forward movement was measured by the number of fields or orchards taken. The only division to attain its first day's objective was the 82nd Airborne. This unit, led by Major General Matthew Ridgway, attacked with its characteristic vigor and outstanding courage. Even though their ranks were badly depleted by casualties from the landings and subsequent fighting on the peninsula, they were on their initial objectives on Hill 131 by 0920, and took the Hill itself by 1445. The courage and fighting ability of these troops may well stand as a distinguished example to all soldiers.

The 79th Division advanced against Hill 121 from the west and took it with the 2nd Battalion, 314th Infantry, at 040830, the second day of the attack. The 82nd Division captured Hill 95 during the evening of the second day, thus completing the occupation of the three dominant hill features on the immediate front of the Corps. To the east, the 90th Division reached St. Jores by 030845, and the 358th Inf. was advancing against heavy resistance some 2,000 yards west of St. Jores by the close of the second day.

On 3 July, the 82nd Airborne captured a marked map, which indicated a German MLR generally along the line: Le Plesis (2782) - Foret de Mont Castre (2383) - just south of La Haye du Puits (1882) - St. Germain-Sur-Aye (1478). Subsequent operations of the Corps comfirmed the authenticity of this map. At the beginning of the offensive on 3 July, elements of the following German infantry divisions were known to be on the Corps front: The 77th, 91st, 243rd, 253rd and 265th, plus a number of OST battalions. On 7 July, prisoners from the 2nd SS Panzer Division (Das Reich) were captured, as well as from the 15th Paratroop Regiment on the left of the Corps.

On 5 July, the 79th Infantry progressed to the south of Bolle-ville and the 3rd Battalion, 314th Infantry captured the railroad station north of the town of La Haye du Puits at 051000. Efforts on the part of this division to secure the town of La Haye du Puits were thwarted by strong German resistance and the town itself did not fall until the 9th. The 90th Division, on the 5th July, succeeded in placing the 3rd Battalion, 379th Infantry, on the forward slope of the Foret de Mont Castre, a portion of the German MLR, while the 357th Infantry drove south along the road leading from St. Jores to Les Plesis. The 82nd Airborne completed the occupation of all portions of its sector and organized for the defensive. On the 6-7 July, the 8th Division was moved to position southeast and west of St. Sauveur Le Vicompte, to place it in a more favorable position for future employment.

The 79th Division at 071130 July passed the 313th Infantry through the 315th, while the 314th continued its attack on La Haye du Puits. The 90th Division sustained counter-attacks against the position of the 359th in the Foret de Mont Castre, and against the 357th Infantry west of Les Plesis, bringing the division to a standstill.

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highly vulnerable. At 111145, the division was released from Corps and moved to an assembly area to the north, preparatory to its return to the United Kingdom.

Air effort in support of the Corps, during the first days of this period was characterized by attacks on known strong points of the German invasion defense scheme. While these strong points were constructed primarily as defenses to repel an amphibious operation, they were adapted for all around fire. Since these strongpoints were in depth from the coast, they presented considerable obstacles to the advance of our troops. Due to the inclemency of the weather, the result of these attacks were largely interdictory in nature. There were no close support missions flown in the initial phase of the attack.

During the later phases of the period, air effort was directed at gun positions, supply installations, munition dumps and lines of communication directly in rear of the enemy. The targets were located from information gained during the attack. These missions were largely successful when weather was favorable. In many cases, dive bombing attacks were made by P-47's when the cloud base did not allow the planes to make an accurate bomb run.

The heaviest air operation occurred on 11 July. Twenty-two targets located north of the Lessay-Periers road in an area 3000 by 2000 meters in size were attacked in the evening. This attack had been held up for two days on account of weather. Approximately 200 sorties were flown from the United Kingdom in execution of this mission. A part of this effort failed to locate the target and bombed 100 yards in front of the 79th Infantry Division troops. Fortunately, no casualties resulted to our troops and they were able to take advantage of this close support to continue their advance.

During the entire operation, the Corps Artillery rendered effective support to the attack with counter-battery, interdiction, neutralization and supporting fires. The 12th Observation Battalion extended survey control into forward areas locating targets by flash and enemy batteries by sound and flash. During this period, the development and use of the P-51 fighter aircraft for observation was continued and excellent results obtained for long range adjustments of fire. Reports of prisoners and civilians indicate that our artillery fire was most effective in the destruction of material, personnel, and morale. Harassing interdiction fires were delivered daily and counter-battery fire was reported effective.

The 106th Cavalry Group, consisting of the 106th and 121st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons, performed reconnaissance and surveillance missions in the rear areas of the divisions reducing pockets of enemy resistance, and protected the flanks of the Corps.

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The period of 15 July to 25 July was one of consolidation and regrouping of the First United States Army forces in preparation for execution of plan "Cobra". This attack was to be initialed by the VII Corps and it was designed to effect a penetration of the enemy fromt followed with an armored exploitation to the south and west in the direction of Coutances. The point of penetration selected was a narrow front to the west of St. Lo and it was intended to open up a gap between Marigny and St. Gilles, to permit the passage of the armored forces. This attack was to be preceded by a "saturation" bombing intended to paralyze the enemy front and initiate the breakthrough. The VII Corps was given the 1st, 4th, 9th and 30th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions. VIII Corps was to attack the enemy from the north, delaying its attack long enough to permit the effect of the VII Corps action to be felt, but not long enough to permit enemy withdrawal.

The attack was originally set up for 21 July but bad weather set in and forced a series of postponments until 25 July 1944.

During the interim, VIII Corps consolidated its positions generally along the north bank of the Ay River, and regrouped its forces. Vigorous patrolling was carried out, as well as harassing artillery fire. On 15 July ten battalions of artillery participated in a "serenade" fired against a concentration of enemy artillery and trucks, with devastating effect.

On 16 July, the 4th and 83rd Infantry Divisions were attached to VIII Corps, and at 161830, the 4th Armored Division was attached. The 4th Armored took over the sector of the 4th Infantry Division, completing its relief at 172300. The 4th Infantry Division was released to the VII Corps and moved over into that area.

The 83rd Division launched a limited objective attack on 17 July, designed to secure a foothold on the La Varde "Peninsula" in its front. The attack was resisted vigorously from the beginning, and the attacking elements suffered heavily from mortar and artillery fire. On 19 July, the 3rd Battalion, 331st Infantry, effected a lodgment on La Varde, but were forced off by a heavy counter-attack.

The 90th Division was ordered to clean up the St. Germain-Sur-Seves "Island" in its immediate front, and attacked with the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 358th Infantry at 220630. Resistance was extremely heavy. By mid-afternoon, most of the 1st Battalion was on the island, and a portion of one company of the 2nd Battalion. The position on the island was not a secure one, as few anti-tank weapons, other than bezookas were sent over. During the night, men began to drift back from their defensive positions to fislds near the river, in spite of efforts on the part of officers to keep them up. At first light, the enemy attacked, using infantry and three or four tanks. The 1st Battalion was squeezed into two fields near the river where some portion, including the battalion commander, surrendered. The remmants of the battalion escaped back across the stream where the regiment was reorganized and put into a defensive position. The effort for the island was then discontinued by order of Corps.

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On the 25th J. , the weather turned favo be for air operations and the VII Corps launched its attack to carry out the "Cobra" plan. The attack was preceded by an intensive saturation bombardment by both heavy and fighter bombers on the area over which the two assault divisions attacked. The attack of the assault divisions, the 9th and 30th was successful and these were quickly followed by the 1st and 4th Infantry divisions and the 2nd and 3rd armored.

The 330th Infantry of the 83rd Division, on the extreme left of the VIII Corps, attacked at 1100 in conjunction with the 9th Division. Initial progress of this regiment was fairly rapid, but enemy small arms and mortar fire became increasingly heavy, halting the advance at about 2,000 yards. The remainder of the VIII Corps continued preparations for the attack on the morning of 26 July.

By the plan of the VIII Corps, the 8th Division was to attack south of St. Patrice de Claids, followed closely by the 79th Division which was to pinch out Lessay. The 90th planned to encircle the island of St. Germain-Sur-Seves from both flanks, while the 83rd advanced southwest. The 4th Armored Division was to hold its present position and support the attack of adjacent units by fire.

The VIII Corps attacked at 260530 July, after artillery preparation. The enemy reacted immediately with heavy fire from artillery, mortars, and automatic weapons along the entire front. In the 8th Division sector, enemy strong points near Battiere were reduced early in the afternoon and the division continued its advance to the high ground about 1000 yards further south. The 79th Division attempted to move in behind the 8th and cut to the right flank, but experienced heavy enemy fire and had not reached the flank position by daylight 27 July.

The 90th Div. established a bridgehead across the Seves River on its right. Five German counter-attacks were repulsed, and four enemy tanks were knocked out, three by bazookas, and one by artillery. On the left, the division made very little progress due to heavy fire, and extensive mines. The 83rd Division jumped off at 0530. Initial progress was difficult but it succeeded in cutting the St. Lo-Periers highway before dark.

The Corps resumed the attack early on 27 July. Extensive mines and booby traps were encountered, causing annoying delays, but the tempo of the advance increased rapidly as the day wore on. It became increasingly evident that the effects of the VII Corps attack were being felt on the enemy in front of the VIII Corps.

In the zone of the VII Corps, the 2nd & 3rd Armored Divisions were able to exploit the breakthrough effected by the infantry, and penetrated deep into the enemy rear. By nightfall armored units were east of Coutances and within five miles of the city, while the infantry held the high ground dominating the terrain to the north and west of that town.

In the zone of the VIII Corps, the 8th Division cut the Lessay-Periers highway by 1600 and at nightfall was about 1000 yards southwest of Periers. The 79th crossed the Ay River in the zone of the 8th Division and pushed to the right flank, capturing Lessay at 272130. The 90th Division occupied Periers about 271500, as well as the island of St. Germain-Sur-Seves in the division center. It continued to advance to a line generally east of the positions held by

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the leading elements of the 8th Division, south of Periers. The 83rd Division advanced to limited objectives south of the Taute River, the principal opposition being enemy mine fields. The 330th Infantry on the extreme left was the only Corps unit in contact with the enemy at nightfall on 27 July.

Since it appeared that the enemy was making a general withdrawal in the Corps sector, it was decided to employ the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions to spearhead a rapid drive to the south. In the evening of 27 July, the 6th Armored Division reconncitered routes of advance in the western half of the Corps zone, while the Corps engineers worked through the night constructing bridges across the Ay and the Seves.

28 July was a day of marked advance for all units of the Corps, principal delays being caused by extensive and well prepared mine fields, the widespread use of anti-personnel mines, and booby traps. Active resistance was limited to delaying tactics, usually by small groups of riflemen who had become separated or lost from their units during withdrawal action. Only a few prisoners were captured by VIII Corps units, but PW's were from the 77th, 91st, 243rd, 265th, 353rd, and SS "Das Rei ch[#] divisions, previously known to have elements on the Corps front, as well as from the 17th SS Pz Gr Division and the 5th Paratroop Division.

Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division advanced down the Periers-Coutances highway through St. Saureur Lendelin, and captured Coutances at about 281700 July. They established contact on their left with elements of the 3rd Armored Division, and at dark were approximately one kilometer south of Coutances.

Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Division crossed the Ay River at Lessay where they were held up until 1340 by extensive mines along the approaches to the bridge and through the town. Free at last, they advanced down the highway toward Coutances against light resistance, their first enemy contact being at 1910. They reached a point about 1500 yards northwest of Coutances by dark.

The 79th Division advanced the 314th and 315th Regiments in column of battalions, without opposition, through areas thick with anti-personnel mines, to positions generally along the lateral road from Coutances northwest to Gouville-Sur-Mer, on a line with, and to the right of, Combat Command A of the 6th Armored Division.

The 8th Division advanced approximately seven miles against no opposition, to division objectives just north of Coutances to the left of the 6th Armored Division. It, too, was delayed by mines.

The 90th Division advanced south and established contact with 1st Division elements to their front, along the road from St. Lo to Coutances. Very little small arms fire was encountered, but there were extensive mine fields. At the close of the day, the 90th was completely pinched out by the 1st Division on their front and the 8th Division on their right. They organized their positions and dug in for defense. Likewise the 83rd Division advanced until they were

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pinched out by the 1st Division to their front. Resistance was very light.

The Corps right flank was protected by the 121st Cavalry Squadron of the 106th Group, which advanced down the coast line to the mouth of the Sienne River west of Coutances. The 106th Squadron remained attached to the 83rd Division.

Corps engineers bridged the Ay River at Lessay and worked to remove mines in Lessay to clear a gap for the advance of the 6th Armored Division. Lessay was one of the most completely mined and booby trapped cities ever encountered by VIII Corps forces.

The VII Corps continued its advance, having turned to the south and many prisoners were taken. Fighter bombers operating to the south bombed and strafed German columns of armor and artillery.

Early 29 July, the VIII Corps resumed its advance to the south with the 6th and 4th Armored Divisions abreast. One combat team each of the 79th and 8th Infantry Divisions was motorized, to follow the advance of the armored units. The advance elements of both the advance of the armored units. The advance elements of both armored columns ran into almost immediate trouble in the form of armored columns ran into almost immediate trouble in the form of armored columns of the form of armored bivision, overcame its ever, Combat Command "B", 4th Armored Division, overcame its resistance and advanced on to La Jourdaniere. At 301430 it had reached La Haye Pesnel, southeast of Granville and at 1900 of 30 July was in the outskirts of Avranches. The 13th Infantry was motorized and moved down to La Jourdaniere early 30 July.

Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Division established its bridgehead over the Sienne River against no resistance, and advanced down the highway to Brehal. The 79th Division advanced across the Sienne, behind Combat Command "B" of the 6th, and on to Lingreville, about 5000 yards north of Brehal, by the evening of 30 July.

The morning of 31 July saw both Armored divisions of the Corps continuing their advance, although the extremely narrow Corps front made traffic a tremendous problem. A motorized combat team of infantry was attached to each of the armored divisions.

The VIII Corps moved its CP on 30 July to the vicinity of Geffosses northwest of Coutances. Both the 83rd and 90th Divisions continued regrouping and reorganizing, preparatory to being taken over by the XV Corps.

By nightfall, 31 July, the 4th Armored Division had captured Avranches, including the bridge over the See River, and had pushed on south, secured the crossing over the Selune River above Pontaubault and occupied Ducey to the southeast of Avranches.

The 6th Armored Division captured Granville, and advanced southeast toward Avranches.

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
The positions occupied by units of the VIII Corps at the end of July are shown on Map "E".

July, for the VIII Corps, had been a month of extreme opposites in fighting experiences. The attack from 3 July to 15 July was characterized by slow, costly, advance of foot troops against stubborn hedgerow defense. Casualties were high and gains were measured in thousands of yards. The period of 25 July to 31 July was one of extremely rapid advance of armor against a defeated, disorganized and demoralized enemy. Casualties were very light, resistance was sporadic and advances were limited more by traffic problems arising from the fact that it was necessary to advance two armored divisions and two infantry divisions down a narrow corridor, with never more than two class "A" roads available.

During the period 17 July until after the breakthrough, the VIII Corps was severely hampered by an extremely low ration on artillery and mortar ammunition imposed by Army. Even on "D" Day, 26 July, the allowance for most calibers was approximately one-fifth of a unit of fire, dropping to one-sixth for the days following. After the breakthrough was accomplished very little artillery ammunition was expended and the effects of the ration were not felt, even though it extended until the close of the month.

TROF H. MIDDLETON,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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APO 308, U. S. Army, 20 July 1944.

REPORT OF THE VIII CORPS AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENERY FORCES ON THE COTENTIN FEMINSULA, NORMANDY, FRANCE, FOR THE PERIOD 15-30 JUNE 44.


The advance echelon of the Headquarters of the VIII Corps landed in FRANCE over UTAH BEACH, on the 14th and 15th of June 1944. Because of the desire of the Commanding General, FIRST UNITED STATES ARM, to have an additional corps headquarters available on the continent as soon as possible after D-Day, and because this decision was made after the troop lists were compiled, only a skeletonized force could be phased into the lift afforded by the available shipping. Consequently the headquarters echelon consisted of about one half of the personnel of the General Staff Sections, artillery, Surgeon, Quartermaster, Signal and Engineer Sections. The exception to this was the G-3 Section, which came over with about 75% of its personnel. Accompanying the echelon was a minimum amount of personnel from the Headquarters Company and M.F. Company, a part of the 59th/Signal Battalion and a battery of the 12th F. A. Observation Battalion. An Advance Party consisting of three officers headed by the Corps Chemical Warfare Officer preceded the advance echelon, arriving with the 9th Division. The work of this advance party proved invaluable in preparing for the reception of the headquarters.

Shortly after arrival of the leading elements of the headquarters, a command post was established at BICSVIIIE (T%9924) and opened at 151200B. At this time the Jorps became operational with the mission of protecting a portion of the south flank of the VII v Jorps, along the line LES FIVRES-LA MAISENTAIN-IA SADOTTARIE, while that Jorps pressed its attack north toward CHARBOURG.

On the Corps front as initially established, the enemy is believed to have had the oth Parachute Regiment, an OST battalion, and elements of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division. When the Corps took over the line across the peninsula, enemy forces included a comparatively intact 205th Division, the 77th and elements of the 91st Division, in addition to scattered smaller units.

Troops attached to the Corps initially consisted only of the 101st Airborne Division, with attachments. This division had suffered relatively heavy casualties in its dropping early on D-Day and after that in its move south securing the exits to causeways 3 and 4 from UTAH BEACH, disrupting enemy communications and destroying pockets of resistance. The division's strength at the time of its attachment to Jorgs was between 60 and 70 per cent of its committed strength. In the battle for CARANTAN, which was taken 12 June, it overcase organized enemy defenses along the road from STA. ECRE. EGILS to CARANTAN. This road runs through inundated areas, canalizing the advance of the 101st; there were leavy engagements at each of the four main bridges north of CARANTAN. The enemy withdress approximate-

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relieved the 52 d Airborne from the sector extending from FRETUT to BAUFTE and also took over from the airborne division the responsibility for the defense behind the inundated area from ST. SAUVEUR DE FIRMS FONT to the junction of the DOUVE and the estuary running thru the FRAIRIES MARZOACHUSES (T228921). The disposition of the VIII Jorpa units as of 20 June are shown on Map B.

In order to take advantage of the confused state of the enemy caused by the penetration to the west, and to shorten the defensive line held by the VIII Gorps, an attack was planned to secure the line IESSAY-IA COUTRIE. The 90th Division, making its main effort on its right was to make a double envelopment around the Hills 121 and 131. The 357th ROT (90th Div) which was on the westernmost part of the line was to take off from the line ST. LO d'CONVILLE-ST. SAUVEUR BE PIERRE POWT and meet the remainder of the division south of IA HAYE DU PUITS. The 82nd Airborne Division was to make the secondary effort, departing from a line BOIS DE LIMORS-PRETOT and capture Hills 121 and 131 from the east. This operation would have pinched out the 22nd Airborne Division and given them a much needed rest. The 101st Airborne Bivision and given them a much needed rest. The date of the attack was set for the 22nd of June. On 21 June, this attack was postponed for 24 hours and, on the following day, for an indefinite period. The reason for the postponement was a severe storm which for almost 72 hours from 20-22 June prevented landing of supplies in any quantity over the beaches, reducing the Army's annunition stock level to a point where it was not considered adequate to support both the attack on CHERBOURG and the VIII Corps attack.

The abandonment of this plan was a disappointment, for each day of delay in the attack to the south gave the enemy a golden opportunity to reorganize his forces, receive reinforcements from BRITTANY and prepare defensive positions in front of us.


On 26-27 June, the remainder of the forward echelon arrived, bringing with it the much needed balance of the 9th Signal Battalion and Company A, 511th Military Police Battalion. The remainder of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VIII Corps Artillery, did not arrive at this time, as the ship on which this unit was being transported was damaged by a mine or torpedo, and had to put back to ENGLAND.

Operations for the remainder of the month of June consisted of maintaining the defense and the regrouping and build-up of forces to carry out the First army plan for the next phase. This plan provided for a coordinated attack to the south with four corps abreast. The main effort of the Army was to be made on the west with the VIII Corps.


The date on which this attack could get under way depended upon the speed with which VII Corps could eliminate the decreasing enemy resistance in CHERBOURG and in the east and west tips of the peninsula. 3 July was finally settled as the date of attack. Upon

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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HEADQUORTERS
SIXTY-THIRTY FIGHTER WING
AFO 374

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7 July 1945

SUBJECT: Receipt for Classified Document.

To: Major Daniel T. Selko, Directorate of Intelligence, Hq USSTAF (Rear), APO 413, U. S. Army

I hereby acknowlede receipt of the following classified material:

"Rough Sketch, Sixth Army Group Activities, 20 Oct 1944 - 30 Apr 1945" (Secret)

Name

Rank

Organization

Date

(THIS RECEIPT IS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED AND RETURNED TO: Headquarters 63rd Fighter Wing, APO 374, U. . Army. Attn: Historical Officer)

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CHARLES TO

(20 October 44 to 31 December 44)

GROUND OVERHEAD

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By 1 Nov 44 the Sixth AG had passed to the Mestern roothills of the VOSGES Mountains in a sustained drive which began 15 August 1944 with assault landings in Mouthern France. The enemy, forced back into prepared defensive positions, was now offering especially stubborn resistance in the Seventh Army sector centered on the key terrain west and southwest of ST. DIE. Three new U.S. divisions, 100th and 103rd Infantry, and 14th Armored debarked at MARSIEILES on 25 October and were assigned to Sixth Army Group.

Meanwhile, the armies facing the First French Army
II Corps, on the Seventh Army's south (right) flank, had
been strengthened with additional troops, and farther south,
around BELFORT (in the II Corps sector) a general increase
in artillery and anti-aircraft concentration was noticed.
The enemy continued reconditioning the SIEGFRIED LINE

DRAGOON Operations, under command of seventh Army. (See Assumption of Centrel of DRAGOON Forces by SHAEF.)

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(extending to a depth reaching east of FRANKFURT, MANNHEIM, and MUNSTER.

The German's movement of supplies during October had
been maintained without substantial reduction in volume.

In view of this heavy traffic and the absence of evidence
to indicate the existence of supply shortages, it was not
likely that the enemy was experiencing difficulty in bringing up supplies to the Sixth Army Group front.* The
enemy steadily stocked up small supply dumps in the BLACK
FOREST where numerous storage sites had been developed.

The enemy showed a general trend in withdrawing mobile units, especially from the VOSGES for general refitting.

A shift of . . .

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^{*} Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 5, 21 Oct. 44, Sixth Army Group, Part 5.

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Machinery and equipment, evacuated from areas west

of the RHINE and ITALY, to comparative safety in regions

hitherto unaffected by Allied air effort was in progress

-- new factories springing up in the LAKE CONSTANCE region.

Increased railroad traffic evidenced this movement.

German railroads, however, were feeling the effects of

Allied air attacks in serious lack of rail equipment,

especially locomotives.* Many workers were refusing to

drive trains through exposed areas, particularly those

leading towards the front. Consequently, virtually all

RHINE traffic was moving at night.

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On 5 November some of our units had reached the FRANCO-ITALIAN border. At this time their mission became purely defensive.

^{*} Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 7, 4 November 44, Part 6.

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Toward the end of October, however, enemy strength in the Sixth Army Group front was estimated as inferior to ours and his attitude and intentions as generally defensive. There were indications of a gradual shift from "offensive defense" to "static or delaying defense".

Both the situation and the SHARF directive of 28 October 1944, from General EISENHO ER to the principal sub-ordinate commanders, called for a continuation of the offensive.

General EISENHOWER wrote that "the enemy has continued to reinforce his forces in the West" and "present intentions are that he intends the strongest possible stand on the West Wall in the hope of denying us access to Germany He (the enemy) is also sensitive to a threat against the BELFORT approaches to the Upper Rhine Valley. Limitations of transportation and maintenance prevented our over-running the SIEGFRIED LINE before

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the enemy's resistance stiffened My intention continues to be the destruction of the enemy. The general plan . . . is: . . . On the right (southern) flank to act aggressively with the object, initially, of overwhelming the enemy west of the RHINE and, later, of advancing into GERMANY. These operations are divided into three general phases which will, however, overlap. First phase: The battle west of the Rhine, taking advantage of opportunities to seize bridgeheads. Second phase: Operations leading to the capture of bridgeheads over the RHINE and deployment of our forces on the east bank thereof. Third phase: The advance beyond the RHINE The mission of the Southern Group of Armies (Sixth Army Group). During the first two phases: a) to advance in its zone, secure a crossing and deploy in strength across the RHINE; b) to protect the southern (right) flank of the Central Group of Armies (Twelfth Army Group). This will entail denying the area LUNEVILLE to the enemy initially."

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The boundary between the Central (Twelfth) Army

Group and the Southern (Sixth) Army Group was defined

by EISENHOMER as follows: "CHAUMONT - LUNEVILLE
SARRESBOURG - BITCHE - PIRMASENS - NEUSTADT - MANNHEIM."

The Sixth Army Group was confronted by a choice of plan concerning the location of the main effort.

Should it be by the First French Army on the South or by the Seventh Army on the Morth? Sixth Army Group had been assigned by the SCAF the mission of protecting the right (South) flank of Twelfth Army Group. In the zone of the Seventh Army the avenues of advance, while anything but avenues, appeared not quite so difficult as those available to the French. Objectives in the Seventh Army zone were more remunerative.

While a successful turning of the enemy left

(south) flank would have desireable results, the proximity

of the Swiss border and the strong fortress of BELFORT

restricted the manuever room needed for such an operation.

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On 28 October 1944 in Letter of Instruction Number Two, Sixth Army Group, outlined details of the plan

as follows:

"Sixth AG continues the offensive to destroy the enemy in zone and advance to the RHINE, capture STRASBOURG, cleaning the area west of the RHINE and protect the South flank of Twelfth AG. The First French Army will: 1) continue current operations; no later than 1 Nov 1944 launch strong effort on the left, passing to the South of GARARDHER and assist Seventh Army in capture of high ground along Army boundry immediately east of GRRARMER. 2) On D-Day exert maximum pressure along entire front and hold enemy in position; launch strong attach in an effort to breach BELFORT GAP and destroy enemy in zone. 3) Protect South flank of Seventh Army, South flank of Sixth AG, and flank along FRANCO-ITALIAN border in currently assigned sector. The Seventh Army will: 1) Continue current operations. Secure a suitable line of de-

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parture not later than 5 Nov 44 for an all-out offensive, capturing in this period the high ground along the Army boundary immediately East of GERARDMER. 2) On D-Day, launch an all-out offensive on entire front, with the main effort on general axis EPINAL-STRASBOURG; capture STRASBOURG and destroy enemy in zone west of RHINE. 3) Protect South flank of Twelfth AG. The First Airborne Task Force will protect flank along FRANCO-ITALIAN border in currently assigned sector. Armies will exploit promptly any opportunity to seize a bridgehead across the RHINE or breach the West Wall without waiting for instructions". Meanwhile, Letter of Instruction Number One* was issued from Headquarters, First Tactical Air Force (Prov), on 1 November 1944, setting forth the responsi-

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*Letter of Instruction Number One; 1 TAF, 1 Nov 44,

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would support the continued advance of the Sixth Army
Group which was protecting the south flank of the
Twelfth Army Group. It was further outlined that the XII
Tactical Air Command would support the Seventh U.S. Army,
and the French Tactical Air Command would be under operational control of the XII Tactical Air Command and would,
within the limitations of its capabilities, support the
First French Army.


This initial Letter broadly outlined the manner in which this "support" would be achieved, by: 1) bombing vital highway and railfoad bridges; 2) cutting railroad lines on inner and outer lines of interdiction; 3) providing assault area cover, air support missions, armed reconnaissance, and night-fighter operations; 4) conducting photographic reconnaissance to obtain target information and results of bombing attacks on targets. Furthermore, until further notice, RHINE River communications targets would be Priority Number One, and enemy

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installations and communications between the RHINE and the front line would be Priority Number Two.



Thus the task of softening up enemy defenses and disrupting enemy movement of troops and supplies had begun, though Headquarters First TAF was not actually engaged in the detailed operational control of XII TAC.

An urgent request from Third Army brought the First

TAF Commander into a critical tactical decision. Through

Ninth Air Force and SHARF, Third Army sought from First

TAF two fighter-bomber groups to support a jump-off for

D-Day plus seven. General Royce wired SHAEF:

"The release of the two fighter groups requested by Ninth AF precludes our furnishing but meager air support to the main effort of the Sixth AG offensive which is based on an increase in air support."

SHAEF ultimately authorized the Ninth AF operational

control of the two fighter groups for 5 November 44 only.

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Note: Groups concerned: 50th f/g (1 TAF); 405th f/g 9 AF outfit attached to 1 TAF 28 Oct 44); 358th f/g (1 TAF has no instructions which attach 358th to us, see Dlumenthal file).

On 11 November 1944, Letter of Instruction Number
Two* was published oficially severing the First French

Air Corps from operational control of XII Tactical Air Command. The two tactical air commands -- the XII and First French were jointly charged with greater responsibilities. These included, besides the original instructions outlined in Letters of Instruction No. 1 the reconnaissance of oil installations and fuel dumps (now on a high priority basis) with the aim of attacking and destroying these targets; the conduct of reconnaissance for troop concentrations, fortified positions and command posts with particular emphasis on the XV Corps front; the conduct of reconnaissance for operational landing fields.

With the initial organization of the two tactical

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^{*} Letter of Instruction No. 2, etc.

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commands -- XII Tactical Air Command and First French
Air Corps -- completed by 15 November 1944, each
tactical air command was primarily responsible for
close cooperation with its respective Army -- XII TAC
with the Seventh US Army and ler CAF with the First
French Army. However, either tactical air command
could be called upon by First TAF to furnish additional
support as required in the area normally covered by the
other.

Intentions involving either normal or additional
effort were to be initiated by either tactical air command,
based on its estimate of the forces required, to give
the support called for by its staff officers and by the
directives which were to be issued by the Commanding
General of the First Tactical Air Force.

The 42nd Bombardment Wing (M), consisting of the

17th and 320th Groups, was placed under the operational

control of XII Tactical Air Command, also by authority

contained in Letter of Instructions Number Two.* The

*(Perhaps it would be preferable to site 1TAF 60 # 12, 27 Hov 1944, as the authority Lacing 42nd Bomb Wing under attachment to XII TAC)

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42nd was expected to become operational at Dijon in the near future.

The French 31st and 34th Bombardment Groups (M) were assigned for operational control to the First French Air Corps in the same Letter. Both the 31st and 34th were expected to become operational in the near future at Lyon.

Maximum close support to the main effort of

Sixth Army Group was given as the first priority, and

interdiction from the front line to include the RHINE

was given as the second priority. Specific operational

instructions for the employment of the medium bombard
ment force as a unit or on special tasks which were

to be issued by First TAF.

During most of November adverse weather interferred

very seriously with air support in the Sixth AG zone.

Briefing officers from First TAF explained that support

was made more difficult because of the great distance

from the front to the nearest practicable landing fields.

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Many good opportunities with good visibility over the target area were lost because of bad weather at LYON preventing takeoff, or fog so thick over the high country between LYON and the front that planes could not get thru. There was also the disadvantage of reduced bomb leads and heavy consumption of gasoline.

Advance landing fields would have been the answer, but with the extremely heavy rainfall they would have been seas of mud without steel planking. General WILSON had held up the shipping to FRANCE of aviation engineers and steel planking in order to facilitate any redeployment of the TAFs that might be decided upon.

Roughly, by mid-November, the general large mobile enemy units suitable for offense or large-scale counterSuitably attack were being replaced by less mobile formations suitable for static defense and delaying action. At the same time small armored units were provided to support their defense and assist in counterattacks and

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were below former standards. However, these deficiencies were offset by natural defensive obstacles of terrain, strengthened by carefully prepared and concealed defenses in depth. These defenses had been augmented during the enforced hull while supply lines were being established.

Note: This switch of forces might have been a prelude to the Ardenne push. Let's dig into this with a view towards determining what our air power might have achieved during this tactical manuever.

when their tactical position was hopeless. This attitude seemed to be a result of propaganda, claiming that the consequences of defeat or surrender would be equivalent to, or worse than, death.

The terrain in the VOSGES where the fighting was heaviest was very rugged and described as a wilderness of trees, rocks, mud and water. Snow-covered ground made it very difficult if not impossible to approach hostile positions unobserved.

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A brief extract from the Sixth AG Weather Study

follows:

"In the area south of MANNHEIM, it will be noted that rainfall is generally high, flying conditions are bad, and by November, the cloudy skies and unsettled weather or early winter weather prevail . . . Winter weather prevails in the area during the months of November thru March at altitudes of 3000 ft and above, which are generally snow covered . . . Valleys generally have low night temperatures, causing fog, which persists until late morning . . . During November the skies are overcast a majority of the time . . . The worst storms occur in late December and January."

Note: Let's introduce our own distantian story

By 13 November there appeared an accute artillery ammunition shortage. The WD advised to the general effect that artillery ammunition reserves in the US were practically exhausted, that future shipments

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conly supply one-third the current day of supply and that material improvement in the condition at the front could not be expected before March 1945. Since the day of supply was based on the assumption that artillery units would spend a considerable portion of time out of action. In view of the fact that Sixth AG artillery was being kept continuously in action regardless of release of Infantry units, it was estimated that the new of Infantry units, it was estimated that the new basis of supply would provide not more than one-third the actual needs.

Paraphrase of letter from Devers to Ike on 13 Nov 1945:

"The weather on my front has been especially difficult since early October. Almost daily rains have reduced ordinarily good tank country to quagmire.

Heavy clouds and fog have permitted the comparatively small Air Forces . . . Note this supporting my operations to operate only 14 days and only 2011

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sorties were possible since 15 October. Since the 1 Nov this condition has been especially aggrevated. Frequent rains, light snows, and sleet storms which have approached blizzards in the VOSGES area. The last three days final preparation for the attack this morning have been completed by commanders under the most adverse condition . . . The entire zone, this morning, is covered with l_3^1 to 2 inches of snow in the open country and much deeper in the mountain regions. The clouds are overhanging and prevent air support from operating. The main attack with the XV Corps jumped-off promptly at 0700 hours, following an artillery preparation . . . culminating in a short but violent bombardment of the hostile infantry positions this morning . . . On the front of the II French X Corps, offensive action is restricted largely to fire action and minor limited objective attacks designed to hold enemy reserves on that front. The character of the terrain, the extent of hostile defenses, and the broad frontages held by the French troops definitely limit offensive action in this Corps' sector. The attack of the I French Corps to breach the BEEFORT GAP has not yet been launched."

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The following morning (14 Nov) General de Lattre directed that the First F/A attack, already planned in detail, be launched at noon that day. A raging blizzard with the dawn of 13 Nov caused General de Lattre to hold up the attack.

French success was due in part to carefully planned deception and the attainment of such complete surprise as is rarely achieved.

Note: --Flash back on weather-- Sixth AG historian wrote: "During the course of the mid-November attack, the weather improved and substantial gains were made wherever pressure was applied. It was on the right, in the zone of the I French Corps, that the initial advance was the greatest." Let's tie this down to our French Air.

During 18 Nov the I French Corps made a seven mile advance through the BELFORT GAP between the SWISS BORDER and the RHINE-MIONE CANAL.

The Weekly Intelligence Summary, Sixth Army Group, dated 18 Nov quoted:

"In the face of Seventh U.S. and First French
Armies attack, the enemy's coherent defense is showing
signs of deteriorating. Some divisions have reached a
dangerously low level of combat effectives and are candidates

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for withdrawal. The arrival of one new large unit and various smaller units, as well as a reshuffle of the enemy's disposition, does not seem to meet the emergency. Therefore, further substantial reinforcements will be needed to re-establish the required balance."

By 20 Nov the 5th DB (Fr) had reached the town of ST. LOUIS, a suburb of the SWISS city of BASLE. Nost of the town was in the hands of FRENCH motorized reconnaissance patrol but the enemy held the eastern section behind the canal.

Note: About 21 Nov . . . at this point, the detaching of two divisions for the INDEFENDENCE (Bordeaux) project was in the First F/A fire again. See page 51, 6 AG history, Vol III.

and reach the RHINE, it may be asked why greater strength
was not poured on behind the spearhead. It is pointed out
in 6 AG history that the initial advance was on a very
narrow front with a limited road net. From observations of the
congested traffic on these roads on 20 Nov it appeared that
attempts to route additional large units over them might have
caused a dedrease rather than an increase in the speed and extent
of the advance.

On 21 Nov, General Devers issued the following order of the day: (extract follows)

end French units, after weeks of being handicapped by

poor flying weather is supporting the attacks of the

armies in a decisive manner . . . The mettle of each

officer, non-commissioned officer, and soldier of the

American and French forces, both ground and sir, has

been shown by these operations. Their proven battle

prowess is the strength of our armies. Our attack

continues. We will press on relentlessly to attain

final victory." -- Jacob L. Dever, Lieutenant General,

U.S.A."

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Neither Arry had a reasonable chance to seize a bridgehead (see SCAC Nessage 114, letter of instruction # 2, 8 AG, dated 28 Oct 44, paraphrased earlier in this text). On 24 Nov there were false reports of such a seizure opposite STRASBOURG.



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The First French Army was not in possession of amphibious assault equipment adequate for a crossing of the RHINF. There was hardly enough equipment for one army and this was alloted to the Seventh whose zone was the more favorable.

The French army were to be profitably employed in the clearing the area west of the RHIME.

The situation with respect to the Seventh was screwhet different. Its mission included "protection of the southern flank of the Central Group of Armies" (12 AC) which was considered to include assistance on that flank in such form as the 12th AG CG Bradley considered most effective. Thich would be most helpful? Continued operations west of the RHINE or a crossing and advance to the North. This was essentially a choice between emphasis on close-in support on the one hand and indirect support by wide envelopment on the other.

General FATCH was confident his Seventh Army could breach both the RHINE and the SINGFRIED, both within range

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of immediate assault. He had amphibious assault equipment for about six assault battalions and this equipment could be brought to the KHINE by about 1 Dec. However, there was practically no reserve equipment.

Rever hose; find out what complements.

Rever hose; find out what complements.

Rever pay have made to DEVER / TOH for this

bridgehead" were reserved for the SECOND IMAGE, would Ceneral

EISENHOWER approve of this action by 6 AG while the Northern and

Central Groups were still so far from the MHINE? The rapid

conquest of the BELFORT and VOSGLS barriers was, perhaps,

an unforeseen development which would call for some adjustments

to SHAEF's operational directives.

Close-in support est of the MINE. A new AG boundary was proposed and the proposals approved by General Eisenhower who was with DEVERS/BRADLEY at the conference. The new line turned sharply to the Northeast thru the SINGFRIED Line and thence eastward again to the REINE, thereby reducing the

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width of the 12th 3G zone in the vicinity of the SIGGATED defenses. Thus the early success of the 6 AG caused little change in General Alexander's plans. His apparent decision was to continue operations for a decisive defeat of the enemy west of the HINL and to await a more favorable opportunity for opening the SECOND PHASE, involving the capture of bridgeheads over the NHINE and deployment on the East bank.

General DEVIKS and EKADLIY agreed that the Southern Armies present mission (assigned pare 10, 28 Oct 44, SCAF number 114) be changed as follows:

to be continued, the SIEGFRIED line west of the RELINE
to be breached, the enemy to be destroyed in zone, with
deployment in strength across the RELINE; b) strong
attack to be launched west of the FFALZERMALD together
with southern flank of Central Group of Armies to accomplish breaching of the SIEGFRIED Line."

On 27 Nov ShakF's former directive was appropriately ammended. (if necessary see page 56, 6 AG history).

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Enemy disorganization, after twelve days of continuous attack, is described in 6 AG Weekly Intelligence Summary #10, dated 25 Nov 44:

"The combined attack of the First French and

Seventh US army has completely disorganized the enemy's resistance. The swift advance resulted in the annihilation of two German Divisions, the capture of more than 15,000 prisoners, including several generals, and members of 19th army Hq, guns and considerable equipment.

The present disposition of the enemy remains chaotic. With both his flanks dangerously threatened, he cannot have any hope of reestablishing the required balance west of the RMINE. Even the commitment of one or two fresh major units could not materially change his situation, particularly if



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Suggest this document (and an expendix, but not sufficiently important to record entote in the text.

At noon 30 Nov the CF of Hq 7 A closed at AFILL and

opened at SARREBOURG.

During Nov, 6 AC units reported a total of 19,932 battle casualties of which 3,103 were killed; 15,282 wounded; 1,538 missing and nine captured. Major casualties were about equally divided between 7 A and First F/..

The impact on the enemy of the twin attacks by Saventh and First French Armies during the latter helf of Nov is indicated in the Saventh the 6 AC Weekly Intelligence Summary # 11, 2 Dec.

"The repid advance of the Seventh US Army and the reaching of the FHINE by the French 2nd arm Div in the STRASBOURG area on 23 Nov caught the energy completely unaware, isolating the 19th German Army in the VOSGES, thus dislocating the tactical cooperation between the limit and 19th German Armies. Three Corps commanders were dismissed

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for their feilure to deny us the access to the BIFORT and DAVING Cal. In addition to two annihilated divisions, the enemy had to withdraw two more battered divisions, unable to provide sufficient replacements.

The Normal the 19th army continued to fall back on the Mains, offering stiff delaying action. The elemy endeavored to meet the emergencies by shifting depleted and tired units between the northern and southern VOCCLE, without successfully establishing the required balance. It is noteworthy that he did not correit any new major unit . . . probably considering such a commitment too risky in view of the hopeless tactical situation of his formations south of STRANBOURG.

Note: Let's look at the reces record and see what our air power to the "annihilated divisions" and, if possible, determine to what extent our air power prevented bringing new units into the sector.

"In the HARDT mountains, the First German Army, forced to withdraw two badly battered major units, continued to fall back on prepared positions. In order to meet the emergency and to deny the approaches to the successive defenses of the MAGINOT and SIEGFRIED Lines, the enemy had to commit new units (four divisions)."

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Further 6 AG & First French plans for operation
INDEFFEDENCE or 1 Dec, determining French units to be
included on the troop list. In addition to the First DEI
and the lat DE there were included 27 smaller combat and
service units.

On 2 Dac 6 AG Letter of Inst # 4 was published:

"Sixth AG continues the offensive as outlined in Letter of Inst #3 with modifications . . . " (in boundaries)

to destroy the energy west of the LEINE by accelerating especially the advance of the North flank of the 3rd DIA and of the elements between MERCUSE and the RHINE."

The Seventh Army will: "1) Capture SELECTAT. Clear

North of SHIESTAT and West of L'ILL River by converging action of the 2d French Arm. Div and the 36th US Inf. Div and pinch out all elements of 103rd US Inf Div and 14th Arm Div . . . no later than 1800 hrs 3 Dec 44.

2) Pass 2nd French Arm Div and 36th US Inf Div op converd to First French Arm Div have been pinched out.

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The First French army will: "1) Increase at once present efforts to destroy the enemy west of the RHINE BY accelerating especially the advance of the North flank of the 3d DIA and of the elements between MULHOUSE and the HHINE.

2) Assume op control of 3d French arm Div and of the 36th US Inf Div promptly upon completion of (para 1, Seventh Army, above). Thereafter, renew strong effort on this flank and complete the destruction of the enemy West of the Rhine in your zone of action".

• • • "When operations permit, First French army to provice troops made necessary thereby the East end of boundary between armies will be moved North to give STRASHOURG to the First French army."

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On 2 Dec Gen de Lattre issued a personal letter of instructions to his troops urging that they surround and destroy the German forces in ALSACE and the VOSGES so that they would be unavailable for later use east of the RHINE.

The rear boundary of the Combat Zone along the FRANCOITALIAN frontier was established effective 2 Dec. NICE
was excluded.

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On 6 Dec the following message was dispatched to the Commanding General, First French Army:

"Request you take prompt and energetic action

on south flank. Strong indications that enemy on

your action is on verge of total collapse."

General Summary of Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 12,

"The enemy continued to oppose the advance of the First French army in the VOSGES pocket with one major unit and remnants of three major units organized in battle groups. The constant flow of infantry and vehicular columns over the RHINE indicates the enemy's intention eventually to withdraw his troops from the ALSACE Plain."



"On the Northern front (HARDT Mountains) the enemy is fighting a delaying action withdrawing slowly towards the consecutive positions of the MAGINOT and SIEGFRIED Lines."

on 9 Dec SHARF directed movement of three inf reg of the 70th Inf Div (which had arrived in the MARSEILLES area) to be moved to the Twelfth AG.

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Gen Devers opened on advanced CP 14 Dec at FHALSBOURG, a small town about 8 kilometers west of SAVERNE, including Assts C/S, G-2, and G-3. G-Air . . . will remain at rear (VITTEL). First TAF will establish at PHALSBOURG simultaneously.



On 14 Dec the following message was received by 6 AG from SHAFF:

"From all indications the enemy is sending replacement
personnel for his division in the COLMAR bridgehead and
intends to hold it. You should regard elimination of this
bridgehead, which is now occupying eight of our divisions,
of great importance. You are authorized to postpone
INDEPENDENCE if forces earmarked for INDEFENDENCE are
necessary to ensure prompt liquidation of COLMAR Bridgehead."

Factors contributing to the virtual stalemate on the First French Army front were enemy reinforcement, extensive flooded areas, and the depletion of French units. Replacements (French) were difficult to obtain and many companies were down to a strength of about one platoon. Movement orders for 1st DB cancelled.

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DEVERS to SHARF on 14 Dec (in answer to foregoing message, see para above):

"... Seventh Army operations towards the North are currently making rapid progress. At a conference with Army and Corps commanders this morning, all expressed supreme confidence in their ability to breach the SIECFRIED Line with their currently available troops within a very short time. All agreed, however, that for the moment the most urgent and compelling need was fresh troops with which to exploit the breach.

... All the Seventh Army Div have been carrying out the current battle at top speed for 32 days ... I have the utmost confidence that we will break thru the SIECFRIED Line on the front of the Seventh Army shortly."

By 16 December substantial crossings of the German border had been made by VI Corps. Devers to Eisenhower:

three of its Divisions across the German frontier . . . 79 Div is mopping up in LAUTERBOURG and has cleared NIED RLAUTERBACH and SCHIEBENHARD . . . 14 Armd Div cleared SCHLEITHAL and SALMBACH. Other elements of this

"The VI Corps advance has carried elements of

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div have reached points less than two miles from WISSELBOURG . . . The opposition encountered by the VI Corps appears to be outposts of the SIEGFRIED defenses. The enemy will probably defend along the LAUTER River where reports indicate all bridges have been blown. Advance of the MV Corps continues to be slow in the BITCHE vicinity where strong opposition is being encountered. Corps reconnaissance elements on the right flank have advanced up to 3 miles to occupy positions in the Forest BANNSTEIN. In the COLMAR Pocket the attack of the 36 Inf Div went off on schedule; however, advances have been slow, but the 30 Inf Div has advanced one mile to occupy the high ground in the vicinity of V-6550. On the south flank of the First French Army there has been no change." On 17 Dec the VI Corps contacted forward positions of the SIEGFRIED Line, meeting greatly increased resistance.

[Star Heads the plant (see good and below (singer and)

On Dec 12 the Commanding General, XII Tactical Air Command informed the Ninth Air Force that the VI Corps would

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be on the high ground everlooking MISSEME HRG and the SIEGFRIED fortifications. He requested that medium bombardment support be furnished and that LANDAU and FIRMASENS be bombed. (TAM E 112A, MII TAC, 12 Dec 1944)

rolling for several days and the situation there somewhat clarified, General Eisenhower called a conference at 12 AG Hq (Main) at VDRDUN on 19 Dec . . . It was decided that the 6 AG should take over the front of the XII and XX Corps then deployed over about thirty miles of the 12 AG front, and, as promptly as possible, begin relief of Third Army units in the new zone with the exception of the 87th Div, the regiments of the 42d Div which were then arriving in the area, and such supporting units as could be spared by Gen Fatton . . The relief was begun at once.

Returning to PHALSBOURG (his adv CP) Gen Devers

learned that he would have to make one additional Inf Div

available to SHAEF as soon as possible. The 87th Div, in

the former zone of the Third Army, was the logical choice.

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Its relief was continued and SHADF was informed that it would probably be available by 23 Dec.

SHAEF's confirmation cable, dated 20 Dec, follows:

"This directive confirms verbal instructions already issued. The enemy is making a powerful thrust with Infantry and armor thru the ARDENNES with the object of reaching the MEUSE. He still has uncommitted some of his Inf and Armor and we must assume that he will use these to widen and strengthen the thrust. A further thrust is probable in the TRIER area. Holding attacks on other parts of this front are likely. Unless he receives reinforcements, minor offensive operations East of the MOSKLLE do not seem likely. I Intend to take immediate action to check the enemy's advance and without delay to launch counter offensives on each side of the enemy salient with this main purpose in order to insure the security of essential areas and to strengthen our counter offensive (Boundaries) . . . Between Central and Southern Groups of Armies: KAISERSLAUTERN-LUNDSTUHL-

NEUNKIRCHEN, all to Southern Group of Armies. (New

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Commanders concerned but as early as possible. Mission of Southern Group of Armies: a) To cease present offensive operations, relieve Central Group of Armies westward to SAARLAUTERN, exclusive, defend zone against major penetrations. b) Southern Group of Armies will be prepared to yield ground rather than to endanger the integrity of their forces. However, this is subject to securing essential lines of communications. c) To do everything possible to assist Central Group of Armies to accomplish their offensive mission.

On 21 Dec Sixth AG, in Letter of Instruction No. 5, declared:

"Sixth AG assumes the defensive and relieves certain elements of the Twelfth AG westward to SAARLAUTERN, exclusive. Subject to securing essential lines of communications Sixth AG will be prepared to yield ground rather than endanger the integrity of its forces . . . (Boundaries) . . . Seventh Army: a) Abandon present offensive operations at once and defend in zone against

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any major hostile penetration. Be prepared to yield ground rathern than endanger the entegrity of the command.

b) Initiate at once and complete with the least practicable delay the relief of elements of the Third Army in the Western section of the new area of responsibility

c) Frotect flank along west bank of RHINE. Disposition of troops along the west bank of RHINE and of bridging material will be such that they can be readily employed in an attack across the RHINE north of STRASBOURG. d) All positions will be completely wired in, and all avenues of approach, especially those suitable for armor, will be extensively mined, etc., etc. h) Third and Seventh Armies have joint use of the highway paralleling and immediately west of the new AG boundary between DOMBASLE and BUSS."

The following day, 22 Dec, Sixth AG issued Letter of
Instr Number 6 with additional instructions paraphrased as
follows:

communication, Sixth AG will be prepared to yield ground rather than endanger the integrity of its forces. Sixth

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AG will continue the offensive on the South to reduce the COLMAR Pocket, destroy the Germans west of the HHINE and defend that line. " . . . (More boundaries, between 12 and 6 AGs) . . . No changes between 7 A and 1st French A

boundaries . . . The First French Army will: "a) Launch a coordinated attack along the entire front no later than 5 Jan 45 and destroy the Germans west of the EHIME. b) A main effort from the north will be directed so as to capture COLMAR, thereafter exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH Bridge. c) A main effort from the south will be so directed so as to capture CERNAY and cut the road net in the GUMEWILLER area, thereafter exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH Bridge. . Immediately upon completion of the destruction of the Germans west of the EHIME all approaches leading from west bank of the EHIME * will be wired in and wined. In addition, all roads leading to the west bank of the HUME will be protected by road blocks. . . e) All bridges across the EHIME will be destroyed.

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^{*} This means in areas in which offensive operations are not being immediately conducted.

f) Upon completion of the destruction of the Germans west of the NHINE, be prepared to take over immediately the STRASBOURG area and defend the line of the RHINE as far south as the SWISS border. g) Protect south flank of 6 AG and FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier in currently assigned sector."

Working against the obstacles of track removal and tunnel damage, the LUNEVILLE-SARREBOURG-SAVERNE rail line was opened to HaGENAU and STRASBOURG by 21 Dec.

On 21 Dec the 6 AG A. C/S G-2 published the following:

"The energy has sufficient reserves in the form of replacements to keep bolstering his units whenever they become scriously depleted. The tendancy apparent lately to move in whole regiments or battalion strength reflects an aggressive attitude. In addition, the terrain is such that it lends itself to an aggressive defense, being covered by excellent defensive positions to which the enemy can retire should Allied counterattacks prove too successful. Finally, the enemy must keep employed on this front the maximum number of Allied units, in order to prevent their removal to the active front toward the north."

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"Relief by Seventh Army of units of Third Army

on Devers to Sidd nessare of 22 Dec was significant and is paraphrased as follows:

incident . . . There has been no material change on our entire front. The enemy on the front of the VI Corps has offered strong resistance from fortifications, but the action of the AV Corps has been confined to patrolling. The enemy remained aggressive northwest of COLMAR on the First French Army front. Elsewhere on the front little activity was reported."

By 22 Dec the 1st DMI had completed its movement fo the Western FRANCE sector near BORDEAUX. Because of the need for all available troops to man the greatly extended Sixth AG front, an urgent message was dispatched directing immediate return of the 1st DMI, 2d Bn 17 Eng Combat Reg and the 3d Mobile Surgical Formation to the Sixth AG area at SAVERNE by the fastest possible means by road and rail. Priority on road and railways was assigned to the movement. . . as designated on other side.

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The almost immediate recall of the 1st DMI, from southwest France to the First Fr Army sector in the VOSCES hountains, covered 738 miles, one of the longest overland trips yet made in Europe by our forces.

Seventh Army reogranization continues 23 Dec according to schedule. Little activity on the Seventh Army front. The enemy's defensive attitude continued in XV Corps zone while in VI Corps zone enemy remained alert.

First French Army front was generally quiet. The resistance continued strong northwest of COLMAR, however, 3 DIA was able to make slight advances over the rugged terrain west of LA CHAPBLIE.

The following is quoted from the Weekly Intelligence
Summary No. 14, 23 Dec:

"The German 19th Army, partially isolated in the

VOSGES area, is showing every intention of maintaining its

defensive positions in the pocket and along the RHINE. The

German First Army has been forced back into the HARDT

Mountains after having attempted to salvage and husband

infantry strength for the SIEGFRIED Line by strengthening

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weak points with mobile armored forces. Reported heavy rail novement in the rear area of First German Army indicates probable arrival of reinforcements."

On 25 Dec: "Continuing reorganization and relief on the front of Seventh Army . . . Much rail activity in the Landau and HOMBURG areas reported by fighter-bombers."

On 26 Dec Sixth AG was furnished with Gen Eisenhower's draft directive that declared that (no direct quote available on this) the 6 AG should pass to the defensive along its entire front with the main position along the line of VOSGES. The purpose, he explained, was to shorten the front and make available for SHAEF reserve a corps including one infantry division and one armored division then in SHAEF reserve, but to be released to 12 AG for operations.

Meanwhile, 7 A G-2 reiterated his convictions of an imminent German attack. The forces to be employed by the enemy, the locality (HOLBURG - SARREBOURG), and even the date (between 1 and 3 Jan) were specified.

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Devers decided that as soon as the present crisis had passed, first priority would be given to the reduction of the COLMAR Pocket.

Sixth AG Letter of Instruction No. 7, dated 28 Dec, was published as follows:

"Sixth AG continues the defensive and will be prepared to give ground rather than endanger the integrity of its forces. West of the general area of BITCHE the main positions will follow the general trace of the MAGINOT Line. South of BITCHE, the main position will follow the eastern slopes of the V SGES as far south as the area west of COLMAR from where it will follow the general trace of the present front line to the vicinity of THANN; thence, along the southeast slope of the VOSGES to the area north of BELFORT, thence across the BELFORT GAP to the general vicinity of DELLE. Boundaries between 12 and 6 AGs no change.

. . (Change between 7 A and 1 French A, page 89, Vol 4, 6 AG Hist). . . 1 DMI passes to command of the First French Army upon arrival in the detraining area.

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be made to hold STRASBOURG and MULHOUSE."

Note: Within a space of two days, Sixth AG had been reoriented with a fully defensive mission and provided with a plan.

On 26 Dec a message was received from General de Larminat forecasting that 1st DMI and associated units would close in SAVERNE from Western FRANCE by 31 Dec.

Devers to SHARF 28 Dec: "On our front activity continues quiet. In VI Corps zone the enemy continues to improve his defenses. In the XV Corps zone enemy activity decreased, but contact was maintained. Fighting in the SIGOLSHEIM area northwest of GOL AR c ntinues intense against strong enemy resistance. We now hold part of the town and the hill to the south of the town.

Infantry elements of the 70th Div closed in BISCHWILLER area forming Task Force Herren to enter the RHINE Defense Line between Task Force Harris (63 Inf Div) on the south.

XXI Corps became operational with the 36th Div in SARREBOURGH area and 12th Arm Div in DIEUZE area attached."

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The following is quote from the Weekly Intelligence

Summary No. 15, dated 30 Dec: (Note to the writer:

Use this document for guide at the conclusion of this

chapter or the beginning of the next.)

Note: The French, concerned over the threat to STRASBOURG, wanted to send FFI reinforcements. Devers sent representatives to determine their quality, prepardness, etc. (Note: By month) end, no further entries on this matter.)

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a frontage of about 270 miles which is divided equally between the two Armies. . . The rapid movement and regrouping required of Seventh Army by the great extension of front, coupled with the loss of the 87th Inf, 36th Inf and 12 arm Divisions, have naturally brought about a lack of cohesion that can be corrected only after all movements have been completed and troops and installations are settled in their proper places . . . the situation with respect to general reserves is satisfactory for the moment in the First French Army . . . In view of the very definite threat that has developed on the front of the AV Corps, I must point out the necessity for leaving the divisions surrently earnarked for STARF reserve in this area at least until this threat disappears, or until PATCH is able to constitute a suitable general reserve on the north flank, whichever is sooner . . . In view of the excellent avenue of attack along the axis HOLDURG-SAARDEOURG, which definitely threatens lines of communications of Seventh Army leading thru the VOSGES, and the very serious over-extension of my front, especially on the north, it is essential that

H I S P A G E I S U N C L A S S I F I E D

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strong reserves be available behind the MV Corps so long as the danger of enemy attack on this axis is present.

Mote: At this point, Devers recommended that all forces east of the MOSBALE be under a single command and recommended boundary changes, etc., etc. However, by Dec's end no reply from CHART had been received.

During the period 21-31 Dec, Seventh A and First Fr A regrouped, organized defensive positions, patrolled and deployed their forces in depth.

Three new US divisions, 100th and 103d Infantry and 14th

A_mored, debarked at MARGEILLES and were assigned to the

Sixth AG. On 13 New Seventh Army, composed of the VI and

XV Corps, began operations destined to breach the SAVERIES

Gep and capture STRASBOURG by 23 Nov. On 14 Nov, First

French Army's offensive against BELFORT Gap began and

MULHOUSE was captured on 22 Nov. After capturing STRASBOURG,

Seventh Army turned north and had reached the FRANCO-GERMAN

border when the German ARDENNES counter-offensive upset

operations. Seventh Army sideslipped to the left, taking

over a corps' sector from Third Army, thereby weaking its

front, and shelving temporarily its offensive.

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CHAPTER

January, 1945

On 1 Jan Gen Eisenhower directed prompt withdrawal of VI Corps to main positions in the Vosges. It was agreed that the XVI Corps, then under SHAEF Control could be used by General Levers if needed to meet the impending hostile attack. General Patch directed General Books, CG VI Corps, to pull back behind the Maginot Line that night because of the threat to the left bank of the salient he then held. Little time had been available to VI Corps for preparation of defensive works in the frozen ground, but it was believed that use of the Maginot defenses would be very helpful. Although at this stage the timing of 6 AG operations was not definitely fixed, the plans contemplated generally an orderly withdrawal with the first, second and third intermediate positions being reached by daylight of the second, third and fourth of J n respectively no tre main position on the morn of the 5th. The successive withgrawals were to be made under cover of darkness.

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The period from z to z5 Jan was in a sense unique in 6 AG history. The enemy, largely deprived of the fruits of his Ardenne breakthru and driven back to his starting line with serious losses, made a determined attempt to break thru the front of the Seventh army to recapture Strasbourg and as much as possible of the Alsace Plain. The power he could muster for this was less than in the North, but he knew our lines were thin and that the results of the breakthru would be very significant because of the lack of powerful Allied reserves in or reasonably near the sectors selected for attack. Therefore an assault, once it penetrated the defensive line, could not well be contained and

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forced back. With the predominance of power and initiative in enemy hands, and lacking the strength to be sufficiently strong everywhere on a static basis, it became necessary to predict and anticipate his successive thrusts at various points, blunting them with artillery fire and moving the limited reserves into positions where they could limit the width and depth of the selients driven into our positions. Thus it was a critical period.

A report to serif 2 Jan 45 follows: Quote the front of the entire First French Army sector was marked by patrol activity and harassing enemy artillery fire on both sides. The enemy launched a series of strong probing attacks yesterday along the XV Corps front from Sarreguemines to Neumhoffen . . . 500 enemy tried to cross the Blies River at several points. Unduote.

A report to SHALF on 3 Jan follows: (uote The entire First French Army front is quiet. Only scattered light artillery and patrol activity is reported . . . On the 44 Div front 17 SS Panzer Div supported 500 enemy inf in their attack across the blies River. 1 Comp succeeded in establishing a small bridgehead at the close of the day. Our artillery stopped these attacks against a great toll of enemy personnel and equipment. The critical day is believed today. Unquote.

A report to SHAEF on 4 Jan follows: Quote the front of the First French Army remained generally quiet. The enemy offered some opposition northwest of Colmar and made numerous infiltration attempts in the Lacnoir region. All . . . were repulsed. The bulk of the VI Corps has been withdrawn to the Maginot defenses. Heavy enemy pressure continues on the east and south flank of the Hardt Mountains salient, but an

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P A G E I S U N C L A S S I F I E

advance of 1 km north of Baerebthal was made by 70th Div. On the west flank of the VI Corps elements . . . are attacking in the direction of Mouterhouse . . . and (other units) are blocking roads farther north. In the XV Corps sector, the enemy penetrated the right flank of the 44 Div and reached Gros Rederching. Slight infilterations were made as far as Achern. These were repulsed by elements of 2 BL whose advance continued north from Achern to recapture Gros Rederching. The center and left of the 44 Div is still holding on the blies River line. The remainder of the front was quiet. M/Y at Zweitrucken and Neunkirchen were having a turn-over yesterday. Friedurg yerds were apparently very active. During the night of Jan 2 - 3 heavy southward road movement was reported between basle and Karlsruhe. Uncuote.

Luring the days 1 and 2 Jan SHARF's views regarding 6 AG operations were that a withdrawal to main positions should be made without regard to the defense of Strasbourg for which the 6 AG was said to have no responsibility. On 3 Jan the instructions for 6 AG were changed and it was given the respons. of Strasbourg. (Note: Plans for the defense of Strasbourg were substantially as covered in Letter of Ins #8, 6 AG, 7 Jan.)

On 5 Jan the command of the Strasbourg area passed to the CG, First French Army. Also that the Seventh Army was to withdraw from the Maginot Line North of Hag nau only under pressure. Seventh Army was instructed that the bulk of VI Corps must be in position by 5 Jan organized in great depth for defense, First French Army to withdraw bulk of command on North flank to main (Vosges) position and organize in great depth.

A report to SHAEF 5 Jan follows: Quote. An attempt on Loechle and enemy raids on Kembs accompanies by



heavy artillery fire on both places were repulsed by elements of the 1st French Corps. There are no other changes on the First French army front. The enemy continues to harass . . . Along the maginot Line from the Rhine thru Windstein the VI corps front is very quiet. During the past 24 hours our troops in the Harat mountains sector have been materially increased. We hold Phillipsbourg . . Lemberg is held firmly by elements of the XV Corps. La Blies hiver sector of the 44th Liv continues quiet. Unquote. (Note:

A report to SHAEF o Jan follows: quote A raid by the enemy on He Napoleon preceded by an artillery preparation was repulsed . . . Further north, on the VI Corps Rhine front, a hostile raid was carried out in the vicinity of Hambsheim and the town was occupied. . . . The VI Corps front along the Maginot Line remained quiet. In the Hardt Mountains salient, close contact with the enemy was maintained with some relaxation in enemy pressure noted . . . On the XV Corps front there was no change in our positions and the enemy was very quiet . . Command of the Strasbourg sector passes to First French Army. Unquote.

A report to SHAEF 7 Jan, also outlined ops of 6 Jan foliows: Quote The First French Army front is generally quiet . . . Along the Maginot Line the front of the VI Corps continues quiet. A German attack on Phillipsburg in the Hardt Mountains salient was repulsed. Unquote On the XV Corps front there was virtually no change.

On 7 Jan there was considerable activity on both army fronts. The First French Army lost ground along the Rhine-Rhone Canal but made some advances in 3d Div zone . . . Seventh A. units stopped five attacks

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and made advances in the 45th Div some. Unquote. (Note: Reference is suggested here to 6 AG Op Memo #7,

Operations 9 Jan were characterized by sharp actions in both army zones. Enemy thrusts by inf and tanks were stopped with little or no gain and several towns and other areas receptured. 16 enemy tanks were destroyed and 50 prisoners taken.

On 11 Jan the French units in Rossfield and Herbesheim between the Rhine and L'll Rivers, after repulsing enemy attacks, witherew to the west bank of the latter streams. In the Seventh Army zone there were slight withdrawals at some points and minor gains in others.

On 12 Jan Gen Devers dispatched an urgent personal message to Gen de Lattre pointing out apporent lack of organized defenses in the II French Corps zone and ursing all speed in their preparation as well as effective blocking of the passes leading into the Vosges.

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Operations 12 Jan were covered in report to SHARF as follows: Quote. It was quiet . . . along the whole of the First French Army front except for hvy arty fire received in area of SERMERSHEIM-HUTTENHEIM-SRAFFT. Fierce house-to-house fighting has taken place in RITTERSHOFFEN. Except for one small strong point, the town has been cleared of the enemy. . . . In the HAROT Mountains salient the 276 Inf continued to advance up to 2 km against strong enemy resistance . . . The entire XV Corps front remained quiet . . . 3d Army Tac Reconn planes reported appx 1300 inf and 150 vehicles including armor apparently converging on SAARBRUCKEN. Unquote.

On 13 Jan there was hwy fighting in some sectors but li tle change in front lines.

TODD ENCYCLOSE

Plans were initiated by SHAEF for the movement of 28 inf div., loth arm div and lolst a/b div to 6 AG azone from the rapidly shrinking ARDENNES salient.

There was continued hwy fighting 15 Jan by the 14th arm div in the RITTER-SHOFFEN-HATTEN area against very stubborn resistance and counterattacks.

On 16 Jan the 1st French & established a VOSGES sector on the western face of the COLMAR bridgehead in an area previously occupied by 3 DIA.

Ops on 17 Jan were covered in report to SHARF: Quote The entire 1st Fr A front was marked by enemy arty and patrol activity. Ops begun against the HERRLISHEIM-OFFENDORF-GAMBSHEIM bridgehead by 12 and div and 232 inf reg. . . Elements of 7 pare div have occupied DENGCISHEIM, STATTMATTEN, and DALHUDDEN. Elements of the 14 am div and 315 inf are still he vily engaged in HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN against bitter resistance . . . The 157th inf was making slow progress against very strong resistance in the HARDT Mountain salient. Unquote.

On 18 Jan elements of 12 arm div were forced out of HERRLISHSIM and a defensive line established along the ZORN River. A passage between the RHINE and the MODER was cleared by heavy enemy reinforcements.

By 18 Jan fragmentary oral and cabled instructions had been issued providing for passage to the offensive south of the STRASBOURG area, for the purpose of eliminating the CCIMAR Pocket and destroying the German forces w of the RHINE in that area... Note See 6 AG Ltr of Ins #9, 18 Jan.

On 20 Jan VI Corps began a planned withdrawal to the second line of delaying position. There was evidence that the enemy had planned to launch strong attacks on our original positions the following day and such attacks were actually

launched in the BISCHWILLER area.

The enemy was forced to move elemths of the 2d Mount div from the 7th A front to meet the French attack on the CCIMAR Pocket. This withdrawal was a source of considerable embarrassment to the enemy. In addition to wasting much ammunition, he found that before he cold hope to inflict serious losses on our troops or threaten our new defensive line it would be necessary to follow up, hampered by obstacles and small delaying actions, definitely locate the new line by reconnaissance and probing attacks, and move an adequate supply of ammunition forward, this latter being a slow and laborious process in view of his limited transportation and the poor road net. The withdrawal saved our troops losses from artillery fire, served to maintain the integrity of units and afforded a welcome breathing spell.

During the night of 21/22 Jan the lolst A/B div completed its assembly in the DRULINGON area in the zone of XV Corps.

During the night 22/23 Jan about 75 enemy tanks were reported to have crossed to the west bank of the RHINE northeast of STRASBOURG. Other enemy movements towards this general area were also reported and it was estimated that he might be able to commit as many as three panzer and two strong inf div there. There were indications that the enemy planned to seize the forest 5 mi north of STRASBOURG and then attack in am southerly direction but west of the city.

On 23 Jan there were outpost ations against strong enemy patrols all along the line of the VI Corps. The 35th Div closed in the DIEUZE area in the zone of XV Corps.

On 24 Jan CI Corps was subject to five probing attacks on its left by infantry and tanks.

On 35 Jan VI Corps lines were subject to local penetrations by enemy probing attacks. These were contained and counterattacks launched to restore the original positions. An isolated enemy battalion in SHILLERSDORF was mopped up.

About this time a very definite threat on the XV Corps front with much incoming rail traffic and increased radio activity.

On 26 Jan VI Corps eliminated all menetrations of its MIR and restored its original positions. The 12th US Armor Division was attached to II French Corps and assembled northwest of STRASBOURG. As soon as the 75th Div was made available, Devers decided to move XXI Corps down to take over the attack from the

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north of COLMAR Pocket, and II French Corps to cover its left and defend STRASBOURG

By 27 Jen the lolst A/B had relieved two regiments of the 42nd Div.

On 27 Jan, at VITTEL, Gen. Eisenhower was quite emphatic in expressing his desire for reduction of the COLMAR Pocket as soon as possible in spite of the serious obstacles of heavy snow and reduced combat effectiveness of French units. He gave no new instruction, having 6-22 to continue reduction of the COLMAR Pocket in order to release troops for other operations.

Gen Devers has pointed out that: 1) the 7 US Army and 1st French Army were engaged on a front extending for 225 miles: 2) the 7A, including 13 inf, 2 arm and 1 a/b divs, was short 800 off and 20,000 em; 3) the First Fr Army, included 12 inf, 4 arm (of which 3 inf and 1 arm were US), had an inf shortage of 4,700; 4) opposing the 7th Army there were estimated to be 35,400 combat effectives and 65 tanks and sp guns.

The General then outlined plans for future operations in the following sequence:
Quote.

- AQ To complete reduction of the CCIMAR Pocket not later than 15 February.
- b) To hold the line of the RHINE WITH THREE FR Inf Div supported by 2 Fr Arm div and at the same time retrain and refit the First Fr Army units by rotation.
- c) To reduce the GAMBSHEIM-BISCHWILLER Pocket. This operation would be concurrent with reduction of the COLMAR Pocket.
- d) To stage a limited objective attack for capture of dominating terrain in the BITCHE area by 28 Feb.
- e) Beginning 1 March to move the 1st DAM to the AIPINE front, releasing US Task Force from that area and returning US units to 7th US Army . . .
- f) The 27th Alpine Div to remain on the ALPINE front under command of a French general directly under 6 AG.
- g) 7th A to conduct intensive refitting and retraining program during first half of March in preparation for resumption of offensive when directed by SHARP.
- h) The 42d, 63d, and 70th div were expected to be completely operational by 15 Feb.
- To stage an offensive on existing 7th A front would require three corps comprising four arm and appx 13 inf divisions.

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F A G E U N C L A S S I F

j) In case 7th A front should be extended to the MOSELLE and divs on temp loan from SHAEF withdrawn en addtl corps with two inf divs and one arm div would be required.

> On 28 Jan patrols were active along the 7th US Army front. Personal message, Devers to de Lattre, 28 Jan:

Suckey 1: 35 74 deciman to tele edventage of snemy weakness in the nocket. North of Strassburg between Gambsheim and Bischweiller and requests full assistance of your troops north of Strasbourg, in a coordinated effort to drive the German out of this pocket west of the Rhine and south of the ModerRiver. This undertaking is to be carried out by the Commanding General, $\nabla^{\mathbf{I}}$ Corps. 2) I desire that you direct the commander of your forcesin your sector north of Strasbourg to contact the Commanding General, VI Corps at once to coordinate action. I desire that your attack be as strong as possible in an all-out effort to eject the German. The security of Strasbourg will thus be definitely insured. 3) Responsibility for coordination of the effort of his own forces with that of the French Commander rests with the Commanding General, VI Corps. 4) Your efforts to reduce the Colmar pocket must not be reduced. 5) Please advise me of your actions and consider this as a matter of great urgency."

During the month of January only patrol and harassing actions were carried out along the Franco-Italian border.

With the transfer of the mission of the Seventh Army from the offensive to the defensive, the rail lime immediately behind the defensive positions became of utmost importance, not much in the actual support but with the evacuation of maximum supplies and civilian refugees. This line, Strasbourg and Haguenau to the west utilized to its fullest capacity.

Air supply drops were successfully made 10 Jan to units of the 1st DMI isolated in the Colmar pocket. (No indication in Sixth AG files of type aircraft. Reference COSUMS).

There was a decrease in reserve supplies during Januarybecause of reduced shipments, additional units, and delay in delivery due to heavy snowfall.

Some 22,000 FFI troops in the Bordeaux area, not on the Rearmament program, were at least partially clothed and equipped from British miscellaneous sources by Sixth AG action with the help of SHARF.

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FEBRUARY, 1945

Gen. Devers charged his staff at a 2 February meeting not to criticize the French for their difficulties but to help in correcting them. He said that, upon the reduction of the Colmar Pocket, the First French Army would need a period for refitting and retraining before it would be ready for the major offensive action. He then briefly outlined his ideas and plans for the period immediately dollowing the collapse of the Colmar Pocket. a) The First French army, including the Billote Division, would guard the Rhine front. b) The First French Army would also hold a small section of the northern front just west of the Phine. c) In name the French would have one armored division on wach flank and one inf div which would be rotated with front line divisions. . . d) the 2d DB to betransferred to Seventh Army. e) Divisions along the Rhine were to rotate regiments for small unit training. f) loss of the divisions laoned for reduction of the pocket was to be expected and possibly loss of the vet 3d Div.

recorpy the Siegfried until such time Seventh Army should be sufficiently reinforced to go on thru in an allout offensive.

With regard to INDEFENDENCE, it was further pointed out that for the time being the initiation of further action was up to SHARF.

. . . Wkly Intell Summ 3 Feb. 6 AG Order of Day #3, 10 Feb 45 (Commendation)

. . . Wkkly Intell Summ, 10 Feb. . .

On 10 Feb the 10th Arm Div passed from 6 AG control closing in the Netz area.

On 11 Feb the 75th Div initiated movement to the Rambersvillers area, passing from XXI Corps and First French Army

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control , and the 18th Arm Div closed in the St. Avold area, XV Corps sector.

On 12 Feb the 2d DB assembled in the Morhange area, passing to control of Seventh Army.

Extract from comm, Devers to CG, XXI Corps, 12 Feb. Quote. . . From early Bovember 44 to January 45 the German Army had clung tenaciously to the Colmar Pocket, presenting a constant threat to the security of 6 AG. To drive the enemy from Colmar, the First French Army on 20 Jan launched a determined drive in which the MMI Corps played a brilliant role. . . On 29 Jan the MMI Corps assumed command of a sector of our lines west and north of Colmar with the II French Corps on its left and the Vosges sector on its right. You were not only confronted with a desperate enemy but appalling weather, flooded areas, and a network of canals and ri vers promised to make your task arduous and exhausting. Upon your arrival the CG. First French Army, entrusted you with the mission of attacking Neuf Brisach and the Brisach Bridges so as to cut off the enemy's main line of retreaf the pocket. Despite the obstacles, in your path, the herd-driving American and French under your command on 2 Feb reached the Colmar-Neuf Brisach railroad and entered Colmar. . . On 5. Feb main armored units of your corps made contact with troops of the I French Corps thrusting northward from Mulhouse. The Brisach bridge was reached on 6 February, Neuf Brisach Tell the following day, and 8 Feb your sector, together with the remainder of the pocket, was in the hands of Allied troops. . . Devers. Unquote.

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. . . To deal with the new situation resulting from the reduction of the Colmar bridge head, 6 AG issued Ltr of Ins #10, 12 Feb. Generally, 6 AG would continue the defensive. . .

Following the reduction of the Colmar Pocket on

9 Feb, SHAEF called for release of the loaned divisions for return to the North at the earliest possible dates. Movement was initiated by the 75th Div on the 11th, the 28th two days later, and the 3d Div

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on the 18th. Meanwhile, 6 AG released (thru SHAEF) the 79th Dnf Div and the 101st A/B Div for use in the orth and to earmark an ermored division for SHADF Reserve. Thile these troops were being concentrated in the Luneville-Rambersvillers area, a severe thaw set in, greatly impeding the movement of troops. On the 15th SHAEF ordered suspension of these orders.

On 14 Feb Devers forwarded to SMAEF an est of the sit. Quote. As a result of the crushing defeat of the 19th Army and the withdrawal of depleted element east of the Rhine, the enemy&s immediate capability for offensive action along the Rhine has been destroyed. The enemy forces between the Moselle and Rhine Rivers are est as follows: 35,000 inf effectives in div formations; a proportionate number of supporting troops, including 150/180 tanks and SP guns and 650 arty pieces. Reserves imm available do not exceed 5,000 combat inf eff and 50/70 tanks & SP guns. The equivalent of one div might be made available. . . from the remnants of the 19th Army. Ops elsewhere have forced the German to reduce his strength in the Saar to a low level and to expose the area to capture by swift Allied action followed by a possible advance into Germany to the east or to the north in the direction of Kassel. . . The German has one capability on the 6 AG front: To defend himself. . . The First French Army is deployed on the Rhine. It is incapable of offensive action until it undergoes a thoro retraining and refitting program for a min of six to eight wks. It can hold the line of the Rhine. The Seventh Army is left with eight inf and one US arm div, one French arm div, and two corps hq., the balance on orders to move north. These units can be retrained and refitted for off action by 10 March. The defensive frontage (80 miles) assigned Seventh Army requires seven inf divs deployed, leaving one inf div and two arm divs in reserve. Ammo reserves are depleted. Su ficient reserves to open an off with Seventh Army while First French Army remains on the def can be reconstituted by about 15 March. The ineffectiveness of the Birst French Army and the weakness of the

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Seventh Army leaves the 6 AG only one capability while deployed on its extensive frontage: To defend. . . Future possiblities: a. SHAEF contemplates ops to secure a Southern Bridgehead in the Frankfurt area for an adv on Kassel, possible target date 15 April. These plans envisage the employment of 40 divs. As a preliminary . . . ops must be conducted to clear the Saar and close on the Phine. . . First Tactical Air Force (Prov) is currently conducting an extensive and successful interdiction program against communications in the Saar basin and against lines of communication leading thereto. Its effort will be increased by the addition of one fighter-bomber group by 25 Feb. The 9 AF is supplementing this program especially by its interdiction/ of the crossings over the Moselle. . . . To break the Siegfried Line and clear the area east of the Moselle sade and south of the Rhine of the present German strength, it is est that a minimum of 16 inf divs and five arm divs will be required. Presently deployed and in reserve in this area, including those scheduled for movement, to the north, are 14 US inf divs, one a/b div, and five arm divs, one of which is 2 BD. Of those in 6 AG area, all can be prepared for major offensive action by 10 Mar provided suitable reinforcements are available. . . The front preferred for a main attack to breach the Siegfried line and clear the Saar lies in the valley of the Blies between Primasens and Saarbrucken . . . Conclusions: Current strategy will best be makerendx enhanced by passing to the offensive between the Moselle and the Rhine on or about 15 March with sufficient strength to close on the Rhine rapidly, complete preliminary preparations necessary for the Southern Bridgehead, threaten the Germans with an advance on Kassel and/or Lunich, draw strength away from the main effort on the north, as s on as possible, and thus facilitate the capture of the Ruhr, .. Unquote

On 15 Feb the 44th div made an adv of overtwo miles

NW of Bitche to straigten its front. On 16 Feb the 44th Div sustained -
a counterattack by the 17th SS Panzer Div. On 17 Feb the 63d and 10th

divs launched a limited objective attack across the Saar and Blies

- 4 -

FEB -5-

Rivers and the 2 DB closed in the XV Corps sector.

. . . Wkly Intell Summ #22, 17 Feb. . . Quote. The defensive attitude of the enemy on the 6 AG front has contined. In fact, the low priority of this front leaves him no other choice but to struggle along with only those forces presently available in the area. Unquote.

On 19 Feb the 70th Div entered Forback and occupied high ground to the east. This was the beginning of prolonged intensive fighting for this town.

On 22 Feb the zone of the First French Arry was extended.

It was necessary for 6 AG to determine accurately
the possibilities and consequences of articifial flooding of the
Rhine using a French hydro experimental lab at Grenoble. . . with
the result that the engineers know that they can face and overcome
the problem of putting armies across the Rhine come hell or high water.
On 23 Feb CG 1 French Army issued personal secret

Inst #9 to organize in depth; to continue instruction and reorganization of mits; to answer enemy provecation by an aggressive
attitude in the form of raids on the east bank of the Rhine; to be
ready for every possibility of completing liberation of Alsace
in liaison with Seventh Army, and, if the opportunity presents
itself, to cross the Rhine and gain a foothold on the German shore.
Uncuote.

. . Wkly Int Summ #23, 24 Feb. Quote. The enemey's defensive attitude between the Moselle and the Rhine Rivers continued for still another week. The lengths to which he was forced in order to maintain his lines unbroken . . . strengthen the belief that he has no alternative . . Unquote.

By 28 Feb dep og 2 DB from 6 AG area was underway; the 101 a/b div cleared the Seventh Army area, relieved by the 36th Div; XXI Corps became operational under Seventh Army and assumed command of the 63d and 70th Inf Divs and 101st Cav Gp; the 2d French Arm Div began movement to destinations outside 6 AG area.

that the Franco-Italian border be kept under 6 AG control, and on 1 March the Alpine Front Command was org.

FEB -5-

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PEB - 6

as a separate command under 6 AG. The sector of responsibility will be from the Franco-Italian border from the junction of the international horder boundaries of France, Stritzerland and Italy to the Led coast.

JAN +FEB Sum: On 1 Jan a strong German attack was hurled against Seventh Army in the hardt Lountains and made some headway before being stalled. These operations, however, made it necessary for Seventh Army to withdraw to the Moder River line which it occupied while operations were underway to reduce the Colmar Pocket.

Corps launched an attack southward on 22 Jan to join up with the I French Corps attacking towards the north to reduce the Colmar Pocket. Ops did not progress as repideber rapidly as expected, and the XXI US Corps, with the 28th and 75th Inf and 12th Arm Div, were sent intocbolster the attack. When the XXI Corps came into the picture, the 3d US XXIII Div went under its control. With this added strength, GERMAN resistance was broken and the west bank of the Rhine south of Strasbourg was cleared of the enemy 9 Feb. Following this op, the entire XXI Corps was transferred back to Seventh Army.

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END & FEB

PEB - 6

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END & FEB

CHATTER IV

MARCH

(March to May)

On 3 March the 70th Division, making small advances on a five mile front whose center was Forbach. Further progress was made in the town. Elements of the 63rd Division captured Huntingshof in the course of a limited objective attack.

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 24, 3 Mar:

"On the Sixth AG front the enemy maintained a shallow line only by extensive manipulation of his dwindling forces. . . etc. " (See Summary)

The French, effective 1 March 1945, have redesignated the forces formerly known as the "French Forces of the West" (abbreviated FFO) or "Western French Forces" (abbreviated WFF) as the "Army Detachment of the Atlantic" (Detachment d'Armee de l'Atlantique), (abbreviated D.A.Atl.).

On 5 March elements of the 70th Division cleared the last of the enemy from Forbach, culminating a long and bitter struggle. Other elements overran a concentration camp near Stiring-Wendel, liberating 1200 Russian, Polish, and French inmates, mostly 111.

On 9 Mar elements of the 71st Infantry Division arrived in the XV Corps sector.

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 25, 10 Mar:

"The collapse of the German forces in the north has left Army Group "G" the only higher echelon with units on the west bank of the Rhine River." (See Summary)

By 12 March, the 6th Armored Division had closed in the area of XV Corps to which it was attached.

No. 11 and Administrative Ltr No. 14. Ltr of Instructions No. 11 of utmost importance to this chapter.

Cperations on 13 March included enlargement of the Haguenau outpost north of the Moder, a follow up of limited enemy withdrawals on the extrace left and regrouping for the forthcoming attack.

. . . Note: . . . An appropriate spot here for our own "regrouping", "fitting", etc. for the kayo.

On 15 March a letter, subject: Tentative Basis for ECLIPSE, was sent to CG's Seventh Army and First French Army.

MARCH -1 -

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MARCH - 2

Operation UNDERTONE was launched on schedule 15 March.

The XXI Corps and the 3rd and 45th Divisions of XV Corps

jumped off at OlCOA, followed by the 100th Division of the

XV Corps at 0500. The VI Corps (less 3 DIA) attacked at 0645A

and the 3 DIA followed at 0715A, this latter being 30 minutes

ahead of schedule. The 63rd Division took its initial objective early in the day and progress was considered highly sat
infactory with advances of from three to five kilkometers.

The prisoner take was estimated at 2000.

. . . Note: 1 TAF flew 1670 (?) sorties, including 311 medium bomber sorties. Perfect weather.

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 26, 17 Mar.

"The time remaining to Army Group 'G' to remain in the Saar-Palatinate is rapidly diminishing as a result of the deep penetrations southward from the Moselle River to east of Bad Kreuznach and to Bingen." (See Summary)

On 18 March the 3rd Division penetrated the main Siegfried defenses south of Zweibrucken. Over 4,600 prisoners were taken by the Seventh Army for the three day period, 15-16-17 March. On the First French Army front, fifty commandos crossed the Phine, spending 2½ hours in destruction of casemates.

. . . Check air cooperation, if any, on this one.

Cn 18 March Sixth AG Ltr of Instructions No. 11 was modified.

On 22 March Ammendment B to Ltr of Instructions No. 11 issued by Sixth AG.

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 27, 24 March:

"Army Group 'G' has been reduced to merely an expression as a result of its complete and over-whelming defeat in the Saar-Palatinate" (See Summary)

See Modification of Ltr of Instructions No. 11, 24 March, Ammendment C

On 29 March instructions were issued covering movement of the Hq and Hq Btry, 13th Field Artillery Brigade to Cognac, reporting on arrival to the Commanding General, Ap %. Atl and on 31 March accompanying units were specified, including the 1st Field Artillery Obs Bn, 257th FA Bn (155 mm Howitzer) and 635 FA Bn (155 mm gun).

MARCH -2-

MARCH -3

On 27 March Ltr of Instructions No. 12, Sixth AG, was issued. (Pertains to rail rehabilitation)

On 31 March the following s ecial bulletin was received:
"CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE. A message has been received advising that the United States House of Rep has unanimously adopted a motion expressing to Generals DEVERS, SPAATZ, BRADLEY, HODGES, PATTON, SIMPSON, DOOLITTLE, BRERETON, PATCH AND GEROW and to Officers and Men of all ranks under their command its congratulations and sincere thanks for the magnificent victories on the Western Front which they have won"

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 28, 31 March:

"Army Group 'G', after its overwhelming defeat in the Saar-Palatinate, has been able to organize cohesive resistance only at a few widely scattered critical points deep behind the conquered river barrier" (See Summary)

March summary: Rested and refitted and strengthened by addition of 63rd, 42nd Infantry and 10th Armored Divisions, Seventh Army launched an attach against the Siegfried Line 15 March as Third Army drove from the north from across the Moselle Riverthrough the Saar-Palatinate. Aided by the rapid advance of Third Army, Seventh Army rapidly closed to the Rhine River in its zone while making preparations to make an assault crossing across the river at the same time. All organized resistance west of the Rhine River ended 25 March. As the Third Army advanced on Frankfurt from its bridgehead across the Rhine, Seventh Army, spearheaded by the 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisons, established a bridgehead over the Rhine on 25 March. Progress was rapid and Seventh Army elements relieved Third Army units along the Main River on 27 March. Advancing eastward, Seventh Army moved north to Nuremburg to the Bayreuth area where it was turned southward, directed on Munich. First French Army made an assault crossing of the Rhine on 31 March and advanced southward . . . the end of March summary.

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APRIL GROUND OVERHEAD

decided On 31 March SHAEF and 6 AC xxxxixixxxi that as soon as the issue in the Rhur area was settled the German Army in western central Germany would be finished and that the Sixth Army Group should plan for a movement into south Germany to destroy what was left of the units in that area. SHAEF contemplated turned 30 to 35 divisions into south Germany as soon as the Ruhr pocket was reduced. It was felt that the movement into south Germany should be made generally by two maneuvers: first, to destroy the German Nineteenth Army in the Black Forest area south of the Neckar River area and get the whole of First French Army east of the Rhine; the other, to drive to the southwestxxx with the Russians and to close the Austrian pocket. First French Army had started the crossing of the Rhine in the xxxxxxxx Germershein area only that morning 31 March. The French were to conduct operations south as soon as they were successful in getting a good sized force across the river.

". . . Now that operations to isolate the Ruhr (as directed xxxxx 25 March 45) have been completed, it is my intention to divide and destroy the enemy forces by launching a powerful thrust directed on the axis Cassel - Leipzig. It is hoped that this advance will make an adjunct with the Soviet forces in that region. . . The Southern Group of Armies:

a) will protect the right flank of Central Group of Armies west of Bayreuth where it will contact the central group of armies. b) To prevent consolidation of German resistance in the south . . . boundries effective 040001-B April MAXXXXII and subject justment in detail by commanders concerned: . . . By box the southern and central groups of armies present boundary extended from Meiningen - Coburg - Bayreuth all to the Central Group." 1.

as follows:

See 6 AG Letter of Instructions # 13, dated 3 April and Administrative Letter #17, dated 6 April, which was to accompany Letter of Instruction # 13.

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#29 for the week ending April 27.)

Sixth Army Group's Headquarters closed at Vittel, France, and opened at Kaiserslautern 6 April. By 10 April the French had made considerable progress across the Rhine. (Note: See Weekly Intelligence Summary

On 9 April the question of the reduction of the Royan pocket was an extremely live one because the 16th had been set as the target date for the operation. The question of air support had been settled to General de Larminat's complete satisfaction and so the G-3 to Cognac the next day by air for the conference. Meantime, General Webster, CG, 1 TAF, had agreed to go to General de Larminat's Headquarters on the 11th and discuss the air problem. At conference on 10 and 11 April all air aspects were buttoned up to everybody's satisfaction. It was decided, because of air and weather conditions, that D-day for the attack would be 15 April instead of 16 April. One of the outstanding features noted was the absolute confidence found among the officers from General de Larminat on down.

On 10 April the command post of the Army Detachment of the Atlantic had moved from Cognac to Ville Nouve in preparation to open the Port of Bordeau. (Note: Weekly Intelligence Summary # 30, 14 April.) (Note: President Roosevelt's death 15 April.) (Note: President as a consistency was received from the President)

On April 14 it was learned that the Third Army planned to change its direction about the time Bayreuth and move to the southeast, down the Danube Valley with about 15 divisions. Those divisions plus the expected strength of the Seventh Army and First French Army would bring the total number of divisions to be used in southern Germany to about 34, which compared favorably with the number which ShAEF has previously indicated.

On 15 April General Eisenhower directed the course of the Sixth Army Group's next operation, which date included as its initial attack the operation to destroy the Nineteenth German Army, clear up the Black Forest area and the area south of Stuttgart, and get the entire First French Army east of the Rhine. New army group boundaries meant that Seventh Army would have about 50% as much front as it was then holding. In addition, SHAEF gave Seventh Army two more divisions, giving the Seventh Army more hitting power and ground depth to its offensive front than it had ever enjoyed. It was agreed that the Sixth Army Group should undertake the operation against the German Nineteenth Army Kear, as soon as possible. That same day General Devers gave and directives to General Patch concerning the operation and particularly the launching of the effort on the right of Seventh Army to cut off the German Nineteenth Army as quickly as possible. (See 6 AG Letter of Instruction #14, dated 16 April 45.) The original conception was that the initial effort by the First French Army would be in the nature of a holding effort and indicate weakness and thus encourage the German to stay in his position until the VI Corps U.S.

was in proper position to go all out up the valley of the Neckar and to the south. (See paragraph X, Letter of Instruction #14) General de Lattre dia not accept the Sixth Army Group conception of the maneuver and launched a premature main effort through his center, directed southeast, which frightened the Germans so that he started running to the rear. The Garmans morale was already quite low because of the terrific defeat he had suffered recently and he was ready to run. The French troops crossed the Neckar into the zone of action of the VI Corps (Quoting from the 6 AG History) "Several cables were sent attempting to hold General de Lattre's center back and get the proper timing in the maneuver but they were wholly unsuccessful and as a result a goodly portion of the German Nineteenth Army escaped from the southeast and, so, on the 22nd the main effort of the Seventh Army was directed to the southeast on Ulm and a new boundary was set between First French Army and Seventh army." On 15 April Eisenhower directed: ". . . It is my intention further to divide, isolate, and destroy the enemys/remaining force by thrusts on Salzburg and Lubeck on completion of current operations as directed (2 April) . . . The Southern Group of Armies a) will occupy western Austria and that part of Germany within its zone of advance and protect the southern (right) flank of Central Group of Armies. The 13th Airborne Division will be available to this group. . . . Boundaries: . . . by the Central and Southern Groups of Armies: Present boundary to River Rhine, thence, Darmstadt, Wurzburg, Ansbach, Freising, Lorfen, Rosenheim, on to Gentral Group of Armies." (Note: Order of the Day from Supreme Commander, April 21.

The comparatively hopless enemy situation as of 21 April is described in Weekly Intelligence Summary #31. (Make reference thereto.) When the decision was made to divert the Third Army to the southeast, Sixth Army Group divisions found themselves in the new zone of action of the Twelfth Army Group and in this case it was desirable to continue the available and pressure on the enemy and to avoid blocking by cross traffic the roads.

Stuttgart was something of a problem for a few days after its occupation 23 April. It was on the boundary by the First French and Seventh Armies, first to the French and later to the Seventh Army, with joint use to routes through the city. Both 100th U.S. Division and Third DIA attempted to maintain order in the city while mopping was still in progress. During the period 23 - 25 April & serious situation developed in the zone of the VI Corps, which had powerful armor than and infantry forces pressed for a rapid drive to the south and southeast in zone. However, in the afternoon of the 23rd, Seventh Army reported that elements of the First French Army were moving east of Ulm across VI Corps' zone. So French units were directed to withdraw into their own zone. The following afternoon, 24 April, VI Corps reported that the First Db were then in Ulm astride the axis of advance of VI Corps, about 40 miles outside First French Army zone. French compliance began on the 25th. This was a serious delay because Seventh Army was engaged in a race to seal passes into the Redoubt area before the retreating German forces could retire and defend it. The objective of forcing the

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surrenderof the Army Group "G" was eventually accomplished in spite of the delay. On 26 April a letter with subject, Annex III, Operation-ROLIPSE, was sent to the armies. (See Weekly Intelligence Summary #32, dated 28 April.) Prior J sceipt of the cirective of 27 April from SHAEF, however, there was issued 24 April a directive assigning the objective of First French Army the bregenz-Feloxirck area, which is along the edge of Lake Constance; and for the Seventh Army, the Innsbruck - Brenner Pass area. The French were told to be prepared to seize Landeck and the Seventh Army was to be prepared to assist the First Trench Army in its capture. The sevent ray was preparing to swing hard with the right in order to cut off the German formations and prevent them from getting into the Redoubt area. The French were in agreement but in doubt as to getting through the Bregenz area rapidly.

had been cut up very badly and prisoners were taken in tremendous number. Both the VI Corps and VVI Corps met practically no opposition other than some isolated groups. And they started their swing quits rapidly. The VI Corps hit south with its right and began to turn its center and its left towards the east which, of course, had the effect of swing the VXI Corps right, which was also free. Meanwhile, the French were not making the progress hoped for. By the evening of 29 April it was evident that the Seventh Army could reach Landeck before the First French Army could reach that area. The XXI Corps was on April 30 moving armor rapidly and infantry by truck, swinging its right in along the edge of the Alsace, south of Munich. It succeeded in reaching the

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entrance to the pass at Rosenheim leading up the valley of Inn and cutting the retreating Germans off.

So, it was simply a question of time before the Insbruck - Brenner Pass area would fall leaving the Germans only one route into the National Redoubt and that was through the pass in the Salzburg area. The TRAFF directive, 27 april: **...*Southern Groups of Armies alli. *** a) protect the right flank of the Central Group of Armies.

b) continue operations under current instructions, seize the areas Innsbruck and Landeck, occupy that part of Germany and Austria in zone and seal the Brenner Pass.


. . Boundary between Central and Southern Groups of Armies will be: Openheim - Darmstadt - Wurzburg -

Armies will be: Openheim - Darmstadt - Wurzburg Ausback - Freising, (all Central Groups of Armies)


Edling - Prien (to Southern Group of Armies) St. Johann
and road to Ketzbuhel - Bramberg - Lienz (to Central
Group of Armies)."

Sixth Army Group, G-1 after-action figures for April follow:

	U.S. Forces	French	Total
Killed	1,710	2,135	3,845
Wounded	8,038	7,066	15,104
Missing	280	541	821
Captured	257	2	259
Total Battle Casualties	10,285	9,744	20,029
		109,393	374, :49
Numerical total of Prisoners.	410,618	196,463	607,081
	Killed Wounded Missing Captured Total Battle Casualties Prisoners of Ma Captured during move. Numerical total	Wounded 8,038 Missing 280 Captured 257 Total Battle 10,285 Casualties Prisoners of War 265,556 Captured during move. Numerical total 410,618	Killed 1,710 2,135 Wounded 8,038 7,066 Missing 280 541 Captured 257 2 Total Battle Casualties 10,285 9,744 Prisoners of War Captured during move. 265,556 109,393 Numerical total 410,618 196,463



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HEADQUARTERS SINTH US ARMY GROUP Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

By Auth of 1 OG, 5 Army Group : Initials: 2 LH : Date: 3 Feb 45

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 20

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 3 FEBRUARY 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENDMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Confirmation of several probabilities has further clarified the enemy situation on the Sixth US Army Group front.

The cessation of offensive action by the enemy in the SAAR-PALATINATE was marked by the withdrawal of several major units and concomitant realignment of responsibilities. Army Group G may be assumed to have regained control of the whole northern sector as far as the RHINE, after the failure of HDMLER's politice-military campaign in ALSAGE. From the west the corps are aligned as follows: LXXXII Infantry (11 Pz, 416 Inf, 719 Inf and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 Inf, 17 SS PG, and 559 VG Divs); KC Infantry (257 VG, 6 SS Min, and 36 Inf Divs); LXXXIX Infantry (245 Inf, 47 Inf, and 10 SSPzDivs). XXXIX Panzer Corps, formerly controlling the HAGUENAU area, probably relinquished its command and followed in the withdrawal of its three major units (25 PG, 21 Pz and 7 Para Divs). The First Army remains as the intermediate echelon, with the probability that LXXXIX Gorps is operating independently under the army group, for the same logistical and tactical reasons which previously made the similar situation expedient.

Behind the RHINE, Army Group OBERRHEIN is returning to its purely administrative defence command status. The loss of XXXIX Penzer Corps and the imminent liquidation of the Nineteenth Army will remove from its control all offensive forces. XIV SS and XVIII SS Corps now can have only a defensive role under a still clusive higher echelon (Twenty-third or Twenty-fourth Army). In the rapidly constricting COLMAR pocket, no changes in organization were noted.

Along the entire front, the enemy's offensive power has been completely eliminated. West of the HARDT only screening forces have been contacted, with defensive positions obviously under construction. In the HARDT mountain sector, a gradual sidestepping process by 257 Infantry and 6 SS Mountain Divisions permitted the withdrawal of 256 Infantry Division. East of the HARDT 10 SC Pt Division has been forced to spread thinly from the RHINE to limits west of HAGUENAU, helping to cover the sectors vacated by 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grensdier and 7 Par chute Divisions. Although no positive swidence is as yet available, the recent pattern of train movements suggests that all four of the divisions withdrawn are destined for employment on other sectors of the front.

In the VOSGES area, the orderly disengagement of the Nineteenth Army began to show signs of hasty retreat, 708 Infantry Division had already fallen back across the river, while 16 Volksgrenadier, 189 Volksgrenadier, and 198 Infantry Divisions were beginning to lose organic cohesion. Reinforcements from 5 Mountain Division were unable to bolster the weak 2 Mountain Division to the point where it could do more than fight a delaying action. North of MULHOUSE the few remaining troops of 716 Infantry, 159 Infantry and 338 Infantry Divisions were battling to keep the southern shoulder of the pocket firm.

The enemy was completely on the defensive along the entire Sixth US Army Group front.

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b. Capabilities

The enemy has but one capability remaining: to defend himself. He can best execute this capability by withdrawing behind the bastions of the SIENFRIED Line and the RHINE. In the SAAR-PALATINATE, the present line and the MAGINAT Line sould be manned as delaying positions. In the south the enemy can choose only between the RHINE and destruction.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Sear-Vosges Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enery forces opposing Sixth US Army Group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINTS (Q 5056), RIMLINGEN (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHRON (Q 7540), HAGUENAU (R 0424), KALTENHOUSE (R 0721), R 1021, R 1120, BISCHUILLER (R 1019), R 1416, HERRLISHEIM (R 1215), R 0714, R 1410, along RHINE RIVER to V 8841, BIESHEIM (V 8638), V 6939, V 6046, V 4845, V 4629, V 6010, ENSISHEIM (V 7118), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), E along the HINTENET Correl to NITERE (N 8021), Section (V 7118), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), E along the HUNINGUE Canal to MIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE River to the Swiss Border.

b. XXXIX Panzer Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. KIRCHENTRAUER von KIRCHDORF)

The withdrawal of this corps and 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier, and 7 Parachute Divisions was started during the early days of the period. The last date of contact with units of the corps was 30 January and it is believed that their departure is nearly complete.

21 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. FEUCHTINGER) was pulled out of line shortly after the failure to cross the Moder River on 24/25 January. The division was in a battered state, and had been located in a sector that can well be held defensively by a unit of lower efficiency. The larger portion of its responsibilities were probably inherited by the units under control of 553 Divisional Staff. Last information shows 21 Panzer Division having 1,400 effectives and 30-35 armored vehicles including self-propelled guns.

25 Panzer Grenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BAUMEISTER) was last identified by a PW of 119 Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 30 January. 35 Panzer Grenadier Regiment has been out of contact since 25 January. The combat effectives of the division were estimated at less than 1,000 effectives and the unit is accepted as withdrawn.

7 Parachute Division (CG: Maj. Gen. ERIMANN) has not been encountered since 28 January. The western part of its former sector has been taken over by 47 Volksgrenadier Division while the eastern portion probably has become the responsibility of 10 SS Panzer Division. The withdrawal of 7 Parachute Division is accepted. As its commitment on Sixth US Army Group zone was short, its combat effectives are still estimated at 3,500. The division should be ready for action elsewhere on short notice.

c. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Gen. BLASKOWITZ)

(1) 172 Reserve Division is an upgraded division number with headquarters in HOMBURG. The division appears to have as a primary duty the responsibility of supplying replacements for line units of Army Group G.

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The First Army assumed a defensive attitude throughout period and made no appreciable changes in its front line positions. Extensive reorganization of its front line dispositions in the area of the HARDT Mountains to the RHINE River was: carried out as 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier, 7 Parachute, and 256 Infantry Divisions were withdrawn to the rear. 245 Infantry Division moved into line between 47 and 36 Infantry Divisions and 6 SS Mountain Division sidestepped to the west assuming responsibility for a large sector in the mountains. This afforded the enemy the opportunity to withdraw an additional division from this sector, 256 Infantry, Division SECRET having been selected

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(c) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

29 January the division is believed to have been squeezed out of line by the westward move of 6.88 Mountain Division and 36 Infantry Division. The low state of its effectives (1,600) and its continuous commitment through December and January should qualify it for rest and refit, but the present serious situation should force early recommitment in a relief or reinforcement role elsewhere on the Mestern front.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. SEIDEL) now holds the sector from Q 7644 to Q 8138. Of its three regiments only 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified, on 2 February at Q 7541, while 457 and 477 Volksgrenadier Regiments were last contacted on 24 January. Pl's of 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment stated that 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment was to their left, with 477 Regiment in reserve. Organic strength in combat effectives is 1,500, plus 200 effectives in the attached 815 Heavy Machine Gun Bettalion.

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CO: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) moved westward taking over part of the former sector of 256 Volksgrenadier Division.

It now holds from Q 8138 to Q 8631. 6 SS Reconnaissance Battalion was identified at Q 8137 on 31 January. 11 SS Mountain Regiment was contacted last at Q 8434 on 28

January; 12 SS Mountain Regiment on 2 February at Q 8631. The losses inflicted on the division caused one or more battalions to be withdrawn for refit behind the lines. Combat effectives are estimated to be 2,200 including 200 for 506 SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion.

36 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLM) shifted slightly to the west, now holding the line from Q 8631 to Q 9028. The extent of its sector was curtailed appreciably by the commitment of 245 Infantry Division. Neither 118 nor 165 Grenadier Regiments were identified during the period. 87 Grenadier Regiment was identified on 30 January at Q 8729. Pris confirm that I Battalion 87 Regiment is still at BAUMHOLDER while II Battalion is subordinated to 165 Grenadier Regiment. Divisional combat effectives total approximately 2,000.

(d) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOEHNE)

This corps is temporarily carried under command of First German Army. Prior to the offensive in the HAGUETAU area, LXXXIX Corps was directly sub-ordinate to Army Group G for logistics and tactical reasons, while operating in this area. It is probable that the same situation will be repeated.

245 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KECLER). The presence of this division in the sector from Q 9028 to Q 9328 has been established by the identification of 937 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9228 on 30 January and of 935 Grenadier Regiment in the same area on 1 February. Initial interrogation of prisoners of 937 Regiment suggests that reorganization of the division during its long rest period was less extensive than had been anticipated. On this basis a strength of 3,000 would be the maximum.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) committed its third regiment, 115 Grenadier Regiment, during the period and now holds from Q 9328 to R 0025, though the withdrawal of 7 Parachute Division may well have forced the division to extend its sector east toward HAGUENAU. Identifications for the period were as follows: 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 27 January and 1 February at Q 9328; 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 31 January and 1 February at Q 9526; 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 29 January and 1 February at Q 9825. Combat effectives are about 1,500.

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(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOERNLEIN)

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) is responsible for a sector from the Moselle to the area L O501. Identification of 713 Regiment at L O501 denotes a dhift north into positions formerly held by 11 Panzer Division. 714 Regiment was last contacted at L O504 on 27 January. Division combat strength is estimated at 3,500 as of 29 January.

719 Infantry Division (GG: Maj. Gen. SCHTALBE) is holding a long stretch from MERZIG to the SAARLAUTERN area. Last identifications were as follows: 723 Grenadier Regiment at Q 2881 on 1 February and 743 Grenadier Regiment at Q 2880 on 23 January. Strength was estimated at 4,000 on 29 January.

11 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. von WIETERSHEIM) was identified by its artillery elements on 1 February on XX US Corps front. However, lack of identification of either Panzer Grenadier Regiment since 27 January and the assumption of responsibility by 416 Division of its former sector would support the theory that the division has been withdrawn. A fair source reported that on 26 January one half of the division left for the eastern front. Latest estimate of divisional strength is 4,500 combat effectives including 50 tanks and self-propelled guns.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) continues to held the sector from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2982) to the vicinity of FORE-CH (Q 3966). During the period only 861 Grenadier Regiment was identified on 29 January at Q 3273, and on 31 January at Q 3173. PW statements lead to the assumption that this is the only organic regiment remaining to the division, it having absorbed 860 Grenadier Regiment. The mission of the division remains purely defensive, with no replacements or any prospect of relief expected. Combat effectives of the division are estimated at , 2,400, including 900 from 90 and 107 Grenadier Replacement Battalions (172 Res Div) and 514 Grenadier Replacement Battalion.

(b) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZEIMAYR) holds the sector from FOREACH (Q 3966) to Q 6055. Identifications during the period include those of 59 Grenadier Regiment at Q 4960 on 27 January, and of 74 Grenadier Regiment on 29 January at Q 5359. 73 Grenadier Regiment has not been identified since 7 January and its present whereabouts are not known. Service personnel of the division have been identified fighting in line as infantry troops. The increased strength of 59 Grenadier Regiment would imply that it had received recent replacements. The division's combat strength is estimated at 1,700, including the 400 effectives of Battle Group KIEIN.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Lt. Col. FICK) holds the sector Q 5955 to the BITCHE area (Q 7750). Light contact throughout the period identified 37 Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 28 January at Q 6654; 38 Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 28 January at Q 5955. Prisoners of war from 38 Panzer Grenadier Regiment stated that their strength and positions had not changed considerably for three weeks and that no relief is expected. Regiment KENINER (Battle Groups HARTIG and HELIMANN) left the line on 28 January as organic units of the division took over their sectors. Strength of the division is 2,000 effectives with about 20 self-propelled guns.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von MUEHLEN) continues to hold the sector from Q 7450 to Q 7644. 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified on 29 January at Q 7445, while 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified on 29 and 30 January at Q 7450. 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment has as yet not been contacted and there is no evidence of its having refitted. Only small scale actions have relieved the passive tenor of the division's role. Remnants of the 361 Volksgrenadier Division provided 300-350 replacements for 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment. These bring the divisions total combat effectives up to 2,200, including 500 from the attached 58 Fortress Machine Gun Battalion and Battle Group ZWEIBRUCKEN.

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were diverted to 2 Mountain Division. The division contains a large proportion of Austrian personnel who have proven themselves to be only medicare troops. Up to the close of the period the division had yielded 2610 prisoners of war.

At the close of the period the division was operating in battle groups mostly in the areas of 198 and 189 Infantry Divisions. The division was originally given an estimated strength of 4,500 troops. However, the extremely heavy losses inflicted on the division suggest that the combat effectives do not now exceed 2,000 men.

198 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SCHIEL) managed to pull practically all its units out of the SELLT.T (V 7862) area before being cut off. A captured field order of 1 February has the division holding a sector from V 7741 to V 8141, flanked by 2 Mountain Division on its right and 189 Volksgrenadier Division on the left. The proposed lines of withdrawal for the division were in a south-easterly direction. Operationally attached to the division were in a south-easterly direction. Operationally attached to the division were in Battalion 221 Volksgrenadier Regiment (16 VG Div), II and IV Battalions 111 Mountain Artillery Regiment (2 Mtn Div), II Battalion, 1316 Artillery Regiment (16 VG Div), 993 GHQ Artillery Battalion, 2 Artillery Battalion, 1326 Fortress Artillery Battalion, I Battalion 14 AA Regiment, 501 AA Battalion, 2 Company 1316 A T Battalion (16 VG Div) and elements of 654 GHQ ATK Battalion. The existence of 235 Artillery Regiment, 198 Fusilier Battalion, 235 Tk Company, 235 Engineer Battalion, 235 Signal Battalion, 235 Field Replacement Battalion, and Supply Regiment were confirmed. The division, is estimated to have not more then 1,000 organic combat effectives.

189 Volksgrenndier Division (CO: Col. ZORN) was responsible for a sector west of V 7741. Though the western extremity of its sector is not known, 189 Division was responsible for the defense of COIMAR and vicinity. The presence of 1212 Grenadier Regiment, not identified since 28 December, is most doubtful. The regiment is believed either disbanded or detached. Last identifications of the other two regiments were: 1213 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 1 February vicinity V 7442; 1214 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 2 February vicinity V 7242. Present organic strength of the division is estimated at 800 strong.

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Ool. MUKILER) has been very badly depleted and is presently incapable of independent action. The regiments of the division have been disorganized and the remnants are operating in various battlegroups under the control of other divisions. A prisoner of war stated that the division trains crossed the RHINE River during the night of 31 January. Its remnants total approximately 500 combat effectives.

16 Volksgrenndior Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HAECKEL) was forced into the NEUF BREIDACH area. However, some elements of 221 Volksgrenndior Regiment are still being contacted in the northwest sector of the pocket. The division is being constantly reported as having given up elements to other divisions and the identifications prove the scattered disposition of its units. Its strength does not exceed 500 effectives.

Miscellaneous Units in LXIV Corps Sector: The critical situation in this sector has produced the usual conglomeration of miscellaneous CHQ units, with compositions varying from paroled criminals to converted clerks of higher headquarters. This collection of bodies and odd types of arms is estimated to have increased the total number of combat effectives by a maximum of 1,500 men.

(b) LXIII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. ABRAHAM)

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. E.ERT). During the beginning of the period commitment of the division rumnined rether obscure, with only 758 Grandier Regiment identified at V 7011 on 28 January and at V 6813 on 1 February. On 2 February 757 Grandier Regiment was identified west of COIMAR. However, the repeated sightings of eastward movement in the former divisional sector suggest that its withdrawal is nearly completed. Organic units total about 1,400 combat effectives.

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10 SS Panzer Division (CG: SS. Brig. Gen. HARMEL) has been left with a considerably enlarged sector due to the withdrawal of 7 Parachute and 21 Panzer Divisions on its right and left flanks respectively. Its line now extends from west of HAGUSAU (R 012a) to BISCHVILLER (R 1020). Last identifications were of 21 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 2 February at R 0124 and R 0919; 22 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 1 February vicinity R 0920. Heavy losses during the previous period have been partially offset by replacements held in local reserve. Divisional strength has educed to about 2,800 effectives supported by approximately 50 tanks and assault

d. ARMY GROUP OBERRHEIN

- (1) Army Oberrhein (CG: SS Lt. Gen. von MAUR)
 - (a) XIV SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. von dem BACH-ZELETSKI)

563 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER) has probably present boundaries are believed to be BISCHTILLER (R 1020) on the right and the RHINE River on its left. Contact during the past week was light, the only identifications being that of Battelion TREUTLER of Regiment MARBACH at R 1312 on 1 February. Combat effectives remain at 2,500 strong. It is understood that this formation is actually a division staff operationally controlling miscellaneous units temporarily assigned.

405 zbV Division continues to exercise administrative control over Volkssturm and garrison units in the SIEGFRIED Line along the East bank of the RHINE River from R 1107 to W 0018.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH)

30 SS Orenadier Division is still carried East of the RHINE in the general area between OFFENBURG and FREIBURG. It may well have the mission of assisting 405 zbV Division in holding defense positions along the East bank of the RHINE River.

(2) Nineteenth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

The enemy defenses in the VOSGES Pocket failed to withstand heavy Allied pressure from the North and South. The troops of Lt. Gen. RASP were unable to prevent a developing pincers movement within the pocket and, in order to avoid complete annihilation, a withdrawal of men and equipment to the SIECFRIED Line and Germany was started on approximately I February. Casualties in men have amounted to about 6,000 combat affectives during the period and loss of equipment has been proportionate. Two divisional units suffered extremely heavy losses; namely, 708 and 16 Infantry Divisions. No substantial reinforcements have arrived, indicating that the departure of this Army from France is imminent.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HEIMUT THUMM)

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN) has suffered extremely heavy losses in attempting to stem Allied advances to the RHINE River in the vicinity of NEUF BREISACH. Complete concentration of the division was effected in the area of COLMAR, when elements previously in the MULHOUSE area moved North. The division ar arrived in the VOSGES Pocket much below T/O strength and was reinforced by elements of 5 Mountain Division and 4 High Mountain Battalion from Italy. The independent Battalion was absorbed by 137 Mountain Regiment, and 3 Company of 85 Reconnaissance Battalion by 67 Mountain Reconnaissance Battalion. A further five companies of 5 Mountain Division, originally intended to serve as a cadre for a new mountain division,

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159 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. DERNEN) continued to defend the approaches to CERNAY and ENSIGHEIM. The divisional sector seems to have contracted in the east as elements of 716 Infantry Division were identified within the former's area. The division now holds from V 5216 to V 6212. Identifications were made during the period of the following units: 1209 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 29 January; 1210 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 27 January at V 5911; 1211 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 31 January at V 5812 and on 2 February in the vicinity of V 5214. Prisoners state that the two original battalions of 1209 Regiment were consolidated into I Battalion and that 40 Panzer Grenadier Replacement Battalion was possibly renamed II Battalion, 1209 Grenadier Regiment. Organic strength is estimated at 1,200 plus 400 for attached units (201 and 202 Mountain Battalion, 808 Super Heavy Machine Gun Battalion, and 21 Mortar Battalion).

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) has expanded westward as indicated in the identifications of 726 Grenadier Regiment at V 6512 on 30 January. · 736 Regiment remains unidentified, but a captured code name list of 15 January confirms its existence. 706 Regiment was last contacted at V 6713 on 1 February. Reinforceing the depleted division are 758 Grenadier Regiment of 338 Infantry Division, 785 Engineer Battalion, 2 Company 654 ATk Battalion, possibly 40 PG Replacement Battalion, and elements of 106 Panzer Brigade. 726 Regiment is known to have received some replacements from 460 Replacement Battalion (ULM). Organic strength, 1,200 plus 600 in attached units.

106 Panzer Brigade. A prisoner has stated that the unit is to move from the vicinity of ENSISHEIM to the area south of COLMAR in order to cover the withdrawal of 189 Infantry Division. Its present strength in tanks and men is much depleted, as it foughtvery stubborn battles in the south. Total strength is 500 men supported by 15 tanks and self-propelled guns.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve: (Combat Effectives)

25,000 * Seventh US Army 10,000 First French Army

Artillery Effectives:

15,000 Seventh US Army First French Army

7,500 Estimate Reserves in Saar 12,000 Estimate Reserves in Black Forest

71,500 TOTAL

Tanks and SP Guns

80-100 Seventh US Army 40- 50 First French Army

120-150 TOTAL

(*) Sharp drop due chiefly to withdrawal of 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier, 7 Para-

chute and 256 Volksgrenndier Divisions. (**) Strength rapidly decreasing as a result of casualties and withdrawals.

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3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBLE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

The ranks of 5 Mountain Division in the Alpine sector have again been reduced to provide further reinforcements for 2 Mountain Division in the COIMAR Pocket. However, the strength of nominal Alpine units on this front remains the same, as elements of 5 Mountain Division continue to be identified and ground sources report some influx of other mountain units as replacements into the V.L di SUSA. The only indication of any further weakening of the German units comes in prisoner of war statements that approximately one battalion of Italian troops is distributed among regiments of 34 Infantry Division. Ground sources have not confirmed the report that the general evacuation of PIEDMONT, orderd to begin on 10 January, has actually started.

b. Enemy Strength

The lack of positive information on the strength of Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult. It is conservatively estimated that the total does not excee, 10-12,000, with 60% carried as combat effectives.

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4. OPERATIONS

The French First Army attack continued its successful push in the Southern VOSCES Sector against stiffening opposition. The enemy established numerous strong-points with armor support and installed extensive minefields to aid the defense. The heavy fighting which had taken place in CENNAY region subsided by the end of the period.

The unabated drive on the northern flank of the VOSGES Pocket brought our forces well along the COIMAR Canal by 27 January, but the enemy at that time was concentrating remnants of his armored units on the west bank of the III River, probably preparing a more aggressive defense. At CHUSSENHEIM (V 8147) his resistance was extremely stiff, but to the west the town of HOLIZWIHR (V 7646) was taken in stride and no contact was reported with the enemy by patrols which reached the canal junction at V 8545. East or the III River from SELESTAT to KRAFFT the enemy also remained out of contact.

Thus, the panhandle in the north was successfully cleared by I February, as friendly elements reached the Rhine River. Throughout that part of the front, resistance was negligible.

The bitter opposition and armored counterattacks met early in the period in the drive on COIMAR slackened after HORBOURG (V 7448) was finally cleared. Similarly, the capture of ARTZENHEIM (V 6546) materially reduced the strong resistance which small enemy groups had put up in the HARDT woods. The end of the period saw steady advances being made in spite of the mines, snow, and obstructions encountered all along the front. COIMAR was taken 3 February, but some fighting continued at isolated points. Enemy activity in the rear areas continued to be reported in the form of heavy movement from this area to the south and southeast. This was explained by FW statements to the effect that troops, supply trains, and artillery were evacuating through the NEUF BRISACH area.

The enemy proved himself very alert in the HHILE bridgehead area throughout the period. Our forces found BETTELHOFFEN and GAMBSHEIM clear, but the position from OBENHOFFEN to the road junction at R 0910 was an enemy strongpoint which put up stubborn resistance supported by 8 - 10 tanks. East of BISCHWILLER, he appeared to be entrenching at critical points. The flooding of this area proved to be an obstacle of major proportions at the close of the period, as friendly forces reported water to be waist-high at some points.

The enemy's attitude was definitely defensive in the sector from HAGENAU to the HARDT Mountain area where his principal activity was digging defences north of the Moder River. Scattered resistence, with some tanks, was met in the HAGENAU Forest, but steady vehicular movement to the rear was reported.

REIPERTS/ILLER (Q 8037) in the HARDT Mountain area was found unoccupied and from that point to the eastern edge of the mountains, no report of enemy contact was received. Further westward, however, the enemy was digging in and reacting to cur patrols with mortar and self-propelled gun fire.

The relative quiet in the SAAR remained unbroken except for one minor probing attack in the area of WORLFING(Q 5955), which caused some withdrawal of friendly forward elements. No contact was made in the area from EPPING URBACH (Q 5957) to the BITCHE Forest but the movement of small enemy groups was: observed, probably effecting local reliefs.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

Observations made during the period revealed a very definite trend of enemy withdrawal along the Sixth Army Group Front. In the Vosges Pocket vehicular movement to the south and east as well as reports of crossings of the Rhine by barge and ferry indicate a further reduction of enemy forces in the pocket. Along the MARLSQUEE - OFFEI BURG - FREIBURG line heavy rail activity was reported, although not very much actual movement was visible. Heavy military activity was also seen in the MANNHEIM-KARLSQUEE - HEILBRONN area, consisting of approximately 25 - be military trains reported on 29, 30 January, and 2 February. The SAAR was likewise active with considerable road and rail activity along the WISSELBOURG - LANDAU - GRUNSTADT (M 3107) lines, and also in the KAISERSLAUTER. - HOLBURG - FIRMASENS area.

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East of the Rhine the rail lines converging upon HEILBRONN revealed heavy traffic whenever a break in the weather permitted good visibility. Indications are that the bulk of this activity was movement headed in an easterly direction, thus pointing to a departure either of military units from our front or of troops from the large training camps in the PRORZHEIM - STUTTGART area.

Large scale movements of motor transports in a northeasterly direction along the WISSEBOURG - LAYDAU roads or 29 and again on 31 January, confirmed the conclusion that the withdrawal of enemy forces was underway. This conclusion is supported by the fact that on 2 February, 5 military trains were seen moving north and east on the LAYDAU - GRUISTADT (M 3107) rail like, and another military train eastward from the vicinity of BIEBERMUHLE (Q 9083).

In the Gas, large concentrations of locomotives, reil and flat cars, were reported in the sidings and marshalling yards along the KAISERSLAUTERN - HOMBURG line. Photo reconncissance and TAC/R revealed a total of 8 - 9 trains along the line on 29 and 30 January. One of these trains, hauled by 4 engines, consisted of 15 probable light AA wagons. Reconnaissance of 2 February revealed four additional trains moving west along this line.

It is of interest to note that many of the military trains seen throughout the period were made up in part of flat cars loaded with motor vehicles. Moreover, much of the activity seen in the marshalling yards, especially in the SAAR Region, consisted of large numbers of flats loaded with vehicles. As many as 100 - 150 of these loaded cars were seen at NEUSTADT and another large number at ALEY (M 2828). A comparative study of the week's movements reveals that reil and road activity was heavier and more pronounced than at any other comparable period during the past month.

II CLO SURES

Inc # 1 - APPENDIX "A"
Inc # 2 - Ordnance Depots
Inc # 3 - The Rhine Bridges
Inc # 4 - Enemy Disposition

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APPENDIX "A" TO SUMMARY NUMBER 20 DATED 3 FEBRUARY 1945

PANZER BASE CENTER

A Pansor Base is a center where unserviceable armored force vehicles are reconditioned or replaced, and where new or repaired armor and spare parts swait collection by field units. Thus, a Panzer Base comprises workshops, spare parts depots, offices, and storage facilities which may be spread over a considerable area. Of the three Panzer Bases located on the western front, two are in the Sixth Army Group area; Panzer Base Center, near KAISKRSLAUTERN (R 0094); and Panzer Base South, near Promiser (R 7133).

The head restrict Section 1s now at Vilmanger. Installations in the immediate vicinity which may be a part of the Base are shown on Enclosure #1. It will be noted that the road and mail nots are adequate, and that installations are widely enough dispersed to render complete destruction unlikely. A workshop company is located in OTTERBERG, repairing tanks and motor vehicles in buildings on both sides of the road leading to OTTERBACH.

Additional repair facilities are available at SIEGELBACH, where normally dense natural cover has been artificially thickened to provide concealment for a camouflaged workshop tent 60 meters long, and for a small wooden shack which serves as an office building. A report of 19 December 1944 mentions vehicles parked under the trees beginning at the north edge of the woods, and extending south in a single line along either side of the road. Approximately 20 tanks and 40 - 50 trucks were reported ready for use, in addition to the vehicles under repair. Later information reveals another large tank, truck and repair point just northeast of MAISERSLAUTERN at R 049952, not shown on Enclosure No. 1.

Winterizing equipment for armored vehicles is available at the HOHERCKEN depot, and further supplies at EINSIEDLERHOF, where a large ordnance depot, reported in September, may still be functioning. A very large ordnance depot just east of KAISERSLAUTERN, at R 060945, is housed in six large storage buildings, and eight sheds. It is a major installation served by five reilroad spurs and a good roadnet. It was bombed on 30 December, but damage appears so slight that the instellation is probably still functioning. Spare parts are stored at FRANKENSTEIN, where an underground wine cellar, built 60 meters deep into the side of a hill, is used as a depot for replacement motors, tracks, and other spare parts for Pz Kw III, IV, and V. Conveniently at hand is the tank factory at NIEDERFELS, a 1 1/2 story building at the south end of town, between the main highway and the railroad tracks. Pz Kw III and IV bodies, and Pz Kw III, IV, and V, motors are constructed here.


Only little is known about Panzer Base South. A FW taken on 11 December located a tank spare depot called Panzer Base South in a former cellulose factory at MALSCH (R 430324), west of PFORZHEIM. Parts for all types of armored force vehicles are stored there. Photo interpretation and ground information of 20 January 1945 confirm this statement. Much track activity and vehicles parked in the area tend to confirm the report that this is a tank and motor transport repair depot.

Other ordnance installations in the immediate vicinity of the present 6th Army Group Front Lines are shown on Enclosure No. 2.


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
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
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
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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 21

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 10 FEBRUARY 1945

SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The departure of all known reserves from the SAAR-PALATINATE for other fronts and the destruction of the German Nineteenth Army's offensive power in southern ALSACE have placed the enemy entirely on the defensive in these areas.

Army Group G is supervising First German Army, whose sector extends from the MOSELLE River to the RHIVE River. Operations are controlled by the following corps: IXXXII Infantry (11 Pz, 256 Inf, and 416 Inf Divs); LXXXV Infantry (719 Inf, and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 Inf, 17 SS FG and 559 Inf Divs); XX Infantry (6 SS Mtn, and 36 Inf Divs); LXXXIX Infantry (245 Inf, 47 Inf, and 257 Inf Divs).

The exigencies of other fronts forced Army Group G to regroup its forces considerably. LXXXV Infantry Corps was shifted from the Seventh Army to the First Army, moving in between LXXXII Infantry and XIII SS Corps, with no change in actual divisional strength. This probably permitted the direct subordination of LXXXIX Corps to First Army. Two more divisions (21 Pz end 10 SS) left the front; their sectors were covered by a shift of 257 Infantry Division and the assumption of organizational control by 905 Divisional Staff. 256 Infantry Division moved across the front and was identified operating in conjunction with 11 Panzer Division, whose relief it is now in position to effect. 6 SS Mountain Division spread its forces thinly over the sector vacated by 256 and 257 Infantry Divisions. The general debility of Army Group G's front in organic divisional units is probably partially made up by Volkssturm infantry and a larger allottment of GHQ troops, particularly artillery. There is a possibility that elements salvaged from the Nineteenth Army may be used, but no other reserves seem at this time available.

The Nineteenth Army was destroyed as an effective fighting force. By 1200. hours on 10 February over 22,000 permanent casualties could be charged against it, as well as the loss of 55 armored vehicles and 66 artillery pieces. It is estimated that no more than 3,000/4,000 combat infantry effectives were successfully evacuated, with only a slightly higher figure for supporting arms and service troops. They could serve as cadre for rebuilding two or three very weak divisions. The present shortage of headquarters and staffs may cause a rapid meidentification of some of the higher formations, particularly the corps headquarters, but their relation to the units beaten in scuthern ALSACE will be only numerical.

East of the RHINE it is assumed that Army Group OBERRHEIN has returned to its preoperations status of OBERRHEIN Defense Command. Its command is exercised through XIV SS and XVIII SS Corps southward along the RHINE to a point near FREIBURG where Twenty-fourth Army assumes control. Twenty-fourth Army has been confirmed as definitely in control of the Swiss border region and the upper RHINE south of BADENWEILER (V 9513), known to be the headquarters of XVIII SS Corps in late January.

The ultimate role of Nineteenth Army is still conjectural. From its present headquarters at BADENIEILER, it will at least temporarily assume command of the area east of the former pocket, while its remnants reassemble. It may be used in an operational role under Army Group G, relieving the First Army of the HARDT Mountain - RHIME River sector. Finally, it may remain in the eastern RHIME Valley, exercising administrative control over the miscellaneous units which garrison the region. However, since the function of command in this area is administrative rather than operational, this possibility is the least likely.

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b. Capabilities

For the moment the enemy has only one capability on the Sixth Army Group front: namely, to defend himself. In the northern sector he can attempt to hold on the successive positions of (1) the present line; (2) the MAGINOT Line and the line of the RHINE; and (3) the SIECFRIED Line. Limited objective spoiling attacks can be launched in the SALR area. Along the RHINE he is capable only of harassing raids while he marshals his forces for the defensive.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FROMT (Saar-Vosges Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing Sixth US Army Group were as follows: VOIXLINGEN (Q 3573), FOREACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), HAGUENAU (R 0424), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517), South along RHINE River to the Swiss Border.

THE ENEMY STRENGTH FIGURE GIVEN IN SIXTH US JRMY GROUP WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMIRIES LIWLYS REPRESENTS THE COMBAT INFAMIRY EFFECTIVES, UNLESS QUALIFIED. IT INCLUDES ALL PERSONNEL OF THE UNIT INF. MIRY OR PANZER CHEMADIER REGIMENTS, THE RECONNAISSANCE OR FUSILIER BATTALION, THE REINFORCEMENT BATTALION, AND THE COMBAT ENGINEER BATTALION. SUPPORTING OR AUXILIARY TROOPS ARE NOT COUNTED IN THE COMBAT INFAMIRY EFFECTIVE STRENGTH, SINCE ESTIMITION OF THEIR STRENGTH MUST USULLLY BE CONTECTURAL AND UITHOUT STRENGTH, SINCE ESTIMITION OF THEIR STRENGTH MUST USULLLY BE CONTECTURAL AND UITHOUT EVEN THE DOUBTFUL BASIS OF THE NUMBER OF KNOWN CASUARTIES AND INTERROGATION REPORTS. EVEN THE DOUBTFUL BASIS OF THE NUMBER OF SUPPORTING TROOPS, BOTH DIVISIONAL AND GHO, ARE TO BE DOED IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A FIGURE REPRESENTING THE ENEMY'S OVERALL COMBAT STRENGTH.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Gen. BLASKOVITZ?)

There have been a number of reports which indicate that BLASKOUTTZ has been transferred to an Army Group command on the Eastern front. However, this change has not yet been confirmed. His possible successor is not known.

- (1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)
 - (a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOERNLEIN)

Corps headquarters has been at WADERN (L 3904) since 6 December 1944. An identification on 1 February placed it specifically in a building at the road bend approximately 70 yards southeast of the village church.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) had only a short rest after its withdrawal from the BITCHE area, for elements of it have already been contacted south of the MOSELLE. So far, however, only 256 Artillery Regiment has been identified, at L 0504 on 7 February. It is believed that the rest of the division will soon go into line to take the place of 11 Panzer Division. Combat infantry strength of division: 2,000.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) is responsible for the line from the MOSELLE to the vicinity of L 0205. Identifications: 712 Grenadier Regiment, on 5 February at L 1399 and L 1498; 713 Grenadier Regiment, on 7 February at L 0502; 714 Grenadier Regiment, on 4 February at L 0502. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 3,500.

11 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. von WIETERSHEIM) was identified in the same general area as 416 Infantry Division, suggesting that the two divisions may have been engaged on a combined mission with 11 Panzer lending support with its mobile and armored forces. Only 110 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was met during the period, at L 0504 on 7 February. It is believed that the bulk of the division has been withdrawn. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 4,000 supported by about 50 tanks.

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(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNIESS)

The presence of this corps in the SAAR was established by prisoner statements that it controlled 719 Infantry and 347 Infantry Divisions. It formerly formed part of the German Seventh Army in the ARDENNES sector.

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GEDE) is holding a broad front from MERZIC to a point immediately north of SAARLAUTERN. 719 Fusilier Battalion was the only unit identified during the period, at Q 2981 on 4 February. Reinforcements were received at the end of January from 34 Reserve Grenadier Regiment. Combat infantry effective strength is estimated at 4,500.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) is holding the sector from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2982) to east of FORBACH (Q 4263). Recent identifications of 860 Regiment disprove the assumption that it had been completely absorbed by 861 Regiment and make it appear that such dissolution as took place was merely a temporary measure. In addition, 880 Grenadier Regiment received reinforcements in the form of 80 and 107 Replacement Battalions of 172 Reserve Division, 347 Field Replacement Battalion, and 5 company of 861 Grenadier Regiment. In all probability, the division has acquired 880 Regiment in order to provide the necessary troops to bring it up to the standard 3 regiment - 2 battalion basis. During the period, the following units were identified: 860 Regiment on 6 February at Q 3567; and 880 Regiment at Q 3665 and 4065 on 7 February. Last contact with 861 Regiment was on 29 January. Generally, the division proved to be more aggressive than it had been for quite some time. For on 7 February it mounted a small scale attack in the OETING (Q 4064) area which forced the withdrawal of friendly outposts. Combat infantry strength is carried at 2,400.

(c) XIII JS Corps (OG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. ÉRITZEIMAYR) continued to hold the sector from east of FORFACH (Q 4263) to Q 6055 and was comparatively inactive during the period. The 59 Grenadier Regiment which was identified on 7 February at Q 4862 evidently has an extremely weak I Battalion and there is some doubt as to whether or not the II Battalion has been reconstituted. The only other identification made during the period was that of 119 Artillery Regiment on 7 February at Q 5057. 74 Grenadier Regiment was last contacted on 1 February while 73 Grenadier Regiment has not put in an appearance since 7 January. The division combat infantry effective strength, including Battle Group KLEIN, is estimated at 1,700.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: Col. KLINGENBERG) continued to hold the sector from Q 6055 to the BITCHE area at Q 7750. During the period the division maintained relatively close contact, probably due to its recent strengthening and the consequent boost in aggressive spirit. 37 SS and 38 SS Grenadier Regiments were identified on the 6th and 7th of February respectively, the latter at Q 6353. 17 SS Reconnaissance Battalion was also identified on 5 February at Q 6455.

The division has received considerable reinforcements recently.

Some 700 effectives for the grenadier regiments arrived from IGLAU (CZECHOSLOVAKIA).

The reconnaissance battalion is also reported to have been brought up to strength.

Considering this rejuvenation, combat infantry effectives of the division are now estimated at 2,500. Battle Group KENTER, with a strength of 300, is still believed to be in reserve, although it was not contacted during the week. It is believed that the estimated number of tanks and SP guns operating with the division has risen to approximately 40.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von MUEHLEN) holds a sector from the woods south of BITCHE to Q 7545 with 1126 and 1127 Grenadier Regiments in line. Lost identifications were: 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 6 February in the vicinity of Q 7446; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 7 February in the vicinity of Q 7549. 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment has not been identified for a long period and may be undergoing reconstitution. 1126 Grenadier Regiment received a small number of replacements but no further refitting seems to have taken place within the division. A scarcity of heavy weapons has been noted within the unit for it has been proven that some of the battalion heavy weapons companies do not exist. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,200.

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(d) XC Corps (CG: ?)

further to the west as 257 Volksgrenadier Division went out of line. The division is now defending stubbornly from Q 7545 to Q 8435. Identifications: 11 SS Mountain Regiment, 4 February at Q 7639 and Q 7441, 8 February at Q 7639; 12 SS Mountain Regiment, 5 February at Q 7639; 6 SS Mountain Artillery Regiment, 9 February at Q 8237. Thus the weatward extension of the divisional sector was accomplished by 11 Mountain Regiment sidestepping from the left to the right flank of 12 Mountain Regiment. Partial reorganization within the infantry component took place as returning convelescents and rear schelon personnel were allotted to both regiments. Some companies were dissolved in the process of consolidation. Combat infantry strength totals approximately 2,200.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLM) is committed from Q 8435 to Q 9028. Close contact was maintained during the period as the following units were identified: 87 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 5 and 7 February at Q 8532; 118 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 8 February at Q 8929; 165 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 4 February at Q 8631. 87 and 165 Grenadier Regiments continue to have only one battalion each in the area, the others presumably remaining at HAUMHOLDER. Not including these battalions which should have been ready for commitment several weeks ago, the divisional combat infantry strength is estimated to be 2,000, including 51 German Air Force Fortress Battalion.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

245 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KECLER) is holding a very narrow sector between 36 and 47 Infantry Divisions. During the period, the units of the division were not satisfactorily identified due to the quiet which prevailed on the front. Combat infantry strength is 2,500 men.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was in very light contact during the period. The only identification was that of 104 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9228, indicating a slight westward shift. 47 Volksgrenadier Division is believed to cover from Q 9128 to R 0225. Casualties during the period seem to have been negligible and combat infantry effectives are estimated at 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. SEIDEL). As mentioned above, this division was withdrawn from its old sector south of 559 Volksgrenadier Division on or about 4 February. It lost no time in moving east to the HAGUENAU area where it, in turn, relieved 10 SS Panzer Division. The following identifications were made in its new sector from R 0225 to north of BISCHVILLER (R 1020); 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 9 February at R 0324; 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 7 February at OBERHOFFEN (R 0919); 477 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 9 February, at R 0920. Since there have been no indications of replacements, combat infantry strength is carried at 1,700.

10 SS Panzer Division (CG: SS Brig. Gen. HARMEL) left Sixth US Army Group front about 6 February. PU's claimed their destination was to be the BERLIN front. At the time of its relief by 257 Volksgrenadier Division, 10 SS still had combat infantry strength of approximately 2,800, supported by about 50 tanks and assault guns. Considerable replacements had been received prior to the division's departure.

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- c. OBERRHEIN DEFENCE COMMAND
 - (1) XIV SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. von dem BACH-ZELE SKI)

statements to have taken over the group of miscellaneous units formerly under control of 553 Volksgrenedien Divisional Staff. A captured code list dated 1 February placed the following units under its control: 2 SS Police Regt (GIESETE), comprised of II Bn 2 SS Police Regt, III Bn 2 SS Police Regt, and VI Gren En OBERRHEIN (MORG); 2 Gren Regt OBERRHEIN (MARBACH), comprised of Police School HEIDENHEIM (GRUTZNER), I Gren Bn Army NCO School ETTLINGEN (TREUTZLER), Gren Bn XIII Corps Area NCO School (SCHMIDT), and IV Gren Bn OBERRHEIN (MAGNER); 1514 Fortress Arty Bn (SCHMITZ); 1539 Fortress Arty Bn (MAYER); 405 Engr Bn (TERJUNG); PZ Engr Co FELDHERRNHALLE; 831 Engr Bn; 833 Mtn Engr Bn; 68 AA Regt; 405 AT Bn; and AA Hq TAUCHNITZ. Both its number and location suggest that it is a Wehrkreis V unit. The strength total of the former 553 Division subsidiaries has been reduced considerably by casualties and by the identification of a few of its units in the VOSGES pocket. In addition, elements of 2 SS Police Regiment were identified at R O621, in the 257 Volksgrenadier Division sector on 7 February. The other sub-units which were not identified during the period, are believed to be responsible for the sector from R 1020 to the RHINE (R 1614). Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 1,500.

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CC: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER). The staff of this division was withdrawn in all probability for reorganization. There had been reports of 1120 Grenadier Regiment reforming in PFORZHEIM and prisoners claimed that the reconstruction of the division was to take place in south-west Germany. Thus it is possible that the whole division is now being rebuilt in the PFORZHEIM

405 zbV Division remains responsible for a portion of the SIEGFRIED Line in the Black Forest.

(2) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH or ROTH)

30 SS Grenadier Division continues to be carried in the OFFENBURG-

(3) Twenty-fourth Army (CG: Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

This headquarters is now accepted on the strength of several documentary and prisoner interrogation reports. It has been located variously at BADENWEILER (V 91) and ENGEN (W 7717). It controls the Swiss border area for a distance of approximately 50 kilometers north of the border.

- (4) Nineteenth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RLSP)
 - (a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HELMUT THUMM)

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DECEN) is considered virtually destroyed, having lost over 4,700 men in prisoners and at least 1,000 other casualties during its commitment in the VOSGES. The predominantly austrian personnel of the division gave a poor account of itself, as indicated by the relatively high rate of desertion.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. E.RTEL) was engaged heavily to the end and fought well. Approximately 1,000 prisoners were taken and the division may have managed to rescue about 500 of its effectives. Colonel BARTEL was reported to have succeeded Brigadier General SCHIEL as division commander.

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416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER). As mentioned above, this division shares the MOSWIE-MERZIG (Q 2095) sector with 256 Volksgrenadier Division. The division was in close contact during the period and suffered casualties in several engagements. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 3,500.

11 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. von WIETERSHEIM). Last contact was made on 10 February. The division is accepted as being out of line. Higher Headquarters and Tac-Reports suggest that the division has crossed the Moselle River and is entraining for a new destination. Combat infantry strength was estimated at 4,000 men supported by 50 tanks.

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNIESS)

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GAEDE) continued to hold the line from MERZIG (Q 2095) to SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880). 743 Grenadier Regiment was identified at Q 2981 on 13 February; other elements of the division were met ut Q 2880 on 15 February. Combat infantry strength is unchanged at 4,500.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) remained inactive throughout the period in its old sector from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880) to FORBACH (Q 4263). The following identifications were made: 860 Grenadier Regiment, on 10 February in the vicinity of Q 3568, on 15 February vicinity Q 3369; 880 Grenadier Regiment, on 10 February in the vicinity of Q 3863, on 16 February vicinity Q 4063; 861 Grenadier Regiment is unidentified since 30 January. Some replacements were received from the BERLIN area on 5 February. Prisoners confirmed the absence of heavy weapons companies in the battalions of this unit. A similar lack was reported by prisoners from 559 Volksgrenadier Division. The 1945 Infantry Division Table of Organization provides for concentration of heavy weapons from the rifle companies into the heavy weapons companies of the battalions and the regiment. Possible explanations for the prisoner statements may be the use of the heavy weapons companies either as divisional reserve or in static fortified positions, while the rifle companies continue to be employed in the front line. Combat infahtry strength is now carried at 2,400.

(c) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZEIMAYR) remained in very loose contact from FORBACH (Q 4263) to Q 5957. The only units identified during the period were 73 Grenadier Regiment at Q 5758 on 11 February and 74 Grenadier Regiment at Q 5057 on 16 February. Including the Battle Group KLEIN, combat infantry effectives are estimated at 1,700.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: Col. KLINGENBERG) holds the line from Q 5957 to Q 7453. Identifications were as follows: 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 7055 on 11 February and Q 6657 on 15 February; 38 SS Panzer Gremadier Regiment at Q 7541 on 11 February, at Q 5154 on 12 February, at Q 5957 and Q 6256 on 15 February, and at Q 6555 on 16 February; 17 SS Panzer Battalion (Assault Gun) at Q 6555 on 16 February; 17 SS Reconnaissance Battalion in the vicinity of Q 5953 on 16 February. The division offered initially weak resistance against our attack on RIMLING (Q 6555) on 15 February, but rallied later to stage a counterattack with armored support in an unsuccessful attempt to reestablish their line. The division lost seven self propelled guns in these operations.

Prisoner statements exemplify the efforts of German units on this front to cope with the situation with only their presently allotted means. The Assault Gun battalion, organized on a basis of a headquarters company plus three 15 SP gun companies, was held in reserve well behind the line for employment only in counterattacks. The Reconnaissance battalion has a headquarters company plus 4 companies and includes amphibious jeeps. Some of the Artillery battalions are horse drawn. The formation of a reserve within each rifle company was standard practice before they went into action.

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b. Capabilities

The reorganization of First Army mentioned above has not effectively increased its overall defensive capability. The enemy is making the most of his long experimence in defendive tastice to stave off the eventual breakthrough. Along the entire Army Group G front his defensive role daily becomes less a capability and more an inescapable necessity.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Sear-Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing Sixth US Army Group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), RIMLING (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), HAGUENAU (R 0424), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517), South along Rhine River to the Swiss Border.

THE ENEMY STRENGTH FIGURE GIVEN IN SIXTH US ARMY GROUP WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES ALWAYS REPRESENTS THE COMBAT INFANTRY EFFECTIVES, UNLESS QUALIFIED. IT INCLUDES ALL PERSONNEL OF THE UNIT INFANTRY OR PANZER GRENADIER REGIMENTS, THE RECONNAISSANCE OR FUSILIER BATTALION, THE REINFORCEMENT BATTALION, AND THE COMBAT ENGINEER BATTALION, SUPPORTING OR AUXILLARY TROOPS ARE NOT COUNTED IN THE COMBAT INFANTRY EFFECTIVE STRENGTH, SINCE ESTIMATION OF THEIR STRENGTH MUST USUALLY BE CONJECTURAL AND VITHOUT EVEN THE DOUBTFUL BASIS OF THE NUMBER OF KNOWN CASUALTIES AND INTERROGATION REPORTS.

IT IS ALWAYS ASSUMED THAT A PROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF SUPPORTING TROOPS, BOTH DIVISIONAL AND GHQ, ARE TO BE ADDED IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A FIGURE REPRESENTING THE ENEMY'S OVERALL COMBAT STRENGTH.

b. ARMY GROUP G '(CG: SS General HAUS ER)

Higher Headquarters reports that the recently promoted Oberstgruppenfuhrer (Gen) HAUSSER probably commands Army Group G, replacing Gereral BLASKO ITZ, repeatedly reported assuming responsibilities on the Eastern front.

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The First Army continued to readjust and organize its defensive positions with 12 Divisions in line between the Moselle and the Rhine and two divisions in reserve.

245 Infantry Division (Acting CO: Col. WAGNER) has not been identified satisfactorily since 31 January. It was squeezed out of line by 36 and 47 Volks-grenadier Divisions. The division was withdrawn from line for refitting and at the same time is to serve as Army reserve. The division's strength is 2,000 combat infantry effectives.

Unidentified Division. Heavy military railroad traffic was revealed by tactical reconnaissance to be moving into First German Army area during the early days of the period. The arrival of a divisional formation is accepted on the basis of these train movements. The current situation and the direction of rail traffic make it probable that the unit is one of those formerly under Nineteenth Army.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) committed its three organic regiments about 10 February in completing the relief of 11 Panzer Division. Conflicting identifications obscure the precise divisional sector and, for the present, it can only be stated that 256 and 416 Divisions are responsible for the line from the MOSELLE to MERZIG (Q 2095). 256 Volksgrenadier Division was able to replace some of the losses incurred at BITCHE in January, but its refitting was incomplete and the division is still under strength. Combat infantry strength is estimated at about 2,000.

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 22

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 17 FEBRUARY 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The defensive attitude of the enemy on the Sixth US Army Group front has continued. In fact, the low priority of this front leaves him no other choice but to struggle along with only those forces presently available in the area.


Army Group G has undoubtedly assumed full command of the SAAR-PALATINATE-BADEN front, with its boundaries limited on the north by the Moselle River and on the south by the Swiss Border. In addition to the First Army, it now has under control the remaining operational elements of the Nineteenth Army. Its mission remains the same: to provide the mobile forces necessary to maintain the integrity of the SIEGFRIED positional defenses. For this, Army Group G can count only on the immediate rehabilitation of Nineteenth Army's defeated divisions as a reserve, as long as the German High Command appreciates an obviously defensive mission for Sixth US Army Group.

First German Army was forced to compensate for the loss of an armored division by some reorganization within its component formations. It continues to operate on its front from the Moselle to DRUSENHEIM (R 1618) through the following corps: LXXXII Infantry (256 VG and 416 Inf Divs); LXXXV Infantry (719 and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 VG, 17 SS PG, and 559 VG Divs); XC Infantry (6 SS Mtn and 36 VG Divs); and LXXXIX Infantry (47 VG, 257 VG, and 905 zbV Divs). Train movements indicate the arrival of an unidentified formation of divisional size, which may turn out to be 2 Mountain Division. On the other hand, the departure of 11 Panzer Division has impaired the fighting efficiency of the First Army to a considerable extent. In this emergency, the creation of reserves became a paramount necessity. The weak 245 Infantry Division moved out of line where it could be rehabilitated and serve simultaneously as Army reserve. The divisions in the line created sector reserves by thinning out the elements in contact, except where the immediate threat was obvious. The reorganization of two-regiment divisions on a three-regiment/two battalion basis afforded ease of maneuver for this redeployment, while three-regiment divisions merely moved one regiment out of contact. In addition, Volksgrenadier Divisions have made fuller use of the organic anti-tank battalion's 14 SP guns by employing them consistently in a counterattacking role. This tactical redeployment has resulted in an enemy capability to effect immediate, if limited, shock action against attempted penetrations especially in sectors where the objective is apparent or to which the approach is canalized by terrain features. There CHQ mobile formations are available, the enemy can still make initial penetration of his defenses most difficult.


Nineteenth German Army has apparently assumed operational control of the mobile units east of the Rhine. Some documentary evidence and observation of train movements indicate two general assembly areas. LXIV Corps has moved northward toward KEHL with 708 Volksgrenadier, 716 Infantry and 198 Infantry Divisions. In the BADEN.EILER (V 9513) area, XVIII SS Corps may have taken the place of the apparently defunct LXIII Corps. Of the remaining units, there is slight evidence for northward movement of 106 Panzer Brignde and 2 Mountain Division, the latter probably into First Army's area.

No change has been noted in the status of OBERRHEIN Defense Command, except for the probable transition of XVIII SS Corps from a purely administrative to an operational function. The presence of Nineteenth Army Headquarters in the area has relieved the Defense Command of any operational duties it may have had. Twenty-fourth Army remains in control of the Swiss border region.

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189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Lt. Col. JUNGE) was mauled very badly in its defense of COIMAR. 1,250 FW's were taken from it and it is not believed that more then 300 combat effectives succeeded in crossing the RHINE. Lt. Col. JUNGE, excommander of 1213 Grenadier Regiment, was stated to have relieved Colonel ZORN.

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKWENN) was not contacted during the period. It is believed to have pulled its battered remnants across the river about 3 February, but it is not believed that more than 500 combat infantry effectives remained.

16 Volksgrenadier Division 100, 1845, Car. HAGARE, 1005 av 1east 1,500 prisoners. A captured order sets the phases of withdrawal from 4 to 7 February. During this period the division was to offer delaying action on consecutive lines, finally holding a sector along the HLL River south-west of DESSENHEIM (V 8130). The following units were attached to the division: Regiment GROSSJOHANN, AZERBEIDJAN Legion (BG LANG?), 3 Grenadier Battalion OBERRHEIN, 360 Cossack Regiment, 4 Border Guard Battalion, Regiment Group 1214 (189 VG Div), SS Battalion ELLWANGEN, BG SCHLAGER, and 1516 Fortress Artillery Battalion. A good part of these units managed to extricate themselves, but organic combat infantry elements of 16 Volksgrenadier Division that survived amount to not more than 400.

(b) LXIII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. ABRAHAM)

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EJERT) managed to pull the bulk of its units out of the VOSGES area, before the closing of the Allied pincers movement succeeded. However, this initial escape did not relieve the division's plight, because 757 Grenadier Regiment suffered very heavy casualties when committed south of COIMAR, 758 Grenadier Regiment was destroyed in the ILL-THUR triangle, and 759 Regiment was mauled during its hasty retreat. 1750 Phis were taken and not more than 400 combat infantry effectives got to the east bank of the RHINE

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BURCKY) finally abandoned CERNAY, after a stubborn defense that is estimated to have cost the division 800 killed or permanently disabled and 1,200 prisoners. Remnants total 400 combat infantry effectives.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) 426 dead attest to the heavy losses suffered by the division in its determined defense of the area north of MULHOUSE. Prisoners totalled over 800. 736 Grenadier Regiment, never identified, was not included in a captured list of component units dated 16 January. Thus the dissolution of this regiment can be accepted. Remnants of the others do not exceed 300 combat infantry effectives.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH SDXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Sear-Vosges Front) (See note on strength, page 2, paragraph 2)

Units in Contact and Divisional Rerserve:
(Combat Infantry Effectives)
Seventh US Army Front
First French Army Front
4,000
Artillery Effectives:
Seventh US Army Front
Reserves:
Estimated Reserves in SAAR
Estimated Reserves in Black Forest
10,000
T O T A L
52,500

Tanks and SP Guns:
Seventh US Army Front 80-10
Reserve (11 Pz Div) 40-5

(*) Remnants of Nineteenth Army

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3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT /Alning Front

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEV.L SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M T.BOR (K 3022), ALGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBLE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

Continuous rumors about withdrawal of German units from the .lpine front and their replacement by Italian units have not as yet been substantiated by more precise information. However, line crossers from the S.ORGE (N 8309) region indicated that some, or even possibly all, of the German artillery units in the northern part of the ROY. River valley have been replaced by Italian artillery units. This information, if correct, could explain reports about additional German artillery that had arrived in the S.N REMO area.

Furthermore ground sources reported repeatedly that the German High Command of the Alpine from has received orders to begin the retreat in PIEDMONT, leaving the responsibility for the entire Alpine front to Italian units. However, this plan has apparently been abandoned due to the present conditions of roads, the use of gasoline substitutes, and the necessity for night road movements, all of which would create too great a risk of losing all heavy material.

Few identifications were made due to lack of contact because of the weather conditions in the high mountain passes. During the period only the 253 and 107 Grenadier Regiments of the 34 Infantry Division were identified.

Until further clarification, it is accepted that elements of 5 Mountain Division are still part of the ilpine front garrison intermingled with elements of the MONTE ROSA and LITTORIO Divisions.

b. Enemy Strength

The lack of positive information on the strength of Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult. It is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000, with 60% carried as combat effectives.

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4. OPERATIONS

In spite of stubborn enemy resistance to the French forces advancing from the south at the beginning of the period the enemy's west-east bridge route across the THUR River was out by the capture of ENSISHEIM (V 7118). Immediately thereafter, crossings were made at 'ITTELSHEIM (V 6312) which caused the opposition along the THUR to collapse and paved the way for the immediate capture of RAEDERSHEIM (V 6523) and SOULTZ (V 6222). During this period the enemy was attempting to evacuate his forces from the VOSGES between RHEINROPF (V 4334) and the SCHLUCT pass (V 4740). In the north he stiffened his resistance along the line HERRLISHEIM-HUSSEREN (V 6637) to assist the VOSGES evacuation and simultaneously put up a strong defence in the NEUF BRISACH area supported by heavy artiflery fire from the KAISERSTUHL across the river. The junction of friendly troops from the north and south was finally made at ROUFFACH (V 6728) on 5 February, encircling an estimated 1,000 enemy in the VOSGES.

The next day, our forces found the western approach to the ERISACH bridge unusable while to the east, the ILL River Line from ST CROIX EN PLAINE (V 7334) to NIEDERENTZEN (V 7428) was completelely secured.

By 7 February the area between the RHINE-RHONE Canal and the III River had been cleared of enemy and NEUF ERISACH was completely in our hands. At this point in the battle the only bridge over the RHINE remaining for enemy use was the damaged MEUNBURG bridge at V 8512 but additional means were being improvised by the extensive use of ferries. The strong enemy opposition to bridgehead attempts at IIE NAPOLEON (V 7407) was overcome and our advance began in the HARTH Forest. In the north, stragglers continued to be ferreted out of the hills as GUEENILLER was taken. The RHINE was cleared as far south as BALGAU (V 8525). Contact along the entire perimeter of the remaining front was made only with disorganized remmants who appeared to be under instructions to make their way across the RHINE individually as best they could. The 3 mile bridgehead which remained before CHALAMPE (V 8513) on 8 February collapsed the next day at 0800 when the southern ALSACE pocket was officially declared clear. At the end of the period only large calibre artillery fire from the opposite bank broke the tranquillity of First French Army's WACHT AM RHEIN.

Saar-Palatinate Front

In the HAGUENAU area, ROHRUILLER (R 1217) was cleared early in the period, but subsequent advance in this area was slowed by floods and heavy enemy fire. OBERHOFFEN (R 0920) and DRUSENHEIM (R 1518) were stubbornly defended by vigirous infantry counterattacks supported by tanks. By 7 February OFFENDORF (R 1212) and HERRLISHEIM (R 1214) were found evacuated but heavily mined and booby trapped.

The enemy proved alert to our patrols in the area of BITCHOFFEN (Q 9028) during the period where continuous rear area activity and movement were reported.

In the HARDT Mountain sector the enemy appeared to be digging in to compensate for his extended line of defence. Patrol raids on BISCHOLTZ (Q 8532) and ROTHRACH (Q 8434) inflicted heavy enemy casualties but found him expectant.

In the area west of the HARDT small enemy attacks and infiltrations were attempted south of BLIESBRUCK (Q 5957), and at Q 7447. South of OETING (Q 4063) friendly outposts were forced to withdraw slightly. Light resistance was made to friendly raids on GROSBLIEDERSTROFF (Q 4862), while the enemy was observed defending the woods of LE BRANDERSUSCH (Q 4763). By the end of the period activity had diminished to occasional spurts of small arms and automatic weapons fire.

On the ALPINE Front two Italian Marines, together with a fifteen foot motorboat, two depth charges and a twenty-one inch torpedo, were captured on 5/6 February at 5 7683. On 9/10 February there fell into our hands two line crossers, one enemy agent, one German deserter and a Russian deserter.

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Sixth A Go., G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary, Week ending 10 Feb 1945

B. STATUS OF ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS

The Tactical and Strategic air forces continued to launch successful air attacks on enemy marshalling yards and communication centers as well as effecting 121 rail cuts and destroying 6 rail and 2 road bridges during the period. A large part of the damage wrought was concentrated in the FREIBURG - DONAUESCHINGEN - OFFENBURG triangle causing heavy damage to equipment and temporarily halting through traffic along these lines. In order to offset the disruption caused by these aerial bombardments, it was necessary for the enemy to rely largly upon motor transport in order to effect the eastward evacuation of troops and equipment from the NEUENEERG - REEISACH area. Direct rail movement to TUTTLINGEN and STUTTGART from the DONAU - ESQHIMGEN - FREIBURG - OFFENBURG area was also brought to a temporary standstill as a result of these attacks.

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5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

The total liquidation of the VOSCES Pocket brought with it large-scale with-drawals of men and equipment along the roads and railroads leading north and east from FREIBURG. To the north, indications of enemy departures were evident in the extremely heavy activity noted in the RHINE Valley from K.RLSRUHE to BINGEN. Lines running east from the RHINE likewise revealed some movement away from our front. Activity in the SAAR points to normal supply movements as well as redeployment of enemy forces.

The close of the current period saw the last enemy elements driven across the RHINE from the COIMAR Pocket leaving bridges at CHALAMPE and BRIGACH demolished. The roads leading north and east to FREIBUAG and ETTENHEIM were very active as trucks, motorcycles, tanks, and armored force vehicles, moved toward assemble areas, rail centers and main lines of communication. Heavy activity along the OFFENBURG -FREIBURG rail axis suggests the arrival and formation of trains destined to alleviate the problems of speedy evacuation. Later in the week, lines running north and east from OFFENBURG revealed traffic moving away from the battle area, thus substantiating the view that military withdrawals were underway.

All along the RHINE Valley from KARLSRUHE as far north as BINGEN, extremely heavy rail activity prevailed throughout the entire period. More than 100 trains were observed in this area, with the prependerance of traffic moving north and east away from our front. In the vicinity of BINGEN, light to moderate two way rail traffic was noticed.

Slight rail activity, probably representing the movement of replacements and supplies, was noted along east-west lines leading from the east into the SAAR. The moderately heavy activity noted in the KAISERSLAUTERN - NEUNKIRCHEN - ZWEIBRUCKEN area is possibly the source of the light traffic seen moving north via B.D KREUZNACH toward MAINZ or BINGEN, suggesting some departure from the SAAR.

B. Status of Enemy Communications

The Tactical and Strategic air forces continued to launch successful air attacks on enemy marshalling yards and communication centers as well as effecting 121 rail cuts and destroying 6 rail and 2 road bridges during the period. A large part of the damage wrought was concentrated in the FREIBURG - DONAUESCHINGEN -OFFENBURG triangle causing heavy damage to equipment and temporarily halting through traffic along these lines. In order to offset the disruption caused by these aerial bombardments, it was necessary for the enemy to rely largly upon motor transport in order to effect the eastward evacuation of troops and equipment from the NEUENBERG -BREISACH area. Direct rail movement to TUTTLINGEN and STUTNGART from the DONAU-ESCHINGEN - FREIBURG - OFFENBURG area was also brought to a temporary standstill as a result of these attacks.

> EUGENE L. HARRISON Colonel, G. S. C. A. C. of S., G-2

INC.

#1 Inc - The Rhine Bridges #2 Inc - Enemy Disposition

DISTRIBUTION

There were no indications of further reinforcements for the division during the period. On the basis of known casualties, division combat infantry strength is reduced to 2,300, supported by 40 SP guns.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von MCEHLEN) holds a sector from southwest of Briche (Q.7750) to Q.7543. Contact during the week was sporadic and the division maintained its generally passive attitude. Identifications were as follows: 1126 Volksgrenadier Division at Q.7446 on 14 February; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q.7448 on 12 February and at Q.7449 on 16 February. No replacements were received recently and the division is well below T/O strength, with combat infantry effectives numbering approximately 2,200.

(d) XC Corps (CG:

an alert defense of its broad sector from Q 7443 to Q 8433 through the HARDT Mountains. Lack of recent contact with 12 Mountain Regiment and identification of the Reconnaissance Battalion in the old regimental sector suggests that this regiment is in reserve. The following identifications were made during the period:

11 SS Mountain Regiment on 12 February vicinity Q 7639, and on 16 February at Q 7440;

12 SS Mountain Regiment on 10 February vicinity Q 7937; 6 SS Mountain Reconnaissance Battalion on 11 February vicinity Q 8337; 506 6S Panzer Grenadier Battalion, on 13 February vicinity Q 8434. Prisoners report that 6 SS Field Replacement Battalion is training 600 men in the rear areas. These reinforcements have arrived from an Austrian Mountain Replacement Battalion. PW's state that a small number of replacement have also been received by I/11 SS Mountain Regiment from 7 SS Mountain Division "Prinz EUGEN" in southeast Europe. Including the Field Replacement Battalion division combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,500.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig Gen. WELLM) was in light contact in its old sector from Q 8433 to Q 9228. PU's stated that the division CP was located at Q 932391. Only identifications were: 165 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 11 February vicinity Q 8630; 36 Engineer Battalion on 12 February vicinity Q 9128. There is no further news of the battalions supposedly reforming at BAUMHOLDER. The division is operating 2 regiments on line, with II Battalion/87 Grenadier Regiment and I Battalion/165 Grenadier Regiment forming one regiment (probably under command of 165 Regiment staff) and 118 Granadier Regiment the other. The strength of this weak division amounts to approximately 1,700 combat infantry effectives, including 51 German Air Force Fortress Battalion.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE).

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was relatively inactive throughout the period. Contact was made with 104 Grenadier Regiment on 14 February at Q 9527 and 115 Grenadier Regiment in vicinity of Q 9826 on 12, 15, and 16 Pebruary. The divisional sector remained unchanged, from Q 9228 to R 0225. Combat infantry effectives continue to be estimated at 1,500.

week in the OBERGOFFEN (R 0920) area, putting up a stubborn defense against repeated Allied assaults. All three regiments were in close contact during the period, with last identifications as follows: 457 Volksgrenadder Regiment on 14 February vicinity R 0424; 466 Volksgrenadder Regiment on 13 February at R 0921; 477 Volksgrenadder Regiment in OBERGOFFEN area. The division holds a line from R 0225 to R 1120. It was reported to have 9 assault guns left in 1257 Assault Gun Company. Of particular interest is the prisoner statement that a divisional mortar company, equipped with 15 X 120 mm mortars, was organized in January with personnel and armament from the regimental 13th companies. Battalions HARTIG and HELIMANN, formerly under 17 SS Division, were identified in support of 257 Division on 11 February. Approximately 250 replacements were received through 257 Field Replacement Battalion. However, losses in prisoners and other casualties more then offset this increase. Combat infantry effectives are now judged to be 1,000 plus 300 or the two attaches the second of the companies.

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905 Mobilization Division presumably remained in charge of the diverse units listed last week. Of these, Battalions SCHMIDT and TREUTLER of 2 Grenadier Regiment Oberrhein (MARB-CH) were identified at DRUSENHEIM (R 1518) on 10 February. Prisoners of war taken from the division confirm previous statements that the units responsibility includes a sector on the east bank of the Rhine River, the sector are not yet clear. Combat infantry offectives are estimated at 1,500.

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

At the time of its retreat across the Rhine, this army included 16, 159, 189, 708 Volkagrenedier Divisions, 198, 338, 716 Infantry Divisions and 2 Mountain Division as well as 106 Panzer Brigade. The army appears to have been allotted two assembly areas, one in the vicinity of FREIBURG-MUKLIHEIM-SCHONAU, and the other east of OFFENBURG. Rehabilitation and regrouping of these units is continuing.

LXIII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. ABRAHAM)

Strong negative information indicates that this corps has no longer any operational functions under Nineteenth Army.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HAECKEL) is still unlocated after its retreat across the Rhine. Permanent casualties are now estimated at 61 Officers and 1,751 enlisted men killed, captured or severely wounded. Scattered elements of all divisional units are believed to have extricated themselves from the pocket. However, remaining combat infantry effectives do not exceed 400 men.

159 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) is unlocated at present. However, it may be in the area south of FREIBURG. The permanent casualties suffered by the division totaled 43 Officers and 2,997 enlisted men. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 400.

189 Infantry Division (CO: Lt. Col. JUNGE) is unlocated, but it too is probably in the area south of FREIBURG. Known permanent casualties suffered by the division totaled 34 Officers and 1,609 enlisted men. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 300.

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EMART). The disposition of this divisional unit is not known. The division suffered permanent casualties totaling 55 Officers and 2,300 enlisted men. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 400 effectives.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN) is believed to have moved into the SAAR-PALATINATE area during the present period. The division had been previously reported doing police duty along the western fringes of the Black Forest. Prior to its escape from the COIMAR area the division suffered the highest losses of any unit under Nineteenth Army control. A permanent casualty total of 62 Officers and 6,026 enlisted personnel includes 4,764 registered prisoners of war. It is estimated that the maximum number of personnel evacuated from the COIMAR pocket amounts to 4,000 of all the arms and services, including attached units.

106 Panzer Brigade (CO:) managed to evacuate the pocket in fairly good order. Its present location is believed to be in the area ETTENHEIM (W 0662) - MAHLBERG (W 0666). Its tank strength is estimated to be approximately 20° vehicles, including repaired tanks known to have been in the shops at FREIBURG.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM) crossed the Rhine River in the NEUF BREISACH area and then moved to its assembly area East and North of OFFENBURG. The rehabilitation of this corps is presently taking place.

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716 Intentry Division (CO: Col. HAFFNER) has been located by continued document in the area of Kril. The permanent casualties suffered in the coket totaled 1,724, including 18 Officers. No positive evidence has been received freinforcements having been sent to this division. Combat infantry effectives

This corps has been probably forced into an operational role under Nineteenth Army from its former purely administrative functions under Defence Command OBERRHEIN. This change in status has been brought about by the need of corps headquarters under the army to tactically control those divisions ordinarily controlled by the departed or defunct LXIII Corps. Its operational headquarters are in the vicinity of BADLWAILER (V 9515).

c. DEFENCE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG:)

No change in status.

405 zbV Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEDAR). A deserter states that this unit was to have been upgraded to a reserve division during the first days of February according to orders issued by the divisional commander. The new regimental numbers were to be 10, 12, and 14, and the present Landesschutzen and Guard Esttalions were to form these units. The division was to come under the adminis -trative control of XIV SS Corps. Its present area of operations north and south of KRHL was not to be affected by the reorganization.

30 SS Grenadier Division (CO: Col. SIEGLING) continued existence of the division is doubted,

805 Mobilization Division. The division appears to have the dual function of providing replacements for combat units and also administering defensive units manning the SIEGFRIED Line.

(a) XIV Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. von dem BACH-ZELE SKI)

Its administrative status remains unchanged.

d. TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY (CG: Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

It performs defensive duties along the Swiss Frontier from the left flank of Army Group G to the BODEN SEE. Its headquarters are at ENGEN (W 7717).

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ENDAY STREAMTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Sear-Rhine Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve: (Combat Infantry Effectives)

Seventh US Army First French Army 21,000

Estimated Reserves in SAAR
Estimated Reserves in Black Forest

7,000

TOTAL

Artillery Guns;

* 41,000 625

Tanks and SP Guns:

Seventy US Army

Seventh US Army Front Reserves on Seventh US Army Front (653 Anti-Tank Bn) First French Army Front 130-150 30- 50

20- 30

180-230

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3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), ALGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

No confirmation of major changes in enemy disposition has been reported. The 34 German Infantry Division and elements of 5 German Mountain Division are still committed on the Alpine Front. In addition to the LITTORIO and MONTE ROSA Divisions occupying the central and northern sectors of the Alpine Front, ground forces reported that the SAN MARCO Division may relieve elements of the 34 German Infantry Division. However, no indications of such a move have been received.

b. Enemy Strength

The lack of positive information on the strength of Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult. It is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000, with 60% carried as combat effectives.

4. OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

Throughout the period, enemy forces evidenced considerable anxiety over friendly intentions and troop dispositions along the entire Rhine Front. Daily patrols varied in aggressiveness from mere nuisance raids to penetrations of several kilometers. On one attempt, they were content to machine gun friendly positions from

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boats in aid-Phine, but late in the period a surprise attack in the vicinity of V 6006 succeeded in taking some night friendly prisoners. The usual harassing artillary fire and sarial reconnaissance were observed and in the area FREEDURG - VELETROR (Q. 9227) heavy vehicular activity was noticeable.

Prisoners stated that fear of an attack from the STRASBOURG area, which the energy believes has been reinforced, was the basis for the civilian evacuation from many towns in the KEHL-WITTEN EIT (R 0170) area. Reports were also received that some yill loxes in the KEHL sector had to be abandoned by the enemy due to the rise of the Ehine.

MORTE FRONT

At the beginning of the period, elements of 905 zbV Division supported by armor stubbornly resisted the friendly advance against DRUSENHEIM (R 1618). At the same time, 257 Infantry Division succeeded in strengthening its position near OBEMHOFFEN (R 0820) and in cutting the north-south road at R 0920. The town was finally taken on 15 February after severe fighting, including house to house action, but the enemy continued to oppose friendly attempts at debouchment with intense mall arms fire. Flooding by the Moder River in the HACCURNAU area impeded friendly operations, as 47 Volksgrenadier Division reacted alertly at BISCHOLTZ (Q 8552) and joined with 36 Volksgrenadier Division in repulsing friendly patrols at BITSCHOFFEN (Q 9128). The latter unit was reported to be preparing a secondary line of defence between ENG-HLLER (Q 9131) and GUMERREHTSHOFFEN (Q 9254), having requested for this purpose 29,000 mines in addition to the daily production of 60 from a sawmill at Q 9235, operated by the engineers.

In the eastern HARDY Mountains, 6 SS Mountain Division held commanding ground in its sector with the minimum number of troops. Patrols from 11 SS Mountain Regiment were unsuccessful in their attempt to take prisoners in the WILDENGUIN (Q. 7857) area.

Heavy caliber artillery fire increased considerably by the end of the period with concentrations falling on the bridge at BISCHWILLER (R 1018) and on the towns of OBERGODERN (Q 8527) and PFAF ENHOFFEN (Q 8927) as well as ERUMATH (Q 9614) which received some 240 mm fire. A concentration of 20 rounds of railroad artillery fire fell on SAVERNE (Q 7215) during the night of 16/17 February.

West of the HARDT Mountains, activity was negligible early in the period.

The URBACH (Q 7055), HLIESBRUCK (Q 5957) area was being manned in increased force but operations in the BITCHE area found 559 Infantry Division holding an extended sector. On 15/16 February our limited objective attack against RIMING (Q 6535) and GUIDERSKIRCH (Q 6656) met only spotty resistance. The next day, 17 SS Panzer Granadier Division counter attacked twice: first with 100 infantry, which was broken up by artillery fire; and later in the area northwest of RIMING with 200 infantry supported by 10 tanks/SF gams. This offensive penetrated to the Moronville Farm (Q 6455) before the attack was contained and the line restored by friendly forces. At the end of the period, 15-20 bunkers in the HLIESBRUCKEN Woods area (Q 5956) manned by 4-5 men each continued to resist with small arms fire. Some armor was reported regrouping north of RIMING possibly for another counterattack. To the north, 19 Infantry Division prisoners were taken from a strong point at HANVEILER (Q 5157) on 16/17 February and the right flank of the division was pressed back east of FORBACH.

Enemy losses in these attempts to restore and maintain their lines west of the HARDT Mountains totalled approximately 1,000 prisoners of war and 20 tanks/SP guns destroyed or damaged.

ALPINE FRONT

At the beginning of the period infantry activity was noted in the area of FETIT ST BERNARD (C 40) and BRIANCONNAIS (P 49). Twenty-one Italians occupying ROCHE IA CROIX Gap (N 48) deserted to French troops on 14 February. At the close 35 of the period an ener outpost reoccupied the village CLAVIERES (K SECRET

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In the LA ROCHELLE zone, enemy patrols were active throughout the period in areas T 4525-4937 as vehicle traffic was heard in the vicinity of R 4546. Five Polish deserters were taken in the area on the 14/15 February as a large explosion was heard in the East sector. On POINTE DE GRAVE loud explosions were heard several times during the period and vehicle movement was observed on the roads Y 3856-3650 and Y 3656-3755. Flares seen on ROYAN on 12/13 February were followed by several volleys of small arms fire. At the end of the period enemy aircraft were sighted

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A Factical Reconnaissance

With front line activities at a minimum, movements in rear areas highlighted the extensive coverage flown throughout the week. Heavy activity persisted on all days during the period except for the 15th and 16th when a marked decrease in the mount and tempo of movement was evident. The Black Forest area revealed considerable activity this week, probably representing replacements for the remnants of the Mineteenth Army. The northerly movement of one unit of the Nineteenth Army may be connected with movements along the Rhine Valley from FREIBURG to KARLSRUHE and the measured movement of trains over the Rhine into the Saar.

Roads and railroads throughout the Black Forest were extensively used, as remaints of the badly mauled Mineteenth Army moved to assembly areas and regrouping points along the FREIBURG - OFFENBURG - VILLINGEN line. Because of rail interdiction on lines running due north of OFFENBURG, traffic away from the area was, of necessity, re-routed through the very active centers of KARLSRUHE and HEIDELBERG, thence into the BARE-PALATIMATE.

Such a routing would account for only a part of the activity noted along the lines running west from the Rhine toward KAISERSLAUTERN and NEUNKIRCHEN. It must be borne in mind that a large part of the activity in the SAAR is directly connected with the still-operating industrial centers in this area. In this regard it is of interest to note that a large percentage of the trains seen in the KAISERSLAUTERN-NEUNKIRCHEN-SAABHRUCKEN area were made up of coal cars, gondolas, flats, and box-cars. Very likely much of the southbound movement from VORMS and DARMSTADT toward MANNHEIM and HEIDELHERG is intimately connected with this industrial traffic. The concentration of 1000 flat cars at MANNHEIM and much rolling stock in other marshaling yards along the Rhine Valley on the 16th of February represents a collection of stock from the SAAR-P.L.TIN.TE after the completion of military and commercial movements into that area.

Signs of continued military departures from our front were evident in the activity noted along the LANDAU-NEUSTADT-SPEYER and KARLSRUHE-DARMSTADT lines on the 15th and 14th of February. The trend of military movements along these lines was generally northward indicating that some of these military trains may be headed for points north of the MAINZ area.

B Status of Communications

Capitalizing on the unusually good flying weather afforded them during the latter helf of the current period, Allied aircraft flew a record number of sorties attacking marshalling yards, railroad centers, rail lines, road and rail bridges. A total of 92 locomotives and 1617 rail cars were destroyed. 147 rail cuts were scored causing marked delays and making re-routings necessary on many lines throughout the Rhine Valley and in the Black Forest area. Fresh cuts on the KARLSRUHE-FREIBURG, STUTTGERT - TUTTLINGEN, and the SCH ENZINGEN - KARLSRUHE lines further hampered communications. The destruction of 3 more rail bridges along the Rhine 3 (Valley added to the difficulties of transportation.

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The unserviceable bridges at B.D MUNSTER (M 0835) continue to render the BAD KREUZNACH-KAISERSLAUTERN line unusable while the destroyed bridges in the RASTATT area prevent through traffic on the OFFENBURG-KARLSRUHE line.

Indications are that the twin lines from MANNHEIM to KARLSRUHE carry a major portion of the traffic along the eastern bank of the Rhine. Observations suggest that movement on the easternmost parallel line is usually routed north while the western line carries southbound traffic.

6. DEFENSES

German intentions to hold the Rhine Plain and deny us access through the Black Forest are indicated by the scope of the digging activities on the East side of the Rhine. The section of the 1/25,000 overprinted map attached as enclosure No. 3, shows a typical sector of the Rhine defenses 10 Km south of STRASBOURG.

The pattern followed seems to be an adaptation of the principle of "Coffered" coastal defense, already used extensively in the coastal defenses of North Italy.

This system entails the construction of a first line of defense to deter or delay a landing, with a second line several miles inland where it is hoped to halt it. At right angle to these, but connecting them, are obstacles: streams, canals, A/T. ditches or fire trenches aimed at preventing lateral movement, thereby isolating the field of action of any thrust.

In this case, the SIEGFRIED pillboxes and casemates on the immediate banks of the Rhine constitute the first line of defense. It is hoped to check any successful penetrationthrough these at the line of fire trenches supported by additional pillboxes and artillery.

This system of multiple interconnected lines of fire trenches has the added advantage of permitting surprise opening of fire from alternate positions. Thus, troops subjected to a preparatory artillery barrage can take refuge in any one of the original position. This trench network is further strengthened by being anchored on towns which have been turned into strongpoints by the construction of perimeter

This digging is in progress from BASLE to KARLSRUHE, and it is estimated from air cover that 600 Km. of fire trenches and 250 Km. of communication trenches have been dug since early December.

> ROCENE L. HARRISON Brigadier General, G. S. C. A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

Appendix "A"

#1 Inc - The Rhine Bridges #2 Inc - Enemy Disposition


#3 Inc - Defense Overprint

DISTRIBUTION


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
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SECRET APPENDIX "A" TO WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY #22. WEATHER CONDITIONS ALONG THE UPPER RHINE VALLEY FOR MARCH GENERAL Although February is the best Winter month for air operations in this area, conditions in March present an improvement insofar as ground activities are concerned. In spite of a general increase in precipitation, there are fewer overcast days in March and much less snowfall and snowcover. A general increase in temperature, better soil conditions, and a longer daily period of daylight and sunlight are to be expected. TEMPERATURE Average temperatures along the Rhine Valley and in Southwestern and Western Germany for March are about 5 degrees warmer than for February. In the Black Forest the mean minimums remain below freezing, but in the warmer Rhine Valley itself mean minimums are in most instances 32 degrees or above. Mean monthly temperatures are above 41 degrees along the Rhine from just north of Basel to just north of Strasbourg, slightly colder (37 to 41) to Karlsruhe and warmer than 41 north of Karlsruhe. East of Freiburg, mean temperatures drop sharply to 34 degrees in the mountain regions. MEAN TEMPERATURES FOR MARCH Rhine Valley Baden 40.0 Basel Netz 41.0 Strasbourg 41.2 Karlsruhe 41.2 Freiburg 42.0 Black Forest Villingen Donaueschingen 34.0 Freudenstadt 35.0 Western (Central) Germany 37.5 38.0 Augsbürg Nurnberg 39.0 Stuttgart There is a general increase of precipitation over all of the area. In the mountainous regions east of Freiburg and Baden, mean monthly precipitation increases sharply to over 6.0 inches, in contrast to less than 2.4 inches for the most part all along the Rhine. The mean number of days with precipitation over .004 inches for the whole area varies from 10 to 18 days. Mean Brecipitation (Values in Parenthesis are for February) Nurnberg 1.3 in 1.5 in 1.6 in 1.8 in 1.9 in (1.3) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) Strasbourg Frankfurt Metz Munich 2.0 in Besancon 3.1-in (2.3) Feldberg Freudenstade 4.5 in 5.7 in (4.7) SECRET

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	SECRETEDIX "A" TO BEKLY INTELLIGENCE SULMARY #22 (Cont'd).
	Mean Number of Days with Snowbover in March
	Karlsruhe 2
ten jar	Flm 2
V	Metz 3
	Stuttgart 4 Munich 16
Ar .	Freidenstadt 14, Feldberg, 30
	Mean Number of Days of Snewfall
	Stuttgart 5 Ulm 5
	Munich 10 Freudenstadt 16 Feldberg 13
	A G Mean Monthly Snowfall in Inches
	Frankfurt 0.3
	Kaiserslautern2.2'. Trier 2.8 Nurnberg 3.2
	Freiburg 11.1
	CLOUDS AND VISIBILITY
	In the Khine Valley March has the greatest number of clear days observed for the year except for the month of August. Seven to eight is the average number of clear days
	(less than 2/10 coverage). However, days with coverages of 8/10 or more remain almost the same in number (see below).
	With a minimum of high pressure centers over France and Western Germany, visibilities improve generally, if slightly
	Dut periods of several days of poor visibility persist during March.
	Number of Days with Low Ceilings and Visibilities (ceilings 100 ft or less and/or visibility 12 mile or less)
	Ave Min Mex
	Frankfurt 4 1 12 Strasbourg 6 3 10 Nurnberg 7 3 13
	Nurnberg 7 3 13 Cologne 7 4 160 Munich 8 1 15
	Metz . 81 5 15
	Mean Number of Clear and Cloudy Days (Values for February in parenthesis)
	Clear - less than 2/10 sky cover Partly cloudy - 2/10 to 8/10 Cloudy - 8/10 to overcast
	Clear Partly Cloudy Cloudy
	Trier $\frac{4}{4} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right)$ $\frac{14}{12} \left(\frac{12}{2} \right)$ $\frac{13}{12} \left(\frac{13}{12} \right)$ Munich $\frac{4}{3} \left(\frac{3}{2} \right)$ $\frac{15}{12} \left(\frac{13}{12} \right)$
	Karlsrune 5 $(4\frac{1}{4})$ 13 $\frac{1}{4}$ (10) 12 $\frac{1}{4}$ (13 $\frac{1}{4}$)
	Valley 7 (5) 15 (11) 9 (12) Frankfurt 7 (5) 14 (11) 9 (12) 39
	Strasbourg 8 (7) 12 (9%) 10 SECRET
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By Authority of

CG, 6th Army Group

Initials:

Date: 24 Feb 1945

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 23

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 24 FEBRUARY 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The enemy's defensive attitude between the Moselle and Rhine Rivers continued for still another week. The lengths to which he was forced in order to maintain his lines unbroken - the sacrifice of German soil in the Moselle - Saar triangle and of German civilians at FORBACH - strengthen the belief that he has no alternative. On the BADEN front extreme nervousness as to Allied intentions is the sole explanation for the sporadic raids across the Rhine.

Army Group G found it necessary to draw on the depleted Nineteenth Army in order to preserve the First Army in this extremity. Its mission of providing the mobile forces necessary for adequately defending the Siegfried Line is steadily becoming more impossible to fulfill. With the entire Allied front in motion, Army Group G will find it difficult even to protect its forces from the demands of the other hardpressed German armies. From SAARBURG to SAARBRUCKEN the Siegfried Line has become the front line. Now General HAUSSER must prepare to execute his mission with only his own resources and they cannot be fully counted upon.

First German Army demonstrated the effect of its lack of reserves upon present operations. The new alignment of divisions represents actually a desparate attempt to meet a situation where the initiative is entirely in the hands of the Allies. From West to East, the major formations were identified as follows: LXXXII Infantry Corps (256 VG and 416 Inf Divs); LXXXV Infantry Corps (719 and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS Corps (559 VG, 19 VG, 17 SS PG and 2 Mtn Divs); XC Infantry Corps (6 SS Mtn and 36 VG Divs); and LXXXIX Infantry Corps (47 VG, 257 VG, and 905 zbV Divs) Especially notable were the displacement of 559 Volksgrenadier Division by the newly arrived 2 Mountain Division and the move of the former westward to aid in the defense of FORBACH. Reconstruction of the maneuver would indicate a redisposition of limited increase in the gravity of the situation at FORB CH outweighed the enemy's fears of Allied attacks in the HAGUENAU area. 559 Volksgrenadier Division had evidently been moving east of the HARDT while 2 Mountain Division was preparing to occupy the vacated sector. The threat to FORBACH forced immediate despatch of reinforcements, principally elements of 559 Division but also including 2 Mountain Division's Reconnaissance Battalion. The use of Volkssturm battalions at SPICHEREN (Q 4366) and at FORBACH, the hasty march of a battalion of 719 Infantry Division, and the coordination of the defense by the town commandant at SAARERUCKEN all point to the measures which the enemy must employ merely to hold his lines. The reserves of the First Army are obviously nearing the point of complete commitment.

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Nineteenth German Army has already given up one of its divisions (2 Mtn) for the SAAR front. The others have scarcely had sufficient time for rehabilitation. In any case, this defeated army can supply possibly two more divisional formations by gathering together staffs and personnel from its remnants. In the meantime, it can continue to serve as the mobile force for the Upper Rhine.

OBERRHEIN Defense Command maintained its watch on the Rhine.

b. Capabilities

Army Group G has still only one capability: to attempt to defend itself. It may do this by falling back entirely into the psychological safety of the SIEGFRIED Line's masonry or by fighting delaying actions from behind its prepared positions. There is no doubt that it ill never regain the initiative. There is no doubt that the execution of its mission will be more an attempt than a capability.

2. SIXTH US ARMY CROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing Sixth US Army group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), ST ARNVAL (Q 4667), RIMLING (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7750), ALTHORN (Q 7640), PFAFFENHOFFEN (Q 9027), DRUSSENHEIM (R 1517), South along Rhine River to border of Switzerland.

- b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)
 - (1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The withdrawal of its right flank from the Moselle to the Saar imposed extensive reorganization of the First Army's troop dispositions. It was able to maintain the integrity of its lines in the central sector only by committing its reserves and by further withdrawal. Of its two reserve divisions, 2 Mountain is now in the lines and the existence of 245 Infantry as an organic unit is now somewhat doubtful. At best 245 Infantry Division can be considered more a divisional staff controlling Volkssturm and defense units in the rear areas rather than a formation with tactical capabilities.

245 Infantry Division (CO: Col. WAGNER). The precise nature of this division has long been a riddle. Not more than two of its battalions, (I Bn, 935 GR and I Bn, 937 GR) have been committed at any time since the middle of December. It is inconceivable that the German Army could afford to hold a field division in reserve for this length of time. The division command has repeatedly been reported in the MISSEMBOURG sector of the SIEGFRIED Line. It is believed that, when the division was relieved in December, much of its remnants were consolidated into the two battalions that have been contacted and that the divisional staff then assumed control of diverse static units known to be manning SIEGFRIED defenses. The combat infantry strength of the two original battalions, one or both of which may be detached, is estimated at 300 each; that of the static units at 2,500.

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(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen FRANZ) retained all its subordinated units in line in an effort to stem Allied advance, but, by the end of the period, the division had withdrawn across the Sear River to new defense positions. It became clear that 256 Division was nothing a sector morth of 416 Infantry Division. This sector is limited by the Moselle to the north, and SERRIG (L'1510) to the south. Elements of the three grenadier regiments (456, 476, 481) and all auxiliary units were identified in the area on 20 February. Interrogation showed that the division had an average rifle company strength of 50 at the time of its commitment, about 10 February. Losses since then have been considerable and present combat infantry strength is not in excess of 1.000.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) had the bulk of its units concentrated in the area L 0502 - L 0704 on 19 February. At this time elements of 712, 713, and 774 Grenadier Regiments, 416 Artillery Regiment, 416 Engineer Battalion, and 1416 Anti-Tank Battalion were identified in the area. By the end of the period, the division completed its withdrawal to the SIEGFRIED Line positions on the east bank of the Saar. Its present sector extends from L 1510 to MERZIG (Q 2095), The division suffered heavy permanent casualties during the week, thus reducing its combat infantry effectives to approximately 2,500 men.

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNIESS)

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GAEDE) is still responsible for the line from MERZIG (Q 2095) to SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880). II Battalion, 723 Grenadier Regiment was identified at Q 4667 on 21 February. This battalion, after resting for several weeks, was sent to bolster 347 Infantry Division in its defense of SAARBRUCKEN. Prisoners claim that the battalion is under the SAARBRUCKEN Defense Command. The whereabouts of the remainder of 723 Regiment is not known. 743 Regiment was located in its old area Q 2881 on 17 February. Division combat infantry strength is now estimated at 3,500

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) is possibly continuing to hold the sector as far north as SAARLAUTERN. However, its forces are concentrated south and southwest of SAARBRUCKEN for defense of the city itself. The division offered stubborn resistance against Allied attacks. After suffering considerable losses, the division was reinforced by the commitment of local Volkssturn units, 67 Reconnaissance Battalion of 2 Mountain Division, 193 Tank Destroyer Brigade (also known as T D Bm GUSTAV or T D Bm "G" zbV), 486 Anti-Tank (Briagde) Battallon, 1313 Fortress Artillery Battalion. Furthermore, II Battalion, 723 Grenadier Regiment (719 Inf Div) was shifted east from the MERZIG area, and II Battalion, 1127 Volkagrenadier Regiment (559 VG Div) was shifted west from the BITCHE area to reinforce the defenders of SALRERUCIEN. The last identifications were; 860 Grenadier Regiment at Q 3965 and Q 4467 on 22 February; 861 Grenadier Regiment At Q 3172 on 22 February; 880 Grenadier Regiment at Q 4066 and Q 4367 on 22 February; 347 Artillery Regiment at Q 4169 on 22 February; 347 Engineer and Anti-Tank Battalion at Q 4467 on 22 February; 347 Replacement Battalion at Q 4267 on 22 February; 103 Tank Destroyer Brigade at Q 4570 on 20 February; 486 Bazooka Battalion at Q 4969 on 22 February. The divisions authorized assault gun strength of 14 is increased by 25 assault guns of attached 103 Tank Destroyer Brigade. The divisions casualties amounted to at least 600 men, reducing organic combat infantry strength to about 1,800 men, excluding Volkssturm,

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(c) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

Has the sector from SAARBRUCKEN to BITCHE area and controls 559 Infantry, 19 Infantry, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier and 2 Mountain Divisions. The corps has not only been to red to withdraw its forward positions under pressure, but also has needed more forces to prevent a breach of its lines. First Army was compelled to subordinate 2 Mountain Division to the corps on about 18/20 February. Due to the two distinct terrain features presently within the corps boundaries there is a strong likelihood that its responsibilities will be reduced to cover only the single terrain feature directly and indirectly connected with the defense of the Elies Valley. The result of this shortening of the sector will be that 2 Mountain Division will come under the tactical control of XC Corps.

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZEIMAYR). Prior to the arrival of 559 Volksgrenadier Division on its right flank, 19 Infantry Division was concentrating its forces in the defense of the area just east of FORBACH although its entire sector extended to the east as far as Q 5857. The division fought with much determination throughout the period. Its present sector extends from Q 4467 to Q 5857. All infantry regiments were identified within the area Q 4467 to Q 4862 as was 1119 Anti-Tank battalion. A prisoner states that the Anti-Tank battalion has two assault gun companies of eight guns each. In present heavy defensive fighting the division suffered heavy losses and its present strength is estimated at 1,000 combat infantry effectives.

17 SS Panzer Gremadier Division (CO: SS Col. KLINGENBERG) fought well but took heavy punishment resisting our attacks of 15-16 February. The divisional sector extends from Q 5957 to Q 7453. 37 SS Grenadier Regiment was identified on 23 February at Q 6656; 38 SS Grenadier Regiment was last contacted on 22 February at Q 6556 and 6156; 38 SS Grenadier Regiment is one more of the First German Army units to be reported as not having heavy weapons companies in the battalions. Remnants of both regiments are reported to have been reorganized on a two-battalion basis. 500 casualities since 15 February are accepted, thus, lowering the division combat infantry strength to 2,000.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN) during the early days of the period held a sector southwest of BITCHE (Q 7750) to Q 7545. The last identifications in this area were: 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 6956 on 17 February; 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7445 on 17 February; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7449 on 16 February. The commitment of I Battalion 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment seems to have merely been an expedient to aid in keeping firm the left flank of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division during the US push. It was also the first identifications of this regiment which was reconstituted from elements of XII/1 Static Regiment since its dissolution in December.

The division was relieved of its sector in this area on the following days and went into line in the SAARBRUCKEN area on the right of 19 Infantry Division via WISSABOURG-PIRMASE'S-SAARBRUCKEN. II Bettalion 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified at Q 4468. Present combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,000.

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2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN) equates with the unidentified division which arrived into First Army area during prior period. The division replaced 559 Volksgrenadier Division in the BITCHE sector. The following identifications were made: 136 Mountain Regiment at Q 7452 on 23 February; 137 uga stated, by a prisoner of wer to be on the right of 156 Mountain, Regiment; 67 maissance Battalion was contacted in the FORBACH area on 22 February. The dispatch of the reconnaissance battalion to FORBACH (Q 3866) was merely a temporary expedient. 2 Mountain Division lost 4,800 prisoners in the COLMAR pocket and its pat infantry effectives were considered to have been actually destroyed as of 8 February. However, much of the artillery and service elements reached the east nk of the Rhine. Combat infantry strength depends entirely on the number of men-trained from supply services and on the number of replacements received during the past two weeks. Its combat infantry strength is tentatively estimated at 1,200.

(d) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. HENNER) continued to defend its drawn out HARDY Mountain sector from Q 7442 to Q 8433. Contact was relatively light as the division held elements in local reserve for purposes of refitting. The division obviously has a high priority on replacement as witnessed by the fact that prisoners claim 1,300 replacements to have been received since the beginning of February. Of these; 800 are said to be Moslems. The majority of these new comers came from AUSTRIA. Some of these replacements are still with the divisional field replacement battalion; others have already been absorbed by line units, raising the combat infantry strength of 11 Mountain Regiment to about 1,400. 11 Mountain Regiment was last identified at Q 7738 on 22 February; 12 Mountain Regiment at Q 8237 on 23 February. Division combat infantry strength, including the attached 506 SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion, is 3,200 men.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLEM) was not identified during the period, probably due to lack of activity on its front from Q 8433 to Q 9227. Identification of I Battalion, 935 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9227 on 20 February is interpreted as a bolstering of the feeble 36 Volksgrenadier Division, rather than as a full scale commitment of 245 Infantry Division. Maximum combat infantry strength, including I Battalion, 935 Regiment and 51 German Air Force Battalion, is 1,800.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) remained in light contact in its sector west of HAGUENAU, continuing to hold from Q 9227 to R 0325. Identifications made were: 103 Grenadier Regiment at R 0324 and Q 9924 on 19 and 19 February; 104 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9427 on 21 February; 115 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9726 on 16 February. The status of the division is substantially unchanged, combat infantry strength is still estimated at 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) was inactive during this week while recuperating from the heavy losses of the past period. Its sector is unchanged, from HAGUENAU (R 0325) to east of OBERHOFFEN (R 1120). Following identifications were reported: 457 Grenadier Regiment on 19 February at R 0524; 477 Grenadier Regiment on 23 February at R 0922; 257 Engineer Battalion on 18 February at R 0324; while 466 Grenadier Regiment has been out of contact since 13 February. Still attached to the division are Battle Groups HARTIG and HELDMANN as well as I Battalion, 2 SS Police Regiment. Combat infantry strength, including attachments 2,000.

905 Moblization Division (CG:) is rather lightly committed in the sector from R 1120 to the Rhine, with only Battalion SCHMIDT and TREUTLER and elements of 2 SS Police Regiment in line. The rest of the units under command of the division are believed to be manning defenses on the sect tank of the Rhine or those in reserve. Combat infantry strength of units in line is judged at 800 and of those in reserve, or east of the Rhine, at 700. (Total 1,500 combat infantry effectives.)

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

This army has lost at least one of the divisions it had under its command in the ALSACE Pocket, since 2 Mountain Division was contacted in the First German Army area. This would leave Nineteenth Army with 16, 159, 189 and 708 Volksgrenadier Divisions; 198, 338 and 716 Infantry Divisions; and 106 Panzer Brigade. The departure of LXIII Corps is accepted. The continued presence of LXIV Corps with 198 Infantry, 716 Infantry, and 708 Volksgrenadier Divisions in the OFFENBURG area is a strong probability. It must be presumed that the refitting of these divisions is progressing and that they will be capable of limited action in the near future. Recent estimates made on the basis of more detailed interrogation agree substantially with previous estimates that not more then 4,000 enemy combat infantry effectives escaped from the ALSACE Pocket. It is confirmed that 90% of the artillery effectives and 75% of the artillery pieces crossed the Rhine. This figure is equivalent to 3,600 men and 90 artillery pieces. Losses sustained by service and anti-aircraft units, are believed to have been negligible. Of armored units, 40 tanks and assault guns are believed to have escaped.

though an unconfirmed agent report places it in the FREIBURG (V 0832) TUTTLINGEN (W 8032) area. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 500.

159 Volksgrenadier Bivision (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) is not yet located definitely, though it is also reported in the FREIBURG-TUTTLINGEN area.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Lt. Col. TUNGE) is another division that may be in the FREIBURG-TUTTLINGEN area. One unconfirmed report names the Eastern front as the division's ultimate destination. Combat infantry effectives total 300 men.

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EMART) is the fourth division reported in the FREIBURG-TUTTLINGEN area by the same source. Its combat infantry effectives are believed to number 400.

days. It will be remembered that only about one half the unit was committed in the VOSGES Pocket. Therefore, its early appearance on some other sector of the front is to be expected.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM) continues its rehabilitation in the area East and North of OFFENBURG.

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198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL). According to a captured rganization Order Number 2" dated 18 January, the division diately, according to the Table of Organization of Infantry o bring about this reorganization, the following changes pply units were to be drastically reduced and the ble to be used as combat troops. All assault rifles were platoon per company. The overstrength in assault rifles anies. Each regiment is to form one impany) which would comprise all light guns, medium morters and

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nine gums. In case of a surplus of these weapons; they were to be used to madre for a second heavy sompany (8 Company). The thirteenth (Infantry Oun) ies would be completed with the acquisition of heavy (120 mm) mortars as ry guns are presently hot available. However, the necessary training for ng the guns due to arrive would begin immediately in order to have trained when the weapons were delivered. when the we

The fusilier battalion was to become an infantry battalion and the designation "squadren" for the first company was to be dropped as the mobility of this battalion would depend on the number of bicycles which could be provided.

The existing motor transport of the division was to be reduced so as to correspond with the new Table of Equipment. It was inferred that 198 Infantry Division possessed more vehicles than permitted by the new T. O. and was to give up the surplus. This plan did not go into effect in January as the heavy commitment of the division precluded any major organizational changes. However, it can be assumed that, now that the division is being rehabilitated, this reorganization will take place according to the order outlined above. The division is located east of OfficeBurg (W 1585) with left-over combat infantry effectives from AISACE numbering 500.

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKWENN) is still carried sembly area north of HASLACH (W 2664). Combat infantry effectives

in its initial assembly area north of HASLACH (W 2664). Combat infantry effective is estimated at 400.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) is presumed to have stayed in its assembly area in the vicinity of KENL (W 0596). Survivors of the "Pocket" are estimated at 400 combat infantry effectives.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CC: SS Lt. Gen. REINFARTH or ROTH)

Its operational status remains unchanged.

RRHEIN (CG:) c. DEFENCE COMMAND OHE

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SECCER) is responsible for an extensive sector along the Rhine River to the north and south of KEHL (W 0596). The upgrading of this unit to a reserve divisional status is accepted.

30 SS Grenadier Division (CO: Col. SIEGLING) continues to be carried in an uncertain status.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO:), according to prisoner of war statoment, was located in NEURNBURG (V 8713) area and was in command of 7 OBERRHEIN Regiment on 31 January.

805 Mobilization Division (CG:). like 405 Reserve Division is responsible for a section of the SIEGFRIED Line defenses. The division according to prisoners of war, is composed of three regiments, with three battalions each. The 5 Volkssturm Regiment holds the central sector from V 8844 to V 9130 with its 11, 12, and 20 Volkssturm Battalions. On tis right, 3 Russian (Ukrainian) Depot Regiment 50

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holds from V 8844 to V 9457. The number of the third, a Volkssturm Regiment, is not known, but it holds a sector south of 5 Volkssturm Regiment, Interrogation has established that the 5 Regiment, composed of Volkssturm from BADEV, has a strongth of 500-700 combat infantry effectives, equipped with regular infantry weapons.

d. THENTY-FOURTH ARMY (GG: SS Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

Status of this army remains unchanged

e. 600 Infantry Division (Russian)

A captured document of the LXXIV Corps, dated 17 January 1945 identifies this division as follows: "Cavalry trained Russian non-commissioned officers and men are needed for the formation of a Reconnaidsance Battalion for 600 Infantry Division (Russian): It is requested that all cavalry trained Russian volunteers in your sector, even from German units, be given an opportunity of applying for transfer to the 600 Infantry Division (Russian): The number of those volunteers is to be reported to this office and the volunteers are to be transferred to the 600 Infantry Division (Russian). Training Camp, Mupsinger ".

f. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserves
Combat Infantry Effectives)

Saar-Palatinate Front Rhine Front 20,000

Reserves:

Estimated Reserves; Saar-Palatinate Front Estimated Reserves; Black Forest

000

TOTAL

36,000

Artillery Guns:

Saar-Palatinate Front

600 pieces

Tank and SP Guns:

Sear Palatinate Front Reserves on Saar-Palatinate Front Rhine River Front

.40-160 30- 50

TOTAL

190-230

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBLE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SECRET SECRET a. Enemy Disposition The enemy has not materially changed his dispositions along the Alpine Front during the present period. There are indications that local reliefs within the units of 5 Mountain Division have taken place. A further infusion of Italian elements in forward positions in the passes northeast of MOUNT AIGUILETTE (N 59) has occurred. The reports of either evacuation or thinning out of the forces under LXXV German Corps 34 Infantry, 5 Mountain, LITTORIO Infantry, and MONTE ROSA Infantry Divisions are still without foundation. However, in the area west of TURIN, two Anti-Aircraft battalions, one light and one heavy, have departed for the east. b. Enemy Activity Evidence of the enemy's forward expansion of his northern outpost line is seen in the occupying of positions SW of MONT BLANC at CROIX DU BON HOMME and COL DE FENETRE, giving him observation of the valleys between CONTAMINES and SAINT GERVAIS. In the same area, an ambitious patrol unsuccessfully attempted to destroy the cog-wheel railway at AIGUILLE DU MIDI (C 42) moving over passes better than 3000 meters high c. General During March, the prevailing snow conditions and poor communication facilities will prevent assumption of an offensive attitude by the enemy. The present lack of depth in his dispositions is indicative of passive intentions. However, defense of the present positions will continue to be aggressive, with frequent raids for harassing and intelligence purposes. Enemy combat infantry effectives total approximately 9,000, with a full complement of supporting and auxili ry troops. SECRET

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4. OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

Elements of the miscellaneous units on the east bank of the Rhine continued to send patrols across the river throughout the period. PWs stated that the forces were made up of Volkssturm personnel in large part, usually under command of Februacht or SS officers, with harassing missions only.

On the night of 21 February a force estimated at company strength crossed the river in ten motorboats and raided friendly strongpoints southeast of BALGAU (V 8525). During the raid friendly elements at V 8823 were forced to withdraw temperature of the north was surrounded for a short period.

NORTH FRONT

From the Rhine to the western HARDT the enemy maintained a completely defensive attitude, reacting to patrol activity especially with artillery fire. Early in the period 250 rounds of Nebelwerfer and heavy artillery fell in the area Q 9028 - Q 8533. SAVERNE (Q 7215) was intermittently shelled by a 380 mm gun, receiving four rounds on 18/19 and three on 23 February.

BITCHE and the area west to Q 6255 were generally quiet. 559 Volksgrenadier Division attempted minor infiltrations east of RIMLING (Q 6355). Elements of 1125 Regiment were unsuccessful in regaining the ground lost earlier in the week by 17 SS Division. An increase in artillery fire was noted east of BLIESBRUCKEN Forest (Q 6255) and was especially marked late in the period near BITCHE after the arrival of elements of 2 Mountain Division.

BOBINGEN (9 4965) proved strongly held by elements of 19 Infantry Division as at least five tanks were heard in the town. Enemy troops had by the end of the period, entirely withdrawn from BLIERMENGEN (Q 5461). The division fought fiercely, throwing in infantry-tank counterattacks to hold its line in the VORDER ALD Forest (Q 5065), but was forced to withdraw beyond BLIERGERS/TLLER (Q 5261) and KLEINBLITTERSDORF (Q 4962). Enemy infiltration attempts in the VORDER ALD woods were unsuccessful.

On the east flank of the 347 Infantry Division's salient resistance was strong, but troops of the 19 Infantry Division were cleared from GROSHLIED - ERSTROFF (0 4862) and ZINZING (0 4764) early in the period. The enemy was unable to hold a firm line in the center and withdrew approximately one mile on 20 February, giving up the ERANDENBUSCH woods (0 4663) and ALSTING (0 4564). Fierce counterattacks at SPICHEREN (0 4567) were overcome by 21 February. STIRING-MENDEL (0 4267) proved heavily defended, but the road between that town and SAARBRUCKEN had been cut as enemy elements were forced from the high ground overlooking SAARBRUCKEN in the vicinity of the ARNVAL woods (0 4668). On 23 February, 347 Infantry Division elements, reinforced by units of 19 Infantry and 2 Mountain Divisions, made a series of three tank-supported counterattacks in an effort to regain the heights. Volkssturm units from SAARBRUCKEN and one battalion of 719 Infantry Division aided in the defense of FORBACH (0 3965), as house-to-house fighting continued in the western outskirts at the close of the period.

ALPINE FRONT

At the beginning of the period friendly positions at COL DU FREJUS (K 4323) received hostile machine gun fire, as did our patrols to COL DU MONT CENIS. On 19 February an enemy reid on our post at AIGUILLE DE MIDI (C 42) was repulsed as the enemy reacted strongly to our attempt to occupy ROCHE LA CROIX (P 9252). Patrol clashes occurred at ERUILCLACIER (Z 4989) and at LAC DES ROCSSES (H 6353)

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WESTERN FRENCH FORCES

Patrols were fired on during the period in the IA ROCHELLE zone at ANAIS (T 4937) and at (T 5234) as the enemy was observed establishing positions west of PERRIERES where a patrol clash took place on 23 February. Two heavy daliber shells, probably fired from OLERON, landed north of FOURAS (T 3416) on 23 February. A friendly raid at RONCE (Y 2795) netted 7 prisoners of war, a 20 millimeter cannon and a machine gun. 77 millimeter fire (50% duds) fell in the area of GRANDE GORCE (Y 4877) on 20 February.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Reports of scattered military rail and road activity throughout our area indicate that the regrouping and normal supply of enemy forces in BADEN and the SAAR PALATINATE area were continuing. Activity in the Black Forest region centered around FREIBURG and moderately heavy traffic was also seen in the CALW (R 7413) - FREUDENSTADT area on 22 February. Marshalling yards and rail lines in the KARLSRUHE-HEILBRONN-MANNHEIM-LANDAU area revealed considerable activity on 22 February with a westward trend indicated by the observations.

Heavy holdings in the FREIBURG marshalling yards and moderately heavy rail activity in the OFFENBURG-FREIBURG-VILLINGEN triangle on 19 and 20 February suggest that perhaps another unit of the regrouping Nineteenth Army is being assembled prior to transfer to an active sector further to the North. Rail activity in the CALW - FREUDENSTADT area included some military traffic directed to the east with the remainder of the movement going in a southerly direction deep into the Black Forest. These trans moving into the forest may be carrying tired and wounded soldiers to rest centers known to be in the area north of the Swiss Border.


Throughout the Rhine Valley, the movement of military and supply trains coupled with the sizeable concentrations of railroad rolling stock in marshalling yards of the KARLSRUHE-HEILBRONN-MAINHEIM-LANDAU area on 32 February indicated the arrival of some badly needed reinforcements for the SAAR. To the west, unusually light activity prevailed in the SAARBRUCKEN-NEUNKIRCHEN area throughout the period with scattered rail and road movements suggesting normal supply activities for servicing the SIEGFRIED Line installations and formations in that sector. Light rail traffic was also noted in the ST ENDEL-BAD KREUZNACH area on 22 February with scattered trains seen moving in a northeasterly direction.

Observations made during the week reveal no large scale departures or arrivals within the SA R PALATINATE.


B. Status of Communications

Fighter and medium bombers were especially active throughout the week with mediums concentrating on marshalling yards and railroad stations, while fighters exerted their main effort on railroad lines. Attacks were particularly successful on 22 February when 170 rail cuts were made and 2 bridges destroyed.* The majority of these cuts were scored east of the Rhine on lines east from STUTGART and from MANNHEIM to BASEL. The results of these attacks, coupled with effects of preceding bombings, succeeded in greatly hampering enemy movement along our front.


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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP :Init: hc/m :
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 :::::::::::
APO #23, U.S. Army

24 February 1945

Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 10
Period from 1 February to 15 February 1945

Part I - Civil Security

1. General Survey.

a. The number of enemy agents captured has been low, although it is believed the enemy's interest in army group activity should be greater than normal since the wiping out of the Colmar pocket has freed a certain number of Allied divisions for employment elsewhere.

b. Hitler Jugend agents continue to be active. A 16 year old Hitler Jugend agent arrested by the First French Army admitted readily to his interrogators that he had been sent on a mission by the S.S. In addition, the poor briefing given to a captured agent who was parachuted is one indication of the enemy's lack of intelligence in rear areas. The agent, who was given the mission of espionage in Luneville, could not identify a Seventh Army insignia and had no inkling of the location of any headquarters in Luneville or its vicinity.

c. The tension that existed among the civilian population in Alsace has been considerably relieved by the wiping out of the Colmar pocket and by Seventh Army advances.

d. There is reportedly a certain amount of anti-American sentiment in the 44th AAA Brigade area, fostered to some extent by the fact that American food distributed through the French civilians for civilian consumption is entering black market channels.

2. New Cases of Individual Suspects.

See Annex I.

3. Progress of Cases under Investigation.

. See Annex #2.

4. Personalities in Areas Still under Enemy Control.

SESSIER, (fnu): German Naval Lieutenant, Villa Alcha, San Remo. Apparently associated with Abwehr and Abwehr agent "FELIX" in sending agents across the Italian-American lines and in conducting a school for agents in San Remo. See RODINI case.

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SEGRET Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 10 dated 24 February 1945 (Continued)

BONA, Marcel: Isolabona, Italy. Friend of RODINI, who established the contact for him with SESSLER thus enabling him to become a German agent.

GODARD, Major: German SS officer who briefed FIORILI. Head-quarters in San Remo.

MURAT, Henri (Nom de guerre) Abwehr agent expected to cross 44th AAA Brigade lines in near future. Address: Villa Delle Palme, San Reno. Description: Italian nationality. Height 1m86. Black wavy hair, blue eyes, approximately 39 years, square face. When last seen was wearing brown suit, grey overcoat, grey felt hat, brown shoes and cowboy shirt with bright varicolored plaids.

RENE: (nom de guerre) Abwehr agent expected to cross 44 AAA Brigade lines in the near future. Brazilian nationaltiy. Speaks French, Italian and English. Address: Villa Delle Palme, San Remo. Description: 1m66 (height), age 35-36 years, strong build. When last seen was wearing grey checked trousers and coat with brown topcoat.

NINO: (Nom de guerre) Abwehr agent expected to cross 44th AAA Brigade lines shortly. Italian nationality. Address: Villa Delle Palme, San Remo. Knows Morse code and is expected to be sent with a radio. Description: Height lm90, age approximately 39; black wavy hair, blue eyes, small black mustache, square face. Wore various outfits but always wore a tan trench coat and grey falt hat. (In this connection it should be remembered that three confessed agents apprehended in this area have worn these tan trench coats. While there is no apparent connection between them and the first one apprehended had been given his coat by FEXIX, and it is known that several of the agents expected to cross the lines are in possession of such coats:

PIERRE: (nom de geerre) Address: Villa Delle Palme, San Remo. Abwehr agent expected to cross the lines in the near future. Italian nationality. Description: Height 1m70; medium stature; black curly hair; oval face; strong build; age 19 years. Wore blue suit and tan trench coat

FELIX: (Nom de Guerre and not to be confused with the FELIX, alias LEON JACOBS, previously mentioned in the RODINI case.) Italian nationality. Address Villa Delle Palme, San Remo. Description: Height lm70; blonde thinning hair; medium build; small black mustache; no description of clothes available. Abwehr agent expected to cross 44th AAA Brigade/in the near future.

PILON, Joseph: Nationality French. Description: height 1m74; black wavy hair, black eyes, strong build, age about 21 years. Wore khaki riding trousers with wrap leggins. SD agent to cross 44th AAA Brigade lines soon.

Z (1): Description: Blonde, medium build, small scar on left side of face under eye; age about 21 years. Speaks French with Parisian accent. SD agent to cross 44th AAA brigade lines shortly.

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SECRET Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 10 deted 24th February 1945 (Continued)

Z (2): SD agent expected to cross 44th AAA Brigade lines in the near future. French nationality. Former PPF member at Nice. Description: Height lm60; small build, blond straight hair; sharp face with long crooked nose. Age 29-30 years. Wore long blue overcoat.

Z (3): SD agent expected to cross 44th AAA Brigade lines shortly. French nationality. Description: Height lm50; large square build definite peasant type; with stupid, unpleasant face; red hair; square

"DEUTSCHER-AGENT" Espionage School at BADEN-BADEN and SAND. Source X-1, See Annex 1.

Colonel SCHMIDT. German. Speaks poor French. Chief of Service. Short and fat. Mentioned in reports regarding OUARI (See CI Report No. 4 and GODEFROY (See CI Report No. 5)

Captain Murtin: Chief of school. Makes decisions on missions, Accompanied X-1 to airport. Lives at Friedrich Hilda Heim near SAND. See reports on OUARI and GODEFROY.

BUCARD, Marcel: Head of Francistes, formerly at 17 Blvd des Italiens in Paris. Now works closely with Martin in recruiting, training and sending on missions selected Francistes living in Ger-many. See report on OUARI.

Lt. BERAUT; German Officer, instructor at school. Assists in recruiting. See report on OUARI.

ZIEBERT: Issued radio and equipment to Agents parachuted with X-1. Occupies small shed near airport 13 kms. from Stuttgart.

MERCIER, Alias MARECHAL. Visits school in unknown capacity. Former PPF of DORIOT's entourage. Description 50-55 years old; 1.72 meters; stoop shouldered; long nose, greying eyebrows and mustache with tips turned up; loose jowls and wrinkles at throat. May be at Freidrich Hilda Heim at Sand.

Henry (last name unknown): French instructor at school. Was formerly a TRUPP KOMMANDO.

LERAY, Jackie: French Franciste from ROUEN, about 21 years old. She has experience in radio monitoring and radio transmission. Took Formerly worked for SD. Parents have a florist shop at ROUEN and she is said to own a small house in PASSY which may have served for SD. Will cross or be parachuted. Description: About 21 years old; 1.60m fall, heavy frame: loose-hanging enhant heir; blue eves pale complex. tall; heavy frame; loose-hanging auburn hair; blue eyes, pale complexion; small mouth, small pug nose; protruding chin, heavy legs; not chic in appearance.

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DURAND, Leon. Franciste from Paris, son of a Milicien. Mechanic Unable to master radio at school, so concentrated on collection and evaluation of information. Last seen at Freidrich Hilda Heim, and was anxious to come across lines. Description: 21 years old; 1.68m tall; slim; pale, long face; auburn wavy hair; independent walk; clear voice.

LAVEZZARI, Jean: Milicien and Franciste from El Corrano, Corsica (near Ajaccio). Lived with uncles in France since 1939 and benefitted from income of large flour mills in Southern France controlled by his uncles. Did not complete radio courses, but was good on collection and evaluation of information. Ready and anxious to be parachated. Description: 19 years old, 1.67m in height, auburn hair; lips chapped and torn from biting; pale, sickly complexion; dark, brilliant, shifty eyes. Suffers from nervous collapses.

HANQUES, Jean: Franciste. Milicien son of well to do Roubaix wool buyer, who is divorced and of low morals. Was black market informant for S.D. at Lille. Did not complete radio courses, but has good memory and did well on courses in collection and evaluation of information. Was not anxious about coming over. Description: 21 years old; 1.72m tall; slim; dark brown, wavy hair; wears horn-rim glasses; light tan complexion; clean shaven; pigeon-toed and suffers from foot trouble, looks like a student.

ANGIBAUT, Andre: Milicien-Franciste from region south of Paris. Was good on radio (transmitted at 100-105 characters a minute). Attended a few courses on collection and evaluation of information. Anxious to come over. Description: 22 years old; 1.72m tall; black wavy hair; medium build; heavy beard, clean shaven; good appearance.

du X...., Jean: Hunchback. Franciste, son of Gaulliste parents killed by Maquis who was trying to kill him. Boasts of many killings for SD and Gestapo in France. Worked into Maquis in Hte Savoie and gave information to Germans who massacred group at Plateau d'Argillier. Condemned to death by Algiers and London radio. Took radio and course: in information, collection and evaluation. Will be ready about 1 Marci 1945. Friend of Vallier, parachuted with X-1. Description: 1.50 m tall; long pointed face; large chest; small fine hands. Cold cruel cheracter as result of own deformity.

PREVOST (fnu) Mrs. May be from Alpes Maritimes. Husband now espionage agent in France. Wants to be parachuted. Description 28 yrs. old; 1.70m tall; has Midi accent; very pretty; fine features; longish face; pencilled eyebrows; auburn hair; slim; worldly appearance.

DURAND, Hugette: Franciste from parts unknown. Poor on radio transmission but good on collection and evaluation of information. Description: 18 years old; long, combed-back auburn hair which curls on rainy days; oval face, clear complexion; small ears; straight short nose; large mouth; pronounced eyebrows; well built, but on heavy side; student type; neat.

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SECRET Group Fortnig ly CI Report No. 10 dated 24th February 1945 (Continued)

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DURAND, Hubert: Franciste from Toulouse region. Has been at school for 3½ months, but is slow at learning. Expected to be ready for parachuting about 1 Merch 1945. Radio and information courses. Description: 22 years old; 1.74m tall; wide shoulders; medium build curved nose; receding hairline; large ears; protruding eyebrows; large mouth; thin pointed face; prominent cheekbones; protruding lower lip; sallow complexion.

OBERG, nicknamed "ZIG": Franciste-Milicien from French Mediterranean Coast; was interned three weeks by Milice for refusing to join Waffen SS, and released through efforts of Francistes. Had been in school since mid-September 1944. Ready to come over as radio and information specialist. May be AUBERT (carded). Description: 19 yrs. old; 1.74m tall; medium build; wide shoulder; brown hair that stands straight up.

GAGNE (fnu): Parisian Franciste. Important and active in Francisme and good friend of BUCARD. Has been at school since August, September 1944; but no mission was ever assigned to him. Has completed all courses, Is sure to come over some day. Description: 20 yrs old; 1.68m tall; curly auburn hair; thered up nose; slim but wide shouldered; clowns continually. Mentioned in report on OUARI.

fRNAIL (fnu). Franciste. Specialist in radio. Ready for mission. Description: 21 years old; 1.75m tall; medium build; dark curly hair; clear complexion; fine regular features; well-groomed. Mentioned in report on Godefroy.

BARRIERE (fnu): Franciste from Toulouse area, worked for SNCF in marshalling yards. Attended school about 3½ months but could not master radio so concentrated on collection and evaluation of information. Not very intelligent. Description: 20 years old; about 1.68 - 1.70m tall; strong frame; heavy step; dark hair; light tan; large mout and smiles a lot.

DEVAUX (fnu): Worked at Paris Francisme Headquarters and attended Marcel BUCARD school in Versailles. Joined Baden school in January 1945. Expected to concentrate on radio work. Description: 22 years old; 1.68m tall; very heavy; near-black curly hair; tan face; reset nose; boxer's face, heavy lips.

LORIOT: (Carded). Espionage / gent now in France supposedly working as / gent.

LEFEVRE, Pierre. SS Condor member; former Franciste from Rouen. Former employee of Cartographie. Was in Milicien Camp at Kassel in November and mobilized in Waffen SS.

BECU, Roger: French; about 20 years old; 1.74m tall; German type light chestnut heir. Franciste. Is about to complete the radio course and will be ready to leave on a mission very shortly.

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6th Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 10 dated 24 February 1945 (Continued)

LAMOUR: 22-23 years old; 1.72m tall; heavy thick glasses. Formerly lived in the south of France, probably around Toulouse. Franciste. Will shortly be ready to leave on a mission inasmuch as his radio course is almost completed.

SOURCE for following. SCHULER, Jean-Louis, see CI Report No. 6, Enemy agents encountered by SCHULER In FAT 251 and other organizations.

BERGNER, fnu (Oberleutnant): Officer in, and recruiter for, the Lehrregiment Kurfuerst. In civil life was a lawyer. From Frankfort. Description: About 50 years old; 1.75m tall; medium build; blond hair; oval face; blue eyes; drooping eyelids; round chin; pale complexion; North German type.

MULLER, Rene (Gefreiter): Alsatian from Strasbourg. Former office employee. Description: 22 years old; 1.56m tell; curly blond hair; long face; brown eyes; round chin; long straight nose; sporty bearing; pale complexion.

FEIDER, Lucien (Gefreiter): Alsatian from Natzweiler. Former employee of the Eaux et Forets. Description: 23 years old; 1.75m tall; heavy; blond hair; bluesgrey eyes; round face; sporty bearing; dull complexion.

ENZMINGER, Charles (Gefreiter): Alsatian peasant from lower Alsace. Description: 23 years old; 1.72m tall; heavy; brown hair; dark eyes; round face.

WENDLING, Georges (Gefreiter): Alsatian from Kurtzenhausen; butcher by trade. Description: 23 years old. 1.70m tall; heavy; brown hair; dark eyes; round face; ruddy complexion.

REYMANN, (Gefreiter): Alsatian, teacher by profession. Description: 28 years old, 1.70m tell; medium build; blond hair; grey-blue eyes; oval face; light complexion.

NISSE, Rene (Gefreiter): Alsotion from Deux Fontbines near Serrebourg. Married, two children. Railroad employee. Description: 24 years old; 1.72m tall; medium build, wavy brown hair; moustache; brown eyes; oval face; elegant bearing; dull complexion.

FRICKER, Camille (Gefreiter): Alsatian from Mulhouse, accountant by trade. Description: 22 years old; 1.70m tall; medium build; black hair; thick eyebrows; black eyes; round face; sporty bearing; dull complexion.

STOLL, Raymond (Gefreiter): Alsotian from Strasbourg. Office worker. Description: 23 years old; 1.72m tall; medium build; blond hair; grey-blue eyes; round face; light complexion.

ADAM, Charles: //satian from Strasbourg. Was a member of the city police. Description: 23 years old; 1.72- tall; medium build, wavy blong hair; dark own eyes; round face.

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SECRETY Group F. tnim.ly CI Report No. 1

LNDVOGT (Lieutenant): German from Thuringia, but French type. In civil life was an Inspector of the Eaux et Forets. Description: 28 years old; 1.80m tall; wavy brown hair; light brown eyes; long face; dull complexion; quite stout but well proportioned.

BREUEL (Feldwebel): German from Berlin. Technical designer. Engineer and specialist in explosives. Description: 30 years old; 1. 80m tall; sparse, wavy blong hair; pale blue eyes bordering on grey; round face; dull complexion.

MEICHIOR, Ernst (Feldwebel) German from Lachen. Farmer. Gave military training. Description: 30 years old; 1.72m tall; medium build; brown hair; dark eyes; oval face slightly sunburhed.

NOVOTNIK (Captain): was one of the Kurfuerst leaders. Doctor of laws. Description: 50 years old; 1.70m tall; medium build; greying blond hair; light grey eyes; round face.

PARTL (Major): Chief of the Kurfuerst regiment. German from Augsburg. Headquarters officer in regular army. Is probably a lieutenant colonel now. Belongs to the Armored Force. Married to a lady in the nobility. Description: 35 to 36 years old; 1.75m tall; dark brown hair, cut in the German fashion; dark colored eyes; round face; very aristocratic bearing; very elegant.

VON SCHEINER (Oberleutnant): German from Saxony or from Silesfa. Lendowner. Description: 35 years old; 1.80m tall; thin; blond hair; grey-green eyes; long face; somewhat aristocratic bearing.

HARSDORF, (Lieutenant): Orderly officer. From Berlin. Description: 26 years old; 1.75m tell; medium build; wavy blond hair; greyblue eyes; oval face.

LOCHNER (Lieutenant in reserve): Student. Has lived in Turkey. His mother is Countess of Caravel. Speaks French, English, Italian and Spanish perfectly. Has carried out diplomatic relations in several countries. Description 23 years old; 1.80m tall; black hair; oval face and medium build.

KASSNER (Lieutenent). Description: 30 years old; 1.80m tall; wavy blond hair; blue eyes; long face; strong; light complexion.

RIEMER (Oberzahlmeister): Probably was business man in civilian life. Description: 26 years old; 1.75m tall; blond hair; long face; quite thin; light complexion.

ILLMER (Oberzehlmeister): Probably worked in industry in civilian life. Description: 26 years old; 1.75m tall; blond hair; long face; quite thin; light complexion. Speaks English.

PAUL (Captain) Description: 40 to 45 years old; 1.80m tall; dark brown hair, quite sparse; round face; fairly stout; haughty bearing; dull complexion.

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light complexion.

DORR, (Stabsarzt): reserve medical officer. Description: 28 to 30 years old; 1.32m tall; wavy lond hair; round face; medium build

LORENZ (Lieutenant): Former chief of a FAT in Holland. Description: 25 years old; 1.75m tall; light blond hair; light colored eyes; oval face; light complexion.

KIEFER (Oberleutnant): Infantryman. Wears German gold cross. Has one stiff leg. Description: 26 years old; 1.72m tall; brown hair; brown eyes; round face; dull complexion.

French and Spanish.

SOURCE: SCHULER - Instructors in the Pestalozzischule (Sabotage and Espionage school at Brandenburg. Following names.

VERBEEK (Major): Air corps officer from the last wer. Industrial man from Saxony. Probably an Abwehr II Chief. Specialist in Southeast Europe. Description: 50 years old; 1.70m tall; greying blond hair; blue eyes; oval face; dull complexion; thick lips; speaks Eng-

KUTSCHKE (Captain): Regular engineer officer. Specialist in sabotage and known as "Le Grand Satobeur". Very military bearing. Description: 40 years old; 1.80m tall; black hair; black eyes; piercing look; slightly sunburned complexion.

T.RRUSIO (Oberfeldwebel): Regular army in the engineers. Sabotage specialist. Description: 38 years old; 1.70m tall; brown hair dull complexion.

KNIESCHE (Captain in reserve): Specialist in Abwehr administration and falsification of official documents. Doctor of law. Description: 50 years old; 1.68m tall; completely shaved head; light colored eyes; pink complexion; thick lips; teutonic type.

ZIEGIER (Feldwebel): Probably from Honover. Specialist in the Russian language. Has been active in the Caucasus and in the Ukraine. Taught in a school in Belgrade. Description: 27 years old; 1.80m tall; thin; brown hair, dark eyes; dull complexion; long face. Speaks French and English but with an accent.

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dated 24 February 1945 (Continued)

DIETTMAR (Oberleutnant): Specialist in parachutings. Description: About 30 years old; 1.80m tall; light blond hair; blue eyes; light complexion; round face.

SCHNEIDER (Unteroffizier): Specialist in the use of secret inks and in photography, as well as other clandestine means of correspondence. Description: About 25 years old; 1.70m tall; black hair; dark brown eyes; dull complexion; face oval. Speaks English. Is considered as a horseman.

HUBNER (Stabsarzt): Viennese. Description: About 45 years old; 1.70m tall; medium build; black hair; black eyes; dull complexion; face slightly pockmarked. Speaks Arabic.

SOURCE: SCHULER: Individuals who spent time at the Pestalozzischule and known by SCHULER as having worked abroad.

MEYER, Erwin. Former official of the Arbeitsdienst. Worked in France at Lille. Description: 35 years old; 1.75m tall; heavy; brown hair; dark eyes; slightly sunburned complexion; oval face.

SCHEIBE, Kurt (Obergefreiter). From Berlin. Inspector in a Berlin public service. Spent time in France before the war at Dijon. Description: 25-26 years old; 1.75m tall; medium build; wavy blond hair, slightly sparse; grey-blue eyes; oval face; light complexion.

GOLLIN (Unteroffizier). From Berlin but appears to be of Belgian stock. Former journalist of the Volkischerbeobachter. Lived in Paris before and during the war. Was once sent to Brussels. Description: 35 to 40 years old; 1.70m tall; medium build; brown hair; dark eyes; sunburned complexion; slightly stooped. Speaks French and English perfectly. Heavy drinker. Adept as an actor.

NOLL (obergefreiter): German from Frankfort. Served in Russia and in Paris in the radio service of the Abwehr. Description: 27 years old; 1.75m tall; brown hair; dark eyes; light complexion; skin slightly pockmarked; bony face. Has attacks of neurasthenia.

HELMS (soldier). From Hamburg. Served in Spain, then was sent to Lille. Description 38 years old; 1.85m tall; blond hair thinning over the temples; blue eyes; dull complexion; round face.

BINIAS (soldier). German from Lubeck. Merchant and business man. Description: About 40 years old; 1.70m tell; light brown hair; brown eyes; prominent nose; light complexion; oval face.

FIEBIC (Gefreiter) From Halles. Former director of the conservatory of that town. Later served in the radio service at Kamenz. Description: About 40 years old; 1.70m tall; greying blond hair, cut short; wears glasses characteristic of near-sighted people; grey eyes round face; Light complexion.

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KUMMEL (Obergefreiter) From Berlin. Engineer. Has lived in Egypt. Description: 42 years old; 1.70m tall; blond hair, but slightly beld; light blue eyes with drooping lids; round face; dull complexion. Speaks English and Arabic but very little French.

SCHNETZER (Soldier). German from Koln. Has been in touch with Switzerland where he has some family. Formerly lived in Helsinki (Finland). Description: 35 years old; 1.75m tall; blond hair; brown eyes; wears glasses with fine frames; long thin face. Is somewhat vulgar.

UTOFF (Soldier) From Berlin. Business man. Has been in Southwest France. Was sent back to France after four week's military training. Had his wife with him. Description 35 to 40 years old; 1.80m tall; heavy; brown hair, brown eyes; wears glasses with thick ear pieces; round face.

MULLER, Helmuth (obergefreiter). Was at Roconcourt in FAT. Description 35 years old; 1.75m tall; brown hair; long sideburns; light colored eyes; long face.

KAUFFER (soldier). Alsatian Nazi from Strasbourg. Insurance agent. Description: 30 to 35 years old; 1.75m tall; black wavy hair dark eyes; wears glasses with thick ear pieces; round face; dull complexion.

HEIDENREICH, Theodore (soldier). Ex-employee in the Spanish consulate. Description: about 35 years old; 1.70m tall; thin; dark brown hair; piercing dark eyes; glasses; prominent nose; long face; dull complexion.

SCHMAIFELD (soldier). From Munich. Formerly employed in the Portuguese consulate. Description: about 30 years old; 1.75m tall; light blond hair; grey-blue eyes; long face; light complexion.

Beron Von MASSENBACH (soldier). From Munich. Business men. Worked in South American for I.G. Farben. Description 35 years old; 1.75m tall, grey hair, blue eyes; round face; dull complexion, distinguished manners.

FROELICH (soldier) German of Rumanian origin. Doctor of laws. Returned later to Rumania. Description 40 to 45 yrs old; 1.80m tall; brown hair; brown eyes; round face; thick lips; dull complexion. Speaks German with a strong Slavic accent.

LIEBACH, Tony (Unteroffizier). German from Dresden. Has lived in Rumania. Description: 35 to 40 years old; 1.75m tall; slightly sparse bland hair; grey-blue eyes; wears glasses; prominent upper jaw; oval face.

Von FALZ-FEIN (Soldier). Landowner in Crimea. Wholesele grain purchaser in America. Description 42 years old; 1.85m tall; black greying hair cut "q the German fashion; wear ;lasses; long face; upper lip protrudes over lower. Speaks six languages. Excellent SECRET

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6th Army Group Fr this tly 24 Feb. 1945, continued.

s. HARRY (Obergefreiter). Of Persian origin. Has lived in Iran, Russia. Was sent on a mission in Rumania. Description: 30 years old; 1.72m tall; black hair; sun-burned complexion; black moustache; thick black eyebrows; piercing look; long face. Speaks French (with accent), Turkish, Rumanian, Hungarian. Arabic.

5. Additional Information on Carded Personalities.

GERLIER, Mme "Annie": Mistress of FELIX; alias LEON JACOBS, and reported to be a dangerous enemy agent. Presently reported to be living with FELIX, Villa Aloha, San Remo. Described as about 32 years of age, dark brown hair, small, slender and very pretty.

6. Subversive Activities.

Nothing to report.

7. Security Control of the Civilian Population.

The security control of the civilian population is being accomplished under very satisfactory conditions.

a. The stabilized situation has enabled the placing of increased effort on travel control measures. Two officers of 307 CIC Det. have been assigned to coordinate travel control measures between Army service area and Corps areas. One Agent in each corps CIC Det. has been placed exclusively on travel control. Due to the limitation of resources, spot check control is maintained in the Army service area, with road blocks and patrol facilities concentrated in the forward areas. During the period 25 January to 10 February, 758 civilian were detained by travel control installations for lack of credentials or for other suspicious indications.

b. VI Corps CIC Dets reported that a more complete coverage of towns by Civil Affairs officers would facilitate a more effective control of civilian traffic by giving information to local authorities Close liaison between VI Corps Detachments and Corps Civil Affairs is being maintained for this express purpose.

c. The 101 A/B Div. CIC Det. had reported poor discipline in the FFI. Many attempted to use FFI armbands as a permit to travel. Many of the FFI personnel who were manning roadblocks did not report for duty when they learned that the FFI had been dissolved through vague announcements in the French press. A clarification of the FFI status, plus recruiting of auxiliary police where a sufficient number of FFI personnel has not been available, has served to remedy the situation. Conferences with FFI chiefs regarding discipline have shown satisfactory results. In some sectors FFI armbands have been reduced to a minimum, being passed on to reliefs at roadblocks.

d. Printed instructions have been issued to all roadblocks under control of VI Corps to insure complete understanding of regu-

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e. The unheralded reappearance of several persons arrested and evacuated as security hazards has been detected by VI and XV Corps units. Most of the persons are still considered as dangerous to security of the respective units and have been turned over to SM for reinternment.

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f. A patrol of 103 Inf Div ambushed a group of three persons attempting to enter our lines. The line passers were using a horsedrawn cart, one leading, one riding and one walking behind the cart. The latter was shot and killed and was found to be wearing a U.S. combat jacket and camouflage pants. No identifications of papers were found. The remaining two returned to enemy lines.

g. A German deserter, interrogated at Seventh Army Collection Point, furnished the following information:

Grenadier Werner EHRHARDT of 6 Co, 860 Regt, who speaks very good French and English, goes every second night on a recommaissance mission, crossing the Rosselle River. He never fails to bring back American food and candy. For his excellent services, such as unit identifications and locations, measuring tank tracks and determining tank locations, he was recommended for the Iron Cross, 1st Class, and a promotion. Very recently EHRHARDT went on a 3-day mission, wearing civilian clothes. He crossed the Rosselle and Lauterbach Rivers and went as far as the vicinity of St. Avold (Q2456):

h. In the 100 Inf. Div. a command decision was made to evacuate the three towns of Goetzenbruck, Sarreinsburg and Alton in early February. Evacuation of approximately 1,200 refugees was completed during the hours of darkness in two successive nights. The 100 CIC Det., cooperating with Civil Affairs, screened all evacuees and assisted in the movement.

i. VI Corps reports continued security hazard of numerous civilians traveling from the vicinity of Strasbourg into Seventh Army area. Civilians carry unrecognized credentials of at least ten varieties. VI Corps G-5 is establishing liaison with the French authorities in an attempt to limit the issuance of passes to those cases where approval of appropriate Seventh Army CIC/CA units has been received.

j. A 36 Inf Div soldier, captured near Bischwiller (RO818) on about 21 January and escaped 31 January, stated that while a PW in Oberhoffen (RO920) he had observed many enemy dressed in US Army officers' and enlisted mens' uniforms.

k. A PW captured by 100 Inf Div on 1 February stated that on the night of 28 or 29 January his NCO ordered him not to fire on 4 men who were passed through their lines toward U.S. lines. The four were dressed in white camouflage suits and were believed to be wearing civilian clothes undermeath.

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8. Relations between Troops and Civilian Population.

a. The 14 Armd Div reports evidence of growing indifference on the part of the civilians and points out that this appears to be the result of their confidence in ultimate victory and the consequent feeling that they are no longer dependent upon American help. Other divisions in VI Corps report a satisfactory condition.

b. With the view of discovering the presence of any widespread hostile feeling, the VI Corps CIC Det conducted, during the period, a survey of civilian reaction. Several sources of information were used and the feeling of people in all stations of life were considered. Fear of the consequences of German reoccupation predominated in the wide range of emotions expressed. The population was puzzled and unable to comprehend the reason for the withdrawals. There was a fairly widespread feeling among those most directly affected that the Americans were "abandoning" them. Isolated cases of bitterness were noted, but the respect for American forces remained unaltered. No evidence of a widespread hostile attitude, which might be considered a security danger, was discovered.

9. Relations between GI Personnel, Local Authorities and Police.

Upon completion of preliminary interrogation and search for equipment of X-l(See Annex 1) he was interned in the Morhange jail (operated by National Gendarmes) by 215 CIC for safekeeping prior to forwarding to 307 CIC for further interrogation. On 2100 hours 5 February, the Adjutant, Chateau Salins Gendarmerie presented himself at the jail, and showing a written order from the Commender, Metz Military Region, took Xlfrom the jail. Xlwas returned to US control on 7 February when CIC withdrew him from the Metz jail. It was found that Xlhad been taken to Chateau Salins for interrogation and transferred to Metz and that during this period his wrist watch had been taken from him.

Investigation revealed that the orders upon which Xlwas released from Morhange were general in nature, directing Gendarmes not to pass prisoners to US control, but to evacuate them to French control at Metz without delay.

Upon demand of 307 CIC the prisoner's watch was returned by the Adjutant Chateau Salins Gendarmerie. The matter has been brought to the Gendarme officials' attention and the assurance has been given that such actions will not reoccur.

10. Rumors Current among Troops and Civilians.

Nothing to report.

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Part II Military Security

1. General Summary.

Numerous reports on wire cutting continue to be received. In one case a young Frenchman of low mentality who intended to use wire for tethering stock and for clothes lines was responsible.

Three hand grenades were discovered planted in coal piles at Blainville (Y-0196). Indications are that the grenades were probably placed in the coal while it was at NEUFCH/TEAU. The case has been passed on to Com Z ETOUS/.

The Army Group has changed it method of disseminating paroles and countersigns. Previously the Army Group furnished all commands with the paroles and countersigns for ten day periods. However, due to the difficulties which arose in notifying all units in case of compromise, it was decided that Seventh Army, First French Army and 44th AAA. Brigade should all issue their own set of paroles and countersigns.

2. Security of Information.

a. Two cases of violations of Army Regulation 380-5 have been reported and have been referred to proper authority.

b. One instance of tapping of wire between a 70 Inf. Div FA btry and Fire Direction Center occurred on 10 February. On the same day an unknown radio station answered calls for two FA bns in the 70 Div Arty Radio command net.

VI Corps CIC on 30 January 1945. The Saverne postoffice switchboard has connections for local use only, mostly for public officials. Long distance cables to the forward areas are either cut or unserviceable. American Army lines running through the postoffice do not run into the civilian switchboard. Civilian employee lists were chacked, and access to the switchboard room prohibited to anyone not securing permission from the officer in charge. It was learned that the private railroad lines which run along both sides of all tracks are in good working order, have been used for private calls to Strasbourg by R.R. employees. All stations within the Saverne area have been forbidden to use these lines for private calls. Locallet list of R.R. employees was checked with the local Police. Telegraph lines, running in separate cables alongside the telephone lines have not been in operation since November 1944, and are cut in forward areas. CIC Detachments in VI Corps will keep constant check that telephone nets from the local office are discontinued, that cables of telephone and telegraph communications be cut in places where reilway traffic does not function, to forbid the use of functioning railway nets for private calls.

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3. Security of Personnel.

Nothing to Report.

4. Security of Installations and Material

Wire Cutting

n. Telephone wires of a circuit of the 35 F. Gp, hir Operations, and the 2d Fh Obsn Bn went out of operation on 1 February. Reprimen found that the two strands were cut at Monswiller (Q74051716). VI Corps CIC Det investigation revealed that this same line had been cut or broken two or three times during the week. The break occurred in front of a building containing a restaurant whose residents had daily shoveled snow from the area. Although the FFI at Monswiller stated that the persons residing in the building were pro-German in sympathy, CIC files revealed no unfavorable information regarding them. An FFI guard is being stationed near the building and the residents are under surveillance and investigation. No direct evidence of the cause of the breaks has so far been obtained.

- b. On 5 February two soldiers of the 533 AAA Bn found a young Frenchman cutting and rolling US /rmy telephone wire at a point about midway between Phalsbourg and Quatre-Vents. He admitted to VI Corps CIC that he had cut the wire for use in tethering stock and for clothes line. Complete investigation of the case by VI Corps CIC revealed that the youth was low witted and that his act had not been enemy inspired. He was turned over to French authorities.
- c. 70 Div. reported that a cable was cut on 29 January at Puttelange (Q4150) and another cut by an axe on the highway 3 miles north of Morhange (Q2036). This is believed to be the work of saboteurs.
- d. 100 Inf Div reported that on 4 February a wire line forward from a Bn. Hq. from vic Goetzenbruck (C7442) was cut three times.

Attempted Sabotage

a. Two British Mk I fragmentation hand grenades were planted in the coal pile of the Blainville (Y0196) Railroad yard. The first grenade was found at 0400% 10 February 1945 in the coal box of the stationary crane used for loading tenders. The second grenade, found 6 hours later, was in the tender of a US Army locomotive after loading by stationary crane. An additional grenade was found a day leter near the railway on the south side of Domaliviere Bridge in the gutter, evidently discarded by an unknown person. All three grenades were British Mk I fragmentation grenades with rusty green band around middle; markings of the first grenade are unknown since it was thrown in river; second grenade was marked "No. 36 MI, HID."; third grenade "No. 36M-MKI, Z, WD-C, 44." Grenades are believed to be of a type parachuted by R.F to resistance groups during liberation of France. The coal in which grenades were discovered was unloaded from Gondolas


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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SECRETmy Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 10. (Continued) 24 February 1945) #18952 and #4749266, Train #N-46-5, which arrived at Blainville 6
February 1945 from Neufchateau. Indications are that the granades
were probably placed in the coal at Neufchateau by unknown persons
attempting sabotage. The remaining coal is being hand-shoveled. Investigation continuing. b. 103 Inf. Div. reported that German troops had used deception in an attempt to gain a bridge at Rothbach. They had gained the confidence of the guards, troops of 1st Bn, 410 Inf. Regt, by shouting, "Nous sommes FFI" and had then killed all the guards, except one who escaped and reported the incident. c. The 6638 Engr. Mine Clr Co. discovered, with the aid of local inhabitants, a booby-trapped mine (German ramp) in a roadside cinder pile on route N 392 (V317907). Investigation by 307 CIC indicated that the mine was planted by enemy forces prior to their withdrawal. PART III - PORT, AIRPORT AND FRONTIER CONTROL Nothing to Report. SECRET - 16 -

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ANNEX NO. 1

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 10

New Cases of Individual Suspects.

X-1---, 21 years old; French national and Franciste member. Parachuted, confessed espionage agent. Mission: to observe and report by W/T information of troop dispositions and movement in Luneville (V0899) area. Apprehended by XV Corps Gendarme patrol near Dalhain (U1432). X-1 was dropped by parachute from an enemy-operated B-17 at approximately 0200A 4 February near Marthille (Q1336). Equipment including two W/T sets was dropped by separate parachute, but due to improper operation of the chute was damaged and scattered over a large area. X-1 was carrying 50,000 francs, 50 Rentenmark, one U.S. 20 dollar blue seal bill, but no identity papers. X-1 attributed the lack of papers to the German belief that new French identity cards had been issued the first of the year. The drop was planned for the northern edge of the Forest of Parroy (Q175080), but actually occurred in vic Q132387. X-1 had been instructed to proceed to Luneville to contact Francistes, and set up his transmitter in the house of one of his contacts. He had not been informed of the locations of any major headquarters in the Luneville area. Secondary missions included radioing of information on travel control, new cartes d'identite, laissez-passers, etc. He seid five other agents were in the plane with similar missions. Of these one was to jump at Reims, one was to cover the region south of Paris, and three the region north of Paris. X-1 stated that three of the five were radio operators and two were liaison men.

X-1 joined the Franciste movement in November 1942, becoming a Youth Leader three months later. In October 1943 he joined a motorcycle unit of Laval's unsuccessful private army, the Premier Regiment de France. He remained with this unit until after its dissolution following the June 1944 invasion, when he accepted refuge at a Milice camp near Auteuil, from which time he was considered a Milicien. A short period of basic training was followed by his departure to Gerardmer in the Vosges with a small Milice unit which, joined by other groups, proceeded to Kassel, Germany. Here, although all Milice units were mobilized into the Waffen SS, X-1 maintains that he was not mobilized, due to his insistence and record proof that he was a Franciste. In November 1944 Darnand gave orders that X-1 and other Francistes were to be sent to Ulm and mobilized into the German Army. At Ulm, X-1 declares, he and a few friends deserted and went to Sigmaringen to find Marcel BUCARD, Franciste chief, who was finally located in Beden-Baden on 21 November. BUCARD asked them to accept a special mission "to mop up behind the lines." X-1 accepted and was sent to an espionage school conducted by Capt. MARTIN for LVF, Franciste, RNP and PPF members at Baden-Baden. There for nine weeks X-1 had instruction and practice in radio operation, as well as lectures in intelligence work and unit identification. On 27 January BUCARD suddenly gave him his present mission. BUCARD and X-1 left Baden, proceeded through Rastatt and Karlsruhe to an airfield about 15 kilometers from Stuttgart, where X waited eight days for favorable flight conditions. During this time X met the other members of the group destined to be perachuted behind American lines, as well as several GIS officers.

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Y----, unidentified German soldier dressed in American uniform, probable saboteur, shot and killed by an American guard at a railroad bridge over the Meurthe River, (U855172), vic Champigneulles. At approximately 0600 hours 2 February 1945 a guard of "D" Co, 65 Inf Regt. saw a man standing near the river's edge under the R.R. bridge. The man was dressed in U.S. Army uniform and was carrying a bundle about 8" wide and 24" long. The guard challenged the man, who immediately threw the package into the river and started to run. The only piece of identifying evidence found was a German identification tag marked: 1156 A 2/Inf. Ers. Btl. 109. The man's clothing consisted of U.S. Army issue shoes and leggings; U.S. issue trousers marked ASN M-5191; a handkerchief marked Wo877; an American shirt, non-issue; Englishmake underwear; a U.S. field jacket; and suspenders of unknown origin. CIC Det, CAS, Nancy investigated and forwarded identity disk and report to G-2 Advance Section, Dijon. Attemots by Co. "D", 65 Inf Regt to retrieve the jettisoned bundle from the river have so far been unsuccessful. The man's original unit, as indicated by the dog tag, was the 109 Infantry Replacement Battalion, which was contacted by Seventh Army on the breakthrough to Strasbourg, the unit's home station. According to a PW statement mid-January 1945, this unit is now manning the Siegfried Line near Stollhofen (R2318)

RODINI, Pierre: Born 2 January at Menton, A.M. French by naturalization. Subject is confessed Abwehr agent who crossed the lines 8 January 1945 in the vicinity of Sospel. Subject was sent to Italy as forced laborar after the FFI group to which he belonged was apprehended by the Germans. After that he joined the Italian Army, deserted and fled to Bordighera where he remained until the Allied landings in Southern France. At end of November 1944 subject was presented through a friend at Isolabona, one Marcel Bona, to a German Naval Lieutenant named SESSIER and FELIX, alias LEON JACOBS, formerly operating in the Nice-Cannes area and known as a dangerous Abwehr agent. Subject was taken to the Villa Aloha, San Remo, headquarters of Felix and Sessler and then transported to the Villa Delle Palme where there were six other agents, one Brazilian and five Italians. During the time subject was there he was given a course for one hour a day in identification of American vehicles, guns and uniforms under the instruction of FELIX. Subject was to cross the lines 23 December 1944 by boat and to land near Monaco. Mission was to go to Nice and Cannes and if possible to Toulon and Marseille, to determine what activity was taking place in the two ports at Nice and Cannes, to secure the number and types of American units in the two localities, to discover what types of "Laissez-passers" were necessary for travel, and to note any changes in identity cards, and to secure copies of French and American newspapers. Subject was to return within eight days. If arrested he was to tell the authorities he had crossed lines to join the French Army. Was given the number "Felix 5018 Pieere San Remo" to identify himself with on returning across lines. Subject made several unsuccessful attempts to cross the lines. He was given 50,000 francs for the mission in advance, an equal amount to be paid on his return. If the mission was successful he was to be paid 300,000 francs for the second and to return with three agents and a radio transmitter. Case

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MOHN, Paul. Agent of the German Auxiliary Police. Suspected of economic espionage. Case in progress at SM 60.

GRAFF, Marthe)
Graff, Lucien) Accused of having caused assassination of 26 FFI
members at CHALON on 26 August 1944. Will be transferred to Paris.

FREIHEIT. S.D. informent. Case in progress at I Corps.

X-2---. German woman intelligence agent of Swiss nationaltiy. Worked for Wagner. Did counter-espionage mostly. Case in progress with T.R.

GOUSY, Pierre, alias VICARI, Pierre. German intelligence agent. Case in progress at 3d DIA.

X-3---. German intelligence agent. Arrested at COLMAR. Case in progress with T.R.

X-4---. Employed by MULHOUSE SD service, and during the occupation gave information to the enemy at the same time as she aided the resistance movement.

X-5---. Former communist and Gestapo informer.

GEWINNER, Alfred. Arrested on 23 January by 2nd DB B.S.M. Had military intelligence mission. Was to contact several persons at Strasbourg. Handed over to Strasbourg S.M.T. for sentence.

STEINECKER, Erwin. Age 16. Member of the Hitler-Jugend. Stated at once to the 1st DMI B.S.M. that he was sent on a mission in behalf of an S.S. officer.

FIORILA, Louis (Luigi): Crossed front lines 7 February 1945.
Born 21 July 1914, Finsberry, England. Claims to be British national, Moved to Italy in 1927 with his family excepting his father. Subject claims that about October 1943 he began furnishing information to.

Major Enrico Rossi and Captain Alfonso Testa-Verda, San Martino, Italy who claimed to be in contact with British Intelligence at Genoa. After the arrest of Testa-Verda in February 1944, subject claims to have assisted in other activities of a patriotic nature for the Allies until 15 November 1944, when he was arrested by the S.S. in San Remo. On 4 January 1945 a Major Godard, S.S., advised subject papers had arrived from Genoa authorizing his execution as a hostage unless he would agree to undertake an espionage mission. Subject claims to have accepted this mission in order to escape Italy. Subject was told to go to Monte Carlo under the guise of having escaped prison and contact antifascists and anti-Germans and through them meet Allied Intelligence Officers and be returned as a double agent. Subject was to ascertain what information he could of a military nature in Monte Carlo, as well as the attitude of the Monegasques toward American and British military

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Annex No. 1 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 10 dated 24 February 1945.

personnel, morale of the troops, and the attitude of the Monegasques toward their food problems. About 19 January 1945 a French captain came to subject and gave him these instructions again, at the same time stating that some twenty Frenchmen were expected soon at San Remo from Milan to establish a courier service between San Remo and France. Interrogation continuing.

PIETRZINSKI, Heinz, alies LUPIN, Raimondo. Age 19, born Hinderburg, Upper Silesia; Germany. Arrested as line-crosser Menton, A.M. 9 February 1945. First claimed he was Italian partisan who had escaped from German SS at San Remo after his arrest for partisan activities. Then claimed to be Polish. When it was found that subject was insufficiently fluent in either Italian or Polish, subject claimed to be of German gationality. Subject still maintains that he worked with partisans after having deserted German army and crossed lines after partisans were defeated by the Germans. Subject claims to have twice escaped from the SD villa in San Remo where he was imprisoned. Interrogation continuing.

HUGON, Louise. English national of French extraction living in Monte Carlo. CIC investigated case at request of 44th AAA Brigade MP's who were interested because of subject's claim of being robbed of 1,550,000 francs by members of the MP detachment. It was felt that subject might be attempting to discredit military personnel in Monte Carlo since no proof that subject had actually been robbed could be found. Another possibility that subject was attempting in through intervention of her lover, JEAN CANELLA, a men of cuestionable reputation and a reported ex-Spanish terrorist, to obtain the release of a political prisoner from jail. Case was dropped when it was ascertained that subject was unscrupulous, immoral woman whose motive was probably to place a claim against the American Army for the money with which she could engage in various business enterprises.

COTTALORDA, Pierre. 43 years of age. French national from Breil. Crossed lines 8 January 1945 as guide to RODINI. Also had brought FIORILI across on 7 January 1945. Claimed to have no knowledge of either of these and to have done it merely for money. Claimed that the reason why he did not attempt to raturn the second time was that he intended to stay with his uncle, the mayor of Sospel. Interrogation continuing.

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ANNEX No. 2.

Progress of Cases Under Investigation.

SCHAGUENE, Joseph. Was recruited by the SD, thinking he was to work for the Allied Intelligence Service. Having discovered his error decided to get around the enemy services. Was thus let to certain compromising situations. Was under orders from FANEISA, alias FAUBEL, and from MONFORT. Supplementary investigation.

FEIGNIER. Milicien. Handed over to BELFORT S.M.T. for transfer to DIJON S.M.T.

TIHSLER. Pole. Taken prisoner in 1939. Joined German police and was then in a specialized radio unit. Sent to ITALY to the 15th Regiment of Police. Engaged in the struggle against the pertisans. He succeeded in making contact with the latter. Got into France with the help of the Maquis. Given over to Polish Liaison with First French Army.

CHEJKA, Antoine. Fought in POLAND; then in FRANCE. Got to England in 1940. Landed in NORMANDY in July 1944. Taken prisoner in BELGIUM in September and escaped. Given over to Polish Lisison with First French Army.

OSTERMANN. Crossed the RHINE on the morning of 13 January at ROBERTS/U. Was recognized as being an S.D. and SRA agent. Had been assigned an intelligence mission in the political and military field for the SRA. Handed over to STRASBOURG S.M.T. for trial before military court.

FOURNIER. Formerly of the Croix de Feu. He was a former member of the French Volunteer Legion (LVF). Retired to SIGMARINGEN. Thanks to DARNAND, was enabled to enter FRANCE by way of SWITZERLAND. Accepted a political mission to be accomplished in SWITZERLAND. Handed over to the French military authorities by the Swiss. Transferred to the BELFORT S.M.T. for internment until the end of hostilities.

DELL: VECCHIA, Maria Louise)
BROUST, Odette
VIR: ULT, Mireille
HAGEN. Handed over to Lieutenant FAVCUS of S.C.I.

BZEWSKA, Marie. Appears to be the mistress of TISSEYRE and accompanied him on his mission. To be interned.

TISSEYRE, Joan. Sent on a mission for "Renseignements Generaux" of VICHY (withdrawn to SIGM/RINGEN). Will be passed to the S.M.T.

X----. SRA agent mentioned in the last report. Employed by WALTER. Handed over to T.R.


PRZYBYL, Otto. Will be handed over to a French service for use if needed.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SECRET : 7 February 45 : Init: HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 91 APO #23, U. S. Army 7 February 1945 Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 9 Period from 16 January to 1 February 1945 Part I - Civil Security 1. General Survey. a. In the area of the Seventh Army and also the First French Army the Germans are continuing to use mediocre agents who have been poorly trained. As an example, in the Seventh Army area another sixteen year old Hitler Jugend member was captured. Travel control is continually being tightened and a pass known as a "Laissez-Passer Militaire" is being used between Seventh Army and First French Army areas where language difficulties are encountered and for civilians entering the Group Area. It is expected that large numbers of stay-behind agents will be left behind as the Germans withdraw from Alsace: Seventh Army evacuated approximately 8,000 refugees from forward areas during the period. period. b. Following is an analysis of the espionage and sabotage agents captured by 6th Army Group units between D day, 15 August 1944 and 31 December 1944. (1) Total Espionage - 132 (including 16 women)
Total Sabotage - 15 (including 1 woman) (2) 18 Agents were found with 20 radio transmitters. (3) Following is a breakdown according to nationalities: French Lux. Swiss Dan. Canad. W.Russian Dutch Ger. Total 2 Espionage 15 Sabotage 13 147 '(4) Average per day: 1.06. New Cases of Individual Suspects. 84 See Annex I. SECRE' SECRET

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S E C R E T ECRETY Group Fortnightly dated 7 February 1945, continued.

3. Progress of Cases Under Investigation.

a. The brothers COMBIER, Georges and Bernard, (See Report No. 8) crossed the lines in MULHOUSE and told the following story: Sent to forced labor they met a French captain working for the Allied Intelligence. This officer facilitated their crossing and gave them the address of his wife in STRASBOURG. They are asking to be sent back with a W/T. After interrogation by BSM First French Army, they admit being engaged in a short range mission (8 days maximum) in the region of MULHOUSE in view to locate CP's and note movements of troops. They also wanted, by means of their story, to try to be recruited by the French Special Services. They are employed by Golonel KIEFFER, probably an assistant to Colonel BICKLER. They have given interesting CI information. They have been turned over to BSMT Belfort for trial before military court.

b. SIMON, Robert, (See Report No. 8), member of the Gestapo in DIJON, later in STRASBOURG, finally in MULHOUSE, where he has been arrested, has given information on each of these Gestapo offices. He had denounced several patriots. Turned over to BSMT Belfort for trial before a military county when above of treeses. before a military court under charge of treason.

- c. COURTISSON (See Report No. 8), enlisted in First French Army, is a former P.P.F. Will be turned over to BSM Lyon.
- d. RAVEY, Rene (See Report No. 8). Not a CI case. Turned over to BSMT Montbeliard.
- e. THISTER, Bruno (See Report No. 8). Pole of the German Army. Crossed the lines in the Alps. Under investigation.
 - f. WELDE, Lucien (See Report No. 8) (Under investigation) (at BSM,
 - g. SCHAGUENE, Joseph (See Report No. 8) (1st French Corps.

h. LEANDRY, Andre (See Report No. 7). Recruited by GIS. Employed by WINTER and KAYSER of F.A.T. 358. Admits having already accomplished missions, one of which led to the arrest of an Allied agent. Admits being on mission in region of FELLERING for the purpose of:

- (1) Collecting information regarding units in sector of ST. AMARIN.
- (2) Collecting information on armored units.
 (3) Finding out whether any Allied headquarters were located in GIROMAGNY.

After a new examination by BSM First French Army, case was turned over to BSMT Belfort for trial before a military court.

POINSIGNON, Roger (See Report No. 7). Confessed spy. Died of wounds received when trying to escape.

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dated 7 Feb. 1945, continued.

j. HOELLINGER, Franz. (See Report No. 8). To SM to verify claim he worked for French Intelligence.

k.. WINTZ, Edouard. Subject in process of being removed from Combat Area of 44th AAA Brigade. Case closed.

- 1. HAGEN, Hans. Subject in process of being evacuated from Combat Zone of 44th AAA Brigade. Case closed.
 - m. SCHLEGEL, Maurice. Subject under surveillance. Case pending.
 - n. SCHLEGEL, Queenie. Subject under surveillance. Case pending.
- o. SCHOPPEER, Jacques. Investigation continuing, no further information.
- p. MOHTAR, Pacha. Case pending. No further information. Case temporarily suspended, pending information on other persons thought to be associated with Subject.
- 4. Personalities in Areas Still under Enemy Control.

See Annex No. 2.

5. Additional Information on Carded Personalities.

LA CARON de CHOCQUESE, Herve Serge. Committee of Liberation.
Beaulieu S/Mer reports Subject to be presently resident of Paris, No. 4
Rue des Maronniers. Information with copy of dossier held by committee
forwarded to Seine Base Section.

LIBEROS, Antonia Jean. Reported by Committee of Liberation, Beaulieu S/Mer to have committed suicide at Beaulieu 24 October 1944.

VERES, Maximilien Anfroy de. Reported by Committee of Epuration, Beaulieu S/Mer to have been in flight since June 1943. Left because his anti-French role was too evident and probably feared the patriots. Recrutted for anti-Bolshevik Legion and was member of PPF. Rumored to be in PERPIGNON.

6. Subversive Activities.

First French Army reports an increasing number of escapes of German PsW, which leads them to the belief that an escape organization exists, working with the aid of French collaborationists. This matter is being carefully investigated.

7. Security Control of the Civilian Population.

a. The "Security Company" of First French Army Headquarters participates in control of civilian security by setting up unexpected road blocks. It has arrested several military personnel and civilians who did not comply with the travel control regulations.

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b. In the 44th ALA Brigade area the Provost Marshal has been given complete charge of all personnel operating road blocks and attached to his staff are a French Gendarmerie Officer, and a French Army Officer. The Cinquieme Bureau office in Beau Solcil and the 44th ALA Brigade CIC will approve all passes for travel in the city of Monte Carlo and neighboring localities.

c. The major problem in security control of the civilian population in the Seventh Army area arose with the withdrawal on VI Corps front. Prior to the withdrawal VI Corps G-4, G-5 and CIC representatives developed and implemented a plan for control of the evacuation of refugees, embodying the following:

- (1) Civilian residents were allowed to evacuate forward areas without the usual laissez-passer.
 - (2) Refugee travel was diverted to secondary roads.
- (3) No travel was permitted forward except under unusual cirstances, certified by CA.
 - (4) Measures for screening of refugees were established.
- (5) As far as practical, all screening was to be done at original points of departure.

G-5 Seventh Army arranged rail evacuation of approximately 8.000 persons. Most shipments were by rail from Saverne to the rear of the Army area, with truck evacuation to Saverne from forward collecting points.

Where possible, shipments were screened prior to entraining. Where complete screening was not possible units receiving shipments were notified that the screening had not been completed. The rail evacuation, which averaged 1 - 3,000 persons daily for seven days, placed a heavy strain on screening facilities. FFI and SM were utilized to separate unidentified and suspicious cases. CIC resources were concentrated on examination of the questionable cases. Special emphasis was given to the search for Hitler Jugend cases. Several informents were employed to detect rumor-mongers and rabble-rousers. Names of all persons were checked against the VI Corps dessier.

XV Corps screened a portion of the refugee traffic, checking approximately 1,200 refugees during the period. The movement was accomplished without indications of panic or serious uneasiness.

d. A system of tagging evacues in a manner similar to PWs is being considered by G-2 and G-5 of Seventh Army Headquarters to insure more complete screening of evacues and to prevent duplication of effort in rescreening at the several echelons of evacuation in the event of future major evacuations.

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e. In order to improve security and standardize travel control restrictions throughout the Seventh Army area, a revised Seventh Army policy was published 27 January, including the following:

- (1) <u>Division sectors</u>. All travel by civilians in division sectors is prohibited, except in cases of extreme emergency. Permits for civilian travel will be issued by Civil Affairs officers when proof of extreme emergency is considered adequate, and will be approved by a member of the Counter Intelligence Corps. Issuance of permits will-not be delegated to local civil authorities. All civilians found traveling without permits will be arrested and turned over to the nearest CIC Detachment for interrogation as suspects.
- (2) All civilians attempting to enter or leave forward positions will be arrested and turned over to the nearest CIC Detachment as espionage or sabotage suspects. All their belongings will accompany the
- (3) Corps sectors. All travel by civilians in Corps sectors is prohibited except where necessary to the success of the Seventh Army operations. Permits for civilian travel will be issued by Civil Affairs officers or by local civil authorities of proven reliability to whom this responsibility may be delegated. Each permit, however, must be approved by the CIC before it will be considered valid.
- (4) Army sector. Free civilian travel for a distance of six kilometers will be permitted. Permits for travel in excess of six kilometers will be issued by Civil Affairs officers who may delegate such authority to local civil authorities of proven reliability. Permits will be issued only where necessary to the success of Seventh Army operations.
 - G-5 is accomplishing public notification in the areas affected.
- f. Due to the withdrawal, displacement to the rear of travel control installations was accomplished in VI Corps. Withdrawal of road blocks was accomplished at night under careful supervision to prevent alarming the public. The Corps system of travel control, in effect 25 January, included the following:
 - 65 road blocks manned by national gendarmes.
 - 9 road blocks manned by territorial gendarmes.
 - 6 MP check points.
 - A system of road patrols by Tr "C", 94 Rcn Sq.
 - A system of mobile gendarme patrols.

The static condition of XV Corps front permitted refining of the travel control system. Due to the increased area of responsibility 88

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and reshuffling of troops, a problem in maintaining security control was presented which was met adequately. Traffic control measures in effect 25 January were:

95 road blocks manned by FFI.

43 road blocks manned by gendarmes.

7 MP check points.

MP road patrols in division sectors.


4 gendarme bicycle road patrols.

Rigid control was maintained over refugee movement in the corps . area throughout the period.

- g. In Seventh Army area, 28 spies and saboteurs attempting to infiltrate behind our lines have been captured since 15 October as a direct result of the installation of effective travel control. Travel control was indirectly responsible for the capture of several "staybehind" agents who were attempting to move about in rear of division areas. Since 1 January 1945, capture of all agents found by Seventh Army was made by combat troops.
- h. The Seventh army reports the following general information concerning the agents it has captured:
- (1) German agents have invariably been of poor character, low morals and entirely without scruples. The only agents who showed any element of patriotism as a motive for missions were three Hitler Jugend (all aged 16). All three were "drafted" for the mission and were not volunteers. At least one was promised a medal. A large number of French traitors were used apparently on the supposition that they would return because they faced severe sentences as collaborationists. French criminals, selected and released by the Germans, were also used. A love of easy money dominated the action of practically all agents captured. tured.
- (2) "Stay-behind" agents have refrained from collaborationist activities which would cause suspicion of their espionage missions. "Line-passers" used cover stories that they were escaping workers or prisoners from Germany and that they had tactical information to give to the Americans. Recruiters invariably assured agents that the Americans were very naive, stupid, and that they need have no fear of capture.
- 8. Relations between Troops and Civilian Population.

Relations between troops and civilian population remain good. The First French Army reports that in the rear areas the civilians have shown some resentment at the refusal of the Army authorities to grant travel passes. SECRET

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Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 9 (Continued) 7 February 1945.

Part II Military Security

1. General Summary:

a. The Military Security of Personnel and materiel has remained good throughout the area. No important sabotage has been reported.

b. The 410 Infantry Regiment reports a new type of security menace. A black dog caught going through our lines toward the enemy had a note in German reading, "Send some flour home", attached to its collar.

c. Several cases of wire-cutting have been reported in both First French Army and Seventh Army areas.

2. Security of Information:

a. Interrogation by MU 500 CSDIC of PW SS-Standartenfuehrer (Colonel) Hans LINGNER, Commanding the 17 SS Pz Gren Div, revealed the following indications of what the Germans think of our security measures:

Lingner said that his unit did not monitor Allied radio communications and that he had no deciphering unit (Auswertungsstelle). In his Division sector he had one flash and sound ranging section which was under Army command. American PWs readily revealed their units but practically nothing else. He remarked that most American PWs were not at all worried about being captured because they were all convinced that the war would be over in two or three months. Lingner indicated that intelligence eminating from his higher headcuarters was not very extensive.

3. Security of Personnel:


Propagands in the form of sheets printed to look like the cover of "Life" magazine have been found on the person of an Italian prisoner in the 44th AAA Brigade Area, who claimed that they had been given to him by a German officer but not for the purpose of distribution if he were captured. No campaign has been ascertained to propagandize American troops and the above reported instance is felt to be of small importance.

4. Security of Materiel and Installations:


a. 79th Infantry Division, Task Force LINDEN and First French Army reported cases of wire cutting and in each case investigation failed to fix the persons responsible. No other cases of successful sabotage were reported.

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
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ANNEX NO. 1

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 9

New Cases of Individual Suspects

OSTERMANN Charles - Agent SD - Arrested by BSM 3rd DIA - Under investigation.

MARTIN Emma and DELAFOLIE Robert - Knew the activity of WILHELM Francois well known German agent, but did not report about same. Turned over to BSMT Mulhouse for trial.

CHESKA - Polish line-crosser - Tells a fantastic story. Under investigation.

X.... - Was in contact with Gestapo representatives in Vichy. Turned over to TR.

X.(women) - Turned to TR. Travelled much in Germany, where she has known many SD and Gestapo personalities.

X..... - Vichy police member (Agent des renseignements generaux) who refugeed himself in Germany.

CADO Lucette, born 13 May 1920, was arrested and later escaped. Was coming from Germany through Switzerland. Was working for SD through POINSOT "Commissaire des renseignements generaux in Vichy. Description: height 5'42", dark hair, pale complexion, very long curly heir falling over the shoulders, parted in the middle, rather pretty, overcoat made with heavy white woll, large sporting shoes, white scarf or handkerchief either around the neck or over the head, glasses, no money, no identity papers.

PRZYBYL Otto, German, expelled from Switzerland, has worked for the Swiss Intelligence. Under investigation.

TISSEYRE Jean - Commissaire of Vichy. Has arrived through Switzerland. Under investigation.

X.... German agent - Under investigation.

FEIGNIER Joannes - Milician - Under Investigation.

X..... Came through Switzerland. Seemingly employed by Darnand. Under Investigation.

DELLAVECCHIA Marie Louise, BROUST Odette, VIRAULT Mireille - Already known. Under investigation. Turned over by BSMT Belfort to BSM First French Army, upon the latter's request.

BZEZWSKA Marie - Crossed from Switzerland. Under investigation.

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l to Forthightly CI Report no. 9, dated 7 February 1945 (Continued)

New Cases of Espionage and Sabotage Agents Apprehended.

WENNER, Frederic. Confessed espionage agent. Hitler Jugend member; (See Report No. 8, Annex II) French (Alsatian) national; 16 years old. Apprehended 15 January 1945 by Task Force LINDEN CIC at travel control point at Schirrheim - Schirrheim (R1322). He confessed that on 13 January 1945 a Frontaufklaerungstrupg Lieutenant had given him the mission of going from Seltz (R2632) through Kesseldorf (R2430), Forstfeld (R2229) and Soufflenheim (R1625) to Haguenau (R0323) in order to cather and memorize information on number and kind of troops. order to gather and memorize information on number and kind of troops, negro or white, shoulder patch identifications, amount of armor and other types of vehicles with their markings. His cover story was to other types of venicles with their markings. His cover story was to be that he had been forced to join the Volkssturm and dig fortifications and that he was escaping back to France. "ENNER was to complete this mission within three days and return to the Ortskommandantur of Seltz, which was the CP of a Volkssturm company. He was given a new set of civilian clothes, 40 marks, a can of meat, a loef of bread and a promise of the Iron Cross, 2nd class, if he were succe sful. MENNER was one of the group of five Hitler Jugend which included RECHER who were apprehended 12 January and recruited by Bannfuehrer BERGER about the beginning of this year. He claimed that his only intelligence training had consisted of a half-hour lecture by an NCO on U.S. Army vehicle identification markings and shoulder patches. To SM for trial.

DENJEAN-MASSIA, Joel Robert Marcel, alias DIETRICH, Willy. Confessed espionage and sabotage agent of Frontaufklaerungstrupp 251 DENJEAN-MASSIA, Joel Robert Marcel, alias DIETRICH, Willy.
Confessed espionare and sabotage agent of Frontaufklaerungstrupp 251.
Apprehended on 9 January 1945 at a road block near Bischwiller (RO818)
by "4" Battery 49th FA, 12th Armored Division. French national; member of the Franciste Perty; former student at the Chateau de Moulny and La Montagnette sabotage schools. Interrogated by 12th Armored Division and VI Corps CIC. He stated that after 14 weeks treining during period February to May 1944 at the two sabotage schools his group was employed in a feldgendarmeric capacity, made the retreat up the Rhone Velley and finally located in Ottersweier, Germany (R2708). The commandent of the La Montagnette sabotage school, Lt. MEYER, alias Lt. MEYES, was at Ottersweier engaged in dispatching agents across the lines north of Strasbourg. MEYER sent DENJIAN-MASSIA ecross the Rhine on 8 January mear Offendorf (R1312) with four others, including Gustave HACGER, NCO explosives instructor at La Montagnette, who gave him instructions for his mission. He was told to go to Rohrwiller (R1217) place an explosive charge under a tank, ascertain road conditions, determine the exact number of tanks in the woods south of the Rohrwiller-Bischwiller road, the intentions of the armored units, and any rumors circulating in Rohrwiller. His cover story was to be that he was an escaping Todt worker attempting to make his way to Marseille. Maving received his mission, he proceeded to Herrlisheim (R1214) carrying a plastic charge and two British-made detonator pencils, which he claims to have discarded in the belief that they jecoardized his more important espionage mission. He passed through German lines using the German Army password and was arrested about three and a half hours after leaving Herrlisheim. To SCI.

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dated 7 February 1945 (Continued)

BERTOLO, Cocile Therese. Confessed espioning agent. Italian national; 23 years old. Apprehended at a travel control post on 18 January 1945 by 1st Bn, 399 Inf Regt, 100 Inf Div as she was attempting to cross American lines near Lambach (97248). She confessed to 100th Division CIC that she had been sent across the lines with the mission of obtaining and memorizing information on troops and tank dispositions, artillery emplacements, vehicle markings and shoulder patches, and in particular the dispositions of the 36th Division. She cleimed to have received no traffning other than a cuick demonstration of shoulder patches, was to complete her mission within three days, and was promised ample remuneration upon her return. She had been told that she would have no trouble convincing the Americans that she was a refugee. On 20 August 1944 BERTOLO and her two friends, Huguette and Yvette PELLETTA, left her fether's restaurant in Lyon, where they were working, through foar of partisan reprisal as the restaurant had been frequented by Germans. They went to Pirmasens, Germany (19066), where BERTOLO worked in a shoe factory until 2 December 1944, when she and her two friends left for Bitche, where she mat Franz HOELLINGER (arrested 12 January by 100th Div CIC). The Gestapo in Bitche exploited the fact that the women had no papers, and a Ceptain MEHL asked them to become informers for the Gestapo against French workers in Germany. BERTOLO claims that she refused. She was subsequently offered an espionage mission and was advised by a 1st Sgt "CHARLIE" to accept, which she did when MEHL threatened her and her friends with concentration camp. On 17 January MEHL, an unknown artillery lieutenent and CHARLIE brought her by automobile to a forester's house. MEHL remained there and the party proceeded several kilometers to a bunker containing German soldiers, one of whom led her friends with concentration camp. On 17 January MEHL, an unknown artillery lieutenent and charle the instructions to proceed in a straight he minerican road

RUNGE, Alice. Confessed espionage agent. French (Alsatian) national 49 years old; member of Francists Party. Apprehended 16 January in Woorth (RO137) by 14th Irm Div CIC. In 1937 and 1938 subject added the Gestapo through association with a Franz WIMER in the escape of Fascists from France to Germany via Strasbourg. RUNGE, who was WIMER's mistress, later furnished him with political and economic intelligence concerning Strasbourg, and acted as informer against anti-Fascists, particularly Francophile Jews and Communists. Subject states that her only motive was love. During this period she was employed as a cleaning-woman in the apartment of one ALMINN, and managed to steal from him maps of Maginot Line fortifications and a defense plan for the adjecent areas. She hid these documents in a beby carriage which also contained her child and was caught as she attempted to cross into Germany on the Kehl-Strasbourg bridge. She was released 16 months later upon German occupation, and secured employment as a cook in the Strasbourg SD Headquarters, but was shortly thereafter brought to trial by the Gestapo for having turned state's evidence

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Annex No. 1 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 9, dated 7 February 1945 (Continued).

during her previous trial by naming various Gestepo agents. She extricated herself from this trial with the assistance of a Charles CRIDLIG, who had had the same courtroom experiences. CRIDLIG had prebably been engaged in espionage in North Africa and was then working as an interpreter for the SD and as a double agent for anti-German, pro-Petain groups who managed the escape of General GIRMUD. CRIDLIG is also credited by RUNGE with warning French patriots and Catholic circles of impending Gestepo action against them. RUNGE confessed blackmailing CRIDLIG for 10,000 Reichsmarks and the pilfering of his papers. No evidence of espionage mission against Seventh Army. To SM for trial.

KATCHOURINE (fnu). Formerly resided at Hotel St. James, Monaco. Known collaborator and suspected enemy agent. During occupation Subject and wife were constantly with German officers and entertained German consul at their hotel two days before liberation. Shortly thereafter Subject went to Paris, having returned to Monaço once before Christmas for a few days. Reported to be planning to return again. Information forwarded to Seine Base Section and surveillance maintained in this area for Subject.

"EISS, Franz. Subject at present at 47 Blvd. Gambette, Nice. Description: Tall, thin, blond, wears glasses, last sien wearing gray hat and block coat. Of Jewish extraction, looks German. During occupation Subject was arrested by Germans. Believed now to be working for them, however. Possibility Subject may be agent for unknown Allied Intelligence agency. Information forwarded to CIC, DBS, Riviera District. Case closed.

SINABIDI, Paul. Formerly employed by Casino in Monte Carlo. Presently in custody of French. Search made of Subjects apartment in Monte Carlo at request of SCI but nothing of importance discovered. Subject believed to be agent of Germans. Case closed.

ARMI, David. Becasoleil, A.M. Subject reported to be overly incuisitive when with officers. Investigation to date reveals Subject to be possibly dengerous Fascist. Investigation continues.

JOUANNET, Jean. Hotel Royale, Monte Carlo. Subject reported to have been employed before the invasion of Southern France by the Gestapo. Subject known to have done work for the Allies also before the invasion. Presently carrying papers from the French Ministry of Interior, which papers are alleged to have been produced on the strength of commendatory latter from OSS, 7th Army. Subject has been under observation by CIC Detachment, 44th AAA. Brigade since December 1944.

KRICHEVESKY, Indre. Hotel Royale, Monte Carlo. Partner of JOUANNET. Same history as above. Case closed this office.

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NNEX NO. 1 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 9,
dated 7 February 1945 (Continued)

BONNET, Francois Jules: French nationality. Born 10 March 1920 at Saint Hyppolite. Present address: 6, Rue des Heros, Marseilles. Subject arrested by MP Detachment, 44th AAA Brigade, attempting to pass road block. Subject had a military permit to circulate from BCRA and FFI and was in civilian clothes. Claimed to be attempting to enter Monaco to contact a former member of the British Intelligence in an effort to obtain employment with that organization. Subject was turned over to the C.R. when it was found that Subject's credentials were possibly spurious.

BOURNE, Pierre Louis: Born 28 June 1908 at Romens, Drome. Address 38, rue Beron Paris 17. Lieutenant. Same story as BONNET. Same disposition.

COLUMBO, Enzo: Hotel Carlton, Cannes. Apprehended 14 January 1945 by military police attempting to go to Monte Carlo, because his papers were not in order. Subject reported to be ex-agent of Italian Intelligence on Black List. Subject was released at request of CIC, DBS, which reports that it is handling the case.

GUGLIELMO, Wanda: 8 Avenue de Viliane, Beausoleil, A.M. Reported on Black List as Agent of the Gestapo and O.V.R.M. Reported to be often at the Hotels Alexander and Monte Carlo Palace, Monte Carlo. Investigation continues.

Dr. "N": Hotel D'Angleterre, Nice. Former resident, during the occupation, of Monte Carlo; often seen in company of the Gestapo. At present reported to be seen with many American soldiers at the American Red Cross, Nice. Information forwarded to CIC, DBS, Riviera District, Case closed.

RACHIOTTI Family: L'Escarene, A.M. Family has strong Fascist tendencies. Suspect in case of sabotaged telephone wires. Investigation continues.

FASAN Family: L'Escarene, A.M. Same as above.

ARNAULF, Maria: L'Escarene, A.M. German wife of French World I veteran. Known to be pro-German. Suspected of being involved in sabotage to telephone wires. Subject has not been interned by French because her husband is blind from the last war and unable to take care of himself. Investigation continues.

CAMERIO, Pierre: Born 1 April 1907, Lombardore, Italy. During occupation was barboy, Snack Bar, Monte Carlo. Disappeared during the landings in this area and last reported seen again in Monte Carlo 29 January 1945. Reported to be a dangerous O.V.R.A. agent. Investigation continues.

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MNEX NO. 2

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 9

The descriptions in this annex of persons believed to be engaged in espionage or sabotage have been obtained from enemy agents captured by the Seventh army.

- 1. The following Hitler Youth members have already been sent or will be sent on espionage missions in this area. Source: WENNER, Frederic (See Annex I.)
- a. ROSNER, Eugen. Age 16. Home in vicinity of Saverne, exact town unknown. Has been at Lauterbach, Alsace to recruit possible agents from among the young men there. Was recently wearing a Wehrmacht uniform and the Iron Cross, Second Class, awarded on his completion of a short espionage mission early in December 1944, in which he obtained military information in the Surbourg area (R0834), seven miles northeast of Haguenau. Description: Height 1.62 m; heavy build; dark blond hair, wavy; heavy cheeks and round face. Wears watch on left wrist.
- b. ROBIS, George (called "Rubi"). Age 17. Native of Hundsbach. Last seen by WENNER in Baden-Baden early in January 1945, at which time he was being used as a messenger between local HJ camps. It was then stated by BERGER, Bannfuehrer of the district of Wissembourg, now in Baden-Baden, that ROBIS was not to be used on a mission (reason unknown). Description: Height 5'6"; round face; brown hair, parted on left side.
- 2. The following Hitler Jugend members are described as potential short range enemy agents. Source: DINTINGER, Emil (See C.I. Report No. 8, Annex I.)
- a, KAHIE (fnu), Lt. Inf. Age 35-40. Height about 1.70 m; normal build; black and gray hair.
- b. X....., an Oberstleutnant (Lt. Colonel). Age 45-50; short and stout. Last seen by DINTINGER in Baden-Baden.
- c. BARTH, Heinz. Age about 30. Home in Mannheim. Now an HJ Bannfuehrer, he was formerly an Oberleutnant in the Gebirgsjaeger (mountain infantry). Description: medium height; strong build; shot in right leg while a member of the Gebirgsjaeger, and cannot participate in active sports.
- d. FISCHER, Philip. Age about 25, home in Mannheim. Now an HJ Scharfuehrer; was formerly an Oberscharfuehrer in the Waffen SS. Broze his feet (probably in Russia) and as a result walks with a very slight limp. Description: Height about 1.72 m; slender build; light blond hair.

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Annex No. 2 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 9 dated 7 February 1945 (Continued)

- e. BAUER, Mannfred. Age 16. Home in Mannheim. A Kameradschaftsfuehrer in the HJ. Description: Meight 1.65 m; normal build; dark blond hair.
- f. CROSSIE (fnu). Age 16. Home in Mannheim. An Oberkameradschaftsfuehrer in the HJ. Description: Height 1.70 m; strong build; light blond heir.
- g. SIEGMULLER, Karl. Age 16. Home in Mannheim. A Rottenfuehrer in the HJ. Description; Height 1.60 m; weak build; black hair.
- h. HAURY, Alfred. Age 15. Alsatian. A Kameradschaftsfuehrer in the HJ. Description: Height 1.62-1.63 m; stout build; black hair.
- 3. The following named persons are members of Frontaufklarungstrupp No. 251. Source: DENJEAN-MASSIA, Joel, alias DIETRICH, Willy. See Annex 1.
- a. Von OTTO (fnu), alias OSWALD. Lieutenant, chief of the unit. Age 30, German. Now at Ottersweier (R-2708), three kilometers south of Buhl. Entered unit 1 August 1944 to replace Lt. KOLBERG, known under false name of V-O (Fau Null). Lawyer; always in uniform; speaks French with difficulty. Aristocratic, distinguished appearance; drives a Mercedes Benz limousine with a broken MB insignia on front. Not liked; hard, distant; no feminine company. Description; Average height; thin; wears glasses; slightly wavy halr; small piercing eyes; slightly pointed nose; light complexion.
- b. MEYER, Hans, alias MEWES, Maurice. Lieutenant. Age 26. Home at Frankfort a/Main (address: Mewessen Strasse, but his house has been destroyed); was a student there before the war. He participated in French and Russian campaigns, being with an engineer unit at Stalingrad Was last seen at bridgehead when due to depart for Treves (Trier) to pick up other characters. Now probably at Ottersweier (R2708); if not, at Ihringen (V93), near Breisach. Description: Tall and thin almost bald, has dark hair on sides of head; dark brown eyes; very slight hump in middle of nose, and nose pointed at tip; large ears. Very exuberant. Does not smoke; drinks very little. Does not speak French fluently. Married, has a daughter named GISEL-CHARLOTTE, born at Easter 1944.
- c. DESPLANQUES, Jean. Age 22. Reported shot by FFI near Vesoul in September 1944. Known to have disappeared west of Belfort that month. Description: Small, about 1.68 m in height; dirty blond hair; light blue eyes; broken nose; good teeth; weight about 62 kilos. Although French, exhibits Italian characteristics. Speaks only French with a Marseille accent. Wore a wrist watch and possessed four or five rings.

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Annex No. 2 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 9 dated 7 February 1945 (Continued)

d. LEVET, Jean Firmin. 'Age 26-27. Comes from a suburb of Toulon, was a quarryworker. Was a PPF stormtrooper; is believed to be a Communist. Description: Strong, giant build; height 1.80m; weight about 85 kilos; brown hair; probably brown eyes; bad teeth, with many missing. Married; speaks French with Marseille accent, also known Provencal and perhaps Italian. Behavior is theatrical.

e. GIBERTI, Joseph; nom de guerre; GALBERT, Sepp. Age 22-23.
Home in suburb of Toulon; formerly a worker in the Toulon arsenal (shells). Captured at Vesoul by FFI, he gave a normal story and was recruited by FFI to carry food to front-line troops, which gave him the chance to recross. Now probably at bridgehead area or in a Franciste camp near Treves (Trier) as instructor. No interest in politics, but a natural Social Democrat. Clever, keeps his mouth shut. Description: Height about 1.70 m; thin build; weight 65-70 kilos; light brown hair, combed straight back; very blue eyes; large ears; well-cared-for hands; good carriage, moderate walk. Has an exceptionally strong Marseille actent; also known Provencal. Always had much money on him (fellow members of No. 251 accused him of black market activities). Neither smokes nor drinks.

f. ROUSE, Francois (called "Der Schwarze" or "Le Negre"). Age 21. From NICE (Palais Righi); lived near Dijon (Serres). Was a student at Ecole de Navigation at Nice. Military bearing even to exaggeration. Has instructed Franciste recruits. Description: Height 1.72-1.75 m; weight about 70 kilos; dark complexion; very black eyes and coal black hair; pug nose; large feet.

g. MATHIEU, Henri. Age 18-19. Residence in Cannes, where he had worked in a railroad station, his father being chef de gare there. In June 1944 left in a speed boat from St. Malo to go to Cherbourg (mission unknown) and was not aboard when the boat returned. Has Marseille accent; knows Provencal. Sometimes referred to as "Der Lacher" ("one who laughs"). Description: Short and somewhat fat; ruddy complexion; beard noticeable even directly after shaving; blond hair combed back with slight part on left; wide nose; one tooth missing. Wears no jewelry except a watch.

h. CHARBONNEAU, Camille. Age about 18; from Paris, where he was recruited by Walter ADAM. Disappeared west of Belfort in September 1944; reported shot by FFI near Vesoul. Belonged to a school of Francistes (Marcel BUCARD) in Versailles. Description: Average height; dark hair; wore glasses; brown eyes (?); face covered with pimples. Parisian accent. Father worked in a sorting station (gare de triage) in Paris.

i. CALMEL, Pierre, alias PETER. Age 18-19. Native and resident of Lyon, where his father was a dealer in silks. Once lived in Marseille. Family Gaullist, he a Franciste. Disappeared in September 1944 when he and GIBERTI went on a mission to Epinal; reported captured by the FFI at Vesoul with GIBERTI. Description: Tall and thin; brown hair; brown eyes (?).

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- j. MARTEL, Gaston. Age 18-20. Reported dead after fighting with his Company against the Maquis. Formerly in Paris, his parents owning a distillery in that region. Belonged to the Milice of Constantine; had ghonorrhea in Paris, and because of this was sent to the Brandenburg Division, 8th Company, at the end of March or April 1944. Description: Light brown, curly hair; aquiline nose; sunken cheeks; thin face. Parisian accent was very pronounced.
- k. FALLER, Sepp. Age about 35. An Unteroffizier from Tyrol. A German, he speaks very little French but fluent Italian. What French he knows was picked up while he was in Paris in March 1944 studying unidentified subjects. An instructor at La Montagnette sabotage school. Engineer expert; went with SCHULER, a very intimate friend, to St. Die in September 1944 to mine houses. Now either at Gebweiler (V52) or Orschweier (W0464) with Lt. WILM, Obersoldat KNUT and George COLPERT doing liaison with Headquarters at the Gebweiler administrative office. Description: Small stature; pointed nose; small brown moustache; black hair; dark brown eyes.
- 1. HAGGER, Gustave. Age 35. An Obergefreiter (Unteroffizier) who was chief instructor at Le Montagnette. Will be either at Ihrengen (V93) or Ottersweier (R2708). Description: Tall; gray hair; blue eyes; gold teeth (metalled tooth on one side visible when he smiles); thin face. Friendly. Good command of English and French languages, learned in Germany. Speaks French in short, clipped manner.
- m. COLFERT, Georges. Gefreiter. Probably Flemish; family came from east Germany. Age about 35, but appears much younger. Instructor in arms at La Montagnette; now probably at Gebweiler. A cook, he has lived in Brussels. Good German and French but instead of saying "on ne peut pas faire ceci" he says "on ne sait pas faire ceci." Description: Medium height; swarthy complexion; round face; dark brown eyes. Wife died last November.
- n. LIEBRICH (fnu); nom de guerre; LAMBERT. Age about 30. Perhaps an Alsatian; said he was born in Riga. Knows the dialect of Breisgau, Germany, and stated that he knew Alsatian; speaks French very well and can speak "Patois du Nord" (pas de Calais, Lille). A career soldier, he joined the La Montagnette faculty in February 1944. Left for Infantry OCS near Berlin late in December 1944; instructor in arms, platoon tactics, terrain study. Went through Russian campaigns. Description: Tall; thin; blond; light complexion.
- o. LIEBRICH (fnu), alias LAMBERT. Brother of above. Gefreiter; a serious soldier; several times wounded and decorated. Probably Alsatian (but claimed a Russian mother). Known at Chateau de Maulny sabotage school, where he was last seen. Less capable than his brother. Speaks French as well, but less prettily.
- p. DIEDRICH, Karl. Unteroffizier. Age about 25. Carpenter and former farmer, probably from southwest Germany; married. Taught at La Montagnette; now at Ottersweier. Pleasant personality, but has no intellectual standing in the group. Relies on his stripes a good deal. //22 Speaks only German Tall build. Teeth mostly false or bridgework //22 (has a pivot tooth...

q. HOEFER, Karl, alias CHARLEY. Obergefreiter; from Bremen; family coffee importers. Chauffeur and general companion of MEWES. An instructor at La Montagnette. Large and fat, has an erect carriage. Wears glasses; usually smokes cigars--resembles typical Russian caricature. Despite physical appearance, is a cultured and aristocratic person. Speaks a remarkable brand of Germanic French, also English.

- r. SCHULER (or SCHUELER), Jean. Age about 22. Gefreiter, a La Montagnette instructor. Alsatian (?), probably from Barr (V7878), southwest of Strasbourg. A former student and will-educated, he had some military training. Had been fighting pertisans in Russia. Disliked the Germans; Gaullist in spirit. Deserted in Strasbourg about 25 November 1944. Description: Medium build; full face; one or two upper teeth protrude in front of mouth. Parisian manners; does not speak German well. Captured by Seventh Army.
- s. STARK, Rolph. Gefreiter. Age 30. Speaks German and Spanish fluently, French poorly; taught German in Spain before the war, and later taught ranks of German Army. On faculty at La Montagnette. Left with LIEBRICH at end of December for an officers' school in Germany. In May 1944 was seen in civilian clothes in Avignon. Description: Normal build; very blond with very blue eyes.
- t. GRIMM (fnu). Captain. Last seen in Altkirch (A69), rumored to be on the point of promotion and transfer. Description: Medium bulld, strong; looks like a sot, redfaced Prussian in uniform, but in civilian clothes is quite unstriking and completely ordinary.
- u. SCOGNAMIGLIO (fnu). One source reports belief that he is dead. Age 22-23. From Toulon, but of Italian parentage and very Italian in mannerisms. Believed to be of Sardinian origin. Speaks better Italian than French. Sent to Eighth Brandenburg Co. in March 1944, but has acted like a fool (selling his pistol, etc.), and probably has been "thrown out." Description: Very short legs contrasting with a large, strong body; on the whole rather small but strikes the observer as being disproportioned. Carries his head thrown back; jutting chin ("like Mussolini"); weight 50-60 kilos.
- v. BAUDOIN, Francois (Franz). Age 22-23. Reported killed at Rennes after 7 June in bombing raid. Belonged to RNP at Dijon, where he resided. Was recruited by Walter ADAM. Description: Height 1.70m; dark hair; dark eyes; wears glasses; Parisian accent.
- w. LEFMAN, Willi (Wolfram). Age 35. From Bremen, of a shipping family. Radio sergeant of 251; had an electric cipering machine at Gebwiller-Shrenengemard. Now at Ottersweier (R2708). Very rich; hates war and complains constantly. Description: Height 1.70m; tall and thin; stiff walk; well-kept hands; wears ring with blue stone superimposed by crown. Sings in Spanish and English.
- x. LIPPACH (fnu). Known as "Le Singe". Unteroffizier, paymaster of the unit. Not often seen. Last seen at Isenheim (V62) early in October; probably has left unit by now. Description: Tall, dry, thin type; blond; wears glasses; has gold teeth. Wears orange decoration./03 SECRET

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y. MANACOTERA, Carl. Chauffeur for Lt. Von OTTO. Speaks German and Spanish, but no French. Retiring type. Description: Medium height and figure; regular features; black hair combed back.

z. OUTCHAKA, Franz. Obergefreiter, now at Ottefsweier (R2708). A medical sergeant, he fought in Russia as an engineer and was decorated. A drunk. Description: Medium height; thin, brown skin, Hungarian type; has peculiar walk with head forward; speaks with Tyrolean accent.

aa. RASCHKE, Alfons. Age 21. Obergefreiter, now with unit at Ottersweier (R2708). Chauffeur, not well known in unit. Speaks with lisp. From Breslau. Medium build; blond.

bb. SCHAEFFER, Albert. Unteroffizier. Good truck driver; is supply man. Stayed at Ihrengen when unit moved to Ottersweier (R2708). Married, has two (?) children. Description: Medium height; heavy build; irregular features; blue-gray eyes. Speaks only German.

cc. WILM, nickname "Bretelen Zunder". Age 26. Lieutenant charged with mining houses in wake of retreats; described as an "arsenist at heart". Joined unit at Gerardmer (V34); was at Orschweier (W0464) 2 January; is with German part of unit. Blond hair; handsome.

dd. KNUT (fnu). Age 35-40. Obersoldat, recently joined the trupp, looks unmilitary in a uniform. Was at Orschweier 2 January. Worked for various German houses in Spain in 1943. Wife is in Spain. Round, fat face; wears glasses.

ee: HUBERT (fnu). Gefreiter. German; chauffeur at Chateau de Maulny sabotage school. Small; thin, straight blond hair; sickly air.

ff. "ROBERT" (only name given for him). Obersoldat, teacher. Had head and arm bandaged in early January. Wife and two children in Spain. Medium height and build; regular features.

gg. "BUBBY" (only name given for him). Chauffeur, truck driver, well-known at Isenheim (V62) and Stossweir (V53). German, Youthful; tall and thin; black hair; pleasant face.

4. The following names are those of persons who belonged to Aufklarung-strupp No. 250 (Note: Source has a haunting suspicion that the number was 252). Source: DENJEAN-MASSIA, Joel, alias DIETRICH, Willy (See Annex I).

a. MARSCHALL (fnu). Age about 26. Lieutenant, chef du camp de l'ouest. Capable. Lived in Brussels; believed to be Viennese. Speaks impeccable French and very correct German. Had trouble in July 1944—had to leave to marry a girl already the mother of his child. Last seen at Josselyn in Brittany; now probably in Germany training a new troop, the greater part of the old unit having been reported lost on the retreat from Brittany. Description: Tall and slender; swarthy complexion; small, black eyes; elongated face; long, pointed ears;

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b. SCHNEIDER (false name). Age 28-29. Oberleutnant; commanding officer of No. 250. Distinguished appearance; medium height; slender; weers glasses with gold rims.

- c. HUGUENOT (believed to be false name). Age about 30. Alsatian (?). Feldwebel since 1940; had been oberleutnant of aviation and in a technical line, but was broken for an accident for which he was responsible. Was east of Belfort in October 1944, but is now in Germany. Was either in the French Army or the Legion Etrangere—certainly spent some time in North Africa. Speaks French very well. An engineer by profession. Description: Tall, heavy build and physically strong; wrestler-type head; slightly graying hair which is rather thin.
- d. TIERRING. Age about 30. An unteroffizier; ran supply room and gun room. Now in Germany. Very likeable. Speaks only a small amount of French. Slight build; wears glasses with a very thin frame. Has a round face.
- e. LEBAS, Paul. Age about 20. From Cannes; resident of Paris, speaks French in a mixture of Parisian and "Midi". An office worker. Well known by most Francistes. Adventurous spirit; went on lone wolf mission in Normandy to cross lines. Seen west of Belfort in October; now in Germany. Description: Tall and slender; feminine head; dark complexion; black eyes; sometimes had his hair close-cropped. Lively and exuberant.
- f. LEBERT, Marcel. Parisien. Went on Cherbourg mission and probably did not return. Description: Tall, heavy build; brown hair; blue eyes; when walking leans forward slightly with shoulders well forward and swings arms in a gangling manner. Speaks with Parisian accent.
- g. LAURENT, Rene. Originally from Nimes. Father in Paris. Spoke with Parisian accent ordinarily, although sometimes lapsed into a "Midiacent; knew Provencal. Was a Franciste. Now in Germany. Description Tall, slender; thin face; one glass eye; brown hair.
- h. THORPE, Daniel. Age 17-18; from Paris. Knew the instructors well. Had worked in an office. Spoke only French. Last seen at Josselyn, Brittany. Description: Tall, heavy, strong; small eyes; baby face; straight, brown hair; parted. Not a pleasant person.
- i. BOELER (or BOLHER), Michel (true name believed to be RONNET).

 Age 22-23. Led minor revolt against officer who replaced MARSCHALL at
 Josselyn. Speaks German very well. Bohemian character, liked music
 and the theater. Had a clownish face; sometimes sported a large,
 Groucho-Marx-style moustache. Dressed in "swing-style" clothes. Brown
 hair, possibly brown eyes.
- j. GALVINI (fnu). Age 17-18; from Montpellier. Not a likeable person. Believed to have completed baccalaureate in philosophy. An amateur swing-pianist. Was last seen near Belfort in October; now in Germany. Description: Just over medium height; slender; black hair, 105 crew-cut; black eyes; thin face; poor complexion.

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k. PIGNON (fnu). Age about 30; from Paris. Has Parisian accent. Was a sailor in the French Navy; a legionnaire (MBF). Knows no foreign language to speak of. Description: Medium height and build; very darblack hair; black eyes.

1. ROGER (fnu), alias "PINARD". Age 35. Veteran member of No. 250. Franciste and former police inspector at Tours. Small, fat, per sant type. A drunkard. Married. Description: Red-faced; large hooked nose; false teeth. Last seen at Josselyn, Brittany.

m. ROGER (fnu). Brother of above. Age 29. Stayed at Chateau de Maulny sabotage school after others left in July. Older member of Trupp 250. Description: Small, fat; peasant-type face; broken teeth; broken nose; brown hair cut short.

n. X....Age 28. Former police inspector in Paris. Young, lookin thin; pugilist face; medium build; blue-gray eyes.

o. Y....Large, thin, thin-faced, poor complexion.

The following members of Frontaufklarungstrupp No. 250 were instructors. All names are false, with first initial same as that of their actual names. They entered the Army in 1943 and acted as assistants to German instructors at La Montagnette sabotage school. They were disgusted, referred to Germans as "Les Schleur," put little efformation their work into their work.

p. PUCK. Age 22-23. Parisian; was a wealthy medical student in Paris. Speaks German very well--perhaps English also. Recruited by Walther ADAM, and when on leave was usually in the Victoria Cafe near the Madeleine in Paris. Description: Handsome, American type; thin face; curly, light brown hair; very blue eyes; white, regular teeth; weight about 70 kilos. Wore "snappy" American sport-style civilian

q. IEIBERT (LEIBY). Age about 23. French with Parisian accent; believed to speak good English. Had worked in an office. Had a "nig club pallor". Bouncing, exuberant type, very fond of American swing bands and American manners. Last seen at Chateau de Maulny when leaving for Cherbourg from St. Malo to cross lines. Description: Very tall, stooped; brown eyes; large mouth; perpetually sick appearance a "benging" expression. "hangdog" expression.

r. CARUSO. Age 22-23. Breton; spoke some German; former student Tall, heavy build; deep voice; blue eyes; deep lines in face; hollow cheeks. Reported not a bit satisfied with his work or with the German

s. LANGBART. Worked in a factory in Paris. Studied engineering (aerodynamics?) and was very much interested in aviation; always had aeroplane pictures. Believed to have disappeared around Cherbourg in June 1944. Description: Height about 1.60 m; very small and thin; active; light complexion.

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dated 7 Feb. 1945, (continued). SECRET t. MAUSER. Corsican, resident of Paris with a pronounced Parisian manner and speech. Possibly studied law. Father a director of Citroen works. Description: Small and fat; blond hair; blue eyes. 5. The following descriptions were obtained from BERTOLO, Cecile Therese. (See Annex I). a. MEHL (fnu), Captain, Chief of Gestapo at Bitche (Q7750). Age 50. Heavy build; height 1.65 m; nearly bald; round face; bluegreen eyes; complexion fair; protruding, separated upper front teeth. b. TOMAS (or THOMAS) (fnu), Oberleutnant. Gestapo at Bitche. Age 44. Slender build; height 1.73 m. Always has a "severe look." Long face; pale blue eyes; pale complexion. c. "CHARLIE" (fnu), German non-com, wearing first sergeant uniform. Age 32-35. Believed to be a member of the Gestapo at Bitche. Height 1.73 m; slender build; brown eyes; pale complexion; oval face. d. PELLETTA, Huguette. Age 22. Girl friend of BERTOLO; possible line-crosser. Home address: 2 Rue Littre, Lyon. Description: Height 1.68 m; round face; blue eyes; blonde hair; clear complexion; has strong cough. e. PELETTA, Yvette. Age 20. Sister of Huguette (above): Girl friend of BERTOLO; possible line-crosser. Description: Height 1.68 round face; blue eyes; brown hair; tan complexion; rosy cheeks.

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ANNEX NO. III

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 9

Interrogation of SS Standartenfuehrer Hans LINGNER, captured commander of the 17 SS Panzer Gran Div, disclosed the following:

- a. Guerrilla Warfare. LINCNER does not believe that there will be any large-scale guerrilla warfare inside Germany, because guerrilla warfare is unsuited to the German character. However, there are some "patriotic" organizations which will engage in such acts of sabotage as derailing trains and blowing up bridges.
- b. German Intelligence. The Abwehr is far from being what it was before its struggle with the SD. He attributes the heavy setbacks of the German Army in France to the complete failure of German intelligence. Even on the Saar front, the intelligence bulletins he received from higher headquarters gave only very general and sketchy information on the moves of Allied divisions. As an example he cited the attack of 1 Jan 45. He was not informed, he pointed out, that 2 French Armored Div was in Sarrebourg.

A few days before the attack started he noticed that units of 36 Div which had been in the line had been withdrawn, but he was unable to find out where the rest of the Div was located. He believes that the German Command assumed that 36 Div had been shifted to Belgium When LINCHER reached his assigned objectives he continued to press infantry forward on his own initiative until he had captured two French PMs from 2 French Armored Div. By that time his assault guns had reach the village of Achen. He immediately reported the presence of 2 French Armored Div, whereupen he was ordered by XIII Corps to withdraw to his former objective. It is his opinion that the German Command feared a counterattack by 2 Div, possibly in conjunction with 36 Div.

- c. Allied Intelligence. In the course of the attack of 2 Jan LINGNER's Div captured an American battalion CP, where he found a situation map. The information on it seemed very sketchy and incomplete. He noticed on the map that German dummy btry positions had deceived the Americans. In Normandy LINGNER captured a British battalion CO's map and was amazed at the accuracy of the information it contained.
- d. Miscellaneous Opinions. LINGNER does not count on new weapons nor does he believe in a final German victory. He thinks that Germany will be able to keep the war going long enough for Russia and the United States to fall apart, and he fears American occupation of Germany more than Russian. As he put it, a "blood bath" will take place when the Americans get into the Reich. He does not believe that the German people will overthrow Hitler. He believes Nazism is part of the German people. As far as manpower is concerned Germany will always have enough. New age groups will be called up, he believes, and the fixed defenses will be manned by Volkssturm.

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ANNEX IV

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 9

The following report on Austrian resistance comes from a usually well-informed source:

During the last fortnight the Gestapo has arrested a large number of democratic politicians in Vienna, including seven former members of the Austrian parliament and four former members of Vienna's City Council. Among the arrested are members of all the old main political parties.

This sudden wave of arrests is explained by the Gestapo's determination to eliminate all those elements suspected of anti-nazi political activity, and particularly those who might be of assistance to

It is generally known that there is a Committee in Vienna composed of representatives of the five most important political parties existing before the Anschluss. It is not known, however, whether this pommittee should be regarded as a national committee or merely as a

There are also so-called resistance committees in Graz, Linz and a number of smaller places, where they have existed for three or four years.

Various groups have been formed in Vienna. Among them is a sort of Mixed Council created about a year ago and representing all political parties except the communists. This Council is not the same as the Committee mentioned above, the latter being a much more recent creation and of far greater interest to the Gestapo.

For security reasons Austrian opposition circles are extremely cautious, and it is therefore difficult to know exactly what is going on. However, the anti-nezi political organizations are not as yet of any great importance, being composed mainly of old and new leaders, without any organized support among the people. This lack of popular support is explained by the fact that the Austrians as a whole have not yet really made up their minds about the future. They do not know what they want. Their present attitude is a purely negative one,

According to Nazi estimates the number of persons actively engaged in anti-nazi activity in Austria is not more than 3,000. Whether this figure is correct or not, it is certain that Austrian resistance is still very much in its infancy.

Nazi circles now admit cuite openly the existence of Austrian partisans. Previously they claimed that the partisans in Carinthia, Styria, Tirol and Vorarlberg were all foreigners - deportees, workers

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Annex No. 4 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 9, (Continued) dated 21 January 1945.

or prisoners of war. Now they admit that "a certain number" of Austria "communists", co laborating with Slovenian followers of Tito, are showing "slight activity" in the border districts of Southern Austria. The Nazis estimate the number of Austrian partisans at "less than one

The following information on these Austrian partisans comes from Nazi sources: The only permanent partisan base is in the Eberndorf district near Klagenfurt. The partisans here were originally sent by Tito from Croatia, and were mostly army deserters. They were joined by a number of industrial workers with communist sympathies from Graz, and later by a few students and intellectuals with marxist sympathies from Vienna. They are quite well equipped with small arms, mostly stolen from Graz factories or supplied by Tito bands. Permanent contact has been established between them and the Tito partisans across the Croatian border, who undertake occasional raids into Austria.

The Nazis complain that numerous Austrian officials sympathize with the partisans, giving them indirect support and thus preventing the German police from eliminating their bases. The partisans are

always warned when police forces are approaching and are thus able to avoid open battle with superior forces.

During the last two or three months the partisans have been more active, and several proper expeditions have been sent out by the Carinthian Military Command to extrainate them. These expeditions

active, and several proper expeditions have been sent out by the Carinthian Military Command to extrainate them. These expeditions have all failed.

Partisan activity of a more sporadic nature, but involving a certain number of Austrians has been reported from the mountains south-west of Vienne, and particularly from KL. Zell and Oberpax.

Anti-nazi circles claim that partisan activity has been going on in Austria for three years, but on a very small scale. In November last greater numbers of partisans assembled in the southern and eastern parts of the country. The partisans in the east are mostly unaried refugees whose exposed positions make any activity extremely difficult. However, at the end of November the Nazis were considerably alarmed by several attacks on military traffic on the Brenner line between Brenner and Steinach. These attacks were carried out by Austrian partisens, mostly deserters from the Italian front, who have their bases in the mountains above Trins between Innsbruck and the Italian frontier. The Germans know where they are, but so far have been unable to exterminate them. Bavarian Alpine troops have been employed, but have failed to capture these experienced Austrian mountaineers, many of whom have lived all their lives in the Innsbruck area and know every inch of the country. To date these partitions have done no serious demage, but the German Command in Austria fears that their numbers a e increasing, and that they may prove a more serious menace in the summer when it will be easier for them to maintain their mountain bases.

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nnex No. 4 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 9, (Continued) detad 7 February 1945.

According to enother usually reliable source, at the end of December a company of Austrian soldiers mutinied at Weiskirchen near Merzig on the Sear front. They refused to fight on the grounds that their equipment was not good enough. Subsequently they fired a gasoline depot and threw a number of ammunition cases into a river. SS troops and German Volksgrenadiere soon appeared on the scene and disarmed the Austrians. Every sixth Austrian was shot, and the rest were sent under escort to the eastern front where they are to be put to work as military prisoners. Only 26 men escaped punishment, as they had taken no part in the mutiny and had helped the SS and Volksgrenadito disarm the rebels. They were incorporated in a German unit. The rebels reportedly belonged to older age groups, had been employed on occupation duties in France and Italy, and were seeing real fighting for the first time. for the first time.

From a usually well-informed source it is learned that, for war economy reasons, the German government has decided that Croatia must be defended at all costs. Croatia is regarded as a most important source of raw materials for German industries and also of foodstuffs. A German industrial commission has just returned from the country. During its stay in Zagreb a new plan of production was decided upon for Croatian industries, oil sources, mines and agriculture. Under this plan the production of bauxite, which is Croatia's most important product for the Germans, is to be oubled within the next three months, while the production of metals is to be tripled within live or six months. ive or six months.

Croatian industries may be transferred to Germany in order to e them from bombings in their present exposed positions. They 1, however, remain the property of Croatian firms, many of which in fact German-controlled.

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ANNEX V

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 9

A captured German document dated 28 August signed by Field Marshal KEITEL reveals German subterfuges intended to protect Nazi Perty members in case of capture:

- "1. The following troops are to be considered as combatants, according to the rules of the Hague convention:
 - a. Soldiers of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS.
- b. Members of the auxiliary services of the Air Corps and the Navy.
- c. Female members in uniform of the auxiliary services of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS.
 - d. Members of the German Police, in uniform.
 - e. Male members of the German Labor Service (R.A.D.).
 - f. Members of the Organization Todt, in uniform.

Exceptions are members of the Medical Corps, with regulation badges and identification cards, and the chaplains.

2. Only those issued a yellow armband, with the inscription 'DEUTSCHE WEHRMICHT' and a combatant identification card (see below) issued by a military office, are to be considered as combatants. This card is issued by any unit or service of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS.

SAMPLE

The holder of this identification certificate (space.for.name) is a member of the German Armed Forces and is an Officer -- Senior NCO -- Junior NCO -- Private (Strike out those not applicable). For the purpose of indicating his membership in the Armed Forces he wears a yellow armband with the inscription 'DEUTSCHE WEHRM/CHT'. He is entitled to carry weapons and is subject to combat duty."

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		HORHT	Los of Last Ident.	
	08 vo Division	Date of Last Ident.	V 6047	
	TAB VOR	28 December 11 January 8 January	V 765? V 7049	
	780 YGR			
The control of the control of the control of the security of the control of the c	estengent 1,000 plus approximated	· ++**	THE RESERVE THE PROPERTY OF THE PERSON OF TH	and a state of the
	Fighting Value: Fair	here lately received some replace	cements. Considering the	
	nay be provided by replacements o	r the absorption of attached un	its.	
	16 VG Division		Toc.of Last Ident.	
	221 YOR 223 YOR	27 December	V 5945 V 5745	
T H	225 VGR	27 December		
I S	Strength: 500			
P	Fighting Value: Unknown Remarks: Strength figure as of 1	est identifications, division a	apparently out of line	
A G	and probably refitting.		Loc of Last Ident.	
E	338 Inf Division	Date of Last Ident.	V 4327	
I S	757 GR 758 GR 759 CR	13 Jenuary 11 Jenuary 17 Jenuary	▼ 4240 . ▼ 4622	
U	Strength: 1,800			
C	Fighting Value: Fair		nder of Tanuary.	
A	Remarks: Division received abou	t 300 replacements at the begin	Loc of Last Ident.	
S	159 VG Division	Date of Last Ident.	▼ 6807	
I F I	1209 VGR 1210 VGR 1211 VGR	16 January 5 January 29 December	V 5212 V 5412	
E D	Strength: 1,800			
	Fighting Value: Fair		ength of rgt is now 600.	
	Remarks: 1209 VOR was reorgani	zed lately. PW stated that str	Loc of Last Ident.	
	716 Inf Division	Date of Last Ident. 9 January	V 6607	
	726 GR 736 GR	14 December	₹ 7752	
	Strongth: ??			
100	Fighting Value: ??		At the end of December	
	THE PROPERTY AND THE PROPERTY AND IN STREET, SHOULD BE S	unidentified since December 14 identified at V 5607. PW state 11 be absorbed by 716 Inf Div. GR. This would be however the organized 716 Inf Div.	TA 4 - man out mad that DOLL	
	HAFFNER BRIGADE	Date of Last Ident.	Area east of MULHOUSE	
	Rgt FRANKE Rgt BAUMGARTEN	15 January	114	
	Strength: 1,200	BECRET	""	
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THER BRIGADE (Conti)

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rks: In October 1944 a Colonel HAFFNER was C O of 736 GR of 716 Inf Div. It is possithe that Col. HAFFNER, C 0 of the brigade, equates with the C 0 of 736 GR. The reported presence of the 726 GR on the right flank of Brigade HAFFNER may indicate a possible canection of 716 Inf Div with Brigade HAFFNER.

The total strength (combat strength, includes combatant elements of Infantry regiments ingineer bms, ron bms, and A T bms, and does not include Tank bms, artillery and signal bms) of enemy forces in the VOSCES pocket is estimated at approximately 17,000.

It is estimated that since December 21, 1944 about 3,500-4,000 replacements arrived in the VOSCHS pocket. Of these about 2,000 went to the 196, 269, 159, 338 Divisions. (Substantition). The statements). The rest was probably elletted to the 16, 708, 716, and 189 Divisions. The quality of the replacements is rated rather poor with the exception of NCO and OCS schools as well as the replacements for the 106 Panzer Brigade.

The average fighting value of the major units is evaluated as fair. The type of replacements and the haphazardly refitting of the depleted units does not denote any major effort on the part of the enemy.


B. ENEMY RESERVES.

No major unit in reserve has been located in the pocket (West of the RHINE) reported RR and road movements east of the RHINE between 2 December and 6 December are attributed to the arrival of reinforcements and equipment for 106 Panzer Brigade. However, the reported location of an XVIII SS Corps in the vicinity of LORRACH suggests the probable presence of a major unit in that area. Such a possibility seems to be supported by the reported location of a divisional headquarters near SULZBURG. Higher headquarters suggest that 30 SS Division may be reforming in that area. Another candidate would be PC Brigade RKICHS-FUHRER, unconfirmed reports indicate that one of the unlocated enemy divisions may be moving to the Black Forest area. Replacements from 188 Res Mtn Div have been reported consistently in this area and at KARLSRUHE. The represent either the strengthening of 269 Division or possibly the arrival of 2 Mtn Div, whose normal replacement unit is 188 Res Wtn Division.

All available factors seem to indicate that we should expect one to two major units east of the RHINE, evailable either for the VOSCES pocket or any other sector.

- C. ENEMY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES.

 - Intentions
 It is evident that enemy intentions are conditioned by two main factors.
- (1) By holding the VOSGES pocket the enemy is immobilizing a substantial portion of our forces which otherwise could be used on other vital sectors of the front.
- (2) The enemy's efforts to break through the WISSEMBURG or the ROHRBECH gap may be substantially supported by offensive operations from the VOSGES pocket thus threatening the eastern flank of Seventh Army and our lines of communications south of the Saverne Cap.
- b. Enemy's capabilities are conditioned by the number of replacements and major units he is able to muster in order to continue his defensive attitude or to build up sufficient power required for offensive operations.
 - 2. CAPARTLITTES
- a. The enemy's control of innumerable lines of communications in the VOSGES pocket gives him the advantage of speedy shifting of his forces from the southern to the northern shoulder of the pocket. Combined with the characteristics of the terrain this enables him to continue successfully his defensive attitude, provided that he maintains his combat effectives at a 17-20,000 level.
- b. A reinforcement of his present disposition with one major unit, would enable the enemy to launch a secondary attack along the RHINE on the BENFELD-STRASBOURG axis. Such an operation, combined with a thrust across the RHINE north of STRASBOURG, would successfully support the enemy's main effort in the HAGUENAU area - thus threatening the eastern flank of Seventh Army.
- c. A reinforcement of the enemy's present disposition in the VOSCES pocket, with two major units, would open possibilities for the launching of a strong attack on the axis



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By Authority of

CG 6th Army Group
Initials:

Date:

51 January 1945

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION

The Germans are attempting to hold the Vosges Pocket with 14,000 combat effectives supported by 4,500 artillery troops and 60-75 tanks or self-propelled guns.

Enemy resistance will continue in the MULHOUSE - THANN area so long as the integrity of the forces of IXIII Corps are not jeopardized. Completion of the with-drawal from the western Vosges can be expected to precede any retirements by IXIII Corps. IXIV Corps will concentrate to the end on the fefence of an established bridgehead in Alsace, in area NEUF ERKISACH. The withdrawal of 189 Infantry Division West of COIMAR is already in progress and will probably take positions up in the NEUF ERKISACH area. Forces remaining northeast of COIMAR to RHKINAU area will be withdrawn and employed further south. Strengthening of the enemy forces in the pocket is not anticipated, but reinforcement of the SIEGERIED Line with material and low calibre troops is expected.

On Seventh Army front the enemy intends to hold his present positions with an economy of forces and will dithdraw to the SIECTRIED Line under pressure for his main stand. His defensive attitude is exemplified by the lackeof activity and the placing of his forward firing positions approximately two kilometers behind his forward lines in the HAGUENAU area.

The continued availability of 21 Panzer Grenadier and 7 Parachute Divisions for this front is not accepted. 245 Infantry Division has moved in between 47 and 36 Infantry Divisions and there are definite side stepping moves to the West by 36 Infantry and 6 SS Mountain Divisions. The results of this westward shift is the squeezing of either 256 or 257 Infantry Divisions out of line. 256 Infantry Division has not been contacted by patrols and is favored. Although elements of 10 SS Panzer Division continue to be identified, it is also accepted as a candidate for departure.

It is probable that low calibre infantry divisions and evacuated troops from the Vosges Pocket will arrive in the SAAR. Total strength on this front is presently estimated at 28,000 combat effectives supported by 11,000 artillery troops and 105-120 tanks or SP guns. (Includes 256 Infantry and 10 SS Panzer Divisions).

Movement during the past few days indicates that the departure of troops from the SAAR is being affected and in the PFORZHEIM area, large numbers of replacements and quantities of equipment are being sent to the East.

> EUGENE L. HARRISON CONONEL, G. S. C. A. C. of S., G-2

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP Office of the A. C. of S., G-2 APO 23. U. S. Army

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 16

FOR THE LEEK ENDING 6 January 1944

GENERAL

Estimate of the Enemy Situation

On 30 December the enemy was opposing Seventh US Army on a line roughly east-west from LAUTERBOURG-BITCHE-SAARGUEMINES with six divisional formations (256, 245, 361, 257, 19, 347 Infantry Divisions).

Seven divisional formations were accepted as being in reserve (21 Pz, 25 PG, 17 SS PG, 36 Inf, 172 Res, 553 and 559 Inf.). Reinforcements occurrent in strength to an estimated three divisions were considered available for this front. The bulk of these are being absorbed by units already in line or in reserve, with 6 Sb Mountain already committed as a complete unit.

On 1 January the enemy launched an attack from the area with six divisions (36 Inf,

559 Inf, 17 SS PG, 257 Inf; 256 Inf, and 361 Inf).

On 6 January the enemy had in line the bulk of ten divisions (245, 256, 361, 6 SS, 257, 559, 17 SS, 36, 19, and 347) with three and possibly four identified divisions located in innediate reserve. (21 Pz, 25 PG, 172 Res and possibly 553 VG Divisions).

It is estimated that on the Seventh US Army front the enemy massed about 150-200 armored vehicles, thus increasing his capability to meet the counterattacks immediately launched by our forces.

At the present stage of operations it is difficult to discern further intentions of the enemy. So far he had succeeded in occupying the HURDT massive thus improving his operations west of the HARDT Mountains trough the MISSE BURG gap. However, the stubborn resistance of our forces and counterattacks in strength forced the enemy to commit the majority of his forces in the H.RDT Mountains pocket, leaving him with only three or four fresh divisions for new operations.

b. Capabilities. (see Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 15, 30 December 1944.)

Capabilities as set forth in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 15, 30 December 1944,

remain basically unchanged.

Capability 1 has been attempted by the enemy and was met easily by our forces. However, the drain on the enemy's strength has not been sufficient to eliminate entirely his definitely offensive intentions. The armored strength has not yet been committed and its use will determine which of the following modifications he will employ:

a. To await further reinforcements and carry on with his original intention.
b. To accept a more limited objective and shift his effort from the west to the east side of the H RDT Mountains

That the enemy could reinforce this front with the necessary offensive power can hardly be expected then his position along the rest of the front is growing critical. Since his ultimate objective - to pin down the Seventh Army - can still be effected by operating against the ALSACE Plain from the east by more complete use of the forces presently at his disposal, it may be expected that the continuation of the offensive will come in that area.

The attempt to effect this capability will be marked by the movement of armored forces toward the east along the BITCHE-ISSEMBOURG-KARLSRUHE line and an outbreak of RHIME crossings north and south of STRUSBOURG, with renewed activity against the northern edge of the VOSGES pocket.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Sear-Vosges Front)

At the close of this rather active period First and Nineteenth Army forces were disposed as follows: VOLTIMBEN (Q 3573), FOLCTLING (Q 3861), SARREGUINGES (Q 5056), RIMLING (Q 6565), BITCHE (Q 7650), KOHLHUTTE (Q 7338), REIPERTSWILLER (Q 8037), BAEREFTHAL (Q 8442), DIMERCH (Q 9245), CLE BOURG (R 1145), FORT LOUIS (R 2321), South along RHINE to RHINAU (V 9768), SELLAT T (V 7861), OSTHEIM (V 7251), LE VALTIN (V 4644),

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ODEREN (V 4323), SWEIGHOUSE (V 5706), ILE WAPOLEON (V 7408), East along the HUNINGUE Canel to NIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE to border of Switzerland.

(a) FIRST ARMY (CG: Ben. d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

The situation in this area has clarified itself to some degree. In the attack which started on 1 January, First German Army has to date committed eight divisions with one division holding on either flank. The 21 Panzer Division, 25 PG Division and 172 Reserve Division are accepted as being in Army Group or Army Reserve in the HOM BURG-PIRMASENS area. The attack has not as yet developed sufficiently to indicate the actual alignment of corps responsibilities. However, the XIII SS Panzer Corps is probably in charge of the present phase of attack with an unidentified corps and the LYXXIV Corps toking the area from east of the attack zone to the PHINK.

(1) XIII SS Panzer Corps

347 Infantry Division continues to hold the sector which is now on the front of the 106 Cavalry Group and the 103 Infantry Division anchoring the right flank of the enemy. During the period, 860 GR was the only organic unit identified. However, a number of attached units appeared on the scene, (41 GAF Fortress Engr Bn; 80 Repl Bn; 107 Repl Bn; and Bn SCH AB) all of which suggests that the other divisional organic units might be refitting in the immediate rear. Combat effectives of the division including attached units are estimated to be approximately 2,000-2,500.

19 Infantry Division has elements on the 44th Infantry Division sector which aided the holding attack of the 347 Division and supported the preliminary advance of 36 Infantry Division. North of SAAREGUEMINES the 73 and 74 GR were identified during the period. The third regiment, 59 GR, was located on the left flank of the division at Q 7444 after having been drawn down from the Third US Army front where its comb t effectives were estimated to be 120. Since the previous identification was made 26 December, it must be assumed that some replacements have been received by 59 GR. In addition, 73 CR was reported on 2 January to have an average company strength of 100 which would indicate that the division as a whole has received substantial replacements. Comb t effectives therefore are estimated at 2,500-3,000.

36 Infantry Division had elements committed on the XV Corps front on 1 January after having had a 10 day period to rest and refit. Originally it appeared that its mission was immediate support of the 17 SS PG on its left, but as the period progressed it was found that 87 and 165 GR's had only one battalion each committed, with the remaining battalions reported to be reforming at BAUMHOLDER. Pl's stated that heavy casualties had been sustained in the attack. Combat effectives - 1,200.

17 88 PG Division. As indicated in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 15, this division had been rebuilding and refitting for return to the role of a strong mobile force. Its committeent therefore, on 1 January, as the spearhead of the attack was not surprising. Both regiments (37 and 38 RCR's) had an average strength of 100-120 men per company. The division's armor, according to py statements, consists of one battalion of 45 assault guns with 20 Mark V tanks (Panther) attached. Discounting losses taken by the division in the attack, combat effectives are still carried at 3,000 - 3,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division. Developments during the period indicate that the sector was originally held by various BG formations from WAR XII. After the attack was launched one battalion each of 466 and 477 VGR's passed through to fulfill their mission of supporting the advance of 17 SS PG by pressing forward in the area just west of BITCHE. On 3 January elements of 457 VCR came into line, but it is be-Combat effectives should be fairly high 1.6, about 3,500.

559 Volksgrenadier Division was seriously depleted while holding a sector on Third US Army front. 1126 VOR which was last identified in that sector on 23 December evidently had absorbed some of the troops of 1125 and 1127 VCR's which were being refitted in the rear areas. On 1 January, XV Corps identified 1126 and 1127 VCR in the attack as well as some attached units (58 Fort MG Bn and OCS VIESBADEN).

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1125 VGR has not been located as yet and it may be presumed that it is being carried in divisional reserve. P's taken indicate that the average company is about 100 strong. Combat effectives of the division should total approximately 2,000.

361 Volksgrenedier Division. This division took a very definite part in the attack and acquitted itself well. Its previous low strength was evidently raised by partial refitting of its units directly behind the line.

6 SS Mountain Division Nord. The arrival of this unit on the Uestern Front ws finally reclized on 2 January when PU's were taken from the Signal Battalion. Confirmation was made on the 5th when elements of 12 SS Mountain Regiment were identified in line at Q 7436 between 361 VG Division and 256 VG Division. PM's stated that the division and left DENMARK by rail on 24 December and had been routed via HAMBURG-ZELLE-HANOVER-COETTINGEN-FULDA-JUENZBURG-M.MJHEIM-LUDJIGSHAFKN-L.NDAU-PIRMASENS reaching STURZELBROWN on 30 December. Prisoners further state that the division consists of two regiments (11 SS and 12 SS Mountdin Regiments) of 3 battalions each. Personnel are said to be 70% VOLKSDEUTCHE; ducluding a large portion of Hungarians. Commanding General is SS Gruppenfuhrer BOENNER. Combat effectives are carried at 6-7,000.

. (2) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Gen. HOEHNE)

256 Volksgrenadier Division was shifted about 36 hours before the attack from the RHINE River flank to the area near NEUNHOFEN where it was given the task of holding the left flunk of the zone of attack. Identification of all three regiments (456, 476, and 481 VGR) was made in the BARREWIE L-DAMB CH zone. Combat effectives number in the neighborhood of 3,000.

245 Infantry Division had a static role during the period. The only identified unit was the attached XII/I Regiment north of LEMBACH. It is presumed that most of the organic elements of the division are refitting in the rear of its relatively quiet sector. LT. East of LEMBACH no other unit has been identified. However, some major

unit must be in the area to control the Volkssturm and miscellancous units reported to be covering the front.

(b) THE RHINE FRONT

Ground sources report that a higher headou rters for the Upper Rhine have been established in the Black Forest area with persistent indications that HEINRICH HIMMLER is in command. There are also indications that this command has subordinated to it (a) the Nineteenth Army on the VOSGES front and (b) one or possibly two Corps covering the area along the east bank of the RHINE. Nominations as possible candidates are the XVIII SS Corps and XC Corps, which according to some reports no longer exercises jurisdiction in the pocket itself. The composition of such Corps remain matter of conjecture, but recent r il and road movements between BASLE and KARLSRUHE are indic tive of a potential build-up of troops in that area.

(1) The east bank of the RMINE from LAUTENBERG to RHINAU continued to be held by static units oper ting under 405 zbV Division. Late in the period, various probing offerts were made in the vicinity of G MB-HEIM and OFFENDORF where small units were est blished by 5 January. Elements of E-V Regiment, 81 Greendier Replacement Battaliany and Motor Transport Replacement Battalian No. 5 were identified in the area, the latter under command of 553 Division. Mission was said by PJ to occupy evacuated territory or to determine whether it was still held by American troops, Some PU's did not know the mission, had been given a very short notice of the orders to cross, and had been supplied with only one day's ration.

(c) MINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen! d. Inf. IESE)

Thile the attitude of the enemy rumnined defensive, the gradual shift of forces to the northwestern shoulder of the pocket was noticeable during the period. Elements of two battalions of 269 Infantry Division were identified north of COLMAR, but the location of the rest of the unit remained nebulous. In the same area elements of one regiment of 198 Infantry Division were also located while the 708 VG Division sidestepped to the east, indicating a possible build-up in the MUNSTER-COLMAR-SELESTAT eren.

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The buildwup in this area, created primarily by the displacement of units within the pocket, is intended to serve two purposes: (1) firmer protection of COIMAR, key city of the pocket; and (2) the mounting of a limited effensive in conjunction with the main effort in the SMAR-HARDT area. The arrival of some six replacement battalions permits the enemy at least a very aggressive defense.

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. HEIMUTH THUMM)

198 Infantry Division. The relatively quiet activity in this sector during the period partially accounts for the lack of identifications. The division is now seriously depleted and would be a logical candidate for refitting. Perhaps the arrival of replacements in the VOSGES pocket has helped satisfy this need. 326 GR remains NE of COLM.R intermingled with troops of 708 VG and 269 Infantry Division

by the paucity of information received during the period. Consideration should be given to its possible refitting and employment as a tactical unit in command of the various scatteredunits within the pocket.

189 Volksgrenadier Division has not been identified since the close of the preceding period. FU's stated that 1212 VGR had absorbed 1214 VGR. This division is also a likely candidate for the reception of newly-arrived replacements but present information does not indicate a combat effectiveness of over 1,000.

708 Volksgrenadier Division. The apparent piecomeal employment of the division is indicated by the identification of some elements NE of COIM.R on 3 January and elements of 748 VCR on 4 January south of SELEST.T. in additional candidate for replacements, combat effectives now number about 1,000.

269 Infantry Division. On 2 January one battalion each of 489 and 469 CR were identified north of COIM.R which may foreshadow the arrival of other elements of the division in the ST. M.RIN region. Low in strength, it is estimated that combat effectives do not exceed 1,100.

16 Volksgrenadier Division is carried as a virtual momentity for Pi's are now reporting regimental strengths to be about 100 each. Unless reinforcements are received soon, it is probable that the remaining elements will either be withdrawn or reorganized into battlegroups. Its strength is now undeterminable.

Miscellaneous Units. In addition to units previously mentioned along the northern front of the pocket, there are a number of scattered units which bolster the defensive potentiality of the enemy. It is estimated that these combat effectives total 3,200.

(3) LXII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JOACHIM v. TRESKOW)

159 Volksgrenadier Division. 300 replacements were received by the 1210 YGR during the period. Identifications last made on 1209 and 1211 YGRs were made on 6 December and 29 December respectively. The latters strength at that time was about 300 so it should be expecting reinforcements. Combat effectives of the division are estimated at 1,500.

338 Infantry Division had little chance to recover from the losses sustained early in December. In as much as no organic units have been identified since . 28 December it may well be that the division is refitting prior to fresh employment, probably repeating its usual role of bringing a loosely held sector under tactical controll.

BRIG.DE H. FFNER composition remained unchanged with Regiment B.UMG.RTEN and Regiment FR.NCE under command. Combat effectives are estimated at about 1,200.

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	SECRET SECRET	ROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges	Front)	
	Units in Contact (Infantry eff	'ectives):	30,000	
	First French way: Artillery Effectives: Seventh US Army First French Army	A STATE OF THE STA	15,000 15,000 5,000	
	Reserves:			
	Build up opposite Seventi Units available in the B		20,000 15,000	
	TOTAL		100,000	
T H	Tanks and SP Guns: Seventh US .rmy	in contact	80	4
I S	First Frenchmy	in reserve in contact in reserve	150 - 200 20- 40 50- 60	
P A	TOTAL		220-380	
G E	3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Lipine	Front)	April 1997	
I S U N	Lt the close of the period enemy subject the front were disposed as follows: BONNEY L-SUR-RC (H 5676), MOD WE (K 6500), GRIM LDI (S 8088), MONTENEY.	: .LBERTVILLE (Z 1683), 4132), M T BOR (K 3022), 0), ST S LUVEUR (N 4823),	BOURG-S MAURICE (Z 4680)	
C	(a) Enemy Disposition			
A S S I F I E	Further adjustments of enemy of two Italian Infantry Companies are at Firthermore PC's stated that on the logerman units located, suggesting that of 5 Mountain Division in that sector. In the French sector only the wis identified which fact, combined will brigade, see ision may have been withdrawn from the	teched to the 253 GR of left flank of the 44 AM unidentified Italian Un 85 Recon Battalion of the ith the reported absence ms to indicate that the	the 34 Infantry Division. Brighds there were no its relieved elements he 5 Mountain Division of German units on the	
D	(b) ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US RMY		t)	
	Combat effectives: Lack of substantiated in of Italian Units renders estimate of these units may be estimated as poor.	combat effectives imprac	organization and strength tical. Combat value of	
	4. OPERATIONS		' '3	
	Frustrated in his attempt to achie ain counteroffensive, the enemy is apported in the present wedge, whose limits he will be achieved the positions N and S of STRM One hour before the turn of the yethrough the HARDT Mountains on a from (Q 5345), BITCHE (Q 7750); to SAARGEM mortar preparations, in some areas, as were made mainly in the area of HAREN Panzer elements enjoyed moderate successforce a crossing of the SAAR near SAAF heavy in the REIPERTSUILLER (Q 8037), PHILIPPSBOURG (Q 8742); but only short-	parently massing armor for is stubbornly defending SEOURG. ear, the enemy launched to extending from NEUNHOF UTNES (Q 5169). Precede du supported by enemy aid HAL (Q 8442), by tenhese as in pushing toward the only at heavy cost that GEMUINES at Q 5460. By and HARETH L areas as	or new thrusts E and T, while probing our his counteroffensive EN (Q 9146), BANNSTEIN d by heavy artillery and rereft, initial gains upported infantry, eir objective of ROFR—the enemy was able to 5 January, pressure was he infiltrated into	

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The assembly of armor and infantry for projected attacks were frustrated by our artillery and counterattacks E of SAARGEMUINES. The enemy's axis of advance was becoming restricted as he obcupied VILDENGUTH (Q 7838), on the 4th, and partially occupied PHILIPESBOURG with infantry and tank; the attempts at REIPERSWILLER (Q 8037), and MEISENTHAL (Q 7140), were blunted. An armored drive in the good tank country SE of SAARGEMUINES temporarily put GROSREDERCHING (Q 6252) in enemy heads, while ACHEN (Q 5949) became a bone of contention between allied and German armor. A new sphere of action opened on the 5th as approximately a bn of enemy forces were reported crossing to the W of the RHIME where they had occupied HERRLISHEIM (R 1215), OFFENDORF (R 1312), and were threatening GAMBSHEIM (R 1110). Strong pressure at DAMSACH (Q 9244) indicated the enemy's intent to search for new points of attack. Elsewhere he went over to the defensive, putting up stiff resistance to our attacks in the "INGEN (Q 7335) and "IMMENAU (Q 7634) area, while falling back slightly from ACHEN and REDERCHING. ACHEN and REDERCHING.

est of the RHINE, the enemy forces were cleared from WEYERSHEIM (R 1513) while strong resistance continued at GAMBSHEIM. At the close of the period the situation in this area had not been completely clarified or restored. It was estimated, however that three platoons were established on the west bank of the RHINE supported by some 88's and a few tanks. The participating troops were identified as being under command of 553 Division were not of very good calibre. At the end of the period DAMBACH (Q 9244) continued active as steady movement indicated further build-up in the area; the enemy made successful infiltrations on the East side of his pocket as stiff resistance contined to our advance N of "INGEN (Q.7436) and WIMMENAU (Q.7735). Infantry and tank attacks were repulsed S of SAARGEMUINES, while movement N of ERCHING (Q.6557) and GUIDERKIRCH (Q.6656) indicated an imminent action brewing in that area. Two isolated enemy battalous still resisted strongly at "INGEN.

ares. Two isolated enemy battalions still resisted strongly at INNEN.

In the ALSACE pocket, ILE N.POLEON (V 7408) was the scene of continuous, intensified counterattacks throughout the period. Strong enemy raids were made on KEMES (A 8598), while aggressive patrols were met in the THANN (V 5413) area; west of the RHINE near ERSTEIN (V 9580) and at WITTERNRACH (V 9268). Elsewhere on the northern edge of the pocket, the enemy made but one heavy counterattack at ORBEY (V 4847). In the ALPINE sector normal patrol activity and harassing artillery fire prevailed.

5. MOVEMENT

On 2 January the RAF sighted a 27 mile long gold convoy southbound on the KARLS RUHE-BASLE road, with the head of the column approximately 20 miles south of OFFENBURG. In this same area during the period 1-3 January 7 trains and many groups of coaches were sighted at intermediate stations of the H.SL.CH-OFFENBURG-LAHR rail line. Little active movement was reported on the rail lines but indications strongly point to military movements taking place in the OFFENBURG-FREIBURG area.

The rail lines FR NKFURT-KARLERUHE were active on 2 and 5 January with trains

The rail lines FR NKFURT-KARLSRUHE were active on 2 and 5 January with trains going in both directions. During these same days much activity and some turnover was noted in the marshalling yar s of FRANKFURT, WIMES, MUNNHEIM, and LUDIIGSHAFEN.


The BRUCHSAL (R 6359) yards on 1 January and the ASCH FFENBURG (N 0253) and HEILBRONN (S 0861) yards on 2 January were between 50-655 full.

In the SAUR very many groups of boxcars were sighted on 2 January on the lines 100MS-K ISERSL UTERN-SAURBRUCKEN and the lines LUDIIGSH FEN NEUST DT-L MILU-ZHI
ARULIEN. On this day the ending of a large military move appears to have taken place on the LUDIIGSH FEN-NEUST DT-LINDU-ZHEIBRUCKEN line. On 5 January, there was again heavy activity on the lines KLISERSLUTERN to S. RERUCKEN. The bridges at 10FMS and M.NHALIM appear to have been the principal points of entry into the SLAR during the past week.


The appearance of a great number of groups of cars without locomotives in the battle zone suggests that enemy rail movement generally takes place under cover of darkness, so as to prevent Allied air interference. There are also indications that the enemy is attempting to augment his lines of communications into the COIM.R pocket by making more ferries, pontoons, and pontoon sites available for the RHIME crossings.

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
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
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


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


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(a) FIRST GERM N ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

Immediately after the close of the preceeding period the enemy committed his mobile forces which had been held in abeyance pending the outcome of his initial effort. At present, 172 Reserve Division is the only identified unit not committed, but there are strong indications that the Army reserve has been increased. Corps responsibilities began to take form as the XIII 3S Panzer Corps was located by PW reports at SCHEIDT where it appears to have charge of the attack along the ROHRMACH axis. In the HARDT Mountain sector, the control of the forces must be vested in a Corps headquarters, as yet unidentified. Whether IXXXIX Corps controls all of the area east of the HARDT Mountains to the RHINE including the attack area of 21 Panzer and 25 PG is not clear as yet, but the mounting magnitude of the effort in the HAGUENAU area would seem to require the presence of another corps, probably armored.

(1) XIII SS Panzer Corps

347 Infantry Division remained inactive on the front of the 105 Cavalr Group and the 103 US Infantry Division. 861 GR was identified on 7 January which co firmed the continued presence of the unit in the sector but no identification has been made of 860 GR since I January. Of the attached units 80 GR Repl Bn was identified 10 January. Consequently it is assumed that the division has been able to rest and refit consid rable portions of the unit while holding a line which both sides regard with only mild interest. Combat effectives including attached units are carried gard with only mild interest. Combat effectives including attached units are carrieat 2,800.

19 Infantry Division continued to hold the sector opposite the 44 US
Infantry Division while contributing to the advance in the HARDT Mountain sector by
the shift of elements of 59 CR from the left flank of the divisional sector (identified by document as Q 6055) to the western edge of the HARDT salient where it opposes the 36 US Division. The major portion of the division, however, continued to oppose the 44 US Division as the 73 CR and 74 CR were identified on the 6th and 7th of January respectively. Total combat effective strength including miscellaneous units such as the 202 Stomach Bn and BG KLEIN would probably not be more than 2,400.

17 SS PG Division has been fighting in front of the 44 US Division and the 100 US Division since the attack was launched on 1 January. Both PGR's were identified during the period indicating no substantial change in positions. In addition to the Assault Gren Bn spotted on 4 January the division has attached the 59 For ress MC Bn and CCS WIESBADEN unit. Considering the action in which it has been involved the strength is estimated at 2,800 combat effectives.

(2) Possible Unidentified Corps

559 VG Division had 1126 and 1127 VGR's in line on 9 January opposite the 36 US Division and the 100 US Division. The fact that 1125 VGR has not been committed since the attack wtarted raises some doubts as to its actual existence, but it may have been cast in a defensive role for the area just west of BITCHE which has not been very active. Including BG HEITMANN strength is estimated at 1,900.

6 SS Mountain Division Nord bore the brunt of the effort in the south ern part of the HARDT Mountain salient. Both the 11 and 12 SS Mountain Regiments were identified 11 January as was the Entineer Bn and the Ron Bn. Early in the period the Arty Regiment was also located and later it was found that the 506 SS PG Bn is one of the divisions attached units.

Regarding strength, PW's stated that the unit has sustained severe losses in Finland and Norway which had not been alleviated by reinformements due to the hasty departure from Norway and Demmark. Therefore, the combat strength is now reckoned as being about 5,000, including possible reinforcements still arriving.

257 VG Division continued its eastward shift around the rim of the HARDT salient until the end of the period. It seems to have established itself in the south sector opposing the 36 US Division and the 45 US Division. All VGR's weridentified during a period which was aggressive but not particularly offensive. Combat effectives: 1,800.

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361 VG Division committed all of its units against the 45 US Division 951, 952, and 953 VGR's were identified. The US VI Corps evidently took ito camp for it is reported that 951 was destroyed. Strength is estimated

So Infentry Division pulled back during the ported from the US XV Corposition in the unit of the division front in whice enemy's attitude was rather defensive. It is presumed that 87 CR and 165 CR are notified in the rear since their effectives were very low. The scanty information available makes it impossible to render estimate of the division's strength.

256 VG Division continued to support the pivotal position on the east k of the HARDT salient. During the period all three regiments were identified on the 45 US Division front, but were comparatively inactive. The division has been given additional firepower with the attachment of 815 and 816 Super Heavy MG Bn. total combat effectives: 2,100.

(3) LXXXIX Corps (and an unidentified Corps)
(CG: General HOMENE)

It is unlikely that this Corps would be given command responsibility formidable force as 21 Panzer Division and 25 PG Division on the RHINE flank. However, its presence in the area must be considered. Pending future clarif-lestion it is carried as having a passive mission which may be both defense and train-

21 Penzer Division was committed early in the period on the front of the 79 US Division after the effort in the HARDT sector was launched, 125 PGR, 192 FGR and 220 Engr Bn were identified on 8 January and were believed to be still in the proximate area at the close of the period even though they were not in close contact; proximate area at the close of the period even though they were not in close contact; The division received a considerable number of replacements in the period from the end of December to early January when it was out of line, but it is not felt that the refitting was entirely complete prior to its reappearance. Precise figures are still lacking but it is known that heavy losses were suffered in its effort this week which should materially reduce the estimated 4,000 it was credited with before the attack.

45 Infantry Division continued its static role opposite the northern front of the 45 US Division and the eastern portion of the 79 US Division. The only identification during the period was the capture of one PW from 937 GR on 8 January wistated that the mission of his unit was to insure road clearance for 21 Panzer Divis-The fact that 935 and 936 GR's have not been identified since middle December ion. The first that 935 and 936 GR's have not been identified since middle because may indicate that they have been refitted and may turn up in a revivified condition may indicate that they have been refitted and may turn up in a revivified condition.

All factors considered, the division's strength in combat effectives is carried at 4,000 including the 600 accredited to XII/I Regiment (atchd).

25 PG Division supported the effort of 21 Panzer on the front of the 79 US Division and 14 US Armored Division and as the attack progressed remained in moconstant contact than its partner. 35 and 113 PCR's were identified on 9 January while the Engr En, Ron Bn and the 5 Tank Bn (an attached unit said by PN's to have about 40 tanks) put in an appearance as late as 11 January.

(b) THE RHINE FRONT

North of STRASSBOURG, the bridgehead over the RHINE River established during the previous period continued to exist as a harrassing factor. Fis taken from 53 VC Division in that sector stated that the operation is controlled by the XIV SS Corps. It has been further reported that XVIII SS Corps is charged with the area eas of the RHINE and south of the VOSGES pocket which has been pregnant with reports of enemy activity.

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553 VC Division in the bridgehead was quiet at the period's close after all of its VCR's were identified by 9 January. The division appears to have incorporated diverse units into its regiments as is shown in the example of 1120 VCR which absorbed Volkssturn Bn STURMLINGER and Bn HOPPE. Other miscellaneous units Bn) which were identified between 4-9 January appear to be under the command of 553 VC Division rather than subordin te to 405 zbV Division as was previously believed. Combat effective strength is estimated at 2,000-2,500 with shout 30% still on the west bat effective strength is estimated at 2,000-2,500 with about 30% still on the west

(c) NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. WIESE)

This command rose from its passive attitude this week and succeeded in stir ulating considerable activity in its sector. A major reshuffling of forces took place as 716 Infanty Division, long dut of contact, assumed control over a sector in the French I Corps zone. The 338 Infantry Division shifted to the northwest and took over the sector of 269 Infantry Division along the VOSGES ridges. The latter then proceeded to the northwest and was located at the end of the period just south of SELESTAT. Consequently it would appear that these changes took place in order to support the effort of 198 Infantry Division which attacked northwards along the RHINE-

(1) LXIV Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. HELMUTH THUMM)

198 Infantry Division advanced against the front of 1 DMI (Fr), reached the village of KRAFFT and succeeded in clearing the area between the canal and the RHINE River. During this period 326 GR and 308 GR were identified on 7 January and 11 January respectively. In addition, the 192 Engr Bn (11 Jan) 746 Engr Bn (12 Jan) and 199 Pusition Bn (7 Jan) were leasted in the line. Including attached units it is and 198 Fusilier Bn (7 Jan) were located in the line. Including attached units it is estimated that combat effectives do not amount of more than 1,500.

106 Panzer Brigade provided the armored support to 198 Infantry Division. Ph's state that after reorganization the Brigade consists of seven companies, three of which have armored reconnaisance vehicles with the other companies consists ing of motorized infantry. They also indicate that the Ede has one bn of 40 tanks and SP guns. Probable strength of combat effectives: 800-1,000.

269 Infantry Division is in a new location opposing the 1 DMI and perhaps the 3 US Division. The 469 GR was identified on 11 January, but there has been no trace since 2 January of the 489 CR. Suspicious also is the lack of contact

That the division had been given a period for rest and refitting is obvious, but any estimate of strength is very difficult. Reinforcements from Norway reported in the Black Forest may be intended for this division.

189 VG Division continued to hold on the northwestern sector of the pocket opposite 3 US Division; 1213 VOR was identified early in the period but no appearance has been made by the other regiment (1212 VOR) since 28 December. Strength

708 VO Division also holds a sector in front of the 3 US Division. 760 VGR was identified on 8 January and early in the previous period 748 VGR was located south of SELESTAT, probably now on the flank of 269 Infantry Division. Combat effectives number about 1,000.

16 VG Division. The lack of identification of this unit since 29 December is rather indicative that a period of refitting is taking place in the rear

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3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4660), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4138), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBLE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTENEVER (K 4602).

(a) Enemy Disposition

The France Italian border is held by German and Italian forces which are recapitulated as follows:


- (1) The sector from the coast to ST MARTIN VESUBIE: 34 German Inf Division
- (2) The sector ST MURTIN VESUBLE to LARCHE PASS: Elements of the LITTORIO Division and possibly elements of 5 German Mountain Division.
- (3) The sector LARCHE PASS to MONT GENEVRE: Elements of 5 German Mountain Division and elements of MONTE ROSA Division,
- (4) Sector MONT GENEVRE to PETIT SAINT BERNARD and Swiss border: Elements of 5 German Mountain Division and elements of LITTORIO, Division.

The enemy continued to demonstrate a defensive attitude with the usual patrolling and spasmodic artillery activity. The combat value of the troops opposing us has materially decreased since the tendency has set in to replace German units with Italian troops. Indicative of their attitude is the garrisoning of rear areas by Gorman soldiers in order to protect their line of supply and possible lines of withdrawal. This is particularly true in the valley regions.

(b) ENEMY STRUMME SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

The shifting of units, and the lack of positive information on the strength of the Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult, but it is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000 with 60% carried as combat effectives.

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B. SUPPLIES.

Interrogation of PW's from various formations on Seventh Army Front during the past week indicates that supplies of ammunition and wrations were generally sufficient. However, due to Allied air activity, local shortages occasionally developed.

PW's stated that the enemy's current policy is not to establish large ammunition stores, but that he prefers to create a number of well dispersed small dumps in order to achieve a measure of protection; against air attacks. Some dumps of this type were claimed to be in the vicinity of CONTWIG (C 7773), east of ZWEIERUCKEN. This appears to be consistent with the enemy's known practice of siting supply installations in fairly close proximity to the LANDAU - ZWEIERUCKEN railway.

The two known POL dumps belonging to the enemy in the Alsace pocket are both located north of COLMAR and are well sited to maintain the armored forces attacking towards STRASBOURG. In addition, the enemy has a large fuel depot in the Moos Wald (W 03) as a potential reserve east of the Rhine.

The FREIBURG - BRISACH - COLMAR rail line continues to be the main supply route into the pocket, with pontoon bridges and numerous ferries in operation to insure adequate supply.

C. BOMBING OF SINGEN.

The bombing of the SINGEN railroad center on 25 December completely destrayed the large rail bridge over the River Aach thus cutting lines of communication with IMMENDINGEN to the north and SCHAFF ting lines of communication with IMMENDINGEN to the north and SCHAFF-HAUSEN to the southwest. The marked effect which the destruction of this rail bridge had upon this communications system is self evident by the fact that for a period of 11 days all through traffic toward the front had to be re-routed through RADOLFZELL (W 9503) and SIGMARINGEN (X 1044). The special effort of repair crews working both day and night stresses the importance of the strategic rail lines through SINGEN to IMMENDINGEN and SCHAFFHAUSEN. By the night of 5 January, provisional repairs had made it possible for through traffic to be resumed.

D. CAMOUFLAGE OF TANK CARS.

German railway officials are reported to have ordered many thousands of camouflage cases for railroad fuel tank cars. In the past it has been indicated that tank cars were being disguised as boxcars, but this activity was restricted to those areas which were particularly liable to air attacks. The present wide scale effort to conceal tank cars is now necessary since no area is any longer immune from aerial attack. Camouflage may therefore be used in order to protect the contents of these cars and to avoid making known the location of production plants or possible storage points.

COUNTER - INTELLIGENCE.

SECURITY REFRESHER

As the initial infiltration scare begins to wear off, security alertness tends to lag. This offers a vulnerability which the enemy will be quick to exploit. It would be dangerous to imagine that the Germans have exhausted their bag of tricks in the line of infiltrating GI clad soldiers or agents in civilian clothes. Careless guards are a costly gamble. Hence the following tips are republished with the suggestion of individual dissemination to all road guards and MPs. Each one should know these things:

WAYS OF SPOTTING GERMANS IN AMERICAN UNIFORM

1. In halting vehicles question the driver because, if Ger-

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man, he will be the one who speaks and understands the <u>least</u> English. The best English speaker of the group will wear an officer's uniform and sit in the front seat next to the driver. Thus, the best way to trap these parties is to ask the driver for his trip ticket, and then ask the <u>driver</u> some questions which <u>he</u> will have to answer.

2. Helmets are usually not marked with signs designating officers or NCO's.

3. Dog tags should be compared with identification cards.
Ask for serial number. Staff cars must be stopped also, and you must
forget rank when asking for dog tags, ASN, etc. Some of these GI-clad
Germans are posing as high-ranking officers. One is supposed to be
dressed as a Brigadier General. None of the Germans captured so far in
GI uniform has known his "ASN".

4. Soldiers offering paybooks as means of identification are suspicious and ought to be carefully checked.

- 5. AGO cards used by Germans are Form 65-4, which carries an officer's counter-signature below holder's signature. However, 65-1 is the form generally carried by American officers. Forged AGO cards may be brand new, filled out by the German himself, signed by him, and then dirtied up a bit; but creases in the card can usually be spotted as new.
 - 6. Trip tickets should be checked in rear areas.
- 7. All personnel not knowing the password should be regarded with suspicion and should be investigated. The password must never be given to unknown soldiers by guards or control posts. It is known to have been done in the past.
- 8. On several occasions Germans, posing as Americans, were dressed only partly in American uniform. Therefore, uniforms should be closely checked.
- 9. Staff cars being used by the Germans are believed to be Citroens painted khaki with the white star. Also look out for persons riding in the rear of trucks.
- 10. Simple questions should be asked which American personnel should know the answers to as a further means of identification.
- 11. Don't forget that any German jeep party will be heavily armed on a desperate mission. In order to facilitate escape they may be carrying phials of acid to be thrown into the faces of allied personnel, so one man should cover while another inspects credentials.

EUGENE L. HARRISON Colonel, G. S. C. A. C. of S, G-2

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
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
Incl. #1 - Rhine Bridges.
Incl. #2 - Sixth US Army Group
Front.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED and composition of the higher command controlling the off-the MHINE between "INSEMBOURG and the southern limit of question. 245 Infantry Division, the only divisional unit ordinate to LXXXIX Corps, has had prictically no role in anzer and 25 PZ Gr Divisions are known to be operating med Operation Feuchtinger, named obviously after the eral last identified in command of 21 Panzer Division. whose arrival was evidently the signal for the beginning of the tt.d only elements of its 20 Para Regiment at HATTEN,. 19 and 21 rossed the RHINE into the bridgehead and are presently in contact ial crossing was made by elements of 553 VG Division, which was led by 14 SS Corps. It was von MAUR, signing himself as Oberbefehl-Gruppe CHERRIEIN on 5 January, who addressed the following to the mand: "I place my full trust and all my hopes in you so that in a le to report to the Fuence: The Swastika flies once again from the iral" On 13 January HIMMLER's congratulatory message to the troops sidgehead was signed in his capacity as Oberbefehlshaber der Heeres-Gruppe On 19 January the Reichsfüchrer's Escort Battalion was identified in head. Finally, the identification of XXXIX Panzer Corps provides the tigal unit capable of controlling the of ensive units already active in and the newly-arrived 10 S Division. -1-SECRE SE CRET

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b. Capabilities and Discussion.

The actual use and subordination of the offensive units concerned (the Reichs fuehrer's Escort En, 21 Pz, 25 Pz Gr, 10 SS and 7 Para Divisions), undoubtedly the strongest units on the whole Sixth US Army Group front and three of which were obviously brought in for the operation, determines not only the enemy's capabilities, but also his intentions in this area. The following capabilities may be listed.

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1. To stabilize the front from the Moselle to the HARDT Mountains, with spoiling attacks against the Allied bridgehead at SAARIAUTEN and holding attacks in the vicinity of the major cities. The low number and poor quality of the troops in the area makes the encountered this capability imperative and purely defensive in character. Il Penser Division does not represent sufficient offensive power to permit the enemy more than an aggressive defense and the possible employment in this area of salvaged remains from the ARDENNES diminishes as the Allied counteroffensive gathers momentum. Finally, there is no evidence of other reserves which the enemy's previous costly fedlures along the western edge of the HARDT Mountains must have taught him were necessary to make any venture profitable.

2. To defend the COIMAR pocket, the Allied attack launched in the MULHOUSE area has robbed the enemy of any offensive capability he may have had in the southern sector. In the northern sector of the pocket, it has been established that the enemy's intentions were limited to the establishment of a main line of resistance on the ILL. River. A reliable officer PW has stated that operations northward from the VOSGES pocket were intended to be only diversionary in character, with the main effort to be directed against STRASBOURG from the north.

3. To attempt to capture STRASBOURG. Again the number and quality of troops does not permit execution of a capability allowed the enemy before 1 January, that of capturing SAVERNE and the entire ALSACE plain. Coordinated drives south from the eastern HARDY and through the HAGUENUU forest, elst against SAVERNE from the HHINE, and northeast against MOLSHEIM would all be necessary. Without increased reinforcements, the enemy is not capable of meeting all the requirements for such action. However, the capture of STRASBOURG would serve not only to maintain the initiative, but also as an extremely valuable morale factor within Germany. The excessive political tings of the higher commands, the expressed intentions of the enemy in this area, and the obvious determination to gain some advantage from a poorly conducted military campaign into which good troops are now being thrown after the bad, lends some weight to the possibility that the operations are being controlled by Army Group OBERYMEIN. A southward shift of units from HATTEN through the newly established borridor to the GAMBSHEIM area would be even more convincing evidence that XXXIX Panzer Corps has been provided with the best units at the disposal of the Army in order to save the Party's prestige. If HITLER could not enter ANYMERP, HIMLER must at least take STRASBOURG.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FROMT (Sear-Vosges Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing 6th Army Group were as follows: VOLKINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGURMINES (Q 5056), RIMLING (Q 6535), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), DYMENCH (Q 9245), CLEEBOURG (R 1145), ROESCHWOOG (R 2225), DROSENHEIM (R 1518); East of WEYERSHEIM (R 0713), South along RHINE to ERAFFI (V 9766), ERSTEIN (V 9480), OSTHEIM (V 7251), LEVALTIN (V 4644), ODEREN (V 4223), SWEIGHOUSE (V 5706), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), E along the HUNINGUE Canal to NIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE to Swiss Border.

b. FIRST GERMAN ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

The importance which the enemy has attached to this front after the failure of his ARDENNES effort has been very noticeable of late particularly in his propoganda broadcasts. More concrete results of this attitude were revealled in the arrival of two major units (7 Para Div and 10 SS Pz Div) during the current period opposite the Seventh US Army. His reserves in this area at present are in a depleted state. There is one located division (172 Res Div) which could possibly be committed and one badly 140

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rauled division (361 VG Div) which although identified at the beginning of the proricus period has not been contacted since that time and is presumed to have been withdrawn into local reserve.

Originally a mobilization division of Wehrkreis XII, 172 was upgraded to a Reserve Division. At present, it appears to provide reinforcements for the units opposing the Seventh US Army. Its static role is evident from the list of the units identified as having been under its control prior to commitment: 35 Observation En; 41 CAF Fortress Bn; 58 Fortress MC Bn; 80 Repl Bn; 87 Repl Bn; 107 Grem Repl Bn; 282 Stomach En; BG HARTIG; BG FRIDMAN; BG KLAMPMAYER; EINHEIT KLEIN; BG HIES-BADEN and BG ZHIBRUCKEN.

(1) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. WALTER HOERNLEIN)

347 Infantry Division displayed no sign of any change in its passive attitude and no identifications were made of any of its units during this period.

Organic strength: 1,500; attached units: (41 Fortress Engr En; 80 Repl En; 107 Repl En; 514 Repl En) approximately 900, for a total of 2,400 combat offectives.

(2) XHII SS Corps (CG: Maj. Gon. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division was also inactive and no identifications were made during the period. In addition, contact with its element (59 CR) in the HARDT Mountain sector has not been firm since 15 January. Organic strength: 1,500; attached units: 300; for a total of 1,800 combat effectives.

17 SS PG Division came into prominence late in the preceding period when the Commanding Officer SS Colonel HANS LINGNER was captured while on a personal reconnaissance. Subsequent interrogation has revealed that the capacity of the unit is fairly low, in his estimation. During the period, 38 SS PGR was identified, but the lack of contact with 37 SS PGR tends to confirm the theory that it was badly mauled and is refitting in the rear areas. All factors considered, combat effectives are estimated at about 2,400 and (20-30) tanks or SP guns.

in a sector which has taken on a purely defensive color. The continued lack of identification of 1135 VCR since the attack started is perhaps accounted for by PW statements that the regiment was dispanded and has not been reconstituted. Including BC ZWEIBRUCKEN, 58 Fortress MC Bn and BC HELDMANN effectives are estimated at 2,000.

(3) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. (LT) PETERSEN ?)

257 VG Division stubbornly resisted our efforts to take ground in the southeastern corner of the HARDT Mountain salient and undoubtedly sustained some losses. After 466 VGR was contacted on 14 January, the subsecuent identification of 477 VGR and 457 VGR on the 15 and 19 January respectively definitely limited the division's sector. Considering the action in which it has participated, the strength of the division is estimated at 1,500 combat effectives.

6 SS Mountain Division Nord continued during the early part of the period to play a major defensive part along the critical southern edge of the HARDT malient. P's stated that the Arty Regt had some batteries refitted with 105 mm gun howitzers in place of the former 75 mm mountain howitzer. Further PN statements revealed that new uniforms and weapons had been issued to the unit while in Denmark. During this period elements of 12 and 11 Sb Mountain Regiments were identified on 12 and 19 January respectively. Incomplete contact, therefore, makes it appear that while some units remain in line, the major part of the division has been pulled back into what would be conservatively termed local reserve. The strength of the division is at least 4,000 combat effectives.

256 VG Division shifted from the east flank of the HARDT salient down to the southeastern corner where it appears to have taken over at least part of the front formerly held by 6 35 Mountain Division. Although completely on the defensive all three VCR's were identified during the period. Total combat effectives including attachments (39 GAF Bn and 815 Super Heavy MG Bn) are now estimated at 1,700. / 4/

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36 Infantry Division appears to have been definitely committed in the pivotal position on the e st flink of the HARDT salient where both 118 GR and 165 CR put in an appearance during the period. 87 GR has been unidentified since 2 January. The accounting for the rest of the division as i fitting in near reseals, in part, supported by PW statements that the reason for our identification of only one battalion of each regiment on the day of the initial attack was that the other battalions were refitting in BAUHHOLDER. Organic units are estimated at 2,800 combat effectives with an addition al 300 in the 51 GAF Bn and the 816 Super Heavy MG Bn.

(4) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Gen. HOEHNE)

245 Incomet. District has been lightly Southest a of 10.58. 957 GR was identified in the sector northeast of LISSEMBOURG while available information indicates that attached units (XII/I Regt and 52 GAF Bn) have the responsibility for the sector between the two vital attack areas. That the division remains in the area is supported by the PW statement that the division CP is located in the SIEC-FRIED Line at R 1756. Organic strength: 3,500; attached units: (XII/I Regt and 52 GAF Bn) approximately 700, making a total of 4,200 combat effectives.

(5) XXXIX Panzer Corps
(Note: Subordination of units to this and XIV SS Corps is still in doubt)

RITTERSHOFFEN and sustained heavy losses in these engagements according to FW statements. It was also stated that the operations were call "FEUCHTINGER" which would indicate either that 21 Panzer division controlled more than its own units in the battle or that is Commanding Officer has been given control of a higher tactical unit. A single large replacement battalion is reported provided 4-500 men for the division, with 300 additional troops being sent to a pool in WISSEMBOURG and the balance to 25 PG Division. Considering the activities engaged in during the period it is reasonable to assume that the infantry effective strength of the division is about 2,000 and that organic tanks and SP guns number approximately 50.

25 PG Division experienced the same heavy fighting as the 21 Panzer Division under whose control it may have operated during the period. Both 35 PGR and 119 PGR were identified on 19 January but the tank battalion has not been positively contacted since 11 January. The 4-500 replacements received recently will help to offset the heavy losses suffered by the division in the HATTEN area. It is estimated that the division has 2,000 comb t effectives supported by 30 tanks or SP guns.

7 Para Division had its three Para Regiments identified on 17 and 18 January. First elements of the division were located in the vicinity of HATTEN on 14 January after its arrival from HOLLAND. Route of approach appears to have been; VENLO; (the end of December); to HATTOVER-PRETURT-HEILBRONN with crossings of the RHINE being made at KARLERHE and GERMERSHEIM thence to LANDAU and NEUSTADT. The evidence suggests a strong infantry division of nine battalions and an artillory regiment of three battalions. Some of the vehicles are known to be wood-burning. At the close of the period one regiment (20 Para) appeared to have been detached for duty in the HATTEN area while the other regiments were in position along the vest bank of the RHINE. Organic units are estimated to have a comb t effective strength of about 4,500.

10 SS Panzer Division first gave evidence of its location by the capture of a 17 year old Sergeant in the bridgehead area on 19 January. The division h d never been identified in the APDEINES salient and hence hed over one month in which to be refitted in manpower (reported to be 90% GAF) and equipment. The division appears to have moved by read from SAARRUCKEN-NEUNKIRCHEN area via ZHEI-BRUCKEN-PIRELSENS-BERGZABERN then to the east bank of the RHINE opposite the bridgehead. Elements of 21 SS PGR and 22 SS PGR were identified by the close of the period. The division has at least 4,500 combat effectives plus 80 tanks and SP guns.

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a. May 38 Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. SS v.d. BACH-ZKLENSKI)

To additional information has been received which would suggest that this corps controls any units other than 553 VC Division in the RHINE bridgehead. Its role is in any case assumed to be largely administrative.

553 VC Division had none of its organic units identified during the period but PW's continued to refer to its command responsibilities in the area. The regiments appear to have emphasized their already motley tone by absorbing virious miscellaneous units. For example, BC KAPPES, is now lst Bn 119 VCE; 1120 VCE squates with Bn HOPPE and En STURMLINGER. Information is scarce on the composition of 1121 VCE. Thus far, it is only possible to estimate the strength of committed units at 5-500, while the attached units (2 SS Police Regt; Bn MEYER; Bn OBERRHEIN and Regt E/V) increases the total to about 1,000 effectives.

405 2bV Division is still controlling a large number of static replacement and defense units along the cast bank of the RHINE, stretching at least from R 1107 to W 0018. Thether it is still directly subordinated to Wehrkreis V or now under one of the new higher echelons in the area has not been settled. Its function, however, has not changed.

(2) NIMETERNIH ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. WIESE)

IXIV Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. HELMUTH THUMM)

196 Infantry Division appeared to have been satisfied with its diversionary effort during the preceding period. Its subsequent conduct was hardly indicative of offensive intentions. 308 CR was the only regiment identified during the period (16 January). There was evidence however, that some 500 replacements were recently received by the division and by this amount the previous estimate of combat effectives is increased to 2,000 including attached units (192 Engr Bn; 56 Fortress Engr Bn and 746 Engr Bn)

106 Penzer Brigade has not participated in front line activity since 8 January at which time it was identified northeast of SELESTAT. Therefore careful attention must be paid to ascertain its zone of future committment. Combat offectives are still carried at about 800 with an estim ted 30 tanks or SP guns.

269 Infantry Division has not clarified its status since the close of the last period. At that time, only the 13th Company of 469 CR was identified.

PW's have stated that the front in the COIMAR area is rather thinly held by 198 Infantry Division and attached units. The length of time during which this unit has been refitting suggests a now role, with the possibility that it may also to nother front. Pending nor confirm the east to factive of the dividing rear indication.

number as 1214 VCR was identified on 14 January. Previously 1214 VCR had been reported absorbed by 1212 VCR but now it seems to have been reorganized from undertermined sources. Organic strength: 1,000; attached units approximately 800, making a total of 1,800 comb t effectives.

700-VG Division also sluded identification during this quiet period. The 728 VGR is assumed to be refitting for it has not yet been identified this month. Combut effectives including attached units are estimated to amount to 1,800.

16 VG Division finally case out of the unidentified column (after one Month) as elements of 2.1 VGR. turned up on 16, January. PW said that the regiment was reorganized from Regt MACKER and Bn MACKE. Based on last known identifications and the fact that some refitting must have taken place, combat effectives should 143 mumber in the vicinity of 1,000.

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LXIII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JOACHIM v. TRESKOW)

338 Infantry Division draw attention to itself only by a slight shift to the northwest in the quiet VOSGES sector as 759 GR was identified on 18 January. Strength estimate is unchanged at 1,600 combat effectives.

pocket as he identifications were made during the period. Conservative strength estimates of the division would be 1,800 total combat effectives.

716 Infantry Division remains a very large question mark, although a value is strong with the artision or was at KURTHEIM V 8542 in early January. This same deserter in relating his p st stated that he arrived in the VOSGES pocket with FELDSTREP Battalion 15 (COLMAR), which unit was absorbed into one of the regiments of 716 Infantry Division. Then in compliance with an order dated 11 December, this division was absorbed by 708 Infantry Division, whereupon his unit became I/748 GR. It therefore appears that 708 Infantry Division has absorbed the troops of 716 Infantry Division, but not the staff's of the division. Therefore, if a regimental staff of the division appears in any sector it may forecast the absorption of the motley formations in the area into a new 716 Infantry Division. There is sufficient evidence to accept such a possibility as an accomplished fact in the HARTH forest area where the connections between 716 Infantry Division and the various units of Brigade HAFFNER have become increasingly more frequent.

BRIGADE HAFFNER. Miscollaneous Battle Groups identified on 15 January approximate 1,000 in combat effective strength.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve: (Combat Effectives)

Seventh US Army 38,000 First French Army 17,000

Artillery Effectives:

Seventh US Army 18,000 First French Army 5,000

Reserve:

Units available in Black Forest 15,000 Reserve opposite Seventh US Army 5,000

TOTAL 98.000 Tanks and SP guns: Seventh US Army First French Army TOTAL

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)
At the close of the period the energy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army
Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE
(Z 4680), BONNEY L SUR ARC (H 5676), MOLLIE (K 4132), M T.BOR (K 3022), AIGULLES
(N 3703), S QUEYRLS (N 4394), POND MINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN
VESUBLE (N 6020), GRIMLIDI (S 8088), MONTEMEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

b. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group Front (Alpine Front)

The lack of positive information on the strength of the Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the .lpine front difficult, but is is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000 with 60% carried as combat effectives.

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4. OPERATIONS

Having extended the COLMAR Pocket to include the area bounded by the RHINE and ILL Rivers during the previous period, the enemy satisfied himself with aggressive patrolling actions and harassing fire in the region North of SELESTAT. However, he managed to gain a small bridgehead over the ILL River in the vicinity of BERFIELD (V 9075) which he still maintains. Within the pocket proper the enemy made a few sorties in the area northeast of COLMAR, in the region west of THANN and in the HARTH Forest. All attacks were unsuccessful.

The Germans successfully maintained their positions in the Rhine bridgehead from dug in positions along the railroad N of HERELISHEIM (R 1315) during the early part of the period and on 16 January launched an infantry attack supported by tanks from OFFENDORF (R 1312) to the north, enabling him to reach the NE outskirts of HERELISHEIM. From these positions he maintained a strong defense with small arms, mortar and machine gun fire while further reinforcements were being carried across the RHINE by barges.

The "MAGINOT Corner" was the scene of an intense enemy effort through out the period as counterattacks utilizing tanks and flame-throwers led to house-to-house fighting in both HATTEN (R 1733) and RITTERSHOFFEN (R 1634). Balked in his break-out attempts, the enemy utilized fresh toops and armor to join with the bridgehead further south as he took STATTMATTEN (R 1921), DEMGOLSHEIM (R 1821), and for a short time, SESSENHEIM (R 1921). The tempo of his efforts was increased, resulting in the recepture of SESSENHEIM and the woods in the vicinity. Smoke screens and camouflage aided his troops in gaining the line of pillboxes in vicinity R 1734.

Infantry in dug-in positions offered strong resistance in the HARDT Mountain zone near ALTHORN (C 7540), BUEHN (C 8039) and REIPERTSWILLER (C 8036), holding US troops to minor gains. However, the enemy mounted a few small-scale attacks in the HARDT Mountains attempting to cut roads in the areas (C 7639 and C 7738) by means of infiltration tactics.

Chief activity in the SAAR area during the period has been that of trains carrying contoons in the W half of the zone, and of vehicle movement in area (4064 - 5066.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

The enemy continued to reveal little rail activity during daylight hours, but it was apparent that two major rail movements were being completed early in the past week; one in the LANDAU - NEUSTADT sector, and the other in the SAARBRUCKEN - NEUNTIRCHEN - HOMBURG - PIRMASENS ARRA. Increased activity was also noted on the lines about BAD KREUZNACH. In the Black Forest from VILLINGEN and DONAUESCHINGEN toward OFFENBURG and northward, some military activity was apparent on all days available for observation. Some southward movement in the direction of OFFENEURG from the north was also rejected. Unimportant activity was observed in both the FREIBURG and COLMAR areas. The Germans continued to display a willingness to move vehicles on main roads close to the front during hours of daylight. However, some of these moves were probably forced upon him as a direct result of the numerous cuts effected on his parallel rail lines in the rear of forward jositions. of forward positions.

The identification of medium tank trains, large numbers of flats (some loaded with motor transport) and groups of boxcars on the lines between RASTATT and OFFENEURG substantiated the view that a

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military move took place early in the week into this area, chiefly from VILLINGEN and KARLSRUHE. The substantial vehicular movement in the area north of OFFENBURG on 18 - 19 January is at least partially connected with the arrival of 10 SS Panzer Division.

Within the Vosges Pocket and in the FREIBURG area very little rail activity was noted. However, it was clear from the fresh tracks converging into the Illwald Forest, that these woods concealed a fair amount of armor.

The FRANKFURT, DARMSTADT, MANNHEIM, and NEUSTADT rail lines were active on 14 January and the marshalling yards of WORMS, MANN-HEIM, and GERMERSHEIM were all one-half full. This rail activity appears to have been connected with the movement into the NEUSTADT - LANDAU area.

The ending of a large scale related movement into the NEUSTADT - LANDAU area apparently took place on 14 January. The weather permitted reconnaissance over the area on only 13 and 14 January, but on these days 13 trains were sighted, as well as a large number of flats loaded with tanks and motor vehicles. The appearance of scattered groups of boxcars on most station sidings between WORMS and KARLSRUHE on 15 January suggests that the cars were being shunted about prior to collection for distribution.

Loadings in the yards and in small stations on the lines about SAARBRUCKEN, HOMBURG, NEUNKIRCHEN, and PIRMASENS, on 14 - 15 January took on added importance with the sighting of 3 medium tank trains plus some 150 loaded flat cars. In addition, TAC/R sighted large groups of tanks in the area during this period. This movement appears to have started in a northeasterly direction. At PIRMASENS, the trend of road movement on the same day also appeared to be toward the east.

B. ATTACKS ON RAILS.

Enemy rail communications in the Saar area bounded by the Rhine and Moselle Rivers were subjected to intensive air attacks. Approximately 80 cuts were effected during the week, but due to inclement weather, the enemy had had sufficient time to make repairs. The cuts do not appear to have caused any serious delays, but the inconveniences were no doubt annoving. The sealing in of a tunnel on the NEUSTADT - KAISERSLAUTERN line temporarily prevented through traffic, and photos of 14 January show that most of the BAD MUNSTER rail bridge has been destroyed, thus preventing uninterrupted movement between BINGEN and NEUSTADT.

C. FERRY CROSSINGS

The Germans are employing a total of at least 15 ferries along the Rhine between RHEINAU (V 984681) and RHEINWEILER (V 846012) in order to provide more ample means of communication with the Vosges Pocket. In general, night use appears to be much preferred.


At least two types of ferry are in actual operation, one capable of carrying 4 - 5 trucks, and the other a cable ferry guided by a steel cable strung across the river. The Germans also maintain much pontoon bridging equipment in the vicinity of these sites.

The following is a detailed list of known crossing sites showing the location and type, where specifically identified:


RHEINAU (V 984681) SCHONAU (V 941571) SASBACH (V 898498) JECHTINGEN (V 883468) GEISWASSER (V 915311) NAMESHEIM (V 895270) BALGAU (V 885252) NEUENBURG (V 859129)

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
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KLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 19

FOR THE TRUE ENDING 27 JANUARY 1945

ARY OF THE ENDAY SITUATION

etimate of the Enemy Situation

rganization along the Sixth US Army Group front has been clarified.

Army Group G controls the front from the Moselle through approximately the MECURE HARDENAU road. Under it the First Army operates through the following interest infantry (11 Pz, 416 Inf, 719 Inf and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 Inf, PS, and 559 VO Divs); XC Infantry (257 VG, 256 VG and 6 SS Mtn Divs); EXXXIX TY (245 Inf, 47 Inf and 55 Inf Divs).

Army Group OHERRHEIN includes the operational Nineteenth Army in the COIMAR poster, the administrative defence command known as Armse-Gruppe OHERRHEIN (possibly content third or Twenty-fourth Army), and the XXXIX Panzer Corps. The subordinate units in the pocket remain unchanged, except for the replacement of 269 Infantry Division (identified on the Russian Front) by 2 Mountain Division. The administrative role of XIV SS and XVIII SS Corps has been confirmed by agent reports and some documentary exidence. XXXIX Panzer Corps has conducted the operations in the HAGUENAU-HILL area with 25 Panzer Grenadier, 7 Parachute, 10 SS and 21 Panzer Divisions under command, as well as those units in the GAMBEHEIM area controlled by the staff of 553.

The offensive power of the enemy has definitely diminished along the front.

West of DEWALLER, there has been practically no offensive action. On the contrary,
an excellent agent source reported various defensive preparations already in effect.

Both 719 and 347 Infantry Divisions have been absorbing reinforcements from 172 Res
erve Division's various units, while 19 Infantry was forced to recall its errent unit
from the HARDT. Any reinforcements received by 17 SS were necessary to permit the

spread of this battered formation, whose original combat efficiency was depreciated
by its espured commander. Nor can the divisions in the HARDT be held in higher est
em, with the possible exception of 6 SS Mountain, whose losses from a second
surrounded battalion are revealing both poor tactics and even pooper quality per
sonnel.

Rast of the HARDT the enemy has by no means achieved a success worthy of his announced intentions and the units delegated for the operation. The aggressive actions were in the nature of probing attacks, searching for the weak point where his armor might be effectively used. In addition terrain factors forced him to canalize his efforts along routes which were obvious and easily controlled. This indecision was prolonged to the point where extremely bad weather and events on the other fronts decided the issue for him. By the end of the period the enemy's offensive intentions were no longer possible of execution.

In the VOSCES pocket the enemy was reduced to shuttling his units to meet attacks from north and south. Commitment of mobile formations in the south was followed by a parcelling out of the reserves, when even 2 Mountain Division was found operating on both sectors. A distinct lowering of the quality of forces in the CERNAY sector set in early, while even the enemy's better troops were having extreme difficulty holding well prepared defensive positions in blizzards propitious for such an intention.

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As for strategic reserves, there were none identifiable along the whole Sixth US Army Group front. 361 Infantry Division was in fact committed, while its staff-retired to Germany. 47 Infantry Division, hardly an impressive unit, had to be brought in from the northern front and was committed immediately after a road march from LANDAU to HATTEN. 245 Infantry Division was approaching the lines in an obviously relief capacity. 2 Mountain Division drew part of its complement from 188 Reserve Division in Austria and 5 Mountain Division on the Italian Alpine front. 30 SS, according to prisoners from another unit, was in such a demoralized condition that the enemy did not dare to use it, for fear of mass desertion. Finally, documentary evidence for the presence of II SS Corps is completely discounted, as merely the rough draft of a plan whose temporarily pregnant possibilities never achieved fruition.

In sum, the enemy has lost the initiative.

b. Capabilities

- 1. From the Moselle to the Rhine:
- (a) to attempt to stabilize the front, withdrawing if necessary to the successive positions along the Moder, the Maginot Line, the Siegfried Line. The high cost of his present operations, the inability to use armored formations efficiently under actual terrain and weather conditions, definite indications of their withdrawal, the preparation of defensive positions with a subsequent economy of forces and the lack of contact for some days combine to make this capability the most favored.
- (b) to defend east to the HARDT and carry on his attempt to recapture STRASSBOURG. Bad weather and energetic resistance have successfully thwarted any serious enemy advances with heavy losses to his present strength. The turn of events on other fronts has deprived him of the reinforcements necessary for further progress. This capability is not favored.

2. In the COLMAR pocket:

- (a) to reinforce and attempt to maintain his present lines. Here again reinforcements are lacking and available strongth is being depleted to a point where manpower earmarked for the Siegfried Line is being drawn upon. The present defensive position running from MULHOUSE through CERNAY, along the VOSGES and then the canals to the Rhine, is being forced and will fall under determined attacks. The danger to the Nineteenth Army of a sudden breakthrough from north and south cannot be underestimated by the enemy. Finally, the cessation of active operations in the HAGUENAU area makes no longer imperative the necessity to keep occupied a large part of the Allied forces. The possibility of an eventual intention to break out against STRASBOURG from the BENFELD area is no longer considered. This capability is not favored.
- (b) to retire in good order into the Siegfried Line after having completed the establishment of a bridgehead position in the NEUF ERISACH area. A retreat into the Siegfried line would permit an economy of forces now necessary to the enemy, releasing some for use in the HAGUENAU area eventually. Gruppe von OPPEN has already been identified making ready the ancient fortress area of NEUF BRISACH, under exactly similar circumstances to those prevailing earlier at BELFORT. Such a position would effectively deny use of the Rhine valley to the Allies and serve to protect the : vital east bank communication lines for the enemy. This capability is favored, particularly in conjunction with 1 (a) above.

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SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Sear-Vosges Front)

a. At the close of the period the font lines of enemy forces opposing 6th Army Group were as follows: VOIKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINGS (Q 5056), RIGHINGEN (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), HAGUENAU (R 0424), BISCHWEILER (R 0919), HOERDT (R 0410), KILSTETT (R 0808), South along the Rhine to KRAFFT (V 9780), ERSTEIN (V 9480), SELESTIT (V 7862), JEBSHEIM (V 8147), LE VALITIN (V 4644), ODEREN (V 4323), CERNAY (V 5811), "ITTENHEIM (V 7012), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), E along the HUNINGUE Canal to NIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE to the Swiss Border.

b. ARMY CROUP G (CG: Gen. BLASKO TTZ)

(1; First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The First Army failed, during the period, to make any appreciable changes in its front line, excepting on its left flank which moved forward to the line of the Moder River. 47 Volksgrenadier Division is a new arrival in the area and was first contacted to the West of HAGHENAU. However, the cannibalizing of 361 Infantry Division offsets the above new unit, with 256 Infantry Division receiving the lion's share of its remaining effectives. The role of 172 Reserve Division with headquarters at HOMBURG continues to be the same: namely to provide replacements for divisions actively engaged in line. This division constitutes the only known reserve for the army.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOERNLIEN)

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) continues to
hold the sector from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2982) to the vicinity of FORBACH (Q 3966). Identifications of elements were made by Sixth Army Group's left flank neighbor: 347 Fusilier Battalion, and 347 Artillery Regiment at Q 2981 on 21 January. Due to the extremely light contact during the period it is believed that the enamy's losses were
negligible. Its strength is estimated at 2,400 combat effectives including 900
combat effectives from 41 Fortress Engineer Battalion, 80 and 107 Grenadier Replacement Battalions (172 Res Div), and 514 Grenadier Replacement Battalion.

(b) XIII SS Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CO: Col. ERITZEIMEYER) holds the sector from FORBACH (Q 3966) to Q 5956. The only identification of subordinate units during the week was 59 Grenadier Regiment at Q 4662. This indicates the return of the regiment to its parent unit from control of 559 Infantry Bivision. Combat strength of the division is estimated at 1,600, including the attached Battle Group KLEIN with 400 affectives.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division extended its sector slightly to the east and is presently holding the line from Q 5956 to the BITCHE area (Q 7750). 37 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was identified at Q 7353 on 25 January after being absent for over two weeks. The regiment is believed to have been completely reorganized after suffering extremely heavy casualties during its earlier attacks. Col. LINGMER, captured Commanding General of the division, revealed that the division had no organic or attached tanks but did have 22 X 75 mm assault guns on 3 January. The present strength is 2,000 effectives with about 20 SP guns.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von MUEHLER) continued to hold the line between Q 7550 - Q 7643 passively. The present existence of 1125 Grenadier Regiment is very doubtful as no identification of the unit has been made since its destruction in December. The only unit contacted was 1126 Grenadier

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Regiment on 23 January. Some replacements were received during the period, presum ably making up for any losses suffered. Combat strength including Battle Group ZWIBRUCKEN, Battle Group HELDMANN and 58 Fortress Machine Gun Battalion, totals,

(c) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. SEIDEL) has been holding the quiet sector between Q 7443 and Q 7738. The following identifications were made during the period: 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 22 January; 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 22 January Q 7442; 257 Engineer Battalion, 22 January Q 7441. Division strongth is 1,500 effectives.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. FRANZ) moved forward after the US forces withdrew to now positions in the HARDT Mountains. The line now extends from Q 7738 to Q 8336. Reported identifications were: 476 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 24 January Q 8137; 481 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 25 January Q 7937; 456 Volksgrenadier Regiment has not been contacted since 14 January. Although 256 Infantry Division received the bulk of the 4-500 remaining effectives of 361 Infantry Division, the division strength is still deploted. The combat effectives total 1,600 men, including 400 effectives in 38 German Air Force Battalion and 815 Super Heavy Machine Gun Battalion, which are still believed attached to the division.

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: Maj. Gen. BREMMER) in moving eastward during the present period sidestepped 256 Infantry Division and assumed responsibility for the sector between Q 8536 and Q 8632. One battalion of 12 SS Mountain Regiment was surrounded and decimated at Q 8430. The following identifications were made during the period: 11 SS Mountain Regiment, 24 January Q 8534; 12 SS Mountain Regiment, 25 January Q 8530. No replacements are known to have arrived and, on the basis of the casualties suffered, the strength of the division is now estimated at 3,000 effectives, including the satellite 506 SS Panzer Orenadier Battalion.

(d) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOEHNE)

36 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. UEIIM). The sector hold by this division runs from Q 8632 to Q 9544. Identifications: 87 Grenadior Regiment, 23 January Q 9027; 118 Grenadior Regiment, 23 January Q 8830; 165 Grenadior Regiment, 24 and 25 January Q 9544. Organic units now number approximately 2,300 effectives.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Gen. BORK) is the new arrival from Northwest Germany. The division was previously committed in the HATTEN area on 16 January, but PW's claim that the division was previously committed in the HATTEN area on 16 January. It has the sector from Q 9528 to Q 9726. The identifications are: 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 24 January Q 9728, and on 25 January at Q 9626; 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 25 January Q 9728. 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment is as yet unidentified. The division appears to have been despatched to this area without any loss of time or extensive reorganization. Its combat effectives total only 1,500 mon.

245 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KEGLER) was moving forward into line, according to a reliable source. The last identification by contact was made on 15 January when prisoners were taken from 957 Grenadier Regiment in the US 45 Infantry Division zone. Other prisoners taken on 21 January placed the command post at ERLEMBLACH (R 0957). There were indications that this formation, whose organic strength is estimated at a minimum of 3,000, would supplant one of the divisions sligible for withdrawal.

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CRETARM GROUP OBERRHEIN

(a) Army OBERRHEIN (CG: SS Lt. Gen. von MAUR)

(a) XXXIX Panzer Corps

25 Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: Col. BAIMEISTER) closely followed our withdrawal from the HATTEN area and after a slight delay was committed in operations to cross the Moder River. Its remaining offensive power was utilized to reinforce 7 Parachute and 47 Infantry Divisions, with which it operated as combat teams. Identifications: 35 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 25 January R 0025; 119 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 25 January Q 9627. Its maximum strength is 1,500 combat effectives plus 20 tanks and SP guns.

7 Parachute Division (CG: Maj. Gen. ERDEANN) committed only 21
Farachute Regiment during the period, but there are indications that 19 and 20 Parachute Regiments followed it into the area Northwest of HAGUENAU. The bulk of the division was previously in the GAMESHEIM bridgehead area. It is now holding a sector from Q 9726 to R 0425. Interrogations indicate that the battalions were 400-450 strong at the time of initial commitment. However, 21 Parachute regiment suffered beavy losses on the Moder River. Present strength of the division is 3,700 effectives.

10 SS Panzer Division (CO: Col. HARMEL) is crammed into a short sector east of HARMENUM (R 0425 to R 0820). Both regiments (21 and 22 PCR's) were identified at R 0622 on 25 January. This denotes a shift to the west and a switch with 21 Panzer Division in the lineup. At time of commitment, battalion strength was approximately 350. Total combat strength at present is believed to be around 3,500 men, supported by 65 tanks and assault guns.

21 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. FEUCHTINGER), mentioned above in the switch with 10 SS, was located on a relatively long front from R 0820 to R 0511. Identifications are as follows: 125 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 24 January R 0713; 192 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 25 January R 1018. The division is in a weakened state and, in spite of some replacements, its strength is estimated at 1,600 combat effectives, supported by 40 tanks and SP guns.

(b) XIV SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. von dem BACH - ZELE SKI)

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER) is merely a divisional staff controlling a heterogeneous collection of units rapidly assembled from convalescents, over-age and reserve personnel on the East bank of the Rhine. The extent of its sector is not known but it has its left flank on the Rhine at R 1107. The combat effectives of the division are estimated at 2,500 men but the calibre of the troops is very low.

Recent interrogations indicate the composition of the division to

be as follows:

Regiment MARSACH (3 Cremadier Regiment OBERRHEIN)

Battalion SCHMIDT, Battalion TREUTLER, Battalion ZIERES (ex I Bn.

E/V Regt), Battalion MORG, (6 Bn OBERRHEIN), II Battalion 2 SS Police Regiment.

Regiment HOELSCHER

Battalion KAPPES (ex I Bn 1119 VGR), Battalion MEYER, Battalion MOELLER, I and III Battalions 2 SS Police Regiment, Police School HEIDENHEIM.

Regiment von LUETTICHAU

REICHSFUEHRER Escort Battalion, Battalion WIMMER.

405 zbV Division still controls static units along the East bank of the Rhine from R 1107 to W 0018.

(c) XVIII SS Corps

30 SS Grenadier Division. A prisoner states that the Germans do not consider the division suitable for combat because of the tendency of large numbers to desert.

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(2) Nineteenth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. WIE E)

The Nineteenth Army continued its stubborn defense of the VOSGES pocket and maintained its combat effectives at 17,000. The recent arrival of 2 Mountain Division into the area is offset by the withdrawal of 269 Infantry Division. 269 Infantry Division has been claimed by the Russians on the Eastern front.

(a). LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HELMUT THUMM)

198 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SCHIEL). 308 Grenadier Regiment was identified at V 7750 on 25 January and there are other indications that the division is being operated in pieces south of its old sector north of SELESTAT. The division is estimated to be 1,500 plus 500 combat effectives for the attached 56, unit strangth is estimated to be 1,500 plus 500 combat effectives for the attached 56, 192 and 746 Engineer Battalions.

708 Infantry Division (CO: Col. MUELLER) was contacted in almost its entirety north of COIMAR. The divisional sector extends from V 6846 to V 7646, with support rendered by 16 Volksgrenadier Division. Losses for the present operations have totaled approximately 400 effectives. Thus, the present combat effectives of the division total 1,000 men.


16 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HAECKEL) has been committed in the area northeast of COIMAR, on 24 January, thus shortening the sector of 708 Infantry Division. The division was last identified in the Western VOSGES on 30 December. Identifications: 223 Granadier Regiment, 26 January V 7645. The division has received some replacements. The numerical strength of the unit, approximately 1,200, is a result of the absorption of numerous miscellaneous unaffiliated units.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN), traced through Norway and Denmark during recent weeks, was first identified by French I Corps on 22 January. So far the following identifications have been made: 136 Mountain Regiment, 26 January V 8147; 111 Mountain Artillery Regiment, 26 January V 7646; 55 Mountain AT Battalion, 26 January on French II Corps front; 82 Mountain Engineer Battalion, 26 January on French II Corps front; 67 Mountain Reconnaissance Battalion, 25 January V 7348. Elements of the division were committed almost immediately upon arrival in the MULHOUSE area, and later in the period, the bulk of the division joined the battle in the COIMAR sector. The division is organized as a standard mountain division and its combat effectives are estimated at 4,500. There are indications that reinforcements from 5 Mountain Division, in addition to the already identified 4 High Mountain Battalion, may be expected.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. ZORN) 1213 Volksgrenadier
Regiment, the only unit to be identified during the period, was located at V 6148 on
21 January. This does not indicate any change in the divisional sector. The divistion is slightly to the west of our attack and combat effectives are still believed to
be about 1,000 plus 500 attached.

(3) LXIII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. ABRAHAM)

338 Infantry Division. (CO: Col. EVERT). The major change is the identification of 758 Gronadier Regiment north of MULHOUSE on 24 January, as 757 Regiment and the Anti-Tank Battalien were still identified in their old sector in the vicinity of V 5018. It is believed that 758 Regiment was detached to aid 716 Infantry Division which suffered heavily in the French I Corps attack. FW stated that Colonel von OFPEN was relieved by Colonel EVERT. With no reports of replacements, strength is still estimated at 1, 7.



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3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUETRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN RESUBLE (N 6020) CRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

Although no change in enemy disposition has been reported, there are indications that elements of 5 Mountain Division may be withdrawn from the Alpine Fronting appearance of 4 High Mountain Battalion in the COIMAR pocket and lately PW statements indicating that elements of 5 Mountain Division are now under 2 Mountain Division suggest that the garrison of the Alpine Front may lose some of its complement.

-b. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group Front (Alpine Front)

The lack of positive information on the strength of Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult, but is is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000, with 60% carried as combat effectives.

4. OPERATIONS

The attack by the French First Army in the THANN-MULHOUSE area on 20 January achieved initial surprise. Progress was steady until vicious counterattacks by 716 Infantry Division supported by elements of 2 Mountain Division and 106 Panzer Brigade, with extremely heavy artillery fire, stopped the forward surge at the cost of heavy losses in both men and material. Successful repulsion of the enemy counterattacks was followed by a resumption of the slow advance against a motley collection of reinforcements which manned the prepared defensive positions. At the close of the period our forces were approaching CERNAY (V 5812) and WITTELSHEIM (V 6312). Throughout the week operations were hampered by continuously bad weather, with blizzard conditions mounting.

The attack northwest of COLMAR began under adverse weather on 23 January. The initial effort carried across the HLL river after the capture of some bridges before destruction was possible. Enemy counterattacks regained the river line and permitted oc cupation of pillboxes and hastily dug positions controlling the approaches to the COLMAR and Rhone-Rhine Canals. By the end of the period the enemy was being forced back across the COLMAR canal south of HOLTZWIHR (V 7146) after having yielded JERSHEIM (V 8047). Resistance to the Allied attack was initially fierce, but showed signs of diminution at the end of the week.

In the Rhine bridgehead, enemy attacks toward WEYERSHEIM (R 0513) marked the beginning of the period. However, a change of dispositions resulted in a buildup west
of HAGUENU. The main attack was launched on 25/26 January in an all out effort to
gain crossings of the Moder river. The Allied lines were pierced temporarily, but
the situation was immediately restored. By the end of the period contact was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.

SP and artillery fire marked the early days of the week in the WIMMENLU-REIPERTS-WILLER (Q 8036) area. A slight withdrawal of Allied forces followed at ZINSWILLER (Q 8935) on 22 January. Battalion strength attacks and infiltration tactics led to temporary enemy occupation of ROTHENCH (Q 8433). Local attacks continued, particularly at MUHLHJUSEN (Q 8532) and SCHILLERSDORF (Q 8430), both of which were eventually cleared. The SAUR sector was relatively quiet throughout the week. Artillery fire from heavy guns hit SAURIBE (Q 4845) sporadically.

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5. COMMUNICATIONS

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During the current week aerial reconnaissance was greatly hampered by bad weather and poor visibility. The limited observations which were made revealed little rail movement except for the unusual activity observed in the Saar along the KAISERSLAUTERN-LANDSTUHL line on the 26th of January. East of the Rhine in the Black Forest area, some rail movement in a general southeasterly direction was noted on the OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN line and light to moderate activity was observed in the yards at AFFENNMIER, OFFENBURG, LAHR (W 1071), and GENGENBACH (W 2079), on £3 January. On 24 January a concentration of 500 railroad cars was observed at BOTZINGEN (V 9942) on the rail line leading to BRISACH, while across the Rhine in the COLMAN pocket, no rail movement was seen, although considerable vehicular activity was reported heading southward toward EMSISHEIM and SULZ (V 6220).

The presence of 20 trains plus a concentration of 1000 boxcars on the sidings in the KAISESLAUTERN-LANISTUML area reported on 26 January, reveals a movement capable of carrying a major military unit into the Saar region. The fact that 500-700 vehicles were seen just south of this area on 23 January, and that considerable vehicular activity took place in this sector on the 22nd, is further circumstantial evidence that indicates the possible arrival of an equivalent division in our area.

Extensive road activity was also reported in the rear area east of 'ISSEM-BOURG' and in the vicinity of LANDAU possibly representing the southward movement of supplies in that region. In the vicinity of FRIESTETT (R 1508) groups of tanks and motor transport totalling approximately 40-50 tanks and 50-75 vehicles were reported on 20 January. In connection with these concentrations it is of interest to note that the enemy has 6 dismantled pontoon bridges at prepared sites to cross the Rhine in this area between STRASBOURG and VINTERSDORF (R 2727). One report specifically states that the pontoon bridge at DRUSENHEIM (R 1618) is capable of carrying tanks, across the river.

B. STATUS OF COMMUNICATIONS

Adverse weather conditions which prevailed throughout the week not only hindered observation but also made it practically impossible for Allied aircraft to launch successful attacks upon the enemy's communication system. This bull in aerial activity afforded the Germans a welcome op ortunity to repair any cuts and to rebuild their rail transportation net as is evidenced by repairs to the new serviceable ELLER (L 5767) and NONN/EILER (L 4612) bridges in the Saar.

Photo cover of 23 January shows that sufficient damage to the BULLAY rail and road bridge (L 5761) continues to render it temporarily impassable and that the north railroad bridge at BAD MUNSTER (M 0835) is also believed to be still unserviceable.

Photo interpretation reports reveal that the Germans have approximately 43 Rhine crossings available between STRASBOURG and MANNHEIM. Three of these are fixed combination rail and road bridges and a fourth is the rail bridge at GERMERSHEIM: the rest are pontoon bridge and ferry crossings. South of STRASBOURG, there are 27 suitable prossings sites, 15 of which are believed to be in actual use, the status of the remaining 12 being unknown. Except for the rail bridges of ERISACH and NEUENBURG (which can also be used for motor transport traffic) these crossings are either of the pontoon bridge or ferry type,

6. DEFENSES

No new trends have developed in the organization of enemy defenses in the last few weeks.

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The main activity has consisted of the consolidation of the communication and fire tranches connecting the pillboxes and casemates of the Siegfried Line. This is in keeping with the standing order of defending these strongpoints from the outside and permitting retreat to adjacent installations. This work seems to move reached a high state of completion throughout the Sixth US Army Group Front.

Double and triple lines of continuous fire trenches have been developed in the area KEHL-KAISESTUHL, several kilometres behind the bulk of the Siegfried concrete defenses. These trenches are interconnected around towns, forming perimeter defenses. This would indicate that the order to turn each town into a strong point is being applied.

New air cover continues to reveal additional pillboxes and casemates which heretofore had not been observed, thereby gradually inere sing the density of known defenses in the Siegfried Line. This is particularly true between BASLE and KEHL
where the entire Rhine Plain to the foothills of the Black Forest can be considered
as an organized defense area, although the concrete works do not approach the high
density found nearer the Rhine.

Lack of air cover, due to weather, precluded observation of any German defensive activity between the present front line and the Siegfried Line in our northern sector.

7. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

German Frequency Induction Igniter

From documentary evidence, it has been known for some time that the German Army has been experimenting with frequency induction igniters.

The igniter is used to detonate S-Mines. One igniter is placed for every ten S-Mines, and employs an electric circuit. The purpose of the igniter is to prevent the use of electric mine detectors. It functions on the same wave length, and when the detector approaches the igniter, the waves are picked up by a coil antenna. They are transmitted to the relay which closes the battery circuit, thus firing the mines by means of electric detonators.

The sonsitivity of the igniter is such that it will be detonated by any strong wave sent out in its vicinity.

EUGEN L. HARRISON Colonel, G. S. C. A. C. of S., G-2

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX "A" - Weather Conditions in Upper Rhine Valley for February.

2 INCLOSURES

Inc. #1 - The Rhine Bridges. Inc. #2 - Enemy Disposition.

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PPENDIX "A"

WEATHER CONDITIONS IN UPPER RHINE VALLEY FOR FEBRUARY

GENERAL.

February is the most favorable winter month for military operations in this area. Rainfall reaches the lowest level for the year and cloudiness is slightly less than at any time of the year except summer. Temperatures, though slightly higher than in January, remain below freezing for considerable periods, assuring a firm oundation for cross-country movement in many localities. In the air, eloudiness cops off and visibilities improve over the preceding months, providing an increased number of operational days for tactical air support. In all, February presents better weather conditions than either of the two preceding months or the two spring months to come.

TEMPERATURE

The mercury begins to rise in February. Averages are, in general, two to three degrees above those for January. Only at elevated points does the mean remain below the freezing point. Colmar, with a mean of 36.9 degrees shows the highest average, while Grand Ballon in the High Vosces returns the lowest February mean of 24.9 degrees. Valleys points, such as Strasbourg, Mulhouse, and Karlsruhe, enjoy a mean of 35 degrees. The highest temperatures ever registered in this area for the month fall in the high sixties, while below zero marks are still possible. Colmar once recorded -8.3°. In an average February the mercury will rise to a maximum of 55 degrees and drop on the coldest day to a Tow of 10 degrees. To the east of the Bl ck Forest slightly lower temperature prevails: Donaueschingen has 28.0° and Munich 29.0°.

FEBRUARY MEAN TEMPERATURE

Belfort	35.2 Buden Buden	35.0
Saverne	35.1 Freudenstadt	30.0
Strasbourg	35.1 Stuttgart	36.0
Grand Ballon	24.6 Ulm	31.0
Nuncy	35.8 AL_sburg	32.0
Metz	36.0 Freiburg	36.0
Surreguemines	35.2 Karlsruhe	35.8
Mulhouse	35.2 Basle	36.0
Doneuceahingen	99.0	

PRECIPITATION

Fobruary is the driest month of the year. Often a northeasterly circulation prevails for many days, bringing cold, dry air from the G e t Russian Plains. Elevation and exposure are the shief determining factors in the rainfall pattern. Again the amounts received vary considerably in adjacent localities.

Valley locations, in general, receive less than two inches. Now Breisach has a mean of 1.20 inches and all points in the Rhine Valley floor and Alsatian Plain have less than 1.60 inches. Si ilar figures obtain also in the Baverian Plain with Donaueschingen in the rain shadow of the Black Forcat, receiving only 1.20 inches. Further east there is a slight rise (Munich 1.9 inches), but nowhere does the amount exceed 2.0 inches. The Voses and Schwarzwald show almost double and triple the rainfall of the valleys. Averages as high as 5.6 inches are reached at Ruhatein and Todtmoos in the High Schwarzwald. Even the hill country on either side of the Scar provides sufficient elevation to catch additional moisture. East of Trier the average rise to 3.2 inches and in the Hardt Mountains to 2.4 inches.

Snow cover reaches its maximum depth in late Fooruary. It is entirely dependent on altitude. At Str-sbourg the average February snowfall amounts to only 0.8 inches and the greatest depth ever measured on the ground was 5.9 inches. Mountain stations in the Vosges and Schwarzwald report considerably greater depths. Feldberg in the Black Forest has an average February fall of 60 inches and a mean showcover of 103 inches. Snow will measure somewhat deeper on Eastern slopes than on western. In the mountain passes of the Vosges and Schwarzwald snow drifts may form a serious obstacle to the movement of military traffic. 160

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MEAN FEBRUARY PRECIPITATION

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Besancon	2.3	inches	Frankfurt	and the second	-	1.5	n cho	P.
Metz	1.5		Freudenstadt			4.7		
Strasbourg	1.3		Nurnberg			1.1		
D1	1.5		Munich			1.3		

CLOUDINESS AND MOISTURE

Cloud cover in the Rhine Valley, though less than in January, continues to be considerable. Karlsruhe at 0800A has overcast conditions 57 percent of the mornings. The figure falls to 49 percent by noon and to 48.5 percent by 1900A. Thus, the sky may be expected to be overcast 50 percent of the time. Clear skies will prevail 20-25% of the time at Karlsruhe. Similar conditions are found over much of the area with mountain locations in the Vosges and Schwarzwald reporting slightly higher percentages of cloudiness.

Relative humidity is high. Southwesterly winds predominate and this brings moisture-laden winds from the Atlantic. Strasbourg shows an average morning relative humidity of 88 percent and a noon figure of 76 percent. These high figures prevent rapid drying, though occasionally this regime is broken when cold, dry winds sweep out of Russia and brings spells of very dry conditions.

VISIBILITY

Visibility in the Rhine Valley is generally poor throughout February. Obstructions to vision in the form of precipitation, smoke, haze, or fog are present most of the time. At Karlsruhe visibility is better then 6 miles at 0800A only 27 percent of the time, and is below 2½ miles 51 percent. There is a marked improvement in the morning hours, as over 54 percent of the noon observations show better than 6 miles. After sunset a rapid deterioration sets in. Often periods of very poor visibility tend to persist for several days. A haze layer settles near the ground, obscuring both horizontal and vertical sight. Sometimes however, the plateau regions west of the Vosges and east of the Schwarzwald are not affected by this haze layer which tends to settle over the Rhine Valley.

IND

The prevailing wind over the entire area is Southwest. This flow is emphasised by the contours of the Rhine Valley tending north and south. 41 percent of all wind observations at Karlsruhe are from the Southwest and Strasbourg shows 43 percent from South and Southwest. The second most frequent direction at Karlsruhe is Northeast with 20 percent, while Strasbourg tends to North and Northwest with 24 percent. All other directions occur less than 10 percent. Calma exist at Karlsruhe 8.2 and at Strasbourg 15 percent of the observations. Wind speed in low. A general average of 7-8 mph. prevail over the entire area. Gales (Over 32 mph.) are seldom experienced, probably less than once a February.

WIND DIRECTION

	N.	NE	E	SE	<u>s</u>	SW	M	NA	Calm
Strasbourg Wetz	11 8	4	2 3	2 3	12 8	31 16	10 10	13 4	15 34

SOURCE:


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21 January 1945

Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 8

Period from 1 January to 15 January 1945.

Part I. Civil Security

1. General Survey.

German Intelligence Service reached a new low in the caliber of the Espionage and Sabotage agents apprehended during the past two weeks. However, the use of low caliber agents presents a serious threat to security because of the large number available. Little training is necessary for establishing American army identification through shoulder patches and vehicle markings. It can be taken for granted that not all espionage agents sent through the lines have been apprehended despite rigorous traffic control restrictions and the order that all civilians entering or leaving our lines are to be placed under arrest and turned over to the C.I.C.

The movement of refugees from towns along the Rhine started immediately before the German attack on New Year's Eve, but traffic security controls were more than adequate to handle the estimated 8,000 civilians, of whom about 70 percent were men of military age. Screening was effected at collection points established by G-5, and no undue interference with traffic along lines of communication was noticed.

To allay fear of reprisals in the threatened areas, transportation was furnished local officials to evacuate jails which were jammed with collaborators, Alsatian Nazis, and other minor security hazards. These, and several thousand German nationals were sent to camps established by French authorities. First priority on transportation was given to civilians who had assisted our units.

The movement brought out the true colors of numerous civilians who celebrated too soon the imminent return of the Germans. They were arrested wherever found and interned by French authorities.

The First French Army reports that the anxiety on the part of the civilian population in their area caused by the German gains in Belgium has been somewhat relieved by the recent results of the Allied Counter offensive.

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The B.S.M. has authorized evacuation to Switzerland of 10,000 children from Mulhouse and vicinity. All convoys pass through St. Louis where they are checked by S.M. Agents.

The 44th AAA Brigade reports a rash of rumors which have broken out particularly in the Memton region, probably because of increased shelling in that town, and because of indiscreet talk among responsible French civilians and military personnel has caused some uneasiness in area. Consultations with responsible citizens and French officials by the CIC Detachment, 44th AAA Brigade, are planned with the purpose of supplying them with accurate answers to the questions most often put to them by the population to offset this situation. A report by 44th AAA Brigade on the situation in Monte Carlo will be found in Part III, Annex V.

2. New Cases of Individual Suspects.

See Annex I.

3. Progress of Cases Under Investigation.

See Annex II.

4. Personalities in Area Still Under Enemy Control.

CIRRATO: Reported to be agent of Gestapo, Ventimiglia.

LOBLICH: Former Chef of the Gestapo, Menton. Present whereabouts unknown.

LT. SCHNEIDER: Former second in command, Gestapo, Menton.

Present whereabouts unknown.

GALVICCIONE: Italian interpreter for Gestapo, Menton.

Present whereabouts unknown.

TIMOTTI: Italian interpreter for Gestapo, Menton. Present whereabouts unknown.

BUSSANG; Mimilie, alias MULLER, alias PAUL, Collin:
Espionage suspect supposed to be planning to cross
lines into liberated territory. Description:
Stocky, short legs, long trunk, full face, slit
blue eyes, of ten wears blouse made of French tent
material.

DELOFFE: French. Ex-mayor of Sospel and reported Gestapo agent. Present whereabouts unknown.

5. Additional Information on Carded Personalities.

Nothing to report.

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6. Subversive Activities.

Nothing to Report.

7. Security Control of the Civilian Population.

The travel control system was given a severe test during this period. Refugee movement to the rear occurred all along the front, but security control was maintained over all movements into Seventh Army areas.

VI Corps faced a large problem in the security of refugee movement due to the large area of responsibility and the population centers of Hagenau and Strasbourg. At no time did the movements get beyond security control.

The VI Corps system of control of civilian circulation has been considerably enlarged during the period. In addition to establishing roadblocks manned by the Gendarherie and by FFI personnel at all entries to 25 towns and centers of communication, this Corps has a system of seven Military Police check posts in operation, and a new system of extensive roving patrols throughout the Corps area has been inaugurated. The patrols are conducted by the 117 Ren Sqdn, and operate 24 hours a day checking all civilian and military traffic as well as security measures in force at all vital installations, including bridges, ammunition dumps, RR yards, etc. Each patrol consists of two jeeps and an armored car. For the purpose of covering the entire area, the Corps zone has been broken down into four sections so that at all times four separate patrols are covering the area. A section of the CIC/SM Detachment is on duty at the Sqdn Hq at all times, and one Gendarme travels with each patrol; hence, by means of radio communication, action can be taken rapidly on civilian or military problems. The patrol system is correlated with the Gendarme and FFI roadblocks and with those security posts and patrols conducted by the Military Police. The system includes 112 miles of Ren Sqdn patrol, augmented by 33 miles of road patrolled by MPs. A uniform type of civilian travel pass and curfew pass is in effect in the Corps area, and no other passes are honored.

XV Corps security control of civilian traffic continued to function effectively. During the enemy attack in the Bitche area, refugees were permitted to evacuate the immediate area and some control posts had to be withdrawn. Refugees were screened in the rear areas during the transition period, with the cooperation of Civil Affairs. As of 7 January the rearward movement had in general disappeared, and small groups were moving forward to return to their homes. This movement is under control and traffic is kept off the main roads.

The civilian travel control system, coordinated by XV Corps CIC, consisted, as of 10 January, of the following installations:

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dated 21 Jan. 1945, continued.

1. Road blocks maintained by divisions:

44th Infantry Division -

100th Infantry Division - 15

103rd Infantry Division - 10

2. Forty-one road blocks controlled by National Gendarmes under supervision of XV Corps CIC.

3. Twenty-four road blocks operated by FFI under supervision of XV Corps CIC.

Civil Affairs is implementing a plan for handling refugees from forward areas. Refugee routes have been established and are being market. Civil Affairs guards are posted to direct traffic at strategic points, and Refugee Collecting Points have been established at Saverne, Sarrebourg, Luneville and Morhange. 307 CIC Detachment has arranged for screening of all civilians at the collecting points by SM and SA.

XXI Corps reports interrogation of Polish refugees from Haguenau indicated that they migrated due to rumors of the Germans recapturing the city and that enroute German money was accepted as far west as Mutzig.

The 106 Cavalry Group arrested seven civilians attempting to pass through their lines into enemy territory. Six were apprehended before they reached the enemy lines, were checked by CIC and turned over to Civil Affairs. The six were tried by summary court, pleaded guilty to illegal travel and were sentenced to one year imprisonment. The seventh succeeded in reaching enemy patrols, where he spoke to the sentries. He was arrested upon his return and is being held for trial by an intermediary court.

Civil security control in First French Army area is supervised by an Army Field Grade Officer, it is yielding excellent results. Following reinforcement measures have recently been taken:

Control posts check not only vehicles but also pedestrians. This control will be effected by:

- a) Traffic control posts.b) Town Majors.

The only civilians authorized to use military vehicles are those holding a pass issued by a First French Army S. M. Bureau, to the exclusion of any other S. M. Bureau.

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8. Relations between Troops and Civilian Population.

a. Relations between troops and the civilian population remained generally friendly. The population in forward areas became apprehensive and less cooperative, but few cases of hostile acts were reported.

b. The civilian atti
from VI Corps reports: " The civilian attitude of Strasbourg is indicated by excerpts

(1) The city of Strasbourg continued to present the major security hazards in Seventh Army Area until taken over by the First French Army. During the period of Seventh Army responsibility, sections of the 307th and 206th CIC Detachments were assigned the area. Ever since the Allied liberation of Strasbourg, the inhabitants of Strasbourg had been worried about the reoccupation of the city by the Cormon. This fees although it seemed to diminish in force as Strasbourg had been worried about the reoccupation of the city by
the Germans. This fear, although it seemed to diminish in force as
the weeks passed, has always been hidden in the Alsatian mind. Thus
the slightest appearance of withdrawal, or movement of troops in any
direction would be basis for rumors and worry. When the orders for
withdrawal were issued, preparations for evacuation of the Gendarmes
added to the fear. People who had worked with the Allies and Americans
were receiving the brunt of the scorn, fear and despair.

(2) During this period action was taken by French authorities upon recommendation of CIC to arrest 45 persons dangerous to security, the group consisting chiefly of active pro-Germans who revehled themselves under the conditions prevailing. All available
means were used to allay the public fears, and when the evacuation
order was rescinded, the PWB sound truck was used to assure the public
that the Allies were staying. Mass evacuation of the city was prevented, and at the time of transfer of the city to the French, the
population was approaching its normal routine and Allied flags were
again appearing. again appearing.

c. MU 500 CSDIC reports the following attitude of civilians north of Strasbourg, derived from the interrogation of PWs from the initial river crossing: (Rating B-2).

The civilian population assisted the German soldiers in no way. On the contrary, they displayed a hostile attitude. Source talked to several civilians. All of them said that the American soldiers had treated them very well. Furthermore, they said they would have been happy to see the Germans remain on the other side of the Rhine, since they thought the war was over for them with the American occupation and that now the Germans would probably bring new sufferings to them. Some civilians were hiding American soldiers in their houses.

Relations Between CI Personnel, Local Authorities and Police.

Relations remained good, although public fear of German re-occu-pation reduced the degree of active cooperation in some areas and made services of informants difficult to obtain.

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10. Rumors Current Among Troops and Civilians.

a. The following rumors were prevalent in Saverne at the time of the withdrawal of 7th Army Headquarters. Basis for these rumors was not determined:

The Americans intended to withdraw from Alsace.

The move was intended by Americans to influence the DeGaulle government in favor of changing the terms of its agreement with Russia,

German progress in Belgium was due to the use of sleeping gas

. b. The following rumors were reported as being prevalent in Strasbourg:

Parachutists had landed in Molsheim.

Germans were laying bridges across the Rhine from Kehl.

Germans were infiltrating into the north of the town.

CIC and FFI in 7th Army area arrested approximately 20 persons believed to be spreading rumors and propaganda.

In the First French Army area a rumor is being widely circulated that several Russian divisions have landed at MARSEILLE.

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Part II Military Security

1. General Summary:

a. The weeding out of sabotage agents in the stabilized area and persistent security measures have contributed to a good state of security of materiel, indicated by no reported acts of enemy sabotage during the period. Indications of increasing enemy efforts at sabotage were seen during the period, the most notable being the identifications of elements of the Brandenburg Unit on our front. All units report increased security consciousness among the troops. It is apparent that training in security against enemy interrogation must be continued.

b. The French report that information received through investigations of volunteers sacking enlistment in the French Army, has made it possible for them to identify a few miliciens and collaborationists who, if successful in enlisting, had hoped to escape detection and punishment for their previous actions.

2. Security of Information:

a. A captured enemy Prisoner of War Interrogation report indicated the disclosure of considerable unit information by prisoners from 106th Cavalry Group. The facilities of IS 9 are being utilized to intensify security training. No major violations of /R 380-5 were reported.

b. In the 44th AAA Brigade area approximately one hundred and sixty-five line-crossers have been processed by Counter-Intelligence personnel during the period of this report. Only one (See BAX - New Cases of Individual Suspects, Annex #1) was considered of any CI interest. Others conformed to the same general pattern described in previous reports.

3. Security of Personnel:

a. There has been no evidence of organized subversive propaganda encountered during the period. During the course of the withdrawel, several pro-German individuals are reported to have uttered statements of an enemy propaganda nature. Some of these individuals have been apprehended, and it appears clear that these statements were made as a result of personal feelings of the subject rather than as a part of any enemy-inspired propaganda program.

b. 20 penalties have been invoked upon French military peronnel for using the civilian mail service for their private corespondence.

c. Two types of enemy propaganda leaflets were dropped in the rst French Army area. It is reported that these leaflets produced derogatory effect upon morale of the troops.

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
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SECRET 51xt Arny Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 8, (Continued) 21 January 1945. Security of Installations and Materiel: a. Security of material remained excellent with no sabotage acts being reported. 44th Infantry Division reports an attempt to cut communication wire by a French boy of low mentality who revealed that German soldiers had given instructions to children to cut wires after the German withdrawal. He was turned over to SM. b. 69th Military Police Company reported that during the night of 2 - 3 January tacks had been scattered along the main street of Saverne and that three road signs had been changed to improper locations. PART III - PORT, AIRPORT AND FRONTIER CONTROL. Nothing to report. SECRET SECRET

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ANNEX NO. 1

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 8

Individual Cases of Espionage and Sabotage Agents Apprehended.

POIGNET, Jean. French national; 20 years old. Confessed sabotage mission for Brandenburg "Einheit Nord". (See Annex III for composition, training and operations of unit.) Arrested by 79th Div. Recon. Troop at Roeschwoog (R2225) while on reconnaissance to locate suitable sabotage targets. Told VI Corps CIC his mission was to determine whether airport in the vicinity of Hagenau was operative, and the location of gasoline dumps. Secondary mission was to determine the attitude of civilians toward return of the German Army, and to identify American units in the vicinity. He was also to establish routes for sabotage parties which would accomplish the mission after his return. Some would be in civilian dress and others in uniform. Poignet was wearing the uniform of the SS covered with a jacket resembling, but not identical with the American issue, including a hood, and trouser coveralls similar in color to that issued to American armored units. He is a member of PPF and an ardent Nazi. Case to SCI.

TOSTAIN, Georges. French national, 41 years old; LVF member. Captured with POIGNET while on same mission. Gave information of organization to Seventh Army CIC. Was dressed in same type uniform, which he said was a deliberate attempt to confuse American troops, albeit a "legal" one. Case to SCI.

HOELLINGER, Franz. French national. Lt. of reserve in French Army; 36 years old. Arrested by units of 399th Inf. Regt. at SIERSTHAL (2737497) while attempting to enter lines. Confessed to 100th Div. OIC that he had been compelled by the Gestapo in Bitche to undertake mission of ascertaining artillery positions, infantry identifications and positions, and locations of tank concentrations in vicinity of Siersthal, Lambach and Rimling. Was given no money for mission, but his reward was to be exoneration from German black list for particiation in FFI activities during period of American occupation of the town. He was informed by Gestapo that American troops would not molest im because of his status as a French officer. Case to SCI.

HONSEL, Antoine, nee KARLSTETTER. Confessed espionage agent.

orn in Luxembourg, claims German nationality by marriage; member of
the Nazi Party since 1932, and a Blockwalterin (Nazi Welfare official);
tyears old. Apprehended by 79th Division CIC on 8 January 1945 near
ischwiller (RO818) after she had crossed the Rhine near Herrlisheim
1214). She confessed that she had met in Herrenalb through her emloyer, HUMMEL, an individual whose identity is unknown to her and who
ad promised her passage to Strasbourg if she would accept her present
ssion. Upon acceptance, she was given 400 marks and the mission of
ling to Strasbourg via Drei Muhlen, Weyersheim and Hoerth, to find out
brican troop strength, to report on insignia worn by troops, on amount
vehicles, especially tanks, and identification by insignia. She was
report back in three days. If unable to remember what she observed,

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SECRET January 1945 (Entinued).

she was instructed to prick the letters of a book on different pages so that the message could be read when the book was held to the light. HONSEL claims that on 5 January she was picked up at her residence in Baden-Lichenthal by two soldiers in a car and driven to the vicinity of Ulm-Lichtenau, where she crossed the Rhine. After the crossing, she proceeded by automobile and bicycle, accompanied by German soldiers, through Herrlisheim to a bridge near Drei Muhlen, where the soldiers left her. She passed through Rohrwiller and arrived at Bischwiller. With all other papers in order, but with no laissez-passer, she was arrested at a road block. Case to SM for trial.

RECHER, Georg Bernard. Confessed espionage agent. French Alsatian) national; member of the Hitler Jugend; 16 years old. Apprehended by the 3rd Battalion of the 157th Infantry Regiment, 45th Division near Sulstall (Q9844) on 12 January 1945 as he was attempting to cross the lines. He finally forsook his cover story that he had been forced to dig fortifications and was escaping. Confessed to 45th Division CIC that he had been sent through the lines on a tactical espionage mission to observe caliber and number of weapons, strength of tanks and their identification by noticing the arabic number on the left side of turrets, nationality and approximate strength of troops in the vicinity of Lembach, Mattstall and Langensoultzbach. Inducted into the Volksturm at Ingolsheim in early December he was brought with a group to Heidelberg and Baden Baden, where on 1 January a group of six were told by HJ Bannfuehrer BERGER that they were to cross the lines. On 10 January he was given 40 Reichsmarks and his present mission at Munchweiler by an unknown Wehrmacht officer. He was to return to Munchweiler within 3 to 4 days using the password "Rebhuhn". He claimed to have had no special training. Case to SM for trial.

DINTINGER, Wilhelm Emil. Confessed espionage agent. French (Alsatian) national. Member of Hitler Jugend. 16 years old. Apprehended by 36th Engineer Regiment. Confessed to 45th Division CIC that his mission was to report the number of troops in Lembach, their identities, number of tanks and types of vehicles. He was told to observe markings on front and rear of vehicles, and shoulder patches of personnel. He had no previous intelligence training other than a short briefing. Case to SM for trial.

BOULEAU, Raymond. Abwehr espionage agent, probably I Wi (Counter-espionage) Section. French national; 16 years old. Acting on information that BOULEAU had associated with CAVALLIER, RIZOV and SCHE-PPLER (alias SCHMIDT), Seventh Army CIC/SA apprehended him through an agent provocateur placed in the Prison Departmenale in Strasbourg, where he had been under arrest by FFI because he lacked identity papers, the was about to be released due to lack of evidence. BOULEAU confessed that on 22 November SCHEPPLER had given him his present mission, which consisted of gathering information on 1) Allied strength and types of troops; 2) Allied material, particularly condition, age and type of fuel used by vehicles; 3) Allied armor; 4) Activities of the Allied security agencies and methods of operation in regard to civilian circulation; 5) Treatment of coll borators by the Allies. After the comple-

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State of January 1945, continued.

tion of his present mission in Strasbourg, BGULEAU was to cross the lines and report to SCHEPPLER at the Kommandantur in Oberkirch. BGU-LEAU claims that he had been told that he would then have been given another mission into the interior of France, entrusted with 50,000 francs and instructions to contact stay-behind agents. BGULEAU claims to have worked as a kitchen-helper for the Milice in Dijon in July and August 1944, to have gone with the Milice to Schirmeck and to have escaped in September to Strasbourg in order to join his father, a volunteer worker, in Nurmburg. Unsuccessful in this, he returned to Strasbourg, where he met CAVALLIER and RIZOV, who promised him the necessary papers for his return to France, providing he was willing to gather information for them. CAVALLIER gave him 50 RM and ration tickets, and promised him 100 RM and more coupons. Case to SCI.

BIGEARD, Bathile Rolanda, alias Rolande. Abwehr espionage agent, probably 1 Wi (Counter-espionage) Section; PPF member since August 1944. French national; 23 years old. Arrested by Seventh Army CIC on 28 December in Strasbourg on information supplied by BOULEAU. Because her ration cards carried the letters "SD" she had been arrested on 1 December by the FFI, who confiscated approximately 10,000 francs. She had been given this money and her present mission on 21 November 1944 by SCHEPPLER. This mission was to await the arrival of Allied troops in Strasbourg and then proceed to the interior of France to find out landing points and damage caused by V-1 and V-2. With the information obtained BIGEARD was to have returned across the lines to contact SCHEPPLER through an Oberleutnant SPEER at the Kommandentur in Oberkirch. In case of difficulties, she was instructed that she could find refuge in Colmar with a Mile. ROBERT, Mimi. BIGEARD decleared that SCHEPPLER had wanted to make her an important agent after she had successfully accomplished he present test mission. She stated that, after her return from Germany on a visit to her prisoner fiance, she joined the PPF in August 1944 through the party secretary BUHR (apprehended by CIC) in St. Die, who told her member ship was necessary in order to get a good job. When the PPF members evacuated St. Die, BIGEARD came to Strasbourg and early in November fell in with SCHEP-PLER's recruiters, Milice member Pierre LERDY (alias) and the Baron de BARRI, who, after she had expressed reluctance to return to Germany, promised to make her stay in Strasbourg possible. Case to SCI.

ILINSKAJA, Helena. Espionage agent. Russian national; 20 years old. Apprehended by 79th Division CIC in the early mo ming of of 7 January at a road block after she had crossed the Rhine near Plittersdorf (R3031) accompanied by Gestapo agents BUCHER and LUC, who were dressed in Feldgendarmerie uniforms. She reported to the German Commander in Seltz, who gave her the mission of crossing the lines to Niederroedern, Buhl and Oberroedern to secure information on artillery emplacements shelling Rastatt, locations and sizes of ammunition dumps, strength of American troops and armor. She was also to discover how Americans treated civilians. She claimed to have been given no recompense for her mission, but to have been promised proper identification papers, money and letter of introduction to agents in Hagenau. She was to report back to Seltz on 9 January, using the password

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Special 1 to Farti atly CI Report No. 8,

tion of his present mission in Strasbourg, BCULEAU was to cross the lines and report to SCHEPPLER at the Kommandantur in Oberkirch. BCU-LEAU claims that he had been told that he would then have been given another mission into the interior of France, entrusted with 50,000 francs and instructions to contact stay-behind agents. BCULEAU claims to have worked as a kitchen-helper for the Milice in Dijon in July and August 1944, to have gone with the Milice to Schirmeck and to have escaped in September to Strasbourg in order to join his father, a volunteer worker, in Nurmburg. Unsuccessful in this, he returned to Strasbourg, where he met CAVALLIER and RIZOV, who promised him the necessary papers for his return to France, providing he was willing to gather information for them. CAVALLIER gave him 50 RM and ration tickets, and promised him 100 RM and more coupons. Case to SCI.

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"Politik-Schicksal". She declared that she was interned at Schirmeck in the beginning of 1944 for having mode anti-Nazi remarks in her diary. Evacuated after the Allied invasion to the Gaggenau Concentration Comp, she claimed that she refused to work as an informer for the Gestapo in the camp, but that she had accepted her present mission on the promise that she would be freed. She claimed to have had no training. Case to SM.

SCHLINGENSIEF, Heinz, alias REINHARD, alias BAEREN, alias LINK. SD agent of Amt VI (Amt Ausland); an alleged descriter from the German Army. Taken prisoner by 79th Infantry Division. German national; 22 years old; private, 2 Co., Wehrkreis Unterfue here Lehrgeng (NCO school) XII. While he was attending school in Switzerland in 1939, the German government refused to allot foreign funds for his education unless he joined the SD. He accepted and was sent in 1940 to attend a three-weeks' course at Fulda. Upon the completion of this course, he returned to Switzerland as a German espionage agent, where he remained except for two-week ssignments in Spain and Turkey and two additional courses at the RSH. in Berlin. These RSHA courses dealt with foreign countries from the political, cultural and economic angle from the German propaganda point of view. His duties in Switzerland involved espionage on various persons, organizations and activities, including the Oxford Movement; NICOL, chief correspondent for Pravda and Izvestia; an explosives specialist, Professor BUCHEN-ERG; economic espionage on Swiss factories working for Germany; Amberdican planes that landed in Switzerland, and their disposition. Information was transmitted through the German on sulate at St. Gallen, and sometimes by pigeon. Due to the Swiss tightening on visas, SCHLINGENSIEF entered Switzerland as a faked tuberculosis case, after having been inoculated with the bacillus and forwarding positive wolfram. His mission to Turkey in the beginning of 1942 was to report on the movement of Russian industries to Siberia. Case to SGI.

New Cases - Suspicious Individuals

SRA (German information) COMBIER, Georges COMBIER, Bernard) Agents - case in progress.

SRA Agent - case in progress. COURTISSON

Under suspicion - case in progress.

Under suspicion - case in progress.

MULHOUSE Gestapo Agents - case in progress.

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RAVEY, Renee

TIHSTER, Bruno SIMON, Robert

WELDE, Lucien SCHAGUENE, Joseph

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SCHIEGEL, Maurice: Proprietor of Hotel Eden, Cap D'Ail, A.M. This hotel is presently the head quarters of a military unit and Subject was being vetted as an employee of the US Army. It was found that SCHIEGEL's father was considered pro-German during the last war, that SCHIEGEL himself was investigated in 1940 by the French because of a suspicious letter he had written. Investigation continues.

SCHIEGEL, Queenie: Wife of above. Reported to have invited Madame MAYER, arrested by the CIC in 1944 as an espionage suspect and only recently released from prison by the French whose husband is still in prison as an espionage suspect, to stay at the Hotel Eden, where she became friendly with various officers. Subject is a reported Italophile, who has frequented Italian officers, was the mistress of the Marquis de Passano, and in private allegedly expressed admiration for the totalitarian policies of Italy. Investigation continues.

SCHOPPFER, Jacques: Swiss Nationality. 6 Ave. Bellevue, Nice. Presently employed as civilian engineer with the 44th AAA Brigade. Reported to have been an interpreter for and very friendly with the Germans, to be critical of French administration to the Germans, to have worked with the Todt organization, and to have been very anxious especially to gain the confidence of high German officials, Investigation continues.

BAX, Guiseppe: Italian line-crosser reported to 44th AAA Brigade by CIC, DBS, to have been an agent of the Gestapo. Interrogation by CIC, 44th AAA Brigade, revealed Subject to have been employed in Ventimiglia, Italy, as an agent of the police; to have been arrested by the Gestapo because of having been engaged in black market involving the exchange of French money for Italian. Subject was released from prison when his wife paid a ransom to the Chief of Police of Ventimiglia and because he was ill. Apparently this is where the rumor of Subject's having been connected with the Gestapo began, since the Chief of Police was the representative of the Gestapo in Ventimiglia. Subject's story was varified by reliable persons who have known him for a length of time and by the mistress of the head of the Gestapo, Menton, of which Ventimiglia was a sub-office. She stated that she never knew of Subject's having any connection with the Gestapo in the vicinity. Subject turned over to CIC, DBS, for interrogation. Subject is interned for the duration as an Italian national.

MOHTAR, Pacha: Monte Carlo. Reported to have obtained the release for money of persons in the Mouvelle Prison, Nice. Arrested at the request of M. SUTTO, President of the Committee of Liberation, Monaco. Reported to have confessed to above-mentioned charge. Then to have been for some reason released from prison and to have been intrumental in the arrest of SUTTO at Monte Carlo, which arrest caused the public uneasiness.

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ANNEX NO. 2

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 8

PROGRESS OF CASES UNDER INVESTIGATION

LEANDRI

Case in Progress.

The two saboteurs whose names were not revealed in the last semi-monthly report are:

GUYOT, Robert, called "BOB" or "BOBBY", alias BOMBARD. RAILLARD, Andre.

They were arrested by the BSA Commissaire, 3rd DIA, on 20 Decembe: 1944 at Division Advance CP, near SAINT AMARIN, where they had been hell up after crossing the line.

Former miliciens, recruited by the SD, they would be given intelligence and sabotage missions, especially sabotage of pipe line, tank trucks and, in a general way, all material which could be used to store or haul fuel.

They were carrying eight explosive and incendiary magnetic mines enclosed in tin cans, six explosive and incendiary grenades, one tube of virulent poison causing instantaneous death either by absorption or by inhalation of the gas it emits.

WINTZ, Edouard: Investigation continuing. No further information.

HAGEN, Hans : Investigation continuing. No further Information.

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ANNEX NO. III

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 8

BRANDENBURG FORMATION

Following is a condensation of interrogations of two members of the Brandenburg Formation, apprehended by 79th Bivision Reconnaissance Troop at Roeschwoog (R2225) on 8 January 1945. Rating: B-2.

The absorption of the Abwehr into the Sicherheitsdienst brought drastic changes for the Brandenburg Division. The Wehrmacht committed the Brandenburg Division as an infantry unit in the Balkans. The Sicherheitsdienst cadred politically trustworthy officers and NCOs into the Lehrregiment Kurfuerst, which now serves as a replacement and training center for a new SD-controlled Brandenburg formation. While the exact size of the Brandenburg formation is not known at this time, its control by Obersturmbannfuehrer SKOR ENY, head of Amt VI S of the Reichssicherheitshauptemt (Ausland Office, Sabotage section, of the SD), confirms the continued mission connected with the Brandenburg designation: sabotage.

Operating units of the organization are called SS Jagdverband.

After Skorzeny's rescue of Mussolini, Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler decided to entrust him with the formation of a new special unit; raised as a secret weapon to accomplish the following particular missions: a) reconnaissance, b) sabotag; c) political assassination. This unit was to be constituted in the "Strafkorps". The Strafkorps appears to be a new SS in the SS itself, a security service to supervise all German military bodies (Wehrmacht, SS and also the police). It is possible that in case of insurrection or internal troubles it would be called upon to act even against the steadlest police bodies, as, for instance, the SD. It is thought to be the last bulwark of the Nazi regime, since the old SS is weakened through the influx of foreigners. The Strafkorps comes under the command of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) while the other SS divisions come under the Fuehrungshauptamt, Berlin-Lichterfelde.

Absolute independence is given to this unit in order to assure freedom of action. They are issued the newest equipment and armament, all transport facilities, special identification cards and travel permits.

The cadre of the SS Jagdverband came from the Brandenburg Division which originally was a Jaegar division (light division, or, translated verbatim, hunters' division). This explains the word Jagdverband (Jagd: hunting). But this division, with combat experience in Russia, Italy, Greece and the Balkans, belonged to the Wehrmacht, and had to be transferred and its personnel amalgamated for its new SS mission.

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Annex No. 3 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 8 (Continued) dated 21 January 1945

This could not happen without shock to Wehrmacht members, and is not yet completely accomplished. This amalgamation is accomplished in part by importing officers and men from existing SS divisions, e.g.:

Das Reich, Adolf Hitler, Germania. The transformation of the Brandenburg Division is made difficult through the refusal of a large number of men, NCOs and even some officers, to let themselves be incorporated into the SS. Having the choice to emigrate into Wehrmacht organizations, they prefer to leave the Brandenburg organization. Many others, belonging to Brandenburg for many years and who are very attached to the unit and the work, remain with it, sign the SS engagement forms, but refuse to wear the SS insignia and to be called by SS titles (e.g.: In 6th Co Nord, the officers, Capt. Olwen, Lt. Pavel, Lt. Stein are addressed as Hauptmann, Loutnant instead of Hauptsturmfuehrer or Untersturmfuehrer. Official papers, however, give the SS ranks only).

The transformation is under way, but it is slow, and many changes as well as collisions are to be expected. Already certain groups feel more attached to Jagdverband; others still stick with the old Brandenburg tradition.

Every: company is carefully isolated, and in each company the groups (of about 30 men) again separated. Each group is independent and a body around the chief, whose enthusiasm holds them together (e.g.: Lt. Pavel's 6th Company could not exist without Lt. Pavel's inspiration).

Two companies of the Brandenburg (or Jagdverband) unit have been identified and are known under the title "Unit 40478" ("Einheit 40478") which is also their APO number. The companies, the 6th and 8th, are also called North and South from the fact that the 6th was in the North and West of France and the 8th in the South and Southwest. Both companies are under the command of Major Hollmann.

Even though the Einheit Nord is headed in theory by a Capt. Olwen, the actual man in command is Lt. Pavel, a member of the East Prussian Junker nobility, a ruthless, unscrupulous Nazi who holds a high position in the German Intelligence Service, and apparently receives orders directly from Himmler without going through channels.

Under the command of Lt. Pavel, the 6th Company (or North Company) established headquarters in December 1944 near the village of Herschbeck near Selters (Westerwald). Einheit North (6th Company) is subdivided into three groups, A, B and C, each consisting of 30 to 40 members.

Group A was probably committed near Colmar in the beginning of December (code name: Group "Erika").

Group B assembled in Weldkirch (W1744) northeast of Freiburg in December 1944 and is now employed against Seventh Army. (Code name: Group "Edith").

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Annex No. 3 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 8 (Continued) dated 21 January 1945

Group C is training at Schoern, near Nassau.

Doriot's Division Charlemagne and refugee camps in Germany proved to be fruitful recruiting grounds of Einheit North. Soldiers of the Einheit are predominantly non-German; for instance, Group B has 90% Frenchmen, the remainder Dutch and Poles. Therefore, it is to be anticipated that most members will present a "refugee" cover story when apprehended.

Most of the members of Pavel's Company belonged to the PPF owing to special arrangements with Doriot. This recruitment policy allowed them to get politically-trustworthy personnel. The selection was made by means of a superficial examination, during which the candidate was given an imaginary mission to fulfill. If he was reluctant to undertake it, he was eliminated. Ten out of thirty were eliminated this way on 2 January 1945 at Horden, where they are tested. Final selection is made by sending the candidate on a comparatively easy mission, and after his return he is considered eligible for more interesting work.

Training for 6th Company consisted primarily of patrolling, use of compass and map, and field problems. A typical problem required the penetration of a "guarded" village by reconnaissance patrol which was to spot sensitive points which were to be sabotaged later by a group of explosives experts.

Time was spent in discussions of what vital points should be picked for sabotage. In addition to the usual bridges, railway line, and dumps, students were advised that civilian and military post offices were high priority targets. Captured mail was to be brought to Lt. Pavel.

Some of the cadro and students are expert riflemen, and for certain missions they will be furnished telescopic sights and will accompany a patrol or sabotage groups to eliminate sentries at sensitive points.

Carrier pigeons have been used by members of the Einheit. Near Serreinburg (7441) the 2nd Bn, 179th Infantry Regiment, 45th Division, found an exhausted pigeon with the following message written by an assistant to Lt. Pavel, a Sgt. Bergmann, who crossed into Allied territory with a small reconnaissance group:

JAGDVERBAND "EDITH" Squad: Bergmann 6 January 45, quarry 600 meters west of RUNZENHEIM

TO: Maj. SULZER

Time 1400A

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Annex No. 3 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 8 (Continued) dated 21 January 1945

Several attempts to pass the enemy lines during the night of 5-6 in the direction of Sufflenheim failed because of heavy enemy movements. Legionnaire LEGRAND wounded. Will try to reach objective tonight via Leutenheim. Lieison with Capt HOPPE could not be established since his location was not known yesterday and he is cut off today.

. /s/ BERGMANN, Sgt.


On 12 October 1944 in an order of the day, Adolf Hitler rewarded the Brandenburg Einheit for past services by incorporating it into the SS. However, officers and NCOs continue to wear Wehrmacht uniforms while recruits are allowed to choose their uniform. Recruits are not asked to take the SS oath. In some cases, Waffen SS members are incorporated into the unit and retain SS ranks and uniforms. Two members of the Brandenburg unit captured by 79th Division on 8 January 1945 were dressed as follows: ski shoes; beige-colored ski trousers, white on inside for camouflage in snow; parke jacket, dark green on outside, white inside. The jacket had a hood which can be pulled over the head; and has five pockets, three in front and two in back; has a strap about two feet long attached to the back, which may be passed between the legs. Under these camouflaged clothes, the individuals wore regular SS uniform.

One of the prisoners believes that the camouflage garmets were issued to him for the specific purpose of deception, in that they closely resemble American uniforms. He states: "I believe the idea of our C.O. (It. Pavel) to have us put on camouflage clothes and carry weapons resembling American equipment was very good. Even the Germans fell for it (I was detained by the Volkssturm and Wehrmacht for two days) and the population took us for escaped Canadians. We could have carried out our mission or at least a great part of it with great chances of success. Only one detail was overlooked, our German belt and buckle. The arms we had, particularly the new German sub-machine gun, PI 44, extra flat, with short barrel and halfmoon clip, did not look like a German weapon. In my opinion and according to all German and Alsatian reactions I saw, the camouflage thought up by our C.O. was excellent, aside from the belt and buckle."

While members of the Brandenburg Unit will wear uniform, deceptive or regular, when on reconnaissance for suitable sabotage missions, soldiers effecting the actual sabotage are expected to wear civilian clothes.

These men may wear dark overcoats or trench coats and ski trousers of dark color, berets, and probably will carry packs. Foreign pistols (Belgian and Czech make) and identity papers of former French soldiers have been issued. Plastic explosives will be carried in several places for instance, in the pack. These "civilians" might have French wrist-type dog tags and be further equipped with incendiary grenades.

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ANNEX NO. IV

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 8

A. The following members of the Einheit Brandenburg are reported to be preparing to cross into Allied territory: (Source: TOSTAIN, Georges, see Annex I).

I. MAINZ (fnu). German, age 27-28. Probably from Hamburg. Likely to be in charge of the "civilian" group. Speaks English and French fluently. Formerly employed in exporting business in Hamburg. Description: Height: 5'5"; light brown hair, slightly bald on top; light complexion; oval, full face; blue eyes. An expert on disguise; may masquerade as a woman.

2. BERCKMANN (fnu). German, age 30-31. Sergeant in the German Army; expert on explosives, may be leader of the "military" group. Lately crossed the Rhine on a reconnaissance mission east of Seltz, was well-satisfied with the result and is reported to go on a sabotage mission in that sector. Speaks very little English and French. Description: Height 1.68m; average build; blonde hair; brown eyes; pale complexion.

3. BOOSE (fnu). Sergeant in the German Army, Brandenburg Unit; has been in the company for only about three weeks. Will probably be in the "military" group. Speaks only German. Description: Height 1.80 m; weight 165 pounds; black hair; long face; dull complexion; square shoulders.

4. ALDEMAN (fnu). German, age about 26. Sergeant in the Brandenburg Unit, which he joined three months ago. Expert on demolitions; formerly a corporal in an Afrika Korps demolition squad. Speaks little English and French. Description: Height 1.75 m; weight 170 pounds; blonde hair; blue eyes; light complexion; finger missing from right hand.

5. NOVACK (fnu). Polish national, age about 22. Demolitions expert. Joined German Army two years ago, but is comparative new-comer to the Brandenburg. Speaks German, French, Polish and Russian fluently. Description: Height 5'8"; short, blome hair; blue eyes; stocky build.

6. HESSE, Robert. Alsatian, age 28, probably from Mulhouse. Former Gestapo member, he joined Brandenburg about five months ago. Speaks German and French fluently. Description. Height 1.74 m; weight 170 pounds; brown hair; blue eyes; two-inch scar on right arm.

7. DE BRETAGNE (fnu). French national. Former Milicien; joined Brandenburg two months ago. Speaks German and French fluently. Description: Height 5'7"; weight 165 pounds; blue eyes; wears glasses; brown hair, slightly bald on top.

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ECREI No. IV to Fortmightly CI Report No. 8, dated 21 January 1945, continued.

8. ROYER (fnu). French national. Worked at St. Die. Former Milicien; demolitions expert. Speaks a little English. Description: Height 1.78 m; weight 140 pounds; slender; brown hair; blue eyes.

9. CROSSIER, Georges. French national. Sergeant in the Brandenburg Unit; was formerly a Milicien of the Charlemagne Division. Probably will be a member of the "military" group. Speaks a little English and German. Description: Height 5'll"; weight 165 pounds; stocky; brown hair; brown eyes; long face.

10. X... Polish national, age about 20. A former Polish Army sergeant, he joined the Brandenburg Unit about three weeks ago. Expert on explosives. Speaks French, German, Polish and a little Russian. Description: Height 5'9"; brown hair; brown eyes; dark complexion.

11. BOLLMAN (fnu). German national, age about 28. Supply sergeant in the Brand enburg Unit. Speaks French and German fluently Description: Height 5'9"; blonde hair; blue eyes; light complexion.

12. DUMONTHEY (fnu). French national, age about 34. A corporal; this man already has crossed the Rhine on one mission. Speaks both French and German fluently. Description: Height 5'9"; weight about 140 pounds; dark complexion; brown hair; brown eyes.

13. NOEL (fnu). French national, age about 20. Joined the Brandenburg Unit about three months ago. Speaks only French. Description: Height 5'8"; weight about 145 pounds; blonde hair; blue eyes; short, stocky build.

14. MARTEAU (fnu). French national. Former Milicien; has crossed the lines twice already, and is reportedly ready to surrender on his next trip. Description: Height 5'll"; weight about 150 pounds; slender; dark complexion; brown hair and eyes.

15. BOTRAC (fnu). French national, age about 22. Speaks only French. Description: Height 5'll"; *weight about 160 pounds; blome hair; blue eyes.

16. CARACALLA (fnu). French national, age 22. Demolitions expert. Was sent on a mission a few days ago in the Wissembourg area. Description: Height 5'10"; weight about 165 pounds; brown hair and eyes.

B. The following descriptions of persons engaged in espionage and sabotage have been obtained from enemy agents captured by Seventh Army.

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SEGRET, IV to Fort ghtly CI Report No. 8, dated 21 January 1945, continued.

1. According to RECHER, Georg (See Annex I), the followingmen, all enemy agents and members of the Hitler Jugend, are expected to cross the enemy lines into the Seventh Army area on espionage missions:

a. TRECER, Georg. Age 17. Home in Hundsbach. Has one brother, 16, named Herrmann. Relatives named Eiermann live in Hoh-weiler; other relatives in Brisdorf. Description of subject: Height 1.75-1.80 m; dark, wavy hair combed straight back; blue eyes; pointed nose; medium complexion; teeth white; thin face; ears normal; no scars on face; very thin; average-build shoulders; normal walk. Does not smoke.

b. FREY, Georg. Age 17. Home in Ingolsheim (Adolf Hitlerstrasse 30). Members of family: grandfather, father, mother, two sisters (Salome, 18, and Margaret, 10); one brother (Michael, 9). Description of subject: Height 1.72 m; dark hair, parted on left; dark brown eyes; straight nose; dark-complexioned; thin face; teeth white; ears close to head; no scars on face or body; strong build; wide shoulders; normal walk.

c. WENNER, Fritz. Age 16. Home in Steinseltz. Description: Height 1.62 m; weight 122 pounds; dark hair; combed smooth straight back; dark brown eyes; straight nose; shaves; dark complexioned; teeth good, white; broad shoulders; slow gait.

d. HERING, Lucien. Age 16. Home in Walbourg, near Soultz. Description: Height 1.72.m; strong build, wide shoulders; dark brown hair, parted on left; brown eyes; straight nose; medium-complexioned; teeth white; walks with fast gait.

e. X...., Wilhelm. Age 16. Home in Saverne; French uncertain, but speaks the Saverne-German dialect. Description: Height 1.70 m; average weight; light blonde Mair; blue eyes; clear, light-complexioned; teeth white.

All of the above were left in Munchweiler, except for Wilhelm X..., who had left on his mission and it is believed all had identical missions as RECHER in different areas of this region. All were wearing Hitler Jugend uniforms, but are expected to be given a civilian overcoat, a suit coat and a pair of wool trousers.

2. The following is a list of Hitler Jugend members, probably enemy agents, who had been part of the original group and who were together with RECHER until 29 December 1944. This group of seven youths was at Bergheusen, Germany, while the group to which RECHER belonged was sent to Munchweiler:

e. KALISCH (fnu). Age 16. Home in Hagenau. Description Height 1.62 m; average weight; dark brown heir, bushy, parted on left, grey eyes; straight nose.

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b. JUNKER (fnu). Age 16-17. Home in Betschderf. Description: Height 1.70 m; dark blonde hair; brown eyes; straight, long nose; narrow face; thin build.

c. KOLB, Joseph. Age 16. Home in Reitseltz. Description: Height 1.65 m; dark hair; dark brown eyes; straight nese; narrow face; thin build.

d. RUEBY, George. Age 17. Home in Hundsbach. Description: Height 1.75 m; dark blonde-brownish hair; grey eyes; straight nose; scar on forehead (side unknown); thin build.

e. CANNMACHER, Henri. Age 17. Home in Hundsbach. Description: Height 1.62 m; dark-blonde hair; brown eyes; straight nose; thin build.

f. REBMANN, Alfred. Age 16. Home in Morsbronn. Description: Height 1.65m; medium-blonde hair; blue eyes; pointed nose; thin build.

g. HITTER, George. Age 16. Home in Betschdorf. Description: Height 1.65m; light medium-blonde hair; blue eyes; straight, average-size nose; average build.

3. Source: BIGEARD, Bathilde Rolande (See Annex I).

a. NASSE, Hans (alias "PIERROT"). Age about 48 but seems much older. Last reported seen in Hanover; has allegedly made frequent trips to Germany, especially to Berlin. Speaks fluent German. Formerly worked in the German Embassy. Description: Hair completely shaved; round meck; small, dark eyes; poor teeth; several missing; Generally dresses carelessly in black.

b. STIRLING, Louis (alias "FETIT LOUIS"). Age about 50, Last reported in Dassel (Hanover). Butcher by trade. Mcmber of PPF., Description: Height 1.70m; fairly fat; oval face, ruddy complexion; clear eyes; unkempt gray hair.

c. EGELE, "Bebert". French, age about 50. Fled to
Troyes; last reported seen in Dassel. Butcher by trade. Description: Height 1.55m; fat around waist; oval face; dark, smooth,
s. shining che strut hair.

d. BAUDY, Emile. French, age about 60. Last reported seen in Willistaedt. Description: Large, fat stomach; graying hair; sallow complexion; bony face; wears glasses. Always carries a cane, and takes long steps in walking.

c. MONIER (fnu). French, age 55. Last reported seen in Willistaedt. Editor of a PPF newspaper. Has two sons, one 19 years old who was with him. Description: Large; graying hair; wears glasses.

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f. BATY, Mile. German descent; 21-year-old blonde. Now reported in Hanover. Speaks fair German. Description: blonde hair; blue eyes; average figure; healthy complexion; no makeup.

g. LEROY; Pierre (false name). Age 25-26. Claims to be a nobleman. Native of Algiers, he speaks Arabic. Description: Height 1.75m; medium weight; well-proportioned; large nose; dark, wavy chestnut hair cut very short; dull complexion; full mouth; high fore head; small, gray eyes.

The following are persons likely to carry out missions behind the Allied lines:

h. GARGAM, Andre. French, age 35. Has been operating in Strasbourg, and instructed some 30 agents working secretly in Oberkirch on infiltration plans. Description: Large; medium weight; small moustache; wears glasses; blue eyes; dull complexion; straight, brown hair (was going to have it waved.)

i. THIERRY, Pierre. Age 25. One of the Oberkirch agents mentio med above. Description: Height 1.80 m; medium weight; effominate; long, blonde hair; blue eyes; pale complexion.

j. JEANNINE (only name known for her). French, age 25-26. Mistress of Pierre LEROY (see "g" above, this page). Had a small daughter. Lived with a friend, LOULOU (see "k", this page) at Hotel Hannong in Strasbourg. Description: Height 1.70 m; slender; prominent nose; dark, chestnut hair; brown eyes; oval face; pale complexion; full lips.

k. LCULOU (only name known for her). French, age 32. Friend of JEANNINE. Description: Height 1.60 m; small figure; discolored blonde hair; blue eyes; square face; pale complexion.

4. Source: BOULEAU, Raymond (see Annex I).

a. COGOINI, Odilio. Former Milicien and prospective parachute agent, reported to be with the FFI in Strasbourg.

b. X.... Agent of SCHEPPLER (SCHMIDT) who received a mission in Strasbourg, where he lived at the Hotel Honnong. Description: 20 years old; height 1.60 m; brown heir; dark eyes; oval face; yellowish complexion.

par. 2). 5. Source: GUFFROY, Louis (see Report No. 7, Part I,

a. C.RPENTIER, Pierre (alias Charles). French, age 35. Formerly an LVF officer. Description: Height 1.60m; heavy, oval face; dull complexion; chestnut hair; blue eyes; small nose; small mouth.

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b. BINSSE, Pierre (alias BOURDIN). French. Formerly in LVF. Description: Height 1.70 m; thin, oval face; pale complexion; black hair; black eyes; large nose; small mouth; wears sideburns.

c. BOUCHIND HOME, Rone (alias LOTIN). French, age 26. Formerly in LVF. Description: Height 1.60m; heavy, round face; ruddy complexion; chestnut hair; brown eyes; small nose; large mouth.

d. BOUCHIND HOME, Primot (alias MATHIEU). French, age 24. Brother of Rene (see above). Formerly in LVF. Description: Height 1.70 m; weak, oval face; yellowish complexion; che stnut hair; brown eyes; small mouth; large nose; sometimes wears glasses.

e. BRUN, Marcel (alias JANNI). French, age 27. Formerly in SS. Description: Height 1.70 m; heavy, long face; ruddy complexion; black hair; brown eyes; small nose; small mouth.

f. MALBRANQUE, Georges (alias OTTO). French, age 22. Formerly in SS. Description: Height 1.60 m; heavy, round face; ruddy complexion; brown hair; long nose; large mouth; gray. eyes. Walks somewhat stooped.

g. ROBILL/RD, Pierre (alias COLOMBE). French, age 50.
Formerly in LVF. Description: Height 1.65 m; heavy, round face; ruddy complexion; black hair; large mose; large mouth; blue eyes.

h. VASS, Jules (alias OTTARD). French, age 22. Description: Height 1.50 m; heavy, oval face; brown hair; blue eyes; long nose; small mouth.

6. Possible Hitler Jugend .gents. (Source: DINTINGER, Wilhelm, see Annex I).

a. NOE, Rene. From Gorlingen. Age 16; dark blonde hair; stout build; 1.65 m. in height; normal carriage.

b. CRAFF, Alfred. From Receweiler. Age 17. blond hair; strong build; height about 1.65m; poor eye sight; wears glasses when reading and writing.

c. WILHELM, Erwin. From Kirberg. Age 16; dark blond hair; strong build; height 1.67 m.

d. HOHWALD, Rene. From Weier. Age 15; dark blond hair; weak build; sickly-looking due to illness for past few weeks.

e. HAHN, fru. From Weier. Age 16; derk blond hair; slender; about 1.68m in height.

f. BRUA, fnu. From Weier. Age 16; light blond hair; stout build; height 1.64 or 1.65m.

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g. HAURY, Albert. From Weier. Age 15; black hair; stout build; 1.62-1.63m.

h. TUSSING, Oskar. From Eiweiler. Age 15; blond hair; normal build; height 1.62-1.63m.

i. LUTMAN, Otto. From Eiweiler. Age 16; dork blond hair; slender build; height 1.65m.

j. SPECHT, fnu. From Gungweiler. Age 16. Description: not certain; probably blond hair and about 1.62m in height.

k. W.GNER, fnu. From Berndorf. Age 16; derk blond heir; normal build; height 1.65m.

1. VIE GEL, Joseph. From Eschweiler. Age 16; dark blond heir; stout build; about 1.62m in height.

m. DECKER, Josef. From Eschweiler. Age 18; dark blond hair; normal build, height about 1.68m.

n. QUIRING, Otto. From Hirschland. Age 16; dark blond hair with reddish streaks; weak build; short, about 1.62m.

o. VEISS, Emil. From Hirsehland. Age 17; blond hair; normal build; height about 1.65 m.

p. SCHMIDT, Otto. From Hirschland. Age 17; curly blond hair; normal build; about 1.68m in height.

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ANNEX V

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 8

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N/ZI UNDERGROUND PLANS

It is intended in this summary to collate but not evaluate the information received thus far dealing with the Nazi Party's intentions to go underground. It is felt that the broad outlines of these intentions are beginning to appear but that it is too early to reach any definite conclusions conc rning final plens or now they will work out.

All reports thus far received lead to the conclusion that the Nezi Party, unwilling to accept its defeat, has chosen to retire after the military collapse to forest and mountain reaches. Here the Party's post-hostility efforts will be conducted through several different Movements, each separated from the others but having vague lisison, every function in each being subordinated to the central direction of HIMILER himself.

Reports received tend to indicate three different Movements will be operating, the waging of open warfare, the waging of guerilla warfare, and the waging of propaganda warfare. The focal point of these Movements and of all resistance will be BERCHTESG. DEN and OBER SALZBURG where it is indicated that HITLER's permanent headquarters will soon be established.

OPEN WARFARE

The Movement for open warfare will group itself around HITLER's Headcharters in a vest "Retreat" in the Alverian, Austrian and Italian Alps. Here, around a picked garrison that has already arrived, the Party's leading political and military leaders and the best SS and SD troops will assemble when further resistance upon the line appears futile. Those who reach the Retreat are expected to remain until the war comes to them there.

Preparations for this Retreat are already well along. It will have electrical centers, telephone and radio systems, hospitals, underground communications and possibly a chemical laboratory. It will also have depots of hidden arms and ammunition, some of which have already been stocked. Special formations of SS were reported to be combing the entire region in October requisitioning houses; farms, and cabins.

GUERILLA WARFARE

The Partisan Movement of guarilla bands is expected to be broad in scope, to operate from Many dispersed bases and to have as its mission a "Reign of Terror". Members will be recruited from the dependebles of the SS, SD, the Gestapo and the Feldgendarmerie, who will

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be joined at the last minute by acceptable Party members who have no time to hide or reach the main Retreat. Retreats for the bands will be hidden in the mountains and wooded regions. From these hide-outs the bands are expected to sally forth to harass Allied supply lines, cut communications, attack rear echelons, commit acts of violence and sabotage, "eliminate" high Allied officials and Germans who actively collaborate with the occupying powers.

Academies for partisan warfare are now in operation. The course of instruction is based on the lessons learned by the Germans themselve: in Russia, Poland and the Balkans.

It is reported that the organization of these formations (Freischaren) is being done by the Sich-Haupant of the SS, a special department of which has been created for this purpose with the headquarters at the SS-Junker School in BAD TOLZ.

All of the leaders of these formations are young and/or unknown Nazis chosen directly by the Reich SD headquarters.

Many of them have come directly from the Hitler-Youth Ordensburger (training schools) and have not yet been allowed to take part in public life. These leaders are now organizing for partisen operation from a central controlling staff down to groups of five (Fuenfergruppe). These Fuenfergruppe are also to include girls and women wherever possible, especially for counter-espionage and aspibnage work.

Service staffs of sabotage, radio and signal experts are to be organized. The groups will be thoroughly equipped from secret arms dumps with all kinds of guns, flame-throwers, mines, chemicals, corrosive acids, and new sabotage weapons such as pistols disguised as pens or pocket-knives, and bombs resembling digarette cases and combs. They will be supported further by hospital and medical facilities.

The following additional information is based upon a report which comes indirectly from a German who claims to have been concerned with the printing of these instructions. He depended entirely upon memory and the details in the original report are confused.

The book, "Anweisungen fuer Klein und Portisanenkrieg" (Instructions for Small and Partisan Wer), is being published and distributed under the supervision of the SD and is rigidly controlled. It is concerned with the organization and operations of the underground groups referred to as "Fuenfergruppe" above. Emphasis is pleased on the gathering and speedy forwarding of news from each group to the center. This is indicated by the statement that, "in every town and village an Intelligence Section must be set up as a central nucleus," and also by the placing of the intelligence function in the group on a level with sebotage and security functions.

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Contact between the groups, and from group to Headquarters will be maintained by radio, and "special underground couriers". In this connection it may be noted that another source has recently reported the development of a radio which cannot be traced by techniques known at the present time.

The handbook indicates that the ingenuity of district leaders will be relied upon for secreting the equipment and installations but suggests that old and disused mine-shafts will help to solve the problem of concealment in many districts.

The SD and SS selected for these various tasks are changing their names, passports, identity papers, assuming the identity of bomb victims, of "criminals" who have died in concentration camps, or of foreign workers who have been "removed" to make room for their impersonators. Some of the SS and SD men are already being sent as prisoners to concentration camps, there to await liberation at the hands of the Allies.

Gestapo headquarters have been instructed to orepare two dossiers. The first is to contain the names of definitely reliable Nazis who can be counted on to lead a resistance movement during an Alliad occupation This dossier is to be burned as soon as an Alliad break-through materializes and must not fall into Alliad hands. The second dossier will bear the names of Party and non-Party members who are considered unreliable and is destined to fall into Alliad hands, thus causing the arrest of those people the Party thinks are likely to cooperate with the Allies. This will divert attention from reliable Nazis and create public unrest by causing the arrest of the wrong people.

PROPAGANDA WARFARE

A vest organization of 200,000 members, already organized, is spread throughout EUROPE and some countries in SOUTH AMERICA, with the intent of preserving the ideology of Nazism over as wide an area as it can with the ultimate goal of preparing the way for the return of the Party to power. Its "camouflaged" leaders - all of them being experts in clandestine work - are already at their posts in GERMANY and in other countries.

By means of secretly published pamphlets and tracts, and through "whispering campaigns" this group will spread the usual tenets of Nezism. At the same time they will try to cause unrest and disaffection through their personal contacts in the different strata of society. Those operating in working circles will condemn the "bosses", the government, and the Jaws; and those moving in the upper classes will condemn the workers, the Bolshevists, the government and the Jaws. Operating from a head office in SWITZERLEND, the Movement hopes to

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take advantage of the malcontent it foresees in post-hostility EUROPE as the result of food shortages and utility difficulties-especially transportation shortage.

Although widespread, this Movement will be closely disciplined upon pain of harsh Nazi panalties. Members will always appear under some political cover (being instructed to join all local political parties in order to get party cards), will become members of committees but will never accept any prominent political position.

THE TROTZKY -- SS GROUP

A fourth Underground Movement, not sponsored by the Nazi Party but following in its wake, will be that formed in May, 1944, by Leftist members of the SS, many of whom were former members of the Komintern, and Communists of the TROTSKY World Revolution faction. Their ideas are reported to be the following: The German Communists must assume control over all European Communists except the Russians. They have won the right to such domination through their fight against capitalism. European Communism embracing all countries must build the UNITED STATES of EUROPE under German direction, in order to create the new anti-capitalistic order. As a first step choicic conditions are desired, in order to prevent any reconstruction by capitalistic countries or pro-capit listic civilian administrations. The new order in EUROPE must be aligned with the Fuhrer principle. A five-year plan for underground organization and the seizure of the power in EUROPE will be necessary, maintaining close contact with RUSSIA at first in order to profit by her support, but later detaching itself from RUSSIA because RUSSIA can never make good its betrayel of the international proletariat when it dissolved the Komintern.

This Group will be particularly dangerous to a democratic settlement of the problems of EUROPE because of the very large sums of money, foreign exchange, and jewelry at its disposal--stolen by the Leftist SS from Jews and inhabitants of occupied countries and never turned in to the appropriate authorities. These funds are considered not the private property of the thieves but belonging to the new Movement.

Part II

The following information comes from a usually well-informed source:

On Sunday, January 13, the so-called "Krisealarm" was given in all German official offices. There is no doubt that the Russian offensive was responsible for this.

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Although it is still to early to judge the scope of the Russian offensive, high military circles in Germany view the situation with great concern. It seems that a number of things went wrong at FHO during December and January, and that the Russian offensive therefore came at a most critical moment.

In the highest German military circles it is believed that the Russians have embarked upon an all-out offensive with a view to smashing the German eastern defenses. The same circles state that the aim of the Rundstedt offensive was to inflict the maximum casualties on Allied troops by surprise attacks, so that more reinforcements could be sent to the eastern front. It is admitted that the kundstedt offensive has not achieved the hoped for results.

All passenger traffic on the railroad lines to Bromberg, Posen, Lodz, Breslau and Prague has been suspended as from January 14 until further notice. For reasons of "moral security" this fact is not to be published. Instead it is being announced that there is no more room on the trains. Behind this suspension is the transfer of large military convoys. New passenger travel restrictions are also pending in southern and western Germany.

The evacuation of the German population of Cracow, together with the Nazi Party organization and German civil administration, began on January 13. The First trains with civilians from the Lodz district including the town of Piotrkow, were expected in Breslau yesterday (January 16). The evacuation of Czestichowa is also in progress. Informed circles state that no less than 700,000 German citizens are to be evacuated from the immediately threatened areas.

In Silesia defense preparations have been going on for a long time. The Volkssturm in Upper Silesia will be fully mobilized by January 27. Headcuarters of the Volkssturm in Upper Silesia are at Gleiwitz. The Volkssturm mainly comprises mine workers who are not to be transferred. However, most of the industrial workers will be moved west in case the Russians should invade Silesia. Even Polish and Czeck citizens are being incorporated in the Volkssturm in Silesia. To date seven Volkssturm divisions have been armed in this province. Others are awaiting arms. Even three Volksgrenadier divisions have been mustered in Silesia since the beginning of December. This is a mobilization record for eastern Germany. This is a mobilization record for eastern Germany.

According to the same source the German Agriculture Minister, Backe, has pointed out in a report that there will be a lack of several foodstuffs for home consumption before the next harvest. Agricultural products from outside Germany are expected only from Crostie, the Protectorate and Western Poland during 1945. According to Dr. Backe the demands of the Wehrmacht have considerably increased since the summer of 1944, owing to the loss of supplies from

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occupied territories. Backe stated that the bread, meat and sugar rations will have to be reduced as from April, while even fat rations will have to be cut considerably, although not until May.

Part III

The following notes on the situation in Monte Carlo are reported by the 44th AAA Brigade:

The situation in Monte Carlo is not analagous to that in other parts of the area as it is the only city of any size under their command. There has been for a month or so a struggle there between the so-called "liberal" elements and the local authorities. A poll of the former reveals them to be largely Communists or of extremely liberal tendencies. They receive the backing of the Socialist and Communist press both of which are influential in this region. There is a large foreign element among them, many refugees, who live in Beausoleil, adjacent to Monte Carlo. One informant estimates that two-thirds of the population is of this political faith.

The arrest at the end of December 1944, and the detention for several days of the President of the Committee of Liberation in Monaco, himself reported to be a Communist, almost brought this movement to a head with the possible breakout of a revolution in the city against the arresting authority and government of the principality. His prompt release apparently averted this contingency. It is reported that truck-loads of FFI personnel from Nice were to be brought to the city "to teach the Prince a lesson." Further, it is reported that the Commandant of the Morrocan troops garrisoned at Monaco had been sounded out as to his attitude in the case of an outbreak and he is alleged to have said that he would never authorize his troops to fire on his fellow Frenchmen, Although danger of any such outbreak in the near future seems to have died down with the release of the President of the Committee of Liberation, it is reported that the anti-government forces have probably hidden weapons and ammunition ready for use at the opportune moment. In this connection reports are being investigated concerning ammunition and supplies left by the retreating Germans which have not yet been recovered by the American authorities and which might be of assistance to any such effort.

Behind the general unrest seems to be the resentment of large numbers of persons, mostly Communists, to the tight control exercised by the monied interests of the Casino over the Prince and the Monacan government. The food situation is almost desperate, the people existing to a certain extent only through the black market which is flourishing. It is even reported that medical supplies are obtained through purchases from American soldiers. It is believed by these people that the black market operations are carried out in Monte Carlo by the same persons who handled them under the Germans. They consider that under

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
Russian occupation such a situation would never be permitted to exist. Many feel their only chance to wage a winning battle against the finencial interests is now while many of the financiers are tainted with collaborationism and while the United States forces are in the vicinity. Should these forces be removed, they feel their opportunity will have been lost.

Another such provocation as the arrest of the President of the Committee of Liberation could easily lead to some sort of action on the part of these revolutionary elements, the goal of which would be (1) overthrow of the present government, or (2) occupation of Monaco by US forces.

It is further reported that current propagands used to create unrest and dissatisfaction with the United States Army in general on the part of reactionary elements in Monte Carlo is exemplified by the following three examples:

- (1) The United States Army does not know how to run a war.
- (2) Any other Army would have overrun Italy from this front before now.
- (3) US equipment isn't too good, especially around Sospel where both forces and equipment are inferior.

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY OROUP Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 23, U. S. Army

Date 6 December 1

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C-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. The German Nineteenth Army has been isolated in the VOSGES area. The German First Army has been forced back into the FARDT Mountains. Tactical coordination between the two armies, has been disrupted.

The forces opposing the French First Army in the vosus asound the approximately 11,000 combat effectives (Appendix A); opposing the US Seventh Army approximately 7,000 combat effectives (Appendix B).

b. The following table illustrates enemy strength (in equivalent divisions).

	Pz	In
Facing 21 Army Group Facing 12 Army Group Immediate reserve (unlocated)	6 1	11
Siegfried Carrison Norway and Finland Denmark		10
Carmany		

It is estimated that no divisions could be spared from the first four categories. A shift of the point of attack by either Third or Seventh Army would result in a similar shift of German strength without changing the balance of strength now committed along the entire front.

The rate of reinforcements from NORWAY and DENMARK is approximately 3 divisions per month for the entire Western Front. This rate is governed by lack of transportation facilities, especially shipping.

The divisions in Germany become available at a rate of approximately 8 per month. This rate is governed by equipment. It is established that the Western Front has priority for manpower and the Eastern Front for armor and artillery.

c. Terrain is discussed in Appendix C and attached maps.

Winter weater will to a large extent neutralize the present Allied superiority in armor and air power. Average snowfall for January is 8 inches at KAISERSIAUTERN.

The average temperature is above freezing, but cold snaps will require winterproofing of all vehicles. Cloudings is usual throughout the winter. of all vehicles. Cloudiness is usual throughout the winter.

- - a. Enemy capabilities on the VOSGE: front.
 - (1) To reinforce and hold a bridgehead.
 - (2) To withdraw under pressure across the Rhine into the Siegfried Line.

b. Capability (1) is not favored, since lack of manpower, eventual necessity to garrison Siegfried Line, high rate of losses, danger of losing material and Allied air superiority outweigh any advantage to be gained in preventing use of Rhine Valley for line of communications.

Capability (2) is favored as the only course open. In addition, combat units with divisional organization (e.g. 16 Inf Div, 708 Inf Div) can be withdrawn and refitted for recommitment in active combat areas while fortress and static units garrifitted for recommitment in active combat areas while fortress and static units garrifitted. son the Siegfried Line. 201

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
Ties to the A. S. of S., SANO 25, V. S. ANOT DOWNGRADED ENCRHT A RE COLL 16 December 1944 ATE OF THE ENDING STRUCTURE ARY OF THE ENDRY SITUATION Enemy Activities in Forward Areas and Units in Conte The Cerman Nineteenth Army, although iselated in aparties of meinteining its defensive position across the best forced back into the HANDT Houstains, attempting trength for the SIEGFRIED Line, plugging weak points by it and run forces. The Eastern HINE Valley and the SIEGFRIED are under command of the Upper Rhine wile forces on the north and south to concentrate on the The forces opposing First French Army in the VOSCES amount to sombat effectives (Appendix A). They consist chiefly of the remnent (716, 708, 538, 16, 189, 196, 50 85, 869, 189) bolstered into still units by a liberal use of fresh manpower. Since 7 December, the enstrength in this area by adding some 4,000 first rate replacements, man, and even the Reichsfuhrer Escort Bettalion. The quality of rejectedly due to the apparent policy of inserting whole battalies into the organic framework of the old divisions. The sembet value of sidering especially the terrain in which they are operating must be fair (personnel very good, equipment poer). The forces opposing US Seventh Army on the north consist of elements of five divi-sions (21 Pz, 25 Pz Gr, 361, 245, 256), with a combat effective strength of approximately 6,000, supported by a fair amount of tanks and SP guns. (Appendix B). Two of the divi-sions (345 and 256) had already been heavily countried in Holland; two others (361 and 25 Pz Gr) have been seriously depleted on this front; El Pz was brought in from US Third Army front to replace 130 Pz Lehr as a mobile striking force. The enemy is disengaging and counterattacking with his mobile forces where hoceastry, with the plan of reaching the SIECHRESD Line with as much of his present strength as possible. Present fighting value of those forces cannot be sijudged higher than fair, but reinforcements and effec-tive use of prepared defensive positions can raise it to good. b. Sheny Forces on Western Front, and in Strategie Reserve. 1. Enemy Forces on Western Front The number of nominal enemy divisions in the WEST is increased to seventy-ene (15 Ps and Ps Or, 56 Inf), equivalent to thirty-six full strength divisions, disposed as follows: Ps/PG Facing 21 Army Group Facing 12 Army Group Facing 6 Army Group Immediate Reserve Singfried Garrison 15(% TOTAL of the approximately 57 equivalent divisions, practically all are now conmitted. The attack against the 12 Army Group drew two (155 and 1295) of the division from Sixth SS P2 Army, and two Volkagranadier divisions from Germany, in addition to those divisions already in that area. 2. STRATEGIC RESERVES
The enemy now has in strategic reserve the following identified divisions: ARDINES FOREST 2 88, 9 88. 203 AATHEN AREA **EBORT** RE

HOLLAND

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED OWNGRADED TO: 1 01:4: VV HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP SEE RF 6-17/1740 Files of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Days C. T. R. Tuttale 25 December 1944 G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION Enemy Activities in Forward Areas and Units in Contact. The German Nineteenth Army, partially isolated in the VOSGES area is showing every intention of maintaining its defensive positions in the pocket and along the RHINE. The German First Army has been forced back into the HARDT Mountains, attempting to salvage and husband infantry strength for the SIEGFRIED Line, plugging weak points by using mobile armored forces. mored forces. The German Nineteenth Army holding the VOSGES pocket consists of eight normal divisions and one independent brigade. A constant flow of reinforcements from Wehrkreis V and IX enabled the enemy to maintain his combat effectives at a 15,000 level. With the exception of two regiments from the IX Wehrkreis, the reinforcements were constituted by replacements in most cases absorbed by the divisions. The German First Army is holding a very wide sector from the RHINF to the MOSELLE. It now consists of thirteen normal divisions, including one Panzer (21 Pz. Div.) and two Panzer Grenadier Division (25 Pz. Gr., 17 SS Pz Gr.), one Panzer division (11 Pz.) was sent to the battle in LUXEMBOURG, being replaced by a weak Volksgrenadier Division from Poland (257 VG). Enemy combat effectives on the First Army front are estimated at approximately 25-30,000 with about 65 armored vehicles. The enemy is reinforcements in the shape of complete regiments or battalions from within Germany. Present fighting value of these forces is estimated at fair, but reinforcements and effective use of prepared defensive positions can raise it to good. ored forces. B. Enemy Reserves.

- (1) Immediate reserve:

 The attack against I'v lifth army Group has been launched with practically every identified unit along the entire Western front consists to some extent. There are however, still a few units available. Their employment will depend on the success of the present offensive and on possible further plans of the enemy, siming at the dislocation of the who Western front. The 15 PG, 59 Infantry Division, GR DEUTCHLAND Pr. Division a "SAAR" Division, 348 Infantry Division and the 49 Division are possible dandidates in such a case.
- (2) Available Divisions from Norway and Denmark:
 Out of the Nineteen Divisions located in Norway and Denmark it i
 estimated that four divisions are or will be available within the next 10
 days. Most probable candidates are: the 9 Infantry Division; 6.83 Mount
 Division; 710 Infantry Division and 2 Mountain Division.
- (3) Available Divisions in the Black Forrest Area:
 Troop movements from MUNZINGEN to the PFORZHEIM area, as well as SR and OSS reports suggest that a Volksgrenadier Division is forming in that region. Reported troop concentrations around PREIBURG may be also connected with a major unit refitting or forming in that area.

 The 216 Infantry Division has been located in the vicinity of KARLSRUHF as well as the 553 Volks renadier, refitting in that area.

 According to captured documents the 405 2bV Division with a number of static units is manning the SIEGFRIED Line between KARLSRUHE and BASKL.
- (4) Available Divisions from the Pool in German:

 It is accepted that the enemy has the capacity to muster equivale of twenty divisions at the rate of 8 divisions per month feeding the west and east front with reinforcements.

Movements in Rear Areas

The road and rail net behind the SIEGIRIED Line permit the enemy full freedom of movement, with several alternate routes always available.

OTHER interdiction of movement on the rail line is considered practically impossible, the enemy has shown no indication of any limitations on his movements. Shortage of line is compensated by an increased output of synthetic graciline and by use of s-drawn vehicles and more extensive use of rail facilities. The approach of winter har will probably further limit allied air attacks and recommaissence. The present heavy movements in the area between MANHAKIM-KARLSKHEE, HOMBURG-MANHAKI are accounted for reinforcements and a build up of the First Rowever, since troops for this area have been probably coming from deep within any or Norway, there is little opportunity to equate a movement against an identiunit, due to the powerty of intelligence sources within Germany and the inability is recommaissence to cover the area consistently. Fairly heavy traffic reported R in the Black Forest towards OFFINITING and FREIBURG at the beginning of the h would tie tup with reported troop concentrations in those areas.

emy Capabilities on Sixth US Army Group Front.

It is apparent that for the last two months the enemy has opposed the Allies only with a limited number of good units, plugging some portions of the front with second and third rate units, saving the maximum of his better quality man power and equipment for the all-out effort.

If therefore his present breakthrough effort is an all-out drive he may, by throughing all available forces into the battle attempt to dislocate the whole Western front. In the north he may try to throw out of balance our left flank by an air-borne attack against ANTWERP, thus forcing our forces into a battle with a reversed front. In the center he will continue to push his drive with available forces in that area while staging another drive with husbanded forces from Norway, Dermark, Germany and possibly available units from the immediate reserve on the Allies' right flank.

Three possibilities are being considered:
(1) Attack on the MERZIG-METZ axis, attempting to isolate Sixth Army Group by throwing its left flank behind the Marne-Rhine Canal. Such a main drive would probably be supported by a secondary attack north of Strassburg, thus threatening simultaneously Seventh Army's right flank, achieving a double envelopment of the bulk of our forces between the Noselle and the Rhine.

Enemy forces in the VOSCES pocket would continue to tie down our forces, keeping them away from the main zone of operations.

Building of enemy forces shown on Map 1.

(2) Attack on the TERRICKEN-SARREBOURG axis, attempting to cut the only lines of communication amplying Seventh Army, thus compromising its position east of the SAVERNE Cap. Enemy forces in the VOSCES pocket would continue to press down the first French Army by increasing his pressure on the northern portion of the pocket with one additional division.

Build up of enemy forces shown on Map 2.

(5) Attack in the Belfort Cap, sttempting to throw our right flmk out of planes and if possible to out our supply lines between BESANCON-DIJON.


Such an attack would offer the enemy the advantages of a left flank retested by the Swiss Border, and would require therefore a smaller build up of forces. In the other hand the enemy would have to depend for his build up on the Rhine bridges amountrating his forces in the pocket, thus diminishing the advantages of surprise.

Build up of enemy forces shown on Map 3.

Capability 1 and 2 are favored.

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 11

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 2 DECEMBER 1944

. GENERAL SUMMARY

The rapid advance of Seventh US Army and the reaching of the RHINE by the 2 French Armored Division in the STRASSBURG area on 23 November caught the enemy completely unaware, isolating the Nineteenth German Army in the VOSGES, thus dislocating the tactical cooperation between first and Nineteenth German Armies. Three Corps commanders were dismissed for their failure to deny us the access to the BELFORT and SAVERNE GAP. In addition to two annihilated divisions the enemy had to withdraw two more battered divisions, unable to provide sufficient replacements.

In the VOSGES the Nineteenth Army continued to fall back on the RHINE, offering stiff delaying action. The enemy endeavored to meet the emergencies by shifting depleted and tired units between the northern and southern VOSGES, without successfully establishing the required balance. It is noteworthy that he did not commit any new major unit in that area, probably considering such commitment too risky in view of the hopeless tactical situation of his formations south of STRASSBURG.

In the HARDT Mountains, the First German Army forced to withdraw two badly battered major units, continued to fall back on prepared pos-

In order to meet the emergency and to deny the approaches to the successive defenses of the MAGINOT and SIEGFRIED Lines, the enemy had to commit new units (four divisions).

SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Front)

At the close of the period German First and Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line: MACKWILLER (Q 3836), ZINSWILLER (Q 8935), GRIES (R 0517), LA WANTZENAU (R 0606), BOOFZHEIM (V 9670), STOTZHEIM (V 8175), RIBEAUVILLE (V 6855), CLEFCY (V 4351), LES GRANDS VIAUX (V 3836), URBES (V 4120), BURNHAUPT LE BAS (V 5503), East of MULHOUSE (V 8011), HUNINGEN (A 8868).

a. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

(1) LVIII Panzer Corps. It is presumably the LVIII Panzer Corps which controls the 130 Panzer Division and the 25 PG Division. These divisions constitute an armored mobile group capable of aggressive action within the area SARGEMINES-HAGENAU.

130 Panzer Division. 901 and 902 PGR's, 130 Panzer Reg-iment, 130 Panzer Recon. Battalion, 130 Panzer Artillery Regiment, 130 Panzer Engineer Battalion and 130 Panzer A T Battalion were identified at the beginning of the period in the vicinity of HAGENAU (R 0420). Since then, the division has shifted to the West and all its elements were identified in the 44 and 45 US Divisions zones (Q 5540 - Q 8435).

25 PG Division. Elements of 35 PGR, 25 Engineer Battalion and 119 PGR were identified in the 44 US Division zone (Q 6936).

(2) LXXXIX Corps. There are indications that this corps has under its command the units which are containing the advance of XV US Corps. 210 -1-

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256 Infantry Division arrived from HOLLAND and was first entified on 25 November. 455 GR, 476 GR, 481 GR, 258 Artillery Regrent, 256 A T Establion, 256 Engineer Establion and the 256 Replacement Battalion were identified east of HAGENAU in the 79 US Division has PW's stated that the division has received replacements since a arrival on Sixth US Army Group front, but the division is reported be short of motor and horse transportation.

555 Volkerropadier Division has been out of contact since November and is probably reforming. 361 Volksgrenedier Division was very badly mauled and was out of contact since the beginning of the period. On 1 December elements of 951 GR were again identified as components of BG KOCH. 953 iR and the 361 Engineer Estation were also identified, sandwiched between elements of the 150 Panzer Division.

(3) LXIV Reserve Corps. (CG: Gen 1t. HELMUTH THUMM) 708 Volksgrenedier Division has been out of contact since November. PW's stated that the division was withdrawing in a south-terly direction (East of COLMAR) 716 Infantry Division is opposing the 2 French Armorativision and 103 US Division. Heavily committed, it has sustained syers losses. During the period, the division was reinforced by the 98 Georgian Battalion, 56 Fortress Engineer Battalion, 50 Fortress agineer Battalion and 460 Replacement Battalion. (5) LXIII COTDE. (CG: Gen d. Inf. JOACHIM v. TRESCHOO of the French II Corps offering stiff resistance to our advance. SECRE

GREE

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARM

I Corps: Stiff and determined resistance was made to our drive of the clean out the remaining pocket in the southern VOSGES. The enemy logan to make extensive use of SP guns as support for counterattacks on GALFINGUE (V 6202) and LUTTERBACH (V 6607), which continued throughout the period. He unsuccessfully attempted to dislodge our bridgement at V 6606 and destroy our position along the DOLLER River from FONT D'ASPACH (V 5705) to the S edge of LUTTERBACH. Enemy pressure continued strong N of MULHOUSE (V 7006).

FI Corps: Enemy withdrawals took place at the beginning of the period until good defensive terrain was reached at the Passes of BUSSANG (V 3520) and of ODEFON (V 3521). Here, and at the towns of MASEVAUX (V 4468) and LANW. (V 4606), he resisted stubbornly, counterattacking with infantry supported by tanks or SP guns. After the fall of MASEVAUX and LANW, heavy artillery fire in the towns and counterattacks at BOUREACH (V 4711) showed his determination to delay our advance, as he retook several terrain features. Enemy withdrawals took place S of GERAFDMER (V 3642) at the end of the period.

(2) SEVENTH ARMY

VI Corps: In the VOSGES area from N of GERARDMER (V 3642) to the RHINE Plain, the enemy resisted fiercely, wherever tenable terrain could be utilized for dug-in positions. MUTZIG (V 7993) was cleared on the 26/27-November, axcept one of its forts which was still resisting at the end of the period. As reinforcements bolstered his forces, the enemy attempted atrong counterattacks supported by tanks. Near the period's end, defended road blocks were opposing our advance on all routes to the RHINE Valley, with strongest resistance met at ITTERS-WILER (V 7774). Reinforcements were observed arriving in the area of SELESTATT (V 7962). Resistance to our drive S and SE down the HHINE Valley was moderate, except in the vicinity of ERSTEIN (V 9480). Inswhere in this zone our advance was delayed by blown bridges, mines, and flooding. By 1 December BOOFZHEIM (V 9670) and BENFIELD (V 8974) had been taken after slight resistance.

In STRASSBURG, all forts on the outskirts of the dity were taken while the enemy still defended the East end of the KEHL Bridge as his reinforcements arrived. About 30 November, the enemy unsuccessfully attempted to cross the river in rubber boats and launches. At the period's end, heavy caliber artillery fire fell on STRASSBURG and its power plant, while the KEHL Bridges were blown by the Germans. NE of the city, our recommaissance elements contacted small groups of enemy in KILSTETT (R 0909) and GAMBSHEIM (R 1110).


XV Corps: On the front extending from the RHINE to the area of BERG (Q 5833), the enemy fiercely resisted all our attempts to advance toward MAGENAU (R 6425) and through the HARDT Mountain passes. His resistance took the form of heavy counterattacks as tanks were thrown in and infantry reinforcements arrived continuously in the rear area. His defense centered about the W end of the TIEFFENEACH - ING-WILLER Pass, while all vital road nets were protected by strong road blocks, and defensive terrain was held from dug-in positions and by emplaced tanks. TIEFFENEACH (Q 6434) was cleared after heavy resistance, on the 29th, as was the town of INGWILLER (Q 8130). At the end of the period, the enemy was stubbornly holding WINGEN (Q 7336), WINMENAU (Q 7635) and the area N of TIEFFENEACH from entrenched positions, while resisting strongly in the HAGENAU area.

Alpine Sector: On the Alpine front, an increase in chemy artillory and mortar fire were noted in the S sector on 29 November.


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
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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 12

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 9 DECEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The enemy continued to oppose the advance of the First French Army in the VOSGES pocket with one major unit and remnants of three major units organized in Bettle-grant. The content flow of intendry and volucies columns over the INTE-inducates the enemy's intention eventually to withdraw his troops from the ALSACE Plain. On the Northern front (HARDI Mountains) the enemy is fighting a delaying action, withdrawing slowly towards the consecutive positions of the MAGINOT and SIEGFRIED lines.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Front)

At the close of the period German First and Nineteenth Army forces were disposed on a line: ROHRBACH (Q 6549), MOUTERHOUSE (Q 7942), REIPERTSWILLER (Q 7956), NIEDERBRONN (Q 9338), MERTZWILLER (Q9230), GAMBSHEIM (R 1110), along RHINE River to RHINAU (V 9868), DIEBOLSHEIM (V 9465), ROSSFELD (V 9171), SELESTAT (V 7862), KAYSERSBERG (V 6448), LA BON HOMME (V 5352), ODEREN (V 4323), THANN (V 5212), MICHELBACH (V 5307), along DOLLER River-HUNINGUE Canal to RRINE River.

a. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

(1) XIII SS or LVIII Panzer Corps: The presence of the LVIII Panzer Corps in the First Army sector is uncertain. A PW stated that the Corps was located on 18 Movember in the TRIER area. Unconfirmed reports also indicate its probable presence in Fifth Panzer Army near KOBLENZ. The armored formations present on the left flank of US XV Corps area more probably still under command of XIII SS Corps.

130 Panzer Division has definitely left the XV Corps zone. Third US Army reports that, according to a reliable source, the 130 Panzer Division is assembling in the rear area of the Seventh German Army southern sector, suggesting a Panzer build-up in that area. Such a move would also justify the PW statement indicating the presence of LVIII Panzer Corps in the vicinity of TRIER.

25 PG Division. Elements of the division continued to be identified, during the period, on the left flank of XV US Corps zone. (35 and 119 PGR, 25 A T Battalion, 25 Eng. Battalion). These elements seem to operate as Battlegroups intermingled with elements of 361 Volksgrenadier Division. The combat effectives of the division remain very low (1300). Both PGR's are estimated below 700 combat effectives, and their tank and assault gun complement does not exceed 20.

(2) LXXXIX Corps: Although recent confirmation of the presence of the corps is lacking, it is supposed that the corps continues to assume responsibility for the sector opposing XV and VI US Corps.

361 Volksgrenadier Division. A number of BG's constituted from elements of this division were identified in the XV Corps zone. The total strength of combat effectives of these units is estimated at approximately 700. It seems that a few batteries of the 361 Arty. Rgt. continued to support these remnants of the divisional organic units, hastily organized in BG formations.

553 Volksgrenadier Division has been out of contact since 25 Novomber. However, remnants of some of its elements, were recently identified in the BG KRENKEL. PW's indicated that the division was virtually destroyed, and that the BG absorbed some remnants of the division, while its staff and cadres were withdrawn to KARLSRUHE for the purpose of reorganization into a VOLKSGRENADIER Division.

245 Volksgrenadier Division. Although the division offered the strongest resistance in the Seventh US Army zone (gap between the HAGENAU and BITCHE Forests), effectives of its organic units (about 2000) remained far below normal combat strength. However, the reinforcements recently identified in its sector raised the total combat effectives of the division to about 2500. (816 Heavy MG Bn; 60 Fortress Eng. Bn.; 104 PG Repl. Bn.)

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256 Volkegrenadier Division. Its combat effectives remained equally low level (2600). All the organic units were identified during the period a HAGENAU area, indicating that the mission of the division is to protect eff flank of the First German Army.

. NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf WIESE)

The disposition of the enemy in the VOSGES sector remained vague. Units shifted from the southern sector (MULHOUSE) to the north (SELESTAT). The lotment during the period of major units to the corps also continued to be units. XC Corps was identified by document originating from the 16 Volksgrenadier dision in the COIMAR area, suggesting that the XC Corps has assumed responsibility the sector previously occupied by IV CAF Corps. Furthermore, it is assumed that the XC Corps may also be entrusted with the mission of organizing the wither without of some of the major units which, after crossing the RHINE, would become whileble for commitment in the vital sector of the SIEGFRIED Line between CRISRUHE and ZWEIBRUCKEN. Possible candidates for such a presumed reorganization under XC Corps might be 16 Volksgrenadier and 708 Volksgrenadier Division, whose organic elements were not identified since the beginning of the period.

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps

198 Infantry Division lost one regiment (308 GR). The other two regiments (305 and 326 GR) were transferred from the French I Corps zone to the SELESTAT area. The combat effectives of these two units are probably below 500.

716 Infantry Division, heavily committed in continued delaying action around SELESTAT, has been whittled down to about 400 combat effectives. In order to increase its capacity for resistance, the enemy reinforced the area originally occupied by 716 Infantry Division and 16 Volksgrenadier Division with the following: elements of 106 Panzer Brigade (PG Battalion), elements of 269 Infantry Division (469 GR) elements of 189 Volksgranadier Division (1213 GR), 717 1.b.v. Battalion, 5 Cossack Regiment, 202 Mountain Battalion, 30 Fortress Eng. Battalion, 54 Fortress Eng. B attalion, and 602 Mobile Battalion. Consequently, he succeeded in building the strength of his units, presumably under 716 Infantry Division, (opposing 2 French Armored Division and 36 US Infantry Division), to approximately 3000 combat effectives.

(2) XC Corps

708 Volksgrenadier Division has not been identified during the period. Its effectives were so low (7-800) that the division, or at least elements, were probably withdrawn to refit and reorganize.

16 Volksgrenadier Division would be unother candidate for refitting and reorganization. Its organic elements have not been identified during the seriod.

269 Infantry Division has been subject to further disorganization. Hements were identified in the French II Corps zone. (489 GR, 269 Fus. Bn, 269 hg. Bn., 269 Repl. Bn., 269 AA Bn., and 490 GR), while other elements (469 GR) are identified in the 36 US Division zone.

(3) LXIII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JOACHIM v. TRESCKOW)

159 Volksgrenadier Division is the only major unit which succeeded in keeping its organic entity. Reinforced by the CV Regiment, the division was stubbornly stemming the advance of the left flank of French I Corps. Its combat affectives with attached units, amounted to approximately 2000. The rest of the French I Corps opposed remnants of 189 Volksgranadier Division (1212 GR, 1214 GR), remnants of 358 Volksgranadier Division (elements of 757 GR, 758 GR, 759 GR), and various Battlegroups (BG HAFNER, SS POLICE BN., SS BN. LAUER, BG HAHN).

30 SS Division. The 77 GR was reported virtually destroyed. No other elements of the division were identified during the period. It seems that the German SS complement of the division has been included in the various BG's identified in the French I Corps sene. All those units were supported by the 654 A T Bn., equipped with Jagdpanthers.

c. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group Front (Vosges Front)

(1) The corre reading of the prosent strengt. stimute is subs SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED ed by a review of strength estimates during the various phases of the oper-since the beginning of the Allied Offensive. On 16 November the combat effectives of the enemy on the Sixth US Army Front were estimated at 30,000. On the 7th day of the offensive, the enemy's effectives dropped to 21,000, but reached the higher level of 25,000 on 27 or. On 6 December the combat effectives dropped again to 18,000. Between 16 and 27 November the enemy brought reinforcements amounting pembat effectives, followed by another 9000 between 27 November and 5 It is noteworthy that after 27 November (the isolation of Mineteenth. n Army in the high VOSGES), the enemy brought in only 5000 reinforcements to OSGES pocket, while the majority of replacements and new units were allotted a Northern sectors opposing the Seventh US Army (6,000). This analysis roweals that the rate of reinforcements was higher during first phase of the VOSGES battle than it was during the second phase. Further-it reveals that enemy escualties, based solely on estimates of combat effects, reached the approximate figure of 43,000 since 16 November. Finally it is sent that although the enemy was capable of maintaining his combat effectives 16 November on a 25-30,000 level, his capability to maintain such a level r 16 November seemed to be reduced. (2) Estimated Enemy Strength (Combat Effectives) on 6 December. Units in contact Artillery effectives Committed General Reserve W of the Rhine Possible reserve from Wehrkreis V and other sources available within the following two weeks 7-9.000 25-27,000 TOTAL 70-80 Tanks and S P Guns Information not presently Guns SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front) At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (2 1683), BOURG - S MAURICE (4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AICULE S 1703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN IBLE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONT GENEVRE (K 4602). . Enemy Disposition. There are further indications that Italian units are relieving the 157 ntain D vision and the 5 Mountain Division. The location of the 5 Mountain laion remains doubtful, as some of its elements seem to have shifted north. b. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group (Alpine Front) 6-7,000 Combat effectives 5-6,000 Artillery effectives and services 11-13,000 TOTAL OPERATI ONS The enemy is still fighting a well coordinated defense in the Alsace pocket, 210

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reventing complete encirclement with vigorous counter-attacks northward and
buthward, while a slow withdrawal from the Vosges is in progress. Flood
onditions have permitted him to make excellent use of stroam lines. The delayhus gained permits him to evacuate the bulk of his heavy equipment, to ormunize resistance along the Rhine, and to pin down seven to eight Allied
ivisions which might otherwise be available for use further north.

At the southern end of the pocket, he has virtually stabilized his sition along the HUMINGUE canal and the DOLLER River, launching especially gorous counter-attacks in the vicinity of LUTTERBACH (V 6507). In the Vosges slowly withdrew, offering firm resistance only in the area between THANN 5212) and ST. AMARIN (V 4619). He held strongly in the sector KAYSERBERG V 6448) - SELESTAT, employing strong artillery and morter fire, and bringing i resufercements at the end of the period. Meanwhile, his defease of the in Feenforcements at the end of the period. Meanwhile, his defense of the sector east of SELESTAT was aided by flooded terrain, and by long range artil-lery fire from across the Rhine.

In our northern sector, enemy resistance was strong throughout the period, relaxing only on our extreme left flank (6 Dec) as the enemy withdraw in the direction of the Maginot Line. On the Hardt Mountains, an organised defense line in the area FOLKSBERG (Q 6638) - DIEMERINGEN (Q 5938) was stubbornly held until 6/7 Dec. Demolitions, road blocks, and felled trees were used to delay our advance on ENCHENBERG (C 7146). He was unable to prevent our penetration of the gap West of the Hagenau Forest, although aggressive action continues on the right flank of our spearhead. At Hagenau, dug-in enemy offered strong resistance, employing 26 planes on 8 Dec. An unsuccessful attempt was made to hold GAMBSHEIM (R 1110) by house-to-house fighting as the period closed.

On the ALPINE Front little enchy activity was noted in the Northern zone. Scattered enemy artillery fire was received throughout the Southern zone.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

a. MOVEMENTS


The end of November marked the movement of troops and material through the region of the Black Forrest along the rail routes from DONAUESC-HINGEN to OFFENBURG, and from IMMENDINGEN to FREIBURG. With the advant of December, however, the center of activity shifted northward. On the BRUCHSAL (R 6358) - PFORZHEIM (R 7032) rail line, 15 trains were reported seen on 2 Dec. Heavy rail activity was noted in the vicinity of HEIDELSERG, KARLSRUHE, and RASTATT. The marshalling yards of WORMS and ALTRY (M 2727) were also busy with rail activity during the week, and on 6 Dec., approximately 75 locomotives were reported seen by fighter-bombers in the MANNHEIM yards. Since virtually no new major reenforcements have been identified on our front, it seems logical to conclude that much of this movement indicated more troops and supplies for the Siegfried Line.

Indications that the enemy is withdrawing to man the positions of the Siegfried Line are found in the statement of an officer PW who pointed out that the 19th Army was moving eastward across the Rhine to positions in the Siegfried Line. According to his statements, the withdrawal of heavy equipment (mostly horse drawn) has been in progress since 25 Nov, and major units would soon follow. Some verification of these statements may be found in the TAC/R reports of heavy enemy withdrawals on foot scross the EREISACH Rail bridge on 5 and 6 December, and in the French report of 500 trucks seen moving eastward from COIMAR on 7 Dec.


Still further indications of enemy withdrawal along Sixth Army Group front comes from the fighter-bomber report that on 5 Dec. heavy rail activity continued in the northern sector of the front in a ME direction from PIRMASENS (Q 9166) towards MANNHEIM. It is quite possible that this activity points to the evacuation of rear area installations such as the Panzer training area, formerly at HAGENAU.

b. RHI NE BRI DGES


The enemy still has three bridges available south of STRASBOURG; the BREIS, CH rail bridge (V 8635); the NEUENBURG rail bridge (V 8613); and the b



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APPENDIX I

THE MAGINOT LINE

GENERAL

The Maginot Line, built to defend France from an attack from the North and the Bast, runs a few kilometers inside the France-German Frontier from LUXEMOURG to the RHINE, thence along the Rhine to Switzerland. In the area SOULTZ (R 14) to ACHEN (Q 55), it consists of casemates holstered by a "Gros Ouvrage" every 2 to 5 kilometers. Along the Rhine it consists mainly of artillery casemates with M/G turrets.

The "Gros Ouvrage", of which there are 8 in our northern sector, may be compared to land battleships. Depending on the terrain, they consist of various combinations of casemates, pillboxes, artillery and M/G turrets, generally interconnected by subterranean galleries leading to main personnel and munitions entrances at the rear of the position. These entrances in turn are provided with some defenses against attack from the rear. The quarters for the personnel, munitions magazines, power house, are all located deep underground, and are sometimesserviced by a narrow gauge RR. The entire position is integrated and self-sufficient. The galleries are defended by a pillbox for automatic weapons and are mined so as to enable the garrison to isolate sections in case of penetration from the rear.

B. ARMAMENT.

1. Turrets:

The turrets are placed on top of concrete blocks and are reached by means of a shaft, 10 to 40 meters deep, with a stairway and elevator. The ammunition magazines are below the concrete block and are separated from the general galleries by airtight doors. The armored turret is made of special forged steel, 30 cm. thick, with the raising mechanism located on the lower floor. The turret has a 360° traverse, and rises about 50 cm. All operations, aiming, raising, lowering, working the elevator, etc., may be carried out either by hand or mechanically. The firing compartment is protected by a steel frontal shield, 35 to 40 cm. thick and 2m. deep, anchored in concrete. The thickness of concrete for all turrets is $3\frac{1}{2}$ meters

2. Types of Turnet.

- a. M/G Turret: Twin mounted 7.5 MG'S,
 Model 1932,
 (Total number in Maginot Line: About 50.).
- b. 75 mm. (Model 1933) turret: Two 75 mm. guns,
 Semi-automatic breach mechanism,
 Range: 11 Kilometers,
 Rate of fire: 50 rpm. normal
 60 rpm. maximum,
 (Total number: About 20).
- c. 75 mm. (Model 1932): Not Automatic
 Range: 7-8 kilometers,
 Rate of fire: 35-40 rpm,
 (Total number: About 12).
- d. 135 mm. turret: Two 135 mm. mortars,

 Model 1932
 High trajectory,
 Wt. of projectile: About 40 pounds.
 Range: 4-5 kilometers.
 Rate of fire: 14 rpm.
 (Total number: 20).
- e. 81 mm. turrets: Two 81 mm. mortars.
 Smooth bore,
 Fixed elevation (45°).
 Finned shells,
 Wt. of shell: About 9 lbs.
 Maximum range: 3.5 kilometers,
 Rate of fire: 35-40 rpm.
 (Total number: About 20).

above turrets are the only installations in the Maginot Line with an allfield of fire. It has been claimed that these turrets will withstand 420 mm. or 90 mm. A.P. ammunition. The ombrasures are very small and hard to hit, nee the guns do not protrude they cannot be easily damaged. Even the effect by calibre air bonds to the tract in lowered position is doubtful, although the are susceptible to damage if the turret is hit when in living position. But artillary or air bomberdment sufficiently disturb the surrounding ground, it interfere with the traverse or firing. This is particularly true of the

Artillery Casemates.

The 75 mm. casemates contain 5 guns and are organized on the same plan as rets with connections to underground galleries, shaft with elevator, and sub-

. Armament.

a. 75 mm. Model 1929 casemate.

The embrasures are targe (3' x 3'), with 4 inches of armor plate. In firing position, the muzzles of the guns protrude more than 3 feet. The guns withdrawn to the rear and do not protrude when not firing. The embrasures can tainly be damaged by 90 mm. gun fire.

b. 75 mm. (Model 1932) casemate.

The gun rotates about its muzzle with nothing protruding from the case-The armor is the same as for the 1929 casemate.

o. 135 mm. casemate.

Usually of the same type as for the 135 mm. turret with no barrel ding. The casemate has the same armor as the 75mm.

d. 81 mm. casemate.

Usually two weapons of the same type as those in 81 mm. turrets with the serformance. Owing to the fixed elevation of 45°, the embrasures are very well sted and difficult to damage. The guns in all casemates have clearly defineding missions and cannot be turned around; maximum traverse is generally 50°.

Infantry casemates.

The larger works are protected by 31 meters of concrete; some of the rones have only 21 meters. Their armament consists of 2 - twin 7.5 mm. M/G, which may be replaced by a 37 or 47 mm. A/T gun. The casemates also contain --launching tubes, enabling the dropping of grenades into the surrounding Most of the casemates are equipped with a cupola armored with cast steel 12 inches thick, and anchored in 2 meters of concrete. They have up to five les backed by optical instruments which could be replaced by a light machine 50 mm. grenade launcher.

PENSE OF THE ENTRANCES OF "GROS OUVRAGES".

all the entrances follow the same pattern:

- 1 casemate containing 2 machine guns,
- machine guns replaceable by 37 mm. or 47 mm. guns,
- polas, each with a light MG and observation slits

Z successive revolving armored doors, then a shaft, or ramp, leading to subterranean galferies. In the first 150 yards, the gallery is covered by matte rufle fire from a built-in blockhouse.


ENT CONDITION

m the many conflicting reports on the condition of the MAGINOT Line, only 224


THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED I conclusions may be drawn. Indications are that the Germans did not follow if y defined policy of disarming the MAGINOT Line in its entirety, but that it use of haphazard stripping of weapons for a particular need. It will therefore and that conditions vary with location. The XXth US Army Corps only reported the resistance from a few MAGINOT forts, whereas the XIIth US Army Corps red the enemy as mainling the artificial protes in the MAGINOT line, at BINING 18) which is in the vicinity of the "Gros Ouvrage" of ROHRBACH scent air photos show considerable damage done by bombing or demolition in two slarge forts in our sector: SCHONENBOURG and HOCHWALD. This damage appears old, and undoubtedly dates to German bombings in 1940. a captured German document dated November 1944, giving instructions to check conditions and availability of French artillery in the MAGINOT Line, would intend that the Germans will avail themselves of every serviceable installation, this decision has apparently been hurried and forced by recent events, and the lition of the mechanism neglected for four years may well preclude any extensive of the original MAGINOT armament. CONCLUSION. Intrinsically the MAGINOT Line presents itself as a powerful defense system, with tremendous armor, little of it protruding above ground to be destroyed. It shows, however, some very great weaknesses which completely nullify the static strength of the individual positions. 1. Being almost totally underground, it relies almost entirely on cupolas for its observation. Their destruction or blocking would leave the main body of the position without its eyes. This is particularly true at night, when the enemy can approach almost undetected. Artillery casemates have a definite fixed angle of fire, and are not pletely mutually supporting as in the Siegfried Line. 3. No artillery of higher caliber than 135 mm. was present in any of the MAGINOT fixed defenses. 4. The mechanism of the 360° traverse artillery is delicate so that it quires constant care, and some turrets are so constituted that upheaval of the quad around them can effectively put them out of action. The attached illustrations show the typical "Gros Ouvrage" of HOCHWALD (R 0844), sisting of two main units: one, W.; the other, E.; of the HOCHWALD hill, and led by an A/T ditch flanked by nine casemates. The casemates and turrets of the and E. units are interconnected by the underground galleries, but the nine cases, flanking the A/T ditch are independent, and have no access to subterranean leries.

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


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
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED MAGINOT DEFENSES FORT OF HOCHWALD LEGEND MA A/T DITCH IVINO A/T RAIL B+ PILLBOX B- CASEMATE ARTILLERY TURRET

MG TURRET TUNNELS PERSONNEL ENTRANCES: MUNITION


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
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
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Engineer Lattalion and 155 Artillery Regiment in the area N of Limber Back lends credence to PW statements that the bulk of the division will be withdrawn from the AC Corps zone, possibly to defend the vital gap between the VINWALD and HARDT Forests. Tanks of this unit have already been reported in the area. After its losses at SALR-LAUTERN, the division should have an effective strength of about 1,300; this deficiency may however be rectified before full committment on the Sixth Army Group Front.

256 Volksgrenadier Division: With the number of effectives at short 1,500, including such attached units as 686 Hy 4T Battalion and 35 Engineer Replacement Battalion, this division was putting up resistance near the end of the period opposite the E flank of the US VI Corps, at the Laurer River. It may well be that part of its broad sector will be taken over by elements of 21 Panzer Division.

Total combet effectives oprosing Seventh .. rmy - 6,100.

b. NINETERNIH ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf (IESE)

The assumption that a planned withdrawal of the Nineteenth army across the RHINE would take place has been negated by FW statements and our observation of recent trends. Reliable FA's quoted their officers as saying that the existence of the Nineteenth army depended on its holding the VOSCAS pocket. SS men were reported to have been posted on the E bank of the RHINE with orders to shoot anyone crossing from the West side without special permission. Heavy movement W across the ERZISACH bridge early in the period apparently connects with the identification of new units in the Northern sector of the pocket. Emphasis has been placed on this Northern bulge, as evidenced by the transfer of regimental units from the SE corner to the front opposite the 36 US Division. KU Corps may now prove to be nothing more than a remaining of IV G.F Corps, since the CG's of both Corps have been identified as one and the same.

of this givision have been identified 8 of Salast. T. after having been shifted from the RHINE Plain, where the reformed I Sattalion of 308 GR still operates. Effective strength (with the absorbed Fld Repl Bn) is now approximately 1,000. The committment of the two battalions, newly-formed 578 GR (coming from FULDs) in the sector between SKIEST.T and the RHINE may constitute an increase to the command of 198 Infantry Division.

716 Infantry Division: The division's organic elements continue to be identified S of SELECT. T. .mong the attached elements are know to be 469 CR of 269 Infantry Division, and the 30 and 54 Fortrees Engineer Battelions. Thus present strength of organic and attached units of the division, facing 2 French .rmored Division and 36 US Division is approximately 1,200 effectives.

(3) XC Corps

708 Volksgrenadier Division: Organic units of this division have been again identified on the 36 US Division front, although the 728 VG Regiment has shifted to the sector E of SalaST T. Total effectives should be approximately 700.

Battle Groups in North Zone: On the front of the 36 US
Division, pieces of 189 Infantry Division are still being identified
(1089 Eng Bn and 1213 CR) with total effectives of about 300. Newcomers in this area include Regiment REIMERS which is made up of NCO's
from WEHRKREIS IX School (strength 900) and a BR.UW Regiment, composed
of approximately 1,200 SS personnel. Late arrivals during the period
include the SS REICHSFURHER Esecrt Battalion which came from East of
the RHINE by way of MULHOUSE early in December.

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Division and 3 French DIA, this weak division has been well padded with attached units (50 LMC, 360 Cossick Regiment, 4 GAF Ron Bn and 291 zbV Bn). For its holding role, it has some 1,500 effectives.

269 Infentry Division: Inactive during most of the period, this division still meints ins the bulk of its forces opposite the
3 French DIA, with one regiment (469) under command of 716 Infantry
Division near SELEST.T. Total effectives are about 1,300 at present,

(4) LXIII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JO. CHIM V. TRESCKOW)

bornly to oppose the left flank of French I Corps with regiment C-V under command, making total effectives about 1,700.

189 Infantry Division: The elements of this division in this zone (1212 and 1214 GR), with the addition of the 19 ..rmy ..ssault Battalion, can muster an effective strength of about 1000.

338 Volksgrenadier Division: ...lthough only remnants of 757, 758, and 759 GR's continue to exist opposite I French Corps, it appears that some effort toward reforming is being made. General v. OPPEN succeeded General OSCHLLNN(deceased) as CG of the division. The division's strength, with att ched replacement battalions, is approximately 1,350 effectives.

Battle Group in South: Various battle groups and replacement units (EG H.FNAR, H.HN. Bn L.U.R) continue to hold the sector on the right flank of French I Corps. Their combined strength is about 2.200 combat effectives.

30 SS GR Division: The division is believed to be re-

Total combat effectives opposing First French .. rmy - 14,600.

c. Estimated Enemy Strength (Combat Effectives) on 15 Dec. 1944.

Units in Contact:
Seventh ..rmy
First French ..rmy
..rtillery Effectives
Gen Reserve W of RHINE
Possible reserve from WARRELIS V
and other sources

6,100 14,600 ? Committed

7-9,000

TOT .. L

27-29,700

Tanks and SP Guns

70-80

Guns

Information not presently available.

3. SIXTH US .. RMY GROUP FRONT (... lpine Front)

..t the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US ...rmy Group on the ...lpine Front were disposed as follows: ...LBERT-VILLE (Z 1683), ECURG-S. M.URICE (Z 4680), EONHEV.L.-SUR-RC (H 5676), MOD.NE (K 4132), M T.BOR (K 3022), ...IGULLES (N 3703), S. JUEYRLS (N 4394), POND.MINE (N 5050), ST S.VEUR (N 4823), S M.RTIN VESUBLE (N 6020), GRIM.LDI (S 8088), ...ONT GENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition.

Firmer indications have been observed that elements of the LITTORIO Division have relieved elements of the 5 Mountain Division (5 Mtn Bn) in the sector W of CUNEO, and to some extent in the zone 234

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between the SUS. and .OST Valley as well. The 5 Mount in Division has thus been able to spread its units farther to the North, taking ever with the LITTORIO and other Italian elements, sectors formerly occupied by 157 Infantry Division, which is believed to have withdrawn most of its units. In the 34 Infantry Division sector, the 80 Regt. (in reserve) is now patrolling the coast and fighting Partisans on the coastal sector. In the apparent belief that allied forces have stabilized their positions in the lower alpine sector, the Germans are digging emplacements in the coastal zone, the only area believed breachable in Winter months.

o. Inemy Strength Sixth US .xmy Group Front (.lpine Front)

Combat Effectives ..rtillery Effectives and Services 5-6,000

TOT .. L

11-13,000

4. OPER.TIONS

In the VOSGES pocket, the enemy's efforts are concentrated on aggressively wording off all threats of a breakthrough from the North or SW, while he continues to hold on the DOLLER River line and the RHINE plain S of STR SBOURG. The determined daily counterattacks which contested the strategic terrain N of COLLER at KLYSERBERG (V 5448) and W of SELECT.T. (V 6962) reached their climax when strong forces, bolstered by reinforcements from across the RHINE, temporarily cut the road between ST Lakie (V 5961) and RIBELUVILLE (V 6955) on the 13/14 December. Llong the RHINE plain elements of 198 Infantry Division delayed our southward advance by use of road-blocks, village strongpoints and artillery fire from the SLEGFRIED Line. At the period's end, fresh units were counterattacking fiercely in this area. The enemy's Southern RHINE bridgehead was wiped out midway through the period. Defense of the TH.NN area (V 5412) was aggressive as the period began, decreasing about the 15th December.

On the Northern fromt, steady progress was made by our forces as the enemy utilized defensive terrain of the HARDT Mountains only in delaying as he withdrew to the SIEGFAIED Line while stubbornly holding the hinge of the BITCHE forts. BISCHVILLER (R 0918) fell early in the period and stubborn resistance at HAGENAU (R 0424) was overcome by the 11/12 December. The SELTZEACH River was crossed despite opposition from readblocks, entrenched infentry and tanks. 256 VG and elements of 21 Panzer Division provided strong resistance to our drive on WISSEMBOURG (R 1548), but on 15 December our troops crossed the German border and by the end of the period were knocking at the SIEGFRIED Line gates N and NW of WISSEMBOURG, without enemy contact. In the Eastern HARDT Mountain area, the enemy withdrew steadily, but in the forts of the BITCHE area elements of 361 VG and 25 PG Divisions continued to resist stubbornly.

5. MOVEMENT

a. RAIL

Bed flying weather and poor visibility again hindered air reconnaissance throughout the week. However, the few successful missalions that were flown indicate that ERUCHS.L (R 6359), HAIDELBERG, MANNHEIM, and LANDAU (R 2866), were active during the week. TAC/R reported that on 16 December rail activity in this sector was heavier than at any other time during the past month. PFORMARIM and RASTATT were also unusually active on 16 December. Reported moderate activity in FREIBURG and movement between Shanbauckan and activity and the MANNHEIM-KAISERSLAULRIM area probably point to normal supply activity in the FREIBURG sector with some equipment for the SIEGFRIED Line, and reenforcements for the Shankautarn-Markeig sector, especially for the Nineteenth Infantry Division.

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Various reports indicate the following were the main lines of rail transportation for troops and material throughout November and early December.

1. NORTH to SOUTH

- e. Mainz-Darkst DT-Karlsruhe (across the REINE)
 (This line carries the bulk of rail traffic in this sector; sometimes the crossing over the EINE was made at hast IT)
- b. MAINZ-DARMST DT-WORKS-KAISERSL UTERN.
- MANNHEIM-NEUSTADT-LANDAU.
- d. KARLSRUHE-FREIBURG.

2. East to WEST

- a. NURNBARG-KARISKUHA (via HAILBRONN or STUTTGART)
 - MUNICH-ULM-KARLSRUHE.
 - MUNICH-DONAUASCHINGAN to FRAIBURG or OFFANBURG.
 - SINGEN-WaldSHUT (Both lines).

Throughout the week only light scattered road activity was re-rted along Sixth US army Group front except for three long columns ing southward toward NEUNKIRCHEN (C 3885) on 16 December.

The status of bridges north of STRASBOURG is shown on the attached overprint. South of STRASBOURG, the Germans still have in use the rail bridges of Bals.CH (V 885559) and CHALLAPS (V 858128) in addition to the postoon bridge at SaskaCH (V 9149).

The GERMENSHEIM rail bridge (R 4669) was reported by TAC/R as being used to carry the bulk of rail traffic across the AHINE on 16 becamber. The bridges of ORMS, MANNHEIM, and KARISHUHE also appear a important crossings over the RHINE at present.

The SIMPRIED Line confronting our troops in the Northern sector, es the RHINE at NEUBURG (R 3743) opposite KARLSKUHE am follows a ward course a few kilometers inside the German frontier. It pass-through the BLAN LD, emerges into a 6 Km. gap north of WISSAM-3, then proceeds through the PF. LZERWALD to PIRE SANS (Q 9066) ZWKIBKUCKON (C 7272). A secondary line parallels the main line south of LANDAU (R 2867).

From NEUMBURG to STEINFALD (R 2350), through the Blenwald, it was the form of a thin line of pillboxes, casemates, and infantry rong points, preceded by either an A/T ditch, minefield, or wire it. The line appears to be comparatively shallow here and little instructional activity is seen at present. However the dense forest caludes any critical observation and it can be expected that the derbrush is liberally strewn with mines, wire, tank traps, and M/G

From STEINFELD to BERGZ.BEAN (R 1956) the line bridges the 6 km. gap between the BIEN/ALD and the difficult terrain of the PF.LZERW.LD. This gap is strongly fortified to a depth of 6 to 8 km. with a great density of pillboxes, casemates, M/G turrets, several rows of A/T ditches, dragons teath, and fire and communication trenches. Some of the larger works of the SIEGFRIED Line are located here. Considerable additional excavating is seen here at present. A/T ditches and fire 236

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trenches are being dug and mines and wire are being profusely strewn throughout the gap.

The secondary line about 12 km. further north, consists of an A/T ditch, backed by pillboxes, running from HORDT (R 4363) to (R 3161), just southeast of INSHAIM. The line continues southwest of LANDAU (R 2867) to ASCHBACH (R 2164) and poters out in the PF. LARRALD around ANWEILER (R 1667). This part of the line soums to consist rainly of passive shelters and should not constitute a major obstecle.

From OBE OTTERBACH (R 1752) the main line proceeds through the PFALZEWALD via NIED-SCHETTENE.CH (R.0954), BUDENTHAL (R 0555), where it again broadens into a dense area of concrete works, A/T Ditches, and fire trenches, barring the south to north road network. It then proceeds westward along the road to Plantans (Q 9066) via FISHBACK (Q 9854) to LUDWIGSWINKAL (Q 9554) where it jumps a few Km. further north and proceeds westward to EPPANBRUNN (Q 8757). This sector, FISHBACK (Q 9854) to EFPANBRUNN (Q 8757), appears to be the thinnest in the SIEGFRIED Line, due undoubtedly to the difficult terrain. Air photos show only a thin line of pillboxes defending the road running westward to PIRMASENS.

At EPPENBRUNN, the line turns sharply northwestwardly, passing southwest of PIRMASANS and proceeding to Zablewcken. This area is again 3 to 5 km. deep and densely fortified with concrete works, A/T ditches, dragons teeth, first renches, mines, and wire. It has been considered one of the strongest sectors of the line. Recent photo coverage also shows considerable activity in the shape of additional digging of A/T ditches, fire and communication trenches, and laying of mines, and wire. of mines, and wire.

SIEGFRIAD LINE SAST OF THE AHINE

A captured German document reveals that 43,094 civilians were employed on fortifications on the 1st of October, 1944 but only 28,483 on 10 November. The reduction is attributed to the innundations in the Lahr (W 1071), OFFENDURG (W 1585), and KEHL (W 0697), districts and to the fact that farm labor is exempt from work on fortifications until 15 November. until 15 November.

Photo coverage has shown great activity in the line between KEHL and KARLSAUHE. Although there is practically no building of new heavy positions, a great many fire trenches and communication trenches connecting pillboxes are being dug, and trench systems are being organized around villages. The digging activity is on a scale comparable to that noted previously in the VOSGES.

From KARLSRUHE to GENDERSHEIM (R 4569) there has been slight activity confined mainly to installation of A Batteries.

ARTILLERY

Whereas heretofore casemates were believed to have been built to house 88 MM A/T guns at the most, FW interrogation reveals that a number of casemates in a sector familiar to him, near ZWAIBAUCKAN, contain 10 cm. KANONAN (Range 20,800 yds.). Those were sited to serve in the role of additional A/T defense only, according to the FW.

7. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

Information from SH. F reveals that at LETE propagation had been

BOMBE SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED ECRET. ET nade for the complete destruction of the P.T. and T. building and approximately 1/2 ton of dynamite was found under the floor boards of the three floors. In addition a "T" mine had been placed, with trip wire, at the entrance to the Repeater Room. This is the first authenticated case of booby trapping of P.T.T. installations in German territory, and it is felt by SH. IF that this may be taken as an indication of things to come. Evalence Li Houseson EUGENE L. H.ARISON Colonol, G. S. C. A. C. of S., G-2 G-2 Special Distribution N SECRET

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H. W. U. MIRKS SIXTH US ...LY G. OUP Office of the A. C. of S., G-2 APO 23, U. S. Army

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WARKLY INTALLIGACIOS SUBMARY NUMBER 14

FOR THE WELK ENDING 23 DECEMBER 1944

GANGE L SULL KY

The German Nileteenth army, partially isolated in the VOSGAS area, is showing every intention of maintaining its defensive positions in the pocket and along the KHINE. The German First army has been forced back into the HARDT Mountains after having attempted to salvage and husband infentry strength for the SLAGFALED Line, by strengthening week points with mobile armored forces. Reported heavy RR movement in the rear area of First German army indicates probable arrival of reinforcements.

2. SIXTH US .. RLY GROUP FRONT (S.AR-VOSG. Front)

Lt the close of the period First and Nineteenth .rmy forces were disposed on a line: VOIKINGAN (2 3573), S.A. EGUSALINES (C 5056), WALSHEIM (. 6361), BITCHE (C 7650), NAUNHOFFEN (L 9146), BUNDENTH L SHEIM (. 6361), BITCHE (C 7650), NEUBULG (R 3643), South along RHINE (R 0555), SCHWEIGHOFEN (R 1949), NEUBULG (R 3643), South along RHINE to RHINEU (V 9758), SELEST T (V 7861), OSTHEIM (V 7251), ODEREN (V 4323) SWEIGHOUSE (V 5706), ILE N.POLEON (V 7408), East along HUNINGUE Canal to NIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE to border of Switzerland.

- a. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)
- (1) XIII SS Panzer Corps

11 Panzer Division continuing to play the role of a "Chost Division" vanished at the beginning of the period from the XV US Corps zone, to appear as part of the spear-head driving North wast in the EASTOCKE area. However, location of 110 and 111 PGR's is at the present waiting ent writing unknown.

347 Infentry Division. This division formerly opposing XX US Corps is now opposing XV US Corps. It arrived from First US army front in poor shape and while committed on Third US army front the division has not given a too good account of its fighting ability. Its combat effectives are estimated at approximately 2,000, and further signs of weakness have been revealed by Fw's early in December, when they indicated that the merging of companies was taking place.

17 So PG Division holds a sector opposing XV US Coros in the area N/E of S.J.RGULMINES. The division has been favored with a steady flow of replacements which accounts for the maintenance of its identity in spite of continuous heavy losses. It appears from PW statements that the division received during November about 2,000 replacements, losing 50% of this complement in PW's. The division is once more at low ebb and its combat effectives are estimated at approximately 2,000 including personnel from Trains and CM Services, which are being used as Infantry Replacements.

257 Volksgrensdier Division suffered heavy losses on the eastern front during summer 1944 and was subsequently disbanded. The division was apparently reorganized later as a Volksgrenadier Division in LITALINST DT (Poland) prior to its arrival on the bixth army Group front where it was first identified on 20 December, replacing the withdrewn 11 Panzer Division. Its combat effectives are estimated at approximately 4,000 presuming that the reorganized division turned up in fairly good shape. So far the 457, 466, and 477 VG were identified. PW of II/466 stated that strength of his unit was 400, indicating however, that the quality of the personnel was poor. SECRET

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25 PG Division continued to resist stubbornly in the BITCHE area, with 35 and 119 PGR's identified during the period. The division is presumed to have approximately 15 assault guns, and its combet effectives including attached units (669 Erg Bh, First Army Assault Co, BG WESTARK) are estimated at 1,500. It is, however, possible that the division received replacements at the end of the period for 35 PGR had been out of line before its last identification on December 22, for about 5 days.

(2) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. : OLIVE)

Although substantiated evidence is lacking, it is presumed that the corps is assuming responsibility for the sector between BITCHE and the R HELS such a supposition is based on logistic premises justified also by terrain and the existing need for a higher tectical hand warters on the enemy's left flank.

361 Volksgrenadier Division was opposing alements of the VI US Corps. The combat effectives of the division are very low (800) and there is no evidence of reinforcements arriving juring the period.

the period. Its present location is another as no identifications have been reported since December 17. The combat effectives of the division were at a critically low etc. Puts stated that remnants of the regiments would be consolidated in the third bettalions, while first and second battalians would receive replacaments. So far, there is no confirmation of any influx of replacaments to add to the combat effectives of the division which are estimated at 1,700. It is, however, the combat effectives of the division that the MII/I Regiment (700 strong) will be absorbed by the division, which would raise its combat effectives to approximately 2,500.

21 Penzer Division was identified at the beginning of the period in the area north of LE MACH. During the period elements of the division shifted to the East and 192 PCR, 200 AT Bn, 220 Pz Engr Pn and 155 Pz Arty Rgt were identified in the area east of BUDDITAL (R 0555). It was this division that stemmed the advance of the 14 US Armored Division and 103 US Infentry Division. Stemmed the advance of the 14 US Armored Division and 103 US Infentry Divisions and static as the enemy has reached the SIECHRED fine held by Infentry Divisions and static units, the 21 Funzer Division may be withdrawn as mobile reserve or used in another units, the 21 Funzer Division may be withdrawn as mobile reserve or used in another sector where its mobility would be of greater value. The location of its second rock (125) bedly mouled early in December, remains unknown and it is probably reforming. The division lost several hundred prisoners while angaged on VI U3 Corps from and as it has not received replacements during the period, combat effectives of units contacted (192 PCR, 220 Eng Bn, 200 AT Bn) are evaluated at 500 approximately.

256 Volksgrenedier Division opposed stubbornly the advance of 79 US Division and was defending at the end of the period the SIFGRIED Line between WISSELBURG and the RIFT. The division received during the period about 600 replacements reising its combat effectives to about 2,500, including the attached 42 PC Replacement Regiment (104 and 405 Pms).

b. The front along the RUME between LAUTERBOURG and RUMAU is held on the eastern banks of the river by static units. It appears from F statements that these units located in the region opposite LAUTERBOURG are under 553 Volksgrenadier these units located in the region opposite LAUTERBOURG, are while the static units Division, now supposedly refitting in the KARLSKOH, area, while the static units south of that region appear to be, according to documents captured in STRASBOURG, under 405 zbV Division.

c. NINETEET ARMY (CG: Ger d. I.f. WIESE)

During the period the enemy continued to offer stubbern resistance along the Nine teenth Army front, and there were no signs of any change in his attitude, although the flow of replacements for his battered units was on the decrease as compared with the previous period. The increased density of AA around NEUF BRISACH is indicative of the injectance the enemy is attaching

to the crossin's of the MHINE. This may be accepted as an additional indication that the enemy will continue in maintaining his forces on the western bank of the RHINE.

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. HELMUTH THUMM)

198 Infentry Division opposed the French 2 Armored Divsion, north east of SELSST.T, intermingled with elements of 708 Volksrenadier Division. The 326 GR however, was located by document as
sing attached to the 189 Volsgrenadier Division sector. The combet
fectives of the division are accepted at the level of 1,200, which
soludes several hundred replacements received by the division during
the period.

708 Volksgrenadier Division is apparently in the process of cannibelizing the remnants of 715 Infantry Division, if reported PW tatements will prove correct. The low combat effectives of the division (850) would justify any reinforcements. Inasmuch as in this case, samibalizing is being effected between two equally weak units it would towar that the fighting qualities of 708 Volksgrenadier Division recive a higher evaluation at army Headquarters then those of its prosective victim.

716 Infentry Division. Its organic units are estimated at service tely 700 combat effectives. The possible absorption by the Companies of the Principle of the Companies on the Principle of the

(2) XC Corps (CG: Gen. der Fl. PATARSEN)

180 Volksgranadier Division. In addition to the 1213 VG elements of the 1080 Eng En, the 1214 VG was identified in the sectional and US Division. Furthermore, 1212 was also located by the in the same sector. This would bring the whole division back to the sector. As established by captured documents, the division its command the following attached units: 326 GR of the lest 13/II (EG RELEGES); Regt 15/II(EG AYREA or EYRA); the content of the sector brigade); Regt ERAUN; SS En LAUAR. The combat effectates organic units are low (about 900). It is estimated that, the attached units, combat effectives of the division may reach originally 2,000-2,500.

lé Volksgrenedier Division opposed during the period the DIA. Its sector has been considerably marrowed as most of its attached units pessed to the command of the 189 Volksgrenedier Division. Consequently, the strength of the division has been considerably decreased. With the remaining attached units (360 Cossack Rgt and En NO) its combat effectives do not exceed 1,500.

269 Infantry Division continued to oppose the 3 French
The mainteining light contact. With exception of the II/469 GR, which
can ined unlocated, all of its organic units were identified in the

(3) IXIII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JO.CHIM v. TRESCKOW)

159 Volksgrenadier Division remained fairly inactive durage the period, opposing the 2 French DIM. According to PW statements, NOV was absorbed by 1211 VGR. The lack of identification of the relating two battalions suggests that the whole regiment may have been barried by the division. With the attached units (836 Ost Bn und BC LEUR) the combat effectives of the division are estimated at 1200-

338 Volksgrenedier Division although work, continued to oppose the 1 French armored Division and the 9 French DIC. During the paried the division was reinforced by the 746 angineer Bm. Its combat offectives at the end of the period do not exceed 1,500.

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SECRET It is believed that the tactical Headquarters in immediate control of the area between MUIHOUSE and the RHINE is Brigade H.FFMAR. Combat effectives of various BG's operating in that area are evaluated at approximately 1,200. The coordination of enemy operations in that accordinately accordinately 1,600. The BG's (BG BEUCHELT; 56 Jager Repl Bn (ex BG NIEDERM.YER); BG SCHILLING; Security Bn M.SKKER; 269 .T Bn of the 269 Infantry Division) are being controlled by this command.

d. ENEMY STRANGTH SIXTH ...RLY GROUP FRONT (S.L.R-VOSGAS Front)

Units in Contect: Seventh US army First French army

13,000

.rtillery Effectives: Seventh US Army First French Army

No figures available 4,500

Possible Reserve from Wehrkreis V and other sources available within the' next 2-3 weeks

21,000

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53,500

Tanks and SP Guns Seventh US .. rmy First French .. rmy

No figures available

3. SIATH US ... MAY GROUP FRONT (... lpine Front)

.t the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the .lpine Front were disposed as follows: LBARTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG - S M.URICE (Z 4680), BOUNTY.L-SUR-.RC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M T.BOR (K 3022), ...IGULLS (N 3703); S. GULYR.S (N 4394), POND.HINE (N 5050), ST S.UVEUR (N 4823), S M.RTIN VESUBLE (N 6020), GRIM LDI (S 8088), MONTENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

Considerable movement Jastwards from TURIN folloand by several.

in that area. The old alpine sector of the 157 Mountain Division seems to be taken over by a combination of the 5 Mountain Division, the LITTORIO Division and various smaller Italian units. It absers therefore that the 5 Mountain Division has definitely spread its units further north while retaining portions of its old sector. The 34 Infentry Division continues to occupy the southernmost sector with at least one regiment (80th) in reserve. in that area. The in reserve.

b. Enemy Strength Sixth US army Group Front (...lpine Front)

Combat Effectives and Services

6-7,000

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11-13,000

POSCES POCKET: 19 Army made its strongest bid throughout the period in hold-the KAYSERBERG (V4952) pocket, and preventing any breakthroughs toward COLMAR IN. Even efter K.YSERBERG had fallen midway through the period, his efforts intend in the area of ORBEY (V5747) and at MITTELLIE (V6950; only in the ST ar of the pocket did he show any comparable resistance, with counterattacks in SCHEMICPOINE (V5706) - OBERFELD (V5117) area. One amnored CA along the Rhine in E of SELESTAT proved shortive; elsewhere in the sector the enemy was very to our activities and utilized arty and mortar fire heavily.

on the northern front, the enemy was still defending strongly just W of the time River, at the beginning of the period, while falling back to the SIMERIED like in the Hard Mountains. Fe hald fast in the Maginot Line of the FARDT lownshins and defended temptional, the Drawn Sorts. As the period progressed, contains and defended temptional, the Drawn Sorts. As the period progressed temptions in the Haginot line decreased as the main forts at RITCHE were finally resistance in the Haginot line decreased as the main forts at RITCHE were finally resistance by 21-22 Dec, but the enemy became more aggressive to the East, opposing thereby our attempts to cross the LAUTER River at BULDENIAL (RO555) and countering filteractly in the FIREMENGLIFIE RACE (R-0854) area. By the end of the temption of the resistance and fire fights continued in the SCHOLAU (RO151) ERULDENIAL interests and fire fights continued in the SCHOLAU (RO151) ERULDENIAL interests) assetor. Steady vehicle movement had been continuous, during latter part of the period, with much of it into SCHOLBECH Q7653.

APPRICATE On the 19/20 Dec an enemy raid on MT GENEVRE (R4505) was relied. In the S sector, a one-man submarine was asptured intect inside the latter two PM's of an enemy petrol of 7, reported to have been in for 3 days, were captured.

1,21,31

Activity in the MANNERS, FFORZERS-STUTCART, RASTATT and LANDAU areas much heavier then usual this week with the MANNESSN-KARL-RUHE line one of the cative in the entire crea.

Further North, the CIESSE. (G 52)-LARLSTEIN (L 96)-(South of KOBLENZ), and CIESSE. Frankfull lines, carried very heavy traffic on 17 December. Large calls southward twee shown the same day on the line LAUTEREKEN (L 91)-LAUTEREKEN, LAUTEREKEN, LAU

Heavy roll movement of troops and equipment through SINGEN towards

BURN, OFFERDURE, and KAPLSKHEE, from 4-12 December was reported by First French

the reported movement of 8-10,000 troops from the MUENSINGEN (X2981) train
time reported movement of 8-10,000 troops from the MUENSINGEN (X2981) train
time reported movement of 8-10,000 troops from the Prench report of an increase in

transportation of troops and supplies, including new tanks, from the AUGSBURG

transportation of troops and supplies, strongly suggest an influx of resn
time this area.

Reports of unusually heavy real movement in the HOMBURG area are further supplemented by reports of hanvy road movement there throughout the week. On 17 December 8 10 mile convoy was seen moving from MAISMRSLAUTER; toward HOMBURG. Another convoy of the same size was observed moving south toward NEUNCIRCLEN (Q5983).

The status of Rhine bridges north of STRASCOURG is shown on the attached overprint. South of STRASBOURG, the rail bridges at BRISACH and CHALANTE remain still serviceable.

Real movements in the BLACK FOREST coincide with reports on troop concentrations in that area. It is possible that the enemy is forming, or reorganizing, 2 + 3 SECRET SECRET

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one or more Volksgrenadier Divisions in that region. Furthermore he used the LORRAGE FREIBURG area for assembly of replacements destined for the VOSGES pocket:

As the German First Army is holding a very wide sector from the Rhine to the Moselle, held between MURTH and ZWEIBRUCKER by rather weak divisions, a reinforcement of that portion of the front is to be expected. Rail activity in HOMBURG and Labbau might indicate, therefore, the arrivel of formations, even of major

6. SUPPLIES

to clothe and equip such a sizeble force from existing stocks. This is clearly brought forth in a basic directive of 12 October by FIRMER Pg., in a document captured by Seventh Army, which states that all soldiers of the VOLKSSTUR!, without distinction of rank, will furnish their own clothing. All uniforms, as well as weather-resistent sports and work clothes, are doclared suitable. Equipment to be brought is to consist of only bare essentials, but should include knapsack, blanket, and cooking and eating utensils, even if improvisation is necessary. Uniforms of the party and other organizations must be dyed to make them suitable for field service. This suggests a convenient means of concealing the true status of party members when they as individuals enter the VOLKSSTURM.

Another edvantage in a non-uniformed force, required only to wear an armband for identification, is that it enables its components to merge quickly with the civil population with relatively small chance of immediate detection, except when actually participating in combat.

Ordnance Technical Intelligence with Seventh Army reports that of all ammunition recently examined, approximately 50% was manufactured since July 1944, whereas 18 to 20% was produced during October and November 1944. No indications of a general shortage of ammunition have as yet been reported, but the above findings suggest that the enemy at present is able to build up ammunition stores for not much more than his immediate requirements.

7. DEFENSES

On the First French Army sector: ground sources continue to report feverish activity in the BASLE - LOERRAC! - WEIL sector. A/T ditches and fire trenches are under construction and many locations have been evacuated. Barricades are also reported under construction at all the crossings along the Swiss Frontier from BASLE to SACKINGEN (B-18). This with other fortifications already reported along the Swiss Border seems to indicate the Germans to be concerned about cur possible crossing of the narrow strip of Swiss Territory, and thereby turning the SIEGERIED Line.

A high ranking German officer, who participated in maneuvers calling for the defense of the BIEWAID, reveals that an attack through the narrow corridor between the BIEWAID and the GPTNE would, if successful in its early stages, be later opposed by the KARLSRUE - NAXIMILLANSAU (R 4149) bridgehead which has been strongly fortified for some time (CSDIC #662). Air coverage of early November shows A/T ditches and fire trenches covered by a few pillboxes and casemates barring the southern approaches to this bridgehead south of MAGELBACH (R 3747). No fortifications defending the western and northern approaches are revealed. However branches of the Old Rhine, usually filled at high water season, would afford an excellent defensive position, facilitating the creation of a bridgehead similar to that on the First army Front, and the small bridgehead which held out on the West of the Rhine at STRASBOURG.

Captured documents enalyzed by M.I.R.S. indicate an apparent disagreement among Cerman communiers about the value of connected trench systems. One faction disapproves of them because they give eway positions, and advocate slit trenches, toxholes, and strongpoints. Slit trenches are considered by others to be unsatisfactory, since an essential of defens is surprise opening of fire from alternate positions. Slit trenches compel the individual soldier always to fire from the same place, and their supply is almost impossible.

During the recent campaign in the VOSGES, the enemy used a connected trench system, covered by boards and camouflaged with dirt and grass, indicating that he

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SECRET SECRET has learned from the Normandy Invasion and has reconciled the differences of opinion with a compromise which combines comouflage of position with possibility of movement and supply. The effect of navel artillery and air bombardment on the German defenses in Normandy is analyzed from a paper prepared by M.I.R.S., LONDON, from a number of captured enemy reports on the invasion 1 - The preceding wide spread air bombing disrupted the entire transport system this and caused shortage of ammunition by the second day.
2 - All minefields laid near the coast were blown up and proved useless. Barbed wire entanglements were broken down and easily crushed by tanks later. 3 - All field works were destroyed; the sides of communication trenches were crushed in and only concrete emplocements were able in part to survive the havoc. Although the MC turrets generally survived the bomberdment, they were lifted out of position and made useless for firing. Slit tranches, especially if covered with strong wooden lids, gave the best protection.
4 - All flowe throwers, including those built into emplacements, were put out of sction, with most of the crews being milled.

5 - Goliath tanks, which had been held in readiness, were either destroyed or buried by debris, their circuit was shot to pieces and the terrain so churned up as to be impassable to them. 6 - Signals communication, searchlight cables, and position-finding installations 7 - The smoke barrages put down in the course of Allied landings compelled the German artillery to fire blind. No provision had been made for the automatic weapons to lay down defensive fire on fixed lines in the dark or in smoke. were eliminated. (Note: this probably has been remedied in the defense of the SIECFRIED Line). Even more disastrous than the meterial effect was the morale effect of the repidly and precisely firing navel guns, including those of small celiber. The drum fire inspired in the defenders a feeling of utter helplessness. The instinct of self-preservation completely drove from their minds any desire to fight and destroy. This effect on the morale of men whose concrete bunker is subjected to the pound-This effect on the morele of men whose concrete bunker is subjected to the pour ing of artillery fire, is substantiated by a FW captured on the VI US Corps front: Five or six heavy caliber hits, succeeded in knocking the heavy steel door from its anchorage in the concrete but effected no penetration in the door itself; hits on top of the bunker knocked down pieces of masonry but caused no damage; three hits from flet trajectory fire caused a hole 6 to 8 inches in diameter, and smoke penetrative through the document made broatling difficult. etrating through the doorway made breathing difficult. There were no killed or wounded, but PW states that the mental anguish was greater than the physical effect of the shelling. All occupants were captured. Engene L. Harrison EUGENE L. HARRISON HO. 1 Incl. Colonel, G. S. C. A. C. of S., G-2 Incl #1 - January Teather Summery G-2 Spec Distr. SECRET

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JANUARY WEATHER SULMARY

FOR THE

MIDDLE AND UPPER RHINE VALLEY

In January the mercury reaches its lowest point and will average freezing or eligibly below. Precipitation begins to full off from the late fail high totals. Much of this, however, especially on high ground comes as snow or sleet, great r'mpeding traffic. The general visibility remains poor and is a distinct handlesp to military observation and to the operation of tactical aircraft. Cloudiness, the still considerable, averages less than in December and ocilings are generally higher. In all, January possesses many disadvantages for field operations, but is an improvement over the previous three months and leads up to the relatively favorable winter month of February.

Temperature

Temperatures will average very near the freezing mark. Altitude and distance the sea are the controlling factors. The VOGCES Mountains and BLACK FOREST average lower than RHINE Valley locations. Strasbourg is typical of Middle oities, with an overall mean of 31.5°: a daily maximum of 37° and a daily minor to the absolute lowest on record for January there is minus 8°. In an any year temperature will dip below the freezing mark on 17 days. Mountain in the VOGCES, NAMOUT, and BLACK FOREST Mountains will experience colder weather the average mar 25° above 2,500 feet and un absolute minimum of minus 15°. In average Plain the average figure reaches 30° at Nurnberg and dips to 28° at

January Hean Temperatures

Streelleurg 31.6	Kerlaruhe Munich	32,9 28,2
Great Bullen P4.4	Besel Berlin	31.8 31.5
Transfer 32.0 Serregemines 32.0	Nurnberg Feldberger	30,0 25.5

Precipitation

The chief control in January precipitation is altitude and exposure. Westward facing locations in the VOSES, hardt, and HLACK FOREST Mountains receive as much as four to five times as much reinfall as adjacent river valleys. The hills ear of the rain morth of Saarbrucken receive an average of 3.60 inches, while Low selle towns, such as Triar and Collents, get between 1.60 and 2.00 inches. In the ATT Mountains just north of the SECERIED Line the average again increases to 2.40 nches, although an eastern-facing alone like Keiserslautern records less than it than the floor of the HIME Valley in January lies in the rain shadow of seminating and is one of the driest areas in Germany at this time of year. Basle, treatourg, Spayer, and Mannheim all have less than 1.60 inches. New Breisech is the driest spot in Germany in January with an average of only 0.96 inches for the month. MLOK FOREST Mountains, like the VOSES, act as a rain catch and have very accessive falls on their upper alopes. The three highest stations, receive over 6.50 inches with one everaging 7.50 inches, the second highest January figure in Germany. Wet and dry areas like these, lying in such close proximity, make flood prediction extremely difficult. As one progresses eastward, the rainfall drops off repidly with Stuttgart and Ulm measuring only 1.60 inches.

Reiney days are frequent in Jenuary. Strasbourg has fifteen days with measurable precipitation. Mountain stations on either side of the Valley will have 16-18 keys with rein.

Show may be expected at any time during the month. Amounts are seldom heavy, except on the higher mountains, and the snow cover lests for relatively short periods. Strasbourg at 500 feet has an average January full of only 1.2 inches and the greatest ever registered there amounted to only 5.1 inches.

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n mountain areas above 2,000 feet practically all the practicitation falls as snow and by the end of the month amounts accumulate in the passes that seriously hamper reffic. In the BLACK ALT localities at 1,500 feet can expect a 4 inch snowcover of of the time. At 3,000 feet this figure jumps to 84 %. Deep snows believe to 1,500 feet, but at 3,000 feet depths over 16 inches may be anticipated 50 % of he month.

Cloudiness and Hoisture

The chief feature of the HILE Velley winter is the excessive emount of cloud cover. At Karlsruhe at 0800A the sky is overcast 65 percent of the d ys and clear only 12.5 percent. By 1400A the figures are 56 percent and 15 percent. After sunset the average of cloudy days is 59 percent, while 25 percent are clear. This company the dath that described are the dath that described accounts are set to determine the dath that described are the dath that described accounts are set to determine the dath that described accounts are set to determine the dath that described accounts are set to determine the dath that described accounts are set to determine the dath that described accounts are set to determine the dath that described accounts are set to determine the dath that described accounts are set to determine the dath of t emphasises the daily trend in cloud cover: overcast sales at dawn tend to improve gradually throughout the day with the bast conditions obtaining in the early evening, sanshine is near the minimum for the year. Carlsruhe receives in average of only 1.5 hours per day throughout the nonth.

Relative humidity is high. The prevailing southwesterly wirds bring moisture leden air to the area. Strasbourg shows an everage humidity for the month of 88 percent, one of the hig est for all France. Occasional dry periods may be experienced when cold, dry winds from Russia sweep coross Germany and into France, bringing intense cold and low himidities.

Visibility

Horizontal vision in the RITE Valley is generally poor throughout January. Cold oir settles in the Valley and traps a layer of dust, smake, haze, and fog which may persists for a week to ten days without change. At Karlsruhe at O800A visibility is better then 6 miles only 25 percent of the time. The hourly improvement is shown by the 1400 A figure of 33 percent and the 1900A mark of 38 percent. On the other hand, visibility below one mile may be expected 12 percent of the time regardless of the hour. Very poor visibility tends to persist all day, but moderate visibility will generally improve throughout the day.


Wind

The prevailing wind in the RIFE Valley is south and southwest. At Karlsruhe 55 percent of the moon observations show southwest. North and northeast are the second most frequent direction with 37 percent. Wild speed averages low at Karlsruhe. Twenty-four percent of the morning observations show calm and only 5 percent ruhe. over 19 mph. By noon the calm figure has dropped to 16 percent, but the high wind chances remain at 5 percent. Evening shows a marked increase in calm to 28 percent, and the figure for winds over 19 mph. drops to 2.5 percent.


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



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HEADQUARTESS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP Office of the A. C. of S., G-2 APO 23, U. S. Army

Initials: WCH Date: 30 Dec 1944

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WEELY INTELLIGING SUMMARY NUMBER 15

FOR THE USEK ENDING 30 December 1944

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Enemy Activities in Forward Areas, and Units in Contact.

The enemy is showing an aggressively defensive attitude along the entire Sixth US Army Group front. The German Nineteenth Army, although contained in the VOSGES pocket, maintains a defensive but wary attitude and uses every opportunity to these the initiative. The German First Army has used the time made available to it has proposalished and resisting the large units behind the attend defensive resisting of by reorganizing and refitting its worm units behind the strong defensive positions of the SIECFRIED Line. The area behind the RHINE from BISLE to KARLSRUHE is apparently under command of HIMMLER himself in his capacity as Commander, UPPER RHINE.

In the VOSCES pocket, eight divisional formations control approximately 15,000 combat effectives. Two divisions (716 and 159 VG) have been out of contact for sufficient time to have been refitted with the replacements coming into this area from across the RHINE. Tanks have also been noted, with an increase in Jagdanacors. The relatively short interior lines of communications permits the enemy to panzers. The relatively short interior lines of communications permits the enemy to mass his forces with extreme rapidity to meet attempted attacks by our forces. His mass his forces with extreme rapidity to meet of the mountains and in the dense HERH position in the plain below the high slopes of the mountains and in the dense HERH forest area make his intentions difficult to discorn, with the possibility of regrouping and attacking in any sector always a threat.

Along the US Seventh Army northern front, elements of nine divisions are still in contact. The equivalent effective strength amounts to approximately 15,000 in infantry troops. The total armored vehicles, including tanks and SP guns, available in the area are now estimated at 125. The refitting of 17 SS, 25 pG and 21 Panzer Divisions should now have progressed to the point where these units may be considergood in combat effectiveness. The enemy shows no sign of retreating, but on the array is quick to occupy all ground relinquished by Allied forces. His artillery ontrary is quick to occupy all ground relinquished by Allied forces. His artillery estitions have increased in number, both forward of and behind the SIMMALE Line. here is continued evidence of bridgebuilding and large scale movements directly chind the front. The enemy's intentions in this area are definitely aggressive, if all for the purpose of preventing withdrawal of Allied forces from this front to EIFEL sector.

b. Enemy Reserves.

There are at loast five divisions in reserve in the area directly fed by the INERSL UTERN-HOMBURG lines. 17 SS, 25 PG, and 36 Infantry Divisions have been reliding for a period of some two weeks. 21 Panzor has not been identified in its reserve for a week and has undoubtedly moved back into a reserve position. The law according to PW's, left its former position in the line near KARSHURE at is assumed to have moved into the general assembly area behind ZMEIBRUCKEN and IRMASENS for further refitting. Of the candidates from NORWAY (710 Inf, 2 Mtn, 6 SS in), only 710 Infantry and 6 SS Mountain are definitely known to have begun traveling. In the area favors the employment of a mountain division, but no solid identifications have as yet been made. The 216th Infantry Division is still carried as ding responsible for a sector of the SIEGERIED Line near KARISRUHE. The 405 and 415 dministrative Divisions are known by document to be controlling the miscellaneous mits in the defensive positions behind the KHINE. The presence of some staff or orps size sooms necessary for supervision of the relatively quiet but dangerous HINE sector north of the pocket.

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c. Capabilities.

The fall wing empibilities remain apon to the energy:

leatt sken the axis HOMBURG-S.RREBOURG with present force nugranted by an Discussion:

build up in the area, the heavy rull activity, the time clapsed permitting refit ing, and the total number of troops definitely make it possible. The strategic dwintages of forcing the continent of the bowenth army's forces at this time when the energy cannot risk weakening his our front further by sending troops to the HIFEL sector are apparent. Should the energy succeed in reaching SURREBOURG, the withdrawal of allied forces from hard went torritory between the VOSGES and the MINE morth of STRUBBOURG might become necessary. The mortle factor alone in such an eventuality would be considerable for the energy, without cosidering the delay to the allied plans for advancing into Gormany.

2. A rapid shift of forces from north to south within the VOSCES pocket for attack on the axis MULHOUSE-SELFORT, reinforcements being available from the Black

Discussion:

Capability 2 would be executed only in conjunction with capability 1, and at the period when the main attack in the SAAR area had progressed to a noticeable extent. The purpose in this case would be to force employment of all possible Allied reinforcements in the VOSGES thereby preventing their use in the SAAR area.

3. A limited attack across the MHINE with STRASBOURG as the objective. Discussion.

Capability 3 is considered in the same light as capability 2.

4. Aggressive defense along the entire Sixth US Army Group front, using the reserves for commitment on the MIFEL sector.

Discussion.

Capability 4 is not favored. The risk that the Allies might release troops from this front to reinforce the RIFEL counterattack will force the enemy to take aggressive action against the Seventh Army. Furthermore, for the reasons given in capability 1 above, the enemy cannot remain inactive in this area.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Sanr-Vosgos Front)

At the close of the period First and Mineteenth Army forces were disposed on a line: VOLKINGEN (Q 3573), FOLCKLING (Q 3861), SARREQUE:INES (Q 5056), UTWELLER (Q 6858), BITCHE (Q 7650), MAINHOFFEN (Q 9146), BUNDENTHAL (R 0855), SCH WIGHOFFN (R 1949), NEUBURG (R 3643), South along MHINE to MHINAU (V 9768), SELECTAT (V 7861), OSTHEIM (V 7251), LE VIJIN (V 4644), ODEREN (V 4323), SMEIGHOUSE (V 5706), ILE MAPOLEON (V 7408), East along HUNINGUE Canal to NIFFER (V 8201), South long MHINE to border of Switzerland.

(a) FIRST ARMY (CG: Gon. d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

Although it is still difficult to draw definite conclusions from available information on enemy's intentions, it is clear that he is proceeding with a reorganization of his dispositions in First German Army Sector. The probable withdrawal of his mobile units, (21 Pz Div, 25 PG Div, 17 PG Div) into Army or Army Group reserve (HOMBURG area) suggests a build up of mobile striking force, which could either reinforce the EIFEL drive, or (which is more probable) may become a nucleus of a striking force. Furthermore, unsatisfactory identifications of 36 Infantry Division and 361 VG Division indicate the probable withdrawal of these major units for refitting and ultimately possible new assignment connected with the indicated enemy build up opposite Seventh US Army's left flank.

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(1) XIII SS Panzer Corps

347 Infantry Division and att chod units (BG SALRBRUCKEN, and VG Train-Bn MESIMURK) oppose XV US Corps. Comb t offectives of the division with attach-units are estimated approximately 2,500.

17 SS PG Division is accepted as a candidate for withdrawal and refitting, are are indications that the division may have received 50-60 new tanks. Furthere on PN stated that 1,000 replacements have been received. There is sufficient idence to assume that this SS Division will be restored to its role as a strong bile force for this critical area.

19 Infantry Division. This division h s evidently assumed control of the ptor vacated by 17 SS PG. So far two regiments (73 and 74 CR) were identified in US Division zone. Third US army estimated the combat affectives of the division at 2,000 on 25 December. Unless the division recedived replacements, combat effectives of 73 and 74 GR would not exceed 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division continued to oppose 100 US Division. Losses were suffered by the units in line. ..s no arrival of replacements tas reported combat effectives are estimated at 3,000.

25 PG Division is another candid to for withdrawal, refitting and inclusion in First Army or army Group G reservo. There are string indications that elements of the division have been refitting for some time and that substantial reinforcements have belstered the fighting connects of this major unit. However, more precise details are licking and no appraisal of its combit effectives can be made at

21 Panzer Division also has probably been withdrawn. Elements of the division were last identified on Joventh US ..rmy front.on 25 December while its tank regiment (22 Pz Rgt) was reported refitting for some time. Lack of substantiating ovidence renders any estimate of its combat effectives difficult.

(2) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Gen. HOEHNE)

361 Volksgrenadier Division has been identified very unsatisfactorily during the period. It is therefore probable that the division is being gradually withdrawn for refitting and ultimate new assignment. So far the sector occupied by division has been reinforced by the 52 GAF Battalian, but evidence is lacking ther the battalion has relieved elements of the divisi n or is operating under division.

245 Infantry Division. Although satisfactory identification is lacking is believed that the division is continuing to occupy the sector opposing 44 US ision. As was stressed in G-2 Marchy Intelligence Summary No. 14, 23 December, division was budly deploted and was expecting replacements. Possible arrival of acements could be tied up with increased RR activities in the rear area of

256 Volksgrenadier Division was considerably reinforced by two march alions (818 and 819) each estimated at 600 combat effectives and a Volkssturm alion estimated at 300 combat effectives. In addition a B3 ANTON presumably ected with SIMFRIED Line defenses is operating under 256 VG Division. Combat ctives of divisional organic and attached units are estimated at approximately

(b) THE RHINE FRONT

. The front along the MHINE between LAUTENBURG and MHINAU is held on the ern banks of the river by static units. These units were accepted as open ting r the 553 VG and 405 zbV Divisions. There are indications, however, that 553 VG ision which was supposedly refitting in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE may have been to another area. Static units manning the SIEGFRIED Line south of KARLSRUHE accepted as remaining at present under 405 zbV Division (by captured documents RASSBURG).

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(c) MINETE WIH ARMY (GG: Gen. d. Inf. WIESE)

During the period the enemy's attitude in the VOSCES area remained unchanged. Since 23 December no substantial reinforcements arriving in that area were reported. On the Second French Corps front enemy divisions seem to be intermingled and no divisional boundaries can be est blished on the basis of identifications. The status of 716 Infantry Division remains obscure. 159 VG and 269 VG Divisions have not been satisf ctorily identified for more then 8 days and it may be presumed that elements of these major units are refitting in the immediate rear areas.

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. HELMUTH THUMM)

198 Infantry Division continued to oppose the French 2 Armored Division.
The 326 GR, however, remained located in the vicinity of KAYSERBERG (V 6247). Combat
effectives of the division are estimated at 1,000-1,200.

708 Volksgrenadier Division had its elements spread on a large front intermingled with elements of 189 VG and 198 Infantry Divisions. No confirmation of a supposed absorption by the division of remnants of 716 Infantry Division have been received.

716 Infantry Division. The status of the division remains obscure. Last identifications of organic units were reported on 13 December. It is probably refitting for use as a tactical unit in control of the scattered forces within the pocket.

(2) XC Corps (CG: Gen. der Fl. PETERSEN)

189 Volksgrenadier Division. Last identifications of organic and attached units were reported on 21 December. However, a new unit (Rgt. 'MCKER) was identified in the sector. The regiment has three battalions. The combat effectives of the first battalion were given by PJ at 300. It is therefore presumed that combat effectives of the whole regiment may be at 900-1,000. Combat effectives of divisional organic and attached units (including Rgt 'MCKER) are estimated at approximately 3,000.

16 Volksgrenadier Division. Elements of the division were last identified on 27 December. Combat effectives of the division were at a low ebb, estimated with attached units at 1,500.

269 Infantry Division. Since 20 December only the 489 GR was identified on 24 December sandwiched between elements of 189 VG and 708 VG Divisions. The location of other elements of the division remains obscure.

(3) LXIII Corps (CG: Lt. Con. JOACHEM v. TRESKOT)

159 Volksgrenadier Division remained as in the previous period fairly inactive. Last identifications were reported on 13 December. It is therefore presumed that elements of the division are refitting in rear areas.

338 Volksgrenadier Drvision: Elements were identified on 29 December in the 4 French DEM zone. No arrival of reinforcements in that area was reported and count effectives of the division are estimated not to exceed 1,500.

Brigade HAFNER was opposing Fronch 4 DAM. According to FW statements the brigade consists of two regiments (Rgt BAUNG RTEN and Rgt FRANKE).

Regiment BAUNG RTEN consists of Battalion SHILLING; 56 Jaeger Repl Bn;
Regiment BEUCHLIT (14 Repl Bn); Battalion VOULL. Regiment FRANKE, the exact composition is not known. It is presumed however, that the regiment includes Battalion is not known. It is presumed however, that the regiment includes Battalion MAKER and the 746 Engineer Battalion. Combat effectives of the brighde are estimated at approximately 1,200-1,400.

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No.	diday strength sixth	IIS APMY GROUP WRO	NT (Spor-Vosges	Front)		
9336						
	Unite in Contact:) Seventh US Army First French Army			13,000 13,000	V 11.1 - 12.11 (1.2.11	
	Artillery Effectives Seventh US Army First French Army	(VI Corps only)		2,800 4,500		
		in the HOMBURG An in the Black Forest		25,000 15,000		
	Possible Reserves fr sources available	rom Wehrkreis V and within the next ?		12,000		
				95.300		
	TOTAL			85,300		
	Tanks and SP Guns: Seventh US Army			80-100 inc immediat	0	
	First French Arm	,		20-30		
	TOTAL			100-130		
	Guns			87		
	Seventh US Army			120		
				—		
	TOTAL			207		
. s dch u	S ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)				
At the lpine From	close of the poriod t were disposed as f R-ARC (H 5676), MODA (N 4394), PONDAMINE RIMALDI (S 8088), MO	enomy forces opposed the control of	OR (K 3022), AI WR (N 4823), S	GULLES (N 3703),	80)	
(a) Ene	my Disposition.					
The same	e clarification has				е	
The 157 Mountain Division has definitely been relieved in the PERIT SP CMARD sector by elements of the LITTORIO Division (VARESE Bn/4 Alpine Regiment). 888 German Reserve Mountain Battalion was relieved by an unknown German unit.						
In the BARDONECHE sector 1/297 German mountain regiment was lettered by the Monte ROSA Division. In the MT GENEVRE sector 1/85 German Mountain tallion of the MONTE ROSA Division.						
In the ST MARTIN VESUBLE area the German 4 Mountain Buttained of deciment of the LITTORIO Division.						
Elements of the 5 German Mountain Division (85 Recon Bn) were still carried orth of ST MARTIN VESUBLE and further confirmation of its presence in that area is						
cited.	sector South of ST	WEDDIN WESTER'S AG	ntinued to be o	ccupied by the 34		
TOROTTO	Intly Dividion with					

On the basis of this information it appears that elements of the MONTE ROSA of LITTORIO Divisions have relieved the 157 Gorman Mountain Division and possibly aments of the 5 Gorman Mountain Division. Thus the northern sector of the lipine ont seems to be taken over by the Italian Republican amy, while the responsibility rethe southern sector considered most vulnerable, remains with the 34 Gorman Division.

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b) ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

Combat Effectives:

Lack of substantiated information pertaining on organization and strongth lian Units renders estimate of combat effectives imprectical. Combat value of units may be estimated as poor.

Combat effectives of 34 German Infantry Division are estimat d at

4. OPER TIONS

The onemy has in general adopted a defensive but wary attitude throughout the priod, while his tendency to change dispositions indicates purposeful activity be-

On the northern front patrol activity and harassing artillery fire accompanied his improvement of defenses from the MHINE to the HERDT Mountain foothills. Aggressive, early in the period, particularly in the area of HABKINCHEN (Q 5660) and NW of BITCHE, enemy elements in the HERDT Mountains and the SAER district had assumed a defensive stand by 30 December.

The violent counterattacks in the VOSGES pocket NW of COIMER continued until 26 December, when only moderate resistance was encountered in that area, and quiet had provailed by the period's end. Only a raid in the vicinity of LOECHLE (A 8294) on 29/30 December broke the ominous inactivity of the south VOSGES pocket.

On the .lpine Front, the one event of the period was the unresisted capture of 17 armed Italians area N 6322.

5. MOVEMENT

In the HARDT Mountain region, he wy rail activity continued throughout the week. The KAISERSL JUTERN-HOMBURG line appears to be one of the most active routes on Seventh

T.C/R on 24 December reported a concentration of 1,000 boxcars standing along a 10 mile stretch between L.UTERECKEN (L.8917) and K.ISERSL.UTERN. No movement or loading activity was observed. This concentration was dispersed several days later in groups of 25 and 50 cars.

Fighter-bombers on 30 December indicated the presence of 1,000 boxcars and 100 omotives on the SERRERUDCTEN line east and north to B.D KREUZNECH (M 0938) of which perhaps 800 cars and proportionate number of locomotives were scattered along the many marshalling yards throughout this r ther extensive area. The entire sector appeared to be active on the 30th.

The marshalling yards at M.INZ, M.NNHEIM, 'ORLS, SPEYER, and L.NDLU, were again a with firly heavy concentrations of rolling stock and locomotives.

The STUTTE.RT-ROTTELL rilline was reported active at various times throughout week. On 25 December a total of 11 trains were seen moving south and southwest ong the line. ...gain on 27 December, this line appeared active with 8 trains seem. Ose activities lend confirmation to the suggestion that such movements romain reted to reported troop concentrations east of the RHINE. Only slight rail and generally scattered motor transport activity was observed in the lower Black Forest

SH.EF photo recommaissance of 27 December reported movement of medium tank trains the vit 1 FR NKFURT-HEIDELBERG-K.RISKUHE line. This compares with T.C/R reports

r 28 December of many scattered trains moving generally south and southwest toward RLSRUME where the yards were active throughout the period.


The STUTICART-HEILBROWN area was likewise seen to have a heavy concentration of attoracy area on the twin lines from LUDICABBURG to STUTICART on 28 December. TLBROWN apparently handled a considerable volume of traffic as the yards were reorted nearly full throughout the week.


COMMENT:
These concentrations of relling stock in K-ISERSL UTERN-B D KREUZNICH, and the presence on 25 December of a total of 250 railway fuel cars at K-ISERSL UTERN, BIEBER-UTERN, and GRUENST DT, strongly suggest a build-up of supplies, possibly intended for offensive action, in the H-RDT Mountain area.

Movements east of the RHINE appear to be connected with troop concentrations in 151


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HE DQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 23, U.S. Army

25 December 1944

Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 6

1. General Survey.

Operations in Alsace have liven a slight foretaste of what may be expected in Germany. Although the population is predominantly anti-Nazi, despite four years of intensive germanization and incorporation into the Reich, many alsations were members of the Nazi Party. The numerous sabotage and espionage agents apprehended, practically all of them Alsation, attest the thorough preparations made by the Germans prior to their retreat to harass the Allied forces. Of the eighteen persons arrested who were engaged in espionage and sabotage, eight were members of a sabotage group which had been equipped with explosive coal for use in the destruction of locomatives. Forty-four blocks of explosive coal were recovered from the eight sabotage agents who confessed they had received their sabotage instructions and equipment before arrival of Seventh Army. The German who recruited them is among the eight apprehended. (See New Cases of Individual Suspects).

The tension caused by the lack of foodstuff in the 44th A.A.A. Brigade area has been lessened due to the arrival in the port of Nice of several shipments of wheat and flour. Other items are still lacking, but general distribution has been good, and there have been no reports of protest meetings of the population during the past two

The Epuration Committee has continued to function with a great increase in its efficiency. In coordination with the Bureau Securite' Militaire, which conducts the investigations of political prisoners, the Committee has expedited the release or prosecution of persons held in prison. No further incidents of punishment by self-appointed groups have been reported.

New Cases of Individual Suspects

CANTIN, Albert Alfred Emile. French (Alsatian) national, 24 yrs. old, farm hand, resident of St. Jean Kurtzerode (near Mittelbronn). VI Corps CIC recovered 16 blocks of explosive coal and obtained a confession that he had received 10,000 francs and the two boxes of explosives at the end of Jume 1944 from an unknown German lieutenant who was introduced to him by Ortsgruppenleiter Knecht, than Mayor of Mittelbronn, shortly after Cantin had been read out of the Nazi party for being "politically unstable" by Knecht. Cantin informed Seventh Army

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ixth army Group Forthi atly CI Report No. 6 (Continued) SLOS ated 25 December 1944. ECRET IC he accepted the sebotage assignment after Knacht threatened him with incarceration in a concentration camp. A false rumor that Knacht had been apprehended helped extract the confession from Cantin. An and been apprehended helped extract the confession from Cantin. An enlisted men in the French Army, he was taken prisoner in June 1940 and released four months later when Alsoes became Wehrkreis V of the German Reich. Case to BSMT for trial.

MICHEL; aguste. French (Alsotian) national, 53 years old, resident of Vendenheim, auxiliary reliway worker at Grononbourg, Houptzellonleiter of Nazi Porty in Vendenheim. Confessed he received 10,000 france and two packages of explosive coal (containing 16 blocks) from an unknown German officer to whom he was introduced by a Mari from an unknown German officer to whom he was introduced by a Nazi official in September 1944. He was to plent the explosives in coal piles used to fuel locomotives after the arrival of the Allied army. When arrest appeared imminent, Michel tried to escape and his wife threw the coal into a water-filled bomb crater. Efforts are being made to recover the explosives. Michel was arrested at a road block. Case to BSMT for trial.

KIEFFER-MICHEL, Georgette, nee Fulmer, wife of Michel, Auguste. Confessed she was aware of her husband's mission, that she had thrown the explosives into the bomb crater, and during the search of her premises, tried to secrete the 10,000 francs under a wardrobe. She is French (Alsatian) national, 41 years old, a member of the Nazi Party and a Frauenschaft delegate of NSDAP. Case to BS AT for trial.

REINACHER, Charles Louis, French (Alsatian) national, 58 years old, Chevalier De La Legion d'Honneur for heroism during a railroad accident, railroad mechanic, member of Nazi Party and confessed Gestapo informer which resulted in the expulsion from Alsace of his employer for pro-French sympathies. Confessed he received two boxes of explosive coal and 10,000 francs in October 1944 from an unknown German who called himself Liebrich and said he was a native of Sarre-Union. Reinacher said he was compelled to sign a pledge he would carry out his sabotage mission on pain of punishment. The explosive have not yet been recovered. Case to BSMT for trial.

VIX, Christian. French (Alsatian) national, 50 years old, former Feldwabel in German Army and a committeeman of Stahlhelm, former organization of World War I German veterans, resident of Mundolsheim. Organizationleiter of Nazi Party at Hausbergan, Gestapo informer which resulted in arrest of several of his fellow railroad workers who were loyal to France. Confessed he received 12 blocks of coal and 10,000 france in October 1944. Explosives have not yet been recovered. Case to BSMT for trial. to BSMT for trial.

FORTMANN, Georges. Franch (Alsatian) national, 41 years old, president of Lingolshaim, relirond foremen. Confessed he recaived 40 pieces of explosive coal and 10,000 francs during latter part of October 1944. Alsatian tenomist and member of Nezi Party. Twenty eight pieces were recovered by Saventh Army CIC, the remainder are believed to be at the bottom of a well. Case to BS II for trial.

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The Fray Group Food ghtly CI Report No. 6 (Coloned) - 1

Confessed he received two packages of explosive coal and 10,000 france in September 1944. Claims he throw the explosives into a stream when his neighbor was arrested two days after American troops entered the city. Case to BSMT for trial.

KLEIN, Henri. German national, 47 years old. Sonderfuhrer of Frontaufklarungstrupp 251 (sabotage) which was stationed in Issenheim near Guenwiller. Apprehended in Strasbourg by Securite Militaire, Second French Armored Division, and confessed he was in charge of organizing the sabotage of locomotives in Allied areas in alsace. He was authorized to recruit agents on the spot. He is believed to have been the mysterious German "lieutenent" to whom all arrested sabotaurs refer as having given them the explosive coal and the money. Case given to TR.

SCHULER, Jean Louis. French (Alsetian) national, German soldier attached to Abwehr II (sabotage), claims he deserted. Gave information to 3rd Div. after apprehension at a road block while in civilian clothing which resulted in neutralization of delayed action demolitions in St. Die as follows: 350 pound explosive charge located in a factory; 350 pound explosive charge in a farmhouse; two aerial bombs, each of 200 lbs, in a culvert. Case to BS.IT for disposition.

MAZETTA, Jean, slies Jean Hubert MERCIER. Belgian nationality. Confessed agent of Abwehr. Apprehended by and confessed to confidential informant on 1 December 1944 that he crossed Allied lines at Menton. Sent through lines by FELTX, Abwehr agent located presently at Sen Remo, ostensibly to ascertain the number of road blocks between the front and Marseilles and to contact the following persons in Monte Carlo for further instructions:

FARI, BENOIT. French nationality. About 40 years of age. Chauffeur formerly at Monte Carlo; at present in FFI in Nice. Apprehended 4 December 1944 at Nice, after having been approached by a representative of the CIC under the guise of MAZETTA. Claimed to have been a driver for one VANNUCCHI, ex-Italian consular official at Monte Carlo and friend of FELIX. Claimed further not to have realized that the man who approached him was supposed to be an agent, but nevertheless helped him to obtain gasoline to carry out his mission.

ROYER, Jean. Franch nationality. About 48 years of age. Exconcierge of Hotel de Paris Annex, Monte Carlo. Apprehended 5 December 1944 by same method as used for FARI. Advised substitute of following things:

- The dangerous road blocks between Monte Carlo and Marseilles.
 That he should contact a Jean MarQuet, Garage Splendide,
- Marseilles, for an American uniform.

 3. Suggested that he go immediately to Nice "as something was happening in Monte Carlo" which might be dangerous for him.

 4. Asked whether he was from the "group of Lyons" or the "group
- of Nice". Told him that the chief of the "Marsailles Group" was in 5. Told him that the chief of the "Marsellies Gloup and that he had Montpelier, but that he could contact him, and that he had that day received a postcard in code from him.

 6. Stated that he had a meeting the following day in NISECRET

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some friends (see below) who would take him to AIX as they were going to Lyons via St. Etienne. (Substitute was under the impression ROYER may have used term "courier-liaison" in reference to these men.)

ROYER, Philomene. French nationality. Apprehended with her husband (mentioned above) 5 December 1944 because he told substitute that she was familiar with the affair and because she gave substitute information concerning a road block.

FEUTRIER; Francois. French nationality. Radio manufacturer, St. Etienne. Apprehended 6 December 1944 when he was found to be one of the men whom ROYER mentioned having an appointment with that day.

DALBART, Pierre. French netionality. Inspector of police, St. Etienne. Apprehended 6 December 1944 for same reason as FEUTRIER.

ROBERT, Pierre. French nationality. Manufacturer of perfumes, St. Etienne. Apprehended 6 December 1944 for same reason as FEUTRIER. Was armed with small calibre automatic pistol and had with him about 110,000 francs.

PACAUD, Maurice. French nationality. Manufacturer of radio parts, Monte Carlo. Apprehended 6 December 1944 for same reason as FEUTRIER, but released when it was determined that he had probably been innocently involved. Rearrested that night when it was found that he was making every effort to get above-mentioned subjects released, although he claimed to have not known any of them well.

BUCHYAID, Walter. German regular army Colonel assigned to Abwehr since 1929. Confessed Chief of Ast Strasbourg espionage net which had been operating along the entire Seventh Army front for several months. Captured while in uniform in Strasbourg. Since his assignment to the German Intelligence Service, he claims he worked primarily in Abwehr III R (Security of heavy equipment) under Toussaint. For failure to maintain adequate security, Buchwald said he was disciplined by Admiral Canaris, Chief of Abwehr, and transferred to the post in Strasbourg in January 1944. Obviously playing "dumb" Buchwald disclaimed any knowledge of his group's espionage and sabotage activities. He insists that during his entire career he was interested only in technical security. Case to SCI for detailed interrogation.

SCHMIDT, Pierre, elics Jules. Espionage agent of Abwehr (Ast)
Strasbourg. Found with radio transmitter. Franch (Astian) national
25 years old. Apprehended at Selestat by Company G, 143 Inf Regt while
attempting to enter our lines and confesso to 36th Div. CIC. His
mission was to: determine number, identity and nationality of Allied
troops in Strasbourg and vicinity; number and types of tanks and armored vehicles in Strasbourg; location of gun emplacements and size
of guns. Recruited by Abwehr Lisutenant Walter through Marcel Bousselier at Cafe Trocadero in Strasbourg. Trained in radio and espionage at Freibourg. Information he gave on Abwehr personalities are
contained in Annex 1. His apprehension followed the inebriation and
loose talk of his firale companion, also on est mage agent (SECCR)
low). Case to SCI,

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ECRETy Group Fo. A hantly CI Report No. 6 (6 anued)

STEULET, Elizabeth, new Loomart, cliss Lonors. French (Alsatian) national, 25 years old, loss morels. Espianage agent of Abwehr (Ast) Stresbourg. Captured in Silestately Company G, 143rd Inf, while intoxicated and attempting to entire unwilling soldiers. Found with radio transmitter and confessed to 36th Div CIC that she was attempting to enter our lines to operate in Stresbourg. Unwittingly gave information which led to errest of SCHMIDT and WAGNER. Her mission was to establish the transmitter (a British type set, similar to the one found with Schmidt) at Stresbourg and to discover: identity, number and actionality of troops in the vicinity of Stresbourg; number and types of tanks and armored vanicles in Stresbourg and vicinity; location of artillary emplacements along the Rhine; and to organize a group of informers to collect information for her. Steulet was recruited under the same circumstances as Schmidt and trained at Freibourg. Case to SCI.

Wigner, Charles Herbert, alias Charron. French (Alsatian) nationality, 29 years ald. Confessed espionage agent. Arrested by Seventh amy CIC in Strasbourg on information supplied by Steulet and Schmidt to 36th Div CIC. Was awaiting arrival of radio transmitter by Steulet which she threw away before entaring our lines because of its weight, but retained the one issued for her own use. He was a veteran of several prior missions to the Pyraneer, Calais, and Brussels - all prior to landings. Wegner was a member of Frontaufklasrungs truppen 120 (Strasbourg) and formerly 123 (Balgium). His mission was to stay behind in Strasbourg and await delivery of radio transmitter, funds and instructions. These were to be sent by a Lieut. Walter of Abwehr, but instead were sent by Miss Steulet. Initially he was to report the same type of intelligence as that given to Steulet. Wagner was well trained for espionage. He had three months of radio instruction and cryptography in Brussels, three weeks instruction in secret writing in Paris. Wagner confessed he joined the Abwehr in 1942, recruited by Rheinhard Kollender, and was sent to the Franco-Spanish border in the summer of 1943 to establish a courier intelligence service between the two countries. He was then sent to Calais to find a cover job in a construction firm where he was to become a stay-behind radio transmitter agent. He was unsuce seful in finding a cover job and a third assignment for a similar purpose to Boulogne-sur-Mer was cancelled by the invasion. Case to SCI.

STREIF, Erwin, alias Willy Reicher. German nationality, Feldwebel in German Army Intelligence, 30 years old. Confessed agent of
Abwehr III-H Nest Lille, Arrested in civilian clothing by Seventh
Inf. Regt. at a road block after he volunteered to give information
about German activities. 3rd Div CIC found Belgian identity eard in
his shoes made out to Willy Reicher and 100,000 francs of which a
large amount was in new bills, in series. Has made numerous contradictory statements and requests that he be furnished a radio transmitter by the Americans so that he can return to Germany and furnish
the Allies with intelligence. Finally confessed to Seventh Army CIC
he was engaged in espionage against the Franch Army in the vicinity
of Strasbourg in 1939, that he had been a penetration agent in Belgium
against an Allied escape organization and had caused the arrest of two
British aviators. He has worked in Paris, Arras, Senlis, Dworpp, Appledorn and Deventer. Interrogation continuing.

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LEDOCAR, Andre Louis, alias Lucien DIZIAN. French national, 21 years old. Confessed Sicherheitsdienst espionage agent. Released from prison by German authorities where he had been incarcerated by French after having served in French Army 1939-40 and recruited by SD. Arrested by 44th Div CIC at a road block at Dossenheim, near Saverna. Confessed to XV Corps CIC his mission was to observe troop identities, disposition and gun emblacements. Claims he was given the mission to cross into American lines to visit his sister in Saverne by Commissar Wenzel, SD, at Kassel. Ledogar states he was recruited by a PETER of SD while in a prison at Compisene on 6. July 1944, to become an inforcer for the Gestapo at the Junkers factory at Kassel-Bettenhausen. Claims he never received espionage training. Case to BSMT for trial.

POIRER, Albert Eugene Louis. French national, 29 years old. Arrested by 3rd Div CIC when he approached soldiers in Strasbourg and sought the location of the division CP. Confessed he was a Sicherheitsdienst esplonage agent for Col. Beckler (Att VI) Paris and told Seventh Army CIC his mission was: setting up intelligence net in Paris and vicinity; setting up a radio transmitter (A W/T and operator were to be found, if possible, locally); prepare to receive parachated agents and material in the region of Evreaux; infiltrating radio technician agents, particularly from among PPF personnel, into Allied radio installations (allegedly based on an Allied broadcast appeal for French radio technicians) and to contact an agent in the vicinity of Enghien who would put him in touch with a French captain, an engineer, who had plans for an anti-aircraft device on microfilm. Case to SCI.

LESTER, Joseph. French national, 15 years old. Member of the Waffen SS, beliaved to be a Francist. Arrested by XV Corps at a road block near Luneville, 15 November. Said he had been given a mission by the commandant of the Waffen SS camp at Saint Andreas to: report location of French units; strength of French armored units and to determine if a French offensive was planned. He was told to enlist in the French Army "temporarily" if necessary to the accomplishment of his mission. He proceeded from Stresbourg to Badonviller where he contacted a French Division but was unable to enlist. He stole an American uniform at angerviller and proceeded to Luneville where he was apparehended while enrouteto Nancy. Case to BSMT for disposition.

ERH.RT, Pierre. French notional, 23 years old. Confessed Menber of Sicherheitsdienst hat III-e (Allgemeines Volkleben Recht und
Verwaltung) and graduate of an espionage-sabotage course near Frankfurt. Apprehended by VI Corps CIC at road block near Molsheim. Erhart went to Garmany in June 1943 and served as an air force cadet for
nine months prior to entering the SD. He was assigned to Strasbourg
and remained there until the city was captured, whereupon he tried to
escape. Case to BSMT.

ENGELHARDT, Carl. SS Oberfuhrer. Police President of Strasbourg. 43 years old. Ger han a tional. Studied medicine at Jefferson Medical College, Philadelphia, and joined NSD P in 1928. Turned over to Detailed Interrogation Center (MIS), Laxembourg, prior to internment.

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GOIDBERG; Emile - S.D. member from CHALONS SUR SAONE - Case given to the S.M.T. at BESANCON.

GUILLAIS, Roger - S.D. agent - Case given to the S.M.T. at BES-

KAUTZ, Hans - S.D. agent - Case pending.

HERGUET, Fernand - Dutch citizen in the German army - Casa given to the S.M.T. at BESANCON.

GRANDJEAN, Marie - Denounced patriots to the Germans - Case given to S.M.T. at BELFORT.

JIAVAZZA, Victoria - Mistress of a Gestapo member - Case given to the S.M.T. at BESANCON.

KLINGER, Fernand - German agent - Case bending.

X..... - German agent - Case pending

X..... - German agent - Case pending

WEBER, Charles - German agent - Case given to the S.M.T. at LONS LE SAUNIER

GAVOILLE, Paul - Agent of LVF - Case given to the S.M.T. at BES-ANCON for three months internment.

LEPEULE, Francois - NSKK - Given to the S.M.T. at BESANCON for trial before a military tribunal.

FICHOT, Ginette - Relations with S.D. members from Dijon - Case given to S. A.T. at DIJON.

BRUERE - Ex Franc - Garde and Milician.

3. Progress of Cases under Investigation.

MASIENIKOFF, Hotel Chatham, Nice. Under investigation.

The four following confessed spies, arrested by Seventh Army in September and found in possession of radio transmitters, were finally brought to trial by a French Court and sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor: Nicholas MULLER, alias MEHL, Luxembourg national; Michel THIRON, alias TOTO, Luxembourg national; Roger Emmanuel BECASSING, alias Brentano, French national; and Henri Jean Morel LOMBARD, alias MARIUS, French national.

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SECRETay Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 6 (Continued) dated 25 December 1944. CHCULET, Andre MARTINET, Andre RICHARDEL, Michel MARTOT, Gabrielle TOURMANN, Rene DUFOUR, Bernard Gestapo agents - Cases given to the S.M.T. at BESANCON. BERRODIERE, Guy LETINE, Henri BOHER, Eugene RICHARDET, Jean GUENIN, Georges FOLLIET, Paul THIBAUD, Theodore LENTZ, Roger FONTANA, Henri S.M.T. at BLSANCON. 4. Personalities in Areas Still Under Enemy Control. 5. Additional Information on Carded Personalities: 6. Subversive Organizations. A letter found a mong impounded mail at Schirmeck by VI Corps CIC discloses the probable presence in France of an assassination organization directed against Franch Government Officials and Communist "personalities.". The organization is composed of JPF (young PPF members). The letter also discloses an intensified propaganda drive by DORIOT to propagandize the two million Franchmen and Franchwomen in Germany, and reveals also that LVF members are now part of the Waffen Security Control of the Civilian Population. a. The rapidity of the break-through to the Rhine prevented the plete evacuation by the Germans of their nationals, their converts the NSDAP and in many instances, in the vicinity of Strasbourg, ir wives and children. Several hundred German soldiers dressed in sir wives and children. Several hundred German soldiers dressed in vilian clothing have been rounded up at road blocks through operation travel control and by the FFI, which in practically all cases aptred for the first time after the arrival of Seventh Army. The welled by the populace was sincere, although timid, for fear that the rmans would return. In practically all villages and towns, the Germanzed police force had left with the troops or were arrested. Town ficials, all loyal Nazis, either withdrew or were jailed and Civil fairs replaced them with loyal and capable Frenchmen. SECRE

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SECRETY Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 6 (Continued)
dated 25 December 1944.

b. In Strasbourg, civilians appeared especially apprehensive about the return of the German Army. Several days after the entry of our troops, however, French flags began to appear in abundance, and the populace appeared upon the streets again to welcome Allied troops. Since the police force had either been arrested or evacuated by the Germans, Seventh Army sent 54 Gendarmes into Strasbourg from among its travel control personnel. They quickly restored law and order and were placed in command of 13 road blocks around the city, working with FFI. The French authorities estimate about 7,000 German nationals living in Strasbourg will be interned. The road blocks, operating under the 3rd Division which is responsible for security of the city, have apprehended more than a thousand German soldiers and civilians attempting to escape. Approximately 200 additional Gendarmes have been brought to the city within the past few days and the situation is well in hand.

8. Relations between Troops and Civilians.

Troops crossing the Vosges were faced with an outwardly Germanized territory. All town and street signs were German. Advertising signs were in German. Money in circulation was German and the civilians largely spoke German. However, relations between troops and civilians have become cordial again after the first few days of suspicion. A few isolated instances of misconduct have been reported especially where sniping was prevalent. Generally, however, the relationship between troops and civilians is becoming increasingly cordial.

9. Relations Between Counter Intelligence Staffs and Local Authorities

Good to excellent in all areas.

10. Rumors.

a. There have been three rumors current during the period of this report, all without apparent foundation.

(1) That the city of Nice was bombed by the Germans.

(2) That French women were violently mistreated by troops, not of this unit. This rumor grew as it passed from person to person until it became preposterous. It was asserted that at least two women had been killed after having been attacked. A careful check of the city proved the rumor to be groundless. It is however, believed that some people are starting the above mention rumors for ulterior purposes and that the assistance of the local papers could be used with good result in bettering the relations between troops and civilians and therefore making the area less fertile for this sort of propaganda. Liaison of this sort has been suggested to the incoming DBS CIC Detachment.

(3) Civilians spread rumors in Seventh Army area which were picked up by a "War Correspondent" that Germans had recaptured a town and arrested several hundred civilians who had dared to welcome Ameri-26 can soldiers.

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GRETy Group Formightly CI Report No. 6 (Cc. inued) lated 25 December 1944.

Part II Military Security

1. General Survey:

a. With the adoption of a new boundary line, which is defined as being contiguous with the eastern city limits of Nice, the new plansfor the security of the area under command of the 44th AAA Brigade goes into effect. This plan affects illitary as well as civilian personnel. Because of the large number of troops which are expected to be stationed in the adjacent area for rest purposes, it is anticipated that there will be a problem of military personnel not of this unit attempting to anter the comb t zone, particularly Monte Carlo. Therefore all military personnel coming into the combat area will be required to have passes. Limison has now been established with all the S-2s of forward units and arrangements consummated for the immediate transmission of matters of CI interest to the CIC Detachment of the 44th AAA Brigade. All lines-crossers in the 44th AAA Brigade area are searched and interrogated for tactical information immediately following apprehension, allowing small chance of papers being disposed of before questioning. Approximately 200 line-crossers have been interrogated by the CIC during the period covered by this report. While possessing information of future CI interest, none have been found to be possible espionage suspects. Most of them have been found to be possible espionage suspects. Most of them have been found to be possible espionage suspects. Most of them have been found to be possible espionage suspects. Most of them have been found to be possible espionage suspects. Most of them have been found to be possible espionage suspects. Most of them have been found to be possible espionage suspects. Most of them have been found to be possible attempting to return to their homes in the near vicinity and therefore readily identifiable. This process has been coordinated with

b. A c ptured operations map disclosed that the Germans were unnware of one newly arrived infantry division, of which large elements were in the line, and a newly arrived armored division which was in assembly areas immediately behind the Seventh Army line. Prior to the breakthrough their location in France had apparently not been established. Divisions in the line for several weeks had been accurately identified, probably through the explure of prisoners of war.

c. A Line of Communications Command has been established by Seventh Army and four CIC agents have been attached with the primary purpose of surveying the adequacy of security measures at supply dumps.

2. Security of Information:

Prigrate for the been no looking of information evidenced in 44th AAA Brigrate for. Licison establish with S-2s of forward units reveals that they are ownere of the security problems confronting them and have instituted the prescribed precautionary measures.

"Spot checks" conducted on the premises frequented by U.S. Army personnel of this unit have filed to indicate a tendency toward "loose talk". A chack of the Red Cross civilian employees in Nice minimizes the potential hazard which exists there. A similar check will be made of civilian employees.

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b. An enemy situation map found in the vacated handquarters of German LXIV Corps in Strasbourg shows the situation as of 19-20 November with the following notable errors:

Actual Location Location on German Mactual Location of Fedry (06696)

CP Seventh Army Epinal (V0458) Honthurdux (J7243)

CP Lat Franch Print Represent (C7858) Wester (19728)

CP Seventh Army CP 1st French Army CP VI Corps

CP XV Corps

Location on German Map Fedry (06696) Monthureux (J7243) Besincon (07856) Vescul (08798)
Grandvillers Thann-les Vosges
(V2181) (V0582)

identified:

14th Armored Division, which was in an assem ly area near Charmes (29376) 103rd Infentry Division, which had begun to enter the lines on 9 November, 10 days before the map had been posted.

c. A PW reports he emptured four American officers and several enlisted man who had with them secret documents, codes, and marked maps with detailed Allied plans.

3. Security of Personnel:


- b. Because of the repid turnover in the 2nd Replacement Depot, arrangements have been made for weekly sceurity lectures by the CIC to all personnel in the Depot.

4. Security of Materiel and Installations:

- a. A car of munitions and two cars of gasoline exploded in the station of Fos Sur Mer. Six American soldiers were wounded.
- b. Two officers and 45 enlisted men of the Third and Seventh Army liberated after having been taken as prisoners of wer, reported they had been interrogated along lines which suggest efforts to plan sabotage. Interrogators asked all the officers and enlisted men:

Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 6 (Continued) dated 25 December 1944. 1. German frontier control is being set up with the use of CIC to supervise the organization of Gendarmes and Securite Militaire which are being withdrawn from Corps and Division for this purpose. A detailed plan will be furnished with the next C.I. report. 2. The following measures have been taken for the control of the Franco-Swiss border in the First French Army sector: cross the border: (2) Into France b. The only authorized crossing point in the First French or Area is Delle. At Delle there is an Inspector of the Police pecials and an Inspector of the BSM of the First French Army. An Wofficer of the First Army is statished at Montbeliar and controls are post at Delle. is meinteined under patrol by personnel of the 1st Bn, F.F.I., Nice. To date no report has been forthcoming relative to the apprehension of persons attempting to bypass patrols. Any cases of this nature will be referred through OI channels. - 12 -SECRE

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ANNEX NO. 1

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 5

LIST OF ENEMY AGENTS

The descriptions in this annex have been obtained from enemy agents captured by Seventh Army.

1. Source: LEDOGAR, Andre Louis

a. LEGUENNE, Gabriel and his wife (Louise). They are in a community housing camp at Werkheim Bettenhausen. Breton. Always used his real name. Electrician by trade. Remains in camp a few days and then leaves for several days. Ledogar does not know exactly the work done by Leguenne but knows that he belongs to the SD because he, along with others, always came to SD office to get his ration tickets, etc. 24 years old, black wavy hair, lm75, oval face, two gold teeth, long scar on right arm from wrist up. Wife: Breton, hairdresser by profession, 22 years old, lm56-57, black hair, complexion healthy, eyes slightly like Chinese; has had an abdominal operation. Mistress: Mme CHEVALIER, Jeanine. Real name Jeanine MOREL. On her papers is marked Doctoresse. She works with the others since she comes to get her ration card, etc. Was condemned to 10 years of force? labor by French for espionage about 1940 and was released by Germans. Was at Vizsler plane factory, near Bettenhausen. Last seen by Ledogar on 13 November 1944. She is 28 years old, very tall and thin, lm78, black hair with ringlets combed backward.

b. BRINI, Louis (real name). About 30 years old. Now at Vizlor Lager, Bettenhausen. Believed to be from Dijon. Minor SD member active in Paris. Inspecteur controleur in a factory. Was always in an office. Drinks heavily, smokes a great deal, makes faces. Nose broken and somewhat twisted. Black hair. Height lm65, quite large. Probably not the type to cross the lines.

c. LABOURIAUX, Marcel. From Bordeaux. Condemned to 20 years for espionage by the Tribunal Militaire in Lyon. Pardoned by Petain. SD stationed him at Nexon to carry out residence surveillance. Later he was sent to the SD in Paris to carry out police work. Very thin and very tall, wears glasses with metal frames, beginning to lack hair in the middle of his head.

2. Source: STEULET, Elizabeth, and SCHMIDT, Pierre.

a. ANTOINETTE, (probably alias). Female, about 30 years old.

Parisian accent. Height 1m62, weight 50 kilo, black curly hair, fairly short, slightly protruding chin, slight buil: thin, black, penciled eyebrows, black eyes with long eye lashes, speaks with mouth and lips practically still, even teeth, long slender well kept hands, dressed in woman's suit, bandana on head, cloth coat. Jovial, good natured, smokes heavily, medium heels on shoes, rouge under eyes well forward on cheeks. on cheeks.

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Annex No. 1 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 6 (Continued) dated 25 December 1944

b. HELENE, (probably alias). Female, 22-23 years old, Parisian accent. Height 1m65, weight 52 kilo. Brown eyes, ill kept shoulderlength brown hair, talks with "put on" airs, poculiar mouth and lip avenents when talking, continually pushing hair back with right hand, heavy eyebrows, long and thin mose, large mouth, face clongated, large, white, beautiful teeth, long neck, thin waist, long, bony, well kept pianist hands with long nails, index fingers have short nails, large feet, walks tip-toe style, wears black sapphire on ring finger of left hand, wears round wrist watch with metal band on back of wrist, maroon dress, grey fur coat with attached belt invisible in rear, never wears hat, usually wears neckerchief on head, low heel shoes, lip rouge only.

c. LEONHART, Louis, alias LEON. Alsatian; 39; lm60; black hair, greying at edges; grey green eyes; small mose; two gold teeth; lined face, pale complexion, pointed chin; oval face; slight build. A gold watch on left wrist; a gold ring on little finger of left hand; a platinum ring with enamelled head of Marie Antoinette on third finger of left hand; well-dressed; often wears riding breeches and boots. Is very nervous; rubs hands while talking; has slight almost continuous cough. Was member of SD, Paris.

d. WALTER. German; 50; lm70; groying hair but not much of it; high forehead; heavy cycbrows, deep-set eyes; large cars; stooped shoulders. Always has hands in pockets.

e. COMBIER, Kleber, clins LEIM. French; 27; lm60; blond hair; high forchead; blue eyes; red cheeks; clear complexion. Walks with long strides. Well dressed, wearing leather jacket, boots and riding breeches. We sto be parachuted with radio set into France.

f. SUTTER, Pierre, alias CHARLES, Pierre. 26; lm55; wavy black hair; heavy shell-rimmed spectacles which he wears all the time; good complexion; slight build.

g. KNAUER. Alsatian; 36; lm65; flat, black hair; black eyes with thick eyebrews; large nase; shell-rimmed spectacles; large face; big build. Always wears russet evercoat. Has nonchalant manner.

h. BOUSELER. 37; lm50; black hair; red nose; little black byes; locks like alcoholic (which he is); porly dressed; dirty; always laughing.

i. PHILIBERT. French; 38; lm60; block hair; small nose; found face; very fat; a poseur. ...pparently an important official of Jerman services in Paris (?SD). Was headed for Wiesbaden.

j. Mistress of above. 33 but appears eller; relaish hair; long black eyelashes; g. d white teeth; small mouth; uses make-up with 3 of effect; g of figure. Wears grey for fur coat and short dresses 27 show well-proportion

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Annex No. 1 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 6 (Continued) dated 25 December 1944

k. DORION, Pierre. From Lyon; 33; lm55; blond curly hair; blue eyes; scar ever left eye; small nose; round face; almost no neck; very small flat feet. Very deep voice. Is well-mannered, always laughing. Wears a trench coat with checks and turned up collar.

l. Third women radio student at Freiburg. 28; lm55; very blond hair knotted on top; wears glasses with frames of light color; uses make-up; sturdy figure. Wears blue uniform (? Franciste).

3. Source: W.GNER, Challes Herbert.

"Bel Ani". He belonged to German Intelligence Services since 1937 or 1938. According to his own teclarations, he was a volunteer and presented himself to the German services with ut ever having been forced. Does not know which group he belonged to. He had a W/T set in 1941. He had a bar there which was precured for him by the German services. It was in this bar that he collected most of his information. His family still dives in Berlin, where they are a naceted with the diplematic corps. During his stay at the Chateau Vogelsang in the edge of Brussels, the proprietor of which was a certain Madame Lambeau, De Berkowitzi told of his intention of returning to Switzerland where he had a me relatives and where he would be safe. His wife lived at Bach an der Donau near Regensbourg. She has been employed in the German services as a secretary. 33 years old; lm90 tall; very long nose, blende hair, untidy in appearance; small expressive blue eyes.

b. SCHMITT, Fornand, known under name of "BENETTE". Lived in Strasbourg (Newford) at No. 2 rue des Cottages. His nother and mistress live at Nordhausen. His mistress is named PAUSE, Elisabeth. He had identity papers made at Toulouse. SCHMITT has been a member of the Frontaufklarungstrupp 123 (Espionage) since 1941. In 1942 he joined the NSKK and worked in La Rachelle, Rayan, L'ille D'Oleron, and Havre. He was called back by the services to Brussels in December 1943. About July 1944 he was sent on a mission to Lillebanne. He had been given instructions to stay behind when the front lines passed him and to communicate by W/T set all the information he could gather. He is engaged to a person named JOLY, Louisette who lives at 32 rue de la Pugade in Toulouse. About 34 years old 1m75 tall; rather heavy set body; curly blonde hair; round head; high forehead; blue eyes; sporting manner; blind in one eye; usually wears a beige colored felt hat.

c. MANN, Antoinette. Agent for Schmitt. Real name Melina de LAUNE. She usually lived at Vichy. Parents lived at Moulins. Sup-posed to have been sent on a mission to France about 20 November 1944.

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Annex No. 1 to Fortnichtly CI Report No. 6 (Continuel) late 25 December 1914

d. FULHART, Charles. Native of Strasbourg, without exact profession, gambler, known in gambling circles; Wagner know him at Riberac. He was arrest once for swindling. He lived in Strasbourg at No. 6 rue to Weisbumburger. He was employed by the Gestapo in 1940. He went to the school in Brussels and then went to Balen-Balen. He is about 48 to 52 years old; he foll; he wears glasses with thick frames; medium sized body; he has very blon'e hair (sparse); shifty eyes. Was once a boxing trainer or coach.

tory in Strasbourg on the Boulever' de Lyon. Did his military service in the extreme Orient. His wife an' her nother live at Rosenheim. Weibel belonge' to Abwehr Group 3 (Leopol'). He lived in Paris at No. 89 rue "Hauteville. This place is still occupied by the nother of his mistress. WEIBEL is about 31 years of; 1276 tall; rather heavy set body; lark broam heir parted on side; high forehead; small mose; brown eyes.

f. SCHPEIDER (fnu). Lives in Montagne Verte (Strasbourg) rue Oberelsauweg near GRUNLBERG. He is a Canadian citizen. Runs a small factory for making violin strings an' other ent-aut products at Montagne Verte. He speaks Russian and English fluently. His father was Protestant missionary to Russia. His wife is Tyrolean and his son, who volunteered for the Waffen 35, was killed in Russia. He was in relation with Kollender and he often went to Paris. 60 years old; ln75 tall greying hair; from features. He was once-destined for a mission to Russia or America, but never went.

g. RUH (fnu). Noturalized German; 40 years old. Evacuated from Strasbourg to Derlogae in 1941. Wagner knew him at Strasbourg and Riberse (Dorlogae) where he liveled the France. He recruited his own agents. Spent a great tool of time in Paris. 1m85-90 tall; well built; speaks German and French.

h. WEDDFOOL (fnu). Major, Chief of Front Aufklarungstrupp 123; 51 or 52 years ol; 1m75 tall; rather heavy; full face; sparse hair; blue cycs.

i. BLRON De VIDERA. Instructor at Brussels; German nationality. Speaks Polish.

j. GR. PMER (fnu). Instructor at Brussels. Name believed fals

k. "BICHTTL" (fnu). Real name unknown. She was intimate frient of WEDEPOOL and had worked in Madril. She is a brunette; small figure; ln60 tall; speaks German, English, French and Spanish.

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Annex No. 1 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 6 (Continue') deted 25 December 1944

1. SCHNEIDER, Louise ("LOU"). She is daughter of a loctor and was very close friend of BICHETTE. She has been on some missions in Switzerland. Known in Paris under name of De VIGUES. Frequented a large beauty parlor on the rue le la Paix. 1m68 tall; hair raised above nack.

his restaurant was procured for him by German services.

n. LIEUTEMANT VON MATTANIERIM. Assistant to Wedepool at Lille.

o. OWNER OF RESTAURENT METROPOLE SAINT-JOS. At Brussels, Place Madou.

p. HAGRANN (brothers). One of them was known under name of Balbo and worked at the Managuarters in Paris. The two brothers had a transport business at Anchen.

q. H.JOJR (real name Negel). Owned really-male clothing store at Liene with branch in Paris. He was an agent of Dr. Wedepool at Abbeville.

r. PFEFFER, Walter. German from Colorne. Agent and instructor. Was supposed to have been sent to Belgium in September 1944.

s. SCHROEDER, Peter. Instructor and agent at Brussels. Worked in France in 1941-42.

4. Source: STREIF, Erwin.

a. J.CQUEG. 35 years old of French nationality. Lived at Rue de Molinel, Lille; once tried in Marseille for black market activities with bread tickets. Worke' for Abwehr III F and III H. Height lm84, brown eyes, brown heir, medium build.

b. VON-HOUT, Leopold (Werloop). Age 35. Lived at Saint-en-Mer Boulogne; worked for Abvehr III F and III H. Height lm 65, hair blond, slight build both hands badly burned, wears gloves at all times because of sensitive palms; little finger on one hand is missing, wears glasses.

5. Source: POIRIER, .. lbert.

d. WOLF. Lived in Grand Hotel at Fraize. Was chief agent who controlled line passers and radioed information to Berlin from Fraize.

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Annex No. 1 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 6
(Continued) dated 25 December 1944

- 6. GIMBESTRINI, GUY. Italian. 27-28 years of age. Member of Fascist party; suspected of betraying French patriots to Germans. Has fled to San Remo where he is reported to be working for the Gestapo,
- '7. G/MBESTRINI, PIERRE. Italian. Brother of above, known to have engaged in espionage for the Germans and to be presently in San
- 8. ROLLANDO, (FNU). Adjustor. Collaborationist who has furnished information to the Gestapo. Still at Fontan.
- 9. OSENDO, ANTOINE, alias "CHARLIE". Interpreter for the Gormans. Resides at Saorge and is reported to be still there.
- 10. 'RATTIRE, (FNU). Female. Engaged as a storekeeper at Saorge. Mistress of German officers and is known to have denounced patriots.
- 11. MARTINI, (FNU). Formale. Has restaurant at Saorge which was frequented by Germ n intelligence officers. Suspected of being a Gestape agent.
- 12. DELOFFRE, ADOLPHE. Mayor of Breil. Has denounced patriots and furnished information to the Germans. Reported to be in San Remo.
- 13. GIOLNMI, JACQUES. President of L.V.F., former member of Douanes at Sacree. Flei with Germans.
- 14. COTTA, ADA. Aged 24 years. Leader of Fascist party in Picna. Fled with Germans.

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SECRETMY Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 6 (Continued)

ANNEX II

Following is the translation of an official German Directive: Enclosure fr directive 259/44 secret f 22 Sep 1944 Copy:

Armed Forces Operational Staff Deputy Chief of the General Staff (West)

13 Sep 1944

To: 1. Commander-in-Chief (West)

- 2. Chief of the Armaments Office and Commander of the Replacement and Training Army/General Army Office.
- 3. VI Wehrkreis Ho 4. XII ehrkreis Ho 5. V Wehrkreis Ho

Reports sent to:

6. Chief of the Party Chancery, GHQ of the Fuhrer (by courier).

Subject: Instructions for party leaders in areas occupied by the enemy.

- In the case of the complete, compulsory evacuation of designated areas (for example: red zone) the party leaders are to leave
- II. In the event of surprise occupation of areas by the enemy, the Fuhrer has given his consent that the party leaders report voluntarily to the Army and join the fighting forces.

In order to afford the party leaders the necessary protection of international law, the Fuhrer has ordered that in this case the party leaders may wear army uniforms.

The uniforms and other pieces of equipment necessary for this burpose are to be given on requisition to the Gau and Kreis-leiter who will in turn take care of the further distribution.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

OKW Operational Staff

Deputy Chief of the General Staff (West) No. 07014/44 sacret.

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SECRET : A.C. of S., G-2: 7 January, 44:

7 January 1945

Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 7

Period from 16 December to 31 December 1944

Part I. Civil Security

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1. General Survey.

The dominating factor in the activities of the civil populace is fear of a return of the German army to Alsace, as a result of the German attack in the First Army sector. Publicity given enemy sabotage and parachute activity also caused anxiety. Fear of a German return is particularly prevalent in Strasbourg. A large number of civilians living on the perimeter of Seventh Army Sector have made known their intentions to leave their homes for the interior of France if Seventh Army should be compelled to withdraw.

In Seventh Army Sector MP posts have been added to regular travel control blocks and have been stopping all military traffic as well as civil to prevent infiltration of Germans wearing American uniforms. The BSM of the First French Army conducted an intensive search of their area for the German or French saboteurs sent out by the enemy.

In the 44th AAA Brigade area the general situation remains unchanged. There has been little political activity in the area, attributable mainly to the fact that with the exception of Monte Carlo there are no longer any large size towns in the area. A more sensible and calm attitude towards what does not constitute collaboration has resulted in a considerable slackening of the activities of the Epuration Committee resulting in not more than 10 arrests for collaboration during the months of November and December.

2. New Cases of Individual Suspects.

JACOB, Reme Alexandre, alias CRAVILLIERS, Pierre. Confessed Abwehr III and Frontaufklaerungstrupp 360 espionage and counterespionage agent. Nazi Farty member; French national; 21 years old; last residence at Plessis-Trevise (Seine-et-Oise). JACOB confessed he crossed the Rhine near MEMBRECHTHOFEN on 20 December in a motor barge accompanied by two German officers, four soldiers and Agent CHALON of Frontaufklaerungstrupp 360. His mission, given him by Oberleutnant SCHROEDER, was: 1) to find out in Strasbourg why Frenchmen prefer to join the U.S. Army rather than volunteer for the FFI; 2) To report on unit insignia, signs and vehicle markings observed between Strasbourg and Belfort; 3) To report on gun emplacements, types of tanks used, locations of airfields, troop barracks and camps, and any other military information concerning the U.S. Army. 2

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SEGRET rmy Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 7 (Continued). dated 7 January 1945.

JACOB was given 150RM and 5600 francs, promised 10,000 francs bonus and credentials in the Frontaufklaerungstrupp for successful completion of his mission. He was to accomplish this mission within five days and to return to the German lines near Colmar, after contacting a PPF and FAT Agent, Guy ECKERMANN, in Sigmaringen, who was to give him another mission in the same area. After crossing the Rhine he proceeded to Allied-held territory, presented himself at the FFI office in KILSTETT, where he requested a travel permit for Strasbourg and Belfort, volunteered tactical information and claimed that he was an escaped French worker. The FFI referred him to the 7th Infantry Regiment Prisoner of War Interrogators, who turned him over to 3rd Division CIC. Case to SCI.

LITSCHGY, Joseph. Confessed espionage agent and line crosser. French national; 22 years old; volunteer worker in Germany; last residence, Rheims, France. Turned over to 7th Infantry Regiment on 19 December at Gembsheim, north of Strasbourg by FFI after having crossed the Rhine on 18 December near a destroyed bridge between Offendorf and Gembsheim, where the Germans had a bridgehead. He confessed to 3rd Division CIC that he crossed the Rhine in a motor-boat accompanied by three German infantry officers, amother agent named JACQUEMIN who had recruited him, and four German soldiers. His mission, which was to be completed in about three days, was to go to Strasbourg and to sound out lower-class opinion there regarding the end of the war, to report the attitude of the people toward the Allies, to note public proclamations and purchase newspapers, and to discover tactical dispositions and identities of American units. JACQUEMIN and three Army officers escorted him across the river on 18 December to reconnoiter the west bank of the River. JACQUEMIN and LITSCHGY returned to Germany whereupon LITSCHGY was given specific instructions which were that he was to proceed to Strasbourg by a circuitous route, skirting the FFI readblock at Gambsheim and, if in need of food or tobacce, to contact a waitress, Louise KASHNER. His cover story was to be that he had escaped from Germany with a companion by crossing the Rhine on a felled tree. LITSCHGY, with an unvarying record as a malingerer and trouble-maker, was recruited after imprisonment in a comentration camp by an "ANTOINE" in Baden-Baden, who put him into contact with JACQUEMIN. The waitress, Louise KASHNER, who was being treated for genorrhea, is still being sought after investigation revealed that she had disappeared with an American officer. Descriptions of KASHNER and JACQUEMIN will be found in Annex No. 3. Case to BSMT.

POINSIGNON, Roger. Confessed short-range agent and line-crosser. French national; 38 years old; employee of Vichy Labor Ministry at Sigmeringen; LVF member. Apprehended by a patrol of "F" Company, 7th Infentry Regiment after he had crossed the Rhine in the early morning of 17 December 1944 in the vicinity of W045958. He was carrying 15000 francs and a black package containing his effects which was his safe-conduct sign in German territory. In preliminary interrogations POINSIGNON told two different stories to 3rd Division and Seventh Army CIC. In final interrogation by Seventh

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Army CIC POINSIGNON admitted that he had been given the mission of contacting Karl WEINGART, Stockfeld section of Strasbourg, to give him 10,000 frencs and instruct him to obtain immediately information concerning troop movements in Strasbourg and especially the stockpiling of Engineer emphibious material for crossing of the Rhine by Seventh Army. POINSIGNON was to return with this information to the bank of the Rhine near W045958, the point where he had crossed, and at the flashing of blue, white and red light signals any time after 2200 hours on either 18 or 19 December he was to be picked up by motor boat. He was critically wounded while trying to escape after shouting a warning to a motor boat containing Germans who were enticed into crossing the Rhine by POINSIGNON's signal. The boat and occupants were destroyed. Case to BSMT.

WEINGART, Karl. Espionage agent. French national; 36 years old; Nazi Blockleiter. Arrested in a raid on his home in Strasbourg by Seventh Army CIC, following information given by apprehended agent POINSIGNON, who was to contact him and obtain information on American troop dispositions and dumps. WEINGART admitted having been approached by the manager of the Keksfabrik in Neuhof (suburb of Strasbourg) where he vorks and by two other men, one of whom corresponds to the description of the MARTIN who recruited and dispatched FOINSIGNON on his present mission. WEINGART was asked to attend a radio-espionage school in Germany by the se men, but declares that he refused. He was subsequently approached twice for the purpose of having a telephone installed in his home, which was not done, and WEINGART claimed that he had received no instructions, but that he had been given 300 marks for himself and 200 marks for his wife on 22 November. Case to BSMT.

TONIN, alias ANTOINE, alias SCHMIDT. Confessed Abwehr III official of Ast Dijon and of Frontaufklaerungstrupp 353. Arrested by FFI about 22 December in Strasbourg on general suspicion. Swiss national; 38 years old; Chief of FAT 353 Meldekopf in Gerardmer. Beginning April 1938 TONIN worked for a year for the French Deuxieme Bureau in Switzerland, and tompleted six missions to Germany photographing naval installations am gathering air and industrial intelligence. Subsequently he worked as a passeur smuggling refugee Jows from Germany into Switzerland, and then for the Polish Intelligence Service in Switzerland as a licison with its established network in Germany. Tonin was dencunced, arrested by the Gestapo and spent three months in prison. Finally Gestapo Inspector Jahn persuaded him to work for the Abwehr. Tonin and Jahn were both persuaded him to work for the Abwehr. Tonin and Jahn were both working as an interpreter. After difficulties with the Abwehr, Tonin went into business in Paris, conducting numerous very successful business transactions with the SS Purchasing Office, and on the side worked for the Abwehr mainly against the Franch Police whose secret codes he attempted to buy. Tonin was inducted into the German Army in November 1943, but succeeded in having himself reassigned to Ast Dijon, and in January 1944 to Frontaufklaerung-assigned to Ast Dijon, and in January 1944 to Frontaufklaerung-strupp 363, whose Meldekopf in Remirement he headed. In this

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position his activities included the dispatching of German agents across the lines including VLIEGEN, NEBEL, ZELLER, CLAUDE (all apprehended by Seventh Army.) His duties also included the screening of suspected Allied agents, and in October 1944 TONIN recruited and arranged for certain stay-behind agents in the Belfort region (see Annex No. 3). On 14 November 1944 TONIN transferred his Meldekopf to Fraize, which he left on 20 November to visit his wife in Strasbourg. He had no present espionage mission, his orders being to join FAT 353 in Muehlbach, where he had left most of his personal belongings, including a suitcase containing 700,000 frames. Case to S.M.

GUFFROY, Louis, alias GAUDET. Confessed espionage agent. French national; 42 years old; former LVF member; last residence at Gauchin le Gal (Pas-de-Calais). Arrested on 7 December by 3rd Division CIC and confessed to Seventh Army CIC that his mission was to cross the lines near Hagenau and report identifications and strength of American troops, gun positions and armor. This mission was given to him on 3 December by a SIBERNT, who took GUFFROY with two other agents, BOURDIN and JANNI, by way of Kaiserlautern to the vicinity of the front. GUFFROY stated that BOURDIN and JANNI left left on their mission on 5 December, and that he had left on 6 December. GUFFROY was recruited for espionage work after discharge from the LVF, when he had no money and was advised by Pierre CHEV-ALIER to contact SIBERNT. Having done this, he was sent to an espionage and radio school at Wiesbach, where from 26 October to 26 November he studied composition of American units and identification of material and equipment, particularly tenks. GUFFROY has given the names of students at the Wiesbach school (see Annex No. 3). Case to BSMT.

SCHNEIDER, Henry Reinhold. Agent for SD and Abwehr. Canadian national by birth; 65 years old; member of the Nazi Party. Arrested with his wife on 23 November as they were attempting to leave Strasbourg for Germany. SCHNEIDER confessed to Seventh Army CTC that he went to Berlin in March 1941 with a KELLER of the SD. There he was offered \$25,000 to go to the U.S. as a German esphonage agent. SCHNEIDER stated that he refused. He claimed that he also refused in February 1941 the same proposition offered to him by a KCLLANDER of the Abwehr. However, he declared that he accepted the mission from KOLLANDER of going to Iran on a political espionage mission. HOLLANDER accompanied SCHNEIDER to Athens, where the mission was abandoned due to insbility to obtain an Iranian visa. SCHNEIDER continued to see KOLLANDER frequently. He also made frequent alleged business trips to Paris. In 1943, he had dealings with a von ESCHWEGE-LINDE who propositioned him to go to French North Africa as an espionage agent for the Germans. SCHNEIDER claims that he again refused. Turned over to S.C.I.

CHOPIN, Jean Marie. Confessed Abwehr espionage agent; PPF member; French national; 42 years old. Arrested by Seventh Army CIC on 13 December in Strasbourg after several days' surveillance.

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ated 7 Jenuary 1945, continued.

CHOPIN had been named by apprehended agent PIOTR as an agent who would be sent to Belfort on an espionage mission for CAVALLIE. The execution of this mission was frustrated by the Allied taking of Strasbourg. CHOPIN confessed that he had worked for Abwehr Agent SCHEPPLER, alias SCHMIDT who was chief V-Mann of Ast Cologne, Section I Wi (Economic Espienage), and former Commissaire of the French Renseignements Generaux. CHOPIN claimed that he had previously been forced by the Cestapo to reveal the location of a French W/T set. He was recruited by blackmail methods for Abwehr work by SCHEPPLER and Baron de BARRI, with whom he had been engaged in blackmarket deals. To BSMT for trial.

HANUS, Antoine. Confessed Abwehr espionage agent. French national; 22 years old. Arrested on 12 December by Seventh Army CIC at FFI barracks in Strasbourg as agent named by PIOTR along with CHOPIN. He was serving as a private in the FFI, having enlisted after the Allied overrunning of Alsace prevented his accomplishing the mission given him by CAVALLE. This mission consisted of crossing the lines posing as an escaped French prisoner of war, going to Metz and gathering information on French public opinion and troop dispositions. HANUS left on this mission on 18 December, furnished with a false laissez-passer and 100 RM. He returned to Strasbourg on 22 December, his task unaccomplished. HANUS was recruited in the same manner as CHOPIN. To BEMT for trial.

SCHEPPLER, Marguerite, clias SCHMIDT. Wife of Head Agent of Nest Cologne, Edgar SCHEPPLER, alias Erich SCHMIDT. French (Alsatian) national: 54 years old. Apprehended 9 December 1944 at her home in Strasbourg by CIC, Seventh Army, foll owing information given by enfessed agent PIOTR dispatched by SCHEPPLER Edgar on an espionage mission. SCHEPPLER had left Strasbourg for Kehl with a Dr. BECKER on 22 November leaving his wife with 20,000 francs and removing all incriminating evidence from their apartment. In interrogation by Seventh Army CIC Madame SCHEPPLER admitted that she was familiar with her husband's acquaintances, movements, employment, and had accompanied him on several trips. Case to BSMT.

FULLHART, Jean Charles, alias "FUSER". Espionage agent (believed Abwehr). French (Alsatian) national; 51 years old. Arrested by Seventh Army CIC at his home in Strasbourg as a result of information supplied by apprehended agent WAGNER, Charles. FULLHART was recruited at the end of 1940 in Strasbourg by a KOLLAYDER, after having worked as an interpreter for the Gestapo. From January to March 1941 he attended a radio-espionage school in Brus sels together with a SCHMITT, during which time he used the alias FUSER. FULLHART claims that, after finishing the course, he refused to accept an espionage mission to aligiers. FULLHART has given descriptions of his associates in the Brus sels radio school and other agents which will be found in Annex No. 3. Case to BSMT.

VOELKEI, Otto Espionage agent. French (Alsatian) national: 45 years old. Arrested on 17 December in Wissembourg, Bas-Rhin, by 14th Armored Division CIC, as a co-worker with KMMERER and LINK, listed as suspects. He had engaged in border smuggling and opium deals and was in business in Casabland Frank

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Morocco from 1928-1939, when he was arrested and sent to a concentration camp, but was released through German Armistice Commission. Arrested in Marseille in March 1942 by SM on charge of espionage for SD, he was released to German authorities in Dijon in November 1942. His French Army paybook contains a correction in his birth date and does not correspond with his description. Case to BSMT.

During the period of this report the CIC Detachment, 44 AAA. Brigade, has been making a survey of localities in the "Zone Interdite" and the area to its immediate rear, the "Zone Reservee" with a view to ascertaining any suspicious persons frequenting or living in these zones and of having them removed from the combat zone. To date the towns of St. Martin Vesubio, Sospel and Menton have been surveyed and the suspicious persons are listed below:

HEIMG/RTNER, Gustave: Rue Dr. Cagnioli, St. Martin Vesubie. Born Swiss (German) but naturalized French. Classed as a collaborator by the mayor and the Gendarmes because he was known to have been very friendly with the Germans. In process of being removed from combat area as a potential security menace who, it is believed, might aid the enemy if given a chance.

SCHMIDT, Felix: Hotel Mignon, St. Martin Vesubie.
Swiss (German) nationality. Suspected by town speople and the mayor because of his friendliness with the Germans and because his son, according to the mayor, was a Milicien. In process of being removed from combat area for same reason as HEIMGARTNER.

WINTZ, Edouard: Villa Les Lucioles au Vernet, St. Martin Vesubie. Alsatian. A former summer resident of this town, not well known to the inhabitants. Suspicion of him seems to have arisen from the fact that this is the first year that he has spent the winter there, that he does no known work, that he remains always to himself. Investigation continues.

ENCRINE, Jules: Sospel. Italian national whose applications for French naturalization have been refused. During occupation his home was frequented by Italian officers, and because it has been spared damage by German artillery, and is strategically located, it is thought that it might be a possible hiding place for enemy patrols or agents. In process of being removed from compatance for these reasons.

MOR.ND, Henri: Born Swiss, neturalized Frenchman. Has reputation as a collaborator. His daughter was an active Milicienne, a pro-German, who left with the Germans. In process of being removed from the combat area for same reason as ENCRINE.

LEPRON, Jacques: Italian nationality. Lives in evacuated Albarea section of Sospel. Suspected of having been contacted by German patrols for information. In process of being removed from combat area as pot tital security menace.

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C.R.GLIO, Antoine: Italian m tionality. Lives with LEPRON. Same disposition as LEPRON.

LEPRON and CARAGLIO. Same disposition as LEPRON.

IMBERT, Nicolas: French nationality. Reported to have pro-German sympathies and to have denounced 15 Maquis. In process of being removed from combat area as potential security menace.

MILESI, Pierre: Italian nationality. Seen with his son in the evacuated area of Albarca, Sospel. Mayor feels that they are probably assisting the Germans in this region. MILESI and son in process of being removed from combat area as potential security menaces.

Suspicion seems mainly directed at Subject's nationality. Investigation by CIC closed when no ground for suspicion could be found.

HAGEN, Hans: Swiss (German) nationality. Proprie tor
Hotel Westminister Royale, Menton: Reported to have been interpreter for German Kommandantur at Menton as well as for the Gestapo
and, since the liberation, to have made disparaging remarks concerning the needless destruction of property by the American Army.
Considered by BSM, Menton, as possible harborer of German patrols
and enemy agents. Employed at present by Swiss government as caretaker of British and American properties in the Menton area. Investigation continues.

LE.NDRI: Went through the lines 15 December, and after questioning in which he declared at first to be an escaped French worker, confessed to be an agent employed by KAISER and WINTEP an interesting case still in progress.

Three other agents whose names cannot be divalged are being investigated.

Finally, a recent case has led to the arrest of two saboteurs. Case in progress, in cooperation with D.S. DOC. (Direction des Services de Documentation).

An individual having had relations with the SRA presented himself to the French authorities and is being investigated by the ESM.

3. Progress of Cases Under Investigation:

 $\underline{\text{MiSLENIKOFF}}$: Hotel Chatham, Nice. To be turned over to CIC, DBS.

KAUTZ, Hans: Case turned over to D.S. DOC.

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SECRET 7 January 1945, continued.

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KLINGER: Case ended...will be turned over to the BELFORT S.M.T. (Securite Militaire Territoriale) for trial.

4. Personalities in Areas Still Under Enemy Control.

See Annex No. 3.

5. Additional Data on Carded Personalities.

Nothing to report.

6. Subversive Organizations.

a. Due to the current prevalent rumors of enemy parachutist activity credence has been given to the suspicion that there may be an enemy psychological warfare unit operating in the territory of the 44th AAA Brigade, to create unrest among the civilian population and military establishments. It is felt that Monte Carlo might be an excellent locality for this sort of unit. No evidence has been found to verify this suspicion, although an investigation is being made in an attempt to apprehend the personnel of any such unit.

a form letter signed by Jacques DORIOT, found in impounded mail at Schirmeck by CIC of VI Corps. The letters core erned plans of the PPF for future activity both in France and in Germany.

- 7. Security Control of the Civilian Population.
 - a. Travel Control.

(1) In the Seventh Army area, apprehension of German troops who may attempt infiltration while dressed in American uniforms is being given priority. The system of read block and patrol control throughout the Seventh Army Area has been expanded. The six kilometer civilian circulation liberty has been generally rescinded. Civilian travel control measures continue to be responsible for arrests of numerous enemy agents, enemy deserters, and members of French outlawed organizations and Gestapo informers.

(a) VI Corps travel control system now consists of the following:

16 MP check points exemining all traffic.

3 MP traffic points examining civilian and straggler traffic.

17 National Gendarme traffic points examining civilian and straggler traffic.

2 FFI traffic points examining civilian and straggler traffic.

64 miles of MP 24-hour road patrol.

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S-E-C-R-E-T SECRET

Sixth army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 7, dated 7 January 1945, continued.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Numerous additional posts are being organized along the Rhine. All civilian movement in and out of Strasbourg area has been eliminated except for persons with circulation permits from Civil Affairs.

(b) XV Corps is in the process of establishing a revised travel control system covering the enlarged area of responsibility. The following control points have been established:

5 MP Check points examining all traffic.

10 MP traffic points examining civilian and straggler traffic.

10 National Gendarme traffic points examining civilian and straggler traffic.

28 FFI traffic points examining civilian and straggler traffic.

80 miles of MP 24-hour road patrol,

- (c) Army area travel control system has been altered to cover the enlarged area of responsibility and consists of 14 MP check points examining all traffic and numerous road patrols.
- (2) In the First French Army area travel control is now completely centralized under a Senior Officer. Due to lack of personnel, service troops are used to reinforce the control points at critical periods.
- (3) The 44th AAA Brigade has established an overall plan for security control of the civilian population. The entire combat zone area has been divided into three sub-zones. These are:
 - (a) The evacuated area from which all civilians are excluded.
 - (b) Restricted zone, that zone immediately behind the evacuated area, in which civilians may remain if they possess certificates showing residence therein before August 1944. Entry to and exit from this restricted area can be obtained only by possession of a pass properly signed by an SM officer and countersigned by the chief of the local Gendarme Brigade.
 - The third zone is an unrestricted zone which civilians may enter, leave or remain in if they possess an identity card indicating residence there. Basis for enforcement of these measures are road blocks jointly marmed by Gendarmes and American Military Police.
 Evasion of road blocks is being made increasingly dif-29 ficult by the establishment of roving patrols. (c) The third zone is an unrestricted zone which civilians

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S-E-C-R-E-T Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 7, 7 January 1945, continued.

> drivers who connived with civilians desiring to pass road blocks without being checked are being warned that the years personally responsible if caught in such transgressions. The French authorities have been slow to issue certificates of residence to area inhabitants, but this situation is being rectified.

b. Refugees.

Little difficulty was presented by refugees during the period. Seventh Army Centers have been handling a small traffic of displaced persons, mostly Russians, Poles and Italians. Numerous statements by civilians within the Seventh Army Area indicate that in the event of withdrawal by U.S. forces, the major portions of the civilian population will attempt to move rearward to prevent falling into German hands.

c. German Nationals.

(1) All German nationals found were registered and French authorities are interning thom as rapidly as facilities permit.

(2) Up to 23 December 4293 German nationals (60% female)—have passed through the evacuation center in Strasbourg. The total number in the city when Allied troops took it is estimated to have been between 8,000 and 10,000. From the evacuation center in Strasbourg male German nationals are eventually evacuated to the Struthof Camp, female nationals to the Schirmeck Camp. The Deuxieme Bureau of the 10th Military Region estimates that evacuation of all German nationals will be completed by the end of January 1945. nationals will be completed by the end of January 1945.

8. Relations Between Troops and the Civil Population.

a. Relations have been friendly in all areas. A genium fear that the Germans will return exists among the civilians in the Seventh Army and First French Army areas. Ruthless recruiting resulted in bitter anti-German feelings. Troops have become accustomed to the fact that the population is German-speaking and yet French.

b. A survey made by Seventh Army CIC of the Saverne area showed that in Saverne and the district south of it the proportion of the pro-French to pro-German is about four to one, while to the north and near the German border this proportion is reversed.

c. During the period 24-28 December a survey of the CI condition and civilian attitude in Strasbourg was, made by 307th CIC detachment. A summary of the report reveals that the Alsatian population has little interest in French domestic policies, local polities, shows marked effect of German propaganda, particularly with respect to Communism, and is confident of Allied victory but apprehensive and is definitely resentful of the aerial bombardment of the city and destruction in surrounding areas by artillery fire.

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officials has been difficult to establish due to four of return of the Germans. Two PVB public address trucks have been sent to the city. This is expected to counteract German broadcasts by loudspeakers from the cast bank of the Rhine which stated the German Army would soon return to Strasbourg.

9. Relations between CI Personnel, Local Authorities and Police.

Relations have remained good in all areas. In Alsaco there has been a lack of regular police personnel since the Alsatian towns were often policed by Feldengendarmeric who departed with the German Army.

10. Rumors Current Among Troops and Civilians.

A BBC broadcast reported the establishment of an enemy bridgehead in the vicinity of Strasbourg when in fact, only a patrol had landed on an island. This broadcast is reported to have had a serious effect on civilian morale and uneasiness was apparent immediately.

The First French .rmy report that the Swiss radio, which in general has the effect of magnifying German successes, has sometimes had a demoralizing influence.

Rumors in the area of the 44th A.C. Brigade during period of this report have been mainly concerned with the activity of enemy per chutists. The main rumors are listed as follows:

Enemy perachutist lendings at La Turbie, Nice, Antibes, and Cannes.

Enemy glider landings between Nice and Cannes.

A gun fight was conducted by Military Police and enemy soldiers dressed in British uniforms.

A group of French attempted to arrest enemy soldiers in .mcrican uniforms, arrested three, but others of the group escaped.

It is felt that the sudden security precautions taken as a result of the German counter offensive and the speed with which they were effected in some areas tended to cause the ramors to spread among both military and civilian personnel.

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Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 7 (Continued) dated 7 January 1944.

Part II Military Security

1. General Surveyt

a: Military security has been generally good. The numerous alerts against enemy parachutists and enemy personnel wearing Allied uniforms resulted in a tightening of military security. Travel control of military personnel was carried out with extreme vigilance and road blocks stopped all personnel and required them to show trip tickets, dog tags, AGO identifications, etc.

b. The First French Army conducted investigations to detect suspected elements who sought refuge by incorporation into the Army. A certain number of undesirables have been screened out and discharged.

2. Security of Information:

a. A prisoner interrogated by MU 500, CSDIC, stated that German intelligence obtains most of its information by monitoring Allied radio communications. Prisoner claimed that his division G-2 is in possession of almost all codes used by the Allies.

b. 100th Division reports several violations of censorship regulations by members of the division who left letters with civilians to be mailed.

c.: An inquiry is under way to fix responsibility in the French Army in an affair in which some Swiss nationals are said to have been well informed of intended plans of the French Command.

d. Paroles and countersigns for four days were compromised by the First French Army. An investigation is being conducted to determine the circumstances.

3. Security of Personnel:

a. 44th and 45th Divisions report German use of leaflet propagands mostly emphasizing the length of the war and contrasting the position of the front-line "GI" with the stay-at-home war-profiteers. No adverse reaction by our troops reported.

b. One instance of an attempt to propagandize the troops in the front line by means of pornographic literature has been reported by the 44th AAA Brigade, but as yet the investigation concerning this attempt has not been completed.

c. Three sections of MULHOUSE, where attempts against French troops were made, have been scoured and suspects have been arrested.

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Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 7 (Continued) dated 7 January 1945.

4. Security of Materiel and Installations:

- a. The spiral four carrier cable, CADET circuit, at Igney and Nomexy was cut in three places on 16 December 1944 between 1100A and 1200A. CIC concluded that the sabotage may have been the act of a revengeful or malicious person.
- b. An attempt to sabotage the railway tunnel (2 kilometers long) at Arzwiller was discovered on 26 December. Three American 81mm morter shells were found fastened to the railroad track so as to be detonated by the whell flange of a passing train. The ammunition had been placed on a rail line which is out of use, although an adjacent track is in frequent use. Guards at the tunnel exits have been increased and the tunnel interior is being patrolled.
- c. On 8 December two American soldiers of Co A, 163rd Engineer Bn, witnessed a farmer near Hirschland chop and cut a military telephone wire which was strung across the side entrance to his house. Investigation revealed that the act was due to ill-will and annoyance at the blocking of access to his house. The farmer was turned over to BSMT for trial.
 - d. A gasoline train burned at BESANCON (not due to sabotage).
- e. Several houses or villas formerly occupied by Germans, where there were delayed action mines installed, blew up in BELFORT, DELLE and MONTBELIARD.
- f. Breaks in telephone lines in area of First French Army have been reported. (Investigations in progress).
- g. Security measures were increased and military guards at installations strengthened during the period of this report by the 44th AAA Brigade as an added precaution against enemy inspired action. At each installation unauthorized military and civilian personnel are restricted from the area. A survey of these installations has been conducted by the CIC and found adequate. The predautions taken in connection with the Headquarters, 44th AAA Brigade, ammunition dump and fuel dump were given special notice.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SECRET Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 7 (Continued) dated 7 January 1945. Part III Port, Airport and Frontier Control 1. Previous controls set up on the German border have been largely abandoned due to a partial withdrawal of troops. Personnel are being used for travel control purposes. 2. The control of the Swiss frontier in the First French Army area has been placed under the direction of the Chef du Controle de la Circulation. The Army BSM nevertheless has personnel at DELLE and St.

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Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report 1 dated 7 January 1945.	No. 7 (Cont	inued)		
Part IV				
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Counter-Intelligence Sta	is and Per	sonne 1		
Sixth Army Group CI	Officers 6	Agents	SM 3	<u>SA</u>
Sixth Army Group CIC Detachment		26		-
Sixth Army Group SCI Detachment	6		•	
- Seventh Army CI	3		4	6
CIC Detachment	12	27	-	-
SCI Detachment	1		-	-
VI Corps CI CIC Detachment	1 3	8	2	4
XV Corps GIC Detachment	5	. 10	ī	-
12th Armored Division CIC Detachment	1	5	3	4.
14th Armored Division CIC Detachment	2 2	4	-	-
36th Division CIC Detachment 44th Division CIC Detachment	2	13	1	2 -
45th Division CIC Detachment	2	4	1	2
79th Division CIC Detachment 100th Division CIC Detachment	3 2	14 5	1 1	1
103rd Division CIC Detachment	2	5	i	i
Task Force Harris		2		-
Task Force Herren Task Force Linden		2 2	· -	
Total - Seventh Army	41	105	16	হা
First French Army I_Corps			6 2	12 6
II Corps			1	- 2
lst DMI			2 2	6
2nd French Armored Division	-		3	7
2nd DIM	-		1 2	6 6
3rd DIA 4th DIM			2	6
5th DB			2	4
9th DIC 27 DA (F.F.I.)			2	9
3rd U.S. Division CIC Detachment	3	2	ī	2
Total - First French Army	3	2	27	70
Western French Forces			2	-
44th AAA Brigade		_4	_1	그
TOTAL - Sixth Army Group	63	137	49	92296
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17 - SH/EF (Main)

2 - 21st Army Group

2 - 12th Army Group

15 - G-2, COMZONE, ETOUSA

2 - A-2, IX A.F.

2 - A-2, XII TAC

10 - First TACAF

1 - G-2, SOLOC

10 - Seventh Army

1 - First French Army

10 - 44th A.A. Brigade

2 - Delta Base Sec

4 - C/S

1 - G-1

10 - G-2

1 - Liaison

1 - French Mission

1 - A.L.S. 1 - A.L.S.
1 - A.G. Records
1 - "A" Force
2 - "T" Force
1 - Oise Sec., Com Z SECRET

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ANNEX NO. 1

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 7

PARTI POPULAIRE FRANCAIS

35, Josef Burckelstrasse NEUSTADT a/d Weinstrasse

Neustadt, le 17 Novembre 1944

Monsieur Andre LAINE Schirmeck /Ebs (17b) SS Standortführung RATHAUS (20.275)

My dear Comrade,

We received your long letter of the 5th and we thank you for the magnificent sentiments which you show, we expected no less of you. It is thus that the Chief likes his comrades and his men. We must continue to fight as in the past with the maximum of courage and will, that is the way battles are won, and as our Chief has said, "Treason saves nothing, combat alone leads to life".

I beg of you to transmit to our comrades who are with you the assurance that the Chief is thinking of them and we ask all of you to maintain regular contact with the Party or with the Party representatives in the SS.

We inform you that the comrades from the headquarters of the JPF have remained in France to carry out a special work, the nature of which you can well imagine. You have probably remarked that attempts against Gaullist and communist personalities were taking place daily; you must be aware that the Party is not a stranger in all of that.

Insofar as the criticism to be addressed to our comrade is concerned you shall certainly have satisfaction. I am sending this case to the control committee.

Comrade BOLZRE is at present in NEUSTADT, I shall remember you to him. As for FOURERT, he has left as a volunteer for a dengerous mission Tony GUEDEL is also in NEUSTADT, where, with BOLERE, he is to engage in radio work. The Chief is in excellent health, the Party is organizing very well, the results exceed all expectations, and you must understand, dear comrades, that the Chief is more nagnificent than ever and more confident in our ultimate victory.

Yours,

Salut au Chef

a/ J. SALOBERT

(Translation of letter written in French)

Translated by: Wells F. Chamberlin, Sp. Agent, CIC Letter found in mail impounded 29 November 1944 at SHIRMECK and forwarded by CIC VI Corps to CIC Seventh Army. DORIOT form 296 letter was enclosed.

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Annex No. 1 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 7 (Continued) dated 7 January 1945

(Mimeographed form letter)

Neustadt, 11 October 1944

My dear comrade,

The momentary withdrawal of the German military forces from France has brought about an internal sit ution which gravely menaced the directing organisms of the Party. I have therefore decided to withdraw them, as well as the militant elements in the greatest danger. Several thousand Party men and women are now on German soil. Headquarters is, for the time being, established at Neustadt. I have appointed specially Comrade BEAUX, administrative secretary for the Party, to assume the direction of all the work in Germany.

Our momentary withdrawal in no way signifies the cersation of the Party's work, As a result of conversations which I have had at head-cuarters with M. de RIBBENTROP, Reichsführer HIMLER, the Führer and with Dr. GOEBELS in Berlin, a vast plan of action has been foreseen.

Soon a hundred Party propagandists will carry the French message into all the Gaue where there are French workers. A newspaper of which the control and editing will be assumed by the staffs of PETIT PARISIEN, PARIS SOIR and CRI DU PEUPLE, all belonging to the Party, will soon appear. Finally, a radio station has been placed at our disposition. Freedom of reorganisation of our Party in Germany has been granted us, as well as that of carrying on propaganda among workers and prisoners. A special organization destined for prisoners will also soon be activated.

This is only a part of our work, for the two French military forces (LVF-W.FFEN SS) have just united. As you know, we count a great majority of our comrades with them.

However, our main action is directed toward France. We want to sustain and aid by all means the numerous comrades who have remained behind to accomplish courageously their duty against the communist dictatorship which is trying to implant itself in France.

In order to accomplish this action of an unusual scope and full of difficulties which cannot escape your attention, I call on your fullest cooperation. I have the certainty that we will again tread the soil of France as victorious fighters and that we will than be able to create the French Popular Government.

On that point I have had conversations of capital importance, but it would be boring to go into detail. However, I am firmly convinced of the necessity for continuing the fight we have tirelessly carried on for eight years. It is with entire confidence that I look to the future. The English, the imprisons, the Bolshevists who announce everywhere that National Soci list Germeny is defeated have proclaimed their power too soon. They take their desires for realities. On that point too, my

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SECRET Annex No. 1 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 7 (Continued) dated 7 January 1945 information t ken from the best sources has convinced me that this difficult phase of the war will soon be overcome and that then the new signs of victory will appear. You must immediately go to work to reenforce your organizations everywhere and to create among the two million Frenchmen who are still in Germany the great current which will carry us to power. The retreat which has been imposed upon us is not definitive. I need all your efforts. Consequently it is indispensable that you establish contact with me immediately. I request you to address all your correspondence to Comrade BEAUX, administrative secretary of the Party, Gauleitung of the NSDAP, Westmark, NEUSTADT and der WEINSTRASSE. I send you my cordial greetings and beg of you to transmit them to all your comrades. Long live the French National Popular Revolution. PPF shall win. Jacques DORIOT Translated by: Wells F. Chamberlin SECRET SECRE

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ANNEX NO. II

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 7

The following items were received from reliable Allied sources in . Switzerland:

Germany

An official highly placed in the German Foreign Office told informant that the Reich Government is well satisfied with events in liberated Europe, adding that the Germans are in possession of information which shows that disturbances will increase throughout all the liberated countries, including France. The Germans consider that these disturbances affect morals in the allied countries on the home front as well as at the fighting front. The angle-Saxon soldiers find it difficult to understand that the "Friendly" countries in the rear are dangerous as well as the front itself.

The government of the Reich is expecting more and more differences of opinion among the Big Three on European problems. They believe that once the Russians have occupied Hungary and Jugoslavia they may alter their policy. They also hope that if they can continue the wer for a few months longer such a state of confusion and uncertainty will have developed in the Allied camp that plans for a compromise may be presented with reasonable hope of success. The Reich government is now working on several sets of alternative plans for this eventuality. To date they are far from finished, but it appears the Nazi party problem is not to be permitted to form an obstacle. Supposedly the Nazis are even willing to deliver as "war criminals" a certain number of Wehrmacht officers in line with a Moscow list. Likewise certain Gestapo officials will be handed over as a price for peace. The German Government would be willing to propose a sort of "German democracy along Russian lines". A new party would be formed called the "Nationalbolschewistische Partei." The Reich would be marked off into "Räte-Republiken". High Nazi officials would "sacrifice" themselves to obtain peace.

Tollowing information was given by a Swiss youth who grew up in France and enrolled for work in Germany where he worked since 1942 in an iron works in St. Ingbert near Saarbrücken. He has now returned to Switzerland. The situation in the Saar is chaotic and the region is terrorized by the SS. The place is crowded with war prisoners and foreign workers who live miserably. Russian and Ukrainian women and chiltedran are starving and even French workers are hungry. They receive no assistance from the offices of German labor. German workers are not much better treated. Some German shopkeepers try to slip the half-starved foreigners a little extra rations. When factories are bombed, out, foreign workers are abandoned to their fate. Vegabondage has greatly increased during the last few months. Foreign workers who are thus caught are often shot by SS. In areas where the illies break through foreign workers are mercilessly killed. Meanwhile the smallest offences in the factories are severely punished. There are many imerican prisoners of war working in automobile repair shops in St. Ingbert and

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Annex No. 2 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 7 (Continued) dated 7 January 1945

Saarbrücken. They are correctly treated, receive Wehrmacht rations and supplementary digarattes. In cases frequented by foreign workers, foreign radio programs are frequently and openly listened to, provided they are in some foreign language. Foreign workers are completely despondent, believing they will all be shot in the event of an Allied break-through. The people are helpless, SS being stationed throughout.

Everywhere there is a sort of parachutist phobia. When parachutes come down razzias are held. Captured Allied fliers, according to the informant, are correctly treated. Once the Allies parachuted civilians in the Sear region. Next morning there were mass arrests in every plant. Arrested foreign workers were never seen again. The informant was once arrested on suspicion of being a parachutist. When he showed his Swiss passport to the SS man who cuestioned him, the official replied: "What, a Swiss and you are working here? - You crazy fool!"

A German financier who has close connections with high Wehrmacht circles declares that the aim of the Rundstedt offensive is the occupation of Belgium, the destruction of considerable Allied forces with the expectation that peace moves would thus be fecilitated. German Wehrmacht circles admit that the offensive did not keep up its schedule but they claim that the real bulk of the German forces had not yet been engaged.

Himmler's strongest enemy is now Martin Bormann who has forbidden recruitment of SS men from the SA. He also counters some of Himmler's orders. Himmler has stated in public that he would silence Bormann as thoroughly as he forced Ribbentrop to fade out of the picture. Some reports say that Bormann is connected with the anti-Totenkopf brigade which devotes itself chiefly to denouncing and even killing SS men.

bout seventy clergymen, for the most part Catholic, were arrested in the first two weeks of December in the Ruhr. They were sent to the Dachau concentration camp as supposedly belonging to a clandestine group getting ready for "spiritual sabotage" and the formation of pro-Allied administrations in areas still under Wehrmacht control.

number of workers and engineers, among them many former tradesunion leeders, of the Essen Krupp works have recently been arrested. Six of them died at Essen Gestapo offices on December 14th and 15th after having been brutally tortured. Their arrests are reportedly in connection with the above-mentioned errests of clergymen. Considerable unrest has sprung up in the Krupp Works which is considered dangerous enough that workers are being transferred around among the branches and many sent to Silesia where further Krupp plants are ready to go into operation.

It seems that the center of anti-Nazi activity for the Ruhr is at the Krupp works where the opposition is organized in cells like communist units. Although no directors have been arrested, the Nazis are

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Annex No. 2 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 7 (Continued) dated 7 January 1945

said to suspect that some of the high officers are involved and the Gestapo is investigating all elements in any way suspicious. Count Krupp von Bohlen has been called to Berlin for consultation. It is not known whather there is any suspicion against nim, but he was a friend of three of the hanged generals.

The following information comes from a very reliable source:

The Gestapo has placed a closer watch on foreign legation premises in Berlin. It is learned that this measure may be connected with a belief in Himmler circles that it is worth while knowing all Germans who now try to contact the outside world. The Himmler people fear a new coup d'etat might be tried by persons nigh in the Party who are worried by Himmler's increasing power. It is noted with anusement in Berlin society that Goebbels and Goering have somewhat forgotten their old cuarrel in the fact of Himmler's menacing presence. The two great each other with a friendliness never shown before and are often in conference together.

16 SA men were arrested in Bremen at the end of November on charges of defeatism. 7 were sentenced to death by a party court and shot; the others were sent to Oranienburg concentration camp. The arrests were not announced and the families and general public believe the men to be at the front. They will probably be notified that the SA men were killed in action. Rumors of t is incident have leaked out and many Nezis being called up for military service, who haven't a perfectly clear "party conscience", are afraid of being shot by the Gestapo.

according to information from Berlin headquarters of the Gestapo at least 64 Gestapo agents committed suicide during September and October.

Against the advice of the military, the Gestepo is following close behind the German advance into Belgium and Luxemburg, arresting hostages and shooting persons who collaborated with the imericans. Nazi spies who had remained in these creas are busily denouncing patriots who are then deported to Germany.

Disturbed by reports of the willingness of people in western Germany to cooperate with the illies, three Gauleiters and verious other party officials met in Cologne on December 6th and decided to take forceful measures to prevent this sort of civilian aid to the illies. They decided: 1) to evacuate all elements who couldn't be trusted to remain loyal to the regime when no longer under German rule, 2) to threaten reprisels and 3) to arrange attentets against collaborators. Those formerly active in any democratic party or trade union and even party members who might become collaborators are being evacuated to the extent permitted by the transport shortage. More stress, however, is being laid on the propaganda angle, with the press carrying long stories of mardered "traitors". It is believed that actually few such eases have occurred, but the Nazis feel that the propaganda effect on civ-

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SECRET Anner No. 2 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 7 (Continued) dated 7 January 1945 An industrialist from Breslau reports a serious food shortage in Silesia owing to transport difficulties and overcrowding by evacuees. Serious tension exists in the industrial centers, especially in Kattowitz. Workers have demonstrated, demanding food, and some strikes have occurred, but without political significance so the authorities scarcely intervene, preferring to try to improve the food situation. The Nazis seem anxious not to provoke the workers. Deported Dutch workers, escaped from Germany into Switzerland, report that the Germans in Berlin are more fanatical than those in Southern Germany who are more directly influenced by the war. In Berlin, foreign workers are nated, while in Southern Germany, the population is more friendly, presumably out of fear. SECRET

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ANNEX NO. III

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 7

The descriptions in this annex of persons engaged in espionage have been obtained from enemy agents captured by Seventh Army.

1. Source: FULLHERT, Jean Charles.

a. KOLLANDER (fnu). 36-45 years old; recruited agents to send to France, England and Africa. Height 1.75m; brown hair; red face; speaks French with German accent. Architect by profession. Residence at Frankfurt.

b. CLAUDE. Person from Neudorf, known by Fullhart at Cafe l'Ideon (in Strasbourg?). Cleude knows six Frenchmen who were recently sent to France by Germans for espionage.

2. Source: JACOB, Rene.

a. GIBERT (only name known for him). French; 35 years old. Has been very active in the German Intelligence Service, particularly at Bordeaux where he did C.I. work against the French Maouis. He is said to have robbed many houses at Bordeaux. He is further reported to have worked in several localities in Germany, particularly at Landau where he was engaged in watching French workers. Is a leading figure in F.T 360. Is thoroughly pro-German. Divorced, father of two children. Height 1.75m. Light brown hair, smooth, combed backward; small reddish moustache. One half of his right hand is wooden, over which he wears a glove. On the wooden part of his hend there is a special attachment to hold a fork. It is reported that he intends to have his arm amputeted between the wrist and the elbow in order to conceal his identity. It is also reported that he intends to obtain identity papers, together with the family details of some French prisoner in Germany in order to use them as cover.

b. PAUL (only name for him). German, about 40 years old. Along with GILBERT he is a leader in FAT 360. Was very active in Bordeaux. Height 1.72m; strongly hooked nose; greying hair; dark grey eyes. Speaks French fluently and very rapidly without a trace of foreign accent.

c. CORSETTI (fnu). Corsican, about 42 years old. Member of PPF. Has been very active in the German Intelligence Service in France and in Germany. Is reported to have formed and directed an espionage school of about 30 persons to teach them how to cross the lines. Some ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of these school members were sent to Cologne to attend ten to fifteen of the fifteen of

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Annex No. 3 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 7 (Continued) dated 7 January 1945.

d. PAILL/RD, Marcel. French, about 24 years old. Was very active in the Milice in Bordeaux. Had the job in Germany of watching ppF members who were spying upon French laborers in factories. Has committed many thefts. Height 1.82m; very black thick nair, parted on the left; small black moustache; dark grey eyes, always wears boots he had on pants worn by workers of the TODT organization. He is from Bordeaux and has the accent of that region. Always has a large gold watch which he carries in the pocket of the upper left of his coat. Also wears a large gold ring on his right hand.

has one child. Was very active in the Milice in Bordeaux. His father owns a woolen cost factory in the Bordeaux region. Height about 1.75m. Black hair and dark eyes; five large moles on face, two of which are on the chin. Always wears a leather jacket. Wears a large ring on his right hand.

f. DEMAS, Lucien. 40 years old, French. Prominent Milice leader (chef departmental) at Bordeaux, Height 1.70m; very black hair; dark brown eyes; very thin face. His right leg continually trembles.

g. STENFROCH (fnu). Belgian, about 30 years old. Was very active at Landau in arresting Frenchmen considered to be anti-German. Speaks both French and German with a strong Flemish accent. Height 1.75m; black hair brushed backward; dark eyes; cheeks somewhat sunken; thin face. Was wearing a brown coat with a rectangular buckle. His wife and children are probably in Munich.

h. JACQUES (fnu). French, 25-28 years old. Aviator. Worked with German Intelligence in Bordeaux and later in Germany. Height 1.75m; pele, elongated, thin face; light chesnut-colored, wavy hair; light grey eyes. Ilways wears crepe-soled shoes. Has slightly shuffling walk as if his legs were weak. Wears light colored raincoat. Has a tendency to turn his mouth slightly when he talks.

3. Source: TONIN.

a: X....... (nom de guerre VISON). Proprietor of a hotelrestaurant in ROPPE (on the route nationale where it makes a bend in
ROPPE proper on the right side coming from Mulhouse in the direction
of Belfort). He is 48 years old; 1.75m tall; rather stout; brown hair;
high forehead. X was recruited by Feldwobel HERZ, alies HEID of F.T
353 beginning of October 1944. In the presence of TONIN, X received
3500 or 6000 francs. X was to gather military and political information which was to be transmitted to a German agent after giving the
password: "Est-ce cue vous connaissez...." X was recommended to the
password: mayor of Muenster and former Platzkommandant of
Montbeliard who was also present at the recruiting of X.

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Annex No. 3 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 7 (Continued) dated 7 January 1945

b. Y...... (nom de guerre TICRE or OURS), 45 years old, believed to have been a former French aviation engineer. He lives at Montreaux-le-Chateau (a small village of about 250 inhabitants 19klms from Roppe). Height 1.73m; medium build; brown hair; has a wooden leg. In August 1944 X and Y were given approximately 200,000 francs by Lt. MERCK alias KAYSER to create a network of about 5-6 agents who were supposed to work behind the Allied lines. Y had departed for Muenster and is attending classes in Morse and code. After completion of this course he was to return with a W/T set. TONIN had often translated letters sent to MERCK by Y and also formulated replies in French which voiced MERCK's dissatisfaction over the lack of information sent by Y. Y was recruited by Abwehr agent Raymond LEVASCEUR, of Ast/Dijon and FAT 353.

c. Z...... PIERRETTE, female, 38 years old, employee at the office of the Peugeot plant in Montbeliard-Sochaux, near Belfort. Pierrette was recruited by Feldwebel HERZ and TONIN in the presence of JURER, meyor of Muenster. PIERETTE received at this meeting 5000 france. She was to gether information and transmit same to an agent, who would use the password "PETERIE". Height 1.70m; derk heir; slim; slightly wrinkled face.

5. Source: LITSCHGY, Joseph.

a. JACQUEMIN. French, 28 years old, probably member of Vichy police. May come over on a mission. Height 1.72m; weight 75 kilograms; strong face, cleft chin; brown hair; dark eyes. Wore ten suit; brown hat; grey overcoat with collar usually turned up; black shoes; cocky, calm; welks with short rapid steps, very energetic. Residence probably Haute-Garonne or Bordeaux.

b. KASHNER, Louise. 25 years old; waitress in a Strasbourg cafe, Hotel Pousch. She is a contact for enemy agents coming from Germany. About 5'6" tall; clear eyes, either blue or grey; natural blond hair; attractive; weighs about 130 pounds; being treated for vanareal disease. She was picked up by an American officer in Strasbourg with whom she disappeared.

6. Source: SCHEPPLER, Merguaritte.

a. BOUVY, Ever or Evert. Age about 65, Dutch. Director of the Niederslaendische Hendelgeselschaft, 20 Rue de la Peix, Peris. Height 1.70m; vory heavy grey hair, beld on top; weers glesses; round face; ruddy complexion.

b. BECKER, Dr. Age about 50. German, but speaks French. Believed to be a judge by profession. Short and fet; greying hair; partially bald on top; blue eyes; florid complexion; round face; scar on left check.

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Annex No. 3 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 7 (Continued) dated 7 January 1945

c. KIEIN, Dr. ge about 50; very tall; average build; flushed face; blue eyes; thinning blond hair; round face; broken nose. Lived on Rue d'Isles, Paris.

7. Miscellaneous sources.

Cerman national; about 35 years old. This individual served in the German Army with the 316th Inf. Regt. in Poland and attended an officers school in June 1944. He is reported to have performed counter espionage work in 1939 in the Black Forest and espionage in Alsace in 1939-40; he is said to have "belonged to a Nazi secret organization comprising about 60 men, having all powers", and he is said to have "directed the persecution of Jews at Warsaw in 1940". Reported to be very energetic, gives no quarter and is a good killer, extremely dangerous to arrest. Height 5'5"; round face; thin hair; large round spectacles; brown or black leather jacket and hat. He rides a 4 hp motor cycle. Has several scars, including one on one kneed received from a Russian bayonet.

b. LOENIG, clies RNOID. French (Alsatian) national; 40 years old; born in Ste. Marie-aux-Mines; lest residence 23 rue de Soissons, Belfort. He was to cross front line, in the Colmar-Mulhouse sector on 16-17 December 1944. Height 1.70m; rather sparse black hair, parted; cleanshaven, oval face; lively eyes. Was wearing a dark blue suit, blue overcoat, soft blue hat and high shoes.

c. HiGENDORN, of whom nothing had been heard, is operating at present in the area near Colmar.

d. GASTAIDI, PHILLIPE. Condemned in Marseilles in 1939 as an espionage agent while a member of the French Forces. French citizenship was rescinded in 1940. Is reported to have flood to Italy with the Germans and may attempt to reenter France as an agent.

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H JARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J APO 23, U. S. Army

9 November 1944

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION NO. 3

ENEMY CAPABILITIES IN THE BELFORT AREA

1. Summary of the enemy situation

a. The 198 and 296 Inf Divs are heavily committed in the GERARDMER area. 338 Inf Div is now probably only a staff controlling fortress and MG battalions, having left its organic units in the ST DIE area. The 159 Inf Div has responsibility for the large sector south of LE THILLOT through CHAMPACNEY to the BELFORT Area proper. The south flank to the Swiss border is controlled by Battle Group von OFFEN. The total strength presently in contact on the French front is 8,900 with 6,400 in reserve including static fortress battalions in fortified BELFORT area. Total

strength in the BEIFORT area amounts to approximately 5500. (See table appended).

b. Additional fortress battalions from the SIEGFRIED Line and elements of the army general reserve would be available, about 4000 to 6000 in strength. This additional force is of poor quality and with very limited mobility. The possible arrival of forces from NGRMAY may be discounted in this area, if a general offensive

is in progress along the whole front.

c. The BELFORT GAP is defended by an almost continuous line of fire trenches and A/T ditches running from GIROMAGNY to north of DELLE. The breaks in this line and A/T ditches running from GIRMAGNY to north of DKLES. The breaks in this line occur where terrain affords little opportunity for maneuvering. A second line of fire trenches runs from ROUGEMONT to MERTZEN with A/T ditch protecting DANNEMARIE. There are indications that the enemy is extending this second line to the Swiss frontier, where heretofore minor defenses had been reported.

The MIR is defended by a forward line of strong outposts commanding all avenues of approach. These consists of pillboxes and a high concentration of fire power.

There is a high concentration of artillery and AA defenses throughout the DEFENDER CAP. Pollway artillery is reported between ALTERIRCH and MULHOUSE, and

BELFORT GAP. Railway artillery is reported between ALTKIRCH and MULHOUSE, and heavy long range artillery in concrete emplacements has been reported near BASLE.

Along the HHINE, in the MULHOUSE region, the MAGINOT defenses have been turned to fire west. Where it was impossible to turn them, they are being destroyed.

2. Conclusions

a. The enemey capabilities are limited to delaying actions and defense in the

fortified area of BKLFORT proper.

b. The outpost line will be thinly held as a series of strongpoints guarding b. The outpost line will be thinly held as a series of strongpoints guarding avenues of approach along roads. The enemy will not reinforce these strongpoints, but will fall back to a line GIROMAGNY-BELFORT-DELIE, using artillery consentrations in front of this line. The main strength of the enemy will be employed on this line, based firmly on the VOSCES and the Swiss border. The last line of defense would be ROUGKMONT-MERTZEN-DANNEMARIE, to which the enemy can bring up all available reserves from the SIECERIED Line and the general army reserve to attempt to prevent allied progress north up the valley of the WHINE.

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HADOUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP Office of the A. C. of S., G-2 APO 23, U. S. Army

18 November 1944

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

Situation on the Franco-Italian Border. Hq Sixth US Army Group 18 November, 0900A

1. German-Italian forces holding the Franco-Italian border total approximately 15,000. Of these about 7,000 are combat effectives capable of delaying action through aggressive patroling and local attacks. The attached sketch map shows the enemy order of Battle.

2. The sector of the Franco-Italian Border is held by the following German and Italian forces: Coast to LARCHE Pass, 34 Infantry Division; LARCH Pass to MT GENEVRE, elements 5 Mountain Division, probably elements 90 PG Division (1/2 Battalion) and elements MONTE ROSA Division; MONT CEMIS Pass, PETIT ST BERNARD Pass, GRAND ST BERNARD Pass, elements 157 Mountain Division and miscellaneous Mountain Jaeger

5. Passes along the border begin to close on account of snow by late October.

The principal passes -- LITTLE ST BERNARD, MT CENIS, MOMT GENEVRE, and LARCHE are blocked by snow from November through March unless they are cleared by mechanical means. It is not believed that the enemy can keep them clear under war conditions.

Passes are shown on the attached table.

4. OSS reported the general tenor of an order of KESSELRING to be:

a. Troops would be withdrawn from the Alpine Passes to foothills on the approach of winter weather.

b. Priority of withdrawal of troops from the Alpine Sector would be (1) German, (2) Russian, (3) Austrian troops. In case of an Allied breakthrough on the Appenine front troops from the Alpine front would man the PO - TIGINO Line with Italians manning the Alpine Front.

5. On the Alpine Front, the enemy has demonstrated a purely defensive attitude, with evident intention of withdrawal. Troops have been withdrawn from the border to the Italian Front and to the northeastern Italian border. Increased traffic has been noted toward MILAN and GENOA, including both personnel and war material. Defense lines are hastily constructed in the valleys, with more emphasis being placed on the coastal region. Demolitions have been noted in several areas. Many large headquarters have been moved from this area east to Lake COMO and Lake GARDA. Troops in the MILAN-GENOA area have moved out.

The presence of German troops in the area is mostly due to partisan activity and the necessity to keep lines of communication open. Actual large scale withdrawals will depend on the situation along the Italian front.

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MEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 25, U. S. APMY

18 November 1944

G-2 ESTEMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

MARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

Theny activities in forward areas and new identifications.

Along the Sixth Army Group front the enemy now is employing ten nominal divisions, musting te approximately 15,000 combat troops in the First French Army Sector demother 15,000 in the Seventh Army Sector. The enemy has been retreating with the opposition South and East of BELFORT, showing determined resistance only in a ferts surrounding the city. His first line of defenses has been broken and his cond (DELE-SELFORT) has been penetrated at MORVILLARS. In the central sector a cases, has disengaged rapidly, falling back to defensive positions behind a ne running roughly LE THOLI-ST DIE-BADONVILLER. Resistance in the vital approaches any state of the penetral sector in the first Army Front the enemy has committed all sections are remained as a second sector of the first Army Front the enemy has committed all sections are remained as a second sector of the first Army Front.

forements, concentrations, and establishments in rear areas.

There are an estimated 28,000 low quality reserves in the area still to be semitted. The Siegfried Line has been drained of all available reinforcements, which have been used as static forces in the BELFORT area. Reinforcements recently arrived are low quality Volksgrensdier troops. There are indications that one more division from NOUMAY may be arriving on the Seventh Army Front. It is estimated that fivision from NOUMAY may be arriving on the Seventh Army Front. It is estimated that all available armored forces will be contained by Twenty First and Twelfth Army Irons.

Terrain and weather as they affect the enemy.

Terrois still favors the enemy. The crests of the VOSGES from the BALLON D'ALEACE MOUNT DOMES will permit him to hold dominating positions along the central portion his front. He is valuerable in the BELFORT GAP on the South, allowing access to a Ehime Valley and outflanking of the VOSGES position directly. In the North he equally valuerable through the SAVERHE GAP, allowing turning of the VOSGES position resultant separation of his First and Nineteenth Armies. Bad weather, most resultant separation of his First and Nineteenth Armies. Bad weather, most bably, will hamper allied air activity but will not seriously restrict ground towards, due to an excellent road network. Allied ground mobility is superior to at of the enemy, the is hampered by lack of the means of transportation.

USICES. newy Capabilities

- 1. To reinforce and hold along the whole present line.
 2. To attempt to hold a series of successive lines, as shown on the attached until he retires behind the SIREFRIED LINE.

le He reinforcements have arrived since the beginning of the attack. The enemy is still fighting in French territory, well outside the SIEGFRIED line, along the SIRth Army Group Front. Attacks by Twenty First and Twelfth Army Groups will force committeent of mobile forces on those fronts. Any reinforcements would necessarily be taken out of the SIEGFRIED line or drained from the reserve the enemy must keep ready to prevent penetration of the SIEGFRIED LINE and erossing of his beundaries to the North. It is estimated that one division at the most would be beundaries to the North. It is estimated that one division at the most would be available for reinforcement. Loss of troops in this area would not be justified by available for reinforcement. Loss of troops in this area would not be a the small advantage gained, since occupation of the Rhine Valley would not be a preponderent advantage for the Allies. It is considered unlikely that capability No. 1 would be affected. 11 4266

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED imate of the Enemy Sit In (Cont'd) November 1944 The axes of advance upen to Sixth Army Group are through BELFORT-MULHOUSE-COLMAR-STRASPOURG: SARREBOURG-SAVERNE-STRASPOURG: and SARREBOURG-ZMEIBRUCKEN*KAIRSERSLAUTEN.
The vital area to be protected by the enemy is a line roughly METZ-UHATEAU SALINS-SARREBOURG-SAVERNE-STRASPOURG, resting each flank on the SIECFRIED LINE and using a series of rivers and canals for defensive positions. The successive lines as shown on the attached may would permit controlled shortening of the enemy's front and could be held by reinforcing his vital SARREBOURG area with the troops thus released.

The Rhine and the Siegfried Line could probably prevent invasion of Germany south of STRASBOURG. Such an invasion would be any event be unfruitful for the Allies and could be controlled by the enemy with little expenditure of forces due to the extremely unfavorable terrain East of the River.

Low grade troops could be used to fight delaying actions up the Rhine Valley, until the fourth line is reached. A breakthrough in any section of the Fourth line would force immediate retreat behind the SIECFRIED LINE along the antire front of the Third Army and the Sixth Army Group. Penetration along the axis SARREBOURG-ZMEIBRUCKENG KAISER-SLAUTEEN would separate the German First and Nineteenth Armies, out extremely vital road, rail, and river communication lines, and set the Allies on the direct road to MANNHEIM. road to MANNHEIM. It is therefore considered most probably that capability two would be adopted. ANDREW J. TORIELLI Lt. Col., GSC. G-2/0I SECRET 313

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP Office of the A. C. of S., G-2 APO 23, U. S. Army

24 November 1944

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

Situation on the France-Italian Border. Hq Sixth US Army Group 24 November, 1200A

PRESENT SITUATION

Enemy disposition.

157 Mountain Division with attached units (888 Mountain Bn and Ost Bn) occupies the sector inclusive, the PETIT ST BERNARD, (No 4), exclusive the MONT GENEVER (NO 12).

Elements of the MONTE ROSA Division (Italian) occupies the sector inclusive MONT CHNINYEE (NO 12), exclusive LARCHE PASS (No 18).

Elements 5 Mountain Division occupy the sector inclusive LARCHE PASS (No 18) to ST MARTIN VESUBLE (N 6120).

54 Infantry Division occupies the sector from ST MARTIN VESUBLE to VENTIMIGLIA on the MEDITERRANEAN Coast.

b. Estimated enemy strength of combat effectives:

DOWNGRADED 10:

157 Mountain Division MONTE ROSA (elements)
5 Mountain Division (elements)
54 Mountain Division 2,500 600 1,000 3,500 EHORET TITLE OF A.C. OF S. OPD

7,600

Initials Date

TOTAL

The overall strength of enemy effectives on the Alpine front is estimated at approximately 15,000.

2. SITUATION BEFORE SEPTEMBER 26.

a. Enemy disposition.

157 Mountain Division and elements of Alpen Jugend Division occupied the sector inclusive PETIT ST BERNARD to MONT GENEVER.

5 Mountain Division (elements) and 90 PG Division (elements) occupied the sector from MONT GENEVER to LARCHE PASS.

sector from MONT GENEVIE to LARCHE PASS.

148 Inf Division occupied the sector from LARCHE PASS to the Coast.

NOTE. At the end of September the 148 Inf Division was withdrawn to the rear area for refitting and is at present located South of GENOA. The 34 Inf Div took over the sector from the 148 Inf Div. Since the end of October no identifications of elements of the 90 PG Div were reported while recent identifications of elements of 5 Mountain Div as well as the identification of its C P in SALUZZO (N8583) indicate that the major part of the well depleated divisions are now on that front. Since the middle of October no reports indicating the presence of ALPEN JUGEND Division are available.

3. DEMOLITIONS

Since the middle of October the enemy is ingaged in extensive demolitions in the BREIL-VENTIMIGLIA area (including burning of localities) as well as on the LARCHE PASS and on MONT CENIS (road demolitions).


4. CONDITIONS IN THE PASSES

Passes along the border usually began to close on account of snow by late October. The principal passes--LITTLE ST BERNARD, MT CENIS, MONT GENEVRE, and LARCHE--are blocked by mow by November through March unless they are cleared by mechanical means. It is not beliefed that the enemy can keep them clear under war conditions. Passes are shown on the attached sketch map; periods of blocking are shown on the attached table. Additional data on present conditions will be forwarded as soon as received.

5. On the Alpine Front, the enemy has demonstrated a purely defensive attitude, with evident intention of withdrawal. Troops have been withdrawn from the border to the


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


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ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH ARMY GROUP (Alpine Zone)

In Contact Reservès and Artillery Effectives

6-7000

TOTAL

12-13,000

4. OPERATIONS

GENERAL

The enemy seems willing to withdraw on predetermined lines of resistance in the Northern sector, while holding fast in the central sector W and SW of ST DIE (V 4165), where he is already defending key positions in his fortified line.

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY
I Gorps: The usual patrolling and harrassing artillery
fire was punctuated by an increase in mortar and artillery fire at
PONT DE ROIDE (P 3474) on 1/2 November.
II Corps: For five days the enemy peppered the sector
well with artillery fire, particularly in the area of CORNIMONT (V 3329)
only to be taken by surprise by the 3 DIA's attack of 3/4 November.
His reaction, initially feeble, stiffened at his line of resistance,
due to his being strengthened by additional troops.

His reaction, initially feeble, stiffened at his line due to his being strengthened by additional troops.

(2) SEVENTH ARMY
WI Corps: During the period, resistance has centered on the key terrain W and SW of ST DIE (V.4165), with successive dug-in strong points delaying our advances on the N and S flanks, as the enemy withdrew to more tenable positions and straightened his lines.
JUSSARUPT (V.2752) was occupied at the outset of the period with no opposition, while small but determined counterattacks held us off in the area N.3666. Dug-in positions NE of BIFFONTAINE V.3057 were utilized on the S flank, while an enemy withdrawal to the NE was indicated; FRAIPERTUIS V. 2470 proved clear of enemy on. 29/30 October.

Contact was regained with our "LOST BATTAILON" by 30/31 October at V.3457, however, south of that area intense opposition and counterattacks kept us off Hill 516 (V.3664) while he was successful in taking HILL 556 (V.3668). On the North ST EENOIT (V.2673) was cleared of the enemy. Strong resistance was met only in the area (V.2873). Resistance began to stiffen generally on 31 October/1 November when our troops were forced back vicinity V.3256, By 1/2 November only scattered resistance was received on the South fank, prior to the occupation of the terrain feature at V.3468. The FORET DOMANIALE continued to be resolutely held from strong points scattered along its edges, but LDS PAINCES V.3569 and NOMP-TELIZE V.3470 were casily taken by our troops. Inter dug-in positions delayed our advance on the ST EENOIT-ROOM-LETAPE V.3478 axis, at the end of the period the enemy had taken up a defense from strong points at the mouth of the LES ROUGES EAUX Valley. HILL 616 and HAUT JACQUES V.3564 remained firally in enemy hands in the central sector, but LA SALLE V.3269 was cleared.

VX Corps: Aggressive patrols and widespread artillery had characterized the enemy's attitude until the 1 DB's attack on 1 November, which evidently attained a degree of surprise. Opposition was found to be strong est on the line AZERAILES

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5. SUPPLIES

According to an OSS report of 1 November, air attacks on gasoline plants had a serious affect on all trasport in Germany and particularly in ALSHCE where very few vehicles are now gasoline operated. Due t shortage of liquid motor fuel in this area, even the Army services of supply depend on charcoal burners for fuel.

Stocking-up of small supply dumps in the BLACK FOREST appears to be progressing steadily according to reports which claim that numerous storage sites are being developed, although only a few of these have so far been located.

Indications that machinery and equipment evacuated from areas west of the RHINE and from ITALY are being used for new factories in the area of Lake CONSTANCE, and notably in the vicinity of LINDAU (C 58), coupled with increased rail activity and a recent shift of railway administrative personnel to the SINGEN-RADOLFSZELL (W 91) sector, suggest that part of German industry is being shifted from occupied zones to the comparative safety of the region just north of the SWISS frentier which as yet is largely unaffected by Allied Air effort.

6. MOVEMENT

German railways continue to feel the effects of Allied air attacks in a serious lack of rail equipment, especially locomotives. Reports also indicate that many workers refuse to drive the trains through the exposed areas, particularly those leading towards the western front.

Reports of the past week indicate that the rail line from SINGEN through IMMENDINGEN in the direction of WALDSHUT is being used for transporting troops and supplies. This line is also being used for the evacuation of factory material from the MULHCUSE area, although from WALDSHUT these "non-war" materials pass through SCHAFTHAUSSEN to: SINGEN. A recent Swiss report now refers to it as the "Strategic Railroad Line".

French sources stated that heavy freight traffic from Italy to Germany uses the INNSBRUCK-LINDAU line. The freight may be more factory equipment evacuated from Italy.

Activity along the RHINE shows that the power production of the KEMES Plant is back to 50% and the RHINE boats can again run from STRASBCURG to BASEL. It has also been reported that all RHINE traffic now moves exclusively by night. Boats are loaded in HOLLAND for STRASECURG, the main point for traffic across the RHINE, and here they are reloaded for shipment via the RHINE-RHONE Canal. In this connection it is of interest to note that many bargemen have been transferred from the RHINE to RHINE-RHONE Canal.

While there is NO indication that these shipments are of a military nature, this waterway, although a fairly slow means of transport, represents a valuable addition to the enemy's land lines of Communication especially when his rail lines become unserviceable. TAC/R for the past week reported continued rail activity in and around MULHOUSE, BELFCRT, and CERNAY (V 5812) areas.

The NEUF ERISACH and CHALAMPE railroad bridges appeared to be in use again for railroad traffic. However, since then they have both been hit by Air, and their serviceability is at present unknown. The pontoon bridge at CHALAMPE was also hit by Air on 29 October. According to a French report, the pontoon bridge at NEUF BRISACH has now been reinforced to carry 40-50 tons.

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. APO 23, U. S. Army

WEATHER STATISTICS

I. III. General The Vosges Mountains
The Belfort Gap
The Rhine Valley
The Black Forest IV.

1. GENERAL

The appended statistics give pertinent weather data in the area south of MANNHEIM. It will be noted that rainfall is generally high, flying conditions are bad, and by November, the cloudy skies and unsettled weather of early winter prevail.

II. THE VOSGES MOUNTAINS. (See Appendices A and B).

1. Temperature

Winter weather prevails in the area during the months of November through March at altitudes of 3,000 feet and above, which are
generally snow covered. At lower levels, snow does not lie on the
ground for long periods. In the northern sector, where the mountains
are lower, mild unsettled weather alternates with cold spells.
Valleys generally have low night temperatures, causing fog which persists until late morning.

2. Precipitation

Although October is the wettest month of the year, the worst storms occur in late December and January. During November, skies are overcast a majority of the time.

3. Influence on Movement (See Appendix A).

Roads over the summits of mountains are liable to be blocked intermittently. Passes over 4,000 feet altitude are blocked for a period of four months or more. The Route des Cretes is completely snowblocked for about five months.

III. THE BELFORT GAP (See Appendix C).

1. Temperature

The temperature varies as follows:

a. Cold snaps generally follow rain.
b. At the geginning of November, the first cold weather begins to appear. (About 32 degrees F).
c. The first serious frosts are noted toward the end of November. d. The real cold period begins in Mid-December. (Oftentimes a mild spell, between Christman and the first of e. Streams are not sufficiently frozen to permit skating before Christmas, as a general rule.


2. Precipitation

Autum is the driest season of the year. The heavy rains and snow storms begin about the middle of December.

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APPENDIX "A"	Jan Sala Carlo Carlo Barrella	The state of the s
	THE VOSGES PASSES	
PASS	HEIGHT BLOCKED (FEET)	ROUTE
SOMEOWIE (V 5151)	3144 Intermittent Dec to	ST DIE (V 4265) - COLMAR (V 7142)
ROUTES DOS CRETOS	2950 Nov to late May 4450	BONHOMME PASS (V 5151) SCHLUCHT PASS (V 4841) CERNAY (V 5820)
SCHLUCHT (V 4841)	3757 Late Nov to May	GERARDMER (V 3642)- COLMAR (V 7142)
BRAMONT (V 4255)	3173 Intermittent Dec to	GERARDMER (V 3642)- THANN (V 5212)
BALLON DE ALSACE	3685 Late Nov to Early	BELFORT (V 3493) - GERARDMER (V 3642)
BOUTE JOPPES	2428 Dec to March	MASEVAUX (V 4508)- THANN (V 5212)
		THANN (V 3612)
Level of Control		

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED The average rainfall in this region is 33 inches a year and in some areas of the forest as high as 55 inches. The outer fringes recome areas of the forest as high as 55 inches. The outer fringes recome from 31 to 47 inches and the higher central region well over 47. In the minimum rainfall for this region comes during the winter months of the minimum rainfall for this region comes during the winter months of the dry-light showers or drizzles. Thus, although December is often the dry-light showers or drizzles. Thus, although December is often the dry-light showers or drizzles. Thus, although December is often the dry-light showers or drizzles. Thus, although December is often the dry-light showers or drizzles. Thus, although December is often the dry-light showers of the year, it may have a greater number of rainy days est month of the year, it may have a greater number of rainy days with February and March being very little behind. Snow may fall as early as October, but rarely below altitudes of 1,500 feet. In November, snow begins to be fairly frequent. By December, winter conditions have set in and snow is as frequent as rain. On the outer fringes, the average is from 30 to 50 days of snowfall for the season. In the higher central region the average is over 50 days. Precipitation 3. Visibility The winter is the cloudiest season of the year. The clouds are low and mountain regions are often above cloud level. Up to levels of 3,000 feet, hilly and mountainous regions have a notably high cloud amount. (Eight-tenths of the time in winter). Because of this winter cloud maximum combined with the shortness of daylight, sunshine winter in January average only one to two hours per day. Fog is nearly always land fog. At high mountain stations, mists and fog are really clouds and the frequency of occurence is very high. SECRET

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KARLSRUHE						400	17	16
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MANNHEIM								1
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
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
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HEADQUARTERS .SIXTH US ARMY GROUP Office of the A. C. of S., G-2 APO 23, U. S. Army

Date: 11 Nov 44

110900A November 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 8

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 11 NOVEMBER 1944

GENERAL SUMMARY

During the week, the enemy maintained a coherent defense in the face of almost continuous attack. Aided by naturally defensive terrain and bad weather, he rapidly shifted small units to threatened localities. This resulted in a confusion which may well require some new tactical unit to cover reorganization.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Zone)

At the close of the period the First and Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line: LAGARDE (Q 2410), HERBEVILLER (V 3966), ST MAURICE (V 3290), RAON L'ETAPE (V 3378), West of ST DIE (V 3966), LA HOUSSIERE (V 3455), LAVELINE (V 2754), LA FORGE (V 2641), CORNIMONT (V 3329), RAMONCHAMP (K 2830), RONCHAMP (K 2208), MIGNA-VILLERS (P 2795), COLOMBIER-CHATELOT (P 2379), VILLAR LES BLAMONT (A 3564).

a. Change in the disposition of Armies and Corps:

The alignment of Corps north of ST DIE still remains somewhat obscure. The presence of an Infantry Corps (probably the LXXXIX) is accepted on the north flank of LXIV Corps. A PW of 1119 GR, 553 Infantry Division, stated that the second battalion, previous to its commitment on 8 November, was in LVIII Panzer Corps reserve. However, it is definitley accepted that both 553 Infantry Division and 361 Volksgrenadier Division are operating under an infantry corps on the First

grenadier Division are operating under an infantry corps on the First Army south flank.

The LXIV Reserve Corps responsible for the sector North and South of ST DIE has probably under its command the 716, remmants of 16 and elements of the 338 Infantry Divisions, while IV GAF Corps, which has apparently shifted North, assumes responsibility for the sector occupied by the 198 Infantry Division. LXXXV Corps order dated 15 October found on PW from 338 Infantry Division, suggests that the Corps sector now extends north to include the 269 Infantry Division. Such a shift to the North of the LXXXV Corps sector and the reported presence in BELFORT of General von OPI EN'S Headquarters may indicate further changes in the assignment of responsibilities on the enemy's southern most sector.

b. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. Von der CHEVALLERIE)

(1) LXXXIX Corps:

361 Volksgrenadier Division. 953 Volksgrenadier Regiment and 952 Volksgrenadier Regiment were committed in the XII US Corps zone, while 951 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified on November 7 on the 100 US Division zone, sandwiched between elements of the 716 Infantry and 21 Panzer Divisions.

553 Infantry Division had its elements spread on a front opposing the 44 US Division and left flank of the 2 French armored Division.

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c. NINETE NTH ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. WIESE)

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(1) LXIV Reserve Corps (CG: Gen. d. Inf. LASCH)
A further shift to the South of the 21 Panzer Division confirms the presupposition that the division is temporarily under LXIV
Reserve Corps. Elements of the 192 PGR and the 21 Panzer Recon Battalion were identified on November 9 in the 100 US Divisions zone, while contact with elements of the division previously identified on the XV Corps zone, was lost. The intentions of the enemy as to further use of the division remain obscure.

A PW statement on November 7 may confirm the indication that the division will be withdrawn.

The picture on the 716 Infantry Division sector remains confused. The 736 GR and 716 Fusilier Battalion were identified in 3 US Division zone with the 951 Volksgrenadier (361 Infantry Division) on its right. The 726 GR on the other hand was shifted South and remains LXIV Reserve Corps (CG: Gen. d. Inf. LASCH)

of Division zone with the 951 Volksgrenadier (361 Infantry Division) on its right. The 726 GR on the other hand was shifted South and remains intermingled with elements of the 338 and 16 Infantry Divisions.

Further south remnants of the 16 Infantry Division (elements of 221 GR, B G GRIMM, 225 GR) intermingled with organic and attached elements of 338 Infantry Division (757 GR, 201 and 202 Mountain Bns; 291 ZBV Bn) are operating in Battle Group formations, opposing the 3 US and portion of the 36 US Divisions zones. All these elements are presumably under 16 Infantry Division. presumably under 16 Infantry Division.

(2) IV GAF Corps (CG: Gen.d. Flg. PETERSEN) 198 Infantry Division. Organic elements (305 GR, 308 GR, 326 GR, 198 Fus.) and attached units (360 Cossack Regiment, 61 Fortress MG and the 39 Fortress MG Battalions) were identified in the 36 US Division zone. Due to the broad front occupied by the division, a reorganization of the sector should be expected. Such a supposition implies either the shifting of the 269 Infantry Division north or the insertion of new elements, possibly Volksgrenadier formations. French SR reports the arrival of such units on the VOSGES Front.

(3) LXXXV Corps (CG: Gen.d. Inf. KNIESS)

The 269 Infantry Division, previously supposed under the IV GAF.Corps, seems to be now under LXXXV Corps (indicated by captured order). The three regiments (469 GR, 489 GR and 490 GR) were committed south of GERARDMER, stemming the attack of the French 3 DIA. It may be presumed, therefore, that this fresh division has also committed its reserves. The location of the southern boundry of the division is not known, and it is not clear who assumes responsibility for the sector occupied by the remaining elements previously attached to the 338 Infantry Division, (1034 Fortress, 40 Fortress, 1433 Fortress, 807 Fortress 808 Fortress Battalions, 404 Engineer, 746 Engineer Battalions, II and III/CV.) The 933 GR, identified on October 30 in the 16 Infantry Division sector has not been identified since, suggesting that the regiment has followed the divisional staff located in LXXXV Corps area. The reported presence of the staff of the 338 Infantry Division in VIEUX THANN (V 5212) may indicate that the divisional staff still assumes responsibility for the sector opposing portions of the French 3 DIA and DMI zones.

It also seems that the 159 Infantry Division has shifted

It also seems that the 159 Infantry Division has shifted south while von OPPEN (headquarters located in BELFORT) possibly assumes responsibility for the sector opposing I French Corps. The lack of activity and identifications on this front leaves at present no basis for clarification of the enemy disposition opposite the I French Corps zone.

d. GENERAL RESERVE

No change.

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VI Corps: In the Southern zone, the enemy's defence during the period centered about the LES ROUGES EAUX Valley, where the reaches of the FORET DOMANIALE DE CHAMPS (V 3460) provided vantage points for strong resistance; LA HOUSSIERE (V 3455), whose approaches had been well fortified; and the crossroads town of LAVELINE (V 2853). SP been well fortified; and the crossroads town of LAVELINE (V 2853). SP guns at strong points provided static defense abetted by local tanksupported counterattacks. Determined opposition was carried to the supported counterattacks. Determined opposition was carried to the EMONT (V 3658) with strong mortar, artillery and tank fire at the end of the period.

In the central zone, determined resistance at the beg In the central zone, determined resistance at the beg the period was met from strong positions at HAUT JACQUES (V 374 Hill 616 (V 3664) on the axis of approach to ST DIE. Further I the enemy utilized small arms and MG fire from dug-in position house-to-house fighting in slowing our advance in DEYFOSSE (V LE MENIL (V 3474) and LA BOSSE (V 3373). SP, mortar and artilifire continued to harass our troops as they entered these town the end of the period, the enemy seemed to have withdrawn to might to the East.

the end of the period, the enemy seemed to have withdrawn to hew ions to the East.

To the North, THIAVILLE (V 3130) and the approaches to F To the North, THIAVILLE (V 3130) and the approaches to F L'ETAPE (V 3478) were stubbornly defended at the beginning of the iod; the defense was bolstered on the 5/6 November by the arrival new troops and by use of tank fire from East of the MEURTHE River the 9th, new enemy positions had been found in the FORET DU RECLE (V 3883) and opposition was centering on the roads leading to RAC (V 3883). Rocket fire was received in BERTRICHAMPS (V 30 By 9/10 November lack of contact and FW statements implied that the enemy had withdrawn East of the MEURTHE River.

XV Corps: In the southern zone, harrassing arty fire be

enemy had withdrawn East of the MEURTHE River.

XV Corps: In the southern zone, harrassing arty fire began
the period as concentrations fell on HERBEVILLER (V 2896), MONTIGHT
(V 3191) and VACQUEVILLE (V 3287). The enemy was improving his defenses in the area V 3191, V 3290. Three ME-109's made a nuisance raid
over the zone and enemy patrolsvainly attempted to cross the BLETTE
niver at V 2993. By the end of the period only sporadic artillery fire
and light patrol activity were reported.

The enemy in the northern zone spent most of his time improving defenses including those N of the VEZOUSE River from Q 2700-V2896.

Tanks and Nebelwerfers were observed in the area Q 2904; enemy troops
Tanks and Nebelwerfers were observed in the area Q 2904; enemy troops
Tanks and Nebelwerfers were observed in the area Q 2904; enemy troops
PARROY (Q 2005). By the 10th of November forward positions seemed
occupied in greater strength as contact was made on the entire front.
On the 10/11 November enemy planes dropped three bombs S of MARAIN—
VILLER (V 2099).

Alpine Front

VILLER (V 2099).

Alpine Front
In the 4 DMM sector scattered artillery continued to harass
our zone as the enemy was reported to have set off demolitions and
burned villages in the LARCHE area.

Resistance to the FABTF assault on MT GRAMMANDO (S 7893) was
only light. Explosions were general and frequent throughout the period, occurring at the VAL MADONNA (N 62), in the area of N 7506; some
iod, occurred N of VENTIMIGLIA (S 8787). Slight enemy action and
20-25 occurred N of VENTIMIGLIA (S 8787) slight enemy action and

5. SUPPLY

Prisoners from three Infantry divisions (553, 716 & 16 I.D.), two Armored brigades (111 and 113), as well as from 21 Panzer Division Armored brigades (111 and 113), as well as from 21 Panzer Division Provide additional information on German methods of supply in the Northern sector of Sixth US Army Group front during the month of October. The general procedure for Infantry and Grenadier formations is to assemble Battalion and Company transport at dusk every third day for night movement under strict blackout conditions to depots or nearby railheads, movement under strict blackout conditions to depots or nearby railheads, returning early next morning to the battalion area. In some instances returning early next morning to the battalion area. In some instances supplies were called for at regiment, but more often from division or supplies were called for at regiment, but more often from division or even Army dumps. At battalion, the supplies were distributed to compeven Army dumps. At battalion, the supplies were distributed to compeven Army dumps. At battalion, the supplies were distributed to compeven Army dumps. At battalion, the supplies were distributed to compeven Army dumps. At battalion area, and the supplies were distributed to compeven Army dumps. At battalion, the supplies were distributed to compeven Army dumps, for transport forward to the unit each night after dark.

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The company trains did not ordinarily handle ammunition, which was delivered to the front by battalion trucks.

Infantry, in moving from one location to another, usually carried two or three days march rations and sufficient ammunition. Company trains moved separately and were set up when the unit had been established in the new position.

Finel for armored upits was brought forward by a gas and oil section.

Fuel for armored units was brought forward by a gas and oil section of battalion supply company which distributed the supply to the companies under cover of darkness. Prisoners claimed that shortage of food and ammunition did NOT exist, and that fuel enough for requirements was regularly provided. However, there was an acute shortage of spare parts.

6. MOVEMENT

Limited observation during the week due to unfavorable weather prevents any conclusion as to trends of movement observed during the period. The few observations available showed only light and scattered movement. At STRASSBOURG, concentrations of 1500 railroad cars were noted on 6 November, and again on 8 November, but lack of observation on 7 November prevents a complete picture as to the amount of turnover. 10-12 locomotives with steam up were observed in the STRASSBOURG marsh-

alling yards on 8 November.

The condition of the RHINE River bridges has not been reported changed during the week, with the exception of the ERSTEIN bridge (V 997765) which is now reported serviceable. A French report states that the Germans have stocked enough reserve material along the banks of the RHINE between STRASSBOURG and HUNINGEN to build 7 or 8 bridges. Some of these would be built for light vehicles and marching troops, while others could carry vehicles weighing up to 60 tons.

7. DEFENSES

Our steady advance toward his MLR has caused the German to strengthour steady advance toward his MLR has caused the German to Strengthen his position by plugging the gaps in the system of continuous fire trenches all along the Sixth Army Group front. In the VOSGES, a second lime of fire trenches is being excavated a few hundred yards behind the existing defenses, and 100 new pillboxes are reported under construction around PHALSBURG (Q 6519) defending the approaches to the SAVERN GAP. Bridges are destroyed or prepared for dynamiting and roads are generally mined throughout the sector. Strongpoints show an increase in heavy weapons, A T guns, and artillery.

Ground sources continue to report large-scale construction of fortifications throughout the BLACK FOREST, and in the rough country to the East (SWABIAN JURA). This would seem an indication of some lack of

the East (SWABIAN JURA). This would seem an indication of some lack of confidence in the SIEGFRIED Line, as well as determination to resist on German soil.

The enemy seems worried about his defenses along the Swiss border, both east and west of the RHINE, Along the BELFORT-SWISS border he is both east and west of the RHINE. Along the BELFORT-SWISS border he is strengthening this heretofore comparatively weak section of his MLR with A/T ditches, fire trenches, mining and blocking all roads by cut trees. The enemy is not leaving any stone unturned that might hamper our movement, be it only for a very short time. East of BASLE where the RHINE follows the Swiss frontier, additional defenses are being reported cutting the valley from WALDSHUT (B 39) to STUHLINGEN (W 50) and from SINGEN (80) through TUTTLINGEN (W 83) to SIGMARINGEN (X 14).

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

Two saboteurs, charged with the mission of locating gasoline pipelines for future sabotage were seized by Seventh Army on 1 November. A third member of the party was caught on 10 November. Information has been received that additional agents will be sent to effect sabotage of this nature.

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EUGENE L. HARRISON Colonel, G. S. C. A. C. of S., G-2


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
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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 9

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 18 NOVEMBER 1944

GENERAL SUMMARY

In the face of Seventh US and First French Armies attack, the enemy's coherent defense is showing signs of deteriorating. Some divisions have reached a dangerously low level of combat effectives and are candidates for withdrawal. The arrival of one new large unit and various smaller units, as well as a reshuffle of the enemy's disposition, does not seem to meet the emergency. Therefor, further substantial reinforcements will be needed to reestablish the required balance.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Zone)

At the close of the period the First and Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line: LA GARDE (Q 2410), AVRICOURT (Q 3105), PARUX (V 4094), RAON L'ETAPE (V 3478), ST DIE (V 4165), CORCIEUX (V 3652), ROCHESSON (K 3145), LE DAVAL (V 3433), LE THILLOT (K 3029), RONCHAMP (K 3209), CHAMPEY (P 2696), HERICOURT (P 3296), MONTBELIARD (P 3587), MANDEURE (P 3681), ST DIZIER (A 4274).

a. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. Von der CHEVALLERIE)

Artillery Regiment, 1553 Engineer Battalion, 553 Fus. Battalion, 1553 A T Battalion). In addition elements of the Xth close range A T Regiment were also identified in the division sector.

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps: (CG: Gen d. Inf. LASCH)
The 21 Panzer Division left the VOSGIS front for the METZ area, where elements of two regiments were identified. Its sector has been taken over by the 708 Volksgrenadier Division, newly arrived from CZECHOSLOVAKIA. During the period, the 728, 748, and 760 Volksgrenadier Regiments, 708 A T Battalion, 708 Replacement Battalion, 708 Training Battalion and the 658 Artillery Regiment were identified in the XV Corps, zone. Furthermore, a number of units, we can appear of the state the XV Corps zone. Furthermore, a number of units, presumably attached to the division were also identified in the divisional sector (1417 Fortress Battalion, 602 Mobile Battalion, 14 and 19 Fen. Battalions, (probably labor battalions used for construction work) and the VOSGES JAEGER Battalion).

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ion still remains in the sector, as no identifications of its units were reported strice November 12. The strength of the division is estimated at about 1200. Unless the hard pressed enemy is obliged to throw into the battle all available units, the 716th should be a candidate for refitting and reorganizing.

16 Infantry Division. The division bore the brunt of the battle around ST DIE and its units are dangerously depleted. It is estimated that its effectives reached the critical level of 600. Unless the enemy brings up considerable replacements the division cannot be considered a tactical unit capable of reestablishing a reasonable balance in one of the vital sections of the VOSGES front, additionally balance in one of the vital sections of the VOSGES front, additionally weakened by the transfer of elements of the 338 Infantry Division from the sector to the southermost sector of the LXXXV Corps.

(2) IV GAF (CG: Gen d. Flg. PETERSEN).

198 Infantry Division is another candidate for substantial reinforcements. Its estimated effectives (including attached units) do not exceed 1800. In addition, the division is occupying an excessively large sector, suggesting that the enemy has its forces danger-ously stretched in the area North of GERARDEMER.

(3) LXXXV Corps (CG: Gen d. Inf. KNIESS)

269 Infantry Division. Since its heavy commitment South of GERARDMER previous to November 12, none of this division's units were identified in the French II Corps zone. This leaves in doubt the role of the division in the general reshuffle of the enemy's dispositions on French First Army front. Its southern neighbor, the 159 Infantry Division is to all appearances undergoing a reorganization. The identified 1211 and 1210(absorbed elements of 251 GR) Infantry Regiments are probably the newly renumbered regiments of the 159 Division. The probable Third Regiment (1209) has not yet been identified and is supposed to include the 9 GR. The 189 Infantry Division, recently re-

ents are probably the newly renumbered regiments of the 159 Division. The probable Third Regiment (1209) has not yet been identified and is supposed to include the 9 GR. The 189 Infantry Division, recently renamed Volksgrenadier Division, reappeared on the 2 DIM front and took over the southern portion of the 159 Infantry Division sector. 1212 (formerly 1000 Sec. Regiment) and 1214 (formerly MENKE Regiment) Volksgrenadier Regiments were identified in the 2 DIM zone. It is probable that the 1213 Volksgrenadier Regiment, not yet identified is the former Regiment JUNGE (including HOLLEMMAYER And GABRIEL).

338 Infantry Division took over the sector formerly occupied by von OFPEN Brigade. PW statements reveal that its recently renumbered Regiments (confirmed by the captured document found on Gen. OSCHMANN, CG 338 Infantry Division) were constituted by the absorption of regiment KASSERBEER and ROTH (previously of the von OFPEN Brigade) and possibly by the inclusion of elements of its old organic units. Regiment GEIGER, identified on the southernmost portion of the divisional sector, includes Battalion WOGT (composed of elements of the 91 GAF Regiment, 1433 Fortress Infantry Battalion) and the WONITZKY Battalion (composed of the LXXXV Corps Training School, and elements of MURMAN Battalion.) There are indications that the GEIGER Regiment is the former 757 GR (Major GEIGER was C. O. of a Battalion of the C v Regiment partially absorbed by 757 GR.) 758 Regiment is the former ROTH Regiment of the von OPPEN Brigade. 759 Regiment contains Battalions BOSCH AND RAEDENER of the Regiment KASSERBEER, (von OPPEN).

Considering that the 933 GR, an organic regiment of the division, was practically exterminated, it is possible that remnante will be also included in the 759 Regiment, Other organic units of 338 Infantry Division identified in the divisional sector were: 338 A T Battalion, 338 Engineer Battalion, 338 Fus. Company. In addition, units probably atached to the division were identified by document (993 GHQ Artillery Batta

of responsibilities.

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XV Corps: Our early breakthrough of the forward defense lines at ANCERVILLER (V 3393) prompted a slight unavailing armor reaction at HALLOVILLE (V 3395); NONHIGNEY (V 3894) was held as a strong point throughout most of the period, but the enemy had fallen back to stubborn resistance before BLAMONT (V 3499) and the VESOUZE River, as we occupied BADONVILLER (V 3889) at the end of the period. The LEINTREY (Q 2603), VEHO (Q 2400) Road and World War I positions on high ground vicinity Q 2506 provided excellent defense positions until overrun, after which AVRICOURT (Q 3206) was stubbornly defended and attempts made to reconstitute the AVRICOURT-MOUSY (Q 3008) Line proved fruitless, despite reinforcements from the North.

Alpine Front: Exceptions to the usual harrassing fire and desultory patrolling characteristic of the 4 DMM front were to be found in demolition activity in the LARCHE Valley at the beginning of the period. In the FAETF zone, the enemy stirred himself and staged several company strength attacks early in the period in the area S 7096-7895, while fire fights took place 15/16 November at N 7312; vehicle movement was noted in the S 8887 and VENTIMIGLIA areas.

5. MOVEMENT

Because of extremely bad flying weather, this information is chief- .

ly from OSS and French sources.

All empty open freight cars in the KARLSRUHE rail district were being moved towards the BELFORT area on 5 November. Possible preparation for evacuation of materiel may be indicated.

Many troops from NORWAY and DENMARK have already (13 Nov) been sent to the western front and south Germany. Three battalions of mountain troops from NORWAY passed through NEUF BRISACH and COLMAR towards MUNSTER followed towards MUNSTER followed the next morning by a train carrying skis. These mountain troops have not yet been identified on our front. Another three trains of Volksgrenadiers (possibly part of 306 Volksgren Div) passed through STRASSBURG on 12 November destined for the VOSGES Front. Also reported were two trains carrying artillery (50 light and estimated 50-100 medium pieces) plus three trains of small

arms ammunition which moved into our area via the bridges of KARLSRUHE, STRASSBURG, and CHALAMPE.

A large amount of traffic out of South Central Germany and Austria
is carried along the Swiss border to SINGEN, thence to OFFENBURG, viaVILLINGEN. The SINGEN, IMMENDINGEN line, therefore, remains of primary importance, and reports mention heavy AA and smoke generators recently arrived at SINGEN.

cently arrived at SINGEN.

An increasing number of ferries along the RHINE have been reported between RHEINAU and the Swiss frontier, and are being used for the transport of heavy night traffic only. In addition, 50 barges were reported observed in the vicinity of NEUENBURG. These barges ferry troops and material across the river and can form a temporary bridge should the existing one be damaged

After a successful bombing day (18 Nov), TAC/R reports indicate that only the BRISACH floating highway bridge remains serviceable south of STRASEBURG. All other bridges south of STRASEBURG are reported out of action. (TAC/R 18 Nov and 12 Nov).


In the north our progress in the BACCARAT, BLAMONT Sector should permit us to outflank the enemy MLR running BLAMONT (V 3499) ETANG de STOCK (Q 4117), CANAL des HOUILLERES (W of SAAREBOURG, Q 5015). Following a NE direction, parallel to and east of this MLR no major organized defenses are encountered until the strongly defended position at PHALSBOURG is reached, barring the immediate approaches of the SAVERN GAP.

SAVERN GAP.

Information concerning VOSGES passes is derived mainly from ground sources. The SAALES Pass (V 5372), reputedly the easiest pass in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified.

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DECEMBER EATHER SUMMARY

FOR THE

VOSGES MOUNTAINS AND UPPER RHINE VALLEY

GENERAL

In December, temperatures drop off sharply from November levels and average very close to freezing. Precipitation, though generally less in amount than in the preceding months, will occur on more than half the days. Much of this, especially in the mountains, comes as snow or freezing rain. Long periods of overcast skies are the rule. These conditions combine to produce a soil super-saturated with moisture; movement of wheeled and even tracked vehicles is distinctly limited. Furthermore, frequent low ceilings and poor visibilities will prevent the use of tactical aircraft on three out of four days. In all, December is a decidedly unfavorable month for operations in the field.

TEMPERATURE

Temperatures will average near 'freezing throughout the area. Altitude and distance from the sea are the controlling factors. Epinal, with an average of 33° is typical of the Vosges foothills. Ballon de Servance with 27.7° shows the effect of the High Vosges. Strasbourg and Karlsruhe with 34° indicate the ameliorating influence of the Rhine Valley. Munich with 30.7 is representative of the Bavarian Plain. These are only the averages. Cold waves, originating in the intensely cold air of Eastern Europe, may invade the area at any time in December. The absolute minimum ever registered in the vicinity was close to -15 degrees in the severe winter of 1879-1880. In an average year the lowest to be expected will be about 10 degrees. The mercury is scheduled to skip below freezing on about 20 of the 31 days.

TEMPERATURE DATA (Degrees Fahrenheit)

	MEAN	AVERAGE DAILY MIN- IMUM	AVERAGE DAILY MAX- IMUM
BELFORT	32.9	28.9	36.8
BALLON DE SERVANCE	27.7		
RAMONCHAMP	32.2	25.0	39.4
EPINAL	32.7	28.2	37.2
MIRECOURT	33.6		
LUNEVILLE	34.7		
NANCY	34.0	29.7	38.3
ROTHAU	.33.1		
STRASBOURG	33.8	29.7	37.9
SAVERNE	33.6	29.5	37.8
MULHOUSE	35.1		
COLMAR .	36.0	30.9	41.0
MUNSTER	33.8	28.6	39.0
KARLSRUHE	34.0		
MUNICH	30.7		
BASEL	33.1		

PRECIPITATION

The controlling factors in the rainfall pattern are altitude, mountain exposure, distance from the sea. Northeastern France may be divided into four rainfall belts. First, there is the High Vosges with an average altitude of 1850 feet which receives the excessive Dacember total of 7.87 inches. Secondly, the intermediate altitudes of 1250 feet record the moderate fall of 4.52 inches. A third rain area is that of the low elevations of the Rhine Valley (500 feet), lying in the rain shadow of the Vosges Mountains and receiving a monthly total of only 1.26 inches. Lastly, the plateau area of Lorraine, with an average altitude of 650 feet, receives a monthly mean of 2.40 inches.

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THE SAME figures apply to the mountains of the Black Forest and Southern Bavaria with the amount dropping off as distance from the sea
increases. Nurnberg has an average of 1.7 inches and Munich 1.8 inches.

Rainy days are frequent in December. The High Vosges will have 16-18 days with measurable rainfall. The Rhine Valley reflects the effect of the Vosges Mountain barrier and has only 12-15 rainy days.

Snow may be expected at any time during the month. Amounts are seldom heavy, and the snow cover remains for only short periods. Again altitude is the controlling factor. Rothau (1138 feet) receives an average December fall of 2.0 inches with the greatest monthly total in recent years being 8.2 inches. Measurable amounts of snow may be expected to fall on 4-5 days at Epinal and Munster and on 9-10 days at high altitudes such as Ballon de Servance. In the High Vosges, the average December snowfall is 6.6 inches, and the record fall is 23.6 inches. A tabulation of the Vosges passes usually snow blocked is available in Appendix A, Sixth Army Group Weekly Intelligence Summary dated 4 November 1944.

RAINFALL - DECEMBER (inches)

COL de la SCH GERARDMER	ILUCHT			5.67
EPINAL				3.42
MIRECOURT				2.40
ST DIE				3.26
BACCARAT				2.87
NANCY				2.64
LUNEVILLE				2.32
SELESTAT				1.42
STRASBOURG				1.65
MULHOUSE				2.24
LAC d'ALFELD				9.48
COLMAR				1.06
MUNSTER				3.70
BELFORT				3.31
ROTHAU				5.35
	GERARDMER EPINAL MIRECOURT ST DIE BACCARAT NANCY LUNEVILLE SELESTAT STRASBOURG MULHOUSE LAC d'ALFELD COLMAR MUNSTER BELFORT	EPINAL MIRECOURT ST DIE BACCARAT NANCY LUNEVILLE SELESTAT STRASBOURG MULHOUSE LAC d'ALFELD COLMAR MUNSTER BELFORT	GERARDMER EPINAL MIRECOURT ST DIE BACCARAT NANCY LUNEVILLE SELESTAT STRASBOURG MULHOUSE LAC d'ALFELD COLMAR MUNSTER BELFORT	GERARDMER EPINAL MIRZCOURT ST DIE BACCARAT NANCY LUNEVILLE SELESTAT STRASBOURG MULHOUSE LAC d'ALFELD COLMAR MUNSTER BELFORT

CLOUDINESS AND MOISTURE

The outstanding characteristic of the Vosges-Rhine winter is the excessive amount of cloud cover. The average cloudiness at Epinal is 77%, at Strasbourg 79%, and at Saverne 81%. There are no completely clear days indicated. Furthermore, at Strasbourg, there will be an average of 18 days when the sun does not break through the clouds at all

Relative humidity averages high. The prevailing flow of southwesterly winds brings large amounts of maritime air to the vicinity. Strasbourg shows an average figure of 89%, one of the highest for all France.


The Combination of excessive cloudiness and high humidity prevents any thorough drying-out of the soil. The effect of this condition on military equipment is obvious.

VISIBILITY

Visibility records are very imadequate for this region, but fog is known to be frequent at this time of year. Strasbourg experiences fog on a third of the winter mornings. It often forms at an early hour and persists in the river valleys to the noon hours. It is a distinct hindrance to aviation as most of the airfields are located in valley exposures subject to fog. At Strasbourg 22 December mornings will have less than 6 miles visibility, 16 will have less then 22 miles, and 11 will have less than 12 miles.

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
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
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	and subtract f	rom sunrise. ARMY TIME OF	R 15 DEGR	ees East	TIME, ONE HOUR EARL -	
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(4) General Reserve The 30 SS Division has been committed in the southern sector in order to stem the advance of the French First Army. It is now accepted that the f9 Army Security Division does not constitute a tactical unit. Other available reserves from the V Wehrkreis, and other sources seem to be employed piece-meal on the whole Sixth US Army Group front. Army Group front.

c. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Front)

Units in Contact Divisional Reserve Artillery Effectives Gen Res W of RHINE Possible Res from Wehrkreis V and other sources

7,500 Committed

10,000

39,500 - not inc-luding arty eff.

Tanks and SP Guns

155 -

Not possible to estimate on acct of general withdrawal.

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), ECURG-S MAURICE (Z 4680), ECNNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022); AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUEIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONT GENEVRE (K 4602).

a. RNEHY DISPOSITION

157 Mountain Division with attached units (888 Mountain Battalion and Cst Battalion) occupies the sector PETIT ST BERNARD (inclusive) to MCNT GENEVRE (excluseve).

MONTE RCSA Division (elements) occupies the sector MCNT GUNEVRE (inclusive) to LARCHE FASS (exclusive)

5 Mountain Division (elements) occupies the sector LARCHE FASS to ST MARTIN VESUFIE (N 6120).

34 Infantry Division occupies the sector from ST MARTIN VESUBLE to VENTIMIGALA on the MEDITERRANIAN Coast.

to VENTIMIGLIA on the MEDITERRANIAN Coast.

- b. Eulk of forces withdrawing to foothills.
- c. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group Front (Alpine Front)

Artillery Effectives and Services

6-7,600 5-6,000

TOTAL

11-13,600

4. OPERATIONS

Dazed by our swift attack, the enemy was powerless to prevent a successful two pronged drive to the RHINE. At the close of the period, an attempt to cover his withdrawal from the VCSGES is developing. This takes the form of a holding attack north of MULHCUSE, and a reenforcing of the HAGENAU area, designed primarily to stabilize a line from the present salient East of METZ, to the RHINE, North of STRASSEURG. Should this prove successful, he might then attempt to recapture STHAS BURG.

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(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

I Corps: Our attack through MONTEELIARD (P 8836), and HERI-CCURT (P 9732), reached far beyond DELLE (A 4579) before the enemy could mass enough troops to counterattack on 21/22 November. His maline of resistance then bacame the RHIPL MARKE Sanai from NOWINGOM (A 4593) to ALTKIRCH (A 6292). Our troops reached MULHOUSE (V 0570) while the enemy still held RHINE bridgeheads from KEMBS (A 8398) southward. By nuisance raids and infiltrations the enemy threatened our lines of communication in the vicinity of RECHESY (A 2578), as a built up his strength further north.

II Corps: The forts of BELFORT (A 3493) and the area N of L THILLOT (A 3030) provided the major obstacles to II Corps! attack which met moderate resistance and numerous mines and demolitions.

(2) SEVENTH US ARMY

VI Corps: Only light resistance was encountered until to 21/22 November, when the enemy unsuccessfully attempted to hold pared positions near FRAIZE (V 4554) and SOULCY. At ST DIE, he sisted strongly until our bridgehead was established. After more arily strong stands at ST MARGUERITE (V 4364), DIJON (V 466) and BOURG-ERUCHE (V 5673) the enemy steady withdrew interrupting our ress by vain attempts at infiltration and by use of SP fire. The enemy was soon rooted out of dug-in positions in the FORET DURE (V 3783); in spite of small arms, sniper fire and mines.

XV Corps: Once BLAMONT (V 3499) was taken, SARREBOUND (Proved a minor obstacle, as the enemy beat a steady retreat along FHALSBURG axis, but resisted with dug-in tanks at NIEDERROT (Q 40 3056) that was growing in strength even as the period and while, except for the AT ditch and strong defenses of FRAISBOURG (Q 1965), and the SAVERNE GAP, the advance of our armored element little opposition in its dash to take STRASBOURG intact on the 25 November. As the German-held West end of the STRASBOURG intact on the 25 November. As the German-held West end of the STRASBOURG remain while an infantry-tank build-up near TIEFFENBACH (Q 3464) was being contested, the lower VOSGES yielded surrendering German while an infantry-tank build-up near TIEFFENBACH (Q 3464) was being ability.

Alpine Front: As the winter season set in on the Alpine area, skiers, active in the PETIT ST BERNARD (C 0045) and MT CENIS (H 4455) areas broke the monotony of inactivity in the Northern zone, Scattered mortar and artillery fire was noted to the South, as explosions continued in the VENTIMIGLIA (S 8282) area. Bridges were reported demolished by the enemy across the ROYA River between VENTIMICLIA and BEVERA (S 9282).

5. MOVEMENT

Of interest during the past week were the SHAEF report of movement of one Fanzer Division and possibly an Infantry Division through FRANK-FURT toward the SAARERUCKEN area on 18 and 19 November; the report of two trains with heavy artillery going towards KARLSRUHE from JURNBERG on 16 November; and the TAC/R report of intense rail activity on 20 November in the area KARLSRUHE (R 44), LANDAU (R 26), LUDWIGSHAVEN (R 59), and BRUSCHAL (R 65). The appearance of the 130 Panzer Division on the Army Group north flank is probably a result of the movement noted passing through FRANKFURT. The intense rail activity noted on the 20th probably was connected with the withdrawal from the SAAREBUERG and SAARREGUEMINES area; however; lack of more precise information renders a proper analysis difficult.

A French report of 21 November statedthat all the available trucks in the LORRACH region (A 9590) were sent to FREIBURG to insure the transport of troops and munitions to NEUF-BRISACH; and that 88 mm guns were being rushed there by truck from SACKINGEN (B 1684) and WHYLEN (A 9784). These movements indicate possible reinforcements to contain the break-through of the French First Army north of MULHOUSE.

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The approaches of both rail bridges south of STRASECURG have been bombed, and our advances to STRASECURG and along the Swiss border, cut the source of remaining real amountion routes. It remains to be seen how much rolling stock has thus been trapped west of the RHINE. The damaged rail bridges might still be used to evacuate personnel, in any case. The CHALAMPE-NEUENBURG bridge (V 858128), capable of carrying motor vehicles, is now in range of First French Army artillery. The pontoon bridges across the RHINE south of STRASECURG were all last reported as being out of action. However, bad flying weather has prevented observation since 20 November, so it is now quite possible that they are again being used.

All bridges between STRASECURG and MANNHEIM appear to be service-

All bridges between STRASBOURG and MANNHEIM appear to be service-able. These include 5 permanent rail bridges (including 3 combination road and rail) and 3 pontoon bridges.

6. DEFENSES

Capture of a German Inspection Report giving the status of the defenses in the area northwest of ST AVČLD (Q 25), indicates that the enemy intends to make extensive use of MAGINOT line field defenses, and is in process of re-organizing them. However, he has not had sufficient time to complete these preparations. The following tabulation gives the status of the contemplated work as of November 23.

A/T ditches A/T walls & obstacles Double apron fence First line trenches Second line trenches
M.G. & Mortar emplacements
Artillery & A/T gun emplacements
Artillery OP's

32% completed 45% " 1% " 54% 2% " 30% to 100% completed


It is quite possible that similar work in the Sixth Army Group sector has been brought to approximately the same state of completion.

The MAGINOT line leaves the RHINE at DALHUNDE (R 1819), where it consists of pillboxes, wire, trenches, and shelters, built on the N and E sides of hills and forests to repulse attack from those directions. The line proceeds northward in the form of a 3 to 5 mile wide belt of pillboxes, A/T obstacles and inundation projects, passing between SOULTZ (R 1038) and WISSEMBOURG (R 1348), where it turns west following roads and valleys to BITCHE. Between SOULTZ and LEMBACH (R 0345) are located 5 of the larger type installations of the MAGINOT line. These were built facing north and east but recent air cover shows slight activity and it is possible that the smaller guns housed shows slight activity and it is possible that the smaller guns housed in the coupolas can bring fire in any direction.


A number of the MAGINCT Line pillboxes were sited to take the N to S routes under flanking fire; it should therefore be possible for the Germans to make use of these against our approach from the south.

EUGENE L. HARRISON Colonel, G. S. C. A. C. of S., G-2


1 Incl. #1 - APPENDIX I, List of French-German Place Names.



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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 23, U.S. Army

20 November 1944

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Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 4

Period from 1 November to 15 November 1944

Part I. Civil Security

1. General Survey

The matter of control of civilian movement in Army, Corps and Division areas is constantly being worked on to increase it's effectiveness. Additional trained French gendarme personnel to assist in this work is much needed but difficult to secure. The ranks of the F.F.I. who are helping in this work have been reduced by their inclusion in the regular French Army. Naturally the best are those who enlist and the remainder are none too reliable. Complaints are heard that F.F.I. on post are in some cases apt to be discouraged by bad weather and abendon their posts in fevor of a barn or house.

VI Corps reports that the official stamp of the MAIRIE, was stolen by the Gestapo from Baccarat. All identifications and documents bear-ing this stamp are therefore suspect.

2. New Cases of Individual Suspects.

NEBEL, Ludwig, alias HAAS, Carl, alias NEUMANN, Leon. Confessed saboteur. Swiss nationality. Apprehended 31 October at road control point by C.I.C., 36th Div. just after he had crossed the lines immediately north of LE THOLY (V2643) from German occupied territory. Attempted to give tactical information to American officer. Pretended to be HAAS, Karl, Alsatian, escaping to join the French Army. After 36 hour interrogation by Seventh Army C.I.C. NEBEL disclosed that:

(1) He is a member of the SS, assigned to SD, Abtellung VI-S (sabotage section of the Reichsicherheitsdienst). He said he was an Untersturmfehrer of that organization.

(sabotage section of the Reichsicherheitsdienst). He said he was an Untersturmführer of that organization.

(2) His mission was to locate and destroy two gasoline pipelines which cross France at an unknown location. He received the mission loctober at Bedenweller, Germany, from Gruppenfuhrer SCHELLENBERGER.

(3) He was provided with about 80 lbs of magnetic demolition charges especially prepared founthe pipelines. He cached these inside the German lines until pipeline could be located. (It is considered more probable that he planned to use established dumps.) He was also provided with 1,000,000 francs in new banknotes in series and was provided by the Polizei Praesidium of BELFORT with the identity card he carried in the name of HAAS: Karl, Alsation, killed in an air raid at BELFORT. NEBEL was advised by Capt. HOFMANN, I-c of the 198 Div, GERARDMER, (V3641), to cross into American sector at a point just north of LE THOLY, where the lines were declared to be inside-

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quately guarded. NEBEL has been National Socialist since 1930, escaped from Switzerland in 1942 to join Waffen SS. Still a convinced Nezi, he said he would be happy to carry out his sabotage mission in France. Had been a sabotage instructor at two schools. Turned over to S.C.I. Paris.

ZELLER, Maurice, alias FONTANIER, Jean Louis. French nationality. Confessed sabeteur. Arrested by 36th Div C.I.C. at road control post, it hours after emergency alert had been given following information divulged by NEBEL. Had identity card in name of FONTANIER, Jean Louis, which he claimed had been furnished him by a Fred BENZIGER at ST DIE (V4166). Admitted to having been member of the Communist party, P.P.F. member, informer for the Miliee, and to have applied for work with the SD in February 1944. His confession states that he was sent to BELFORT in August 1944, to report to HAGEDORN, SD officer there. In BELFORT he met NEBEL, VLIEGEN and a group of Frenchmen. At BADENWEILER, the men of the group were given a one month's sabotage and explosive course, which ended about 15 October. At this time ZELLER and VLIEGEN volunteered for a sabotage and espionage mission offered by HAGEDORN. About 21 October he states he went with NEBEL, HAGEDORN and VLIEGEN to GER.RDMER (V3641). At this time ZELLER states that NEBEL showed him a map and photograph showing the location of an explosives dump near VERS/ILLES, which ZELLER was to use. ZELLER was also told that in Paris NEBEL would contact RICHARD, supposed to be the head of their organization in France. Zeller's mission, as given him by NEBEL, was to locate the Allied pipeline crossing France and to blow it up. ZELLER stayed at ST DIE between 23 and 28 October, then proceeded to GER.RDMER, from where on 29 October he started on his trip to Allied territory, by way of LE THOLY (V-2643). Turned over to S.C.I., Paris.

VLIEGEN, Ferdinand, alies VERNEUIL, Francois. Franch nationality. 57 years old. Commercial agent living at BRY-SUR-MARNE. Crossed the lines during 2 - 4 November along route GERARDMER - IE THOLY - CLEURIE - REMIREMONT. Apprehended by S.M. 7 November when applying for a pass to travel to DIJON. Claims mission given him by ZELLER was to gather information on civilian morale in liberated France, identification of units, troop movements, traffic density, quantity of material, fuel and ammunition supply dumps, sirfields and pipelines. Was given 50,000 francs. Was to give information to ZELLER at rendezvous in PARIS. VLIEGEN is believed to be one of the organizers of a stay-behind sabotage net operated by the Germans consisting of numerous Frenchmen, and an unknown number of hidden explosive dumps. Case turned over to S.C.I.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON NEBEL, ZELLER AND VLIEGEN:
Rendezvous of the tric was stated to be; (1) Villa LA ROUILLEE,
in a forest between PIERREFONT and TAILLEFONTAINE, near COMPIEGNE,
north of Peris; (2) 47 Ave. MURAT, PARIS, home of MARTIN, Richard;
(3) 98 Ave. PHILIPPE AUGUSTE, home of GRENET, PARIS. At rendezvous
they were to compare notes and notify their superior in Germany. Explosives allegedly were then to be dropped at a designates spot in the
forest of COMPIEGRA. All three were told to rose as refugees and at-

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tempt to ingratiate themselves with American troops with the usual instructions to attempt to give tactical information to the Americans.

tempt to ingratiate themselves with American troops with the usual instructions to attempt to give factical information to the Americans.

OUART, Deniel Meurice, Alias OBERT. French nationality. 17 years old. Apprehended by American reconnaissance troops after having crossed the lines at VACQUEVILDE (V3248) on 10 November 1944. He was interrogated by VI Corps S.A. and C.I.C. and admitted that he was employed by the SD and had been sent across the lines with the following mission:

(1) To get all the information he could on troops stationed at MENVILLERS (V-2887).

(2) To cheak whether there were any Franch troops in the sector.
(3) To identify divisions, dispositions and vehicle markings.
(4) To locate the employments of batteries.

OUARI stated that he left home efter a femily querrel to work for the Germans in STRASBOURG. In September 44 he mat Christian COUARNEAU, 16 years old, a Francist Party member. By promises of large rewerds.

COUARNEAU persuaded OUARI to join the German Intelligence Service and introduced him to c Captain MARTIN. On 10 - 11 September, MARTIN sent him to the espionage school at HUBACHER-HOF, a hotel in the Black Forest about 30 kms east of STRASBOURG. According to OUARI's confession there are about 25 Frenchmen there, whose average age is only 18 years. There are about 25 Frenchmen there, whose average age is only 18 years. There are about 25 Frenchmen there, whose average age is only 18 years. There are two courses, one in espionage and one in radio. The main subject studied in the sepionage course is organization of the Allied armies. OUARI did not take the radio course, since he refused to be percented behind the Allied lines, a necessary condition for the radio course. Before he started school, OUARI was made to understand by MARTIN that he was now a member of the German Intelligence Service and that his life no longer belonged to him. OUARI declared that this school until 8 November when he was chosen with two others to leave on his present location in the direction of BADEN-BJEN.

CHARISSOU (N), Armand. Recruited agents to become W/T operators in MOROCCO. Now believed to be somewhere in AUVERGNE. Should be apprehended for interrogation:

SOLVER, Vice Consul of DENMARK at 394 bis Ave. du Prado, M.RSEIL-LES. Background should be investigated for connection with M.YER and 35 Rits BARUCH arrested at Monte Carlo.

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BARUCH alias BARON, Henri, may now be working for American Red Cross at MARSEILLES. Should be kept under surveilance at 398 Ave De Prado, MARSEILLES for leads on above case.

STOLLE, Rene, 279 Rue Paradis, MARSEILLES should be investigated for leads in BARUCH case. May be employed at American Red Cross.

SMART, Elizabeth Mariette, English renegade and German agent wanted by AFHQ has been reported at THONON LES BAINS. To be arrested if discovered.

PAUSELLI, Pietro. Lives at Palais Mecatti, Promenede des Anglais, Nice. Suspected because of favors received from Germans.

CORDIER, Paul, Villa "Mon Dede", Belvedere (A.M.) and 219 Promenade des Anglais, Nice. To be evacuated to Nice because of close relations with Germans.

BLICK, and unknown friend, nationality Dutch. Being investigated for suspicious release after arrest by F.F.I.

BESSERO, Pierre, former inhabitant of Monte Carlo, close friend and aide to Armand Charissou, (see above) in recruiting W/T agents in MOROCCO, last reported in Paris.

THOME, head of SPEER organization in Italy now believed to be hiding in Paris. Left Milon for Paris in July to live with French mistress at large villa in suburbs.

GRAGLIA of La Roche suspected of line crossing.

GRUNEWALD, Renne, Collaborator. 6 months internment.

MANGES, Andre, N.S.K.K. (German Motor Corp) Case given to Territorial S.M.

HALB, Germaine, Wife of Paul HALB, S.D. Agent. Case pending.

MARTINET, Andree, Gestapo agent. Case pending

RICHARDEL, Michel, Gestapo Agent. Case pending.

MARTOT, Gabrielle. Gestapo Agent. Case pending.

TOURMANN, Rene. Gestapo Agent. Case pending.

DUFOUR, Bernard. Gestapo Agent. Case pending.

BERRAUDIERE, Guy. Gestapo Agent. Case pending.

VIDAL, Albert. Suspect. Case pending.

FIN, Joseph, suspect. Case pending.

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E G. Frmy Group For hightly CI Report No. 4. (continued) MOHAMED, Ben Tayeb ould Miloud. Milice member. Case pending BENSEFFA, Abdelkeder. Milice member. Case pending.

SABLEAU, Merie, Joseph. Ex-president of the Jeunesses Radicales, who had been taken to Siegmaringen by the Germans, escaped and having crossed our lines was sent to the D.S.M.

5. Progress of Cases Under Investigation.

BARUCH, Rite, alies BERTRAND, Jenine. Nationality German. Conc. fined at CIC prison, Cannes. Turned over to CIC by S-2, FSSF on suspicion of espicinage in collaboration with following persons (Through MANGOID, Bernard)

MAYER, Walter, alias MOREL and wife.

MATHIAS, Alfred.

SUSINI, Charles, fired on GIC agents at time of arrest. No confessions have yet been obtained. Arrested for line crossing and released after investigation.

RAYNAUD nee BIAGINI, Olga, born at VENTIMICLIA, Italy 15 February 1908. Wife of French postmen at MENTON.

ARRO, Lucie, born at Nice 4 December 1922.

CHIALVA, Giovanni, born Viller, Italy 10 May 1923. Lives at SOS-

GATTI, Giovdano and CAIMI, Julio, both escaped from German conten-tration camp Bordsaux. Turned over to French Police., BANKLLI, Jean, suspected of line crossing. Interrogated and placed under surveillance.

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GOLZAR, Heins "Bobby", now furnishing valuable leads on Abwehr.

SCOTTO, Eugenie, Line crosser, still under investigation.

DOBROWSKA, Cecile. Transferred to S.M., Nice for further interrogation.

VON MALTITIZ, Eugen. Trensferred to S.M., Nice for further interrogation.

CERESCIE; Louis Jeen, to be transferred to S.M. Nice for further interrogation.

SELLA, Andrea, Still being investigated. Imprisoned at Antibes.

IID DE TRANCESCHI alias "ADRIA" furnished intelligence to Abwehr office in Cannes. Has excellent connections in Swiss Embassy and other state offices. Has admitted relations with Abwehr Agents.

FRANCIA, Paulette. May have been letter drop. Has admitted relations with Abwehr agents.

SIEBERT, Charles; Becker, Adolph Bass (slies) GASTON and Bernard MANGGID at Moulins (Allier). Turned back to S.M. for further interrogation.

BENBARD, S.D. Agent from Delle. Interrogation has been finished and mis dossier has been sent to the Territorial S.M. preparatory to his being brought before the Willtary Tribunal at Besencon.

CALLOT, Francois. Todt Organization member who joined the lat Franch Army. Case transferred to the Territorial S.M.

IELLERO, Pierre Mercel. Todt Organization member who joined the let French Army. Case transferred to the Territorial S.M.

ROS/LTA, Dominique. Took Organization member who joined the let

Tronon Army. These transferred to the Torritorial B.M.

GUENAT, Henri. Gestapo informant. Casa pending

Two officers who belong so the Steff of Marshall Februa and were arrested, have been sent to the War Ministry in Paris

. Personalities In Area Still Total Sount Control

HITIER, according to an COO Report is located at Dissis non

HIME IR according to an OSS Report is at Himmisbarg Castle near

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DORIOT, Chief of P.P.F. Headquarters is reported as being at Neustadt (North of Karlsruhe).

BUCIRD, Chief of Francism. Headquarters at Baden-Baden.

A majority of those persons who followed the Vichy Government in its flight are now at Sigmaringen. (OSS locates Petain at Sigmaringen.)

MULLER, Lt. who was formerly at Bruyeres. Reported by OSS to be head of the Gestapo for the Meurthe Valley from Beccarat to St. Die. He is established in a chateau near Cleirfontaine (V-363745). Muller is guilty of numerous atrocities in the Rhone Valley.

TARGIONI - an Italian living in BARCEIONA possibly in the employ of HANS WERNER, Abwehr head in Italy. Seen often in the company of WERNER in Monte Carlo.

FAUCAMBERGE, Jean Coulters de - resident of Nice and Vencel Most important V-man for Max Bucholtz. Believed to be in Spain after he presented himself at Vichy just prior to the invasion of Southern France.

STEFANELLI, Emilio alies MILLOU and MILO, - in the employ of WER-NER in San Remo. Was trained at W/T agent, but was never used. At present in San Remo working as a handyman and secretary in Werner Center.

VILLA LODOLA - cemouflaged headquarters of Werner Organization In San Remo. Inhabited by three young German W/T men and 5 Italian W/T men, one of whom is named ANDREA.

PENSIONE DELLE PAIMS - rented by Werner as a billet for men in his employ. Place is run by a Swiss men and his two daughters.

FANCIOLI or FRANCIOLI - Swiss employed both by Max Bucholta and Hans Werner. At present is supposed to be training as W/T agent in school at San Remo.

STARL, Mr. and Mrs: - German couple used as agents by Werner! Are known to have given a great deal of information to Werner on the fersistance groups in Sen Remo sections. Man is known to have around lines on several occasions. Both can be found at the Ville Lorde.

RIBERO - Fesciat head in Bordighere and known agent of Hone Worner.

NOTE: The following are persons whom GU/RI, Deniel (SD Agent) set at espionage school at HUB/GKEN-HOF, in the Black Forest to tween 10 September and 8 November 1944 and are extracted from his confession. The first two names are the agents who GUARI

BCNNIRT, Roger. Probably born in SHNLES, as well as lived share. All 19 years old. Height I m 65; brown eyes; brown hatt, posted on lart;

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ovel face. Wears a round wrist watch. Dressed in dark brown double-breasted suit; army shoes. Member of Francist party. May have alies beginning with "B". May have with him paper attesting that he worked in Germany.

DESRUEL, Fnu. Alies unknown. Height 1 m 60; average build; 32 years old; grey eyes; brown heir parted on left; thin face. Wears square wrist watch. False identity card may contain address in FOITIERS. May be dressed in dark blue suit, single-breasted 3 button coat too large for him, as well as too long trousers. Member of Francist party.

SCHMIDT. Colonel. Infantry officer. Head of the Intelligence Service of the O.K.W. About 40 years old. Height 1 m 68. Stout. Has blond heir; grey blue eyes; round face; red complexion. Speaks very little French. Married.

BERAUT. Lieutenant. Theoretic instructor at the sebotage school. 32 years old. 1 m 71 tall. Average build. Has light chestnut hair; light brown eyes; long face; dull complexion. Speaks fluent French and English. Lives with his mother in the village of CHRISTIANSTADT, about 200 kms west of Berlin.

MARTIN. Captain and artillery officer. Assistant to Colonel Schmidt. 39 years old. Height 1 m 70. Average build; light chestnut hair; blue eyes; dull complexion. Speaks French fluently without an accent, deep voice.

X..........Artillery captain. Is in charge of the surveillance of the camp. 45 years old. Height 1 m 77; frail; dark hair; brown eyes; a bony face and dull complexion. Speaks very little French. Is married and has one child.

BATISSIER. French national. Former Commissioner of Police at Nice and Lyon. Is reported to be known as SCHMIDT in VICHY and to have been employed by the Gestapo as Criminakommissar. 45 years old. Height 1 m 70. Heavy build; greying hair; blue eyes; round face; colored complexion. Is married. His mother and his wife are at present with him.

BEAUBOIS. French national from VICHY. 32 years old. Reight 1 m 70; heavy build; dark heir; brown eyes; round face; colored complexion. Is married and his wife is with him.

MARGUARITA, Jacquis, alias Jean-Pierre MARTIN. Native of Montpernasse Paris. 16 years old; height 1 m 70; svorage build; light chestnut hair; blue eyes; oval face. Very decided Parisian accent. Was a member of the SD at SEDAN (arcennas).

RAMON, Jean, alias Jean RAVERDI. Native of Valenciannes. 18 years old; height 1 m 65; average build; chestnut hair; brown eyes; oval face. Is a Francist and is assistant regional chief at Valenciannes.

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SERRAT, Jean, slias Jean SARAU. Native of Haute-Savoie. 18 years old; 1 m 70; average build; blond hair; blue eyes; ovel face. Is a Francist,

LORIOT, elies LEROUX. Native of Valenciennes. 18 years old; Height 1 m 56; weak build; dark chestnut hair; brown eyes; hollow face. Distinguishing characteristics; node on the right side of his nack. Small mustache. Is a milicien and a Francist.

MARTEL. Native of Marseilles. 22 years old. Height 1 m 75; week build; light chestnut heir; grey blue eyes; oval face; very wide mouth. Was a member of the SD and is a Francist.

BORRIS, Jean. Native of Nice. 17 years old. Height 1 m ?1; average build; wavy blond hair; blue eyes; oval face; colored complexion. Is a Francist.

FABIANI, Andre, alies FARGES. Native of Paris. 24 years old. Height 1 m 68; heavy build; very sparse chestnut hair; blue syes; round face. Wears glasses with brown frames. Belonged to the German General Intelligence Service at the Hotel Ritz in Paris. Is a Francist.

DUPEYRON. Native of Paris. 19 years old. 1 m 70 tall. Average build. Has dark chestnut hair, light chestnut eyes, round face, Weers glasses. Is a Francist.

COUARNEAU, Christian. Native of Steine (Seine); 162 years old; height 1 m 58; average build; chestnut hair; brown eyes; round face. Had worked for 6 months with the NSKK in Russia. Later returned to Paris and steyed there until July 1944.

LANCELOT, alies LEMOINE. Born in Japen and settled in Paris. 22 years old; height 1 m 72; weak build; chestnut hair; brown eyes; oval face. Is a milicien of Haute-Savoie,

BARON, alias BEAUDECIN, Native of Paris; 20 years old; height 1 m 72; heavy build; blond hair; blue eyes; round face; small blond mustache. Is very voluble and a Francist. A milicien from Haute-Savoie.

BARISET, Emile. Native of Peris; 19 years old; height 1 m 60; average build; red hair; dark brown eyes; ovel face; freckles on face.

BERTOLINO, alias BERTRAND. Native of Italy, settled in Nice. 19 years old; height 1 m 62; rather heavy; dark chestnut hair; brown eyes; round face; yellowish complexion. Is a Francist. Was with the German shock troops at Clermont-Ferrand. Was in the Anti-Jewish Brigade at Clermont-Ferrand.

BONNART, Roger. Is reported to have been born and to have been living at Senlis. Is en electrician by trade. Height about 1 m 65; rether heavy build; 19 years old; brown eyes; chestnut heir with part on left side; round face. Wears a round wrist watch.

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JULES. Native of Valence. 38 years old; height 1 m 72; average build; graying hair; brown eyes; oval face. Weers spectacles. Trupp Fuhrer in the Tott Organization.

LE VEUZIT. Native of Paris; 32 years old; height 1 m 68; rather heavy build; dark hair; dark brown eyes; long face; tattoo marks on his chest and back. Is a Legionnaire (L.V.F.)

MARTEAUX, Georges: Native of Peris; 45 years old; height 1 m 75; weak build; dark chestnut hair; brown eyes; oval face; very flat nose; wears spectacles.

DMITRIER, Alex, alies DUVIVIER. Native of Russia, settled in Paris. 18 years old; height 1 m 68; average build; has derk chestnut hair; dark brown eyes; oval face. Is a Francist.

LOUVION, Andre, slies LAURENT. Native of Nancy. 33 years old; 1 m 66 tell; everage build; light chestnut heir; grey-blue eyes; oval face; wears glasses; wears wedding ring. Is a Francist.

GOFFIN. Native of Peris. 18 years old; 1 m 68 tall; weak; wavy blond heir; light brown eyes; oval face. Is a Francist, Attended radio courses.

DURAUJEAN (Spelling?) slies DIAMANTI. Formerly of Rue des Martyrs, Paris (XVIII). 18 years old; height 1 m 75; heavily build; brown hair; grey eyes; round face. Member of Franciste Party. Attended radio courses.

ROTH, Pierre. Formerly of Rue des Martyrs, Paris (XVIII). 19 years old; 1 m 71 tall; slight build; dark brown hair; brown eyes; thin face; slightly lame in left foot, which is slightly turned in. Arrested by the REMIREMONT FFI during August but managed to escape. Attended radio courses.

DUPONT, Andre. Formerly of Paris. Age 16; height 1 m 67; heavily build; light brown heir; round face. Attended radio courses.

BOURDAIS, Jacques alies NESSIERES. Formerly of Montpernasse, Paris. Age 18; height 1 m 70; heavily build; brown hair; round face; small scar on index and middle fingers of left hand. Belong to TOULOUSE SD. Attended radio courses.

ARMAIL, Guy, alies AUNIEL. Formerly of Place de la Nation, Paris. Age 19; height 1 m 72; slight build; slightly wavy brown heir; blue eyes; ovel face. Member of Franciste Party. Attended radio courses.

CACHEUR, Andre. French; 16 years old, 1 m 70 tall; medium build; blond hair; blue eyes; oval face. Belonged to TOULOUSE SD. Member of Franciste Party. Attended radio courses.

GAGNE, Marcel. Born in Paris. 18 years old; 1 m 65 tall; medium build; curly brown hair growing well away from the face; blue eyes; hollow face; very 'ight complexion. Attended adio courses.

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PICARD of PERRAUD. Age 19; height 1 m 68; medium build; brown ha hair; brown eyes; hollow face; very hairy arms and legs. Member of franciste Perty. Attended radio courses.

HEDDY. Radio telegraphist instructor in school. Soldier. 28 years old; height 1 m 80; medium build; very thin brown hair; blue eyes; rather full fece. Wears glasses. Married, one child.

S. RASP/II, Native of Paris. About 40 years old; 1 m 80 tall; heavy build; brown hair; light brown eyes; round face; small mustache. Wears a small chromium chain with a small medallion on left wrist. Former Legionnaire and PPF. Should pass through immediately to remain in France and carry out sabotage.

5. Additional Information on Carded Personalities.

BECKER, Charles, (Dijon) (SHAEF Card) - Abwehr agent. Relationship with Siebert and Bass at Maulin (Allier) and Toulouse Abwehr Headquarters established.

6. Subversive Organizations.

According to a fairly reliable Seventh Army report from French intelligence sources, the families of the 5-6,000 Militia who arrived in Alsace in September have left for Germany. The Militia members are engaged in constructing fortifications in the MUNSTER region. Miliciens are badly armed and equipped; discipline is very lax. The leader is DE BOURMONT. A large number of them intend to take refuge in Switzerland.

According to D.G.S.S. report, reliability C/3, the mustering point for French Militia is at STROUTHOF, S.E. of SCHIRMECK.

7. Security Control of Civilian Personnel.

a. A general tightening of civilian travel control has been effected throughout. Seventh Army has obtained the use for travel control of 100 Gendarmes whose eventual employment will be in the Alsace police. A system of army rear boundary controls is being instituted and has been coordinated with 12th Army Group.

8. Relation Between Troops and Civilian Population.

No change.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 4 (Continued) dated 20 November 1944. 9. Relations Between CI Staffs, Personnel and Local Authorities and Police. Excellent and efficient relations continue to be maintained between C.I.C./S.M. and civilian authorities. Cooperation in the control of civilian treffic is a prime example. 10. Rumors. No rumors of counter-intelligence interest have appeared.

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Part II Military Security

1. General Survey.

Security training among military personnel has been intensified. The Seventh Army found that the exhibition of a low grade agent during a security lecture made a deep impression on officers and enlisted men.

2. Security of Information.

a. A document was found in a public phone booth in LUNEVILLE by XV Corps, containing secret information, a list of U.S. Corps and divisions enroute to the Western Front. An investigation revealed the responsible parties violated security regulations, chief among which were failure to classify and register the document, and carrying a copy on the person of the typist. Those responsible will be tried by court's martial.

- b. VI Corps reports that S.S.S. egent, JEAN LOUIS, and a woman agent were captured by the enemy. The woman, who was induced by the Germans to become a double agent, has returned and reported that she overheard, while in the next room, the interrogation of Agent JEAN LOUIS, and that he revealed the names of 3d Div S.S.S. personnel, as well as locations of CP's of 3d, 36th and 45th Inf Divs. (CP's have been moved.) Agent had SCR-300 set which was captured. He is reported to have been executed.
- c. A PW questioned by C.S.D.I.C. stated that while performing mechanical work on a German MLR in the middle of October about 2.5 km north of BROUVELIEURES, near BRUYERES, he noticed that German Inf. units in front of his construction unit made a regular practice of tapping Allied telephone lines. PW declared that he knows by hearsay that information concerning planned Allied attacks was obtained in this way.

3. Security of Materiel.

A munition train exploded in the station at Baume les Dames. The incident is being investigated by the S.M.

4. Security of Personnel

a. Enemy Psychological Warfere. On the evening of 28 October a German public address system was active on the '14 Inf. Div front, addressing an invitation to the "boys of the 79th" to surrender. On the evening of 1 November, the PA system respected in the same area. This time the 44th Div. was correctly mentioned by namer as were also the regiments of that Div. The Div CG was mentioned by name; a ship which transported the Div. to the continent was also named, in addition to other detailed information, such as the date the Div. entered the line.

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b. VI Corps reports that the Germans have increased their propagands program against our front line troops in the nature of leaflets and newspapers. Two main themes are exploited:

- (1) Growing nostelgie of the GI, faced with an indefinitely long war and,
- (2) Inter-Allied disagreements and the danger of Communism.
 All this propagands would seem to be negative, offering the American soldier no practical alternative which would leed him to forsake his duty.

c. Two propagands tracts quoted below were found in the red light district of Besancon. The regional B.S.M. is endeavoring to apprehend the distributors of the tracts.

1. OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT REPORTS.

This year the great Musulman celebration of the Moulcud was marked only be sad events at Casablanca. Since the appeal of the occupying authorities for the recruitment of native labor obtained no results they decided to take reprisals.

Consequently the French Authorities chose the evening of the Mouloud when they knew that all believers would be gathered in the Mosque to take by force most of the Musulmen who had gathered for religious purposes and enroll them in labor units.

ARAB SOLDTERS

Do you not know that the allies have for their only end the reduction into slavery of the Arab people and the transformation of their countries into colonies?

Cease fighting for your oppressors and join the Germans.
Thus you will assure the return of a free Arabia where your women and children swait you.

2. OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT REPORTS

Following the violent storm which struck the region west of Oran the night of 3 April the reilroad line between Fez and Oran was out by water near the village of Doueira.

The French inspector, an old drunkard, not having taken the necessary precautions, allowed a military train to proceed towards the demaged section, thus causing a serious derailment.

The occupying authorities, suspicious of an act of sabotage on the part of the population, dynamited the entire village

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without any investigation.

ARAB SOLDIERS.

Is this not a new proof that the Allies show only injustice and abuse in their attitude toward the Arabs?

Cease fighting for your oppressors and flee to the German lines. You can be sure of receiving good treatment there.

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
Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 4 (Continued) deted 20 November 1944.

Part III Port, Airport and Frontier Control

The First French Army B.S.M. has been giving special attention to the control of the Franco-Swiss border. The greatest difficulty has been the effective utilization of the F.F.I. personnel available. It has been found that several professional "Passeurs" (smugglers of people) were among the F.F.I. assigned to guard the border. The Army S.M. has loaned S.A. and S.M. personnel to the Territorial S.M. to mann the interrogation center at Pontarlier.

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 23, U.S. Army

7 December 1944

Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 5.

Period from 16 November to 1 December 1944

Part I. Civil Security

1. General Survey.

a. The rapid advance of the armies under this Group has necessitated the realignment of travel control points. This has been done and satisfactory results are being obtained. Three captured agents stated they were strictly warned to avoid the Seventh Army Sector.

Another agent stated the Germans were contemplating sending high grade agents to Spain by air and then across border because so many of their agents have been apprehended by the Allies in the forward areas.

b. During the period covered the armies moved into areas which contained a higher percentage of German speaking and German born civilians than previous areas. This has complicated the security problem by introducing elements not heretofore contacted and lends emphasis to the need for C.I.C. personnel who can speak German.

c. The First French Army report that the F.F.I. in their area have been completely integregated with units of that command.

2. New Cases of Individual Suspects.

PIOTR, Jean Joseph. French nationality. 24 years old. Confessed Abwehr agent. Crossed Allied lines at AUX TIGES coming from ST DIE on 17 November. Asked to be taken to the military police and told the standard story of being a refugee. Asked for a pass to Paris and said he had tactical information to give. He was turned over to the 36th Division C.I.C., then the Seventh Army C.I.C. and has been finally turned over to the S.C.I. He speaks French, German, Russian and Polish and is a qualified W/T operator. He was to proceed to Paris where two espionage rings would aid him in discovering damage by V-2 in the Paris region, shipping and port facilities, railroad and troop movements, and communist and F.T.P. activities in France. His mission was to last about three weeks. He was recruited by a Captain Cavallia, a French Army cavalry offier who is a liberated prisoner.

BUHR, Ernest Raymond. French Nationality. 29 years old. Confessed agent of Abwehr III (Frontaufklaerungstrupp 353) in ST DIE and of P.P.F. Intelligence Service in Germany. Arrested 21 November in ST DIE. It is possible he would have functioned as an active stay behind agent for BAUDY'S P.P.F. Intelligence Service, which is 31 under S.D. supervision. In the past he had submitted lists of anti-

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Germans to the S.D. and abwehr in ST DIE. He had also installed a letterbox at 3 Rue d'Alsace, ST DIE which was used to intercept incoming instructions to an Allied W/T. operator (OSS) who, after his capture by the Abwehr, was turned into a double agent. Buhr had been given no special intelligence training. Case to B.S.M. for trial.

GODEFROY, Leopold Eugene, alias GODIN. French nationality. 42 years old. Confessed Abwehr agent. Apprehended by 36th Division C.I.C., turned over to Seventh Army C.I.C. Interrogation revealed his mission was to proceed to CORCIEUX, weit until the Allies had advanced beyond the town, and return within forty eight hours with information on shoulder patches, bumper markings, other troop identifications and artillery emplacements of troops in that vicinity.

HENRY, Rene Felix. French nationality. 32 years old. Apprehended in ST DIE. Had previously done counter-intelligence work for Germans, including establishment of a letter box, similar to that of BUHR. Case to B.S.M. for trial.

RUMMELIN, Albert. French nationality. Residence: ST LAURENT. Arrested 7 November on the street in EPINAL on general suspicion by Seventh Army C.I.C. The day before his arrest RUMMELIN had boasted to two women in EPINAL that he was a French intelligence officer. Interrogation of RUMMELIN revealed that while he was employed in EPINAL as an accountant and interpreter for the Germans, the SD requested him to work as a long-range financial and industrial espionage agent after the war. RUMMELIN was acquainted with Section VI of the SD. His sister, Mathilde, was a notorious informer for the Gestapo in NANCY. Case to B.S.M.

BRAJON-FRANCOIS, Mearice. French nationality. Residence RAON-L'ETAPE. 39 years old. He stated that he had been a regional delegate of the Vichy Government's Service des Societes Secretes (originally under Admiral PLATON) with the charge of gathering information on all Freemasons in his region. He admitted having furnished his information to the S.D. in Nancy. S.M. believes that BRAJON-FRANCOIS was in direct contact with the German intelligence services and has furnished them with information. Turned over to B.S.M.

JORIOT, Eliane. Frenchwoman. 19 years old. Residence: RAON L'ETAPE, where she was arrested 19 November. From April until June 1944, she had worked for the Departmental Office of the L.V.F. in Nancy, having sought such works through sympathy with the L.V.F. cause. She admits that, as a result of a black market transaction in gold in which she was compromised, she was contacted by BULLER and SCHARF, members of the Sicherheitspolizei, and that she carried out three or four missions for SCHARF. These missions consisted of delivering in the station at NANCY messages to a German agent in a train going to Paris. Turned over to B.S.M.

SCHTZIZER, Xavier. Inhabitant of AUZAINVILLERS. Accused by S.M. of having been a German espionage agent reporting movements of planes and activities at AUZAINVILLERS French military airfield to Germans during 1939-40. Case to B.S.M.

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LESTER, Joseph. 15 years old. Waffen SS. Arrested by S.M. XVth Corps. Received military training in camp of St-Andrias (near Cernay, Alsace). In this camp were about 6000 Waffen S.S. LESTER was sent to the American lines with the following mission:

- a. Strength of armored troops.b. Location of French units.c. If possible, do sabotage work or steal documents.

Had been directed to enlist in the French army in order to easier fulfill his mission. Must be considered as a test agent. Was to report all places where he would have been lodged and routes taken. Turned over to territorial S.M. for disposal.

CHOULET, Andre, Arsene, Guillaume. Arrested by S.M. 1st French Army. Abwehr agent from the Hubacker-Hoff school. Has given information confirming that already given by OUARI.

JONGELEMEN, alias Young. F.F.I. officer and interpreter. Dutch nationality. Subject had contact with SD members in Bruxelles. Jailed in Epinal and case turned over to territorial S.M. Further in vestigation in Bruxelles requested from.D.S.M.

VURTZ, Walter. Kreispropagandaleiter for Wehrkreis V, Second Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce in STRASBOURG. Residence, Kanalwallstrasse. #1, STRASBOURG. Hauptsturmfuhrer in the Allgemeine SS. Member of NSDLP since 1935; active officer and speaker in this organization. Arrested by MV Corps C.I.C. Detachment on 23 November 1944 in vic SARREBOURG (24916). Interned in accordance with SHAEF CI Directive.

LEPINE, Henri, Gestapo agent. Under investigation.

BORER, Eugene, Gestapo agent. Under investigation.

Richardet, Jean, Gestapo agent. Under investigation.

CUENIN, Georges, Gestapo agent. Under investigation.

FOLLIET, Paul, Gestapo agent. Under investigation.

RALLET, Rene, Gestapo agent, soon to be tried before the permanent Military Court of Besencon. Case turned over to Territorial S.M.

THIBAUD, Theodora. Suspected activity. Under investigation.

LENTZ, Roger. Suspected activity. Under investigation.

GAUTHIER, Marcel. Suspect. Case turned over to Territorial S.M.

FONTANA, Henri. Suspected activity. Under investigation.

3. Progress of Cases Under Investigation.

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Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 5 (Continued)

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CHENAT, Henri. Gestapo informer. Case turned over to Territorial S.M.

HALB, Paul. S.D. agent. Case turned over to Territorial S.M.

HAIB, Germaine. Paul HAIB's wife. Suspected of relations with the Germans: Case turned over to the Territorial S.M.

merie.

VIDAL, Albert. Under investigation.

MOHAMED ben Tayed ould Miloud. Member of the Militia. Case turned over to Territorial S.M.

BENSEFFA, Abd-el-Keder. Member of the Militie. Gase turned over to Territorial S.M.

RICHARDEL, Michel. Gestapo agent. Under investigation.

MARTOT, Babrielle. Gestapo Agent. Under investigation.

TOURMANN, Rene. Gestapo agent. Under investigation.

DUFOUR; Bernard, Gestapo agent. Under investigation.

BERRAUDIERE, Guy. Gestapo Agent. Under investigation.

- 4. Personalities in Areas Still Under Enemy Control.
 - Information on SS Personnel and Internees of Concentration,

Several truckloads of documents were seized at the evacuated concentration came in NATZ EILER (V6482) near SCHIR ECK. Came was run by SS Totenkopfverband. Documents found include personnel files on the SS guard, roster of immates (mostly political prisoners and Jews), the came diary, and the guardbook, containing reports of work details. The number of male internees as of 31 October is shown by the roster to have been 18,486. All documents forwarded to SHIJF Document Section.

b. Agents Expected to Operate in Near Future.

CHOPIN, Jean. French nationality. About 45 years old. Former warrant officer in Foreign Legion. Height 5'4" (1m65); weight 130 lbs; black, curly hair (dyed), brushed straight back, grey at roots; very large nose; pointed chin; red cheeks; pockmarked skin; always hatless. Wears navy blue raincoat. Speaks cultured French. Member of P.P.F. and agent of OKH (Abwehr). Chopin will stay at the house of Mme OSENKA, 3 Rue de 1'Etuve, BELFORT, who presumably does not know of CHOPIN's activities.

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SECOND December 1944.

HANUS, Antoine. Native of MORANGES, Lorraine. About 24 years old. Height 5'7" (lm70); heavy-set; short legs, longbody; jet black, wavy hair; long face; seven white-gold teath in upper jaw; wears black patent-leather shoes with yellow toe-caps; goes hatless. Speaks excellent German, French with Lorraine accent. HANUS, posing as a resistance member will seek shelter in the home of Mr. MAUGRAS, lock-smith, living in PEROUSE, Territoire de BELFORT, route d'Altkirch. MAUGRAS presumably is unaware of HANUS' activities.

VAUCHIER, or VAUCHE. About 35 years old. Thin; height 5'5" (1m66); slightly curly, blond hair; walks in a waddling manner, like a peasant; grey eyes, false or very bad teeth, with resultant stomach trouble. Voluble speaker, tells fantastic tales. Very pro-German. Real name probable Alsetian.

MADELAINE, Noel. About 20 years old. "Looks like Algerian"; very black, frizzly hair; quite handsome; height about 5'4" (lm63); very large, black eyes. Radio operator.

X.......(name unknown) About 30 years old; probably from NAN-CY region. Very large eyes with distracted look; face appears slightly pushed to right; large rather protruding ears; blond heir, parted on left; peasant type of individual.

Y......(name unknown) About 19-20 years old. Height 6' (lm 85); brown hair and eyes; elongated face; bedly formed teeth; lower lip slightly receding; very thin build. Possibly butcher by trade.

Z......(name unknown) About 20 years old. 5'3" (lm60); light brown hair end eyes; rather handsome face; small blond moustache. Merseille accent.

5. German Agents Reportedly Operating at Present In France.

a. Information from GODEFREY.

SIMON, fnu (false name). About 50 years old. Height 5'10"; light brown, receding hair. Elegant bearing; looks like an Englishman; wears monocle in left eye. Speaks German, English, French. Left espionage school at HUB.CKER-HOF (in Black Forest) about end of October.

POTIER, fnu (felse name). About 35 years old. Tall and very strong; brown hair; large head; gold front teeth. Always wore light jacket similar to American field jacket. Last seen in July in TOU-LOUSE. Probably remained in France.

GALIBOUR, fnu (probably real name). About 45 years old. 5'6"; gold front teeth; dark brown hair; priest-like face. Laft behind by Germans; possibly went to Paris, where his residence was.

FREMANT, fnu. About 50 years old. Height 5'2"; grey hair and grey medium-sized beard; medium build; weers reading glasses. Quiet temperament. Left on his second espionege mission from HUBACKER-HOF 379 school during latter part of October. Residence: Paris.

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VALIER, fnu. His wife, former Milicienne, was with him at HU-BACKER-HOF school and may also cross lines on espionage mission. Mme VALIER is about 40 years old; height 5'2"; very large conspicuous eyes; abundant, graying hair; rather fat; large pendulous bust.

CHOULAIT, fnu. About 32 years old. Height 5'6"; reddish-blond hair; light brown eyes; very thick reddish-blond eyebrows; often wears glasses. Left HUBACKER-HOF school 1 November.

b. Information from Oueri

CACHEUR, last known to be in TOULOUSE.

BOURDATS, last known to be in TOULOUSE

FABIANI, lest known to be in PARIS (Hotel Ritz(?))

MARGARITA, last known to be in SEDAN.

MARTEL, last known to be in SEDAN.

c. Information by PIOTR on personalities in Strawbourg and Vicinity.

CAVALLIE, Andre. French Cavalry Captain and principal recruiter of agents for the OKH (Abwehr, probably Section I) in Strasbourg. CAVALLIE was intelligence Officer (SR) for the French Cinquieme Burdau from 1939-40. Worked for France during the Spanish Civil War. Made a prisoner of war in 1940 by the Germans. He has since worked for them on various very important missions in Grasce, Bulgaria and Italy. It is believed that after the fall of Germany he and his friend RIZOV will operate in Bulgaria. CAVALLIE lived at the Hotel METROPOLE (room #1) in Strasbourg. Approximately 46-48 years old, medium height, heavy set, receding wavy hair, has tumerous growths on each side of his neck with scar on left tumor. Gives impression of having no neck, livid complexion, strong "midi" accent, bases himself off as an FFI, drinks heavily, very intelligent and experienced in intelligence work, weers a grey felt hat, brim down, and a beige trench coat.

SCHMIDT, Mr. (alias).

Treasurer for the OKH. Lived in the rue Franz Liszt, Strasbourg, (corner house on left hand side coming from rue Schubert at the end of the block). Married and has a daughter. Was known in his house as a notary under a different name until he changed it to SCHMIDT. Speaks excellent Franch and German. He is Alsetian. Approximately 45 years old, 5'5" or 6" tell, bald, blue eyes, distinguished looking face, timid in manner but severe, never smiles, wears dark and conservative clothes.

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OBERBICH (fnu). Right hand men of Major Becker of OKH (Abwehr). German. Lived at Hotel "Lutetia", Durkheimstrasse in Strasbourg (room 55). Native of Cologne. Speaks French with an accent. Approximately 38 years old but looks much younger, "kid's" face, blackgray hair, tall, high forehead, never wears a hat, chubby moist hands, drasses in old fashioned way.

RIZOV, Boris.

Bulgarian, born in Sofia. Abwehr agent. Share room at Hotel Metropole, Strasbourg, with CAVALLIE. Operated in Paris and Bulgaria. Expected to leave for Italy. Came to France in 1931. Set up a confectionery store in the rue St. Denis in Paris. Has been in contact with Germans for a long time. Gave anti-Communist and anti-resistence information. Will go with CAVALLIE to Bulgaria, where he has many contacts to continue work for GIS. 32 years old, tall and very strong build, brown hair, combed back, thin nose which broadens noticeably at tip, double chin, hardly any beard, has wooden leg (right), always walks with a stick, very large hands, wears grey hat with broad brim.

BARON de BARRI. PPF representative of Doriot in Strasbourg. In charge of PPF missions and its organization. In direct contact with the Abwehr and organizer of the "MISSION MARTI". Lived at the Hotel Buerger with his son Patrick, also a member of the PPF. Was formerly a glove manufacturer in the Dordogne region.

Know, and who was introduced to him by Patrick de BARRI, as a man who had crossed the allied lines and could furnish information on the possibilities and dangers to be avoided. The first time X crossed the lines at Dole and went to Paris; the second time at ST DIE, on a short range mission. This individual had a pass issued in Dole by a French organization called CSI or SSI and carried an embossed stamp. Between 22 and 26 years old, lm73, medium build, straight black hair combed back, black deep-set eyes, dark complexion, wears ski pants and ski shoes, good dresser.

X....., Manrice and Wife. Member of PPF and W/T operator for Abwehr. Maurice is said to have crossed the lines in the region of Raon l'Etape on or about 15 October. He was seen at the Hotel Moderne in St Die in company of his wife and the Baron de BARRI. Maurice always carried his W/T set in a brown grain leather suitense, which he kept at all times within reach. The proprietor of the Hotel "Moderne" in St Die, whose establishment had been requisitioned by the SD, could probably furnish information and give his real name. Height 1m76, strong build, slightly bent - brown hair, but almost bald, straight nose, long face, wears a shabby leather coat.

(His wife) Short, rather stout, dyed blonde hair.

6. Additional Information on Carded Personalities.

DURAND, Nice. President of the Collaborationist Group, member of the PPF, the Milice, and the Comite de L'Union Francaise pour la defense de la Races Responsible for the arrest of M. Pierre Beyland.

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FAUCAMBERGE, Jean, Count de. Born 24 November 1901. Was com-penion of Rene Pino. Was not trusted by German espionage system, but was suspected of being a double agent. Is reported to be in Germany at the present time.

LE NDRI, Etienne. Is reported to have left Nice in 1943 for Paris and is thought to be in Switzerland at the present time, with his mistress, Mme NEAL. Known to have furnished Gestapo with information concerning French patriotic activities.

7. Subversive Organizations.

a. Subversive Espionage and Sabotage Group. A Francist espionage and sabotage group, called "Griff" is reported to be operating in France, under the landership of BUCART (or BUCART), Marcel. "The group works in teams of five calling themselves the "Blue Brigade." The GRIFF is divided into two sections: (a) Groupe d'Action Revolutionnaire and (b) Groupe de Renseignements Politiques. The first has the mission of staving in Traces and carmitting selectors; the nos the mission of staying in France and committing sabotage; the second is to re-enter France to inform the group on political trends of the population, and to get military information. BUCART is declared to have boasted that the attempt on General de Gaulle's life in Paris was an act committed by this group.

b. *Organization "MISSION M.RII". This intelligence organization is composed of 15 young men, all bachelors and members of the PPF, organized in Strasbourg and set up in St Die with the help of Baron de BARRI. Its purpose was to organize a chain of "passeurs", who were to establish mosting places and hide-outs for future line crossers of the GIS and PPF. These limison agents were to establish themselves between Paris and the Vosgas, spaced at intervals of 30 km. The "MISSION M.RTI" was to gather political information on Communist activities and report on retalictory steps taken on the PPF members and their families still in France.

8. Miscellaneous Information on igents and Methods of Operations.

B. According to OUARI, parachute agents recruited from the HUBACKER-HOF espionage school are taken to a CP near the mirfield, for instructions. They are told to bury their parachutes directly after landing and to evoid all contact with military and civilian personnel; to find a cover to camouflage their activities. They are instructed to send messages the evening after their day of work at about 1830 hours. These messages are intercepted at the school by the German operator, HEDDY. Radio equipment is of inferior quality; apparatus is very small.

b. PIOTR reported that the Swiss and Spanish Governments are planning to sign a commercial treaty, whereby food supplies would be exchanged between these countries on a barter agreement. Because of the disruption of RR facilities in France, contracts will be given to a British firm, which will arrange for the trucking and transportation. The German Intelligence, having been notified of this planned operation, intende to place its agents as drivers of these vehicles.

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and provide them with Swiss identity papers. The agents will maintain limison between Spain, Switzerland and France for the GIS: A certain BOURGEOIS, Georges (?) member of the Stuttgart SD and formerly employed by the Ministere de l'Information at Vichy will organize the service in Switzerland. BOURGEOIS, an expert on Swiss affairs is bound to leave for Switzerland in the near future.

- c. PIOTR said he had laarned that Abwehr agent CAVALLIE and the Spanish attache at the Spanish embassy in Baden Baden are to meet about the Z2nd of November to discuss the passage of German agents through Spain. These agents will be flown to Spain and provided with Spanish identity papers.
- d. Agent PIOTR at one time was considered for a mission whereby he would have been deposited on the shores of France near La Rochelle by midget submarine. All agents thus landed are to return to the same spot after a lapse of exactly ten days for a return to Germany. Due to the fact that PIOTR had no previous experience and sufficient trust could not be placed in him the GIS preferred to have him sent across the lines.
- e. PIOTR reported that the Germans have a "round C.I.C. stamp" or a copy of the same.
- 9. Security Control of Civil Population.

a. Travel control.

- (1) Original difficulties due to refusal of the Dijon Military District to release sufficient gendarmes for present and future travel control, were satisfactorily settled. 50 gendarmes were dispetched to STR.SBOURG on 26 November to work with "T" force. 20 had already been released for use by the 100th Inf. Div. A standard travel pass form has been distributed to mayors and should be in full use throughout the Army area before the end of November.
- (2) Corps. Approximately 100 traffic control points are maintained within VI and XV Corps Area, as well as numerous roving patrols. In addition to ordinary measures, the following are now standard procedure in VI Corps:
 - (a) Each genderme is provided with a notebook containing names and descriptions of persons on C.I.C. wanted lists.
 - (b) Entire control system is checked regularly by genderme officers, while supervision is exercised by Corps C.I.C. in correlation with Army C.I.C.
- (3) Army Rear Area. Prefecturel travel decrees are being strictly enforced. Civillen travel has greatly decreased.
- (a) Three captured Abwehr agents stated that they were instructed to avoid crossing the lines in the American sector between

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dated 7 December 1944

EPINAL and REMIREMONT where VI Corps and Seventh Army road blocks were functioning because of the extensive control network in operation there. Long-range agents going to PARIS or the interior of France are instructed to pass through NANCY and TOUL or through the French sector. Another agent who did cross in the Seventh Army area stated that he had been told to circulate as little as possible in accomplishing his mission.

(b) One agent stated that Allied counter intelligence had caused the arrest of so large a number of German agents by means of travel control, that Germans now contemplate having important agents enter France via Spain. The agents would be taken to Spain from Germany via bomber or cargo planes. Several of these agents carry either Spanish or Swiss papers.

b. Refugees.

- (1) Provisions have been made for C.I.C. screening of all refugees. Residents of newly liberated towns were ordered to stand fast.
- (2) The refugee movement has not been of a permanent or long-distance type. Refugees have moved what they consider a safe distance (10-20 miles) from the active sectors, and have been permitted to return when the Allies advanced beyond their homes. At the four Seventh Army refugee centers, from 800 to 700 refugees were received daily, the great percentage of whom were not evacuated, and who stayed in the centers only briefly. Crossing of the lines by refugees was most prevalent in the ST DIE area.
- 10. Relations between Troops and Civilian Populations
- a. In general, the relations remain good. However the S.M. chief points out that the civilians in the recently liberated areas have been forced to undergo severe hardships and that practically no supplies can be sent there, so it is only normal that they will take a slightly cool attitude.
- b. The civilian population in VI Corps area is reportedly in difficult straits because of the vast mine fields, sown there, which hamper all civilian activities, but especially farming.
- 11. Relations between C.I. Staffs and Local Authorities.
 - a. Remain cordial.
- 12. Rumors Current Among Troops and Civilians
 - a. Nothing to report.

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Part II Military Security

1. General Summary.

A "T" force including C.I.C., S.M. and S.C.I. entered Strasbourg soon after its capture. The final report on their operations has not yet been received, but will be summarized in the next report.

2. Security of Information.

VI Corps reports an increased security consciousness among troops, evidenced by a larger number of reports received on counterintelligence matters from its units.

3. Security of Personnel.

A VI Corps survey of the results of enemy leaflet and radio propaganda demonstrated that the enemy underestimated the intelligence of the American soldier and consequently produced amusement more than any desired effect.

4. Security of Materiel.

a. The inquiry into the explosion of the ammunition train at BAUME-LFS-DAMES (See C.I. Report No. 4, this headquarters) definitely established the incident as sabotage, but the B.S.M. has not been able to locate the perpetrators.

b. On 18 November at 0600 a delayed-action demolition hidden under a culvert cut on the road between RAMBERVILLERS (V1873) and BACCARAT (V2684). The resultant crater was 25 feet deep and 70 feet long. It is estimated that there were 1500 lbs. of explosive employed. The enemy had covered both ends of the culvert to disguise the demolition after planting it.

c. On 13 November personnel of the 685 Ordnance Ammunition Company noticed that 30 shells of a new and highly classified type had been tempered with. Nose-plugs of these shells had been unscrewed and scattered. All but 3 supercharges from the shells had been removed, and taken away. The type of shell tempered with is for a 155mm how-itzer. The new type of fuse, needed for this shell, classified secret, had not yet arrived in Army area. It does not seem probable that sabotage was intended, since no attempt was made to hide the fact that charges were taken, which would have been discovered in any case before firing. At the time of the incident there were no troops available to guard the ammunition dump which extends for 35 miles over a series of secondary roads. Since the initiation of the investigation, a stationary and patrol guard system has been set up, manned by 120 guards. It is probable, since super charges were removed only from the new type shell, that this tampering was an espionage mission by an enemy agent.

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10 - Seventh Army

1 - First French Army

10 - 44th AAA Brigade

2 - Delta Base Sec

4 - C/S

5 - G-1

14 - G-2

1 - Liaison

1 - French Mission

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ANNEX NO. 1

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 5

The following items were received from reliable Swiss and other sources as indicated. They are published for their counterintelligence interest of events in German occupied territory and may be disseminated as desired.

1. Germany.

Reliable reports reaching alsace through escaped French workers, prisoners of war, foreign workers in the Todt organization, and even German soldiers all point to the fact that the Volkssturm is as yet little more than a paper organization. Workers leaving Bavaria as late as 10 November state that there is very little to be seen of the Volkssturm. In most towns and villages nothing has been done except posting up Himmler's proclamation. In other places able-bodied men have been registered at the town-hall. But not one of these workers from Bavaria has heard of any drilling of Volkssturm troops in the places they came from or passed through, and much less of any handing out of arms to civilians.

Much the same reports come from districts in the Rhineland, not far from the front.

The German High Command which, according to German officers, is not very interested in the Volkssturm, has for months past been training another type of partisan - the sniper. Thousands of snipers, who are to be left behind to inflict as many casualties as possible on the advancing Allied infantry, have been trained in special Wehrmacht and SS Camps. (From reliable Swiss Source.)

A traveller who arrived in Switzerland from Berlin reports that, although morale is low, the Germans are so overtired and apathetic that they have no energy left for any "undesirable" activity. The governments greatest concern is not to leave the people any free time. Thus, women workers comployed by Siemens must come to the factories even when there are no raw materials and so no work can be done. The women simply sit at their benches idle. The government prefers them to be thus under supervision than free at home where they might hear rumors or complain against the government. (Reliable Swiss Source)

The Propaganda Ministry press club is flooded with French "journalists" who have fled to Germany with their families. There are about seventy of them sitting round Berlin with nothing to do. Some work for the French papers published in the Berlin suburbs for French war prisoners and workers. These papers are filled with propaganda telling the French not to go home as they will be treated as collaborationists by the new government. (Reliable Swiss Source)

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Annex No. 1 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 5 (Continued) dated 7 December 1944

On the night of 23 November the local Mayor and party leaders left Weil am Rhein. They requisitioned automobiles, took all their household belongings, and went. There was extreme bitterness among the local populace the following morning when no officials were to be found at the Party offices. More than half of the people of Weil are hiding out in their cellars waiting. With the Nazi leaders flecing, they believe that it cannot last much longer. This belief was strengthened by the local stationmaster last week, when he openly stated that "everything was lost."

Meanwhile the wounded are being evacuated from all hospitals in Lorrach to the Lake Constance district. The evacuation started on 22 November. As there are no hospital trains available, the men are being moved by truck and ordinary train. (Reliable Swiss Source).

After a recent raid on Stuttgart, several hundred workers, mostly Poles, who were driven out of the factories to seek shelter outside the town, overpowered the personnel of a local train and steamed south with it past several small stations. They then stopped the train, smashed several cases of flour and sugar which they found in it, divided this loot between them, and dispersed. Only very few have so far been recaptured. (Reliable Swiss Source)

Foreign workers in Stuttgart also considerably damaged important industrial installations, when Germ n workers and guards fled from the factories to seek shelter, leaving the foreigners behind. An order has since been issued that foreigners must leave the factories before the Germans. Those refusing to do so are to be shot on the spot. (Reliable Swiss Source)

The main subject of discussion recently between Hitler's advisers and army chiefs at G.H.Q. has been the lack of men for the armed forces. Following these discussions it has been decided that all Quisling leaders presently on German soil are to mobilize all their nationals in Germany capable of carrying arms. This decision applies in the first place to the Serbs, French, Belgians and Dutch. (Reliable Swiss Source)

The Dutch Quisling leader <u>Mussert</u>, who up to now has managed to stay in Holland, has been summoned to Berlin to receive instructions on the matter. Dutchmen in north-west Germany, many of whom are Quisling refugees, are presently being called up for military training. The conscription of Poles also continues, and it is expected that a recruiting campaign will shortly be started in Poland proper under the slogen "Poland for the Poles". Such measures indicate the desperate shortage of men for the German armed forces. (Reliable Swiss Source)

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Annex No. 1 to Fortnightly CI Report No. 5 (Continued) dated 7 December 1944

From Singen it is learned that preparations have been made to have the entire railroad services run by women. Personnel is being trained and local trains are running with women workers. The complete change-over to women will take place when the front comes so close that all men must go to fight. Since the Hitler Youth has been conscripted all men must go to fight, even the local fire departments for army service or trench digging, even the local fire departments have taken on more women and girls. (Réliable Swiss Source)

Austria

Events in Hungary, combined with Nazi propaganda stories con-corning the brutality of the Russians, have caused a panic in Austria. Not only Germans, but also numerous Austrians are fleeing into Bavaria. Sometimes people wait three days in Vienna station in order to get a Flace on a train. Valuables are also being evacuated. The SS and Place on a train agreed business, as they control transport means which Place on a train. Valuables are also being evacuated. The SS and Party are doing a great business, as they control transport means which iney only make available against payment preferably in gold jewelry or other valuables. By this means many Party and SS men are trying to secure the futures of their/families, realising that there is little hope for themselves. (Reliable Swiss Source)

Five Waffen SS members crossed into Switzerland illegally last week. They said they had escaped from the Radolfzell-Mettnau SS barracks where they had just finished a special course of training for SS Unterwhere they had just finished a special course of training for SS Unteroffiziere. More than 2000 SS are now at Radolfzell. Four of the five offiziere. More than 2000 SS are now at Radolfzell. Four of the five offiziere insisted they had been forced to join the SS. They pleaded fugitives insisted they had been forced to join the SS. They pleaded on their knees for permission to remain in Switzerland, declaring on their knees for permission to remain in Switzerland, declaring they would kill themselves rather than go back to Germany.

They said morale is generally very low among the SS. They are perfectly aware of the extent of their unpopularity in Switzerland and the still-occupied countries. Within Germany even, people change their path rather than meet an SS man. They get only contempt from the Wehrmacht.

Men are usually forced into the SS and rarely escape alive from it. Concentration camp treatment is better than they receive. One fugitive was beaten with a rifle butt by an SS Scharführer because fugitive was beaten with a rifle butt by an SS Scharführer because former wounds made it impossible for him to bend over as ordered. The former wounds made it impossible for him to bend over as ordered. The slightest offense puts a man in a penal company. Here the men may reslightest offense puts a man in a penal company. Here the men may reslightest offense puts a man in a penal company. Here the men may reslightest offense puts a man in a penal company. Here the men may reslightest offense puts a man in a penal company. Here the men may reslightest offense puts a man as a man in a penal company. Here the men may reslightest offense puts a man as a man in a penal company. Here the men may reslightest offense puts a man as a man in a penal company. Here the men may reslightest offense puts a man in a penal company. Here the men may reslightest offense puts a man in a penal company. Here the men may reslightest offense puts a man in a penal company. Here the men may reslightest offense penal company. Here the men may reslightest offense puts a man in a penal company. Here the men may reslightest offense p

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The above information about the SS Bewährungstruppen was confirmed by another Germen who arrived in Switzerland lately. He verified the statement that only a few of the men live through their rehabilitation. He said suicides are numerous in the Waffen SS. During the past year more and more civilians and Wehrmacht members have been forced into the SS. Intellectuals are being compelled to join the SS in order to improve the SS reputation among the people. (Reliable Swiss Source)

In Berlin last week Goering presided at a conference on the question of escaped war prisoners and deported workers from factories and camps in Germany.

Apparently more than 70,000 instances of "foreigners at large"
have been recorded. Well-informed circles are of the opinion that the
actual figures may well be much higher because many of the small factory
proprietors and farmers are afraid to report men and women who are missing.

Most of the escapees are from farms and factorics in the West of
Sermany; it is believed they are still in these districts. Many are
said to be hiding out somewhere within the Black Forest and supposedly
said to be hiding out somewhere within the Black Forest and supposedly
others have managed to reach the districts along the Swiss border.
Moreover, German agents in Switzerland have been instructed to attempt
to get in touch with those who manage to escape into Switzerland to try
togetind out where the other fugitive groups are and what route they
generally follow.

to get in touch with those who manage to escape into Switzerland to try to difind out where the other fugitive groups are and what route they senerally follow.

Nazis are of the opinion that a German organization especially active near the frontiers is assisting the escapeds to get away. Many of the refugees recently captured were well supplied with food which they obviously got from Germans. There is even the suspicion that they obviously got from Germans. There is even the suspicion that loubt there are a number of faint-hearted Nazis who would be glad to loubt there are a number of faint-hearted Nazis who would be glad to loubt there are a number of faint-hearted Nazis who would be glad to loubt there are a number of faint-hearted Nazis who would be glad to loubt there are a number of faint-hearted Nazis who would be glad to loubt there are a number of faint-hearted Nazis who would be glad to loubt there are a number of faint-hearted Nazis who would be glad to loubt there are a number of faint-hearted Nazis who would be glad to loubt there are a number of faint-hearted Nazis who would be glad to loubt there are a number of faint-hearted Nazis who would be glad to loubt the work of the weekers and workers camps should be given to the Volkssturm which should also be assigned to frontier guard work and searching groups.

Another usually reliable source adds that an underofficer of the weekers of the Wehrmacht organization formed letely to help members of the Wehrmacht who want to escape abroad. (Reliable Swiss Source)

The Japanese seem to believe that the collapse of Germany will not be long in coming as they are transferring their military and political Nachrichtendienst and Domei to Switzerland from Berlin.

They are establishing a Consulate in Zurich to house these agencies and Domei is also opening an office in Geneva.

More than 100 Japanese have applied for visas to Switzerland. So More teached Switzerland, each having a diplomatic passport.

far 12 have reached Switzerland, each having a diplomatic passport.

The Ambassador, Oshima, however has not applied for a visa to The Ambassador, Oshima, however has not applied fo



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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH U. S. ARMY GROUP Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 25, U. S. Army

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APPRODIX II

25 October 1944

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

THE BELFORT - VOSCES FRONT

I. NOVEMBER WEATHER

II. ENERY FORTIFICATIONS

III. ENEMY SUPPLY

- A. RAIL MOVEMENTS
- B. THE PHINE BRIDGES
- C. THE SUPPLY SITUATION D. DUMPS AND RAILHRADS
- E. MOVEMENT TABLE
- IV. ENEMY FORCES

I. NOVEMBER WEATHER

A. THE BELFORT GAP.

1. CHENERAL. In November, generally bad weather for operations in the BEJFORT GAP may be expected: rainfall is high, cloudiness is general, and flying conditions are poor.

2. TEMPERATURE. Frost may be expected at any time in November, but cold snaps, which generally follow rain, will probably not be of long duration.

5. RAIN. Average monthly rainfall of 2 1/2 to 5 inches may be expected in November. This is only slightly less than the October average. Thirteen days with some rain (.4 inches or more) and 4 days with heavy rainfall are usual for the month. There is ordinarily no snow cover, and the land does not become soggy nor the roads dangerously icy until December.

B. THE VOSCES.

1. GENERAL. Altitude is the important factor. Above 5,000 feet there will probably be several days during which the temperature will be below freezing the entire day. In the northern sector, where the mountains are lower, mild unsettle weather alternates with cold spells. Valleys generally have low night temperatures, causing fog, which persists until late morning.

2. TEMPERATURE. Here are the maximum number of days with frost to be expected during November:

ALTITUDE

DAYS WITH FROST

700	ft.	(230 m	le)
1.400	ft.	(460 m	le)
5,400		(1100 1	1.)

11 21

5. PRECIPITATION. Continuous rain is likely, and the skies will be overeast most of the time. Rain is ordinarily heavier and more prolonged on the western side of the mountains and much lighter at places eastward of the high ground. November precipitation is 2.6 - 7.0 inches with 4 inches as average.

One to three days with snow cover may be expected at lower altitudes. The higher passes (SCHLUCHT and BALLON D'ALSACE) will be blocked by snow from

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late November to April and most of the others will be intermittently blocked later in the winter.

Because of boggy terrain, wehicles will be unable to leave the roads in the EPINAL * REMINDMONT - ST. DIE - GERARDMER - SCHLUCHT Area.

II. FORTIFICATIONS.

Z The MLR is anchored in the NORTH on the swampy area bordered by DIEUZE and MITTERSHKIM. The avenues of access through this area are generally barred by road blocks and strong points. The MIR begins just north of PHALSBOURG where sccess to the SAVERNE CAP is barred by two rows of fire trenches and two rows of anti-tank ditches.

From SARREBOURG to BACCARAT, the MLR consists of a continuous line of fire trenches backed by A/T ditches at critical points. From BACCARAT to ST. DIE it consists of a broken line of fire trenches and A/T ditches with pillboxes and artillery protecting the breaks in the line which occur usually where terrain itself is the obstacle to ease of movement. From ST. DIE to FRAIZE it again becomes a continuous line of fire trenches, barring passage to the SAALES PASS which itself is strongly defended.

Between FRAIZE and GERARIMER, thence to LE THILLOT, it consists of scattered strong points, of pillboxes, M.G.'s, and artillery. LE THILLOT has a short continuous line of fire trenches, with strong points on the heights overlooking passes. In general, from FRAIZE to GIROMAGRY the roads winding through the difficult terrain have been cut by A/T ditches or fire trenches; the trees have been prepared with dynamite charges; and strong points have been established.

The BELFORT GAP is defended by an almost continuous line of fire trenches and A/T ditches running from GIROMACNY to north of DELLE. The breaks again occur where terrain offers little opportunity for maneuvring. A second line of fire trenches runs from ROUGEMONT to MERZEN with an A/T ditch protecting DANNEMARIE. Throughout the front, from SARREBOURG to DELLE, strong outposts consisting of pillboms, casemates, N.G.'s, artillery, and A/T guns, protect the approaches to the MLR. The Germans are reported to have re-armed two of the old forts around BKLFORT with modern weapons.

East of MULHOUSE, MAGINOT LINE pillboxes have been altered to fire west. There is a high concentration of fire power throughout the sector.

III. SUPPLY.

A. RAIL MOVEMENTS.

Supply of German units to our front by rail appears to be over the following routes:

- 1. AUGSBERG ULM TUTTLINGEN VILLENGEN OFFENBERG -
- 2. Vic. of SINGEN and RADOLFZELL IMMENDINGEN and thence to STRASSBURG or KARLSRUHE.

The main crossing over the Rhine is at STRASSBOURG. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the R.R. bridges at Neuf BRISACH and CHALAMPE may be in use again.

From STRASSBOURG, the main traffic runs NW toward SAARBURG or south toward MUIHOUSE. Delivery to railheads is made from these main routes.

B. THE RHINE BRIDGES (BASEL to STRASSBOURG).

- 1. HUNINGEN Floating highway 7 tons.
 - Reenforced to 60 tons. (26 Sept.).
 - Traffic interrupted when KEMBS DAM was bombed. (7 Oct.).
 - Bombed, possibly damaged. (20 Oct.). -2- SECR

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- 2. CHALAMPE NEUENBURG R. R. 60 tons.

 - Condition reported poor. (Com Z Engr Rept., 15 Sept.).
 Used as single lane road bridge. (Photo Inter. 14 Sept.).
 Reported in use as R.R. bridge. (French Rept. Received 19 Oct.).
- 3. CHALAMPE NEURNBURG Floating highway 5 tens.
 Reenforced to 24 tons. (26 Sept.).
- 4. NEUF BRISACH Floating highway 5 tons.
- 5. NEUF BRISACH R.R. 60 tons.
 - 3 spans partially destroyed. (Photo Interp. 14 Sept.)
 - Possibly used for light vehicular traffic one way. (Photo Interp. 14 Sept.).
 - Reported in use as R.R. bridge. (French Rept. Received 19 Oct.).
- 6. SASBACH Floating highway 5 tons.
 - Reported destroyed by bombing. (20 Oct.)
- 7. RHEINAU Floating Highway 5 tons. - Damaged by bombing. (20 Oct.)
- 8. OTTENHEIM to GERSTEIN Floating highway 7 1/2 tons.
- Damaged by bombing. (20 Oct.)
 9. STRASBOURG to KEHL Highway Capacity unknown.
- 10. STRASBOURG to KEHL Highway 24 tons.
- 11. STRASBOURG to KERL R.R. 60 tons. - Bridge is double tracked.

(NOTE TO "B" THE RHINE BRIDGES. A French report (not later confirmed by any other source) reported four additional pontoon bridges in the vicinity of NEUF BRISACH. Two reported upstream; two downstream. During the day, these bridges were dismantled and hidden along the shore).

C. THE SUPPLY SITUATION.

The enemy supply position for the VOSCES - BELFORT area appears fairly secure at present. Reports of occasional concentrations of several hundred rounds suggest that the enemy is not generally short on ammunition, except when supplies may be effected by local distribution difficulties. Ration stocks are likely to have been supplemented by produce and livestock taken from the land. It may be assumed that motor fuel requirements in this area are on comperatively low scale due to location of railheads Mrly close to the front.

D. DUMPS AND RAILHEADS.

Enemy supply depots are placed close to railheads at AVRICOURT, SAARBURG, MUNSTER, BRIFORT, and possibly THANN and MONTBELIARD. The known dumps as shown on separate overlay, appear adequate for present supply requirements.

In falling back toward the RHINE, the Germans will probably use principal stations such as STRASSBOURG, COLMAR, and MULHOUSE, which are on the main north-south railway. Supply depots are likely to be set up outside of these

E. RAIL MOVEMENT TABLE. (Estimated minimum requirements).

	From BELFORT		From SAARBRUCKEN
	COLMAR STR	to Asseourg Saarbrucken	COLMAR STRASSBOURG
Fortress MG Bn.	44 hrs	48 hrs 54 hrs .	40 hrs 36 hrs
AA or Light Arty Bn Pz Brig. The above ta with the enemy's	56 " 62 " buletion shows	60 " 66 " 72 " s the minimum time reties3 - 3 E 6	guired for rail movements

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30 OCTOBER 1944

"G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION"

I. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

A. Recent Knemy Activities.

Making full use of his excellent communications, the bad weather with a consequent freedom from air attack, and the natural and prepared positions at his disposal, the enemy is shuffling his units to meet the attacks of the Sixth Army Group.

First French army attacked in the area of LE THILLOT against elements of three divisions (338, 189, 198 Inf Divs). The enemy estimated that concurrent attacks against other sectors would not be made and during the two weeks of fighting committed almost all divisional reserves of the divisions in line. These reserves be was able to make up by a steady flow of replacement units and Fortress Battelions, the latter having sufficient fire power, mobility, and tactical unity to be thrown in at critical points. The enemy's evident determination to impose maximum delay and losses before giving ground, coupled with particularly bad weather and prepared positions, have temporarily stemmed this attack.

Seventh U S Army attacked with VI Corps under more favorable circumstances. Only two divisions (16, 716 Inf Divs) were available to meet the attack. Their reserves were committed within the first few days without immediate reinforcements. The flank divisions were either in process of being relieved (15 Pz Gr by elements of 19 and 553 Inf Divs); covering the flank (21 Pz Div); or fairly well exhausted after the fighting at LE THILLOT (189, 198, 338 Inf Divs). The withdrawal of 11 Pz Div from the Third US Army front further complicated the enemy situation. He was forced to draw elements from 338 Inf Div and an extremely critical situation resulted, which was relieved only by the arrival and immediate commitment of 269 Inf Div.

B. Strength and Disposition.

CHAMPAGNEY-LE THILLOT SECTOR:

- 159 Inf Div in contact 2000; in support 3000 (Comment: 1000 Sec Regt was pulled out and identified on 29 Oct on the VI US Corps front. The mission of the division is still to guard the approaches to the BELFORT CAP).
- 338 Inf Div in contact 2650; in support 600
 (Comment: Approximately 2200 combat effectives have been moved to the ST DIE sector since 26 Oct. The division is exhausted and in need of reorganization, since its units are now too spread out along the front.
- 269 Inf Div in contact 3 companies and elements of the Rcm Bn.

 (Comment: One company from each regt has been identified in the sectors left vacant by 338 Inf Div. Combat effectives amount to approximately 3500. FW's have definitely stated that the mission of this unit, trained for winter combat conditions, is definitely defensive. Construction of new dug-in positions and the laying of mine fields tend to confirm the defensive mission. Local counterattacks by elements of the division will probably be made in order to reduce salients whenever danger of outflanking exists). (269 Inf Div will relieve the remaining units of 338 Inf Div, allowing the latter to move northward on the front).
- 189 Inf Div strength approximately 600 (Comment: The remaining elements of this battered division are being withdrawn due to heavy losses. It will probably absorb some battle groups, particularly DEGENER, and itself be employed as a large battle group.

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198 Inf Div - contact 650; in support 500
{Comment: Now fully committed on the 36 US Div front, it will also have to assume responsibility for the 189 Inf Div sector).

IN THILLOT-BLAMONT SECTOR

- 716 Inf Div in contect 1200

 (Comment: Heavily committed in the 36 US Div front, this division has used up all reserves and suffered heavy losses, about 600 men, since 26 Oct. This div must also undergo complete reorganization or be pulled out of the line very shortly, since it cannot hold a sector of the front in its present condition).
- 16 Inf Div in contact 3500-4000; no reserves
 ((Comment: Fully committed and bearing the brunt of the attack.
 Replacements received are being immediately thrown into line).
- 21 Pz Div in contact 1500; in support 3000
 (Comment: Having absorbed elements of 106 Pz Brig, 21 Pz Div is
 the only mobile unit left on the Sixth Army Group front. It is
 being committed piecemeal at critical points, with an evident attempt to keep a strong uncommitted a mored force for rapid counterattack.]
- 553 Inf Div in contact 2000; reserves 2000
 (Comment; Occupying the sector left vacant by 15 Pz Gr Div and with 19 and 361 Inf Divs holding the front opposite XV US Corps).
- 19 Inf Div units contacted 600 (Comment: See 553 Inf Div).
- 361 Inf Div units contacted 300 (Comment: This division is relieving 11 Pz Div and will be fully occupied on Third Army Front).

GENERAL RESERVE

405 Inf Div I Flg Trmg Div 19th Army Sec Div 30 SS Div Ten Fort Bns

(document identification)
(partially committed)
(includes misc. eluts)
(Russians)

TOTAL

10,000 additional reserves are estimated to be quickly available from Wehrkreis V and other sources. Current enemy replacements and reserves are composed meinly of poorly trained new personnel, convalescents and overage personnel, with poor equipment. The units in the General Army Reserve are equivalent to approximately one US Infantry Division in number of combat effectives, but are very low in fire power and morals. Their only role would be in defense of well prepared positions, backing up units in the line.

C. COMMUNICATIONS, DEFENSES AND SUPPLY

Energy communications are still effective due to short lines, build up of supply, use of reilheeds close to the front, and lack of continuous interference by allied Air Forces. This situation should remain favorable for the enemy as long as bad weather continues, but the onset of winter conditions will lessen it to some extent.

Defenses are still being built up. They consist mainly of development of

Defenses are still being built up. They consider mainly of development of the terrain with road blocks, AT ditches, gun positions and pillboxes. Extremely heavy pine cover undoubtedly hides some defenses on aerial photos. Ground sources continue to report preparations for eventual evacuation after strong defense: mining of roads and bridges, arming of commanding houses, AT gun positions, and general preparation for demolitions.

Supply is adequate both in material and rations as long as present conditions exist. Artillery ammunition is still being expended at a high rate, with temporary concentrations to avoid counterbattery fire being the normal method of employment. POL is limited, but not hurting the enemy appreciably as long as the rail lines are available. Increased use of animal transport with mountain units may be expected to keep his supplies normal.

The terrain is still naturally favorable to the enemy and will continue to be D. TERRAIN AND WEATHER The terrain is still naturally favorable to the enemy and will continue to be until the main ridge lines of the VOSGES has been crossed. Roads are highly canalized it easily blocked or commanded. Heavy pine cover and steep rocky slopes favor the course. The transfer of the line well built up in defenses.

Weather has been continuously bad. The enemy makes full use of rein and for to protect his movements from air strack. The weather will continue to be favorable to the enemy throughout November. Roads will eventually break down under continuous traffic the enemy throughout November. Movement off the roads will be extremely difficult.

II. CONCLUSIONS.

1. To make an all out defense on the VOSGES-RELFORT CAP line using up A. CAPABILITIES

2. To impose maximum loss and delay from the favorable defensive terrain of the VOSGES, retiring only under pressure and covering the withdrawall of major elements to more critical sectors and eventually to the SIEGFRIED line. available reserves.

B. DISCUSSION.

The enemy's defensive situation is favorable in large part due to freedom from constant air attack. Clear weather will permit overwhelming air attack, creating an impossible communications and supply problem for him. Reinforcements will likewise be strictly limited. Isolation of the enemy West of the MHNE would result in a greater loss in men and material than he could stand.

The commitment of men and materiel piecemeal, sacrifice of armor in local and delaying attacks, and the use of more static troops (all contrary to normal enemy tactical destrine) indicate that his main objective has been to delay the allied sufficiently to build up and man the STEGERTED line.

The enemy is short of troops, particularly mobile and armored forces.

The withdrawal of such units as 3 Pz Gr, 15 Pz Gr and 11 Pz Divs for movement to
other fronts shows his complete dependence on the particular in section other fronts shows his complete dependence on troops already in action. Troops which other fronts shows his complete dependence on troops already in action. Troops which have relieved these units are definitely second rate, although better than the stop-gap battle groups being committed in early autumn. Tanks used in battle have come directly from the factories, without normal shaking down periods having elapsed.

It is believed that the enemy will delay in the VOSCES until such time as an all out attack makes his position untenable, that he will attempt to fall back slowly an all out attack makes his position untenable, that he will attempt to fall back slowly an all out attack makes his position untenable, that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the siegraphy and the siegraphy are siegraphy as a siegraphy and the siegraphy and the siegraphy are siegraphy as a siegraphy and the siegraphy are siegraphy as a siegraphy and the siegraphy are siegraphy as a siegraphy and the siegraphy are siegraphy and the siegraphy are siegraphy as a siegraphy and the siegraphy are siegraphy as a siegraphy are

If successful he will have gained time for strengthening his main bastion, kept his line intact, and have a large percentage of the 19th Army still available for use in the SIECFRIED line.

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D. TERRAIN AND WEATHER

The terrain is still naturally favorable to the enemy and will continue to be so until the main ridge lines of the VOSCES has been crossed. Roads are highly canalized as ly blocked or commanded. Heavy pine cover and steep rocky slopes favor the defense. The BELFORT CAP is well built up in defenses.

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Weather has been continuously bad. The enemy makes full use of rain and fog to protect his movements from air attack. The weather will continue to be favorable to the enemy throughout November. Roads will eventually break down under continuous traffic during rainy cold weather. Movement off the roads will be extremely difficult.

II. CONCLUSIONS.

A. CAPABILITIES

1. To make an all-out defense on the VOSCES-BELFORT CAP line using up available reserves.

2. To impose maximum loss and delay from the favorable defensive terrain of the VOSGES, retiring only under pressure and covering the withdrawal of major elements to more critical sectors and eventually to the SIEGFRIED line.

B. DISCUSSION.

1. Capability No. 2 is favored.

The enemy's defensive situation is favorable in large part due to freedom from constant air attack. Clear weather will permit overwhelming air attack, creating an impossible communications and supply problem for him. Reinforcements will likewise be strictly limited. Isolation of the enemy West of the HINE would result in a greater loss in men and material than he could stand.

The commitment of men and materiel piecemeal, sacrifice of armor in local and delaying attacks, and the use of more static troops (all contrary to normal enemy tactical doctrine) indicate that his main objective has been to delay the Allied sufficiently to build up and man the SIECFRIED line.

The enemy is short of troops, perticularly mobile and armored forces. The withdrawal of such units as 3 Pz Gr, 15 Pz Gr and 11 Pz Divs for movement to other fronts shows his complete dependence on troops already in action. Troops which have relieved these units are definitely second rate, although better than the stop-gap battle groups being committed in early autumn. Tanks used in battle have come directly from the factories, without normal shaking down periods having elapsed.

It is believed that the enemy will delay in the VOSCES until such time as an all out attack makes his position untenable, that he will attempt to fall back slowly to prepared positions, covering the withdrawal of major units to more critical fronts or to the SIEGFRIED line, and that he will make a last-ditch stand in the SIEGFRIED line.

If successful he will have gained time for strengthening his main bastion, kept his line intact, and have a large percentage of the 19th army still available for use in the SIEGFRIED line.

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A. C. of S., G-2 Initials: // /

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 3

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 8 OCTOBER 1944

· 1. GENERAL SUMMARY

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Recent moves and identifications of enemy troops clearly indicate that Sixth Army Group is now facing a major portion of Fifth Panzer Army's two identified Panzer Corps (47 and 58), as well as a Nineteenth Army that has, according to evidence in a captured order, surficiently recovered its balance to start reorganizing its divisions from the present collection of independent battle groups, which range the strongth scale from exhausted battalions to strong brigades to weak divisions.

The major move during the period involved the withdrawal of the Sixty-Sixth Reserve Corps. There is no evidence as to its intended use or destination, but the units it formerly commanded continue to be identified. Therefore, it may well be assumed that it is moving out of the area or is to organize defenses in the rear (its role during the RHONE Valley retreat of

Nineteenth Army).

Following the withdrawal of Sixty-Sixth Corps, FW's identifications indicate that 47 Panzer Corps sides copped almost as far south as RAMEZRVILLERS. Assuming that the 47-58 Panzer Corps boundary was adjusted accordingly, this should place all of 47 Panzer Corps and part of 58 Panzer Corps on the front of Sixth Army Group.

While not confirmed from gound sources, the TAC/R report of heavy rail movement South of STRASBOURG on the 8th, may have been connected with the arrival of new units in the COLMAR-MULECUSE area.

The Alpine front remains generally static. However, adding the enemy's overall situation in Italy to the fact that winter brings a communications problem through the passes, it is doubtful whether the enemy will much longer elect to maintain any of his troops West of the more easily defended passos.

2. SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Northern Sector)

At the close of the period the Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line: FORET DE PARROT (Q 1806), VATAINVILLM (V 2891), XATTEVILLERS (V 1680), BRU (V 2273), FAYS (V 2150), RESPECTANCE (V 2652), THLEFOSSE (X 2839), LE MENIL (K 3233), CHEVESTRAYE (K 2816) RONGHAMF (X 2809), ONANS (P 2886), LONGEVELLE - SUR - DOUBS (P 2681), VILLER LES BLAMONT (A 3554).

a. FIFTH PANZER ARMY

1. 58 Panger Corps: 11 Pancer Division, 111 and 113 Panzer Brigades (both apparently absorbed by 11 Panzer Division). 15 Penzer Gronadiar Division (this is included upon the assumption that 47 Panzer Corps has assumed command of 16 Infantry Division --see below).

2. 47 Panzer Corps 21 Fanzer Division, 112 Panzer Brigade (latter absorbed by 21 Panser Division).

16 Infantry Division (as PW identifications confirm the division was not withdrawn with 66 Corps, it is assumed "this unit came under command of 47 Corps, when the latter sidestepped southward).

b. NINETEENTH ARMY

1. 64 Reserve Corps:

B G TAEGLICHEBECK, a strong group which was under 64 Reserve
Corps has not been located lately while the 716 Infantry Division and the 189
Reserve Infantry Division remain in the sector. The 716 Infantry Division
absorbed some elements of the B G BRODOWSKI indicating a trend in reorganizing -1-SECRET SECRET

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the disrupted elements of the Division. The 189 Infantry Division, also in pro-

2. 4 CAF Corps:

The 338 Infantry Division (B G LOPAU) including absorbed elements of the 242, and 244 Infantry Divisions, the 198 Infantry Division (reinforced by the 63 GAF Regiment), and the reorganized 159 Infantry Reserve Division remain the chief tactical units under the Corps. Added to this a number of Battle Groups are on the front in the BELFORT area (MENKE, SPITZMULLER, ROTH and BOSCH). The BOLENSEE Regiment, a new arrival. operates as a B G; however, one Bn has been lately identified in the 64 Corps Area.

The 1st Flieger Division still remains on the front south of

EELFORT, although repeated statements of FW's indicate the withdrawal of the Division to the MULHOUSE area.

A newly identified B G ESCHERICH, composed of Infantry, SP arty, and tanks, is evidently being brought in to the line in order to strength en the position of the enemy in the BELFORT area, weakened by the departure of the 11 Panzer Division.

c. NINETEENTH ARMY RESERVE

Battle Group VON OPPEN, the 30 SS Division, the Russian STAMM Division, the 19 Sec Division and various elements reorganized in the MULHOUSE area, may be considered as general reserve. The majority of these are of low combat value. This group may also be strengthened by new arrivals (the 100

Light Infantry Division, elements reported in the MULHOUSE area).

In connection with the reshuffle of the enemy's dispositions these units may be put under the 66 Reserve Corps and the 85 Corps.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH ON SIXTH US ARMY FRONT

	Effectives	Overall	Tanks	Arty
U. S. XV Corps Sector	5,700	28,250	45	56
U. S. VI Corps Sector	11,150	17,550	35	132
First French Army Sector	6,400	8,300	-	
Nineteenth Army Reserve	8,500	13,000	30GHQ	50-60GHQ
TOTAL	31,750	67,100	110	188-198

3. SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Southern Sector)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth Army Group on the Alpine Front were generally disposed along the line: ALEERTVILLE (Z 6683), BOURG - S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL - SUR - ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602), AIGULLES (N 3703), S PAUL - S U (P 5055), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

The German 75 Corps remains responsible for the defense of the Alpine Passes. Generally the disposition remains unchanged. The 34 Infantry Division, elements of the 5 Mountain Division, elements of the 90th Panzer Gren Division, the 157 Reserve Division and various smaller elements (888 Mtn Bn, MEER ALPEN Regt), are still on the front. The 148 Infantry Reserve Division, ALPEN JUGEND units and the Italian MONTE ROSA and SAN MARCO Divisions remain in the region wast of TURIN. the region west of TURIN.

The LOMBARDY Corps has been identified in this area from a captured document. Its composition is as yet unknown, but it probably includes at least one of the German Divisions on the Mediterranean flank.

Estimated Strength: 12-15 thousand men including the Italian units.

4. OPERATIONS

During the period, the enemy showed a determination to hold the center of the line, clinging tenaciously to strategic terrain features, while offering less resistance on the Southern flank. In the North his efforts were concenholding the FORET de PARROY.

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a. SEVENTH ARMY

(1) IV Corps: Throughout the period, the enemy, despite stubborn defense by use of tank-held road blocks, counter-attacks, and mines, was being forced back from the FORET de PARROY. By the end of the period, only possession of its SE portion remained in doubt. Elsewhere in the Corps sector counterattacks took place in the area of ANGLEMONT (V 2286), MARAINVILLER (V 1699) and MENIL - FLIN (V 2089) with some nebelwerfor fire noted.

(2) VI Corps: The occupation of BAMBERVILLERS (V 1872) forced the enemy to concentrate on blocking further advance through the road net extending from the town. His immediate reaction was explosive, as he utilized all arms and reinforced the surrounding torrain and brought steady artillery fire on the town. By the end of the period he had relinquished only the forest area N E of the town and was still stubbornly defending JRANMENIL (V 2271).

In the central sector, the enemy's defense centered on line of advance GRANDVILLERS (V 2160), BROUVELIEURES (V 2560), which he defended through counter-attacks and the use of up to 15 tanks. By the end of the period his defense had fallon back to the area W of BROUVELIEURES. N of this area AUTHER (V 2267) fell, despite stubborn delaying action, while to the South BROUKES (V 2457) remained in enemy hands.

From LEPANCES (V 2153) to VACHEY (K 2345), the enemy's stubborn defense decreased as he withdrew his forces to straighten his lines, leaving SP guns and delaying forces behind. By the end of the period resistance was weakening as VACHEY (K 2643) was mopped up. LE THOLY (V 2643) continued to be heavily defended, and infiltrations were observed in the area.

b. FIRST FRENCH ARMY

The chemy's defense during the period has centered about the highway LUMN-EXILTORY in the form of counter-attacks, infiltration, and continuous heavy artillery, including that from the long range guns in the BELFORT forts. Occupation of HOUCHAMPS (K 2309) was prevented until 3 October, while counter-attacks occurred in the vicinity of MECOLOGNE (K 2109) and FRESNE (K 2415). Infiltration were attempted in the FORET de MONTAGNE (K 3022), while pockets remained to be cleared up in areas EKUVAROUK (K 2408) and LE RHIEN (K 2211). At the end of the period counter-attacks took place West of LAPILLE (K 2824) and H of CHEVESTRATE (K 2815). The enemy was reported sonding replacements to MESIL (K 3232). Advance through the BROCHE and NORBIED Passes was strongly resisted. In the DOUBS River sector patrols were contacted.

C. ABTI

The enemy continued his defensive attitude, utilizing harassing artillery and aggressive patrols of up to 40 men. As the period progressed, he made use of ambush tactics against our patrols. By the end of the period contact was made at CAMP DES FOURCHES, as freezing weather began to set in.

5. MOVEMENTS

Inclement weather during the week hampered continued observation of motor and rail movements behind the enemy lines. However, enough was observed to indicate that the enemy was still using railheads well forward of the Rhine for the supply of his troops despite our fighter-bomber attacks. Several days of good weather may change his mind in as much as one days activity netted 14 locomotives and 26 boxcars destroyed by the 7th Army air support. The enemy also appears to be well enough organized to wait until night for his large motor movements. Only light scattered M/T movements have been observed during the period by daylight in the Sixth Army Group area. An increased rail movement was noted on 7 October when 22 trains were observed moving predominant? movement was noted on 7 October when 22 trains were observed moving predominantly E and NE on rail lines from (Q 7317 to R 6359). Barrage balloons were reported over the West STRASBOURG yard indicating increased air defense of the railheads. There was heavy rail activity on the 8th between STRASBOURG and SELESTAT.

2 Incls:

Annex #1 - Gorman Defenses of the YOGES and the BELFORT Gap.

Annex #2 - Captured Order: Reorganization of 159 Reserve Division.

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GERMAN DEFENSES OF THE VOSCES AND THE BELFORT GAP

In keeping with the Fuhrer's order to hold the VOSCES-BELFORT line at all costs, the German's are feverishly continuing the strengthening of the defenses blocking all routes offering eastward bassage. A line of fire trenches, AT ditches, and pillboxes with machine guns, AT guns, and artillery, runs from BLAMONT through FRAIZE with the greatest density around ST. MARGUERITE, blocking the approach to SAALES PASS. (See attached sketch).

In addition to the fortifications enumerated, the terrain itself is well adapted for defense, since the narrow defiles of the Vosgos allow little manouver room and are easily defended. The approaching inclement weather will materially aid the enemy.

In the BELFORT region, several lines of defense are reported:

a. The GIROMAGNY - CHAVANNE - HERIMONOURT line, a forward position of light field fortifications.

b. The FRANIER - COUTHENANS - CHAVANNE line, a heavier line of field defenses, forming an outpost of the MIR.

c. The GIROMAGNY - MONTBELIARD - HERIMONCOURT line, (with an alternate position CHALONVILLARS - DELLE) apparently meant to be the MIR, and heavily organized with fire-trenches, AT ditches, pillboxes, AT guns, and artillery.

d. The ROUGEMONT - DANNEMARIE - MERTZEN line which continues SE to the Swiss Border, is still under construction.

o. A ROUGEMONT - DELLE line may exist.

There is considerable activity around BELFORT itself with indications pointing to the manning of most of the old forts. Earthen defenses are being prepared on the slopes and around the forts, and many of the reads between them are being mined, as are reads leading to BELFORT. The shoulders are already mined osposible to be arking areas. This is particularly true on the LE THILLOT - GIROMAGNY; MONTBELIARD - BELFORT; DELLE - BELFORT reads.

A.A. defenses have been increased in the BELFORT - MULHOUSE AREA.

The quality of present enemy resistance in the REMIREMONT area may be due in part to his relatively incomplete defenses of the GEMARDMER - SCHLUCHT route to COLMAR and the Rhine Plain. In the area to the north, and in the Belfort Gap, his defenses have reached a point where he can adopt a more defensive attitude.

ANNEX No 1 to SIXTH ARMY GROUP Wookly Intelligence Summary No 3

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A captured document dated 24 September 1944 gives the following information on reorganisation of the 251st Reserve Grenadier Regiment:

A. The 19th German Army has ordered the reorganization of the 159th Reserve Infentry Division; the table of organization will be that of the Infentry Division 1944.

B. However, only the non and material new available may be used for this reorganisation,

C. The 251st Reserve Regiment is organized as follows:

Ros. Gr. Bn. 205 as I Bn.

Ros. Gr. Bn. 57 as II Bn.

13 (Infantry Gun) Company

Hoadquarters Company

Roorganisation of a 14th Company is proposed for a future cate.

D. The 251st Reserve Granadier In will be reorganized into three rifla companies and one heavy weapons company. The machine gun sections of the heavy weapons company may not be attached to the rifle companies until the heavy weapons company shall have been completely reorganized.

The companies are composed of one headquarters section, 3 combat sections and a supply section. Effectives of the 2d Company as of 24 September: 18 noncoms, 87 mon.

- E. A field replacement battalien under the orders of Major Zellner, CP at Giromagny, is established. The field replacement battalien is charged with the instruction of all men in the division not already trained for infantry combat.
 - P. Mon belonging to the Fortress Cadro Bns shall be returned to those units.
- G. A report of all personnel belonging to the 16th, 189th, 198th, 338th, and 716th Infantry Divisions will be furnished. These men will be returned to their original divisions. Same procedure will be followed for personnel of the frontier guards, State railroads and the German labor service.

ANNEX No 2 to SIXTH ARMY GROUP Wookly Intelligence Summary No 3.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER A FOR THE WEEK ENDING 15 OCTOBER 1944 1. GENERAL SUMMARY 2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Northern Sector) . a. FIFTH PANZER ARMY (1) 58 Panzer Corps:
The bulk of 11 Panzer Division is committed on the left flank of US XV Corps. (North of FORET de PARROY)

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The 189th Infantry Division (recently upgraded) has under its command: B G BAUER, B G MARKEL, 192nd Security Regiment, 200th Security Regiment, Police Battalion MULHOUSE, 3/685th A A Battalion, 198th Fusilier Battalion, 602 Mobile Battalion, 608 Mobile Battalion, B G MAHNKE. As the organic units of the Division were destroyed (except for the 38th Reserve Jaeger Battalion and 163rd Grenadier Battalion) the units at present under 189th should be considered as a basic build up of its strength. General OTTENBACHER, who relieved General SCHWERIN at the beginning of October, is in turn reported relieved by the newly promoted General BAUER.

(2) 4 GAF Corps:

ACHMANN is opposing the French II Corps. According to a captured document the new Divisional organization is as follows: 757th GR with 1 Battalion C/V, 333rd GR with 2 Battalion C/V, 308th GR, 338th AR, 338th Signal Battalion, 338th Engineer Battalion and 338th AT and 338th A A Companies.

The 308th Grenadier Regiment which has apparently not received replacements is being withdrawn to the rear possibly in order to reorganize. 159th Reserve Infantry Division is opposing the French II Corps. As has been reported in Weekly Summary No 3, the Division is being reorganized on the basis of a 1944 T/O.

(3) 85 Corps:

A change in the disposition of the enemy is apparent in the Northern sector of the French I Corps. Reports suggest that the 106th Panzer Brigade (FELDHERRNHALLE) is relieving elements of the 1st Flieger Training Division. Furthermore, elements of the Brigade von OPPEN (KASSEBEER D/V Regiment with I Battalion BOSCH, II Battalion RAEDECKER, III Battalion MURMANN) have been identified on the right flank of the French I Corps.

c. NINETEENTH ARMY RESERVE

It has been established that the Russian FREIWILLIGE STAMM Division is the 19th Security Division and possible new arrivals for this group may continue to be considered as general reserve.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH US. ARMY GROUP (Northern Front)

	STRENGTH	TANKS	ARTILLERY
SEVENTH US ARMY Units in contact- Supporting units-	9,800	-40	168
TOTAL	25,800	40	168
FIRST FRENCH ARMY Units in contact- Supporting units-	10,000	25	150/180
TOTAL	25,000	25	150/180
SIXTH US ARMY GROUP Units in contact- Supporting units- Estimated Reserve W of Rhine	19,800 31,000 30,000	65	318/348
TOTAL	80,800 -2-	.65 S_2RET	318/348 LI

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The report, believed reliable, states that gasoline is drawn directly from Germany by the Army which in turn ships the fuel to Corps where Divisions call for their allotments. Within divisions the lower echelons down to company call for fuel supplies from their high-

In a static situation all echelons make requests for gasoline every two or three days. 198th Infantry Division under such circumstances is said to have consumed 1500 gallons of fuel every 2-3 days.

In a fast moving situation divisional requirements rose to

5,000-6,000 gallons every 1-2 days.

PW stated that procedure even for lowest echelon of his Infantry Division was to have on hand enough fuel for movement of 350 km.

(218.7 miles) without refusling. Whenever the tactical situation permits, and divisional fuel requirements are in large quantities, divisions may call directly at Army depots for gasoline supplies.

b. SUFPLY AND MOVEMENTS

During the period 21 Sept - Oct 5th, German railroads, con-During the period 21 Sept - Oct 5th, German railroads, continued to bring troops and supplies westward across the RHINE. These shipments are reported to include 100 field guns, 50 AA guns, and several heavy railroad guns which moved westward through STRASBURG. Activity at KARLSRUHE seems to have been chiefly troop and supply movement to the VOSGES and SAAR fronts.

The rail lines along the SWISS border between WALDSHUT (B 39) and SINGEN were very active in movement of supplies. Although part of the activity may be involved in large-scale industrial evacuation of ALSACE, much of the remainder must be military.

Despite constant air atticks during the past week, the enemy continued heavy rail movements to supply and reenforce his defensive

continued heavy rail movements to supply and reenforce his defensive position in the VOSGES.

c. TRANSFORTATION An interesting light is thrown on the railway transportation An interesting light is thrown on the railway transportation problem in Germany by a recent report which pointed out that during the first weeks of September more than 400 locomotives were destroyed. Because of the trained-labor shortage, as well as lack of essential materials, repair work on the damaged trains was rendered practically impossible. Increased waterway traffic as a supplementary means of transport has been reported in the upper RHINE area.

6. DEFENSES

German preparations for war on their own soil continue. The party leader of BREGENZ (C 5080) is quoted as saying during a September conference that every German locality would be prepared for defense, and the civilians would be armed. A large supply of prefabricated barracks which was recently brought to the BAVARIAN ALPS was declared by workmen to be intended for the use of the German, "MAQUIS". Indications of a possible headquarters may be gained by the report from French ground observers that feverish activity is to be seen around BERCHTESGARTEN, with numerous underground telephone lines being laid for a 50 km. radius around the OBERSALZBERG Peak, which overlooks it.

This weeks activity has been characterized by the strengthening


which overlooks it.

This weeks activity has been characterized by the strengthening of the enemy MLR in the VOSGES. This line has now been extended northward from BACCARAT to SARREBOURG and along the many valleys leading N E through the VOSGES. A high concentration of defensive positions and fire power has been established at MOYENMOUTIER (V 3776) where part of the MLR leads up the valley to SEMONES. Wire has been seen for the first time and in some sections the trenches are campouflaged to blend with the natural features of the terrain. Scattered defensive positions have been established between FRAIZE and LE THILLOT (V 2929) blocking the few avenues of access through that area.

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 5

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 21 OCTOBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY:

The enemy continued falling back on prepared defensive positions in the VOSGES, offering especially stubborn resistance in the central sector (west of the BALLON massive).

The appearance on the front of a great number of fortress battalions atrengthens the supposition that after reaching prepared positions in the VOSGES, more mobile units will be withdrawn and assigned to sectors requiring a more considerable build up.

SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Northern Sector)

At the close of the period the Fifth Panzer and Nineteenth Army forces were disposed on a line:

XURES (Q 2010), BENAMENIL (V 2197), REHERREY (V 2890), XATTEVILLERS (V 1679), MENIL - SUR - BELVITTE (V 2277), JUSSARUPT (V 2751), ROCHESSON (K 3146), LE DAVAL (V 3443), VENTRON (V 3427), RAMONCHAMP (K 2930), FREDERIC FONTAINE (K 2204), MIGNAVILLERS (P 1795), LONGE-VELLE - SUR - DOUBS (P 2681), VILLAR LES BLAMONT (A 3564).

PIFTH PANZER ARMY

(1) LVIII Panzer Corps:
While the bulk of 11 Panzer Division remained committed
North of the FORET de PARROY (left flank of US XV Corps) the enemy is
apparently changing his disposition by bringing in elements of the
553rd Infantry Division from the METZ area, committing them east of
the FORET de PARROY.

(2) XLVII Panzer Corps:

15 PG and 21 Pz Divisions were strongly committed on the US XV Corps zone. 15 PG Division received considerable replacements (PW states that 104th PGR is up to 90/120 Co strength). Furthermore 56 Fortress Battalion relieved the 51 Fortress MG Battalion, committed in the 15 PG Division sector.

Considering the enemy's evident intention to fall back on the fortified position: SARREBOURG - BLAMONT - BACCARAT, anchored in the North on the marshy area DIEUZE - MITTERHEIM - FENETRANCE, and in the South on the GRAND BALLON massive, mobile units at present committed West of that line can be relieved by static units (Fortress Battalions) and elements of infantry divisions and will become available for other sectors where they are badly needed. 15 PG Division may reasonably be chosen for such a move.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY

LXIV Reserve Corps: According to captured documents the Northern boundary of 16 Infantry Division has been moved South (FORET de MORTAGNE - ST DIE inclusive). The sector of LXIV Corps is further narrowed by

All three Regiments (221st Res Gren, 223rd Res Gren, 225th Res Gren,) of 16 Infantry Division, as well as the 19 SS Police Regiment, the 49 Fortress MG Battalion and elements of a few Security Regiments, attached to 16 Infantry Division, were identified in the US VI Corps Zone.

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Further South 716 Infantry Division is opposing the US Further South 716 Infantry Division is opposing the US
189 Infantry Division with its new build up (Sixth Army
Group Weekly Summary Number 4, of October 14) and 198 Infantry Division under General Major SCHIEL, with 305th GR, 326th GR, Bn BOEHMAN,
235th Security Battalion, 198 Fusilier Battalion, and I, II, III, IV
Battalions of 63rd GAF Regiment in line, were committed on the right
flank of the US VI Corps and the left flank of the II French Corps.

(2) IV G.F Corps:

338 Infantry Division was bearing the brunt of the fighting around LE THILLOT, stemming the advance of the French II Corps.

During the week the Division was considerably reinforced by the 1034th Fortress Battalion; 40th Fortress MG Battalion; 1433rd Fortress Inf-antry Battalion and the 291st and 293rd Battalions (constituted of outlaws). The 746th Engineer Battalion, originally assigned to build

outlaws). The 746th Engineer Battalion, originally assigned to build fortifications, has been added to the build up of combat effectives of the 338 Infantry Division.

Elements of 106 Panzer Brigade were thrown into the battle in the vital sector of the front for which the 338 Infantry Division is assuming responsibility, but there is no indication that this newcomer is under the division. It is rather reasonable to assume that the Brigade remains under the Corps.

According to PW statement 189 Infantry Division has been put under command of IV GAF Corps. Such a change in disposition indicated that IV GAF Corps assumed responsibility for the vital central

icated that IV GAF Corps assumed responsibility for the vital central sector while the LXXXV Corps remains responsible for the BELFCRT area, the Southern anchor of the whole defense system in the VOSGES.

The previously reported appearance of 106 Panzer Brigade in the Corps area has not been confirmed by its engagement on the Corps sector, as the enemy was evidently compelled to throw elements of this mobile unit into action on the endangered portion of the central sector (LE THILLOT).

199 Infantry Division (recently ungraded) with the 9th GR, 251st GR, 1000th Rcn Battalion, the 74th Sec Brigade, and miscellaneous smaller units under its command constitutes the right flank of the Corps, denying the French I Corps access to the BELFORT Gap from the West.

from the West.

Further South 91 GAF Regiment of the 1st Trng GAF Division is still identified in the French I Corps zone, while the presence of elements of the Brigade von OPIEN, on the right flank of the I French Corps has been confirmed by recent identifications.

c. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Northern Front)

No Change.

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Southern Sector)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were generally disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG - S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL - SUR - ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088). Enemy activities were restricted to patrolling. Enemies dispositions have not undergone any change and it is considered that his intentions remain the same.

4. OPERATIONS

During the period the enemy's attention centered on the central zone where stubborn resistance revealed the danger he felt in our drives on the MOSELOTTE Valley, N/W of BROUVELIERURES (V 2560) and against the key terrain features of BRUYERES (V 2457), which was cleared by the end of the period.

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FIRST FRENCH ARMY I French Corps: In the Southern sector of the front an artillery build-up was noticeable during the period around BELFORT, where at least two new battalions were located.

where at least two new battalions were located.

II French Corps: The enemy reacted strongly early in the period to our advance up the MOSELOTTE Valley, after the capture of SAULXURES (K 3137). He defended strongly in the area W of LETT-RAYE (Q 3031), PLANOIS (K 3041), W of ROCHESSON (K 3245) and at CORNIMONT (V 3429) with heavy fighting and counterattacks. During the see-saw course of the fighting, the enemy was able temporarily to retake HILL 739 (V 3328). His artillery fire was devoted to the sector of the MOSELOTTE Valley from CCRNIMONT (V 3429) to LES AMAIS (K 3037) and on TRAVEXIN (K 3528). With capture of LE HAUT DU FAING (V 3431), a key point of the enemy's proposed Winter line was breached and furious counterattacks in this area signified the blow dealt to the Germans as the period ended. Germans as the period ended.

(2) SEVENTH US ARMY
VI Corps: Main emphasis during the period was laid on
the area of BRUYERES (V 2457), E of FREMIFONTAINE (V 2264) and
BROUVELIEURES (V 2560), both in our steady advances and in the enemy's
stubborn defense with all weapons (including AT grenades and bazookas) and counterattacks. About 19 October strong resistance was
received from the hill W of JUSSARUPT (V 2752). By the end of the
period BRUYERES was cleared and limited withdrawal by the enemy was
observed to the E bank of the MORTLONE River. Close contact continued to be maintained in the area FREMIFONTAINE (V 2264),
BROUVELIEURES (V 2560), while the enemy stiffened his defense from
dug-in positions to the north. (2) SEVENTH US ARMY dug-in positions to the north.

dug-in positions to the north.

XV Corps: During the early part of the period, the enemy defended capably with artillery concentrations and automatic fire from well dug-in positions near IGNEY, (W of VAUCOURT (Q 2308). Only moderate opposition was made to advances near EMBERMENIL (Q 2304). By 18 October counterattacks by tanks were being launched in the area (Q 2303), and the enemy continued this aggressive attitude until the 20th, when activity slackened to mixed artillery fires, with Nebelwerfer fire beginning to be noted regularly.

(3) ALPINE FRONT
ABTF: Enemy defensive attitude continued with scattered artillery fire and light patrol activity. 4 DMM: The enemy made a strong raid on TERMIGNON (K 5040) on 19 October, but was forced back. Otherwise the front was quiet.

5. SUPPLIES

The movement of enemy supplies into the two enemy army areas appears from traffic reports to have been maintained without substantial reduction in volume. In view of this heavy traffic and the absence of evidence to indicate the existence of supply shortages, it is not likely that he is experiencing any difficulties in bringing up supplies to Sixth US Army Group front.

Rations are probably supplemented considerably by taking produce

Rations are probably supplemented considerably by taking produce and livestock from the land, as in the ST DIE area several car loads of potatoes were moved daily in a Northeasterly direction.

A general shortage of fuel exists due to the strategic bombing

of processing and storage installations in Germany and occupied countof processing and storage installations in Germany and occupied countries. Nineteenth Army fuel requirements however are not apt to be substantial in the present static situation. Its position has been further enhanced by the location of rail heads in the forward areas which permits economical use of motor transport for short hauls with resulting reduction in fuel requirements.

The supply position of the armies under Army Group G is not likely to cause the enemy grave concern while he has full use of the RHINE crossings. That he is preparing for their possible loss is indicated by the assembly of materials for pontoon bridges at STRASSBOURG.

STRASSBOURG.

SECREI

MOVEMENTS

Rail movements reported during the past week indicate that the line from SINGEN - Raddlessell via Donauschingen - Villingen - Offenburg is the principal route used for movement of troops and supplies to STRASSBOURG. Supplies from STRASSBOURG are then forwarded to railhheads at ST DIE, AVRICOURT, SAARBURG and SAVERNE.

Continued rail activity was observed in the MULHOUSE-COLMAR area. Railheads for the Southern area are probably located at MUNSTER, THANN, BELFORT and MONTBELIARD.

The evacuation of factory parts and materials from the BELFORT-MULHOUSE area continues. The route just N of BASLE and the SWISS frontier in the direction of SINGEN is moving empties in a Westerly direction and loaded trains to the East.

direction and loaded trains to the East.

In the Northern sector, supply trains appear to be moving from NURNBERG into the KARLSRUHE area over a double-tracked main line, which from HALL may be partly diverted to a secondary line with good connections through to KARLSRUHE.

7. DEFENSES

BELFORT: In the BELFORT area, enemy outposts protecting the western and southwestern approaches to the MLR show a general increase in heavy infantry weapons and artillery. Photo reconnaissance confims the construction of a second MLR running from RCUGEMONT (V 4204) to MERTZEN (V 5488) with a few scattered positions further south indicating that it may be prolonged to the SWISS Border. A high concentration of AA defends the entire BELFORT-MULHOUSE sector. (Annex I is an analysis of distribution of fire power based on Photo Interpretation by the FIRST FRENCH ARMY.)

VOSGES: In the VOSGES, photo reconnaissance shows the MLR to have been extended northward and to be anchored on the swampy area bounded by DIEUZE (Q 2520), MITTERSHEIM (Q 4129), FENETRANCE (Q 4723), RECHICOURT (Q 3407). Roads permitting movements through this area are obstructed by A/T ditches and continuous entrenchments perpendicular to the direction of approach.

are obstructed by A/T ditches and continuous entrenchments perpendicular to the direction of approach.

GERMANY: The reconditioning of the SIEFGRIED LINE is reported completed, the fortifications having already received their supplies of food and ammunition. The SIEFGRIED DEFENSES are reported being extended to a depth reaching east of FRANKFURT, MANNHEIM, MUNSTER, and the northern regions of the BLACK FOREST. Defenses are also reported under construction along the southern approaches to Germany, in the ALLGAUER ALPS (C 87) and along the INN River Valley to KUFSTEIN (E 39), where, given sufficient time, the Germans would have another SIEGFRIED LINE guarding the outlet of the BRENNER PASS.

2 Incls:

Annex #1 - Analysis of distrib-

ution of Fire Power.

Annex #2 - Weather Summary for the
Middle Rhine Valley for November.

EUGENE L. HARRISON Colonel, G. S. C. A. C. of S., G-2

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Weather conditions throughout the Middle Rhine Valley in November continue to be unfavorable for combined military operations. This area lies within the zone of migratory storms which move from the North Atlantic across Central and Morthers whose, bringing rain and overcast skies for prolonged periods. Occasionally, a northeasterly current out of Russia will cause brief periods of clear, cold conditions. These, however, are merely short interruptions in the regular regime. With continued overcast and frequent rain, the soil becomes saturated with moisture, impeding the movement of wheeled vehicles. Poor visibilities and low ceilings, combined with sodden airfield conditions, will limit the use of tactical aircraft on a majority of November days.

TEMPERATURES

The mercury in November shows a marked decline in keeping with the seasonal trend. The general average for the area is near 40 degrees:

Strasbourg 40.0 Karlsruhe 40.5 Furnberg 39.0 Potz 41.0 Basel 40.6 Furnberg 37.2

The highest ever registered at Strasbourg in November was 71 degrees, and the lowest on record was 11 degrees. In general, the temperature will reach a daily mean maximum of 44 and a daily mean minimum of 36. Readings below freezing will occur on ten days during this autumn month at this widdle Rhine Valley city.

PRICI DIMAPLION

Rainfall, though still moderate, shows a general decline from the autumnal high in October. The average for the region is close to two inches:

Netz 2.2" Frankfurt 1.7" Purnberg 1.5" Strasbourg 1.9" Basel 2.4" Punich 1.7"

The greatest monthly total ever recorded amounted to 5.0" at Metz and 4.9" at Strasbourg; while the least registered was 0.9" and 0.5", respectively. Twenty-four hour falls of 1.3" at Metz and 1.7" at Strasbourg are the heaviest on record for a single day. The chief characteristic of the rainfall pattern is the tendency to prolonged rain spells. Over sixty per-cent of the rain periods will last for three successive days or more. Measurable rainfall may be expected on the average of fifteen days during the month in the Upper Rhineland. The mercury drops low enough in November for snow. Two to three days of light snow will occur in an average year, although the depth is never great at this season. The heaviest November twenty-four hour fall measured 1.3" at Metz and 1.7" at Strasbourg.

CLOUDINESS AND HUPIDITY

The proximity of the North Atlantic Ocean lends a strong maritime character to the air masses invading the region. The moisture content is high with resultant excessive cloudiness and high humidities. Total cloudiness averages close to 80 per-cent: "etz and mountain stations 80%, Strasbourg and valley locations 76%. "ornings, on the average, are slightly more cloudy than evenings. Absence of sunshine (only 1.2 hours per day) prevents rapid drying, accentuating the humid conditions.


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
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SECRET SECRET WEADLE ALL AND LOS INDICE BLIDDIE SALLES BOK MONTH BEE Pumidity content is near the winter peak. Strasbourg shows a 0700A average of 92% and a 1400A mark of 80%, both high figures. The frequency of fogs demonstrates the high moisture content of the air at this season. Metz experiences eight days with heavy fog, while river valley towns in the Rhine valley may have ten to twelve days with fog. VISIBIT ITV Restricted visibility will occur on two-thirds of the days. It will be below 6 miles on 20 mornings a month, below 22 miles on 14 mornings, and below 12 miles on 10 mornings. Visibility improves generally by noon as the fog lifts to a low overcast. Dense fogs with zero-zero conditions often occur in the Vosgos Mountains area for two to three days in a row, when valleys experience fog in the mornings only. Obstructions to good vision are a distinct handicap to accurate aerial bombardment at this season of the year. The prevailing winds are from the southwest. Contours of the north-south river valleys accentuate the normal flow of cyclonic north-south river valleys accentuate the normal flow of cyclonic winds. Seventy-eight percent of the observed wind movement at Strasbourg is from the south thru southwest to west, and similiar conditions exist at Metz 59 percent of the time. The velocities are moderate with an overall average of 9 miles-per-hour. At Strasbourg calms have been experienced 22 percent of the time, velocities between 1 and 7 m.p.h. 64 percent, and between 8 and 18 m.p.h. 14 percent. Gales will occur only once a month. STIRFACT WITH DIRTCHION (d) IT NE E ST S SW W TW CATH 15 35 9 10 אוויחים 10 STRAFBOTTRG

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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H.ADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY G. CF Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 25, U. S. Army

A.C. of S. Initials; Date: 28 Oct 46

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 6

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 28 OCTOBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The recent withdrawals of mobile units (15 Panzer Grenadier Division and probably 11 Panzer Division) from our Northern flank posseibly indicates a decision by the enemy to transfer much of Fifth Panzer Army to more critical areas of the Western Front.

At the same time, the continued identification of new fortress and other static units points out that the enemy evidently feels his defences on the Northern flank have reached a stage of completion which enable him to pass from offensive defense to static or delaying de-

fense.

If these suppositions are correct, it is likely that the substitution of static for mobile units will continue.

The current improvement of the enemy's situation is probably due in part to freedom from constant air attacks. This enables him to make maximum use of his most forward rail facilities for the movement of troops, as well as supplies.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Zone)

At the close of the period the Fifth Panzer and Nineteenth Army forces were disposed on a line: XJRES (Q 2010), LEINTREY (Q 2603), NOSSONCOURT (V 2178), JEANMENIL (V 2271), LA BOURGONCE (V 3268), West of BT DIE (V.3966), LES ROUGES EAUX (V 3163), LA CHAPELLE (V 2954), LE THOLY (V 2643), LA BRESSE (V 3534), VENTRON (V 3527), LE THILLOT (K 3029), RONCHAMP (K 2208), MIGNAVILLERS (P 2795), LONGEVILLE - SUR - DOUBS (P 2681), VILLAR LES BLAMONT (A 3564).

a. FIFTH PANZER ARMY

(1) LVIII Panzer Corps:

No contact has been established by US XV Corps with the

11 Panzer Division since 23 October. Possibly the division will follow
the 15 PG Division and will be entrusted with a new mission.

In addition to elements of the 553 Infantry Division, the

59 GR of the 19 Infantry Division (until lately spread over a wide
front from South of PRUM (VIII US Corps zone) to NE of NANCY) were identified by the XV US Corps in the LVIII Panzer Corps sector.

Thus the composition of the corps is undergoing a considerable reshuffle probably in view of a possible withdrawal of the enemy
to the prepared fortified position SAAREBOURG-BLAMONT-BACCARAT.

(2) XLVII Panzer Corps:
15 PG Division has not been identified since October 19.
An officer PW from the 56 MG Battalion stated on Oct 20 that his unit relieved elements of 104 PGR, which with the rest of the division were withdrawn to Germany.

The 21 Panzer Division and the 16 Infantry Divisions were

heavily committed in the VI US Corps zone.

The 16 Infantry Division possibly passed temporarily under Fifth Panzer Army. Such a supposition is substantiated by the fact that personnel of the division are now carrying copies of "PANZERFUNK" that personnel of the division are now carrying copies of "PANZERFUNK" that personnel of the "WACHT". (Newspapers of the Fifth Panzer Army and Nine-teenth Army respectively).

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Logically the 16 Infantry Division should be under XLVII Panzer Corps. However, the intention of the enemy to fall back on an organized defensive position, the decreasing number of armored units in the Fifth Panzer Army sector and a persistent build up of Infantry Divisions in that area, suggests that a major reshuffle of enemy units is taking place. Consequently the XLVII Panzer Corps may be withdrawn and replaced by an Infantry Corps, with one mobile unit (21 Panzer Division) remaining for the time being under its command, as a minumum counterbalance to our armor.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY

ered front of Artillery Batt

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps:

Blements of the 716 Infantry Division reinforced the battd front of the 16 Infantry Division (716 Engineer Battalion; 716
illery Battalion; 736 GR).

The situation in the 198th and 189th Infantry Division
tors remains obscure. Elements of the 189 Infantry Division were
tidentified on 17 October. Since then elements of the 198 sidepped South and were identified by II French Corps (326 GR) in the
Division sector, suggesting that the division assumed responsibility
the sector of its Southern neighbour. Possibly the 189 Infantry
ision has been withdrawn due to sever losses.

2) IV CAF Corps:
The 336 Infantry Division, heavily committed in the fighti LE THILLOT is now furnishing reinforcements to the ST DIE
The 291 Criminal Battalion; 2 Battalions of 757 GR; the 407
Battalion and elements of the 933 GR were identified in the

talion and elements of the 300 d.

In zone.

The reported arrival in the COLMAR area of the 269 Infoon from NORWAY, confirmed by the identification of 1 Cotton the French II Corps zone, suggests that the newly sion, which possibly has considerable experience in mountmay assume responsibility for a sector in the VOSGES, region of the BALLON massif.

In such a case the remainder of the 338 Infantry Division its elements already committed in the ST DIE area, where vision may assume responsibility for a sector of the main stance ST DIE-BACCARAT.

ance ST DIE-BACCARAT. he 106 Panzer Brigade has not been identified for the last re are indications that the Brigade is regrouping, poss-21 Panzer Division, in the vicinity of ST DIE.

The 159 Infantry Division with the von OPPEN Brigade and secus attached smaller units, responsible for the approaches to ORT GAP, continues to oppose the French 1st DMI of the French and the French I Corps.

ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Vosges Zone)

77,550 TOTAL

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3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Zone)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (E 1680), BOUNG-S MAGRICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. The sector of the FRANCO-ITALIAN Border is held by the following German and Italian forces: Coast to LARCHE Pass, 34 Infantry Division; LARCHE Pass to MT BENEVRE, elements 5 Mountain Division and elements of 90 FG Division (1/2 Battalions); MT GENEVRE, 85 Mountain Jaeger Regiment and elements of the MONTE ROSA Division; MT CENIS Pass, elements 157 Mountain Jaeger Division; PETIT ST BERNARD Pass, elements 157 Division.

Recent movements in the region of the FRANCO-ITALIAN Border include the following:

Recent movements in the region of the FRANCO-ITALIAN Border include the following:

Units of the 139 Mountain Regiment, previously contacted in the Units of the 139 Mountain Regiment, previously contacted in the Alpine sector have lately been identified in the TRENTO-VERONA area. Alpine troops coming from Western ITALY are concentrating in the region of the BRENNER Pass. Many unidentified headquarters are re-locating in the LAKE COMO and LAKE GARDO regions. Troop concentrations are continually reported in MILAN, with high percentage of the units coming from the West; the bulk of the organized formations are made up of \$5 units, of which detachments had been used in the French border sector. Increased traffic on the reopened Autostrada from TURIN to MILAN has units, of which detachments had been used in the French border sector.

Increased traffic on the reopened Autostrada from TURIN to MILAN has been noted since early October. The same type of concentration has been reported in TURIN, which appears to be the distribution point for troops passing through to the East. Traffic on the road FINERCLOTURIN shows a preponderance of troop convoys eastward, with the main cargo toward the West being war material. The bulk of the 5 Mountain Division is reputed to be holding the passes NW of GENOA, while the First Regiment and Alpine units of the MONTE ROSA Division have been identified in the hills NE of GENOA. Units of this Division have been reported recalled from the French border due to wholesale desertion reported recalled from the French border due to wholesale desertion and negotiations with partisans. Only small MONTE ROSA detachments have recently been contacted in the MAIRA Valley area on the Alpine have recently been contacted in the MAIRA Valley area on the Alpine front. Large numbers of German and Fascist troops have been reported in all-out attacks to mop up the partisans in the VALD OSSOLA, VAL SUSA and VAL PELLICHE to insure free passage on routes from the border to the East. Local withdrawals have been effected in the BARDONNECHIA basin, where defense lines have been constructed across the VAL DI SUSA and armor brought up to the area of OULX (H 34). An increase of medium caliber artillery fire in this sector and in the coastal area has been noted during the past few days.

Preparation for withdrawal may be indicated by these activities. Preparation for withdrawals would seem to depend upon the developments along the border, on the Southern front and in the TRIESTE-TARVISIO area.

b. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Alpine Front)

In contact Supporting units

TOTAL

12-13000

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4. OPERATIONS

a. GENERAL

Despite the harmful inroads made by our attacks during the period, the enemy's reactions have been neither hasty nor unbalanced.
His plan to utilize such static units as are available, to hold successive delaying lines in covering the retreat to the SIEGFRIED Line is
altered only by the necessity to mass, his few reserves of wide-spread
units at such points of eruption as occur in his front.

I Corps: The light patrol activity and sporadic artillery fire characteristic of the enemy's attitude on this front were broken only by the entrance of one adventurous enemy patrol into HYEMONDANS (P 2574) and a late increase of artillery fire on forward positions E

of PONT DU ROID (DOUBS River sector).

II Corps: The steady rain of artillery fire on the areas of LE HAUT DU FAING (V 3428) and CORNIMONT (V 3429) increased to a crescendo by the 25th as it supported (with mortar fire) a nearly successful attack on RONDFAING (K 3343), on the N flank of the 3 DIA salient. Aggressive patrols probed the outskirts of the 1 DMI in the FRESSE wood (K 2614) and S of RONCHAMP (K 2308) as the period ended.

SEVENTH US ARMY VI Corps: At the outset of VI Corps attack, the enemy seemed confident of dealing successfully with our attempt to break seemed confident of dealing successfully with our attempt to break through his positions. His first concern was with the line running E of the BELMONT (V 2758) -BRUYERES (V 2457), railfoad and for the FREM-IFONTAINE (V 2364) -BROUVELIEURES (V 2560) area; the latter he defended with hand grenades and automatic weapons in close-in fighting, while counterattacking from BELMONT (V 2758) with tanks. But on the 23rd forced withdrawals had already begun E of BROUVELIEURES (V 2560) and N of DOMFAING (V 2760), accompanied by a shifting back of artillery. forced withdrawals had already begun E of BROUVELLEURES (V 2560) and N of DOMFAING (V 2760), accompanied by a shifting back of artillery. Despite his resistance E of FREMIFONT.INE (V 2364), the enemys nervousness was shown by a heavy artillery reaction to our use of smoke screens and by his utilizing precious ME 109's in strafing our troops. By the 25th, the enemy had manned positions constructed earlier, and resistance stiffened generally. Close-in fighting in MORTAGNE (V 2764), resistance stiffened generally. Close-in fighting in MORTAGNE (V 2764), resistance stiffened generally. Close-in fighting in mortagne (V 2764), small arms, mortagned artillery fire slowed our advance E of the small arms, mortar and artillery fire slowed our advance E of the MCATAGNE River. General withdrawals began to be observed N and E to-ward HOUSSERAS (V 2466 as we captured abandoned vehicles and equipment ward HOUSSERAS (V 2466 as we captured abandoned vehicles and equipment in our progress along the river. Resistance lessened, except in the forests on the Corps extreme N and S flanks. Another holding position had been manned by the enemy on the 26th, E and N of HOUSSERAS (V 2466) had been manned by the enemy on the 26th, E and N of HOUSSERAS (V 2466) infiltration tactics began to be used from the vicinity of the NEUNE infiltration tactics began to be used from the vicinity of the NEUNE infiltration tactics began to be used from the vicinity of the NEUNE infiltration tactics began to be used from the vicinity of the neumanned attitude displayed about the 27/28 Oct, uted to the strong determined attitude displayed about the 27/28 Oct, particularly in the area of EIFFONTAINE (V 3057). The enemy succeeded in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making use of his strongly defended readblocks in cutting off one of in making zone was neared.

XV Corps: In the Southern sector, the enemy succeeded in retaking MENARMONT (V 1880) on 23 October. He devoted most of his efforts during the rest of the period to scattered patrolling and to harrassing artillery fire, mainly in the areas of GLONVILLE (V 2286), FONTENOY (V 2084), and BENAMENIL (V 2197).

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Resisting all our attempts to probe his activity in the Northern sector, the enemy developed his dug-in positions and brought up tanks, thus being able to launch counterattacks which penetrated our lines vicinity (Q 2306). Further attempts were repulsed by 27 Cctober and by the end of the period the zone was generally quiet, with indications that front lines were now only lightly held.

4 French DMM: Unsuccessful small-scale enemy attacks on CCNDAMINE (P 5150), CHENAILLET (P 4999), BESSANS (H 5260), and TERRIGNON (K 5040) signified an unusual curiosity on the enemy's part. Harrassing artillery covered our zone effectively during the period, with heavy concentrations falling on BRIANCON (P 3998).

FABTE: A sharp increase in artillery fire vicinity COL DE BRAUS (\$ 7098) preceded several small enemy attempts at infiltration SF of CASTILLON (\$ 7594). On the 28th of October, ten explosions were heard in the vicinity of MT EARBONNET and SOSPEL (\$ 7598), two explosions E of MT VETEBREN. A smoke screen was observed over the COL DE BRAUS (\$ 7098) tunnel.

5. SUPPLIES

a. Positions in the PIRMASENS-ZWEIBRUCKEN sector of the SIFGFRIED LINE have been stocked with French and Italian types of ammunition according to an escaped Russian PW who hauled these supplies in to the line. Ammunition was stored in about 25 barracks and 15 underground dumps having about 40 tunnels of concrete construction, all well dispersed over an area of 32 square miles. Each of these subterranean installations consists of a group of 3 or 4 separate tunnels of varying lengths up to 3 km. Several of the main tunnels of the larger dumps have narrow guage railway, and passages leading to concrete block have narrow guage railway, and passages leading to concrete block houses in the defensive line. All are equipped with electric lighting and telephone systems. Loading platforms and entrances to the dumps are located a short distance from hard-surface highways generally 500 to 750 metres from a village. The following localities are known to have such installations:

BURGALBEN DELLFELD HOBEISCHWEILER HOELMUHLBACH MASSWEILER NUENSCHWEILER

PETERSBURG PIRMASENS (probable Branch Ord. Depot)
RODALBEN (also barrack, & large open dump)
THALEISCHWEILER - (THAL-FROESCHEN) WINDSBERG and between PETERSBERG and GERSBACH

Ammunition arrived by trains over the L.NDAU-ZWEIBRUCKEN line which were unloaded daily at RODALBEN (30 cars), TH.LEISCHWEILER (25 cars), DELLFORD (15 cars), and also at RIESCHWEILER, while gun parts were taken to FIRMASENS-NORD.

A substantial number of barracks in this area appear to have been used for storage of ammunition, possibly to supplement the stocks in the underground dumps. Underground installations of this type, are likely to be found in other sectors of the SIEGFRIED LINE. (SOURCE - OSS Report VF 71)

b. German exports of Silesian coal destined for ITALY appear to have been continued via ST MARGRETHEN over SWISS railways. Some of this coal traffic is occasionally routed through MANNHIIM and ST LOUIS, possibly due to Allied air attacks on the rail system in Southern Germany.

Reports from the BELFORT-MULHOUSE sector continue to show conc. Reports from the BELFORT-MULHOUSE sector continue to factories siderable manufacturing activity and southwest for removal to Germany. have been stripped of machinery and equipment for removal to Germany.

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d. The enemy is removing heating and plumbing systems as well as generators from industrial plants in the ST DIE rea which will probably be used for repairs to damaged or newly constructed German instal-

e. A PW of 34 Division captured along the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier claimed that food and ammunition were sufficient, but that re-supply was irregular. B ttalion and Company supply columns arrive from BREIL at night.

6. MOVEMENTS

Railroad and highway transportation difficulties coupled with the lack of repair material and a shortage of skilled labor have led the Germans to turn as much traffic as possible to the waterways for transportation. Reports received during the week show that traffic on the LEC CLD C.NAL _t FREIBURG (W 0933) and on the MARNE-RHINE CANAL continues to be very heavy. Because of transport difficulties, the evactuation by rail of factory equipment from MULHCUSE has been greatly retarded. Further hampering of enemy communications is found in a French report which states that traffic has been interrupted on the HOLLENTAL line between FREIBURG and DCN.UESCHINGEN.

Reports received during the past week show that considerable rail activity took place in the DONAUESCHINGEN area during the first week in October when numerous troop and supply trains passed through to-

in October when numerous troop and supply trains passed through to-

wards Offenburg.

Further activity along the RHINE is brought out by French and OSS reports stating that the bombing of the dam at KEMBS caused the river to run so low that traffic over the bridge at HUNINGEN was interrupted. In addition it has been reported that the rapid current of the river does not allow boats of medium tonnage to go further than NEUENBURG (V 8712). Boats from STRASBOURG to BASEL carry only half loads.

(OSS Report).

Because of unfavorable weather TAC/R reports during the week were limited. Ground reports state sonsiderable rail traffic still persists between ST DIE and STRASBOURG, the former being the unloading point for rails and barbed wire. More rail activity was evident along the AUGSBURG-ULM line carrying troop and supply trains toward COLMAR, STRASBOURG, and SAARBRUCKEN.

Reports on the bombing of RHINE River Bridges during the past week

Reports on the bombing of RHINE River Bridges during the past week revealed the following:

Bridge at (V 9050) vic SASBACH - destroyed. " RHEINAU - destroyed.
" FRETRIM (V 9868) (V 9976)

ERSTEIN - 1 hit, west approach, 2 near misses. " SELTZ - damaged,

2 hits east end of bridge, 2 hits east approach " (A 8987) " HUNINGEN - 6 near misses.


The status of the NEUF BRISACH and the CHALAMPE bridges is not def-initely known at present, but a report has been received indicating that munition trains are now using these bridges, previously reported unfit for rail traffic.

7. DEFENSES

This week has disclosed the construction of a continuous system of fire trenches and A/T ditches around PHALSBOURG (Q 6518) defending the approaches to the S. VERN GAP. Numerous machine guns are already in position.

The aggregate of numerous small items obtained from S.R.F. and The aggregate of numerous small items obtained from the constant of the consta Border.

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The following captured document shows how intelligence is being gathered by the G-2's in divisions opposing us today. Although the enemy's methods are similar to our own, the comments on lack of air recommands and the interfegation of American PW are of interest. (Document captured by First US Army):

246 Volks Grenadier Division G-2 Nr 10/44 - Confidential

Div Hq. 27/9/44

UBJECT: G-2 Operations.

1. The officer in charge of keeping the enemy situation up to date at Division is the G-2. It is his duty to furnish the G-3 at all times a clear and dependable picture of the enemy situation. He has at his disposal, in addition to his clerical personnel, two officers (interpreters) as his assistants for the interrogation of PW.

2. In order to gain an intelligence picture of the enemy situation, the G-2 principally has the following sources:

a. Messages from his Lower Units.

(i) Immediate messages. Every important observation of the enemy is to be reported to Division at once. In particular the following observations:

(a) Special Surveillance by the Guards: To prevent the loss of any special observations noticed by the guards, an observation record will be kept at each post, into which all special incidents will be entered. This record will be kept in duplicate, so the guards will have a copy at all times and the Division G-2 the other copy for evaluation of the report.

(b) Reports of Enemy Ron and Combat patrols: All actions undertaken by the enemy against our own MLR to be reported to Division at once by wire and to be followed up with a written report including overlay.

(c) Observation of Enemy Air Activity: Unusual tactics of the enemy air ferce, as well as every bomb dropped in our own battle sector, parachutists, including emergency jumps and all not definitely indentified flares in the air, are to be reported immediately.

(d) Conduct of the Civilian Population: The fact that the troops engaged in battle on German soil place considerable confidence in the population, constitutes a great danger for the counterintelligence. One must always bear in mind that an increasingly growing number of enemy agents are being employed in the zone of the int-

·(2) Routine Messages. Hereto the following special orders

are issued:

b. PW Statements: Now that the air superiority of the enemy in the West has practically eliminated our own air reconnaissance, the importance of PW statements play a much more decisive role then here-to fore. A skilled interrogation report is often the only source of information about the enemy that extends past the outer area of the MLR into the depth of enemy occupied territories. It is therefore always of paramount importance to take as many PW as possible and to evacuate them as fast as possible to the G-2 of Division for interrogation. The following applies in particular:

(1) The interrogation of PW takes place only at Division. Lower units are prohibited from interrogating PW, as they thereby hamper the possibility of a successful interrogation by the interpreters of Division, who have been especially trained for the job. Practically all English and American PW render good information when interrogated by skilled interpreters.

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BAUCHE, (fnu). Mistress of Police Inspector Marie of French police (Renseignements Giveraux) at Dijon. Inspector Marie was Abwehr agent who was killed in leading an expedition against Maquis. Subject kept on working and when arrested was the secretary to Mr. Courtil, Commissionaire Divisionnal at Dijon.

GRANDJEAN, Henri Kavier, elies Grandidier, alies Tonton. Recruited as Abwehr agent through PPF. Carried out numerous missions in Southern France. Revealed names of agents in Dijon and other sections of France. In 1944, missions mainly concerned penetrating Resistance groups. Revealed existence of letter-drop in Dijon.

RUFFINONI, Jeanne Gessaune, alias "Jamy". Recruited at Dijon as Abwehr agent through employment as servant of occupation troops. She worked with GRANDJEAN as a "Cover" on his trips. Identified agents in Dijon and their contacts. Has confessed.

AINOC, Marie-Louise Racca. Woman of loose morals recruited at Dijon as letter-drop and as custodian of W/T set. Identified agents and contacts in Dijon. Has confessed.

CHARLET, Marcel. Proprietor of Restaurant "Moulin a Vent" at Bourg. Confidential informant to German Military officer of Abwehr concerning the Maquis. Members of the S.S. and various Abwehr agents met at his restaurant. Had 600,000 francs on his person when arrested. Investigation continuing.

GIROUX, Julien. Maitre d'hotel at restaurant owned by Marcel CHARLET. Worked with latter. Investigation continuing.

DELUCRE, Abel. Recruited as Abwehr agent in Bourg by HELESTETTER. Was recruited by being involved in Black Market and then correct into being an agent. Was closely associated with Resistance groups and thus a valuable source of information to the Abwehr.

SCULFORT, (fnu). Recruited as Abwehr agent through HELMSTETTER. Was opered into becoming an Abwehr agent by Black Market involvement. Specialized in furnishing information concerning Resistance activities, especially parachutists, in Confrancon-Macon area. Under arrest in Bourg.

SCHLOSSER, Captein (fnu). Former French Army captain. Was well informed on Resistence movement in Ceyzeriat region and furnished such information to HELISTETTER when latter visited him. Under arrest in Bourg.

MAITITZ, Eugene von, Gorman Vice Consul in Monaco, arrested with his wife, Ella, by the F.F.I. MAITITZ is an agent left behind by the S.D. 'Case turned over to S.C.I.

CAREZOL, Louis, errested in Monaco. He was one of the four sommissioners of the Monaco Casino and was left behind by the German S.D. as an agent. He chained information on personalities for recruiting by SD from the or

SECRET Army Group Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 2. dated 18 October 1944

DOUSSOT, Lucien, alias Captain Lucien, alias Andre. Captain in the Clung Battalion (FFI). Presented himself at SM 60 and asked to be pretected from the F.T.P. who want to "liquidate" him as an important member of the Gestapo. Claims to have worked for the Resistance. Probably a double agent. Turned over to S.M., Lyon, for further investigation.

FOURUERET, Bernard. Arrested by S.M. 501 bearing two letters from Paris for Belfort. Admitted being a courier for a German espionage service. Later retracted. Under investigation by S.M. 60.

SIMOUNT, Andre, Eugene, Jules, from Langres. Member of the Gestapo. Cases pending for Military Tribunal.

SIMOUNT, Madeleine, daughter of SIMOUNT. Member of the Gestapo. Case pending for Military Tribunal.

VANDREDEN, Robert, at Langres. Member of the Gestapo. Case pending for Military Tribunal.

STIVALET, Yves, owner of bakery at Lengres. Member of the Gestapo. Case pending for Military Tribunel.

BRANDT, Magda, German, born at Pellwom, 12 September 1901. Was mistress of Georges JOUHAUD, suspected of espionage. Still at large.

HAMET, Jeanne, French, at New Prison, Nice. Close contact with Baron Von Hessberg and Hans VARELA and members of the German S.D.

MASLENIKOFF, Michel, Russian. In prison at Bosusoliel. Inti-mate friend of General POLOVTSOFF, suspected S.D. agent.

FUCHS, Berta, Czechslovak, Monte Carlo. Still free. Friend of LICHTENSTEIN.

LICHTENSTEIN in FFI, but who worked formerly for the Germans and MELCHIORRE.

Two additional Abwehr agents, both with W/T sets were arrested. For security reasons, their names are not being disseminated.

3. Progress of Cases Under Investigation.

a. AUGER, Gabriel, alias Caldier, Henri, alias ANTOINE, alias ROBERT, has been reported previously as German agent with W/T of the Abwehr Einz Marine. He was turned over to the B.S.T. in Marseille on 30 September after his expanditation by the S.C.I. was compromised by French in Marseille newspapers in connection with execution of Gerbaud. Auger's mistress, Florentine SINNER who did coding and decoding work for him was also turned over to the B.S.T. in Marseille.

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b. All of the following arrested and confined at Cannes except where indicated:

BECCASINO, Roger E.A., Confessed W/T eperater. Sent to Hq. Soveth Army for trial.
THIRION, Michel, confessed W/T operator. Sent to Hq. Seventh

Army for trial.

MULLER, Nicholas, confessed W/T operator. Sent to Hq. Seventh
Army for trial.

MULLER, Nicholas, confessed W/T operator. Sent to Hq. Seventh Army for trial.

LOMBARD-MOREL, Henri, Jean, confessed W/T operator. Sent to Hq. Seventh Army for trial.

ESMIOL, Fortune, Jean. Close relationship with Max BUCHOLTZ. To be turned back to S.M. who arrested him.

CAVALIONE, Edouard, Suspected S.D. agent. Has confessed to certain activities with Germans.

CANY, Pierre. Suspected of dealings with the Germans. Identified as having been paid for the Christmann espionage ring.

SCHOENNERZ, Heinz. Double agent who worked with Max BUCHOLTZ, Abwehr chief at Nice. Still undergoing interrogation.

de BREGEOT, Regis Elnere. Worked with Leon "Felix" JACOBS and BUCHOLTZ. Transferred to S.M., Nice.

POLOVISOFF, Pierre, General. Suspected S.D. agent. Admits almost daily contact with Count KAGANECK, S.D. head at Monaco.

REIGESBERG-VERSLUYS, Guillame. Suspected S.D. agent. Denied knowledge of REDZECK, yet this name and his address has been found in Reigesberg's own hendwriting.

HUTSCHLER, Mme. Lived with above.

COUTURAT, Madeleine nee CARDEN. Former mistress of Baron Von STEEGEH, Abwehr agent of Werner at Milan. She was released after interrogation, but subsequent information reveals even closer relations with Von Steegen's affeirs than first suspected. Now believed to be at 75 Ave de Wagram, Paris. Case to be investigated there.

GOLZAR. Heinz "Bobby". Intimate friend of Werner, who has give

lieved to be at 75 Ave de Wagram, Paris. Case to be investigated there.

GOLZAR, Heinz "Bobby". Intimate friend of Werner, who has given valuable information concerning the San Remo Abwehr organization.

SCOTTO, Eugenio. Italian who came around from Italy and was turned over to CIC by ABTF. Important leads have developed and parts of Subject's story found to be false. Admits he was contacted by the German Intelligence, but claims to have refused to work.

CERESOLE, Louis Jean. Suspected S.D. agent. Incimate friend of Henri ANSELMI, OVRA and S.D. agent. Admits close contact with Kaganeck, S.D. head.

DOBROWSKA, Cacile. Polish mistress of Henri Anselmi. Is furnishing important leads.

VON MALTITZ, Eugen. Was to have become German consular agent after arrival of Americans. Does not claim diplomatic status. SHARF information cells him an S.D. agent.

AESCHLIMANN, Frederic Charles. Still at large. Suspected of illegal crossing of Swiss Border.

KERTING, Herbert, German soldier, thought to have been an Abwehr agent. Sent through FW channels after interrogation.

LAFORCE, Clement, M.J. Suspected W/T operator. Turned ever to S.M. Nice after interrogation.

Sixth Army Group For inightly CI Report No. 2 (atinued)

SELIA, Andres, now imprisoned at Antibes. Denounced by German PW as working with Goneral Eldor, German Intelligence Chief for Merseilles Region.

de FRANCESCHI, Ile. Journalist. To be arrested for interrogation.

4. Personalities in erea still under enemy control

CHEZZI. Age 45, Now at Sen Remo, Abwehr agent of Werner, ANSELMI, Henri. Believed to be at Sen Remo. Abwehr or S.D. Ag agent.

5. Additional information on Carded Personalities.

No cards of personalities are available.

6. Subversive Organizations,

No reports of subversive organizations have been received.

- 7. Security Control of Civilian Personnel
- a. It has been necessary to greatly strengthen the security measures in the forward areas due to the stabilization of the front. The measures taken by the Armies have been well supported by the French Civil Authorities. Pass systems have been put into effect and road blocks and roving patrols operated by F.F.I. and Gendermes under CIC/SM control are being used to insure enforcement of regulations. This is equally true in the area of the F.A.B.T.F. Persons traveling without proper authorization or identification are held for questioning. Road blocks have been established by Divisional CIC/SM as far forward as practical, use being made of M.P.'s, Gendermes and F.F.I. No civilian traffic is permitted in the actual combat zone embracing the area forward of regimental rear boundaries.
- b. French identity cards (Carte d'identite) which were existent in France before end during the German occupation have been subject to such large scale counterfeiting as to be no longer trustworthy Until a new method is devised and put into effect by the French Authorities they cannot be regarded as reliable from the viewpoint of security. The only reliable check that can be made at present of individuals must be made against communal and departmental records.
- 8. Relation between Troops and Civilian Population.

Except in the extreme forward areas where destruction of towns, incident to their liberation, has affected the cordiality of the public towards their liberators, there exists good relations between troops and the civilian population. In some places the public has been irritated by incidents in cafes and in others possional resentment has been expressed at the good treatment seconds German prisoner of wer by thericans. Those have not, however, affected the general feeling of good will towards the troops to any serious degree.

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Part II Military Socurity

1. General Sarvay.

a. In general military security has not been threatened seriously during the period of this report. However the static condition of the front at the present time permits the development of threatening conditions for the First Franch and American Seventh armies. The armies are cognizant of this danger and of the general laxness which developed within units during the period of rapid advence. This is being corrected and Military Security is being emphasized.

b. It is to be expected that *s we approach enemy territory instances of false information may be expected to increase. On 27 Suptember a Lieutenant of the 45th Division was approached by a French civilian who told him that Tundon was unoccupied. The civilian stated that he was a French Captain working for the strategic services section. The company commander, acting on this information sent a twelve man patrol into the town. The town was found to be occupied by the Germans and only one man came back. Seventh Army has cautioned its personnel to beware of such incidents.

- c. New Divisions joining the Seventh Army were instructed to observe radio silence while moving into the army area. Shoulder patches and unit markings on vehicles are prohibited until units have been in contact with the enemy for one week.
- d. An American Colonel was reported by the Seventh Army to have hired a civilian chauffeur who was later found to be a Milician acting as a German Spy through the interception of a letter which he wrote to his wife. CIC is investigating the case.
- e. The First Franch army reports that the trial and execution of an enemy agent by the name of Vincent at the Second DB has proved to be a valuable example in that the division is now sending an increased number of persons to be screened to the B.S.M.
- f. Plans for the redistribution and increase in number of CIC personnel in the Sixth Army Group has been submitted to higher head quarters. If approved they will provide necessary personnel to keep a closer check on all security matters.
- g. Additional personnel has also been requested from DSM in order to supply lieison to new American Divisions of the Seventh Army.

2. Security of Information.

One information leak is reported by Saventh Army. The VI Army Corps states that during the night of 4 October the enemy tapped an OP line.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SECRETarmy Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 2 (Continued) dated 18 October 1944. Security of Material. a. A German sabotage school was discovered near Avignon and its former operations are being investigated by SM. b. A sabotage attempt was reported by the First Rrench Army. A splice bar was set across the railroad tracks between Basancon and Clairval during the night of 2-3 October, near the village of Thise (17/0-86) behind some aviation hangers. An ammunition train passed between midnight and 0100 and dented the bar which was found twelve meters from where it had been set. Railroad workers report that the sabotage device could not be successful as placed and that it could be assumed, therefore, the man was no trained saboteur. SM is investigating the case, 4. Security of Personnel. a. Nothing to report. SECRET

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Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 2 (Continued) dated 18 October 1944.

Part III --- Port, Airport and Frontier Control

a. Control of the Swiss Border is in the hands of the BSM with assistance from Army SM. Under their direction F.F.I. patrols are operating along the border. These patrols are directed and maintained by French Gendarmerie, Customs Guards, etc. The Sixth Army Group is checking the working of this border control system and will direct any changes that may be considered necessary.

b. The security of the Southern France Ports and Airports is the responsibility of Delta Base Section.

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Counter-Intelligence	Staffs and P	ersonnel		
	Officers	Agents	SM	SA.
Sixth Army Group CI Seventh Army CI 307 C.I.C. Detechment	- 6 3 8	30	1 4	7
VI Corps CI 206 C.I.C. Detechment	1 3	9	2 -	4
36th Division 36th C.I.C. Detechment	ī	5	1 -	2 -
3d Division 3d C.I.C. Detechment	ī	5	1	2 -
45th Division 45th C.I.C. Detachment	ā	-	1 -	2 -
XV Corps 79th Division 2d French Armored Division	2 2 -	14 14	1 2 2	2 7
Total - Seventh Army	23	81	13	26
First French Army			6	15
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ANNEX NO. 1

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 2

The following items were received by 7th Army.

1. German Maquis.

a. A young German in a Swiss internment camp, who was a Hitler Youth leader before leaving Germany and who still has contacts with the Hitler Youth, claims that a German Maquis will not originate from the old party members, but from the young idealistic members who are violently opposed to the old leaders. He alleges that the rift is rapidly widening between the young members and the old leaders who have been softened by the good life they have led and by the honors bestowed upon them. The "underground" Nazis will be the most fenatical enemies of the "old" Nazis with the one exception of Hitler. The blame for atrocities, looting, etc., will be shifted on to the old Nazis, while the youths will seek to emerge as "pure idealistic patriots", whose only desire is the liberation of their country. They will claim that Nazism's allience with capitalism, with industrialists as well as the Junkers, was the beginning of the end of the real "pure Nazism". They will further claim that the new Nazism is not out for world conquest, because it is not interested in acquiring new markets for the products of the industrialists. It is a pure nationalist movement and not for export. These new Nazis even hope that they will win sympathy abroad.

b. Usually reliable informant says that the Nazis have definitedly organized underground resistance to the invading Allied forces, but that it will cease the moment Germany is completely occupied. The Nazis realize that when the fighting ceases the only desire of the German people will be to be left in peace. Consequently any underground activity would be very unpopular. However, they believe, that by the end of six months occupation there will be so much discontent and ill-feeling against the occupiers that an underground movement would be more popular. They also believe that if no resignance designs the first six months, the Allies will be encouraged to withdraw a large part of their occupational forces. For these reasons the fenatical Nazis being sent underground are told to remain quiet at least six months after tetal occupation.

ingly on whispering propagands. A special organization created to this end. Men are being trained in the art rumors and distributed throughout Germany. Although at work, these professional rumor-mongers are regarded the future disseminators of subversive propagands duri occupation.

2. Anti-Nazi Organizations.

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11 - SH/EF Main

2 - 21st AG

2 - 12th AG TAC

3 - 12th AG Main

2 - G-2, ETOUSA

2 - A-2, IX AF

2 - A-2, XII AF

2 - G-2 COMZONE, NATO, edv

10 - 7th Army

1 - First French Army

10 - First ABTF

2 - Delta Base Sec

2 - CON Adv Sec

4 - C/S

1 - SGS

1 - G-5

5 - G-1

10 - G-2 EUGENE L. HARRISON, Colonel, G.S.C., Asst C. of S., G-2 **SECRET**

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SECRET 4 November 1944 Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 3 Period from 15 October to 1 November 1944 Part I. Civil Security General Survey

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Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 3 (Continued) dated 4 November 1944.

DU RUPT, Andre Emile. Apprehended as a suspicious character by local police at REMIREMONT 29 September 1944 and turned over to VI Corps C.I.C./S.M. Datachment. Subject confessed being member of ARBEITSSTAB (Abwehr) at Dijon. Investigation further disclosed that Subject has 168,000 frames, part of which was to be paid to enemy agents contacting Subject at his home in REMIREMONT. DU RUPT is part of Dijon ring uncovered by Saventh Army C.I.C. Detachment and reported in Counter Intelligence Report No. 2. Case to T.R.

de FRANESCHIA, Ilo, alies Adria. Swiss journalist for Jaurnal DE GENEYE. Wore French uniform and had French War Correspondent credentals. Had been commuting regularly between France and Switzerland. Claims to be French agent, but on basis of evidence in transcribed shorthand notes found in ville of Captain Max BUCHOLZ, Abwehr agent, indicating that de Franchasia was an active espionage agent for the Abwehr in Switzerland, he was arrested by Seventh Army C.I.C. in apartment of his mistress near MONTE CARLO. Case to S.C.I.

C..........German Intelligence agent, SANDRIN Group (Abwehr DIJON) arrested by U.S. VI Corps Securite' Militeire. Exploited by T.R.

BENBARD, Sicherheitsdienst agent arrested by First French Army as he was crossing the Swiss frontier to enter FRANCE. Will be tried in Military court.

O'BRIEN, Dutch agent for German Intelligence. Interpreter for Colonel COLLINS (CBS) MARSEILLES. Arrested by Securite' Militaire at the Operations Base. Sent to MARSEILLE Bureau de Securite' Militaire for trial in military court.

CAROCERI, elies LESAGE, German Intelligence agent. Arrested in the MONTBELIARD area by First French Army Securite' Militaire. Sent to BESANCON Bureau de Socurite' Militaire for trial in military court.

LABAT, accused of being a Gestapo agent at NIMES. Arrested by a member of First French Army Securite' Militaire. Inquiry in progress.

D........., German Intelligence agent. KONDOR Group. Arrested by an agent of First French Army Securite' Militaire. Exploited by T.R.

BOUX, alias BERTHIER, German Intelligence agent. KONDOR Group. Arrested at the same time as the preceding case. Will be tried in military court.

E........ Dutch interpreter, F.F.I. officer at EPINAL. Inquiry in progress in conjunction with Seventh Army C.I.C.

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GRAS, Joseph, a Frenchman who had volunterily enlisted in the Kriegamerine and who will be brought before a Military Court.

VASSEUR, Merie Helene; REBOUL, Mireille Simone. Two women whose presence near the front lines was suspicious; case passed on to the Territorial BSM for verification.

LECIERCO, Pierre; VITALI, Philippe; ROSALIA, Dominique; GALLOT, Francois. Four new recruite engaged in a unit of the Army, known to have been with a German organization (TODT).

GUENAT, Henri. One individual reported as an informer for the Gestapo - case now in progress.

3. Progress of Cases under Investigation.

REPORTED TO SHARP to be SIPO or SD agent working for RETZECK at TOU-LOUSE. Initial search of apartment and interrogation produced insufficient evidence for immediate arrest, but dispovery of name RETZ-HEGE in subject's handwriting on letter lead to arrest by Seventh Army C.I.C. of Subject and de HUTSCHLER, Meris, Beroness, nee MECK-MAM, companion of REIGESHEMG-VERSLUYS, whom she has known for forty years and lived with for four. Claims to know all facts of Subject's life and denies knowledge of any asplonage activity. Pending further investigation Subject has not yet been confronted with evidence. Subject was denied visit to French Africa in 1940 by French suthor-

CERESOLS Louis Team nationality Monograpus, born 18 April 1805. Reported by Chalf as 1870 or SD ment. Arrested violaty Monte Tariff as Descript Law 1870 or SD ment. Arrested violaty Monte Tariff as Descript Law 1870 of the Control of Tariff as Descript Law 1870 or SD main and State of the Control of Tariff as Descript Law 1870 or State of the Control of Tariff as Descript Law 1870 or State of the Control of Tariff as Descript Law 1870 or State of Tariff as Descript Law 1870 or Stat

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Sixth Army Group Fortnight; CI Report No. 3 (Continued) dated 4 November 1944.

arrest by 45 Division C.I.C. Confessed and turned over to NANCY S.M. for trial.

HEN, Willy Rene, French. Arrested (by M.P.) wearing motley uniform including 45th Divisional Insignia in EPINAL cafe while entertaining American troops. Claimed to be working for French Intelligence Scrvices, as a double agent, to have followed Allied Forces from Normandie and to have worked with C.I.C. as an informant. Carried a paper from 45th Division C.I.C. stating that he had been interrogated and was not regarded with suspicion. Finally confessed to being a "stay-behind" SD espionage agent left in Epinal by retreating Gormans and to extensive collaborationist and aspionage activity since 1940. Soid he was overrun before a radio transmitter, for which he had been trained, could be delivered. Was employed as a telephone operator at the railroad station in EPINAL and instructed to remain behind. File sent to NANCY Securite' Militaire for trial by Military Court.

- 4. Personalities in Areas Still Under Enemy Control
- a. A G.I.S. receiving station is reported by DTSS to be set up at LUTTENBACH, near MUNSTER (Hout-Rain).
- b. At MULHOUSE the Gestapo is reported to have a list of 225 collaborators who will remain in place upon departure of the German troops. These agents are furnished with French and German passports. One list is kept by the Polizeipresident, the other by the Kreisleiter MOURER. Neither is aware of the existence of the other list.
- c. Information from three sources point to the imminent attempt of approximately 50 agents to cross our lines. SSM 163 reports that for reasons yet unknown, certain patriots imprisoned in the Hutry quarter of BELFORT have just been released. They are now trying to cross the lines. The Germans, realizing this, have at the same time "liberated" 50 agents who are to try to infiltrate our lines with or as the patriots. Among these Gestapo agents are the following:
 - (1) LUTAUD, Pierre. Born 17 March at MACON.
 - (2) VAUTHIER, Robert. Born 23 Scotember 1929 at NICE.
 - (3) MULLER, Robert William. Born 16 October 1910 at MENDE.
 - (4) CAUMES, Duniel. Born 23 February 1909 at BEZIERS.
 - (5) MATIER, Frederic. Born 25 Fobruary 1908 at MOLSHEIM. Has assumed an alias, Frederic STRASSNER, at UNTER-SCHARZREICH.

The evaluation of the above information is given as B/3.

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Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 3 (Continued) dated 4 November 1944.

- 5. Additional Information on Carded Personalities.

 No cards available.
- 6. Subversive Organizations.

a. XV Corps reports approximately 140 Militia members were with the German forces which evacuated BRUYERES. Most members of the Vosges Militia are assembled in ST. DIE, where they are reported causing considerable confusion for civilians. Hostile acts by personnel at first thought to be F.F.I. were reported by the 141 Inf. Regiment on the morning of 24 October vic V-322585. After investigation it is believed that these persons were French Militia as no active Maquis organization exists in the ST. DIE area. It is believed that this was a deliberate attempt by French Militia to pose as friendly F.F.I. There is no means of distinguishing Militia from friendly Frenchmen except on reliable information from the French.

b. According to the Vosges F.F.I., who secured the information through interrogation, Militia members identify themselves with other members of the Militia and with the Germans by means of a rectangular piece of white cloth measuring about $2\frac{1}{2}$ " x $3\frac{1}{2}$ " and having the stamp of the German eagle imprinted on it. This piece of eloth is sewn into the clothing and is usually hidden in the lower front left corner of the cost or jacket, inside the lining.

7. Security Control of Civilian Population.

Through the system of road blocks, posts and patrols as described in Par. 1 of this report, travel regulations have been put into effect which prohibit travel of civilians for a distance in excess of 6 km from their homes except by authority and with passes issued by the Prefect and checked by the S.M. In the area to the rear of the Army Control Line passes are issued by the local mayor or chief of police and checked by the local police. Persons arrested as suspects or violators of these regulations are held for interrogation by CIC/SM and further investigations carried out. Excellent cooperation is being experienced by the CIC/SM, M.P's., local authorities and Gendarmes.

- 8. Relation Between Troops and Civilian Population.

 No change in conditions as stated in report for previous period.
- 9. Relations Between CI Staffs, Personnel and Local Authorities and Police.

Nothing new to report.

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Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report No. 3 (Continued) dated 4 November 1944.

Part II Military Security

1. General Survey.

a. A German agent captured by the 36th Division on 30 October states he was sent through the lines to locate gasoline pipelines for sabotage purposes. After locating the pipe lines he was to return to obtain explosives and other sabotaurs. He believed that this additional personnel was either to be parachuted or infiltrated through our lines. According to the egent another group of sabotaurs was at ST. DIE preparing for similar missions. They had been instructed to pretaid they were refugees and to give tactical information to the first allied officer they contacted.

b. A situation which has always existed in relation to Prisoners of War is apparently becoming more prevalent as our forces near Alsace. Prisoners of War claim to be Alsatians forced into German service against their will. The Armies are cognizant of this situation and two B.S.M. officers detached to the Seventh Army are particularly qualified as Alsatian interrogators.

c. A trick more common Japanese tectics was reported used against a company of the 15th Engr. Regiment on the 25th of October in an attack by about 70 enemy. The first wave of attackers were U.S. helmets and raincoats and yelled "G.I.!"

2. Security of Information.


s. A document of the II Ba., Gren-IEHR Bde., captured by the Srd U.S. Infantry Division, refers to FRONTLAUFFER Italian Lads who infiltrate through Allied lines to reach reer areas and observe movements and dispositions. The document orders German troops to bring such "V-Personnel" directly to Battalian Headquarters. The frequency with which Germans use these "V-Personnel" can be surmised when it is noted that the above instructions formed part of a routine battalian order carrying no security classification. The document is believed to refer to Italian line passers used along the Riviera, where the Italians would be less conspicuous.

3. Security of Materiel-

a. Inquiry into reliroed sabotage noted in the preceding report has yielded no further results.

b. Cases of severed telephone lines have been noted but do not seem to be the result of hostile sots. In the French sector, special night petrols guard these installations.

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Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Raport No. 3 (Continued) dated 4 November 1944.

Part III. Port, Airport and Frontier Control


a. The control of the Swiss border presents a problem due to the inadequacy of trained personnel to hendle it. The situation has been carefully studied and recommendations submitted to higher head-quarters for the strengthening of the French detachments responsible for the control system. It has been reported that French refugees from the battle areas on the south of the line are crossing into Switzerland and again crossing back into France to the rear of the lines. This puts an added strain on border control and on the personnel available for screening such refugees. With the known attempts of enemy agents to penetrate into our rear areas this situation gives them an opportunity of which they may be expected to take full advantage.

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Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Report dated 4 November 1944.	t No. 3. (Continued)		
Part IV					
Counter-Intelligence Staf	fs and Per	sonnel			
	Officers	Agenta	SM	SA	
Sixth Army Group CI Sixth Army Group CIC Detachment	6 2	<u>:</u>	1	<u>:</u>	
Seventh Army CI 307 C. C. Detachment	3 12	29	4	6 -	
VI Corps Cf 206 C.I.C. Detachment	1 1 3	9	2 -	4 -	
36th Division 36th C.I.C. Detachment	ī	5	1	2 -	
3d Division 3d C.I.C. Detachment	ī	5	1 -	2 -	
45th Division 45th C.I.C. Detachment	2	- 4	1 -	2 -	
XV Corps 79th Division 2d French Armored Division 44th Division	2 .	14	1 1 2	2 7	
Total - Seventh Army	<u>2</u> 30	<u>5</u> 85	13	25	
First French Army			6	13	
I Corps II Corps lst DMI		:	2 1 2	6	
lst LB 2d DIM 3d DIA	=		2 2 2	6 7 6	
4th DMN 5th DB 9th DIC	<u>:</u>	:	2 2 2	6 6 7	
Total First French Army	-	_	<u>23</u>	<u>63</u>	
Total - Sixth Army Group	38	85	37	88	
-9-					

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APPENDIX A.

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 3

C.I. Report on southwest France

1. The following counter-intelligence information was secured from representatives of the S.C.I. who recently completed a tour of the Spanish-French border and from the commanding officer and special agents of the C.I.C. Border Control Group whose headquarters are in Toulouse and who have been operating in the area since 24 September 1944.

2. The civil government in the Toulouse and Bordeaux regions (exclusive of course of areas occupied by the Germans) is functioning as well as could be expected in view of bad communication and the political strivings of various groups each trying to assert itself and secure popular support. There is no immediate threat to internal security however as law and order have been established. The large conservative element of the population, fearing the rapidly spreading communist tendencies of other elements, are anxious for regular military forces, preferably American, to come into the area to eliminate the German coastal pockets and to give support to a democratic form of civil government.

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Sixth Army Group Fortnightly GI Report No. 3, Appendix A (Continued)

Union of Spain" the avowed purpose of which is to overline the lengist Government. It is runored that Franco may be in negatiation with the German pocket forces for them to enter Spain in order to bolster his troop strength and help him to maintain his belease of power. If any substantial group of Germans should decide to move into Spain there is no adsounts force presently in southwest France into Spain there.

5. It is not known if any interceptions have been unde in German communications between the pocket forces and Germany or Spain but it is known that nearly all Spanish fishing vessels operating in the Bay of Biscay are W/T equipped. While no reports of air cover are available the 2ms Bureau of the F.F.I. think it probable that the air fields in La Rochelle and Royan and possibly the air field in the Pointe de Grave area are being used by the Germans for intercommunication between pockets and for communication with Germany.

6. German intelligence officers who formerly operated in southwest France are known to be operating from San Sebastian and Bardelons through stay-bening agents in France. One of the latter has been apprehended and the whereabouts of further agents is known.

7. In general the public of southwest France is satisfied with the DeGaulle Government largely because there is no other choice. They regret it's present lack of strength. On the lower choice there is wrangling for power and a lack of clear out authorates.

8. Epuration is being handled by the F.F.I. and the tivit Authorities. The latter are taking this matter over more and more. There are still many members of the Milios at large in the area but they are being slowly eliminated.

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· APPENDIX B

To Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 3

The following information is extraeted from Semi-Monthly Counter-Intelligence Report No. 6, Hq., Twelfth Army Group, 31 October 1944.

Convict Agents

Another interesting new development in GIS activities observed during this period is the use of agents who have been convicted previously by the French authorities and subsequently released by the Germans; meny of those released by the Germans had been sentenced to death by the French. While such agents run a greater risk of being recognized, this disadvantage is outweighed, apparently, by the fact that they dere not surrender themselves to the French authorities or to the Allied forces for fear of facing execution or long prison terms for offenses committed prior to their present missions.

That the GIS attaches considerable importance to this type of recruit is indicated by the fact that CHARTIER was paired with a radio agent. CHARTIER was apprehended in the northern part of the Twelfth Army Group zone; a similar agent, PUJOL was arrested in NAMOY, in the southern part. An intention to use such agents all along the line may be inferred. PUJOL, incidentally, had carried out four aspicnage missions for the Germans before being arrested originally by the Vichy French authorities.


According to PUJOL, approximately 100 such convict agents and Sicherheitsdienst personnel left PARIS with him, during the second half of August, for NANCY, where they remained until the advance of the Third US Army forced them back to STRASSOURG. PUJOL has siven the names and brief descriptions of over 100 such agents, including that of CHARTIER. At first glance such a number sounds featured however, PUJOL seems to have an almost trackish memory; moreover many of the 26 names given by CHARTIER solunids with those given by PUJOL.

In view of the above facts, it is suggested that shearer a suspect is interrogated, he be saired whether he has ever men in jet! The enswer will not necessarily be "Not because experiences has that that many ceptured agents, before being broken, sontess to wind offerses or imprisonment in the boys of throwing the interval of the main scent. Trials for exploses in View Trials for prior of the main scent. Trials for exploses in the main scent. It is a series and the main scent. The prior ment of the main state of

he Germans, were ment to 34 Avenue Fook, PARIS, and, then, to the

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SELLE I expecting any change in the enemy's defensive attitude. The presence of an initially large number of troops in this area was due to a faulty appreciation of our intentions. The nature of the terrain is faulty appreciation of our intentions. The nature of the terrain is faulty appreciation of our intentions. The nature of the terrain is faulty appreciation of our intentions. The nature of the terrain is make them virtually impossible. The increasing demand for troops make them virtually impossible. The increasing demand for troops in other areas has already resulted in a thinning out of his forcesin other areas has already resulted in a thinning out of his forcesin other areas has already resulted in a thinning out of his forcesin the ITALI'N front, while the equivalent of one regiment of the latter has definitely moved out of Western ITALY—and no reinforcements are available. With the IDELITIC front rapidly deteriorating and the events in the BALKANS making an escape route through Northeast ITALY an absolute necessity, the military situation will outweigh political considerations and force the enemy to withdraw even more forces from the FRANCO-ITALIAN border. SFCRET At the start of the period, the enemy apparently was planning his defense on a pivotal line based on ETLFORT and extending toward the vocars and a junction with the German First Army. Initially, prepared positions were utilized at Light and in the Initially, prepared positions were utilized at the defense, area of FAUCOGNEY (KIC24) where counterattacks supported the defense, tanks were utilized in an organized opposition which covered the withdrawal of the 1714 Corps toward Livrey . Great sensitivity to our patrol's probes in the FOURS River area indicated that this was a focal point in the enemy's defense. By 18/19 September, the enemy's stubborn resistance at such points as Great and Great FOLL's was slackening, as slight withdrawals took place. Citif delaying action was combined with use of road blocks well supported by norter and artillery fire. This degenerated into scattered rear-guard defenses and harassing degenerated into scattered rear-guard defenses and harassing artillery fire about the 19/20 September, as the bulk of the enemy withdrew across the formular River. 2. FHEMY OPERATIONS withdrew across the FOCTIVE River. A coordinated definse along the entire front was being a coordinated by 21 Ceptember, since a junction had been made with the First Army on the right flark. The DOUBS River bridgehead was being stubbornly maintained from ST. MAURICE to VIVIES SUR PSCOT. Counterattacks and consolidated opposition indicated a new determination to hold, particularly in the region of TELAY (L1920). South of RVIET OF The sistance continued strong, while road blocks denied to us all roads to the town. Indications of the evacuation of TELAY were to be seen in the destruction of bridges, and in movement to the Fast. On the Alpine Front an increased energy sensitivity to our On the Alpine Front an increased enemy sensitivity to our advances in the areas LANSAFPOURG(H4257) was evident as he reacted with increased artillery fire and aggressive manning of positions. 3. EIPNY DISPOSITIONS At the close of the period energy forces opposing the SITH MENT CROUP on the SITH front were generally disposed on a line period of the MENT CROUP (M3365) - MONTH COME M200-T, TOTAL COME (M3365) - MONTH COME (M4703) - MONTH COME (M4703) - MONTH COME (M5766) - MAINTERS (M5260) - MONTH COME (M5260) - MON On the Northeastern Front energy forces were generally disposed on a line: MINOT(A5565)COTTUPE(PM261)-MUTICYY(K1815)HEMIT CONT(K1544)-SPIVI(VO413)-GUBBUILLER(V1089). The energy 19th 10 y, which had finally arrived in the Tree energy 19th 10 y, which had finally arrived force 1st Army, where his LVVI Corps was able to join an armored force consisting of a Punzer Division (al PZ Div) we three Punzer Brigader (111,112,113). The IXIV Corps and IV CAF Corps, constituting the control group of the last consist of remarks of 716, 189, 159, 251, 198 Infanty

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The considerably weakened LYTTV Corps (the pivoting group thich the 19th Army executed its retreating movement) is inforced by various units reorganized hastily in the area, chiefly from the debris of units and isolated trooping from the West. the debris of units and isolated troops

a. ALPINE FROMT

The German LYEV Corps is responsible for the defense of the Alpine passes. It has under its command three divisions: 157th Reserve Mountain Division, which has been identified in the PFTIT ST. BFRNARD and the MCUNT CYNIS area; the 5th Mountain Division, with elements identified at MOUNT CYNIFF and COL DU LARCHT: and the 148th Reserve Division, which, until recently, has been providing the bulk of the opposition to our troops in the NICE-CANDIS sector. These units, like most German units, are scriously understrength and, all total, it is estimated that the enemy probably has no more than 25,000 to 30,000 Germans in this area, with the combat infantry effectives numbering approximately 13,000 to 14,000.

Initially, elements of the 90th Penzer Grenadder Division were identified in the COL DU LARCHT and the MOUNT GYNTWRE pass area, and elements of this division are still being found in the area. However, PW's interrogated recently state that the 15t hn. of the 200th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and the list and 37d Bns. of the 361st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, have recently departed from this area for CYNYMY. PW's further state that the 5th Mountain Division is to relieve the 90th. APPO Woekly Intelligence Summary, for week ending 11 September, reports this division being on the move, but believe that its destination is for the Italian battle area, rather than G'R'MY. Never the less, it appears that the division is leaving the crea and will no longer be concerned with the situation in the Albine passes.

Identification of the 90th Infantry Regiment of the 34th Infantry Division along the coast, in the MYNTON area, plus PW statements, indicate trat tre 14th Reserve Division is in the process of being relieved by the 34th Division. This is understandable in light of the battered condition of the 148th, which has taken the brunt of the firsting in this area since August 15: furthur, the German Command in Ttaly is probably concerned with the stead "nogress being made in the MYDON area; and, fearful of the Allies' intentio

Division.

Farther to the Past are found four Italian divisions, one German division (42nd Vaeger Division), and several independent German mountain battalions. The 42nd is curre thy reported to be moving to the East, and elements have already been identified in the current Italian battle area. It is possible that the four German divisions remaining in the Albine passes could be relieved by these German trained Italian divisions, or the mountain battalion thereby making these units available for more active theaters. In this connection, the present campaign being conducted by the Allies in ITALY is placing a severe strain on the resources of Marshal KPSSFIRING, and as progress is made in the Appenines, it becomes increasingly more likely that the enemy, in his search for reinforcements for the Gothic line, will call upon these four German divisions in the Alpine area to play a more active role.

b. NORTH FAST FRONT

The German 19th Army opposing the US 7th Army and the French 1st Army has under its command four Corps: LXVI Res Corps, LXIV Res Corps, IV GAF Corps, and the LXXXV Corps.

The LXVI Reserve Corps(LUNFVIILE-FPIN/L area) is responsible for the vital area where junction with the 1st Army has been definitely established. According to last reports and identifications the LXVI Corps is being gradually reinforced and built up into a tactical unit, with the possibility of an increased amount of armor. The 21 Pz Div, 111 Pz Brig, 112 Pz Prig and 113 Pz Brig are available in the area, while the 16 Inf Div, considerably weakened, is being but Interested addition of B. G.

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units (192 See Regt, elements of the 194 and 95 See Regts, the 213 Inf Regt, elements of the 1908 Arty Regt and the Torry Engr Regt) may be considered a fairly cohesive group. Fstimated available strength of the Corps is: 120 tanks and 20/05,000 men (including the armored formations)

may be considered a fairly conesive group. Estimated available strength of the Corps is: 120 tanks and 20/5,000 men (including the armored formations.)

The Live Peserve Corps (Productor area) consists of remanent of 716 & 189 Inf Divs reorganized in Pattle Groups (Torontor, Armored First, Pattle, Corps (Productor), Productor, Productor of The Information of the strongest group, with various elements strengted in three entire archis (Ind. R. 10 Ind. and Market).

The Corps represents a patched-up group of units, reassembled on the battlefield, denoralized by retreat and sonstant change of commending officers. Approximate strength of the Corps: 8/10,000 The IV G. A. F. Corps (Montant Expendit of the Corps: 8/10,000 The IV G. A. F. Corps (Montant Expendit of the groups (159 Div. B. G. HOMLZEL, GIFS, DIGNARY: 509 Div. B. G. LOPAU). In addition to these units, the Corps also includes 198 Inf Div, with the 63 GAF Regt, and probably the B. G. MINKE attached. The IV GAF Corps composed chiefly of remnants of disintegrated divisions, may be considered, as its northern neighbor, a weak and gradually deteriorating unit, probably used in the retreating maneuver, for delaying action in order to slow down the pressure of the US 7th Army and French 1st Army. Approximate strength of the Corps: 5/6,000 men.

LIXXV Corps (BFLFORT area) composed of the 11 panzer Div.


LXXXV Corps (BFLFORT area) composed of the 11 panzer Div, 1 Training Flieger Div and various elements organized in two Battle Groups (OPPEN and GRFIF), bore the brunt of the fighting in the BTCAMCON area, constituting the hinge around which the 19th Army executed its retreating maneuver. The Corps seems to be withdrawing its units Fast of BTLFORT. The 11 Pz Div may be pulled out altogether from the Southern sector and, after refitting, may be used in the Northern sector(junction of the 19th and 1st Armies). At present, the LXXV Corps, considerable weakened, requires considerable reshuffling and reorganization. According to French FR reports, units are being reorganized in the TLFORT area, and they are believed to be almost entirely formed of troops recovered from units withdrawing from FAMCE. It may well be that these units will be used for reinforcements of the LMMAY Corps, with possible new errivals. Approximate strength of the Corps: 35-45 tanks, 12,000 men.


tanks, 12,000 men.

In addition to these identified component parts of the In addition to these identified component parts of the Corps, there were additional units identified on the Sixth 'rmy Group front, which probably are directly under 19th /rmy. The 30 SS Division (errived from DANVIG end of August) has not yet been engaged on the front. The Russian Volunteer Cadre Division (components unknown), which has activated the 5 Cossack Inf Regt, the 5 Ruban Regt and the Past Yountein Regt, was identified in the RITERT area. As to the components of Pattle Groups Plury and SCIE/MM, B. G. MANUR contains AA and GUF Supply Troops, while B. G. SCIE/MM has 90 Flieger Regt and 54 GUF Regt: it is reasonable to assume that they contain other units, as yet unidentified. Appr xinate strength of miscallaneous units: about 8,000 men.

4. SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION

The present increased artillery activity and generally stiffer enery attitude may be one result of the improvement in his supply situation resulting from the heavy weatherd rail movements prior to 16 September. Having withdrawn close to the borders of the Reich, the enemy can make increased use of the excellent German railnet, relatively untoucked by bombing and in no immediate danger of organized sabotage. Thus, the large-scale motor movement prevalent in the withdrawal from souther Frence have been replaced by heavy rail traffic, tringing supplies from South Germany via SIMCP and ULM, to the Rhine at NEUF PISCH(V-7435) and KFHL (W-0597). Four new pontoon bridges across the Line in the NEUF BELYCH area, (Sept 13) would parrit movement by notor transport into the Vosages area. In the area south of Killerians the energy supply situation may be still further improved by rail novements now in progress, as well as by the recent large reduction in the number of fortress workers along the cast bank of the Phine.





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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH U.S. ARMY GROUP Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 23, U.S. ARMY:

030 900A October 1944.

WEEVLY INTELLIGENCY SUMMARY NUMBER - 2

For Week Ending 30 September 1944.

I. GENERAL SUMMARY.

During the period, the enemy used increased artillary and some armor to cover his withdrawal and reorganization. The loss of EPINAL forced him to abandon the Moselle line, and fall back to the strong defensive terrain of the Voges. His southern another remains in the fortified BAMPORT region, but there is no naturally strong position between MANCY and the Saverne Cap. Armor as a reenforcement of that area is a logical development, and SHAME reports the armograph of the Fifth Parger line, there reports the appearance of the Fifth Panzer Army there.

On the Alpine front, the situation remains static, with no sign of substantial enemy withdrawal.

2. ENERY DISPOSITION.

A. Mortheastern Front.

At the close of the period, 19th Army forces were generally disposed on a line; HelaHell (21409) -- CROISMARE (21401) -- VAMAINVILLE (V2791) -- TENARMOLT (V1981) -- ST. JET BU-MARKOLT (V2267) -- PLEEREPONT (V2263) -- DEYCHLONT (V1951) -- ST. JET BU-MARKOLE (V2260) -- TENDON (V2247) -- CLEURIE (V2240) -- THERPOSSE (K2639) -- FREDRUPT (K2732) -- CALTELU LAMBERT (K3027) -- MIELLIN (K3022) -- CREVESTRINE (K2666) -- FREDRUPT (K27515) -- RONCHAIP (K2309) -- LONONT (K2200) -- CREVESTRINE (P1795) -- FREDRUPT (F2285) -- COLOMBIER CHATELOT (P248C) -- LONGEVILLE SUR DOUBS (P2591) -- VILLER COUS ECOT (P2978), -VILLER LES BLAUONT (A3564). SUR LOUES (PESEL) -- VILLERS SOUS ECOT (P2978), -VILLER LES BLACONT (A3564).

(1) 66 Reserve Corps (East of LIMEVILLE-RAMBERVILLE area).

The 21 Panter Division seems to remain under 66 Reserve Corps, together with 16 Infantry Division, supported by Battle Group STINGER and Battle Group J.CVAL (a patched-up mixture of CAF service troops and other personnel with little cambat training) and Battle Group OTTENBACHER, consisting of artillery units, engineer units and infantry.

(2) 64 Reserve Corps (area East of REMIRE CONT).

Composition remains unchanged, except that Battle Group WITTE has been incorporated into Battle Group SCHWERIN (remmants of 189 Infantry Division). Remmants of the Battle Group BRODOWSKI (General BRODOWSKI is a Fris ner of War) seem to be incorporated into the 716 and 189 Infantry Divisi ns.

(3) 4 GAF Corps:

The 159 Infantry Division, broken up into several Rattle groups, probably all under don. DECEMBE, has been reinforced by Battle Group MINKE. Battle Group LOPAN, consisting of remnants of 358 Infantry Division and 242 and 244 Infantry Divisions, has received reinforcements, which may indicate an attempt to reorganize the group of divisional lines.

(4) 85 Corps:

The BODE CRE Regiment, which has recently been identified in the Corps sector, cannot be considered an effective substitute for the ll Panzer Division, recently removed from the Corps sector and sent to bolstor the area east of holdy. If the First Flieger Division should like-

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wise be withdrawn, as French reports indicate is possible, the 85 Corps would no longer be capable of holding the vital BEIFORT area. In that case, reenforcements would have to be brought from Germany, or found in the remnants of destroyed units reorganized in the neighborhood of MULHOUSE. Should the German High Command a saider it recessory to withdraw a caps into general reserve, the 85 Corps would seem the most logical candidate.

(5) Estimate: Appr ximate Strength of 19th Army at close of period:

80 - 100 banks 24,000 - 28,000 men, capable of infantry action.

B. ILPINE FRONT.

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth U.S. Army Group on the Alpine Front were generally disposed along the line:

CRIM.IDI (S-8088)--CASTILON (S-7594)--ROQUE BILLERE (N-6514)--ST. MARTIN VESUBLE (N-6020)--ST SAUVER (N-4823)--ISOL. (N-4535)--J.USILERS (P-5045)--M. AIGUILLEREE (N-4492)--MONTEGENEVRE (K-4602)--M. T.BOR (K-3022)--MOD.NE (K-4132)--BESSINS (H-5261)--BENNEVAL SUR ARC (H-5676)--BOURG ST MAURICE (Z-4680)--ALBERTVILLE (Z-6683).

The German 75 Corps remains responsible for the defense of the Alpine passes. It has under command the 34 Infentry Division (GrHMAIDI area); elements of the 5 Mtm Dlv (vic LARME Pass); 148 Res Div (by now pulled back into the rear zone); 157 Reserve Division (MODATE area); some few elements of the 90 Fz or Division (VAL DE STURA area); the MEERES-ALPEN Regiment (vic. of PRIMARDO, N-4255); and the ALPEN JUGNO units which are believed to be in the VAL D'OSTA region. The two to three Italian Divisions of the 75 Corps have been moved nearer to the front which may indicate their possible future employment, it would seem risky to replace the Germans with Italians, as all reports confirm their very low morals and low combat efficiency. The estimated corps strength remains unchanged: 30 tanks and 12,000 to 15,000 ment.

3. - 'OPERATIONS.

a. XV Corps:

The beginning of the period was marked by an upsurge in artillery activity in the areas of Foret de PARROY and Foret de MONDON (V1896). An enemy defensive area based on World War I defenses extended from MANONVILLER (V2099) -- DOMEVRE (V3196) to AVRICOURT (Q3206). Resistance was heavy north of MARINVILLER (V1699). The enemy strongly defended the north bank of the VEZOUSE River, holding HABLAINVILLE (V2591) and AZERAILES (V2398). At the end of the period, the enemy continued to resist our attempts to enter the Foret de PARROY.

b. Seventh Army:


Armored concentrations northeast and southeast of LUNEVILLE (V0799) were active early in the week. The enemy remained aggressive in the areas of BEMONT (K2447) and CREMINVILLER (K2645); TEMDON (V2147) and JEUXEY (V0757) were occupied only after strong resistance, including Mark VI tanks, had been overcome. Resistance began to decrease as scattered delaying groups were encountered in the Foret de FAITE (V1857) and in PONTIERRE (V1863) and GIRECOURT (V1761), behind which defensive positions were reported being dug. At the end of the period resistance north and northeast of EPINAL had become disorganized, while strong forces opposed our occupation of ST. HELENE (V2066) and GUGENCOURT (V1761).

C. First French Army:

on 25 September, the First French army was confronting an enemy CRET

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Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2: Init 4:7. 5. ₽ 53

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9 October 1944

Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Report No.

Part I. Civil Security

APO 23, U. S. ARMY

1. General Survey

a. The confusion of the early days has shown much improvement. The period of wholesale arrests and summary executions without trial by the FFI and FIP is coming to an end although there still remain evidences of hoodlum FFI elements in the Lyon Region. Persons errested by FFI and FTP are gradually being turned over to the Securite' Militaire and are being investigated and brought to trial before properly appointed courts of justice.

b. The FFI itself is going through a period of militarization, or disarmament and demobilization. This change-over is being stimulated by a growing feeling of annoyance on the part of the public who have been irritated by the officious attitude of irresponsible young men in the FFI who have instituted unauthorized traffic controls, identity checkups etc., in addition to occasional acts of unnecessary violence.

c. A situation is reported with respect to the FFI in the larger cities of Marseilles and Lyon, confirmed by the police, that some undesirable characters, convicted criminals and former PPF and Miliciens are masquareding as members of the FFI and wearing FFI brassards. Until the elimination of these from the ranks of the FFI is accomplished these elements represent a security problem.

d. Fear is expressed by the Civilian population that FTP may develop into a political army and be the vanguard of the Communist revolution. Communist groups of the Front National are active in recruiting memberships and are the best organized of all the parties in South and Central France.

e. The limited number of Army CIC/SM personnel available for working the large area of the advance has prevented a comprehensive CI coverage. Although many stay-behind agents were apprehended before this personnel was moved forward, it was apparent from the number of unfinished cases that many other such agents were still operating in the rear areas. As Army CIC moved forward all unfinished cases were turned over to the Securite' Militaire Territorial but no reports from them are available to indicate the progress made on these cases or on other cases which developed from them. It is believed cases or on other cases which developed from them. It is believed that SMT were largely concerned with epuration and with investigations of arrestees made by the FFI so that these may be brought to justice, Static CIC detachments are needed at vital points along lines of communications and supply.

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(2) Their mission is: 1. Seek out all information on any subject which might interest the Reich. 2. To regroup German nationals or supporters in France to make their evacuation possible out of liberated areas. 3. To organize frontier passages to Switzerland, to Spain, and through Switzerland to Germany with false papers, "passers" etc. 4. To commit sabotage or terrorist attempts against the chiefs of the Resistance and important Allied military personalities. These teams maintain contacts in Spain, Switzerland and to Germany.

(3) Only known teams were three formed in Grenoble by Walthers; who was later killed. One of these went to Switzerland and the other two left for the Central part of France and the Spanish border.

6. Security Control of Civilian Population.

a. Regulations have been issued by the SM forbidding the carrying or servicing of cameras and the possession of carrier pigeons, also an order requiring all enemy aliens to report as well as an order to report any knowledge of enemy agents.

b. Control of movement has been effected in the forward areas by use of FFI under supervision of CIC/SM. In the rear areas lack of personnel has made any serious effort to control traffic impossible but shortage of vehicles and gasoline has limited traffic to a comparatively few vehicles. During the rapid advance no screening of the few refugees on the roads was possible.

7. Relations Between Troops and Divilian Population.

Generally satisfactory to excellent relations exist between our troops and the civilian population. There have been incidents of druken brawls which have been exaggerated out of proportion to their importance in the minds of a supersensitive population who have been told to expect the worst from the American by German propaganda.

There exists an impatience in the matter of food supplies which, though only natural, is the most serious threat to good relationship. In proportion as these supplies are received and distributed, this threat will grow less.

8. Relations Between CI Staffs, Personnel and Local Authorities and Police.

a. The strangeness to them of US Army reporting procedure has made it difficult for the French SM to submit complete reports.

b. A good understanding exists between the CIC/SM and the local authorities. The FFI however have been found to cooperate more willingly, with the CIC then with the SM.

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9. Rumors.

Except for a rumor that the Americans would do nothing to repair the port of Marseille unless given a 30 year lease of the port, there have been no rumors reported as having any wide circulation. PWB was notified of this Marseille rumor for such action as might seem to them appropriate.

10. Miscellaneous.

a. Headquarters, Seventh army has issued a memorandum to all American Units of the Seventh army stating that volunteers will be accepted from among enlisted personnel for transfer in grade to CIC units as agents. Applicants selected up to T/O limit will be trained in the field by assignment to CIC detachments. The fluent knowledge of German is a requirement for qualification. Acceptability of applicant will be subject to approval of CO., CIC., ETOUSA.

b. The G-2 Section, Seventh army have issued a comprehensive list of questions for use of PW interrogation units with the object to securing CI Target Information for entrance into Germany.

Part II. Military Security

A. General Survey.

The security situation has been greatly affected by the speed of the advance northward by both the First French and American Seventh Armies. Lines of communication have repidly lengthened and have been susceptable to sabotage. However aside from pilferage no important sabotage has been reported. The rapidity of the advance has made it difficult to counter-intelligence personnel with military units to clean up situations before moving on. However, the territorial SM and CIC detachments of the communications zone are taking over in the rear areas. A CIC border-control detachment is now operating on the Franco-Spanish border and the SM is supervising a border-control set up utilizing FFI personnel on the Franco-Swiss border. Port Security has been taken over by Base Sections.

B. Security of Information.

1. German prisoners report that American PW's seem security minded under interrogation but are very careless about documents and it is believed that much valuable information has been divulged by officers and men having on their persons written information when captured. One case was reported by General Major Otto bichter of the 198th German Infantry Division. In this instance an American Captain had on his person complete identification of Seventh army units down to regiments. The General commented that because of this American tendency the Germans are now concentrating on documents rather than interrogation.

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2. The First French Army reports that the local press has committed indiscretions regarding military operations. A case in point occurred when a town was taken by a French division and the local press published the number of the division and some of the officer's names. The French are taking steps to correct this situation.

3. Seventeen (17) espionage agents have been apprehended by the Seventh Army since the landing.

4. The SM is utilizing a series of security warning posters as anti-sabotage devices. These posters are designed to prevent damage to communications. No wire sabotage however has been reported. Controles Techniques has installed censorship control of civilian communications and is operating along two lines. The first is to limit the use of wire communications and the second is to censor all mail and all wire communications. Advance censorship liaison service is keeping in touch with Controles Techniques in order that Sixth Army Group Headquarters may be constantly informed of the situation.

C. Security of Materiel.

No proven cases of sabotage have been reported during this period.

D. Security of Personnel.

In regard to the regular French and American troops there is nothing to report. The FFI however, has apparently within it certain disaffected elements. Information is being received from many sources that certain collaborationist elements, possibly Milice have in some localities succeeded in infiltering into the FFI. These units in the larger cities such as LYON have been moving about in commandeered cars wearing FFI arm bands and using their weapons after dark. These people are apparently gradually being weeded out and incidents are becoming less frequent. There are also, again largely in the larger cities, certain disturbing elements whose actions are similar to those described above although not motivated by the same reason. These also are being weeded out. The FTP seem to be better organized than the FFI generally and have, it is reported, been responsible for propaganda difficult to trace to its sources, which is being disseminated among the civilian population. This propaganda minimizes the American and English war effort insofar as the liberation of France is concerned and magnifies the contribution of the FFI. It also praises the effort of the Russian war effort in making the liberation of France possible. There is also being disseminated some propaganda, supposedly from the same source to the effect that when the Anglo-Americans are out of France the revolution of the proletariat, with Bussian blessing, will take place. In the rural districts the FFI seems to be much more business-like and patriotic. There is no doubt that in certain areas its contribution to the regular French Army and others are disbanding and returning to their homes. Those supposed to do border work on the Franco-Swiss border are apparently taking their work seriously and doing it well.

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Part III. Port, Airport and Frontier Control.

A. Location of Port Counter-Intelligence Officers and Areas Covered.

Continental Base Section has been responsible for counter-intelligence for the ports in South France. It's organization and security reports are not received by this headquarters.

- B. Port Counter-Intelligence.
 - 1. Security of Dock Areas.

At the time that Seventh Army relinquished control of the ports in Southern France, the following measures were in effect:

- (a) The physical control of port areas with barricades and gates manned by MP's and French police.
- (b) A three way check of port employees by the Gendarmerie, the SM and the administrative police.
- (c) Pass system for ports.
- (d) Control of merchant seamen by CIC port security detachments.
- (e) Apprehension and interrogation of suspects by the French.
- (f) Clearance of all operating fishermen by French Naval Authorities.
- 2. Relationship with Other Port Authorities.

Seventh army reports that the French and Americanswere working well together during the time that unit controlled the ports.


- Nothing to report.
- 4. Travel Control.
 - (a) The control of the Franco-Spanish and Franco-Swiss border is operating as outlined above under Part II, "A".
 - (b) Control of travel in forward zones, military zones and interior zones is now under discussion.

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
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
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P	art IV.					
Counter-Intelligence Staffs and Personnel						
		Officers	Agents	SM	SA	
Sixth Army Group CI		<u>6</u>	=	1	=	
Seventh Army CI		3	-	4	7	
307 C.I.C. Detachment		8	30	-		
VI Corps CI		1	-	2	4	
206 C.I.C. Detachment		3	9			
36th Division			-	1	2	
36th C.I.C. Detachment		1	5		-	
3d Division			-	1	2	
3d C.I.C. Detachment		` 1	7			
				1	2	
45th Division		2	5	-		
45th C.I.C. Detachment						
XV Corps-Roster not available		10	ES	9	17	
Total Seventh Army		<u>18</u>	<u>56</u>		13	
First French Army				6		
\ I Corps				2	6	
II Corps				1		
1st DMI				2	6	
1st DB				2	6	
zá DIM				2 2	6	
3d DIA				2	6	
4th DMM 5th DB				2	6	
9th DIC		== . *		2	· $\frac{7}{63}$	
Total First French Army		_	=	23		
Total Sixth Army Group (less XV Corps)		25	<u>56</u>	33	80	
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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





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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SUBJECT: G-3 Report After Action Against Enemy for Feriod 010001A March 1945 to 312400A March 1945. At the beginning of the period the ath Army Group was under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied expeditionary Forces. The 6th Army Group consisted of the Seventh C. . army composed of the VI, CV and KMI U. S. Corps and First French Army composed of 1 and 11 French Corps. 2. OPERATIONS. a. At this time the oth army droup was on the defensive, only aggressive patrolling and minor incidents were taking place. The 2 be continued to move out of oth army droup area. b. The alpine Front Command was established effective 1800A hours, 1 weren 1945 as a separate command under the 6th Army Group. The Alpine Command was composed initially of 27th alpine Infantry Division and the 44th Ann Frigade and was made responsible for the Franco-Italian border from the junction of the international boundaries of France, witzerland and Italy to the editerranean Coast. 1. - Unly aggressive patrolling and minor inclients took place.

z DB continued to move out of oth army group ures.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED made on a 5 mile front and part of the town of FORBACH was cleared. The First French army repulsed enemy patrols which had crossed the HHINE River. Western French Forces: The Western French Forces regained the lost ground reaching the line (Y-3149), (Y-3046), (Y-2947), (Y-2846) and (Y-2646).

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED λV U. S. Corps: The 3rd Infantry Division and the 45th Infantry Division were released to λV U. S. Corps. 13. - VI U. S. Corps: The 36th Infantry Division made a limited objective attack and expanded the bridgehead north of the MODER River at HAGMAN. 15. - Seventh army: Operation UNDERTONE was launched according to schedule with KAI U. S. Corps and AV U. S. Corps jumping off at 0100 hours. The VI U. S. Corps less 3 DIA attacked at 0645 hours followed by 3 DIA at 0715 hours. All attacking divisions advanced 3 to 5 kilometers. The VI U. S. Corps captured baseCRITHAL (0-8442) in the HANDT Mountains. The KV U. S. Corps reached the outskirts of SITCHE on the south and bypessed it on the west and the north. The 63rd Infantry Division of KAI U. S. Corps advanced 5 kilometers while the remaining divisions mopped up the area south of the SAAR. The 4th Infantry Division closed in the area. First French Army: The usual harassing enemy patrol activity took place. First Tactical Air Force (Prov): The First Tactical Air Force flew a total of 1670 sorties of which number 1139 were fighter

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED 16. - VI 0. 3. corps: The S DEA cleared Confront and with CG6, 5 LB advanced 5 wiles. The 36th infantry division asvanced 5 miles and reached (R-0135). The 102rd infantry division cleared galaxache (9632), UTTELEOFFER (0-9435) and Misseau Edea (0-9339). The 42nd infantry division cleared galaxache Thai (0-6443) and mouthemouse XV U. 5. Corps: the 100th infentry division advanced 3 miles to Limbaschillof (4-8558), valuitations (4-8000) and to infinite (4-9664). The 3rd infantry division reached (4-7768) and captured holder on (4-7565). The 45th infantry division entered the Slagghill line at (4-6970) and (4-6171). VI U. S. Corps: The 14th armored Division passed through the 3cth Intentry Division and advanced through Lattus (A-1835) and hittenshoffEN (A-1834) to Missenshouse. (A-2334) where contact north of MAGENAU forest was established with french units. COB, 14th armored Division reached Of MESEBACE (R-1841). The 3-pt advanced rapidly for 13 miles to LaDichouse (R-3241), and met with elements of the 14th armored Division. Other units of the 3-bis rached Jalmbach (R-2542). The 3cth infantry Division cleared SOULTS (R-1138), then advanced to within one mile of AISSEBEURG t (R-147). The 103rd infantry Division advanced 10 miles to 1080 from 18.0951) and cleared WINGER (R-0647), JINEACH (R-0847) and LEBACH (R-0445). The 42nd infantry Division reached Observable (R-9640), LUDWIGS-WIRELE (Q-9554), (Q-9054) and (Q-8651).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED AV U. S. Corps: The 3rd Infantry Division penetrated the main defenses of the SIEGFRIED Line south of ZWEIBRUCKEN at these points, (4-7770), (4-7570) and (4-7440). The 6th armored Division moved to a forward assembly area in preparation for an exploitation. AXI U. S. Corps: Continued to be heavily engaged in the SIEG-FRIED Line east of SAARBRUCKER. First French Army: Fifty commandos of the First French Army raided the east bank of the RHINE at (A-8791) and remained across for 2g hours, destroying two casemates. The enemy's 19. - VI U. S. Corps: The 36th Infantry Division crossed the LAUTER Eiver, and reached (R-2002). The 103rd Infantry Division also crossed the LAUTER and reached (R-0955) and (R-1255). The 4th Infantry Division moved into VI \sim Corps zone of action. The 5th DB was released from Army Group reserve and was attached to 3 DIA under MONTS and RT THOUPEMENT. AVU. S. Corps: Small advances of one mile by all units were made in the SINGPRIED Line. The 71st Infantry Division relieved the 100th Infantry Division which assembled in the AITCHE area. AMI U. S. Corps: The 63rd infantry Division made good progress south of ST INGLEST. CGA, 6th armored Division was placed under control of AMI U. S. Corps to exploit the breakthrough. Five companies of the 70th infantry Division crossed the SARR River The Alpine Front Command: The 442nd infantry Regiment cleared the area and was assigned to the DELTA B SE Dection. - VI U. S. Corps: Groupement MONTS BEST crossed the LAUTER and captured BERG (R-3443), MEMBERG (R-3743) and SCHEIBLEHERDT (R-3043). Elements of the 14th Armored Division entered DISIN-SELD (R-2250). The 36th Infantry Division captured OBERGITER-BECK (R-1753). The 409th Infantry, 103rd Infantry Division captured REISDORF (R-1255). The 42nd Infantry Division captured ARISDORF (R-1257).

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED 21. - VI U. S. Corps: Croupement MONTAREST reached the outer ring of the SLAGRAND Line along a line from MUNCLEURG (R-3246) to (R-2746). The 36th and 100th Infantry Divisions made small advences of less than one after against a stubborn XV U. S. Corps: CGA, 6th Armored Division reached CHUNDIADT (M-3107). CGB edvanced to (R-0794) east of KAISLASTANTEN. Elements of the 45th Infantry Division reached MONLAUTEAN (R-0297). The 63rd Infantry Division was engaged in mopping up the enemy in ST INGERET and NEURIPERCENT areas. The 70th Infantry Division was engaged west of SAARS UCKEN. VIU. S. Corps: The 14th Armored Division cleared STAINFELD (R-2250) except for a few houses in the northeast ortion. Elements of the 36th Infantry Division pushed through stubborn defenses end entered ELECTABLEM (R-1956). The 103rd Infantry Division advanced to ELECTABLEM (R-2066). The 42nd Infantry Division edynaced north without resistance and reached (R-0004) and (-9863). THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The 71st VI Corps

The 71st and 100th infantry bivisions were attended to the VI Corps.

AV U. 6. Corps: The 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions completed the relief of the 94th Infantry Division and the 11th amored Division.

KKI U. S. Corps: The 12th armored Division returned to control of KKI corps from third army.

First French army: an enemy patrol of 25 men crossed the EHRES in boats abreast of Halfan Halk (V-8744) and retreated after an engagement.

25.,- VI o: S. Corps: Groupement MontgassIT captured worth As shall (R-3650) and MARINILIANS.U (R-4049). The 14th armored Division cleared BaraksAssacia (R-4669). Other units in Corps assembled and effected reliefs.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{KV}}\xspace$ U. S. Corps: Units of this corps continued movement to assembly areas.

AAI G. S. Corps: The 4th and 42nd infantry divisions passed to control of AAI Corps. Other Corps units assembled.

DA ATL: The bouthwestern French Forces headquarters was dissolved. The Gleron Brigade took command of the 50th and 158th infantry Regiments subsectors. The Gronde Division assumed command of the Faulconnier and 107th Infantry Regiments subsectors. The Medoc Frigade assumed command of the three subsectors of the Pte de Grave area.

26. - VI U. S. Corps: Groupement MCNTSABART passed to control of First French Army at 1200 hours. Other VI Corps units held the HHINZ while assembling and effecting reliefs, the 71st Infantry Division relieving the 100th Infantry Division.

AV U. S. Corps: The AV Corps crossed the RRINs at 0230 hours with 8 battalions of the 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions in the assault. The 3rd infantry Division cleared SanDhOFsh (M-5105), BUNTADT and BOBSTADT and were heavily engaged in LAMPERTHEIN (M-5311). The 180th Infantry, 45th Infantry Division cleared BIBLIS (M-21) and advanced to west edge of ALEINHAUSEN (M-5819) and held the Autobehn from (M-5921) to (M-58220). The 19th Infantry cleared GROSS ROHEHEIM (M-5324) and were heavily engaged in GERNSHEIM (M-5429). The 157th Infantry crossed the RHINE and assembled near (M-5226). The 44th Infantry Division began to cross the river in rear of the 3rd Infantry Division.

XXI U. s. Corps: Units of this corps completed assembling vicinity of NAUSTADT (R-3083) and WaYNER (R-2574). 12th Armored Livision passed to control of AV Corps and the 63rd Infantry Division was attached to XXI Corps.

27. 9 This headquerters published Letter of Instructions Number 12 to 00, Seventh Army and 03, First French Army. (Annex 10).

VI U. S. Corps: The 100th Infantry Division completed assembling vicinity of MEGKENHEIM (R-3790).

XV U. S. Comps: The 71st Infentry, 44th infentry Division relieved 7th Infentry of 3rd Infentry Division vicinity of (M-525045) and (M-535070). The forward elements of the 3rd Infentry Division reached (M-6710), (M-6713), (M-6716), (M-6916), (M-6811) and (M-7121). The 45th Infentry Division reached (M-6621), (M-6824), (M-7231), (M-7434), (M-7436), (M-8043) and (M-6841). Elements of the 166th Gavelry Group were at (M-6709) and (M-7316). The 12th armored Division began to cross the RHINE.

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XXI U.S. Corps: The 4th Infantry Division closed assembly area rear DIEDESHEIM (R-3290).

Alpine Front Commend: The Alpine Front Commend was redesignated Detachment d'Armee des Alpes (DA ALP).

28. - VI U. S. Corps: The 103rd prepared to relieve 71st Infantry Division in position by moving north of SPEYER (R-5080).

AV U. S. Corps: 44th Infantry Division: 71st Infantry reached NECKAR River from (R-527999) to (R-528990) and elements were at (R-5799). Elements of 324th Infantry crossed the NECKAR River vicinity of (K-6097). The 114th Infantry was in the vicinity of (M-6703) and (M-6806). The 37d Infantry Division forward elements reached (M-7010), (M-7212), (M-7414), (M-7417) and (M-621). The 45th Infantry Division was in the vicinity of (M-8231), (M-8033), (M-9849), (N-0150) and (M-9851). The 12th Armored Division reached (M-815185) and (M-7111). The 106th Cavalry Group forward elements were on the east side of the MAIN River vicinity of (N-0247).

XXI U. S. Corps: The 63rd Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division began to cross the RHINE and to assemble vicinity of (M-5810) and (M-5401) respectively.

29. - VI U. S. Corps: The 103rd Infantry Division completed relief of the 71st Infantry Division which began to move from Seventh Army erea to the 12th Army Group.

XV U. S. Corps: The town of MANNHEIM was surrendered to the 44th Infentry Division at 1200 hours. The 3rd Infentry Divisions reconnaissance units reached the MAIN River. The 45th Infentry Division moved two regiments east of the river at (N-0440), (N-0443), (N-1050) and (N-0453).

XXI U. S. Corps: Reconnaissance units of the 10th Armored Division reached (N-0517) and (N-0006).

First French Army: Herrassing enemy petrols continued to cross the RHINE.

30. - XV U. S. Corps: The 12th Armored Division advanced to STEINBACH (N-2522), KULSHEIM (N-2920), STEINFURT (N-2613), HARDHEIM (N-2714), WALLDURN (N-1810) and HAINSTADT (N-1606) followed by the 4th Infantry Division. The 3rd Infantry Division advanced to ROLLBACH (N-0931), SCHMACHTENBERG (N-0932) and MECHENHARD (N-0734).

XXI U. S. Corps: The 63rd Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division advanced south of the NECKAR and cleared HEIDELBERG (R-6990), ZIEGELHAUSEN (R-7491) and KETSCH (R-5785).

31. - VI U. S. Corps: The 2 DIM and 3 DIA completed the relief of the 36th Infantry Division and II French Corps assumed command of the sector. The VI Corps began to put their units across the RHINE and took over the southern sector of the Seventh ATMY.

XV U. S. Corps: The enemy continued to offer stubborn resistance in the ASCHAFFENBURG area where the 45th Infantry Division made local advances.

XV Corps completed the relief of Third Army units south of the temporary boundary.

XXI U. S. Corps: The 12th Armored Division columns spearheaded this Corps advance and reached the MAIN River at (N-6425) and (N-6721) while other columns reached (N-5230),

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED First French Army: The First French Army elements imade three crossings of the RHIME in the SPEYER-GENEMERSHEIM area. Elements of 3 DIA crossed opposite SPEYER at (R-5380) meeting light resistance. Elements of 2 DIM crossed at (R-505723) and (R-4871). The northern crossing was unsuccessful and withdrew due to heavy fire from the island at (R-495732). The other crossing at (R-4871) was progressing satisfactorily. Frig oler General, G.S.C., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. GAR/vjt Annex 1 - Overley, period ending 312400A Merch 45 (Main Front)
Annex 2 - Overley, period ending 312400A Merch 45 (Alps Front)
Annex 3 - Overley, period ending 312400A Merch 45 (Western Front)
Annex 4 - Letter of Instructions Number 11, dated 10 March 1945.
Annex 5 - Letter, Subject, Creation of Groupement MONTAGERT and
Modification of Letter of Instructions Number 11 (Amendment
A) dated 18 Merch 1945.


Annex 6 - CALLE, BAX 25342, Subject, Modification of letter of
Instruction Number 11 end Creation of Groupement MONTAGERT
dated 18 Merch 1945.

Annex 7 - Letter, Subject, Amendment of Letter of Instructions Number
11 (Amendment 5), dated 22 Merch 1945.


Annex 8 - Letter, Subject, Modification Letter of Instructions Number
11 (Amendment C); dated 24 Merch 1945.

Annex 9 - CARLE, BAX 25395, Subject, Modification Letter of
Instruction Number 11, dated 24 Merch 1945.


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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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: TOP SECRET
: Auth: CG 6th AG:
: Initials: (AG)
: 10 March 1945
: Copy No: SECRET 70 HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP APO 23, U.S. ARMY 10 March 1945 SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 11 : Commending General, First French Army. Commending General, Seventh Army. 1. a. See Current Intelligence Summary. b. 12th and 21st Army Groups continue current operations. 12th Army Group protects northwest flank of 6th Army Group and assists attack of Seventh Army with an offensive launched southeast from the MOSELLE. c. 1st TACAF (Prov) supports and cooperates with 6th Army Group and will publish details of organization for combat and of air operations separately. 2. 6th Army Group continues the defensive along the line of the RHINE; passes to the offensive west of DRUNENHEIM, breaches the SIECFRIED Line, destroys the enemy in zone west of the RHINE and soizes a bridgehead east of the RHINE in the WORKS area. Target date will be announced later. a. Between 6th and 12th Army Groups: CONFLANE (U-6564) to 6th Army Group - BUSS (Q-3276) - LERACH (Q-4091) - THOLEY (Q-4998) - NOHFELDEN (L-5710), thence along railroad along the NAHE River to BINGEN (M-1152) (inclusive) all to 12th Army Group. b. Between Seventh Army and First French Army: West of OBERHOFFEN - SUR-MODER (R-0920) inclusive, no change - SCHIRRHEIN (R-125224) - SONFFLENHEIN (R-165255) - KOENIGSHRUK (R-20292) - Road Juration 126 (R-222301) - NIEDERROEDERN (R-229344) - WINTERBACH (R-270373) - Road Juration 125 (R-309417) - LAUTERBOURG (R-320420) - LAUTER River to confluence with RHIME River at R-302425 (all to First French Army). (See also 3a(1), 3b(1) and 3x(1)). c. South Flank: SWISS Border. 3. a. Seventh Army (1) At 0600A hours 13 Warch assume operational control of north (loft) flank division of First French Army, with certain attachments and supporting troops (see 3b(1)), until it closes on RHINE in zone as far north as LAUTER River, at which time the division with attachments and supporting troops will revert to First French Army. (2) Attack, making main effort in the general direction:
valley of the HILES - HOMBURG - KAISERLAUTERN - WORMS.
Breach the SIEGFRIED Line, destroy enemy in zone, close
on the RHINE and seize bridgehead east of the RHINE in
the WORMS ares. Plans for seizing the bridgehead will
envisage launching of operation "CHOKER TWO" but will
not be dependent upon success of this assault. (3) See sub-para 3x. CLASSWICATION CHANGED TO: **TOP** SECRET

ANNEX 4


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b. First French Army

- (1) Pass north (left) flank division of First French Army with one TD En and one AAA AW En attached, supported by one combat command of 5 DB, one En of 155mm Hows and one En of 155mm guns (M-1) to operational control of Seventh Army at 0600A hours 13 March for participation in the offensive with right flank of Seventh Army in French zone of action west of the RHINE. When this division closes on RHINE in zone of action as far north as LAUTER River it, with attachments and supporting troops, will be passed by Seventh Army back to operational control of First French Army.
- (2) Except as noted in (1) continue defense along RHINE in scotor. When attack has closed on RHINE as far north as LAUTER River, thereafter defend line of the RHINE.
- (3) Protect right (east) flank Seventh Army and south flank 6th Army Group.
- (4) Beginning at once and until further orders, conduct strong raids each night across RHIME at selected points between BASLE and DRUSENHEIM to test enemy strength and verify identifications of hostile units. Concentrate this effort in the BRISACH area.
- (5) 5 DB, less one armored combat command, will be held in 6th Army Group reserve in the vicinity of WASSIGNAE prepared to move on 8 hours notice. Artillary of the reserve may be employed in an active role provided it can be displaced to join the remainder of the division in reserve on 4 hours notice.
- (6) See sub-para 3a(1) and 3x.
- x. (1) To avoid administrative difficulties during the preparation phase and during initial operations subsequent to closing on the LAUTER River, the boundary between armies now existing has been more clearly defined. However, tactical operations to close on the LAUTER in the zone of First French Army will, for the sake of simplicity and coordination, be under command of Seventh Army.
 - (2) Regrouping for the offensive and other detailed arrangements will be completed so as to enable the offensive to be launched any time after OOOLA hours 15 March.
 - (3) After First French Army has closed on the RHINE to the mouth of the LAUTER River, it will deploy artillery in such a way that at least one battalion of 155mm howitzers and two batteries of 155mm guns (N-1) can bring fire to bear in the zone of Seventh Army as far north as the line: EERGZABERN KANDEL reilroad bridge west of KARLSERNER.
 - (4) Army commanders are responsible for the prompt establishment of such limison as is essential to the accomplishment of intent of subparagraphs 3a(1), 3b(1) and 3x(1).


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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED FOR SECRET :18 Merch 1945 :Copy No: Y AUTHEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP 70 OVINGRADING APO 23, US ARMY 18 March 1945 SUBJECT: Creation of Groupement MONTSABERT and Modification of Letter of Instructions Number 11 (Amendment A - see PAX 25342 of 18 March 1945) Commanding General, Seventh Army Commanding General, First French Army 1. Effective ammediately, elements of 5th DP new in Army Group Reserve are released to First French Army. 2. That part of Letter of Instructions No 11 which directs that 3rd DIA with its attachments and supporting troops will revert to central of First French Army upon reaching the line of the LATTER River, is revoked. 3. A special task force under command of General d'Armee Corps MONTSABERT is created, and is designated as Groupement MONTSABERT. This task force will be composed of 3rd DIA with its current attachments and supporting troops and 5th DP with one AAA AW Pn and one TD En attached. Effective 1800A hours 19 March 1945, Groupement MONTSABERT passes to operational control of Seventh Army. Prior te this time, 3rd DIA with its present supporting troops and attachments will centinue to operate under the direction of Seventh Army 4. Until Groupement MONTSABERT reaches the line of the EPLEN River, at which time all elements of this groupement will revert to command of First French Army, Groupement MONTSAPERT will remain under the operational control of Seventh Army. -5. The defense of the line of the RHINE south of DRUSENHEIM (inclusive) will be the responsibility of First French Army. Until Groupement MONTSABURT reverts to command of Commanding General, First French Army, Seventh Army will be responsible for the defense of the line of the RHINE North of DRUSENHEIM. When Groupement MONTSABURT reverts to command of Commanding General, First French Army, responsibility for defense of the line of the RHINE South of the ERLEN River will be passed to Commanding General, First French 6. First French Army will be responsible for the maintenance, supply, and evacuation of the Groupement MONTSABERT. 7. Upon completion of current operations, a new boundary will be announced. Pending completion of present operations no change in boundary between Armies Southwest of OBERHOFFEN. Armies will submit recommendations for new boundary. 8. In order to expedite carrying out this directive, II Prench Corps and VI US Corps will be directed by their respective Army Commanders to establish liaison immediately. By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS: DAVID G. BARR, Major General, G.S.C., Chief of Staff. OFFICIAL: T) when (JENKINS, R. E. JENKINS, Brigadier General, G.S.C., Appletant Chief of Staff, G-3 CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: SECRET SECRET DISTRIPUTION: ANNEX 5



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DALLWARD DINGUISHMON SPCCET 5. First French Army will be responsible for the defense of the line of the RHINE south of DRUSENHEIN inclusive. Seventh Army will be responsible for defense of the line of the HINE north of DRUSENHEIM until Groupement MONTSABERT passes to command of Commanding General First French Army at which time this responsibility south of ERLEN River will be passed to the Commanding General First French Army. 6. Funding completion of present operations no change in boundary atween Armies Southwest of OBERHOFFEN. Upon completion of current operations may boundary between Armies will be announced. Armies will submit recommendations in this regard. 7. Groupement MONTSABERT remains a supply, maintenance and evacuation ponsibility of First French Army. 8. II French Corps and VI US Corps will be directed by their respective Commanders to establish immediate lisison to carry out this directive. ACTION : G-3 INFORMATION: 56 DOWNGRYDING CONVINCES BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL SI CRET JUL/rmv LC IN 8703

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SECRET : TOP SECRET : Auth: CG 6th AG: :Initials / CU: HEAD WARTERS 6TH ARMY CROUP (TAC) APO 23, US ARMY :22 March 19-5 :Copy No: 70 SFCRET 22 March 1945. SUBJECT: Arandment of Letter of Instructions Number 11 (Amendment B). : CG Seventh Army. 1. In accordance with SHATF message FaD 18052 of 21 March 1945, a copy of which was furnished you this date, Operation "UNDERTOME" will be pushed vigorously with the object of establishing a firm bridgehead across the HILTE from which your command will be able at a later date to initiate an advance in strength in the general direction of KASSEL. Operation "VOYACE", launched by 12th Army Group, will be pushed vigorously with the same object. The combined bridgeheads of Operations "UNDERTONES" and "VOYACE" will be in the general area: NEDMAR River to EMERRACH - AMORRACH - MAIN River to HANAU - CHESCEN - SIEGEN River to its junction with the RHINE. 2. While it has been agreed between the Commending Generals of 12th and 6th Army Groups that full advantage will be taken by both Third and Seventh Armies of any opportunity for crossing the RHINE between NAIMZ and NAIMERIE, Seventh Army will ultimately be responsible for that area of the bridgehead South of the MAIN River. To this end you will be prepared to relieve or replace promptly elements of Third Army which may establish themselves in that part of the bridgehead assigned Seventh Army. 3. The present boundary between 6th and 12th Army Groups will be changed as soon as the tactical situation permits to the following, subject to later-d-justment between the Commanding Generals 12th and 5th Army Groups: SAARBHUCKEN - NEUNKIRCHEN - HOHERIDEN - thence along railroad following NAME River to BAD KREUZANCH - HAINZ - MAIN River to HANAU - FRIEDEURG - GIESSEN (all to 12th Army Group). 4. Operation "CHOKER 2" continues a responsibility of First Allied Airborne army in conjunction with First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) and 6th Army Group and will be employed in support of your bridgehead operations in accordance with present plans. However, prompt advantage will be taken of any opportunity for a successful seizure of a bridgehead in the WOMAS are before Operation "CHOKER 2" By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS: DAVID C. BURR, Major General, G.S.C., Chief of Staff. R. E. JERKINS, Brigadior General, G.S.C., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. DISTRIBUTION: "X" less the following which were previously distributed: 2: 12th Army Group 3: Third Army 4: G-3 SHAEF 5: G-3 File TOP SECRET


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
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24 March 1945

Gopy No **SECRET** HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP APO 23, US ARMY 24 March 1945 SUBJECT: Modification Letter of Instructions Number 11 (Amendment C - see BAX 25396 of 24 March 1945) Commanding General, Seventh Army Commanding General, First French Army TO 1. As soon as Groupement MONTS/ABERT closes to the line of the FRIEN River it will, in accordance with previous instructions, revert to the command of First French Army. 2. a. The following boundary between First French Army and Seventh 'rmy will become effective when Groupement MONTSABERT reverts to control of First French Army: West of BRUMATH (exclusive) no change - BRUMATH (to First French Army) - HAGUENAU - thence along Highway 63 to SOULTZ (R110375) - thence along railroad from SOULTZ to ALTERSTADT (R1748) - thence along railroad of junction RR and ERLEN River at R 284360 - thence along ERIEN River to its junction with the RHINE at K 4658 (all to Seventh Army). Passage of command will be facilitated by the prompt withdrawal of all units and installations of Seventh Army from the new zone of action of First French Army as soon as hostile resistance in the zone of Greupement MONTSABERT has been reduced. b. Running rights of not to exceed 200 vehicle trips one way, daily, along HighwayN63 between FR'MATH and FISSEMBOURG and on the road between FISSEMBOURG and the Army Eoundary (R-244510) will be granted by Seventh Army to First French Army. 3. Seventh Army will make such arrangements as are necessary to insure prompt implementation of this directive and will advise First French Army, Groupement MONTSABERT and this headquarters, by the most expeditious means of the effective date and hour of passage By Command of Lieutement General DEVERS: DAVID G. BARR, Major General, G.S.C., Chief of Staff. OFFICIAL: R. E. JENKINS, Brigadier General, G.S.C., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. DISTRIBUTION: CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: SFCRET BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL MICHADING COMMITTEE 12 TEFF SECRET

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Seventh Arm regrouped forces to contain and destroy hostile penetration in the BITCHE (4-7850) and BARTENTHAL (4-8442) areas. XV U. S. Corps assumed command of 2 DB. Repulsed strong enemy attacks in the BITCHE (4-7850) and FORBACH (4-3966) areas. VI U.S. Corps began retrograde movement to Maginot positions in the WISSEMBOURG (R-1548) - LAUTERBACH (R-3242) area as ordered. II French Corps. $^{\theta}1$ DMI completed relief of 2 DB which passed to control of Seventh Army.

- 3 XV U. S. Corps recaptured ACHEN (Q-5949) and GROS REDERCHING (Q-6252).

 VI U. S. Corps held positions against strong enemy attacks in the REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) SANREINSBERG (Q-7441) sector. Completed withdrawal to Maginot positions in the WINDSTEIN (Q-9543) SOUFFLENHEIM (R-1625) sector.

 I French Corps repulsed enemy raid on KARBS (A-8399).
- 4 Following telephonic instructions from STARF confirmed by cable, 6th Army Group sent cable BX 22329 to CG's, First French Army and Seventh Army containing following directive:

 "Instructions contained in our cables, B22239 and B22247, cancelled. Every effort compatible with preserving integrity of the command will be made to hold STMANBOURG area. Operations to be conducted along lines laid down in Letter of Instructions No. 7 pending receipt of new Letter of Instructions."

 VI U. S. Corps continued operations to reduce enemy salient southeast of BITCHE (Q-7850).

 First French Army issued operation order No. 210 giving II French Corps the defense of STRASBOURG Sector.

 II French Gorps The 1 DMI lost NEUNKIRCH (V-9268) to an enemy counterattack. enemy counterattack.
- 5 6th Army Group sent cable BX22363 to CG's First French Army and Seventh Army containing following directive:

 "Command of STRASBOURG area passes to CG, First French Army. Seventh Army will withdraw from Maginot Line north of HAGENAU only under pressure."

 VI U. S. Corps launcined limited attack to destroy enemy forces which had crossed RHINE in the GAMBSHEIM (R-1110) area.

 II French Corps The 1 DMI reoccupied NEUNKINCH (Y-9268).

 I French Corps repulsed enemy raid on L'ILE NAPOLEON (Y-7407).
- 6 XV U. S. Corps attacked to restore original MLR positions. VI U. S. Corps continued attack to reduce GAMBSHEIM (R-1110) bridgehead.

 II French Corps - The 1 DMI withdrew from NEUNKIRCH (V-9268) to WITTERNHEIM (V-9168) because of enemy pressure.
- 7 This headquarters issued Letter of Instructions Number 8, dated 7 January 1945. This directive confirmed suplementary and fragmentary instructions issued orally and by radio since publication of Letter of Instructions Number 7. It also released XXI Corps consisting of 36th Infantry Division and 12th Armored Division from SHARF and Army Group reserve. (Annex 4). VI U. S. Corps made little progress in its attack against the GAMBSHEIM (R-1110) selient. The WINGEN (Q-7335) pocket and road to LICHTENBERG (Q-8135) were cleared.

 II french Corps evacuated DAUBENSAND (V-9871), RHINAU (V-9768), FRIESENHEIM (V-9568) and WITTERNHEIM (V-9168). Enemy attack against ROSSFELD (V-9171) and HERBSHEIM (V-9272) was stopped on the southern edge of these two villages.
 - XV U. S. Corps secured high ground vicinity SAENGELBERG (Q-7448) by limited objective attacks.

 VI U. S. Corps repulsed enemy tanks and infantry attacks on Maginot positions vicinity ASCHBACH (R-1837).

 First French Army issued operation order No. 221: Maintain present front intact and mop up German infiltrations on left bank of RMINE, south and north of STRASBOURG; defend SECRET

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STHASBOURG at all costs; actively carry out defense work on entire front; resume the initiative firmly on the front as a whole and be orepared to launch a general offensive when a the moment arrives.

II french Corps - the 1 BHI repulsed strong enemy attack against ROSSFELD (V-9171). Our getrison at BODYMAIM (V-9670) withdrew to OBLINERM (V-9673). The 3rd U.S. Division reached the FLORT River and completed clearing of OSTHAIM (V-7351) and SIGOLSHAIM (V-6748).

- 9 XV U.S. Corps repulsed enemy attacks in himling (5-6555) erea with only slight loss of ground.

 II French Corps the 1 A.I soundened LOCK 77, one kilometer not threat of Obnamia (v-9673), and wither ever to same (v-9176) due to enemy counteratteck. Contact was not resatablished with our elements in obnamia. 3rd the livision captured hill (v-6546) and advanced down Alambuchair COLLET road.
- 10 VI U.S. Corps continued its efforts to restore mositions in HATTEN (R-1733) and GAMBARIM (R-1110) ereas.

 II French Corps the 1 Ball lost opposite (V-9673). Alements surrounded by enemy in HABBARIM (V-9272) and HOLD (V-9171) were disengaged by a counterattack of tank surported infantry.
- 11 6th Army Group sent cable E22680 to CG's First French Army and Seventh Army containing Following directive:

 "During the period prior to resumption of the offensive each front line division will conduct at least two walds or limited objective attheous each week with the force employed to be at least one infentry battalion supported by armor."

 VI U.S. Corps was still engaged in heavy fighting in the RITTERSCHOFFEN (R-1533) HATTEN (R-1733) area.

 II French Corps repulsed enemy attacks on No.SFLD (V-9171), HERBSHEIM (V-9272), BANFALD (V-8974) and GSTRABAL bridge (V-9378). Our elements in NO.SFLD and HERBSHEIM withdrew behind the ILL kiver.
- 13 XXI U.S. Corps became operational on west sector of Seventh Army front and assumed command of 103rd Division and 106th Cavelry Group.
 VI U.S. Corps continued strong armored attacks in the HATTEN (R-1733) area.
- 14 VI U.S. Corps continued attacks in HANTEN (R-17:3) sector but strong enemy counterattack forced our withdrawal to southern part of town.
- 15 VI U.S. Corps continued attacks to reduce BITCHE (4-7850) salient and continued armored attacks to restore MAGINOT positions in HATTEN (R-1733) area exainst bitter resistance. 12th Armored Division made preparation to reduce enemy pocket west of RHINE on 16 January.

 CG First French Army issued personal letter of instructions No. 7: launch without delay and by surprise, with all the means now at your disposal, powerful offensive operations converging in the direction of BRISACH and simed at total reduction of the ALSACE bridgehead.
- 16 VI U.S. Gorps ar ored attack to reduce enemy pocket west of RUINZ met atiff resistance and our units withdrew west of ZORN River.

 II French Corps the 3 DIA, supported by elements of the 5 DB launched an attack on GAMBSHEIM (Q-1110).

 After reaching road junction at R-0909 our troops withdrew to their line of departure. The 3rd U.S. Livision repulsed enemy attempt to cross the WRISS River at SIGOLSHEIM (V-6748). The 3rd U.S. Division conducted strong reids in vicinity of LA BAROCHE (V-6147). and LA FLACE (V-5945)

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- 17 XAI U.S. Corps. Plements of 10th Armored Division closed in sector.
 VI U.S. Corps counterattecked and threw back enemy penetration in SESSEMBAIM (R-1822). HERRLISHMIM (R-1214) was entered and fighting continued in town.
- 18 This headquarters issued Letter of Instruction Number 9, dated 18 January 1945: 6th Army Group continues the defensive north and west of the STRASBOURG area, inclusive, and passes to the offensive south of the STRASBOURG area for the purpose of eliminating the COLMAR pocket and destroying the GREMAN forces west of the RHINE in that area. (Annex 5).

 XV U.S. Corps made little progress in HATTEN (R-1733) area and withdrew from HERMLISHMIM (R-1214) to positions along ZORN River.

 CG First French Army issued Orientation Directive Number 6 to I and II French Corps: Immediately after the breakthrough, exploit to the RHINE bridges and first of all to the crossings at BRISACH; effect a junction of the two Corps as close to the RHINE as possible; complete this action by capture of the other crossings at the river, north and south of BUSACH.

ZORN River.

CG first French Army issued Orientation Directive Number 6
to I and II French Corps: Immediately efter the breakthrough,
exploit to the Milah bridges and first of all to the crossings
at SKISACH; effect a junction of the two Corps as close to
the RHIME as possible; complete this action by capture of the
other crossings at the river, north and south of BRISACH.

CG First French Army issued personal letter of instructions
Rumber 3 to CG Central VOJGES Sector: immobilize enemy forces
now on your front and undertake, upon receipt of Army orders,
clearance of that portion of the VOJGES falling into your
sector when the main actions in the ALGACE Plain will have
shown their effect.

II French Corps regrouped to attack east and southeast, with
3rd U.S. Division on the right to make the main effort, to

II French Corps regrouped to attack east and southeast, with 3rd U.S. Division on the right to make the main effort, to seize MBUF - BMRISACH, and the 1 DMI to protect 3rd U.S. Division's left flank.

- 19 VI U.S. Corps made little progress in an attempt to relieve battalion cut off at -815395. Our armor, principally the 12th Armored Division, in sector of enemy pocket west of RHINE, was forced back to general line between ROHRWILLER (R-1217) and WAYARDHELM (R-0513).
- 20 VI U.S. Corps began withdrawal to second delaying positions. Two battalions remained isolated at q-815395 and DRUSENHAIM (R-1518) and all efforts to relieve them failed eithough some infiltration to parent units was accomplished.

 I French Corps launched its attack and reached the southern edges of NOWNENGECH wood (V-5808) and the crossroads at V-5610. 4 DBM and 2 DIM made main attack.

 II French Corps continued regrouping. 28th U.S. Division relieved 3rd U.S. Division on its sector. 3rd U.S. Division assembled preparatory to attack.
- 21. AV U.S. Corps. 101st Airborne Division began to errive in dorps sector.

 VI U.S. Corps completed its planned withdrewel to new defensive sector.

 I French Corps continued its savance to by-press VISUA THANN (V-5412).

II French Corps completed regrouping.

- 22. II French Gorps the 3 DIA counterattacked and elected enemy who had succeeded in entering KILDTHIT (R-0908). The 3rd U.S. Division and the 1 DMI leunched a coundinsted night attack between SHLMCHAT (V-7962) and COLMAR (V-7141). 3rd U.S. Division advanced through FORMI DM COLMAR and reached the ILL River night of 22/23 to gain line of departure.

 I French Corps occupied LUTTERBACK wood (V-6507).
- 23 AV U.S. Corps. 35th Infentry Division (less 134th Inf) closed in assembly area in Corps zone.

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II French Corps - the 3rd U.S. Division cleared the FORET DE COLMAR, and crossed the ILL river in assault boats. Between OSTHELM (V-7351) and GULMAR (V-7454) the FECHT River was crossed at several points and OSTHELM (V-7351) was occupied. 1 DMI cleared west bank of ILL River between Dimbrat (V-7963) and ILLHARUSERN (V-7884).

- 24 VI U.S. Corps sustained five enemy attacks in Corps sector.
 Passed 12th Armored Division to operational control of II
 French Corps.
 I French Corps launched an attack in direction of IITTELSHEIM
 (V-6212), captured MISE (V-6110).
 II French Corps the 3rd U.S. Mivision essent ore sing of the IIL River established a bridgehead east of the Fiver.
 Strong enemy counter-attacks against the 3rd U.S. Mivision were repulsed but some ground was lost in the bridgehead.
- 25 EXI U.S. Corps sector passed to central of XV U.S. Corps.

 Hq and Ha Co AXI U.S. Corps with organic Corps troops passed to central of First French Army.

 VI U.S. Corps restored MLR vicinity KINDSTELLER (-8929) and SCHILLERSPORF (-8430) and continued reduction of enemy penetration west of SCHAMIGHAUSEN (-9924).

 II French Corps the 3rd U.S. Division continued the attack east of the ILL River directed on C.NAL M. COLLER. The BENNAMARSH River was reached by the 3rd U.S. Division at several points. 1 DMI progress to protect left flank of 3rd U.S. Division alowed down in ILLaALD FORMAT.

 I French Corps captured AMLIE Sheft (V-6410), Gite ANNA (V-6810), Gite FIRMAND (V-681M).
- 26 VI U.S. Corps annihilated an enemy group at SCHERICHAUSEN (19924), cleared all enemy penetrations, and restored ELR, CG First French Army issued Operation Order No. 247: follow with maximum speed and vigor the actions now in progress converging on the BRIBE at BRIDACH; mop up without telesy the ALDACE Plain between ALBACH BRIDACH; more up without telesy the ALDACE Plain between ALBACH and MARCKOLDHER; create as quickly as possible resources for the progressive reinforcement of means of defense of STRABBCURG which must be held althout though of giving up and no matter what happens.

 II French Corps repulsed violent attack and last ALBACHT (R-0908). The 3rd U.S. Division continued its attack and captured Holder (V-7347), ROSAMMA ALTA (V-7247) and RISDEHR (V-7847).

 I French Corps occupied Cite GRASSARGALTA (V-6210).
- 27 VI U.S. Corps. 101st Airborne Division assumed command of sector on left of 79th Division.

 II French Corps Alements of the 3 DIA established a bringe-head on the ILL River at BUTTANLER (V-8873). The 3rd d.S. Division captured JEBSHEM (V-8147), BULLMARK (V-7646) and resched the CCLUAR CHARL at three boints south and west of BOLTA-HER, captured of CARROCRAIR (V-7845).

 I French Corps launched of ettack against CLEARY (V-5812), elements reaching the TRUE Bridge (V-5811).
- 28 II French Corps the 3rd U. . Division completed capture and clerring of mickindshalls (V-7745), NCLTZ-LIR (V-7646) and JRBSHALL (V-8147). Retablished a 6 Kilometer front on the SCLEAR CHALL. I DAI captured Grussmanniam (V-8249). I French Corps occupied VINUX Trans (V-5412), reached center of Cite Languages (V-6211), occupied tite Lib I (V-6311). Mopping up of La BRIBLE wood clear finished.
- 29 NV U.S. Corps. 35th Division (less 134th Inf) relieved from line preparatory to its relief from ettachment to seventh army and 6th army Group II French Gorps the 3rd U.S. (vision cleared area between the ILL River and the COLAGE Conel, west and continuent of

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED BECRET HOLIZAHIR 7646). Reached the LARM 1864 at 7-837454, near the imittion of the COLAM and HAIGE - HACKE Genels.
ANI U.S. Corps assumed con and of the sector held by the 3rd U.S. and 28 U.S. civisions with these divisions, the 75th U.S. brivision and the 5th Tranch Armored Division attached.
ANI U.S. Corps hunched an attack at 2100A hours directed toward MADUF - BRIGACH end the BRIGACH Bridge, this effort being the main effort of First French Army; the 3rd U.S. Division attacking being the main effort of ANI U.S. Corps.
I French Corps crossed the THUR River Lest of CARMAY (V-5811) and occupied Cite LANGANZUG (V-6211). (V-8053).

ANI U.S. Corps - the 3rd U.S. Livision crossed COLMAR Canal during the might of 29/30 with 4 inf Battlions and attacked and occupied MUNTARNELIM (V-8045), FORTSCHAIMS (V-7943), BISCHAIMS (V-7744) and WIRR en PLAINE (V-7642). 75th U.S. Division crossed in Gorps reserve prepared to enter the line on the right of the 3rd U.S. Livision. I French Corps reached at Talbillim (V-6312) end occupied streamelm (V-7012). 31 - AV U.S. Corps - 35th Division (less 134th Inf) departed
Seventh Army Area.


VI Corps (U.S.) attacked OBERMONTEN (R-0920 to secure bridgehead over OBER River. Patrols north of GAMBSHEIM (R-1011)
reached south and west edge of STAINMALD woods (R-1012).

XXI U.S. Corps - 3rd U.S. Division, supported by elements of
the 5th French Armored Division, stacked to cut the roads
from COLMAR to NAUF - BRIDACH; entered ANDOLSHEIM (V-6740),
and DUBRENENTZEN (V-8344); mopped up MUNTZENBEIM and FORTSCHWIRR
and HORBOURG (V-7542); attacked and cleared URSCHMBEIM (V-8142),
GRISHNLEHNSALD (V-8042), NIEDELWALD Wood (V-7941), and WIELLSCHEN
(V-8140).


II French Corps occupied GAMBSHEIM (R-1110), OBERREIM (V-9673),
GERZTHE DM (V-9775), OHRENNEIM (V-8354), ELSENBEIM (V-8251) and
BOFFZHRIM (V-9670) against scattered resistance. 1 DMI entered
MUSTMATTEN woods (V-8153).

I French Corps occupied Southern and Eastern edges of I French Corps occupied Southern and Eastern edges of HITTELSHEIM (V-8)12). EMCETTION


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
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


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


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
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
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED NO G N DB ANNEX 2 70 REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY HQ. SIXTH ARMY GROUP FOR PERIOD 31 DECEMBER-31 JANUARY 1945 ~OVERLAY~ SIXTH ARMY GROUP TROOP DISPOSITIONS AND FRONT LINE AS OF 312400 JAN. 1945 MAP : EUROPE (AIR) 1/500,000 CSGS 4072 SHEETS: TORINO, NICE. SECRET


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
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ANNEX 3
TO
TO
REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY
HQ. SIXTH ARMY GROUP
FOR PERIOD
31 DECEMBER 1944- 31 JANUARY 1945
— OVERLAY—

SIXTH ARMY GROUP TROOP DISPOSITIONS
AND FRONT LINE AS OF 3/2400 JAN. 1945
MAP: FRANCE, 1/250,000 GRGS, 2738
SHEETS: 20, 24, 29

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TOP SECRET 77

B 675 TOP SECRET:
Auth: CG 6th AG:
Initials: 7 January 1945:
Copy No: ___:

TO CG Seventh Army
CG First French Army

NOTE: This Letter of Instructions is to confirm supplementary and fragmentary instructions issued orally and by radio since publication of Letter of Instructions Number 7.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP APO 23, U.S. ARMY

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.

b. Twenty First and Twelfth Army Groups are continuing operations to reduce the German salient in the central front.


Sixth Army Group continues the defense in accordance with the provisions of Letter of Instructions Number 7 as modified by instructions contained Perein. BCUNDALIES.

H. He creen Troifth and Sixth Army Groups: No change.

b. Extraon Seventh and First French Ardes: Lest of point V-5484, no chase - Grandformales (V-5771) - OFE Hadded: (V-60.5) - MARGEREIM (Q-2007) - THE HADDES (Q-2007) - OFFICE (Q-2007) - OFFICE (Q-2007) - OFFICE (Q-2007) - HADDES (Q-2007) - HADDES (R-311) - GREEN (Q-2007) - HADDES (R-311) - GREEN (R-311) - HADDES (R-311) - HADDES

c. South Flank: No change.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET B-33 : TOP SECRET : Auth: CG 6th, AG : Initials: 177 : 6 February 1945 : HEAD WARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP Note: This letter of Instructions is to confirm fragmentary instructions previously issued orally and by cable. 1. a. See current Intelligence Summary. b. Twelfth and Twenty-first Army Groups continue offensive. The flank of Twelfth Army Group adjacent to Northwest flank of Sixth Army Group remains on 2. Sixth Army Group continues the defensive North and West of the STRASBOURG area, inclusive, and passes to the offensive South of the STRASBOURG area for the purpose of eliminating the COLMAR pocket and destroying the German forces West of the RHINE in that area. BOUNDARIES: No change from Letter of Instructions Number 8. 3. a. First French Army (1) Attack on South flank on 20 January 1945 with main effort so directed as to cut the road net in CERNAY - CUEBWILLER area, thereafter exploiting in the direction of the ERISACH Bridge. (2) Attack on North flank on 22 January 1945 with main effort be-tween COLMAR and SELESTAT, bypassing COLMAR, and exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH bridge. (3) Continue defense of STRASBOURG area in accordance with provisions of Letters of Instructions Numbers 7 and θ , this headquarters. (4) Protect South flank of Seventh Army; protect South flank of Sixth Army Group; protect FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier in currently assigned sector. (5) See paras 3 b (2) and 3 x. b. Seventh Army (1) Continue defense in accordance with provisions of Letters of Instructions Numbers 7 and 8, this headquarters. (2) Pass 2 DB to operational control of First French Army in sufficient time to take part in First French Army offensive. Times and places of passage of units to operational control of First French Army will be as agreed between CG First French Army and CG Seventh Army (Par 3 a (2)). (3) Be prepared to assemble one armd div generally South of SAVERME by daybreak 22 January 1945 for movement to North flank attack of First French Army and passage to operational control of CG First French Army on order (Par 3 a (2)). (4) 10 Armd Div with one TD and AAA (AW) Bn attached, attached to Sixth Army Group by SHAEF, is attached to Seventh Army on arrival in SARREBOURG area. Movement of 10 Armd Div to SARREBOURG area will be accomplished with radio SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED silence imposed; this restriction will not be lifted unless and until, it becomes necessary to commit 10 Armd Div and its attachments to combat. This div and attachments will be prepared for return to SHAEF control at 1800 hours 27 January (5) Protect Northwest flank Sixth Army Group. (6) See para 3 x. x. (1) 28 Inf Div with one TD and AAA (A.!) En attached; one En 105mm How; one En 155mm How; and one En 4.5 gun, attached to Sixth Army Group by SHARF, are attached to Seventh Army and are passed to operational control of CG First French Army upon arrival in the ST DIE area. All of these units will be so deployed that they can be withdrawn from action for reversion to SHAEF at 1800 hours 27 January 1945. All of these units will enter Sixth Army Group area with silence imposed upon all radios; this restriction will not be lifted by First French Army prior to the opening of the main attack in the COLMAR - SELESTAT area. (2) Movement of all units East of a North and South line through LUNEVILLE will be accomplished under cover of darkness, or by infiltration of small groups in such a manner that normal traffic activity on roads will not be apparently increased. (3) Upon initiating movement to First French Army complete radio silence will be imposed upon 2 DB. This restriction will not be lifted by First French Army prior to commission of this unit to the attack. (4) The importance of preserving the utmost secrecy in preparation for the attack cannot be over emphasized. Armored vehicles, and transport of units in attack positions, will be concealed in buildings and in woods and by other camouflage expedients. All visible activity prior to the attack must be such as to indicate purely defensive intentions. 4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately. 5. No change in current Signal Instructions. By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS; DAVID G. BARR, Major General, G.S.C., Chief of Staff. Problet notices REUNEN E. JEKKES, Brigadier General, G.S.C., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. Following distribution made on 18 Jan 1945: - CG Seventh Army - G-3 S.AEF Regular distribution "X" of copies No. 5-90 made as of 6 Feb 1945 except that 44 AAA Brig to receive copy 5 only.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP APO 23, U.S. ARMY 18 January 1945 ADMINISTRATIVE LETTER) (To accompany letter of Instruction No. 9) 9; 1. Responsibility for supply and evacuation of the 2nd DB and the units presently attached thereto, remains with Seventh Army. The responsibility for supply and maintenance and evacuation of U. S. units that are, or may be placed, wunder the operational control of the First French Army will remain a direct U. S. responsibility. See also paragraph 2, Administrative Letter Number 8, 5 January 1945. 2. Necessary supply and evacuation movements in the area of the First French Army to accomplish paragraph I above will be closely co-ordinated between the respective Army Commanders. DEVERS Comdg. OFFICIAL: WEL/hf Distr: TOP SECRET

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED DOWNGRADED TO. SHORET BY A'MIGATT OF A.C. OF S. OFD APO 23, U.S.AUAY SUBJECT: G-3 Report After Action Against Lnemy for period 010001A
December 1944 to 312400A December 1944. Reference: Maps: FRANCE 1/250,000 Sheets: EPINAL, BESANCOL, LA ROCHE-SUR-YON, ARGOULAME, BOUNDEAUE, COGS 2738. ORDMANY 1/250,000 Sheets: STRABSBURG, BASEL. GOGS 4346. ITALY 1/100,000 Sheets: NICE, TORINO. I. SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD: 1. COMMAND. At the beginning of the period the Sixth any Group was under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces. The Sixth any Group consisted of the Seventh United States army, composed of VI and XV.U. S. Corps and the First French and composed of I and II French Corps. 2. OPER TIONS. a. At this time the bixth any Group was continuing its attack to exploit the breakthrough made by the Seventh United States any and First French any through the Savern Gap and Belfort Gap respectively. The Rhine River had been reached in the sectors of both anales. b. The FR AGO-ITALIAN Border was protected by the 27th French Alpine Division under First French Army command from the area LLBERTVILLS to L'ARCHE Pass, and by 44th AAA Brigade, circuity under Sieth Army Group, from L'ARCHE Pass to the Mediterraneou coast at Mun So. II. OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD. SERIO HIA

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED DOWNGRADED TO. CHEORET HEADQUARTED LIATH REAY GROUP BY A'MIDATTY OF A.C. OF S. OND APO 23, U.S. AUMY 10 Jenuary 1945 . Initiale Date SUBJECT: G-3 Report After Action Against Lnemy for period 010001A December 1944 to 312400A December 1944. Reference: Maps: FRANCE 1/250,000 Sheets: EPINAL, BEJANCON, LA MOCHE-SUR-YON, ANGOULEME, BOULDHAGE. G.G. 2738.

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G.G. 4346.

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THANKINGING (V-6759), OR STAIR (V-7360), Harmon L. (V-9272) and FILE Hall (V-9567).

CG First French army issued personal letter of instructions to surround and destroy German forces still engaged in 1500 and the VOSCAS in such a way that they cannot be utilized again Last of the Hall. The objective of I and II creach Corps is to reach as soon as possible the Hill. At he is in (V-3937).

II French Corps - Ameny resistance collessed in the FRUIT valley which is completely occupied. In the region of Thank (V-5812) some ground was as last.

- 3 Seventh Army passed 2d French Armored Division to operational control of First French Army.

 AV J. S. Corps ceptured Mach. Halad (5-5936), MINSTELLA (5-8935), GUMBRAGHTUHOFFEN (5-9234), and Ultradio 1.3 (5-9432).

 VI. J. Corps occupied Ribada VIII. (V-7055) and Record M. (V-9171). Heavy fighting continued in sold 1 (7-7962).

 II French Corps reached point 1 km southwest of Rhubs (V-9212).

 I French Corps Enemy counterstack succeeded in destroying the bridge at V-7807.
- 4. AV U. S. Corps captured Volabbild (2-6738) and Object (4-9038). VI U. S. Corps campleted electing same that (V-7961), and all towns on the Kintzharm (V-7461) Kibbar VII. (V-7055) road. HUMA-IRK (V-6853) was captured.

 I French Corps Strong enemy infantry susperted by tanks succeeded in reaching bridge at V-7807 and our elements north of the Canal, between ILE MARCHIO. (V-7407) and bridge at V-7807, were withdrawn.
- 5 Seventh army passed 36th U. S. Infantry Division to operational control of First French army.

 AV U. S. Corps captured BUTLEN (4-6242), almost (4-7435), winding U (4-7634) and Filther United (4-8036).

 VI U. S. Corps cleared METTERILLER (4-9629).
- 6 XV U. S. Corps captured MONTHROUR (4-6944) and MAISTHALL (1-7241).

 VI U. S. Corps was forced to withdraw elements from that part of MAISTALLER (4-9629) north of LA MINTALLER DU NONE hiver. I french Corps pushed back the enemy in front of MINTALLER (V-5114) and THURK (V-5212).
- 7 II French Corps out the Mil. Valley between MY SEEG.
 (V-6549) and LACUITOIR (V-5750).
 I French Corps explained HITCH: II. (V-5114), entered WILLIE SUR THUM (V-5212), crossed the Do L. Diver, captured MICHELBACK (V-5307) and enlarged the bridgehead to POIT D'ASEACH (V-5605).
- 8 XV U. S. Corps morped up MOUTENHOUSE (4-7942), entered LABBERG (4-7445) and ENGRANGED (4-7146).
 VI U. S. Corps captured CARBOHEIN (R-1110).
 II French Corps captured L. POUTEOIE (V-5750), freed MEIMERSPACH (V-4718) and MOOSCH (V-4818).
 I French Corps established contact with II French Corps between (MOOSCH (V-4818) and THARC (V-5212), encountered strong resistance at LUTTERBACH (V-6606).
- 9 XV U. S. Corps secured BINING barracks (4-6549).
 VI U. S. Corps cleared NIELEMBROWN (4-9339), BISCHWILLER (R-0818), and OBERNOOFEN (R-0919).
 I French Corps completely occupied and mopped up THANN (V-5212) as far as VIEUX THANN (V-5311), enlarged bridgehead on the right banks of the THUR.

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- 10 NV U. S. Corps captured ROHRBACH (Q-6549), entered MAIERHOFF (Q-6850).

 VI U. S. Corps captured REIGHBHOFFEN (Q-9436), GUNDERSHOFFEN (G-8434), GRIEDSHOW (Q-9532), MERTENTILET (Q-9629) and RALTENHOUSE (R-0721). HAGUERHAU (R-0323 was entered. If French Corps Enemy resistance stiffened and German infiltrations caused slight withdrawal to the north at V-5646. Patrols reached the BOHHOM E Pass (V-5151).

 I French Corps occupied VIEUX THAIN (V-5311), and ASPACH-LEHAUT-(V-5408). The bridgehead, which the Germans still held on the left bank of the RHINE, was reduced by the capture of SCHALFERHOF (A-8395) and LOCHLE (A-8295).
- 11 XV U. S. Corps seized PETIT-REDERCHING (Q-6851) and SIERSTHAL (Q-7149).

 VI U. S. Corps captured WOENTH, (R-0037), WALBERG (R-0331) and Haddenhuu (R-0323).

 II French Corps entered BLEMANIER (V-6949), captured BAS D'ONBAY (V-5747). Snemy elements felled in their attempt to cross the FRING north of NHIMAU (V-9809).

 I French Corps continued its attack between the DOLLETS and the THUE Rivers, freed L.LEB.CR (V-5210) and ABSACH-LE-BAS (V-5007); captured DOMERICHOUSE (V-5706).
- 12 XV U. S. Corps continued advance capturing BETTVILLER (Q-6753).
 VI U. S. Corps continued advance reaching FRILIPPSBURG (Q-8742),
 NINDERFORDERN (R-2234) and SELTZ (R-2732), occupying LANGARGULTZBACK (Q-9941), MITECREDRY (R-0339) and MARKEILLER (R-0637).
 First French Army issued personal instructions: CG II French
 Corps attack in the direction of ANY MARKEY (V-549) COLLAR
 (V-712) ROUFFROM (V-6829), to capture COLLAR and establish
 contact with I Corps in vicinity of ROUFFROM; CG I French
 Corps attack in the direction of CARRAY (V-5812) ROUFFROM
 to occupy CLARAY and attempt to establish contact with II
 French Corps in the vicinity of ROUFFACH; make strong efforts
 to reach the banks of LILL River between ALHOUSE (V-7006)
 and WIL CRODE EN FLAINE (V-7335).

 II French Corps Lnemy launched tank supported attack on
 BESILEMETER (V-6951), BEANNIER (V-6942), RIGGERIER (V-6852) and
 MITTLINIER (V-6950). All our positions remained intect. An
 attack on Oblightal (V-7964) was also repulsed.
- 13 XV U. S. Corps made slight progress, occupied harm VIII.k.
 (1-7549).
 VI U. S. Corps penetrated MACHIOT defenses at several points,
 captured COULT. (B-1037) and Backs ON (R-2436).
 II arench Corps reached the vicinity of Mill 1009 one silometer
 southwest of BORNO an Pass (V-5151). 2nd Balleunched an attack,
 captured afficients (V-9068), reached outskirts of MAUNEIRCH
 (V-9268). Its advance was slowed by mines and about is.
- 14 VI U. S. Corps captured al.Gam (R-0547), Children (R-0846) and OBLICOTELN (R-1346).

 1 hal, which has been relieved of ansignment to first french army and assigned to French Forces of the west, began its movement to the western Jactor.

 11 french Dorps continued its attack; 2 DB made further progress in a terrain covered with mines and obstacles; remarked a point V-9165, two kilometers south of MITHEMELIN (V-9068).
- 15 VI U. S. Gorps entered Germany at R-9749, R-0950 and in vicinity of Minne Labrands (R-2641) which was coptured. IAUTABOUTG (R-3241) was seized.

 II French Dorps 3 Bin and 36th U. S. Division leanched an attack from the region south of BONHOLLE Pass (V-5151).

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occupied ORBEY (V-5747). Following a violent counterattack withdrew to the southern edges of LITTEREEDS (V-9068) and NEUNEIRCE (V-9268) and from the top of the ROLLICE (V-488).

- 16 VI U. S. Corps crossed LAUTE River in several places, seized BOBERTHAL (R-0851), MISSABBURG (R-1548), MISSABBURG (R-1651), SCHAIBERHARDT (R-2942), and BERG (R-3442).

 II French Corps entered RAYSMISBLAG (V-6549) cepturing intect the bridge on the WELLS River. A new enemy counterattack was stopped by artillary fire, positions at MEDERING (V-9268) and WII TERMINIK (V-9068) were held and strengtheped.
- 17 XV U. S. Corps captured FORT FRAUDALLING (2-7551).

 VI U. S. Corps contacted forward positions of SILDFAILD line meeting greatly increased resistance.

 I DMI is reassigned to First French Army and began preparation for movement to the Army Lone.

 II French Corps continued its attack, reached the NOT LANGE BLANC (V-5248), cleared MAYSAMADEMIG (V-6549), captured INVENTIGATION (V-6548).

 I French Corps A German counteratters on the California, North of WILLIAM LUK TRUE (V-5216) was stopped by artillery fire.
- 18 II French Corps freed road from Fh.L.R. (V-6150) to 1. 1. 1. RG (V-6448), occupied Administration (V-6047). Themy reacted violently against this penetration and a strong tank supported attack against A almodulation was received.
- 19 XV U. S. Corps seized MOTVILLE (x-7232) and consisted depture of FORT JELLER (X-7352).

 VI b. S. Corps reduced a number of pittoxes in the SIGCTIED Line.

 II French Corps resched GEORGE DE FING (V-5145), elected the heights north and south of TAY Educate, receptured Mischell (V-5350), tops afford MC (V-5748).
- 20 XV U. S. Corps condicted criture of 100. 33.1.3. On (_-7631).

 II Treach Corps Attack started on 15 Accember, while being stopped in the to another reston, continues in the 0.3.7 and LaC not region.
- 21 This is a parters layued better of instructions as 5 to Gr, seventh many: Jixte stay broup as used the definitive and relieves certain elements of twelfth any droup bestward to Small Unit a, exclusive. Subject to scouring elements to finite of communication, bixth army droup will be prepared to give ground rather than endanger the integrity of its forces (a nex 1). Seventh army issues directive: save La army relieved third army elements in that portion of Tire army area now in seventh army zone: halfs resent arms at ones, or relieve and defends in ground now held.

 3d U. ... Infantry division passed to oper them; control of First French army, relieving both U. S. infantry division which returned to oper those consolidates control of seventh ray.
- 22 This Resignarters is such latter of instruction he o to 2),
 First French Army: Sixth Army Group allowers his observed and
 relieves certain elements of the Evelith army Even content to
 Statuturally, accounties. Subject to security elements lines of
 communication, sixth army Group will be prepared to yield pround
 rather than endanger the integrity of its force. Sixth army
 Group will continue the offensive on the south to radice the
 Statut poster, destroy the Serians sest of the Milat and defend
 that line (Almex 6).
 If French Jords Schtinged souths to of the XY. 2003.75 cods.

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- 23 II French Corps A strong German counterattack caused withdrawal from SIGOLSHEIM (V-6748).
- 25 87th Division is relieved of its assignment to Seventh Army, assigned to SHASF, and cleared Seventh Army Lone on its move-
- 27 Seventh Army assembled AAI Corps, consisting of 36th Infantry Division and 12th Armored Division in the PHALSBOURG-SAURLBOURG area. This Corps is SHAEF reserve prepared to move on short notice.
- Group continues the defensive and will be prepared to give ground rather than endanger the integrity of its forces. West of the general area of BITCHL the main position will follow the general trace of the MAGINOT Line. South of BITCHL the main position will follow the eastern slope of the VOLGHL as far south as the area west of COLMAR from where it will follow the general trace of the present front line to the vicinity of THARN (V-5313); thence, along the southeast slope of the VOLGHL to the area north of BHLFORT (A-3493), thence, across the BELFORT Gep to the general vicinity of DELLS (A-4579) (Annex 7).

 II French Corps finished mopping up of SIGOLSHEIM (V-6748).

 I french Corps repelled, after hard fighting, strong enemy raid on LOESCHLE (A-8295).
- 29 2d French Armored Division passed to operational control of Seventh army.

 II French Corps repelled strong enemy counterstack in the region of LE GRAS (V-6046) and on AMMERSCHWIHR (V-6647).
- 30 Seventh Army issued directive: Seventh Army continues organization and defense of present positions, completes reconnaissance and organization of rearward positions. First French Army issued Field Order No 201 to maintain present front in its entirety by applying the main defensive effort in upper ALSACE to cover the BELFORT Gap on the one hand, and in lower ALSACE to cover STRASBOURG and the right flank of Seventh Army on the other hand.
- 31 During the period 21-31 December, Seventh Army and First French Army regrouped, organized and strengthened defensive positions, patrolled and deployed their forces in depth.

 I French Corps Enemy raids on our posts at KEMBS (A-8398) and on ILE NAPOLSON (V-7408) were repelled by artillery fire. Another German patrol which met our advance elements in THANN (V-5212) was forced to withdraw.


R. E. JENKINS, Brigadier General, GSC., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

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
Annex 1 - Overlay, period ending 312400A Dec 44 (Main Front)
Annex 2 - Overlay, period ending 312400A Dec 44 (Alps Front)
Annex 3 - Overlay, period ending 312400A Dec 44 (Western France).
Annex 4 - Ltr of Instr No 4, Hq Sixth Army Gp, Deted 2 Dec 44.
Annex 5 - Ltr of Instr No 5, Hq Sixth Army Gp, Dated 21 Dec 44.
Annex 6 - Ltr of Instr No 6, Hq Sixth Army Gp, Dated 22 Dec 44.
Annex 7 - Ltr of Instr No 7, Hq Sixth Army Gp, Dated 28 Dec 44.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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



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
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





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


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Auth: CG 6th AG HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP 70 2 December 1944 Copy No: 2 December 1944 DOWNGRAD TO: SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Four. **SECRET** : CG, First French Army CG, Seventh Army 1. a. See ourrent intelligence summary, 22 hits 45 b. Twelfth and Twenty-First Army Groups, not change. 2. Sixth Army Group continues the offensive as outlined in Letter of Instructions Number Three, with modifications as indicated herein. a. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: No change. b. Between Seventh Army and First French Army: West of CLERIUS (J-9837) no change - JARMENIL (V-1446) - HRUYERES (V-2557) - ST. DIE (V-4266) - GRANDFONTAINE (V-5789) - CHERNASLACH (V-7095) - MOLSHEIM (V-2294) - PLOBSHEIM (V-9986) - OFFENALCH (V-1686) all to First French Army; effective uplow completion of the propagate indicated in paragraph 3 a below completion of the maneuver indicated in paragraph 3 a below. c. South flank: No change. 3. a. Seventh Army: (1) Capture SELESTAT (V-8063). Clear area North of SELESTAT and West of L. TILL RIVER by converging action of the 2nd French Armored Division and the 36th U.S. Infantry Division and pinch out all elements of 103rd Division and 14th Armored Division committed on this front no later than 1800 hours 3 December 1944. Notify Sixth Army Group when accomplished. (2) Pass 2nd French Armored Division and 36th U.S. Infantry
Division (with all its current attachments) to the operational control of Commanding General, First French Army
as soon as 103rd U.S. Infantry Division and elements of
14th U.S. Armored Division have been pinched out. b. First French Army: (1) Increase at once present efforts to destroy the enemy West of the RHINE by accelerating especially the advance of the North flank of the 3rd DIA and of the elements between MULHOUSE and the RHINE. (2) Assume operational control of 2nd French Armored Division and of the 36th U.S. Infantry Division (with present attachments) promptly upon completion of the maneuver indicated in 3 a above. The reafter, renew strong effort on this flank and complete the destruction of the enemy <u>x</u>. (1) When pinched out, 103rd U.S. Infantry Division and clements of 14th U.S. Armored Division will be moved North of new boundary between Armies promptly. **ETOP** SECRET




THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 5. DOWNGRADED 10: c. Twelfth Army Group is conducting operations to halt the current German offensive on its front. 2. Sixth Army Group assumes the defensive and relieves certain elements of the Twelfth Army Group westward to SAARLAUTERN, exclusive. Subject to securing assential lines of communication, Sixth Army Group will be prepared to yield ground rather than endanger the integrity of its forces. BOUNDARIES: No change in current boundary West of DOMBASLE (exclusive) - DOMBASLE (U-9803) - CHATRAU SALINS (Q-1028) - BARCHVILLE (Q-1738) - FALQUEMENT (Q-1750) - ST AVOLD (Q-2888) - CARLING (Q-2863) - BUSS (SAAR) (Q-3278) (all to Twelfth army Group) - NEUNKIRGERN (Q-5085) - LANDSTUHL (Q-8791) - HAIS ALAUTERN (R-0294) (all to Sixth Army Group). b. Between Seventh Army and First Fr nch Army: No change. TOP SECRET

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED DAVID G. BARR, Major Goneral, G.S.C., Chief of Staff. CFRICIAL: OLD FINANCE BEIGHT G.S.C., Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-3.

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TOP SECRET : 100 SECTION AGE: Auth: Odisth AG: Initials: 22 December 1944: APO 23, U. S. ARMY Copy No: 33 : 22 December 1944 SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 6. DOWNGRADED TO: BECRET b. Twenty First Army Group: No change: Date e.. Twelfth Army Group is conducting operations to halt the current German offensive on its front. 2. Sixth Army Group assumes the defensive and relieves certain elements of the Twelfth Army Group Westward to SAARLAUTERN, exclusive. Subject to securing essential lines of communication, Sixth Army Group will be prepared to yield ground rather than endanger the integrity of its forces. Sixth Army Group will continue the offensive on the South to reduce the COIMAR pocket, destroy the Germans West of the RHINE and defend that line. BOUNDARIES: a. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: No change in current boundary West of DOMEASLE (exclusive) - DOMEASLE (U-9803) - CHATEAU SALINS (Q-1025) - BARONVILLE (Q-1738) - FALQUEMONT (Q-1750) - ST AVOLD (Q-2556) - CARLING (Q*2663) - BUSS (SAAR) (Q*3276) (all to Twelfth Army Group) - NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-6083) - L'NDSTUHL (Q-8791) - KAISERLAUTERN (R-0294) (all to Sixth Army Group). b. Between Seventh Army and First French Army: No change. 3. First French Army: Launch a coordinated attack along the entire front no later than January 5, 1945, and destroy the Germans West of the RHINE. b. A main effort from the North will be directed so as to capture COIMAR, thereafter exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH bridge. A main effort from the South will be so directed as to capture CERNAY and out the road net in the GUEFWILLER area, thereafter exploiting in the direction of the PRISACH Bridge. d. All areas in which offensive operations are not being immediately conducted will be completely wired in and protected by mine fields without delay. All avenues of appreach in these areas, especially those suitable for armor will be extensively mined. In addition all roads in these areas will be covered by road blocks. Tactical wire, mine fields, road blocks and other tactical SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED obstacles (natural and artificial) will be defended by fire. Immediately upon completion of the destruction of the Germans West of the RHINE all approaches leading from West bank of the RHINE will be wired in and mined. In addition all roads leading to the West Bank of the RHINE will be protected by road blocks. These wired in localities, mine fields and road blocks will be defended by fire. f. Upon completion of the destruction of the Germans West of the RHINE, be prepared to take over immediately the STE SSBOURG area and defend the line of the RHINE as far South as the Swiss border. E. Protect South flank of Sixth Army Group and France-Italian frontier in currently assigned sector. 5. No change in current Signal Instructions. DAVID G. BARR, Major General, G.S.C., Chief of Staff.

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Auth: CG 6th AG:
Initials:
29. December 1944:
Copy No: 76 DOWNCRADED TO! SECRET SUBJECT: Amendment Number 1 to Letter of Instructions Number 7, 28 December 1944. : CG Seventh Army CG Eirst French Army 1. Letter of Instructions Number 7, this headquarters, 28 December 1944, is smended as follows: Paragraph 2, line 5 should read "slopes of the VOSGLS as for south as the area west of COLMAR from where it". OFFICIAL!

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED ADOUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP **TOP SECRET** 76 28 December 1944 DOWNGRADED TO: SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 7. SECRET : CG Seventh Army. CG First French Army BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S. OPD 1: a. See current Intelligence Summary. Date b. XXI Army Group continues to block current German thrust in the North and prepares for a counter offensive. c. Twelfth Army Group continues the defensive south of the MOSELLE, blocks the current German offensive in the north and prepares for a counter offensive from the south in conjunction with XXI Army Group. 2. Sixth Army Group continues the defensive and will be prepared to give ground rather than endanger the integrity of its forces. West of the general area of BITCHE the main position will follow the general trace of the MAGINOT Line. South of BITCHE the main position will follow the eastern slopes of the VOCCHS as far south as the area cast of COLMAR from where it will follow the general trace of the present front line to the vicinity of THANN (v-5313); thence, along the southeast slope of the VOCCHS to the area north of ELIFORT (A-3493), thence, across the MELFORT GAP to the general vicinity of DELIE (A-4579). BOUNDARIES: a. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: No change. b. Between Seventh and First French Armies: West of JARMENIL (V-1446) no change. J.HOUNIL - HRIVER'S (V-2557) - ROUGES EMIX (V-3163) - ST DIE (V-4266) - point (V-5484) - ROTHUM (V-6184) (all to First French Army) - OBERNA (V-8184) (to Seventh Army) - PLOESHEIM (V-9986) - OFFENBURG (W-1686), both to First French Army. c. South flank: No change. 3. a. Seventh Army. First intermediate position east of HITCHE: The general line; MAGINOT Line - West bank of \mathtt{RHIDE}_\bullet Second intermediate position east of HITCHE: The general line; BITCHE (Q-7750) - MIEDERBROWN (Q-9339) - BISCHWEILER (R-0919) - West Third intermediate position: The general line: NITCHE (0-7750) - INCUILIER (0-8130) - STRASSBOURG ("-0198) - Nest bank of RHINE. (2) Assemble in SARREBOURG area without delay, prepared to move on short notice, SHAEF reserves as follows: XXI Corps Hq/Hq Co and corps troops currently carmarked by SHAEF for this corps. one Infantry Division with one TD, one Tk and one AMA AW Bn attached. One Armored Division with one TD and one AAA AW BE Attached TE

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED (3) A reserve of not less than 1 RCT and 1 Armored Combat command will be held mobile in S.RCTBOURG area propaged to move on six hours notice. This reserve will only be committed on the authority of the Army croup commander. Exact location and unit designations of this reserve will be reported. (4) 30 property to receive and coordinate movement of Second preach (proved Division and US artillery units upon their relief from present mission by First French (prov. Coordinate movement with First French Arry. b. First French Army. (2) I reserve of not less than one RCT and one Armored Combet compand will be held sublike in the wististy of LUCTUIL (K-0521) prepared to now on six hours notice, this reserve will be consisted only on the authority of the Lety Group Covered r. Exact locations and unit designations of this reserve will be reported.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SECRET (3) A. interactive positions mention bearing will be in the nature of outposts. In the secretary at the will drawn of outpost traps will be ensured as as to preserve incoming the interaction the defense throughout shall be such as to insure the integrity of the command forward of the min bettle position and the integrity of the command on the main bettle negition. Principal counter attacks will be placed as follows: (a) 27-30volth-rry; against deman penetrations along the general axes; HOMMERS - M. TOY; HOMERS - MINERORRS; COLLER - HELLIC-MONT; COLM.P - FT. 118. (b) by First Franch Cray: grainst Common ponetrations along the general area; CONTN - ROOM CONT; CONTN - OF DEE; and against a common ponetration of the SCARORY & P. id secul

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED TGP SECRET TOP SECRET HEADQUARTERS SIZELLAR Y GROUP APO 23, U.S.Army 3 December 1944 SUBJECT: G-3 Report After Action Against Enemy for period 150001B September 1944 to 302400A November 1944. Reference:- Maps. FRINCE 1/250,000 Sheets: EPINAL, BESANCON
GSGS 2738
GERMANY 1/250,000 Sheets: STRASBURG, BASEL
GSGS 4346.
ITALY 1/250,000 Sheets: AOSTA, SUS., NICE,
CUIEO - LAPERL. GSGS 4230. SITU.TION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD: 1. COMMAND. b. Effective 0001B hours, 15 September 1944, pursuant to message, illied Force Headquarters FX 24992, dated 14 September 1944, the Commanding General, Sixth 14 September 1944, the Commanding General, Sixth 14 September 1944, the Commanding General, Sixth 15 September 1944, assumed command 17 army Group, with Headquarters at LYON, assumed command of all illied Ground and Service Forces in the DRIGOON area, except those units assigned to, or reserved for assignment to 30S and those units which were for assignment to 30S and those units which were then essigned to .FHQ, N.TOUS., and Headquarters then essigned to .FHQ, N.TOUS., and Headquarters Command, .FhQ. (See Operational Jemorandum Humber 1, Headquarters Sixth ..rmy Group, 15 September 1944, (.nnex 7). c. Effective same date and time, the Seventh army, consisting of VI U. S. Corps and French army "B", was relieved of responsibility for operational control and direction of French army "B", which was redesignated First French army. a. At the time Sixth .rmy droup became operational,
Seventh .rmy was continuing to exploit northward.
The 1st French merch infantry Division of II French
Corps had made contact on 12 September at CH.TILLONSUR-SLIL (H-6720) and on 14 September at (Z-0845)
Sundenst of Ch.UNON (Z-0649) with elements of the
Southeast of Ch.UNON (Z-0649) with elements of the
Southeast of Ch.UNON (Z-0649) with elements of the
Under AV Corps of the Phird .rmy. This firm contact
under AV Corps of the Phird .rmy. This firm contact
under AV Corps of the Southwest FR.NCE. The
VI U. S. Corps was noving on axis LYON - DIJON VESOUL cost of the S.ONE River. The main body of
VESOUL cost of the S.ONE River. The main body of
First French .rmy was advancing north and northcost on axis SISTERON - GRAMOBLE - B.S.NCON east on axis SISTERON - GRAMOBLE - B.S.NCON BLFORT. Sixth .rmy Group front line, 15 September
1944: 1st French .mmored Division and 1st French
Merch Infantry Division: JUSSEY (J-6720) -TOP SECRET

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(K-917) - VI'D. S. COPPS: B.UDONCOURT - BITH.INE
(K-0207) - LIEV.NS (K-0201) - /RPEN.NS (P-0496) //THES.NS (P-1397) - L'ISLE-SUR-LE-DOUBS (P-2081) SOUR.NS (P-2376); main body First French .rmy SONR.NS
- BL.MONT (.-3564). The Franco-Italian border on Sixth .rmy Group's right (East) flank was protected by the 2nd French Moroccan Infantry Division under First French .rmy control from the area .LBLRTVILLE (Z-1584) to the L'.RCHE PLSS (P-5550), and by the First .irborne Task Force under Seventh .rmy control from the L'.RCHE PLSS to the MEDITERE NELN coast at MON.CO (S-7284). II. OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER (For situation at beginning of period, see Overlays, Annex la and lb.) 15 - This headquarters issued Operational Memorandum Number 1 This headquarters issued Operational Memorandum Number 1 Headquarters Sixth Army Group, dated 15 September 1944 (Annex 7). Sixth Army Group, behind strong patrolling activity, continued to regroup to bring all French elements, which were west of the SADNE River, to the BESANCON area to consolidate the U.S. and French forces in their respective zones. This placed Seventh Army with VI Corps on the left and First French Army on the right. VI Corps occupied LUXEVIL (K-0321) and LURE (K-1307). right. V (K-1307). 18 - VI Corps occupied FOUGEROLLES (K-0429) and CORBENLY (J-9829). 20 - Regrouping completed. II French Corps completed relief of 3rd and 45th Division. 21 - VI Corps attacked KPINLL (V-0414) and RAMIRLMONT (K-1745). 23 - II French Corps occupied F..IMBE (P-2185) and CHENDLEY (K-1801).

24 - VI U. S. Corps occupied EPIN.L and RaMIRAMONT. This headquarters issued Operational memorandum No. 2, Headquarters Sixth ...rmy Group, 24 September 1944 (Annex 8).

25 - II French Corps launched an attack towards LE THILLOT (K-3129).

26 - Effective at 1200. hours, 26 September First Airborne Task Force, with all its attachments, was relieved from assignment to Seventh any and established as a separate command directly under Headquarters Sixth any Group. First airborne Task Force continued mission of protecting the right (East) flank along France-Italian border south of line allos (P-4225) - ST ETIANNI DE TINNE (N-3643) - CUNDO (N-8755). (See Annex 8). This headquarters issued Letter of Instructions Number One, Headquarters Sixth any Group, 26 September 1944 (Annex 9).

29 - Effective at 0001, hours, 29 Septembor Twelfth Army Group passed XV Corps, composed of its headquarters, 79th Infantry Division, 2nd French Armored Division, and currently assigned and attached corps supporting combat and service troops, to command of Sixth Army Group.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED Infantry Division arrived in Seventh .rmy area end was attached to XV Corps. 18 - Seventh ...rmy directed the two Corps to seize certain positions from which coordinated attack to cross the VOSGES could be launched. 19 - VI U. S. Corps cleared BRUYLRUS (V-2436).
II French Corps mopped up BOIS DL LLNS.UCH.MP (V-3432)
and H.UT BOIS (V-3429). 21 - VI U. S. Corps captured BROUVELLEURES (V-2560) and VERVEZBLES (V-2658). 22 - VI U. S. Corps cleared enemy from west of MORT.GNE River, occupied BallMONT (V-2758). 23 - VI U. S. Corps crossed MORT.GNE River, occupied MORT.GNE (V-2764) and BIFFONT.INE (V-3057). 24 - II French Corps recaptured RONDF..ING (K-3443). 25 - Seventh .ray issued directive to continue its present offensive mission: LV U. S. Corps to launch full scale offensive in its zone of action on or about 15 November; VI U. S. Corps to support this attack. VI U. S. Corps reached HOUSSER.S (V-2468). 26 - VI U. S. Corps cleared FORLT D'HITTREY, FORLT D'HOUSSER'S and Las ROUGES ELUX (V-3164). 28 - Sixth .rmy Group issued Letter of Instructions No. 2 to continue the offensive, destroy enemy in zone, advance to the Rhine, capture STR.SBOUNG, clear area west of the Rhine; D-day to be announced. ..rmies were instructed to exploit promptly any opportunity to seize a bridgehead across the Rhine or to break the Westwall without waiting for instructions. (Annex 11) 29 - XV U. S. Corps captured V.UCOURT (Q-2308).
VI U. S. Corps occupied BRU (V-2272), JELEMENIL (V-2271)
and FR.IPERTUIS (V-2470). 31 - In AV U. S. Corps zone, in limited objective attack,
2nd French .rmored Division captured 10 towns, entered
B.CC.R.T (V-2684), cut rord between B.CC.R.T and
MONTIGNY (t (V-3089), occupied Las PONLLARES (V-3056).
First French .rmy issued field order directing II French
Corps to launch, 3 November, a limited objective attack
on the axis S.POIS (K-2944) - ROCHESSON (K-3245). NOVLLBER 1 - XV U. S. Corps occupied B.CC.R.T (V-2685), BERTRICH MP (V-3081), V.CQUEVILLE (V-3287), MONTIGNY (V-3191), MIGHEVILLE (V-2993), REDONVILLE (V-2594), OCCUPILLE (V-2595), HERBEVILLE (V-2795) and FREEDNIL (V-2496). VI U. S. Corps occupied MENIL (V-2277) and ST BARBE (V-2578). In the LIPS Sector the enemy withdrew from SOSPEL (N-7500) MOLINGTE (N-7216) and C.STIGLIONE (S-7494). TO SECRET

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- 2 XV U. S. Corps occupied DOMINVIN (V-2398) and VENLY (V-3185).
 VI U. S. Corps made slight gains in direction of R.ON I.BTAPE (V-3378), ceptured Las F. IGNLS (V-3569) and NOLPHIELIZE (V-3470).
- 3 XV U. S. Corps occupied FORLT LE RELLBOIS (Q-2503) without opposition. VI U. S. Corps occupied LES B.R.QUES (V-3767). 100th Infentry Division, assigned VI U. S. Corps, closed in Seventh army area. II French Corps launched limited objective attack towards GER.RDMLR (V-3642).
- 4 VI U. S. Corps occupied ST RENY (V-3272), L. SALKE (V-3269), REHLUPLL (V-2547), and LE HLUT J.CQUES (V-3564). II French Corps occupied BOCHESSON (K-3245).
- 5 Seventh .rmy issued directive: Seventh .rmy to attack, destroy enemy in zone west of the Rhine, capture STRISBOURG; XV U. S. Corps to attack on D day, VI U. S. Corps on D + 2. (D day is 13 November). VI U. S. Corps captured Hill 616 (V-3664) and BLRVILLE (V-3570).
- 6 VI U. S. Corps captured BREHEMONT (V-3670) and L. V.CHERTE (V-3769).
- 8 This headquarters issued Operational Memorandum No 3, Headquarters Sixth army Group, dated 8 November 1944 (Annex 12), directing relief of 1st Airborne Task Force in the ALPS Sector by 44th all Brigade.
 VI U. S. Corps captured L. CHAPELLE ((V-2954), occupied LE MEMIL (V-3473) without opposition. 103rd Infantry Division, assigned to VI U. S. Corps arrived in Seventh army Zone.
- 10 VI U. S. Corps captured Lb VIVIER (V-3574) and LA FOSSE (V-3573), occupied P.J.ILLE (V-3474) and L. HOUSSIERE (V-3555) without opposition.
- 11 VI U. S. Corps cleared L. BOLLE (V-3965), occupied PL.TICOTE (V-2650).

 First French Army operation order directed I French Corps to Launch an offensive on 13 November between the SWISS Frontier and the DOUBS River and to progress on 14 November beyond the BOUBS to the GRINGE FOREST; II French Corps to maintain as much activity as possible on its front and be prepared to support the action of the I French Corps.
- 12 XV U. S. Corps completed regrouping in proparation for attack on 13 November.
- 13 This was D day. Seventh Army offensive was launched. XV U. S. Corps attacked to the east gaining one to one and half miles against increasing resistance and occupied LEDVIR.Y (Q-2603).
 VI U. S. Corps occupied AUMONIZMY (V-2852) and CHAMDRAY (V-2749).
- 14 XV U. S. Corps continued attack cepturing STE POLE
 (V-3290) and INCLRVILL. (V-3393).
 VI U. S. Corps occupied Vinvill. (V-3352), GR.NGLS (V2949) and IT THIRIVILLE (V-3354).
 I French Corps launched offensive against the BLLFORT Gap.

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- 15 XV U. S. Corps captured HALLOVILLE (V-3595) and HARBOURY (V-3797).

 I French Corps occupied ECHENANS (P-2890), BOIS DE JEANNEY (P-3677) and ROCHE-LES-BLAMONT (A-3368).
- 16 XV U. S. Corps captured B.RBLS (V-3497), NONHIGNY (V-3795) and MONTREUX (V-3793).

 VI U. S. Corps occupied THL.VILLE (V-3179) without resistance.

 I French Corps breached the outer defenses of BELFORT, resched L. LIS.HER River, captured HERICOURT (P-3295) and BUSSUREL (P-3492).
- 17 XV U. S. Corps captured AVRICOURT (Q-3105), IGNEY (Q-3104), AMANONCOURT (Q-3003), AUTREPTANEN (Q-3101), BADONVILLER (V-3789), and BRAMANVILLE (V-4092).

 VI U. S. Corps captured RAON L'ETAPE (V-3378), CHEVRY (V-3660), TAINTRUX (V-3761), LA FOSSE (V-3861) and occupied BARBLY SEROUX (V-3349).

 I French Corps captured CHAMPLY (P-2696), TRAMOINS (P-2994), MONTBELLARD (P-3688), VANDONCOURT (A-3775), HERIMONCOURT (A-3672), SELONCOURT (A-3474), MANDEURE (P-3782), VOUJEARCOURT (P-3485), BELVERNE (K-2401), COURMONT (P-2099) and DELLE (A-4479). The LISAINE River was crossed at BUSSUREL (P-3492).
- 18 XV U. S. Corps advanced rapidly, captured RICHICOURT (Q-3407), FOULCREY (Q-3504), and FREMONVILLE (Q-3700), occupied MOUSSLY (Q-3008) and BLIMONT (V-3499).

 VI U. S. Corps advanced against little or no resistence, cleared NLUFMLISON (V-3484) and CORCILUX (V-3652), reached L. PLINE River at (Y-3780) and (V-3680).

 First French Army issued directive: Army objective -- the line ROUGEMONT (V-4204) DLINELRIE (A-5392) SEPPOIS (A-5882). Beyond this line exploitation is to be made by three Groupments under direct command of DG, First French Army.

 I French Corps captured JONCHLERY (A-4481), GR NDVILLERS (A-4282), MORVILLERS (A-4083), TESCHES LES CHITEL (A-3781) ETUPES (A-3478), CHITEMOIS (A-3384), BLEVILLERS (P-3798), VIUDOIS (P-3498), LUZE (P-3198), CHIGHY (P-3099), CHENTE EBLER (K-2903), BLEMONT (A-3487), DORLINS (A-3288) and ECHENLINS (P-3398).
- 19 XV U. S. Corps advanced approximately 10 kilometers to general line L. FRIMBOLL. (V-4699) GONDREXINGE (Q-4009). VI U. S. Corps made slight advances while proparing to cross the LEURTHE River.
- 20 XV U. S. Corps continued its advance approximately 12 kilometers against strong resistance and forced the pass through the VOSGLS at D.BO (2-6306), captured SLRREBOURG (2-5015).

 VI U. S. Corps established bridgehead across the MLURTHE River, vicinity (V-3772).

 II french Corps captured GLR.RDMLR (V-3641).

 I French Corps entered BLLFORT, and reached the RHINE at HUNLIGEN (1-8888) and KLUBS (1-8398).
- 21 Seventh army issued directive to exploit east of VOSCES, expture STREABOU.G and cross the RHINE.

 XV U. S. Corps continued advance to the northeast, gained an average of 9 kilometers in the south to 18 kilometers in the north, gained the eastern exit to a pass through the VOSCES.

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VI U. S. COEPS made substituting gains on the entire front, organized mobile task forces to exploit successes. I Franch Corps entered MULHCUS. (V-7005). 44th ML Brigade completed relief of First Airborne Task Force in ALPS Sector.

- 22 XV U. S. Corps occupied S.VLRNL (0-7215), moved through S.VLRNL Cap exploiting breakthrough.

 VI U. S. Corps advanced towards S.JLLS (V-5372) and occupied portions of ST DL (V-4265) north of MLURTHE River.

 First French army issued field order organizing a "Group-nent d'exploitation" to move north in the J.S.TLN Plain towards STELEBOURG, mapping up and seizing RHINE bridges found intect on its right, blocking VOSCLS Valleys entering J.S.TLN Plain on its left.

 II French Corps completed occupation of BLLFORT reached RETOURNLEAR (V-4440) and GROALGRY (k-3614).
- 23 XV U. S. Corps continued to exploit breathrough and its armor occupied STR.SBOURG.

 VI U. S. Corps occupied S.L.L.S (V-5372) and advenced repidly costward through the Gro.

 II French Corps net strong resistance in its advence toward SCHLUCHT P.SS, seized B.LLON D'.LS.CE (V-3314).

 I French Corps captured MORSCHVILLES LE B.S (V-6404) and .SP.CH (.-6293).
- 24 XV U. S. Corps continued exploitation of breakthrough in S.VERN area.
 VI U. S. Corps continued its movement through the VOSGES.
 II French Corps contured L. FONDERLE (K-3125), outflanked LE THILLOT (K-3029), reached SEWLER (V-3712).
- 25 XV U. S. Corps armor continued reduction of forts in STRASBOURG Area.
 VI U. S. Corps made gains in MUTAIG (V-7993) region, captured FOUCHY (V-6569) and STE MARLE (V-5960).

 II French Corps occupied ST GARMATH (V-4300), LA CHAPELLE SOUS ROUGHMONT (V-4501), VETRIGHE (A-3693), and ALROUA (A-3788).

 I French Corps occupied BOUROGNE (A-3885).
- 26 This headquerters issued Letter of instructions No. 3, Headquarters Sixth Army Group, dated 26 November 1944 (Annex 13).

 XV U. S. Corps captured R.UWILLAR (Q-5323) and all remaining forts vicinity STR.SBOUNG.

 VI U. S. Corps advanced rapidly through the BROUCHE River Valley against light resistence and established contact with 2nd French Armored Division (XV U. S. Corps) vicinity NIEDERLI (V-8383); captured STEIGE (V-6373) and VILLA (V-6771).

 II French Corps captured VANTRON (V-3527), LE GROSPRE (V-3626), P.G. P.SS (V-3624) and ST L.URICE (K-3627).
- 27 Seventh .rmy issued directive: Seventh .rmy advance to the RHINL and, in conjunction with French First .rmy, destroy enemy west of the RHINL and south of STR .SBOURG; regroup, continue attack to the north astride the VOSCLS and west of the RHINL. First French .rmy issued field order to harass the enemy, outflank all lines of resistance, seek favorable occasion to make a new encircling maneuver to the north.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED FOP SELET PHORET lst DB, directly under .rmy, to advance to STR.SBOURG on two exis: MNSISHEIM - BRISACH - STL.SBOURG and CARNAY - COLMAR - SLLESTAT - STR.SBOURG. II French Corps to follow closely advance of 1st DB.
II French Corps reached edge of BUSSANG PASS (V-3721). 28 - VI U. S. Corps continued advance to Southeast to clear out enemy in COLM.R region.

II French Corps captured V.UTHILMONT (A-4798), ETEMBES (V-4800), and BELLEM.GNY (A-4999).

I French Corps crossed the RHONE-RHINE Canal, captured ELB.CH (A-5093), TR.UB.CH-LE B.S (A-5295), F.LKWILLER (A-5497), ANSCHINGAN (A-5997), SPECHB.CH LE H.UT (A-6198) and AMERICALIE (A-5799), reached outskirts of LUTTINB.CH (V-6506).

Relief of 1st Special Service Force by 44th ALL Brigade was completed. 29 - XV U. S. Corps attacking in the MERTZ MTS reached the MODER River, occupied HIMSBOURG (2-6734), ID.MSWILLER (2-6234), and BERG (2-5734).

VI U. S. Corps captured B.J. (V-7878), INDIAU (V-7676), HOWARTH (V-7271), ST PLERE BOIS (V-7072), and TH.NVILLE (V-7169).

I and II French Corps made contact on the PLATE/U OF BURNHAUPT wiping out enemy pocket North of DOLLAR River after hard fighting. 30 - XV U. S. Corps occupied WINGEN (9-7335), WINDENLU (9-7734), captured WISSLINGEN (9-6435).
II French Corps outflanked BUSSLING PLSS (V-3721) by the North. For Sixth .rmy Group situation for period ending 302400. hours November 1944 see Overlays, Annexes 6a and 6b.) - tell Males R. E. JENKINS, Brigadier General, G.S.C., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. Inclosures - 16

Annex 1 a - Overlay, period beginning 150001A Sept 44

Annex 1 b - Overlay, period beginning 150001A Sept 44

Annex 2 - Overlay, period ending 302400A Sept 44

Annex 3 - Overlay, period ending 312400A Oct 44

Annex 4 - Overlay, period ending 12400A Nov 44

Annex 5 - Overlay, period ending 152400A Nov 44

Annex 6 - Overlay, period ending 302400A Nov 44

Annex 6 b - Overlay, period ending 302400A Nov 44

Annex 6 c - Overlay, period ending 302400A Nov 44

Annex 6 c - Overlay, period ending 302400A Nov 44

Annex 7 - Ops Memo No. 1, Hq Sixth Army Group, 15 Sept 44

Annex 8 - Ops Memo No. 2, Hq Sixth Army Group, 24 Sept 44

Annex 9 - Ltr of Instr. No. 1, Hq Sixth Army Group, 26 Sept 44

Annex 10 - Amend No. 1 to Ltr of Instr. No. 1, 13 Oct 44

Annex 11 - Ltr of Instr. No. 2, Hq Sixth Army Group, 28 Oct 44

Annex 12 - Opn Memo No. 3, Hq Sixth Army Group, 28 Nov. 44

Annex 13 - Ltr of Instr. No. 3, Hq Sixth Army Group, 26 Nov. 44 700

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED The great momentum of 6th army Group's attack continued with the Germans being pursued out of Germany into Austria by the Seventh U. S. Army and the First French army. The DA ALP was in the process of withdrawing its troops west of the stop line and the ILE D'OLARON operation under DA ATL was pro-gressing very satisfactorily. II. OPE ATIONS FOR THE PERIOD: ? 1.- This headquarters published emendment "h" to Letter of Instructions Number 14 (Amnex 1). AV Corps: 3d Inf Div: The 15th Inf advanced in zone against scattered resistence reached and assembled in area vicinity of (Y9238). The 30th-Inf reached (20137). The 7th Inf sesembled vicinity (Y8248). 42d Inf Div: The 242d Inf advanced rapidly from East bank of ISAR River, captured airport at (Y9049) and reached (Y9546), (9349), (Y9152) and (Y9447). The 222d Inf established bridgehead vicinity (Y8854) and advanced approximately 30 kms to (Y9351), (Y9652) and (Y8854). The 232d Inf moved to assembly area vicinity (Y9354). 45th Inf Div: The 157th Inf began occupation and policing of MUNICH. The 179th Inf cleared resistence East of ISAR River and also began occupation of MUNICH. The 180th Inf completed mopping up snipers and occupied sector in MUNICH. 20th Armd Div: CCA moved to assembly area vicinity (Z2055). CCB remained in assembly area North of MUNICH. CCR moved to assembly area vicinity (Y9771).

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And Corps: Ath Inf Div: The 8th Inf remained in Div Reserve Blocking refers bending south from India. She lath Inf crossed the Lak River at (17730) and remained west of Lak River awaiting consistion of origin. The filst day of crossed land River vic (17730) and sorecased Div Left flak and made contact with 3d Inf Div at (17135). 3dth Inf Div: The 141st Inf advanced west opinat light redistance and reached its objective Bab Tola. (170514). The 142st Inf continued to move to as to assembly area vicinity. Col. (177701): 12th Arad Div: Col. moved from Talmond (17039), crossed. INTR River at (177730) and devenced to Homalichia. (17027) and then moved LE on Actional advanced to Homalichia. (17027) and then moved LE on Actional Massack (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) following Joh. Johnson (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) following Joh. Johnson (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing John Johnson (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing John Johnson (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing John Johnson (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing John Johnson (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing John Johnson (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing John Johnson (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing Johnson (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing Johnson (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing Johnson (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing Johnson (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing Johnson (17039) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing Johnson (17730) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing Johnson (17730) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) relicwing Johnson (17730) and bear crossing bridge at (17730) and bear crossi

VI Corps: 44th Inf Div: The 71st inf advanced Jouth From LALCOD, reduced enemy road block at (B3407) and reached (B360). The 324th inf assembled at Jalandia (D1289), and (D1291), she RAUTE (B2481). The 114th inf cleared FUNCTHACH (D1572), SANDACH (D1368), EIRER (L104) and reached (B0594). 103d inf Div: The 409th Inf advanced on and cleared ETT. Mall (D6077) and Johns In. (D6071) and renched (D6071). The 410th Inf assembled in the vicinity of Change (D500) and CBSM ANDERGAU (B5094). The 41th Inf remained in assembly area vicinity FARCHAUT (D5480). The 107th Cav Se maintained contact with Ani Corps. 101st Airborne Div: The 37th Glider Inf closed in Johnson (Y3017) area. The 30th Freht Inf remained assembled in Lahbsball (Y3017) area. The 30th Freht Inf relieved 324th Inf on the Corps right flank from LEARDI (D0192) to KERLFOI (L9305). 10th Arad Div: JCA assembled GARNISCH (D-5282). CCB assembled in the vicinity of LEARDOS (D-3671). CCR assembled in the vicinity of LARDOS (D-3671). CCR assembled in the vicinity of LARDOS (D-3671).

First French Army.

I French Corps continuing its progress cuptured ALFTACH (D0193), IMPENSTADT (D8787), SONTHOFAN (D9282), LINDAUHARD (C6291), LINDAU (C4785) and, entering AUSTRIA, crossed the BRAZERAER ACH and occupied BRAZERAE (C5180).

DA ALIS

In all sectors, the elements which had already gone beyond the prescribed line east of the Franco-Italian border were brought back westward of this line.

A D ATI

OLERON SECTOR: Lotorized elements entered ST PIERFE D'OLERON (T178115) cepital of the Island. All resistance there ceased at 18008 when German CC surrendered garrison. LA ROCHILLE SECTOR: YVES (T3819) and VOUTRON (T4022) were occupied.

2.- Seventh Army:

AV Corps: 45th inf Div: Continued occupation of MURICH.
42a Inf Div: The 242nd Inf moved to assembly areas vic
(Z-0835), (Z-0337) and (Z-0842). The 222nd Inf moved to
assembly areas (Z-0746), (Z-1547) and (Z-0650). Late in
the day 222nd and 242nd Inf's sent patrols to Inh River
with mission of securing crossings. The 232nd Inf remained
in Reserve during period and moved to assembly area vic
(Z-0050). 3d Inf Div: A 30th Inf patrol reached the INN
River and captured a bridge intact vic (Z-2927). 20th
Armd Div: CCA cleared EBERSERGER Forest (Z-1050) and moved

to assembly area at SCHMABERALGEN (2-3958). CCB moved to assembly area vic EBERSHERG (2-1551). CCR moved to an essembly area vic ANAING (2-0658). 86th Inf Div: Pessed to control of AV Corps from 12th Army Group at 1900B. 106th Cav.Gp: Advanced SE from MITTBACH (2-1960) and RETHLIN (2-1465) and reconnoitered crossings of the IRN River between MASSERBURG (2-3450) and ROSZERBURG (2-2827). Tp B, 121st Cav made initial contact and arrangements which led to surrender of 9th Hungarian Inf Div.

AAI Corps: 4th Inf Div: The 8th Inf continued mission of rear area defense vic (Y-7840), (Y-8042) and in AUGSBURG (Y-3480). The 12th Inf advanced from 8 to 17 kms and reached (Y-9318), (Y-9013) and (Y-9512). The 22nd Inf savanced up to 35 kms and occupied Div objective vic (Y-9728), (Z-0212 and (L-0818). 36th Inf Div: The 141st inf continued to advance, cleared the BIGHL (Y-7509) - BAD TOLZ Mighway and occupied BAD TOLZ (Y-3714). The 142nd Inf remained assembled vic of BENZBERG (Y-7312). The 143rd inf remained assembled at (Y-5702), (Y-5709) and (Y-4033). 12th Arma Div (CCV, 2 DB attached): CCA remained in assembly area vic HOLZKIRCHEN (Y-9025). CCB remained in assembly area vic (Y-7509) and (Y-7507). CCR in two columns advanced up to 32 kms. One column captured 2 bridges intact at (Z-0314) and (Z-0618) and advanced up INN River Valley to (Z-3111). The other column advanced along Autobahn by-passed blown bridge at (Z-0236) and reached (Z-2422). CCV moved from assembly area vic UFFING (Y-5007) and passed over ISAR River on bridge which had just been completed in and TOLZ (Y-8714). 116th Cev 3g and 99.nd Rem 3q protected the Corps left flank from (Z-0327) to (Z-1927). 2 DB (less CCV): Continued to move to Cbrps zone. 101st Cav. Gp (less 11oth Sq): 101st Cav Sq screened the advance of the 4th Inf Div to (Z-0325) and (Z-0415).

The advance of the 4th Inf Div to (2-0325) and (2-0415).

VI Corps: 103rd Inf Div: The 1st Bn 409th Inf continued to push South from SCHEMITE (D-0571) cleared SCHEMITE (D-664) and REITH (D-6201) and reached (D-628608). Alements 2nd Bn pushed Schemite from SCHEMID and reached (D-559628) and were held u by a road blook. The remainder of the Regt motorized moved to forward assembly areas in SCHEMID. The 410th Inf moved to forward assembly areas in MITTENMALD (D-6677) and PARTENMIRCHEM (D-5382). The 41th Inf (less 2nd Bh) moved to forward assembly area vic of MITTEMMALD. 2nd Bh remained on security missions. Alements of the 107th Cav Ron Schemite to push mast from SCHEMITE but found road impassable, while the remained for the Schemite for the Inf continued to engage the enemy force covering the demolition at (D-3407) while the 1st Bn flanked the position from the mast and cut the road at (D-3.9054). The land on remained in blocking position in the LETHOUS (D-3871) area. Alements 114th Inf occupied SCDEM (D-1757) and pushed hast to (D-1958). The 324th Inf remained essembled in the SERG (D-1291 STEINACE (D-1289) - Information towards ALTH (C-3554) and reached (C-9252) where a partially destroyed bridge was encountered. 101st A/B Div: The Div continued to police the Corps rear area. At 1330s the 506th Fricht Inf co menced movement to ALI Corps zone. Upon errivel in AXI Corps zone, Div was relieved of attenment to VI Corps, and conneced to AXI Corps. 10th Armd Div: The Div remained assembled in the GALLISCH (D-5752) - LE E003 (D-3871) areas.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED AD ATL LA ROCHELLE SECTOR: Operation at AICHERUTLLE started at 0630B. PIQUEFESSE (T-454270) and AICHERUTLLE-VIRSON (T-4932) were occupied. Further north outposts pushed to occupy MMAIS (T-4937), NUALLE (T-4841) and PRITT LAPIN (T-454478). 3.- This headquarters published amendment "I" to Letter of Instructions Number 14 (Annex 1). AV Corps: 3d Inf Div: The 7th Inf attached Last blong axis of autobain. Let light resistance, mostly blown bridges and craters, crossed INA River and captured bridge across MELSA TABLE at (2-6726) and reached (2-9028). The 15th Inf acompleted crossing IBL siver, followed 7th Inf and protected the Div right flank. The 36th Inf In Div reserve crossed IBM River, followed the 7th and 15th Infs and reached (2-4525). 45th Inf Div: Continued occupation of EURICH. A2d Inf Div: Fine 24fa Inf moved from assembly area vic (2-0836) to Condition. (2-2627), crossed bridge at (2-29270) and reached (2-323495), (2-362115) and (2-310390). The 22d Inf found bridges over IBM River blown vic MASCABBURG (3-3350). The 2d an forced crossing and reached (4-353495). The 1st acrossed river over blown bridge at (2-30227), and reached (2-30227), the 3d an moved from its assembly area and reached vic (2-3046). The 23d Anf: 1st be moved to assembly area vic (2-2140). The 3d an moved from its assembly area and reached vic (2-3046). The 23d Anf: 1st be moved to assembly area vic (2-2027). The 3d an remained on "1" Force duty in Hallon. Soth Inf Div: the 341st Inf closed in assembly area at 12mm (2-7066). A reinforced on assembly area at 12mm (2-706). A reinforced on assembly area at 12mm (2-706). A reinforced on assembly area at 12mm (2-356), leading clements assembly area vic 50 mascables (1-356), leading clements assembly area vic 50 mascables (1-356), leading clements assembly area vic 50 mascables (1-356), leading clements from assembly area vic 50 mascables (1-356), leading clements from assembly area vic 50 mascables (1-356), leading clements from assembly area vic 10 mm (1 (2-656), bergin preparation to follow CDs. 10th Cby Gr. He 10th Cby or remained at DCCR (2-430). And EDCR (2-430). The 11st Cby or remained at 10 moved from absolute the day and Seventh Army

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED First french Army: 1 French Corps occupied Rale ALL (C-4455) and FELEXIECH (C-4150) reaching the LICHTHASTEL, 300 to the ILLE Velley was completed up to OBELSHOLF (C-9271). AV Corps: 3d Inf Div: The 7th Inf crossed the SALLACH River vic (2-8521) against light resistance, occupied SALLACH (2-9625) and elements entered SALCACH (2-9506). The 30th Inf assembled vic HANDETH (2-8630). 42d Inf Div: The 242d Inf resumed the citeck at 0530s and by 1400s all elements were on objectives vic (2-5437), (2-5340) and (2-5242). The 222d Inf continued the attack at 0600B. At 1400s the 3d Bn reached (2-5946). By 1600s the 1st and 2d Bns reached their objectives; lat Sm (2-344) and 2d Bn (2-6449). The 232d Inf moved to new assembly area (2-4641). The Div encountered no resistance during the day. 86th Inf Div: The 341st Inf on the right advenced from ISAL (2-7066) across IRN River, ALZ River and SALLACH River. The 342d Inf, on the left advance when all elements crossed the SALLACH Rivers, helted advance when all elements crossed the SALLACH River. The 343d Inf crossed the IRM River and assembled vic RMAISG (2-4864). 45th Inf Div: Continued occupation of MAILCH and maintained security guards. 20th Armd Div: CCA advanced through River and advanced to SALLACH River and sesembled SALLACH River and advanced to SALLACH River and sesembled of period was in assembly area vic the Morth and at end of period was in assembly area vic STRASS (2-8628). At 22308, Sq began advance to MAILENN (V-0212). 4 .- Seventh Army:

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED period were attempting to accure a by-pass along a convenient in the left of Div zone and occupied all along with Inf elements of COV (a ba). The 101st lev as alvenced in the left of Div zone and occupied all along will (a-8516). The 327th Gliber Inf moved from the Divingal (a-0939) area and closed in forward assembly area at along (a-0939) area and closed in forward assembly area at along (a-0930) at 10305. The 502nd bright hat remained at Managam (a-9306) prepared for oarly movement to join the Div. 1th area Div: CCA and COS remained in assembly area vic acl. Field (Y-9728) and BICLE (Y-7509) respectively, performed usin-tenance and prepared for acvenent out of Corms-voice. The 142d Inf (36th Inf Div) relieved CCR by 21008. Sowever, during the relief, clements of the 23d Ta on continued their advance to vic (a-3498) where they are seed and defeated the enemy in a fire right. Ock closed in assembly area at (a-2013). 2d DS: CCV relieved from attachment 12th arms Div and reverted to control of parent unit at 12008. CCV operating in none of 101 th a/8 Div area divided into three task forces. Tank elements of 2.3 were held up by clown bridge vic (2-7617) but foot elements defeated the enemy which guarded the obstacle and arcaceded to vic (E-3498). TFD remained in assembly area vic banagamy. In Ca-6325). TFD continued along autobalm into Bab ECC and Left (2-8516) and relieved elements 3d Inf Div. 101st Cav Sp (less 101st Cav Sp): acverted to Corps control. Continued to perform hen and clear routes bouth of the autobalm and East of the INE River to the Abstract Border vic (Y-9913). VI Corps: 103d Inf Div: The 3d Sn 409th Inf continued its advance through the IN. River valley to MAURACH (E-0573) and ken elements and contact with elements ANI Corps vic WORG (E-2685). The remainder of the regiment remained in INMESTECK (D-7658). The lat on 41th Inf received BNEANENC (M-1026) without resistance. The leading elements of the Bn with the 103d ken ag continued South and made contact with elements of the 88th Inf Div (II Corps, fifth Army) et VIPITENO, ITALY (M-0515) at 10518. The 3d Bn followed the 1st moved South to STAFFLACH (M-0933).

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED The 410th Inf moved to INNSBRUCK (D-7658). 44th Inf Div: The 2d Bn 71st Inf remained in TELFS (D-5161) and was joined by the 3d Bn.. The 1st Bn withdrew from blocking positions vic (D-3057) and assembled in NASSEREITH (D-3461). The 1st Bn 324th Inf cleared IMST (D-2753) and elements were held up at MILS (V-4851) by enemy resistance. The remainder of the regiment moved into IMST. Elements of the 114th Inf reached TANGERZ (D-2856). The 3d Bn moved to REUTTE (D-2481). First French Army: I French Corps occupied BLUDENZ (U-8348) and MITTELBARG AD ATL: LA ROCHELLE Sector: CUGNE (T-4432), ST MEDERD D'AUNIS (T-4434), LA GUGOGNETIE (T-465355) were occupied. 5.- General Devers, Commanding General, 6th Army Group, with several officers of his headquarters, Seventh U. S. Army and AV U. S. Corps, met at HAAR, BAVARIA, to give the unconditional surrender terms to Lt. General Foertsch, Commanding General, First German Army, who had proper authority to surrender the German Army Group "G". General Foertsch signed the document surrendering unconditionally the German Army Group "G" to 6th Army Group. The surrender was effective immediately with 0612000bmay as the time which all resistance by the Germans would cease. In addition, VI U.S. Corps was receiving the unconditional nurrender of the German wineteenth Army, which was part of Army Group "G". The effective date was 051800B may. This surrender was superseded by the surrender of Army Group "G". III. Conclusion: The unconditional surrender of the CG, German Army Group "G" to 6th army Group brought an end to resistance on the fronts of the Seventh U.S. Army and the First French Army. The mission of the DA ALP had been accomplished and its elements had withdrawn west of the stop line. With the LA ROCEMLE sector completely occupied 9 May 1945 by the DA ATL, 6th Army Group's mission in the west was accomplished. Brigadier General, GDC., Assistant thief of Staff, G-3.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED and a maintain a : TOP SECRET : SECRET :Initials: 4 41518 HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP :Copy No:____: 64 APO 23, U.S. ARMY 16 April 1945 SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 14. B 774 CG Seventh Army CG First French Army PART I 1. a. See Current Intelligence Summary. b. 21st Army Group continues its operations to defeat the Germans to the c. 12th army Group will launch a powerful thrust with the Third army to join hands with Russians in the DaNUBE Valley and seize SALZBURG. $\underline{\mathbf{d}}_{\bullet}$. First TACAF cooperates with and supports 6th Army Group. Its organization for combat and tactical plan will be issued separately. 2. 6th army Group initiates strong offensive action up the valley of the NECKAR River at the earliest possible date for the purpose of destroying the German 19th army in the STUTTGART - BLACK FOREST area and preventing its escape to the Mast. Its advence on the left will conform to that of the main offensive of the 12th army Group. It will protect the South (right) flank of 12th army Group and occupy Western AUSTRIA and that part of GERMANY within its zone of action. BOUNDARIES: a. Between 12th and 6th Army Groups: Mest of OPPENHEIM (inclusive) no change - DaFMSTADT - WURZEURG - ANSBACH - FREISING - DORFEN - ROSENHEIM (all to lith army Group). This boundary becomes effective as soon as Third army can complete relief of forward elements of Seventh army Northeast of the new boundary and as soon as Seventh army can remove its installations now northeast of the new boundary. Seventh army will have unrestricted running rights on that part of the main highests ansbach - WEISZENBURG - INGOLSTADT - MULICH, within 12th army Group's zone of cetion. b. Between First French army and Seventh army: West of STUITGET (inclusive) no change - Waldenbuck (S-0305) - TUBINGEN (W-9792) - thence along MCCAS Birver to ROTTWELL (W-6752) - BLUMMENFELD (W-7212), thence due south to Swiss Border (all to Seventh army), as soon as STUITGAT is captured Seventh army sill have unrestricted running rights on the main highway through STUITGAET, running south to TUBINGEN. In order that First French army may continue its\advance to the southwest in strength this boundary will be subject to change incadietely upon defeat of the 19th German army in the BLACK FOREST area. 3. a. Seventh Army. (1) Complete regrouping rapidly and launch initial main effort on right, southwest up the Valley of the NECKAR River with a corps strong in a nor and of high mobility. Soize the communication center formed by the triangle TERINGEN - BALLINGEN - SIGMARINGEN, thereafter exploiting to the Mest, and south as far as the SMISS Border and assist First French army in destroying that portion of the German 19th army in the BLACK FOREST area. 13th abborne bivision is available for analogment in this operation in accordance with previous plans and instructions. If 13th Airborne Division is used in an airborne role prior to 23 april First allied .ii-borne Army will be given 72 hours prior notice; thereafter First allied Airborne army will be given a minimum of 48 hours prior notice. (2) Establish contact with Third army without delay and arrange for relief of elements of Seventh army by Third army Northeast of the new boundary SECRET

ALINEX I

- SECRET
 (3) Conform the advance of the left flank with the advance of Third Army and protect right (south) flank of 12th army Group. Maintain contact with CG Third army for the purpose of coordinating this action.
- (4) Isolate AUGSBURG and MUNICH and thereafter advance rapidly south blocking the exits of the BRENNER PASS leading north from the INNSERUCK area in zone of action.
 - (5) See sub-paragraph x.

b. First French army.

- (1) Continue strong action between the RHINE and the BL.CK FOREST and clear East bank of the RHINE.
- (2) Conform action in the STUTTGART area to the advance of the right of Seventh army, enveloping STUTTGART and capturing it from the west; coordinate this action with Seventh army.
- (3) Destroy elements of the German 19th army in the BLACK FOREST area, seal the SWISS Border in zone in accordance with previous instructions, complete regrouping rapidly and be prepared for further advance to the southeast in a new zone of action.
- (4) Protect right (south) flank of Seventh ... rmy and right (south) flank 6th army Group.
 - (5) See sub-paragraph x.
- X. (1) Success in destruction of the German 19th Army in the STUTTGART-BLack FOREST area before it can escape to the SCHW.BISHER JURA will depend in a large measure on:
- (a) Close timing of the savence by First French army to capture STUTTGART with the launching by Seventh army of its main effort up the Valley of the NECKAR River. A premature advance by First French army in the STUTTGART area will be prevented by the Commanding General, First French army, who will maintain close liaison with Seventh army in order to accomplish the proper timing.
- (b) The speed and weight with which the main effort up the valley of the NECKAR River is launched by Seventh army and the maintenance of close liaison between this effort and the attack of First French army to capture STUTTGART. The Commanding General Seventh army will be responsible for keeping First French army fully informed in this regard.
- (2) Seventh army will assist First French army in the capture of STUTTGART by a blocking action from the cast within its zone of action.
- (3) A new directive will issue upon completion of clearing of the BLACK FOREST area.
 - 4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.
 - . 5. No change in Current Signal Instructions.

- 1. After the distribution of Part I to limited addressees, the following messages were dispatched as modifications:
- 4. Message BX-13135 dated 20 April 1945 paraphrased as follows:
- (1) Seventh Army First French Army boundary is changed as follows: West and north of STUTTGART (inclusive) no change thence along the NECKAR River to junction with FILS River and thence along NECKAR River to ROTWELL (3-6652)(all to Seventh Army exclusive of ROTWELL) ROTWELL SIGMAFINGEN (X-1144)(both to First French
- (2) Instructions in basic letter directing Seventh army to exploit south of the boundary set forth in par. (1) SECRET the points of ROTWELL SIGMAINGEN are revoked.

E SECRET

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- E. Message BX-13260 dated 22 april 1945 paraphrased as follows:
- (1) The following temporary boundary change agreed upon between the Seventh army and the First French army is confirmed:

North of REUTLINGEN no change - from REUTLINGEN (X-0989) thence along iR to Bannafritingen (X-1062) and Sigmafingen (X-1043) (all to First French Army).

(2) The following bound ry between Seventh army and First French army will become effective on a date to be announced after the capture of STUTTGART:

West of LaUFFEN no change - from LAUFFEN along ER to ASPERG (S-0235) - RJ (Autobahn) at (R-938211 thence along autobahn to RJ at (S-0911)(all to Seventh Army) METZINGEN - DETTINGEN (X-1993) - MUNSINGEN - EHINGEN - REINSTETTEN (X-6448) (all to First French Army) - KEMPTEN - HOFFEN (D-2279) (to Seventh Army). Seventh Army will have equal running rights on all roads north of the KALSHUHE-STUTTGART autobahn inclusive and will have joint use of KALSKUHE-HELLERONN and KARLSKUHE-STUTTGART railroads. On the autobahn between the autobahn junction west of STUTTGART and BEAN-HISEN the First Franch army will have some lauring wights. HAUSEN the First French army will have equal running rights.

- (3) Paragraph 3a (1) of Letter of Instructions Number 14 assigning mission to Seventh army is cancelled.
- (4) Advancing southeast the First French army will occupy that part of GERMANY in Zone, block the passes in Western AUSTAIA between LAKE CONSTANCE and HOFEN and seal the SWISS border in accordance with previous instructions.
- (5) Armies will expedite necess ry action to establish boundary set forth in par. (2) above, and will promptly effect liaison with each other for this purpose.
- C. Message BX-13351 dated 24 April 1945 paraphrased as follows:
- (1) First French army will advence with strong mobile forces to rapidly seize BRECENZ-FELDKINCH area scaling the AUSTHIAN-SWISS border and there-fter be prepared to continue the advence to capture LANDECK (V-4144).
- (2) The Seventh army will advance rapidly with the main effort on the right, with strong mobile forces to block the passes into AUSTLA along the GEMMAN border in zone preventing the excape of the withdrawing enemy from the north, and thereafter dispatch strong mobile forces to seize the INNSHUK-BLENNE. PASS area and thereafter be prepared to assist in the capture of LANDECK by First French Army.
- (3) Armies will prepare plans for resupply by air. At 251100B april (Wednesday) Army Commanders will report to Commending General, 6th AC Hq to discuss this operation.
- D. Message BX-13610 dated 28 april 1945 paraphrased as follows:
- (1) Effective 272400 B april 1945 the following boundary is established between 12th/6th army Groups:
- (2) Beginning at a point on the FLANCO-GELMAN International Boundary at (#Q8555) to a point at (#Q866) thence along the Mostorn and Northern LANDKHISSE boundaries of BERGZABERN, LANDAU and SPEYER to a point on the RHINE River at (#A5591)(all inclusive to First French Army) thence north along the east bank of the RHINE River to (WMA640) a point on the present 6th/12th army Groups boundary thence as before.
- E. Message BX-13629 dated 28 April 1945, paraphrased as follows:
- (1) 12th/6th army Group boundary is: OPENHEIM-Dah.MSTADT-WUFZEUR-G-ANSEACH-FREISING (all to 12th army Group) EDLING-R.IEN (to 6th army Group) ST JOHANN -thence along road to KETZBUHEL BRAMBURG LIENZ (to 12th army Group). Boundary is subject to adjustment in detail between Third and Seventh armies.
- (2) armies concerned are authorized to communicate direct for boundary detailed adjustments. Final adjustment will be reported to this bandquarters. Boundary changes necessary to take adventage of the tectical situation in order that rajor objectives in southern Redoubt be seized quickly are also authorized between Seventh and Third army. This headquarters will be notified promptly of such changes.

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F. Message BX-13676 dated 28 april 1945 paraphrased as follows:

Effective at once the boundary between the Seventh Army and First French Army is modified as follows:

- (1) No change west of LAUFFEN (S-0353) from LAUFFEN thence along RR to LUDWICS-BURG (S-0633) and KCRN/ESTHEIM (S-0630) (with marshalling yerds inclusive) MULHAUSEN (S-0928) WALBLINGEN (S-1526) (all to Seventh Army) PLOCHINGEN (S-2313) (to First French Army) thence southwest along the NECKAR River to its junction with the present boundary at (S-125020) thence as before.
 - (2) The following will be for the unrestricted use of Seventh army:

autobahn from ASPERG at (S-0235) to hJ (R-9321) to stream crossing at (S-2009).

RR from KORNWESTHEIM to PLOCHINGEN and WALBLINGEN.

From junction with autobahn at S-0129 Highway No. 10 to PLOCHINGEN.

From KCKNWESTHEIM Highway No. 27 to hJ with Highway No. 10 at (S-0526).

From RJ with Highway No. 10, Highway Number 14 at (S-0824) to WALBLINGEN.

From RJ at (S-098240 Highway east of and p rallel to NECKJ River to PLOCHINGEN.

- 43) As prescribed in message EX-13260 dated 22 April, Seventh army will retain joint use of railroads and roads north of and including autobahn from STUTTGAAT to KARSHUME.
- G. Message BX-13776 dated 30 April 1945 paraphrased as follows:
- (1) The present boundary between Seventh army and First French army is extended forward of HOFEN (D-2279) is follows:


HOFEN - HOLNDACH (D-0666) - HAGENAU (C-9553) - KAPP (V-2536) - NAUDERS (V-3317) all inclusive Seventh army.

- (2) In addition to the INNSERUCK B.ENNET. PLSS area, Seventh army will capture the Landeck (V-3944) area.
- (3) When assigned objectives are soized, recommaissence forward will be made immediately and rapidly, and contact between armies on their interior flanks will be made within the hadoubt area.
- (4) The Seventh army will be prepared to move to the east with its cast Corps, and assist Third army after a pture of the INNSM UCK - EMENNEW PASS area and clearing the valley of the INN southwast of RUFSTEIN (E-3497).
- H. Message BX-13823 dated 1 May 1945 paraphresod as follows:
- (1) The coordinates of HOFEN contained in paragraph 1 of BX-13775 should re-d: HOFEN (D-1081).
- I. Message BX-13946 dated 3 May 1945 paraphrased as follows:
- (1) The 6th Army Group will capture S.LZBULG and seize the EAUCK (5-66) MADSTADT area and occupy that part of AUSTALA in its zone in addition to its previous mission. The boundary between 6th and 12th army Groups follows:


No change northwest of FAZISING (inclusive) - MURLDONF - thence clong the IAN River to its confluence with the SALZACH River (to 6th army Group) - SATASZAAL-CHEMEN (to 12th army Group) - Bad ISCH - SCHLDMING - MAUTERNEON-FVILLACH (all to 6th army Group). Boundary between armies no change.




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
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
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
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
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
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


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


THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED 30 API'L - 6 MAY, 1945. - OVERLAYSIXTH ARMY GROUP TROOP DISPOSITION
AND FRONT LINE AS OF OCCORD MAY 1945.
MAP: EUROPE 1/250,000 GS GS. 4346
SNEET:: L 48, 49. M 48, 49. N 48, 49 TOP SECRE!

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XAI U. S. Corps: Elements of the 4th Infantry Division cleared area east of TOUBER River and south of line KONICSHOF-EHOSFELD (N-5209). 8th Infantry relieved elements of CCB, 12th Armored Division south of WORZBURG (N-5835) and crossed the MAIN River vicinity ACHSENFURT (N-6820). Elements of the 12th Armored Division with 222nd Infantry attached patrolled extensively. CCR, 12th Armored Division occupied KONICSHOFFEN (N-4907).

Army Reserve: The 70th Infantry Division passed from control of Seventh Army to control of Third Army.

First French Army:

II French Corps enlarged its bridgehead with successful crossings of RMINE by 9 DIC southeast of LMINERSHEIM (R-4459) between (R-4659) and (K-4656). Contact with 2 DIM was made at LINKENHEIM (R-495). Against strong resistance 3 DIM captured DESTRIEGEN (R-7169), UBSTADT (R-6563) and BRUCHSAL (R-6360). 2 DEM occupied HOCHSTETTEN (R-5000) and KARLSDORF (R-5960).

D A ALPS: No change.

A D AFL: Artillery and patrol activities.

3.- This headquarters published Letter of Instructions Number Thirteen to CG, Seventh Army and CG, First French Army (Annex 1).


Seventh army:

XV U. S. Corps: Elements of the 3rd Infantry Division crossed the MAIN River at (N-3453), cleared PFLOCHSBACH (N-3353) and occupied RUPPERTSHUTTLM (N-2966). The 157th Infantry, 45th Infantry Division completed mopping up ASCHOF ENBUNG, taking 400 prisoners of war. The 180th Infantry met scattered opposition at BUNJOS (N-2479), PFAFTHHAUSEM (N-2475) and FLORBACH (N-2071). The 14th Armored Division crossed the LOHE River and reached NEULHDORF (N-3661), RANGUSBRUMM (N-2970) and RUPPARTSHUTTEN (N-2966). The 106th Cavalry Group captured ALSDENG (N-2665), SHIBERROTH (N-2288), BELLI GG (N-2591), MARTOSS (N-2685), MERGES (N-2483) and FLIEDEM (N-3003).

ANI U. S. Corps: 1 and 2 Bettelious, 22nd Infantry, 4th infantry Division relieved from attachment to 12th Armored Division. The Regiment continued to mop-up groups of enemy vicinity RONISSELTER (R-427) against stiff resistance. The 2th Infantry maintained bridgehead over MAIN River vicinity COSTENTURY (R-5820). OCB, 12th Armored Division passed through bridgehead and 8th Infantry followed attack to north or menopelland (R-5923). The 222nd Infantry, 42nd Infantry Division attacked to 12th Armored Division for operations in although (R-5335), dromand maintaintiver into city. The 232nd Infantry moved to assembly area vicinity (R-4840). The 242nd Infantry assembled in moons east of Dollambounk (R-4240), after closeing cashy in zone, and propered to cross Link Armored Division, established bridgehead over MAIN River into although (R-5335), commanced construction of a bridge, and prepared to cross bridge upon completion. OCB crossed Bailey bridge over MAIN River vicinity (R-721), repulsed enemy construction, and proceeded to expand the bridgehead. OCB across to vicinity of (R-7310) and (R-550). The 101st Gevelry aroup continued agreening mission or south flams, and became manyly constants.

VI c. d. Corps: the 53rd infentry old incentry bivillan

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VIU. S. Corps: The 254th Infantry (-2nd battalion) of the 63rd infantry pivision occupied RODELFALD (3-2697), BROWNECKER (S-2695), HUNGHALE (S-2991) and MERCHINGER (3-2890). The 2nd battalion remained in Halbelbard (R-6990) attached to 5th army Group T Force. The 255th Infantry occupied positions on line ROIGHEDA (R-1686), ADELSEM (R-2090). The 253rd Infantry seized a small bridgened across JAGST River and repulsed a counterattack. Scattered resistance was moppedup in BITTELBROWN (S-1483), MOCKIMIER (S-1781) area. The 398th Infantry of the 100th Infantry Division attacked across NECKAE River vicinity (S-0664) and repulsed enemy counterattack. The 397th Infantry crossed the RECKAE River in bridgened established by 398th Infantry. The 399th Infantry moved to CREMINGEN (R-9062), GROSSGANTACH (S-0161) area and reduced scattered enemy pockets. CCA of the 10th Armored Division reconnoitered vigorously along the NECKAE River. The main body remained in assembly in AIRCHHADSEN (S-0066). CCB attacked to southwest of HEILERONK (S-0861), reached points west of KLINGENBURG (S-0459), GROSS GARTACH (S-0161) and outskirts of BUCKINGEN (S-0660). CCR assembled vicinity (S-0877).

First French Army:

First French Army captured RARLSRUHE (R-4945) by a combined action of the VALLUY Groupment (9 DIC) and II Corps. 3 DIA crossed the ELSELZ River and captured EPPINGEN (R-8660), STEBBACH (R-9061) and GOCHSHEIM (R-7556) where contact with XV Corps was maintained. 2 DIM reached outskirts of HELMSHEIM (R-0655) against strong enemy artillery reaction. 5 DB captured HAGSFELD (R-5248), RHEIMSHEIM (R-4870), and RUPPUR (R-4941) 5 kilometers south of KAMLSRUHE. Elements of 9th Zoueyes crossed the RHIME at MAXIMILIANSAU (R-4149) and occupied DAX LANDEN (R-4445).

D A ALPS: In the commencement of Operation IZARD the 159th RIA occupied ST PAUL (P-5055).

5 .- Sewith Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 7th Infantry of 3rd Infantry Division crossed MAIN River vicinity (N-4161), attacked CEMUNDEN (N-4063) and cleared half the town. The 30th Infantry attacked to east against scattered resistance, occupied SCHOENAU (N-4266), WOLFMUNSTER (N-4367), GRAFENDORF (N-4371). The 15th Infantry cleared HEILICKREUZ (N-4279), DRIESTELZHAF (N-4588), MODLOS (N-4587), OER LEICHTERSBACH (N-4788), BREITENBACH (N-4889), MITCENFELD (N-4990), HECHIUHL (N-4579). The 179th Infantry of the 45th Infantry Division encountered defended road blocks and enemy groups and reached (N-4797), (H-4500). The 180th Infantry advanced to SCHMALINAU (H-4608), and (H-4003). The 157th Infantry moved to assembly area vicinity (N-3598). The 71st Infantry of the 44th Infantry Division occupied positions vicinity HAILER (M-0177) and MEERHOLZ (M-0077). The 114th Infantry relieved elements 106th Cavalry Group vicinity STEINAU (N-2291) and SALMUNSTER (N-1687). CCB of the 14th Armored Division entered GEMUNDEN (N-4063) with elements of the 3rd Division. A bridge across MAIN River at CEMUNDEN was completed. CCA entered town of GRAFENDORF (N-4371) and cleared DITFLOFSRODA (N-4474) against small arms fire. Town of BRUCKENAU (N-4692) surrendered. CCA then continued to advance, passed through ROMERSHAF (N-4893) and entered RIEDENBERG (N-5193) against light resistance. CCR assigned mission of taking HAMMELBURG

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
(R-5370) and liberating allied prisoners of war south of city, successfully crossed SLAR River vicinity SUBSELLA (L-3073) and advanced through Charlabour (R-4371), Alburlat (R-4570) to MCRLSLAU (R-4870) where blown bridge held up advance. The 106th Cavelry Group continued missions of protecting Jorga left flank. It cleared RUCKER, (R-3102), MUTTER (R-3399), VERTSTETT BACH (R-3500), BAUCHARBERG (R-470), ROTHERMANN (R-3809), SCHOLMERGY (R-3506) and passed through FLIGHESSHIL (H-4215), WISSELROD (M-4417) and DISTRIBUM (R-4616), finding towns clear. Contact was established with 2nd Cavelry Group (Third Army) vicinity LANGERSIEBER (R-4836).

AAI U. S. Corps: The 8th Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division captured MITAL (S.M (N-7329) in conjunction with 12th Armared Division, seized bridgehead across M.H. River at that point, and continued north, captured R.D.D.Ro.J.L.M. (N-6121), M.D.R.L.M. (N-6729), LINDRIBACK (N-6528) and EIDERDADT (N-6337). The 12th Infantry reached (N-5804) against heavy resistance. The 12th Infantry reached energy from woods north of DAUGACK (N-4707) and the 101st Cavalry Group (attached) continued screening mission of Division right flank. The 42nd Infantry Division continued neavy fighting in city of JURLBURGE (N-5835). The 222nd Infantry reached eastern edge of town on the south. Progress impended by many enemy snipers, and fantical resistance abetted by extensive underground dugouts. The 2nd battalion, 242nd Infantry was attached to CCA 12th Armared Division. CCA of the 12th Armared Division advanced through KINDERSACKER (N-6231), continued north and reached ROTTENDORT (N-6535). CCB operating with 8th Infantry Regiment (4th Infantry Division), cleared KITZINGEM (N-7329), REPERMORT (N-7329) and OFFICHEM (N-7819). CCB continued advance to north along GRUND River and reached (N-8017).


VI U. S. Corps: The 254th Infantry (-2nd battalion) of 63rd Infantry Division moved forward and consolidated positions on objective, with OSTAIBRUGHEN (3-2293), marchingam (3-2890) area. The 2nd battalion reverted to regimental control in OSTARBURHEN from duty with T Force. The 255th Infantry attacked across SECRACH River and seized objective along line MERCHINGEN (3-2890), OBERMESSECH (S-2786), WIDDENN (3-281), MOCHAUEL (-1881). The 253rd Infantry consolidated positions in JAGST River bridgehead, against determined resistance. The 397th Infantry of the 100th Infantry Division launched attack and forced a crossing of NECLAR River north of HEILBROWN (3-0860) where counteratteck was repulsed. Heavy enemy artillery and small arms fire encountered during and after crossing. The Regiment then turned south and entered outskirts of HaILBROWN (3-0860). The 395th Infantry consolidated positions in SCHMALDRA (4-9661), GROSSAMITACH (S-0161) area. CCA and CCR of 10th armored Bivision passed through the forward positions of the 63rd Infantry Division. CCA cleared REMERSHILLER (3-4491) after passing through ADELSHEIM (3-2090) and ASSAMSTADT (3-4193). Advance elements of CCR reached ROTH (3-5091). CCB cleared BCCRIRGEN (3-0661) and assembled in that area.

The First French Army reached the NECLAR River south of HETLERONN (5-0961). 3 DIA captured ALINGENBERG (5-0459) and NORDHEIM (5-0258). 2 DIM with two CCs of 5 DE took BAULRBACE (R-7453), JOHLINGEN (R-6148), WOSSINGEN (R-6440, GONDELSHEM (R-6851) and UNTENGROEBACH (R-054). 9 DIC advancing south of KARLSRUHE, captured FORCHEIM (R-4242), MORSCH (R-4140), ETTLINGEN (R-4938); to the northeast they captured DURLACH (R-5345).


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ACHSEMHEIM (R-9741) and reached the ENL River at BISSINGEN (S-0040). 2 DIM took KIEIN GLATTBACH (R-9040) and VARHINGEN (R-9938) on the ENL River which was crossed south of MUHLAUSEN (R-8539). The STUTTGART Radio station near MUHLACALR (R-8139) was captured. The SCHLESSER Groupment (CC4 of 5 DB and 4 RIM) captured PFORZHeim (R-7133) and in liaison with 9 DIC occupied DIETENHAUSEN (R-6035)ELLMENDINGEN (R-6234) and DIETLINGEN (R-6433). In the BADEN Plain, between the RHINE and the BLACK Forest, three violent enemy counterattacks were repulsed and the VALLUY Groupment, beginning the outflanking of the SIEGFRIED defenses between ETTLINGEN (R-4948) and the RHINE, captured REICHENBACH (R-5436), LANGENSTEINBACH (R-5635), SPIELBERG (R-5433) and SPESSART (R-5135).

9 .- Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 7th Infantry of the 3rd Infantry Division (CCB, 14th Armored Division attached) secured objectives (N-7882), (N-8844) and (N-8085). The 30th Infantry cleared RAIMUNGAN (N-7677), MASSBACH (N-8179), VOLKARSHAUSHN (N-8377) and WIEPOLTSHAUSHN (N-8171). The 14th Armored Division (less CCB): The 68th AlB relieved elements 106th Cavelry Group and contacted 11th Armored Division (XII Corps).


XXI U. S. Corps: The 222nd Infantry of the 42nd Infantry Division (CCA, 12th armored Division attached) cleared 12 towns while elements maintained bridgehead over MAIN River at ESCHERENDORS (N-7543), and assisted in the reduction of ETTLEBEN (N-7156). The 232nd Infantry reached (N-8666), (N-9067), and (N-8964). The 242nd Infantry advanced to (N-7456) and (N-859). CCA moved south, crossed MAIN River at ESCHEREDORG had elements in HEIDENFELD (N-7755), ZEILTTZHEIM (N-8247) and woods vicinity (N-8249).


VI U. S. Corps: The 254th Infantry of the 63rd Infantry Division occupied INCLLINGS (5-3979) and WhildIngsFalden (5-4582). The 255th Infantry occupied BILSCHELHOF (3-3379) and MEISJBACH (5-3579). The 253rd Infantry made good progress in clearing the HANDTHAUSER WALD and positions on the high ground north of the KOCHER River from STEIN (5-1374) to BUCHOF (5-2476) were occupied. The 393th Infantry (-3rd battalion) of the 100th Infantry Division was heavily engaged in JASTFELD (5-0671) during the period. The attacks of the 2rd and 3rd battalions, 397th Infantry in the bridgehead north of HAILBROWN (5-0862) and the 1st battalion, 397th Infantry in HEILBROWN (5-0862) and the 1st battalion, 397th Infantry in HEILBROWN (5-0862) and the 1st battalion, 399th Infantry cleared part of the city to the line (5-068600) - (5-07596) (5-079602). The 10th Armored Division with the 324th Infantry attached, cleared HONTSTEIN (5-5671) and reached BUTTELBROWN (5-4780). Elements reached (5-505705) where scattered resistance was encountered. COB secured the MSR from BLAUFELDEN (5-6279) to CRAILBREEN, clearing enemy groups and blocks which were intermittently cutting the road. and blocks which were intermittently cutting the road. Elements of CCB maintained contact with the 4th Infantry Division. The 324th RCT of the 44th Infantry Division attacked southeast astride the RCTh (5-5091) - DRAILSHAIM road and cleared pockets of enemy.


THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED Forest, southeest of ETTLINGEN (K-4938) and captured WEILER (K-593) OTTEMPRATISM (K-5931), GRAFFINIAUSEN (K-6231), SCHAAMM (K-6028), PRAFENROTH (K-5329) and ITTEMBERCH (K-5730). The bridgehead south of MULHAUSEN (K-8539) was enlarged by capturing PINACHE (K-8234) and MURICE (K-3935). D A RLPS: 1 DET occupied PORT DU ROI (H-7017), CAPELLY (H-7217) (H-4835), (H-4340), (H-4636), (H-7217), (H-7417), AUGULE (H-6026), CIRISGIA (H-6326) and PIACU (H-6324): Alpine Troops occupied LANSLEBOURG (H-4257) and LANSLEVILLERD (H-4558).

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED at in the branch down the free First French Army: Advancing 8 kilometers, the VALLUY Groupment captured the communication center of HERRAMALE (A-5222) MOSSBROIM (R-4826) and BERNEAGH (R-5025) as well as the heights commanding the northern portion of the MURG Valley. while supporting and covering this advance, II French Corps gained a foothold on the DOBEL Plateau and took the MEUKNBURG Bridge (R-6328) intact. Further east II Corps enlarged and strengthened its bridge hand south of the 282 Piper. D A ALPS: Operation CANARD launched and 1 DAI units occupied CLEE DU DIABLE (N-7317), CLEE DE LA VALETTE (N-6919), CLEE DE RAUS (N-7214), (N-7311), MONT GIAGIABERIA (N-7509) and MANGIABO (N-7504). 27th alpine Division took southwest crest of BELLEFACE (U-4301). XV U. S. Corps: The 179th Infantry of the 45th Infantry Division reached MASSEMBRUMN (0-1168) and occupied KONIGSBERG (0-0268). The 180th Infantry reached MURSEACH (0-2367) and RATTELSDORF (0-2562) and cleared GERACH (0-1963), RECKENDORF (0-2162) and BANACH (0-2358). The 30th Infantry of the 3rd Infantry Division put five commanies across the MAIN River in the vicinity of (N-9061). The 7th Infantry cleared HOLZHAUSEN (N-9768), UNCHENHOFEN (N-9667), HELLINGEN (0-0169) and ROMERSHOFEN (0-9867). The 3rd battalion of the 15th Infantry cleared GADHEIM (N-8661). 106th Cavelry Group elements advanced to positions west of UNITER LEITERBACH (0-3064) and OBERBRUNN (0-2967), cleared half of LICHTENFELS (0-3777) and advanced to UNNDERSDORF (0-3274) and NEDENSDORF (0-3173). XXI U. S. Corps: The 42nd Infantry Division (CCA, 12th Armored Division attached) cleared two-thirds of SCHWEINFURT. CCA advanced to the MAIN River at WEYER (N-8561) but due to intense artillery fire was unable to maintain the position. The 8th Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division (324th RCT attached) moved without opposition across country to positions on new Corps objective line (N-7620), (N-7821), (N-8023). The 12th Infantry advanced 5 kilometers to (N-6103), (N-6301), (N-6507). The 22nd Infantry advanced in conjunction with the 12th Infantry to positions at (S-5995), (S-6196), and (S-6199). The 324th RCT occupied the town of NIEDERSTETTEN (S-5891). CCB of the 12th Armored Division captured MARKT BIBART (N-9420) and CCR advanced 10 kilometers and reached (S-7998), (N-8203). VI U. S. Corps: The 255th Infantry of the 63rd Infantry Division expanded the WEISBACH (S-3479) bridgehead to the southwest while elements crossed the river and advanced southeast to S-363773. The 254th Infantry maintained pressure on the North bank of the KOCHER River while the 1st battalion made a new crossing in the vicinity of (S-393795) and advanced to (S-392785). The 253rd Infantry maintained its positions on the north bank of the KOCHER River from the vicinity of (S-1274) to (S-2476). The 100th Infantry Division cleared additional areas of HEILEKONN and also cleared JAGSTFELD (S-0671). The withdrawal of the 10th Armored Division from the CRAILSHEIM (S-7062) area took place. The Division assembled in the vicinity of WELDINGSFELDEN (S-4582). Elements of CCA commenced movement across the 63rd Infantry







Infantry captured BLAUFELDEN (\$5-6280), SCHMALFELDEN (\$5-6683), and SPECKHEIM (\$5-6685). CCB of the 12th Armored Division (116th Cavalry Squadron, 101st Cavalry Group attached), reached the ALSCH River, seized two bridges intact and crossed at DIETERSHEIM (\$0-0210). CCR advanced to BERGEL (\$5-9096) and MESTHEIM (\$0-9399). CCA moved to assembly area in the vicinity of OBERLAIMBACH (\$N-9920). The 116th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron advanced maintaining contact between the two Combat Commands and secured crossings of the ALSCH River in the vicinity of LENKERSHEIM (\$N-9704) and OBERNDORF (\$N-9805).

VI U. S. Corps: The 253rd Infantry of the 63rd infantry Division maintained positions along BRETTACH River from NEUNSTADT (S-1672) to SCHWOLLBRONN (S-2569), relieved elements of the 10th Armored Division in the vicinity of OBERCHRN (S-3065) and occupied OHRINGEN (S-2868) to relieve elements of 255th Infantry. The 254th Infantry consolidated positions on Division objective in the vicinity of FRESSBACH (S-4371). The 397th Infantry of the 100th Infantry Division repulsed enemy counterattack in vicinity of OBER HEINRIET (S-1656), cleared the town and entered DONNBRONN (S-1157). The 398th Infantry relieved elements of the 10th Armored Division in the vicinity of SCHWABBACH (S-2166), attacked LOWENSTEIN (S-2056), and cleared AFFALTRACH (S-2060) and reached ESCHENAU (S-2161). The 399th Infantry captured TALHEIM (S-0654), and forward elements pushed south to (S-0553), (S-0754), (S-0954), (S-1055). CCA of the 10th Armored Division relieved by 100th and 63rd Infantry Divisions in the SCHWABBACH (S-2166) - OBER OHRN (S-3066) area. VI U. S. Corps: The 253rd Infantry of the 63rd infantry

First French Army:

The VALLUY Groupment advanced 10 kilometers in the BADEN Plain capturing BUHL (R-2911), OTTERSWEIER (R-2708), WAGSHURST (R-1902), LINX (R-1202) and RENCHEN (W-2098). In the BLACK Forest, FORBACH (R-4608) and ST. ANTON (R-4806) were captured and Hill 888 was reached 2 kilometers northwest of BESENFELD (R-5000). II Corps captured ENZKLOSTERLE (R-5408), the important communication centers of WILDBAD (R-6117) and CALMBACH (R-6220) and reached IGELSLOCH (R-6817).

A D ATL: Operation VENERABLE commenced to secure the high ridge in the sector as a departure line for the main attack. In the ROYAN sector, MUSSON (Y-447746), BEAUREGARD (Y-455594), BELAIRE (Y-447687) and MESCHERS (Y-433674) were taken and the entire ridge line held. In the POINTE DE GRAVE sector the advance in the western section along the coast was normal.

D A ALPS: 1 DMI took SESPOUL PEAK (N-4838) with the front line in this sector GLASTAN (N-462362), (N-465377), LA GUERCIA (N-4737), PRALS (N-4839), DEL LANSPER PEAK (N-4938), SESPOUL PEAK (N-4838) Hill 1507 (N-4937), and CIALLANC PEAK (N-484354), (N-755064), LA GONELLA (N-7505).

15 .- Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 30th Infantry of the 3rd Infantry Division cleared GROSS DECHSENDORF (0-3119), KOSBACH (0-3116), ALT ERLANGEN (0-3416), HEMHOFFEN (0-3025), HEFFSTADT (0-2826), ROTTENBACH (0-3024), MOHRENDORF (0-3521), and KLEIN SEEBACH (0-3622). It crossed REGNITZ River and reached BAIERSDORF (0-3722). The 15th Infantry captured ROTHENSAND (0-3136), KLEIN BUCHFELD (0-3136), GROSS BUCHFELD (0-3236), HALLERNDORF (0-3334), HEROLDSBACH (0-3526), POPPENDORF (0-3326), PAUTZFELD (0-3734), BURK (0-3830), and BUCKENHOFEN (0-3831). The 179th Infantry of the 45th Infantry Division reached FORTH

(0-5216), (0-5418) and (0-5515). The 157th Infantry forced crossing of RECRITY River, captured bridge intact, and pushed to southeast to reach LAUF (0-5607), UNTERSDORF (0-5713), (0-5909). CCA of the 14th Armored Division, chared GOSSMEIN-STEIN (0-5936). Recommaissance elements cleared Undersorable (0-1993), - COBURG (0-3090) road. The 106th Cavalry Group cleared several villages, including S.IDMAR (0-4928), GUTTENBERG (0-5222), KIRCHEE-ROTTENBEACH (0-5414) and KASBERG (0-5124).

XXI U. S. Corps: The 324th Infantry (attached), 4th Infantry Division cleared LINDLEIM (3-6482), EM ERTSBUHL (3-6579), SCHMALFELDEN (3-6683). The 12th and 22nd Infantry Regiments cleared SPIKIRAGA (3-6990) and reached (3-7593) and (3-8196). The 8th Infantry mopped up in rear of CCR 12th Armored Division and reached BUNGBLENHEIM (3-8797). The 42nd Infantry Divisions 232nd and 222nd Infantry Regiments moved southeast and closed on the general line of ALSCH River. The 242nd Infantry Closed in assembly area vicinity SUGMNIEUM (N-9515). The 12th Armored Divisions CCB moved 12 kilometers, passed through and cleared 30 towns, reached (0-0304), while CCR gained 3 kilometers and cleared WESTHERM (3-9398).

VI U. S. Corps: The 63rd Infantry Division's 254th Infantry seized GOGGENBACH (3-4569), DOTTINGEN (S-4870), and pushed south to STEINKIRCHEN (S-4872), NESSELBACH (S-5371). The 255th Infantry cleared woods and high ground southeast of ESCHELBACH (S-3567) and reached WESTERNACH (S-4268). The 253rd Infantry captured MICHELBACH (S-3265), STREITHOF (S-3766), and contacted elements of 100th Infantry Division in OBER OHM (S-3166). The 100th Infantry Divisions 397th Infantry captured high ground in the vicinity of (S-1954) and continued attack on LOWENSTEIN (S-1956) and occupied UNITER CRUPPENBACH (S-1255). The 399th Infantry captured TAIHEIM (S-0655), FLEIN (S-0756) and reached (S-0653) and (S-0954). The relief of the 10th Armored Divisions as completed by elements of the 63rd and 100th Divisions.

First French Army:

The VALLUY Groupment after crossing the KIWZIG River north of KEHL and at GRIESHEIM (W-1490), captured KEHL (W-0697) in conjunction with 14 DI (I Corps) elements which had crossed the RHINE at STRASBOURG. In the BADEN Plain the Groupment captured OFFENBURG (W-1685) and reached kURZELL (.-0676) thus advencing nearly 30 kilometers in the course of the day. On its left, the Groupment captured all the villages lying on the western edge of the BIACK Forest between BUHL (R-2911) and STADELHOFFEN (W-2295). Within the BIACK Forest, SAND (W-1494) was reached. II Corps captured ESSENFELD (R-5000) and reached IGELSBERG (W-5294). On its left, pushing towards NAGOLD, SIMMERFELD (R-5802), BREITMARESG (R-6608), WURZEACH (R-6614) and GRUMBACH (R-6926) were taken.

D A ALPS: I DIM drove enemy out of EREIL (N-8004), LA MADONE de GRACE (N-7804), (N-7803), (N-7806), (N-7706), (N-7810), (N-7915).

A D ATL: After having taken a series of fortified works at BELMONT (Y-404746), FORT DE SUBAC (Y-403697) and DIDONNE (Y-408726) our troops reached ROYAN and POINTE DE SUSAC (Y-403697) which were completely occupied by the end of the day. In the POINTE DE GRAVE sector, the interior of the enemy's outpost position was penetrated.

16.- This headquarters published Letter of Instructions Number Fourteen to CG, Seventh Army and CG, First French Army (Annex 2).

Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 30th Infantry of the 3rd Infantry Division crossed REGNITZ River and reached (0-3617) and (0-3917). The 15th Infantry crossed REGNITZ River and cleared HEROLDSBERG (0-4709). The 7th Infantry attacked TENNENLOEF (0-3710) after crossing REGNITZ River. The 179th Infantry of the 45th Infantry Division reached the outskirts of NURNBERG (0-4200) vicinity (0-4625), (0-4805), and (0-4603). The 180th Infantry occupied positions vicinity (0-5300), east edge of FISCHBACH (0-5097), (0-5402) and cleared large portions of barracks area southeast of NURNBERG. The 157th Infantry continued advence to (0-5094), (0-4994), (0-4692), (0-5796), MOOSBACH (0-5594), and (0-5595). The 14th Armored Division: CCA reached RIEGELSTEIN (0-6621), MICHELFELD (0-7730), AUERBACH (0-8020) and cleared SCHOSSBERG (0-6216), KREUBUHL (0-6216), BONDORF (0-6215) and POTTENSTEIN (0-6437). The 106th Cavelry Group captured SCHONBERG (0-5905), BEINBURG (0-5900), WELLITZLEIT EN (0-6295), LUDERSHEIM (T-6094), PENZENHOFFEN (T-5993), PATTENHOFEN (T-5990), OCHENBRUCK (T-5590) and UNTRIEDEN (T-6595).

XXI U. S. Corps: The 324th Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division cleared towns of EHRINGSHAUSEN (S-6980), WIESERBACH (S-6780), SUAIBACH (S-6580) and ELLERTSBUHL (S-6579). The 22nd Infantry advanced 5 kilometers from woods west of ROTHENBURG (S-7789). The 8th Infantry reached (S-4595), (S-8495) and (S-9294). The 222nd and 232nd Infantry Regiments of the 42nd Infantry Division occupied NEUSTADT (O-0712), IPSHEIM (N-9806), RIMBACH (O-0606) and HERZOGENAURACH (O-2712). CCA and CCB of the 12th Armored Division were delayed by blown bridge and obstacles, but succeeded in advancing to ZENN River (O-2103), (O-1609), OBREICHEN BACH (T-1997) and MELERSBERY (O-1600).

VI U. S. Corps: The 255th Infantry of the 63rd Infantry Division seized WALDENBURG (S-3967), closely followed CCB 10th Armored Division and reached KUPPER (S-4366). The 397th Infantry, 100th Infantry Division cleared LOWENSTEIN (S-1950). The 398th Infantry following CCA, 10th Armored Division, pushed south as far as GLEICHEN (S-3061). The 399th Infantry occupied WUSTENHAUSEN (S-1254). CCA and CCB of the 10th Armored Division passed through 63rd and 100th Infantry Divisions and advanced southward. CCB reached the northern outskirts of SULZ (S-4461), WITTIGHAUSEN (S-4463) UBRIGSHAUSEN (S-4465) and CCA was temporarily held up by enemy road blocks in the vicinity of GLEICHEN (S-3061) and HEUFHOLZ (S-3263).

First French Army:

In the BADEN Plain, the VALLUY Groupment clearing the right bank of the RHINE as far as the outskirts of LAHR (w-1071) captured 20 villages. II Corps took CALW (R-7413) and outflanked a bridgeheed on the NAGOLD River at LIRBENZEIL (R-7420).

D A ALPS: I IMI captured CIME DE COSS (N-797130) and COLLA ROSSA (N-780168).

A D ATL: The northern belt of the ROYAN Sector was occupied by noon and mopping up of central portion had begun. ETAULES (Y-325872), CHAILLEVETTE (Y-358869), LA TREMBLADE (Y-295915), RONCE LES BAINS (Y-285950), ST AUGUSTIN LES MOTHES (Y-288858) were reached. In the POINTE DE GRAYON (Y-324554), MONTAVILET (Y-361535), HOPITAL (Y-318519), GRAYON (Y-324554), MONTAVILET (Y-264480) and TALAIS (Y-344583) were reached.



17 .- Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 3rd Infantry Division reached (0-4403), (0-4104), and (0-4103). All regiments of the 45th Infantry Division were heavily engaged in NURNBERG (0-4200). 71st Infantry Division of the Third Army commenced relief of the 14th Armored Division in positions and Division began moving to new area in the vicinity of BERG (T-6988) - ALTDORF (T-6293) as relieved. CP₈ CCⁿ was attacked by enemy infantry and SP guns at 0840B, but attack was repulsed by 1030B. The 106th Cavalry Group cleared the enemy from WEINHOF (T-6093), CRUNSBERG (T-6092), PRACHEMPELD (T-6292), SCHMANZACH (T-6492), ALTCORF (T-6293), and REDNITZHEMBACH (T-4583).

XXI U. S. Corps: The 8th Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division entered AUSBACH (T-0681). The 12th Infantry cleared ROTHENBURG (S-7789) and advanced 3 kilometers south of town. The 22nd Infantry reached (S-7284), (S-7386) and (S-7488). The 324th Infantry reached BRETTHEIM (S-7178). The 222nd Infantry of the 42nd Infantry Division cleared OBERNICHELBACH (0-2908) and reached (0-2603). The 232nd Infantry captured DEBERNICORF (T-2297), ZAUTENDORF (T-2398) and CADOLZBURG (0-2600). The 242nd Infantry occupied PIKKACH (0-2108) and HAGENEUCHAH (0-1908), and leading elements were 4 kilometers west of FURTH (0-3601) and on the REGNITZ River vicinity (0-3501). CCB of the 12th Armored Division gained over 15 kilometers to southeast and reached (T-2092) and (T-2493). CCA followed CCB and reached (T-2399) and (0-1001). CCR entered WEIHENZELL (T-1088) and BRICKENFELS (T-0289).

VI U. S. Corps: The 63rd Infantry Divisions reconnaissance troop and the 117th cavalry reconnaissance squadron seized BELMBACH (3-6273). The 254th Infantry followed CCB, 10th Armored Division and entered SCHWABISCHHALL (3-4559) and reached the line (3-5868), (3-5267), (3-4961) with patrols to east back of KOCHAR River. The 255th Infantry assisted in clearing SCHWABISCH HALL, reached (3-4260), (3-4159) and established a bridgehead across the KOCHAR River in the vicinity of (3-4363). The 253rd Infantry (less 2nd battalion) occupied positions at (3-3065), (3-3463), (3-3762) and (3-3861). The 398th Infantry of the 100th Infantry Division captured NEUHUYTEN (S-2757), and reached BUBENORBIS (3-3577), ZIEGELBROWN (S-3456) in conjunction with CCA, 10th Armored Division. The 397th Infantry cleared SCHMELLENHOF (3-2455), WUSTENROT (3-2554) and pushed out to (3-2553) and (3-2954). CCA and CCB of the 10th Armored Division advancing in multiple columns reached towns of HUTTEN (3-3653), NEUKIRCHEN (3-3759), MAITHARDT (3-3254), MICHALFELD (3-4167), BIBERSFELD (3-4255) and SCHWABISCH HALL (3-4559). CCP passed through CCB late in the day and leading elements were at (S-4459) by derk. The 63rd Infantry Divisions reconnaissance

First French Army:

The VALLUY Groupment passed under command of I Corps. I Corps continued clearance of the right bank of the RHINE, taking OBERKINCH (W-2692), ELBERSWEIER (W-1683), OHLSBACH (W-2083), OBERWEIER (W-1275) and LANGENWINKEL (W-0572). In the BLACK Forest it continued to advance along the heights between ACHERN (R-2804) and the Unper MUEG between ACHARN (R-2504) and the Upper MURG.

II Corps: Advancing more than 10 kilometers, captured several localities including the two important communication centers of FREUDENSTADT ("-5085) and NAGOLD ("-7395). South of PFONAMEIM (k-7032), following a pincer movement by 1 GTM and 3 RTA (3 DIA) 2,000 Germans were encircled in the HAGENSCHIESS forest and were being reduced. In the course of this operation TIEFENHRONN (k-7828), "UHM (k-7329) and "UHABEAG (k-7931) were taken.

1 DAT occupied PIENA Station (N-7901), (800015), MT. AURION (N-8011) and north-slope to peak of PEZURBE (N-8211), Hill 1471 (N-8113).

A D ATL: ROYAN Sector: Troops reached ARVERT POINT (Y-225945)
PASSE BLANCHE (Y-228892) and encircled the LA COUERE REDOUBT.
The last of the resistence in the ROYAN REDOUBT was cleered up and admirel MICHAHELLES, Commending the ROYAN Pocket was taken prisoner. In view of the surrender of the garrison an armistice was begun at 1900B. POINTE DE GRAVE Sector: After crossing the antitank ditch at many points our troops reached TERRIER REDON (Y-303617) and the southern edges of SOULAC (Y-300630).

18 .- Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 3rd Infentry Division advanced into NURNBERG (0-4200) from the north against heavy resistance and all regiments engaged in house-to-house fighting in North portion of city. With the 45th Infentry Division, fighting in the city of NURNBERG continued.

XXI Corps: The 222nd Infantry of the 42nd Infantry Division cleared 6 blocks of FURTH (0-3601) against stiff resistance. The 232nd Infantry captured WACHENDORF (0-2800), BRONNAMBERG (T-3098), LEICHENDORF (T-3197) and AMMERNDORF (T-2695). The 242nd Infantry cleared woods in the vicinity of (0-3200) and reached REGNITZ River. 12th Armored Division attacked ANSBACH (T-0581), cleared ANSBACH in conjunction with elements of 4th Infantry Division.

VI U. S. Corps: The 253rd Infantry of the 63rd Infantry Division, continued to mop up by-passed enemy pockets behind the 10th Armored Division. The 254th Infantry cleared enemy snipers from SCHWABISCH HALL (S-4659), continued to attack southeast and leading elements reached (S-5263). The 255th Infantry captured WECKRIEDEN (S-4760) and assembled forces in area (S-4557) - (S-5674). The 397th Infantry of the 100th Infantry Division seized OBERFISCHBACH (S-2951), ENULAURENN (S-2452) and high ground north of PREVORST (S-2151). The 398th Infantry cleared GRAB (S-3450), OBER ROT (S-4148) and advanced behind armor of CGA 10th Armored Division. The 399th Infantry occupied HELFENBERG (S-1552), OSHLBACH (S-1551) and advanced to high ground northeast of BEILSTEIN (S-1550). The 44th Infantry Division (-324th Infantry) closed in new assembly area in the vicinity of (S-5080) and commenced movement to forward positions in zone of 63rd Infantry Division, prepared to attack to south. CCA of 10th Armored Division, with elements of 100th Infantry Division, Ceared WOLFENBRUCK (S-3747), OBER ROT (S-4148), HAUSEN (S-4246), GRAB (S-3450) and (S-4244). CCB cleared enemy snipers from SCHMABISCH HALL (S-4659) and passed through CCR and seized SEEHOLZLE (S-4250), ERLENHOF (S-4547), FICHTENBERG (S-4444) and reached (S-4440). CCR cleared WESTHEIM (S-4654), OTTENDORF (S-4749) and (S-4348).

First French Army:

I Corps captured LAHR (W-1071) in the BADEN Plain and GENGENBACH (W-2178) in the KINZIG Valley. In the BLACK Forest, OPPENAU (W-3286) and OBERTAL (W-4193) were reached. II Corps captured some 20 localities and were covering the NECKAR River from HORB (W-7183) where bridge was taken intact, to ROTTENBURG (W-8987). South of PFORZHEIM our bridgehead was enlarged by the capture of WIMSHEIM (R-8028) and SERRES (R-8433).

D A ALPS: 1 DMI captured COLIA BASSA Peak (N-8009) for the third time after twice product having withdrawn under

counterattack, and advanced to (N-3109) and (N-3006).

AD ATL: ROYAN Sector: at 0700B the 700 men of the last resisting pocket surrendered. With this copitulation the operations of the ROYAN Pocket came to an end. POINTE DE GRAVE Sector: AMELIE (Y-274597) and SOULAC LES BATHS (Y-300630) were occupied.

19 .- Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 3rd Infantry Division and 45th Infantry Division continued heavy fighting in NUMBERG (0-4200). The 42nd Infantry Division was attached to AV Corps from XXI Corps. The 222nd Infantry and 242nd Infantry captured FURTH (T-3001), and advanced to west outskirts of NUMBERG. CCA of the 14th Armored Division entered NEWERKT (T-7082). CCB cleared PATTENNOFFER (T-5990). CCR relieved 106th Cavalry Group in area KORNBERG (T-4489), REGNITZHEIMBACH (T-4383) and SCHWAND (T-4683).

XXI U. S. Corps: The 63rd Infantry Division was attached to XXI Corps from VI Corps. The 44th Infantry Division (VI Corps) passed through 63rd Infantry Division positions at which time control of zone passed to 44th Infantry Division. The 63rd Infantry Division then commenced shifting troops to east to conform to new boundaries. The 25th Infantry reached (S-4856), (S-5058), (S-5060) and (S-5560). The 254th Infantry cleared OTERBACH (S-5360), UNT SCHEFFACH (S-5362), REASBARG (S-5463), STEINBACHLE (S-5763), and ILSHOFEN (S-5965). The 253rd Infantry attacked toward KIRCHBERG (S-6369). Reconnaissance elements advanced south to (S-5473), (S-5970), and (S-6077). The 4th Infantry Division regrouped forces to conform to new boundaries and resumed advance south in zone. The 32th Infantry was relieved from attachment to 4th Infantry Division. The 22nd Infantry cleared SCHAMBACH (S-6973), ROSSBURG (S-7173), entered SCHANBRORM (S-7372) and GALIROTH (S-7472). The 12th Infantry reached WETRINGEN (S-7676), (S-7673), (S-7874), ARZBACH (S-7974), WILDENHOLZ (S-7980), BOTTENWELLER (S-8172). The 8th Infantry pushed south and southwest against little opposition to DOMBULH (S-8676), BADMHOFEN (S-8874) and DORFGUTINGEN (S-8671). The 12th Armored Division continued to attack south, southwest and east on Corps left flank.

VI U. S. Corps: The 103rd Infantry Division commenced assembling in the vicinity of PFEDELBACH (S-2868) and attached to VI Corps. The 399th Infantry of the 100th Infantry Division occupied SOHLBACH (S-1551) and BELLSTBIN (S-1550). The 397th Infantry captured SULZBACH (S-2946), BERNHALDEN (S-2548), seized a bridge over the MURR River in the vicinity of MURRHARDT (S-3544) and attacked to the west. The 398th Infantry crossed MURR River at MURRHARDT and reached WHSTERMAUM: (S-3541). The 44th Infantry Division, 71st Regiment reached BRECH (S-4328), (S-3930) and (S-4130). The 114th Infantry captured HACKLING (S-4539), GAILDORF (S-4846) and leading elements were at woods in the vicinity of (S-4844). CCA of the 10th Armored Division captured two bridges intact, one across the REMS River in the vicinity of LORCH (S-4323), another across FILS River in the vicinity of FAURNDAU (S-3313). CCB advance elements reached (S-4920), (S-4924) and (S-4726).

First French Army:

I Corps continuing its attack against the rear of the RHINE SIEGF IED Line, captured MAHLBERG (W-0565), KIPPENHEIM (W-0766) and SEELBACI (W-1567). II Corps, after crossing the

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SULZ River, captured SULE (R-7703) and reached the road OBERDOFROFTENBERG. East of the NAGOLD River, it captured TUBINGEN (**-9792) and crossing the NECKAR River established a bridgehead including GOMARINGEN (**-0184) and REUTLINGEN (**-1089). 3 DIA pushing towards BOBLINGEN (R-9310) reached the outskirts of MULHAUSEN (R-3024) and PEROUSE (R-8625).

D A ALPS: 1 DMT occupied the PAS DE BARBACANE (N-4240).

A D ATL: POINTE DE GRAVE Sector: Troops occupied GRANDES MAISCHS (Y-340561), VERDON SUR MER (Y-344563), GRANDE SARRETIERE (Y-350563), LES LOGIS (Y-342670), LE PONT (Y-344674) and VERRIER ST NICOLAS.

20.- This headquarters published Amendment "A" to Letter of Instructions Number Fourteen. (Annex 2).

XV U. S. Corps: The 232nd Infantry of the 42nd Infantry Division cleared enemy from zone east of REGNITZ River then assembled in the vicinity of ZIRNDORF (T-3398). The 45th Infantry Division in conjunction with 3rd Infantry Division cleared NURNBERG. CCB of the 14th Armored Division chared PENZENHOFEN (T-5892), ALTENTHARN (T-5891) and advanced to (T-6290) and (T-5991) against heavy enemy fire of all calibers. CCA withdrew under pressure 2000 yards north of NEUMARKT (T-7081) to reorganize forces to bypass the town. Leading elements reached (T-6385). 106th Cavalry Group cleared ROTH

XXI U. S. Corps: The 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, cleared REICHENBACH (3-8467). The 12th Infantry continued to advance through heavily wooded terrain to capture ELIRICHENHAUSEN (-7506), GERSBACH (3-7506), against scattered resistance. The 22nd Infantry cleared the northeast two-thirds of CRAILSHEIM. The 253rd Infantry and 254th Infantry of the 63rd Infantry Division made slow progress in the direction of GROSSALTECRY (3-5860), reached (3-5460), (3-5861), (3-6067) and (3-6470). The 255th Infantry advanced through heavily wooded area and reached (3-5357). CCA, 12th Armored Division, continued to advance and entered the north outskirts of DINKALSBURL (3-8855) where a blown bridge temporarily halted their progress. Some skirmishing developed in the town when HITLER JUGEND elements attacked our forces. CCB and CCR moved into favorable positions overlooking FLUCHTWANGEN (3-8966) and captured the city with no resistance. and captured the city with no resistance.

VI U. S. Corps: The 114th Infantry of the 44th Infantry Division, captured SCHWABISCH GAURD (-5124) and established positions along line GAILDOUF (S-4846), MITTELERONN (S-5238) and RUPPERTSHOFFEN (S-5233). The 71st Infantry secured bridge-head over the FILS River in the vicinity of UNINGEN (S-3613) which had been seized by 10th Armored Division and advanced to BEZGENRIST (S-3809). The 324th Infantry occupied positions on the line SALACH (S-4712) - MALLHELM (G-3932) - PLUDERHAUSEN (S-3723). The 398th Infantry of the 10th Infantry Division reached ESALSHAUDEN (S-360) and ALTHUTTE (S-3436). The 397th Infantry cleared high ground in the vicinity of (S-2944) and (S-2755). The 399th Infantry cleared MUNDELSHEIM (S-0745) and GROSS BOTTWAR (S-1445). CCA and CCB of the 10th Armored Division, after being relieved by CCR on FILS River crossing sites, seized Division objective of ALCHELM (S-2606).

arriving in front of BOBLINGEN (R-9510). West of the upper NECKAR the road WILLINGEN-SCHWEIRINGEN was reached. On the KINZIG Valley, BIBERAGH (W-2272) was taken. In the BADEN Plains, 1 DB, after cepturing ETTERHEIM (M-1260) and REGEL (W-0150), took a foothold in the northern part of the KAISERSTUHL and reached the outskirts of EMMERDINGEN (W-0847). II Corps: Pushing from Pforzheim towards STUTTGART 3 DIA advanced almost 10 kilometers capturing NUSSDERF (R-8833), RUTESHEIM (R-8824), MAIMSHEIM (R-8620), REMINGEN (R-8878) and WEIL DER STADT (R-8418). 5 DB, pushing from TUBINGEN in the direction of STUTTGART, reached the outskirts of BOBLINGEN (R-9310) and occupied SCHONAICHE (R-9807).

D A ALPS: Enemy retook CIME DE PEEURBE (N-8211) in a violent counteratteck.

A D ATL: POINTE DE GRAVE Sector: The attack continued during the night without interruption. At 1030B our units were in sight of the Verbon POINT (Y-345684) and at 1040B the Germans in the Fort showed a white fleg. A little before 1300B all points of resistance were wiped out and Colonel PRAHL. Commanding German operations on the POINTE DE GRAVE was captured with his entire staff. Thus victoriously terminated the operations of the POINTE DE GRAVE combined with those at ROYAN uncovered the mouth of the GIROLDE but did not open the port of BORDEAUX because the enemy held OLERON ISLAND.

21 .- Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 242nd and 232nd Infantries, 42nd Infantry Division reached (T-2376) and (T-2973). CCR of the 14th Armored Division reached HILPOLSTRIN (T-5171) and was held by road blocks and artillery fire in the vicinity of APPALAR (T-5377) and ALLERSBERG (T-5578). CCA captured HEMG (T-6382), KOSTELBECH (T-6383), KRIMATH (T-6184), POSTBAULK (T-6280), BERNGAY (T-6679). CCB cleared OCHEMBRUCK (T-5590), OBLEMBRILDER (T-6187), BURGTHALR (T-6090) and SCHAFLIOF (T-6089). 106th Cavalry Group cleared walked (T-4571), ROTTEMBROH (T-4066), HUFEN (T-4865), LAFFENAU (T-6758), ROTH (T-4477), BUCHMMBROH (T-4179), ELEIN (T-4589).

XAI U. 3. Corps: The 4th Infantry Division's 8th Infantry cleared the towns of WALDTAIN (5-7962), RISCHARHAUM (S-7653) and DRETINBACH (3-1854). The 12th Infantry, motorized, passed through CRAILMALA (5-7062) captured STIAITON (5-7254) and resched JACATANA (5-7250). The 22nd Infantry mopped up CRAILMALA, MESTAGATSHAUMAN (5-7261) and MATPHATSHOPEN (5-7456) following 12th Infantry. The 63rd Infantry Division advanced in zone over rugged terrain. The 253rd Infantry occupied FOS FRID (5-6662), OBSPETTACH (5-6458), and ONALZHEIM (5-6458). The 254th Infantry captured GROSS ALTON (5-5660) and BELLELIC (5-566). CCa of the 12th Armored Division crossed bridge in Directable (5-855), overcame resistence from HITLL JUCKED and advanced -south to clear BOFFI GEN (5-9232), LACCHAILM (5-8333), and LICHNOMA (5-8524).

VI U. S. Corps: The 44th Infantry Division's 324th Infantry reached FILS River. The 71st Infantry advanced to vicinity (5-4001), (5-4302) and (5-4006). The 41th Infantry of the 103rd Infantry Division advanced to (5-3613), (5-3815) and relieved elements of the 10th Armored Division in Allockilla (5-2607). The 41th Infantry of ared SCACKBOOK (5-3124) secured two bridges intect across the RABS River in that vicinity and captured hadranch (5-2816). The 397th Infantry of the 100th Infantry Division reached general line (5-2622) (5-2124) and (5-2627). The 393th Infantry cleared WINDAMEN (5-232), attacked South atriots the RABS River at GROSS HERPIACE

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(5-21.5), Sefzer harbitation (5-10.7) who so it office the to to (5-1822) and (5-1822). CCR of the 10th Armored Division entered GOBBACH (X-4399). CCB reached (X-3596), (X-3992) and DOWNSTETIEN (X-3592). CCA was relieved in KIRCHEIM by 103rd Infantry Division and advenced south to (5-2600).

First French Army:

I Corps completed the encircling of the BLACK Forest; in the BLACK Plain, a surprise crossing of the RHINE enabled our shock troops to take VIEUA BRISACH (V-8937) while CG3 (1 DB) captured EMBENDINGEN (w-0847) and FREIBURG EN BREISGAU (w-0932). In the BLACK Forest the French continued mopping up mountains between the KINZIG and ENZ Valleys and occupied OBERTIN DEN (w-2550) and HABLACH (w-2064). Southeast of the BLACK Forest, after taking DONAUESCHINGEN (w-6028) by surprise and finding a bridge intact over the DANUES Groupement LE BEL resched the SWISS frontier at EPPENHOFEN (w-6213) while CC1 and CC2 (1 DB), crossing also the DANUES at TUTTLINGEN (w-8032) and MULHEIM (w-8637) reached SIGMANINGEN (X-1145) and continued pushing toward ULM. II Corps after capturing RUIT (S-1116) and ESSLINGEN (S-1317) entered STUTTGART (S-0520) from the south.

D A ALPS: Enemy retook CTME DE PEZURBE (N-8211) in a violent counterattack.

A D ATL: ROCHELLE Sector: Nothing to report.
OLMRON Sector: Nothing to report.

22.- This headquarters published Amendment "B" to Letter of Instructions Number Fourteen (Annex 2).

Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 42nd Infentry Division's 242nd Infentry ceptured bridge intact across ALTMUHL River in the vicinity of GUNSENHAUSEN (T-2061). The 232nd Infentry ceptured bridge intact over ALTMUHL River at UNTER ASBACH (T-2358). The 45th Infentry Division attacked south from assembly area south of NURRBERG. The 157th Infentry reached line (T-362), (T-3663) and (T-3363). The 179th Infentry entered FLEINFELD (T-3761) and reached (T-3962), (T-4261). CCA of the 14th Armored Division prepared to relieve CCR in the vicinity of ALIERSBERG (T-5478) and CCB entered RYRBAUM (T-5883).

XXI U. S. Corps: The 255th Infantry of the 63rd Infantry Division blocked in positions at GAILDORF (S-4946) and SCHWABISH GMUND (S-5124), reached HOLZHAUSEN (S-5734). The 254th and 253rd Infantries reached KOCHER River. The 8th Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division bypassed ELLWANGEN (S-7443). The 22nd Infantry reached ADELMANNSFELDEN (S-642) and LEINEMFIRST (S-6941). The 12th Infantry cleared WASSERALFINGEN (S-7332) and reached AALEN (S-7329). CCA of the 12th Armored Division drove south to the DANUBE River and seized a 600 foot, 2 lane bridge intact across the river in the vicinity of DILLINGEN (T-0401). CCB reinforced CCA at the bridgehead and the eastward advance continued. eastward advance continued.

VI U. S. Corps: The 71st Infantry of the 44th Infantry Division cleared BOTTINGEN (X-3480). The 114th Infantry cleared GEISLINGE (S-5404) (assisted by 324th Infantry) and protected Corps left flank vicinity DONSDORF (S-5211). The 324th Infantry captured AUFHAUSEN (S-4900), NELLINGEN (X-5295) MERKLINGEN (X-4992), MACHTOLSHEIM (X-4890) and TURKHEIM (S-5200). All units of the 100th Infantry Division continued to advance south and southwest, cleared scattered enemy

pockets north and eart of hacket River in zone including that portion of STUTIGART east of the Macket River. The 410th infentry Regiment of the 103rd infentry Division reached BOHRIN LN (A-3190), SAININGEN (A-3338), and ERLEMERSCHISCHIER (A-2597). The 411th Infentry cleared MUNTINGEN (B-1804), ARRELIGION (B-2109) and GRASSHETTLINGEN (B-1500). CCB of the 10th Armored Division reached the DARWER River in the vicinity of SHINGEN (Y-4766) and RADGENSTADT (A-500b). CCA drove rapidly south to MEDICHELLIA (A-3992) and GUTANBERG (B-3194). CCR, following CCB, reached JONTHELM (A-4385) and SAINDEN (A-4382).

First French army:

I Corps continued to push along the DAGUES towards ULM while near the SWISS border they captured STOCKACH (#-9618) and SINGEN (#-8307) and reached the northwest shores of LAKE CONSTANCE. In the BADEN Plain 9 DIC advanced more than 20 kilometers south of FRIBCURG arriving in front of MULLHEALM (V-9212).

II Corps completed occupation of STUTTGART where more than 9,000 prisoners were taken and large amounts of meterical captured. South of TUBLIGEN (**-9892) in the SWABIAN JUMA, 805 (5 DB) captured BODELSHAUSEN (**-9278), BELSEN (**-9678), THALEIN (**-0276) and WILIMAN DINGEN (**-0576) reaching the outskirts of MELCHINGEN (**-0575).

D A ALPS: Operation "LAURE" began at 07008 and the fortifications at ROCHE LA CROIX (P-547504) and ST OURS BAS (P-558509) were taken and the towns of mEYRONAES (P-5551), ST OURS (P-5552), and LARCHE (N-3265) were liberated.

A D ATL: ROCHELLE Sector: Nothing to report. OLERON Sector: Nothing to report.

23 .- Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 242nd Infentry and 232nd Infentry of the 42nd Infentry Division secured bridgeheads across the ALTMUHL River and reached MESTHEIM (T-1449), (T-1950), (T-2248), (T-2450) and (T-2552). The 222nd Infentry cleared ARBERG (T-1064). The 157th Infentry of the 45th Infentry Division cleared STIRN (T-3665), crossed ALTMUHL River and reached (T-2750), AVERNHEIM (T-2445) and (T-2945). The 179th Infentry followed 106th Cavalry Group, cleared ELLIIGEN (T-3556), secured bridgehead at DIETFURT (T-3443), and reached SCHAMBACH (T-3545) and GOHRAR (T-3944). The 14th Armored Division passed to control of Third Army. The 20th Armored Division passed to control of Seventh Army (attached XV U. S. Corps) from Third Army.

XXI U. S. Corps: The 253rd Infantry of the 63rd Infantry
Division partially motorized moved to area MOGGLINGEN (3-6327)
- HEUCHLINGEN (3-6130). The 254th Infantry advanced and the
255th Infantry in positions at (3-5424), (3-5525). The 8th
Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division cleared ELLWANGEN
(3-7443). The 12th Infantry (reinforced) continued toward
AALEN (8-7329), and cleared the city. The 22nd Infantry
advanced 15 kilometers against scattered opposition and
reached (3-6930). CCA of the 12th armored Division protected
bridge site at DILLINGEN (T-0301) across the DANUEE River.
CCB expended bridgehead at DILLINGEN and captured HOLZHEIM
(T-0694). The 15th Infantry (motorized) of the 3rd Infantry
Division reached STODTLEN (3-8748) was attached to 12th
Armored Division on arrival for purpose of relieving Armored
elements in the DILLINGEN bridgehead. The 30th Infantry



(motorized) closed in the vicinity of LAUDENBACH (S-5897). The 7th Infantry remained assembled in the vicinity of NURNBERG.

VI U. S. Corps: The 71st Infantry of the 44th Infantry Division crossed the Danuber River south of EHINGEN (X-4767) and reached BERG (X-4964). The 324th Infantry advanced south repidly, reached Danuber River at ERBACH (X-5972) and OPFINGEN (X-5367). The 397th Infantry of the 100th Infantry Division cleared enemy pockets along north bank of NECKAR River from ALTBACH (S-2115) to PLOEHINGEN (S-2413), and effected crossing of the NECKAR River, reached the autobahn at (S-1810) and cleared KONGEN (S-2010). The 41lth Infantry of the 103rd Infantry Division secured road junction at (X-1479) and reached (X-1588). The 410th Infantry captured TRAILFINGEN (X-3083), and GRABENSTETTEN (X-2793). CCB of the 10th Armored Division captured bridge intact at MUNDERKINGEN (X-4261) and ROTTENACKER (X-4561). CCR secured crossing of the DANUBE at ERBACH (X-5971). CCA established positions in RINGINGEN (X-5474) and ALTHEIM (4-5172).

Army Reserve: The 36th Infantry Division continued to be relieved on rear area security mission by the 28th Infantry Division (Fifteenth U. S. Army). The 2nd Infantry Division moving to XXI Corps zone attached to XXI Corps upon arrival.

First French Army:

The VALLUY Groupment was placed under direct Army orders as of 230001B.

I Corps: South of the DANUBE CC1 and CC2 (1 DB) reached the line BALTRINGEN (X-5955) - OCHSENHAUSEN (X-6544) and contacted VI U. S. Corps at MUNDERKINGEN (4-4261) near EHINGEN (X-4866), thus completing the encircling of German forces in the SWABIAN JURA. North of SCHAFFHOUSE reconnaissance was sent from STAHRINGEN (W-9310) towards kONSTANZ (0-0896).

VALLUY Groupment: Occupied BELLINGEN (V-8604) and LIEL (V-9104) in the BADEN Plain and completed clearing of KAISERSTUHL. In the BLACK Forest reduction of surrounded enemy forces continued.

II Corps: Advencing from north to south in the SWABIAN JURA, reached the line SCHLATT (w-9672), SALMENDINGEN (X-0374), MELCHINGEN (X-0579) and was progressing in the direction of SIGMARINGEN (X-1144).

D A ALFS: ST OURS HAUT (P-5652), (P-5347), (P-5447), (P-5450) (P-5551), (P-5550), TETE DE VIHAYSSE (N-329679), and TETE DE SIGURET (P-5447) reached.

A D ALT: ROCHELLE Sector: Nothing to report.
OLERON Sector: Nothing to report.

24.- This headquarters published Amendment "C" to Letter of Instructions Number Fourteen (Annex 2).

Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 242nd Infantry of the 42nd Infantry Division cleared the towns of WEMDING (T-1935), RUDEWSTETTEN (T-1332), GOSHRIM (T-1930), HUISHRIM (T-1829) and MUNDLING (T-2028). The 232nd Infantry advanced to (T-2230), (T-2328) and (T-2530). The 157th Infantry of the 45th Infantry Division cleared ROTHENBERG (T-2834), WITTERSHEIM (T-3234), MONHAIM

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED (T-2831) and advanced to WARCHING (T-3231). The 179th Infantry advanced to positions in the vicinity of MULHEIM (T-3834) and MORNSHEIM (T-3935). XXI U. S. Corps: The 63rd Infantry Division advanced repidly by shuttling against light resistance and cleared BOBINGEN (S-6125), HEUBACH (S-6123), LAUTERN (S-6424), WEILER (S-5720), BARTHOLOMA (S-6519), WEISZENSTEIN (S-5814), and GERSTETTEN (S-6805). The 8th Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division cleared EBNAT (S-7925) and STAUFEN (S-8709). The 22nd Infantry cleared ESSINGEN (S-6825), STEINHEIM (S-7113), and entered HEIDENHEIM (S-7812). The 12th Infantry (reinforced) entered GEINGEN (S-8405). CCA of the 12th Armored Division (15th Infantry attached) cleared BINSMANGEN (A-1490) and entered WERTINGEN (V-1799) and HOLYHEIM (V-0694). CCB entered OPFINGEN (A-9490). CCR reached LAUINGEN (S-9800) and GUNDELFINGEN (A-9498). The 92nd Reconnaissance Squadron secured left flank of CCB. of CCB. VI U. S. Corps: The 71st Infantry of the 44th Infantry Division advanced from the bridgehead at EHINGEN (X-4766) and reached the ILLER River in the vicinity of DIETENHEIM (A-7359) and ILLERIEDEN (X-7166). The 32th infantry entered UIM (X-6880) with the 10th armored Division. The 100th Infantry Division patrolled south of the NECKAR River in the area southeast of STUTGART and continued to clear the enemy from the area. The 410th Infantry of the 103rd infantry Division entered MUNSINGEN (X-3080) from the north and occupied the towns of URACH (X-2389) and SEEBURG (X-2784). The 411th Infantry entered MUNSINGEN (A-3080) from the west. CCA and CCB of the 10th Armored Division advanced from the EHINGEN (A-4366) bridgehead and established positions on the ILLER River in the vicinity of (X-7266) and (X-7055). CCR attacked UIM (X-6880) in conjunction with the 324th Infantry (44th Infantry Division) and the city was cleared as far south as the River. First French Army: I Corps: Contrary to the orders of this headquarters, CC1 (1 DB) after having traveled 150 kilometers in 48 hours entered ULM (A-3068) in liaison with elements of VI U. S. Corps. CC2 is along the ILLER River from ILLERTISSEN (A-7661) to ULM and is in contact with U. S. troops at VALLUY Groupment: Elements of the 10th Military Region crossing the RHINE near LOCHLE (A-8395) captured intact the KEMBS DAM (A-8398) and made junction with 9 DIC. Pushing southward 9 DIC reached the vicinity of SWISS frontier at BASEL, and occupied LORDACH (A-9590). Reduction of enemy forces surrounded in the BLACK Forest was being actively II Corps: After capturing HECHINGEN (**-9274), EBINGEN (**-9858) and SAMMERTINGEN (**-1062) in the SWABIAN JURA our elements reached the SIGMARINGEN area thus cutting in two the German forces encircled between the NECKAR and the DANUBE. D A ALPS: No change. A D ATL: CG, ADALT issued Operation Order No. 9 for the conquest of OhmRON ISLAND (Operation JUPITER): One Division (MARCHAND Division) to capture OL RON Island, landing in force at its southern end, supported by a secondary landing on the western coast by a strong commando. One Division (d'ANSELLE Division) to carry out, throughout the operations of the MARCHAND Division, directionary actions with limited objectives in the NOCHALLE Se

25.-Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 242nd Infantry of the 42nd Infantry Division advanced to the north bank of the DANUBE River, cleared KAISHEIM (T-2523), OSTERWEILER (T-2019), and GUNSENHEIM (T-2524). The 232nd Infantry cleared BUCHDORF (T-2725), BAIEFBLD (T-2826), HAFENRENT (T-2822) and LAITHEN (T-3120) and advanced to north bank of the DANUBE River. The 45th Infantry Division's 157th Infantry attacked south with 3 battalions motorized clearing GANSHEIM (T-3625) and met still resistence upon reaching north bank of the DANUBE River. The 179th Infantry cleared MEILENHOFEN (T-5328) and occupied TRIEDELHEIM (T-4423), BITTENBRUNN (T-5121), LAISOW (T-5222) and RIED (T-5322).

XXI U. S. Corps: The 254th Infantry of the 63rd Infantry Division crossed the DANUBE River in the vicinity of LEIPHEIM (A-836). The 253rd Infantry crossed the river at GUNSBERG (X-8887) and was engaged in heavy fighting in the city. The 8th Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division crossed the DANUBE River on Bailey Bridge at LAUINGEN (A-9900) and reached LANDENSBERG (Y-0686). The 12th Infantry brossed the DANUHE River and reached road junction at (Y-0396). The 15th Infantry of the 3rd Infantry Division continued attack to southeast supporting elements of CCA, 12th Armored Division and reached (X-1798) and (Y-0694). CCB of the 12th Armored Division continued advance to the southwest reaching OFFINGEN-BRETTENBACH (X-9387) area against heavy resistance, cleared ANHAUSEN (X-9485) and entered LIMBACH (X-9285).

VI U. S. Corps: The 71st Infantry of the 44th Infantry Division (reinforced) continued to hold bridgehead over ILLER River in the vicinity of DIETENHEIM (12-7359) and repulsed a strong enemy counterattack against the bridgehead at VORRINGEN (2-7366). The 324th Infantry completed clearing of ULM (X-6781) and met stiff resistance in New ULM (X-6779). The 409th Infantry of the 103rd Infantry Division cleared ELEHINGEN (2-7486) and advanced to north bank of DANUBE River from (X-7484) to (2-8085). The 410th Infantry cleared THALFINGEN (X-7185) and BOFINGEN (X-6983) and prepared to cross DANUBE River. CCA of the 10th Armored Division assisted 324th Infantry (44th Infantry Division) in clearing ULM (X-6781). Elements also crossed the ILLER River in the vicinity of DIETENHEIM (2-7459) and reached (X-7369). CCB crossed the ILLER River in the vicinity of DIETENHEIM (3-7454), ALTENSTADT (X-7653) and entered KELLMUNZ (2-7849). CCR assisted by 324th Infantry (44th Infantry Division) was clearing ULM (2-6781) and was moving to DIETENHEIM (X-7459).

First French Army:

I Corps: The VALLUY Groupment, which reverted today to I Corps, thrusting deeply through the ROTH Valley reached NEUSTADT (W-3523) while in ascending the RHINE Valley they advanced beyond WALDSHUT. The LE BEL Groupment was making progress in the CONSTANCE Penninsula despite fairly heavy enemy resistance. 5 DB occupied UBERLINGEN (W-8605) and LIPPERTS REUTE (W-9207).

II Corps: 'Between REUTLINGEN (X-1089) and SIGMARINGEN (X-1044) troops were heading east to complete the destruction of enemy forces encircled in the SWABIAN JURA. Annihilation of the final enemy element holding out in the woods north of TUBINGEN (W-9792) was completed.

D A ALPS: Advance units gained TENDE (N-8720), SANDALMAZZO

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(N-8717), PRATOLUNGO (N-5546), BAGNI (N-4846).

A D ATL: Nothing to report.

26 .- Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 242nd Infantry of the 42nd Infantry Division attacked and crossed DANUBE River in the vicinity of SCHAFSTALL (T-2819). The 232nd Infantry attacked in the vicinity of ALTISHEIM (T-3019) and crossed the DANUBE River and advanced to LECH River at (T-3216). The 222nd Infantry which is division reserve assembled in the vicinity of (T-2531) and (T-2818). The 157th Infantry of the 45th Infantry Division crossed DANUBE River using DURMs and assault boats vicinity (T-3620) and (T-3290) and reached (T-3519), (T-3518) and (T-3616). The 180th Infantry crossed the DANUBE River and advanced to (T-4417), (T-4218), (T-4119), (T-4120) and (T-4019). The 179th Infantry crossed the DANUBE River at (T-4620) and (T-5221), occupied UNTERHAUSEN (T-4018), OBERHAUSEN (T-4718), GRADENFELD (T-5218) and FELDKIRCHEN (T-5319) and cleared NEUBERG (T-5320).

XXI U. S. Corps: The 3rd Infantry Division relieved elements of the 12th Armored Division. The 7th Infantry crossed ZUSAM River in the vicinity of VORD (T-2103) and advanced east to the SCHMUTTER River. The 15th Infantry reached (T-1695) and (Y-1996). The 8th Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division reached (Y-0784). The 12th Infantry reached (Y-0989) and (Y-1393). The 253rd Infantry and 254th Infantry Regiments of the 63rd Infantry Division assisted by CCB, 12th Armored Division successfully repulsed strong enemy counterattacks in the LEIPHEIM (X-8486) - GUNSBURG (X-8887) area, crossed DANUBE River and reached (A-8585), (X-8984) and (X-9185). The 12th Armored Division's CCB assisted 63rd Infantry Division in the capture of GUNSBURG (A-8887).

VI U. S. Corps: The 409th Infantry of the 103rd Infantry Division established bridgehead over DANUBE River in the vicinity of LEIBI (A-7584), advanced to the southeast and seized a bridge intact at ELLZEE (A-9174) and continued to WATTENWEILER (A-9272). The 410th Infantry crossed at ULM (A-6680) following the 107th Cavalry Neconnaissance Squadron and advanced to the line WEIZENHORN (X-7970) - ASCH (A-8369). The 411th Infantry crossed the DANUBE at LEIBI (A-7584) and assembled in the vicinity of ECHLISHAUSEN (*-8183). The 71st Infantry of the 44th Infantry Division followed the 10th Armored Division and reached ERKHEIM (X-9941) and WESTERHEIM (X-9138). The 114th Infantry followed the 10th Armored Division and entered MEMMINGEN (*-8234) and KIRCHDORF (X-7744). CCA of the 10th Armored Division cleared ERKHEIM (A-9941) and occupied MINDELHEIM (Y-0542). CCB cleared MEMINGEN (A-8335). CCR crossed the bridge at ILLERRIEDEN (X-7166) and followed the advance of CCA and reached (Y-0950).

First French Army:

I Corps: Troops of 9 DIC effected their junction with those of 4 DMM near DONAUESCHINGEN (w-5628). Paralleling the SWISS Border east of WALDSHUT (B-3696) CC3 (L DB) completed the investment of the BLACK Forest. The closing of the SWISS Border was achieved for 150 kilometers from LORRACH (A-9590) to LAKE CONSTANCE. The pocket in the southern part of the BLACK Forest was considerably reduced by the capture of FURTWANGEN (W-3935), NEUSTADT (W-3523), LOFFINGEN (W-4520) and BONNDOFF (W-4513). 4 DMM continued the destruction of the 3 enemy divisions encircled west of TUTTLINGEN (W-8032). The LE HEL Groupment, after taking

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ALLENSBACH (X-0003) and DETTINGEN (A-0405), entered the city of CONSTANCE. 5 DB took WALDSEE (A-5127) and was pushing in the direction of FRIEDRICHAFEN.

II Corps: Between Nackar and DANUBE, east of the REUTLINGEN (1-1089) - RIEDLINGEN (1-2952) line, 2 DIM completed the destruction of the major part of the enemy forces encircled in the SWABIAN JURA, capturing 35 localities and a considerable amount of material.

D A ALPS: Enemy withdrawal begun on 25 April in southern sector became noticable throughout sector. Positions (P-548569), VALONET PASS (N-3171), VIRAYSEE PARK (N-3368), TETE DURE (N-3465), (N-3662), (N-313535), LARCHE PASS (N-3562), (N-351607), BORDIGHEAR (S-910855), BAIGA MARITTIMA (N-895175), MONTGENEVRE PASS (K-4702), CESANNE (K-5104) were occupied.

A D ATL: Nothing to report.

27 .- Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 222nd Infantry of the 42nd Infantry Division passed through the 232nd and 242nd Infantry Regiments and advanced to (T-363035), (T-398017) and (T-370082). The 242nd Infantry crossed LECH River and reached (T-3216) when passed through by 222nd Infantry and assembled in the vicinity (T-3602). The 232nd Infantry reached (T-3316) when passed through by 222nd Infantry assembled in the vicinity of (T-3905). The 45th Infantry Division's 157th Infantry crossed DANUEE River in the vicinity (T-3620) and advanced to WENGEN (T-4212), (T-3911), and (T-4011). The 180th Infantry crossed DANUEE River and advanced to (T-4711), (T-5010) and (T-4913). The 179th Infantry crossed DANUEE River, deared NEUBERG (T-5321) and reached ROHRENFELS (T-5115), (T-5320) and (T-5318). CCA and CCB of the 20th Armored Division closed in assembly area north of DANUEE River in the vicinity of BAIERFELD (T-2826).

XXI U. S. Corps: The 253rd Infentry of the 63rd Infentry Division (motorized) relieved elements of the 12th Armored Division holding bridge over WERTACH River at HILTENFINGEN ((Y-2156). The 254th Infentry cleared GROSSKOTZ (X-8782). The 255th Infentry reached (Y-0770). The 8th Infentry Regiment of the 4th Infentry Division established bridgehead over LECH River in the vicinity of SCHWABSTADL (T-3254). The 12th Infentry advanced to STRASSBERG (Y-2769). The 7th Infentry of the 3rd infentry Division advanced south along LECH Canal and entered AUGSBURG (Y-3479). The 15th Infentry reached (Y-2688). CCA of the 12th Armored Division advanced to west bank of LECH River and entered LANDSBERG (Y-3443). CCR advanced behind CCA, clearing by-passed pockets of resistance. 101st Cavalry Squadron captured three bridges intect over WERTACH at (Y-2666), (Y-2568) and (Y-2463).

VI U. S. Corps: The 41lth Infentry of the 103rd Infantry Division occupied western part of LANDSBARG (Y-3444). The 71st Infantry of the 44th Infantry Division advanced rapidly behind elements of CCB, 10th Armored Division and reached. OBERGUNSBURG (Y-0120) and FRIESBARRIED (Y-0923). 114th Infantry was moving southeast on main highway from KEMPTEN (A-9305). The 2nd battalion in ULM (X-6680) on rear area security mission. The 324th Infantry moved from north of DANUBE River to MEMBARINGEN (X-8234) - HEIMMERTINGEN (X-8040) area. The 101st A/B Division was attached to VI Corps upon arrival in Corps area. CCA of the 10th Armored Division captured bridges at (Y-146298) and (Y-163244) intact, reached SCHONGAU (Y-3617) and (Y-2819). CCB cleared MARKT OBERDORF

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(X-1613) and elements reached(Y-0101). CCR captured bridge intact at (Y-1642), cut railtoad at BUCHLOE (Y-2342) and reached LANDSBERG (Y-3444).

First French Army:

I Corps: Two task forces from 9 DIC advancing one to the east reached the line TODTHAU (W-1515) MANBACH (W-1104) WEHR(B-1393) LAUFENBURG (D-2585), the other to the south occupied OBERLENZKIRCH (W-3519) SCHLUCHSER (W-3314) and ST BLASIEN (W-0729). 4 DEEM reduced the pocket west of TUTTLINGEN as well as the one in the ENGEN - SINGRE area.

II Corps: 2 DIM was preparing to clean up area included between BALINGEN and the DANUEE.

D A ALPS: Continued rapid advance in Lulche PASS to ARGENTERA (N-3859). Enemy counterattacked in northern sector and held PETIT ST BENARD PASS (C-4701). 27th Alpine Division occupied BUSSOLENO (A-6239) and SUSE (H-5440). Advance elements in the south withdrew from BORDIGHEAR (S-9086) to VENTIMIGLIA (S-8787). CG, DA ALPS was instructed to helt forward movement and prepare to withdraw to French territory.

A D ATL: Nothing to report.

28.- This headquarters published Amendment "D", "E" and "F" to Letter of instructions Number Fourteen (Annex 2).

Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 222nd Infantry of the 42nd Infantry Division continued attack to the south against scattered resistance and reached (Y-4498), (Y-4099) and (Y-3901). The 157th Infantry of the 45th Infantry Division with one battalion motorized reached (Y-7477) and (Y-7275). One battalion of the 179th Infantry advanced to vicinity of (T-7897), remainder of regiment assembled vicinity (T-7700) and (T-7501). The 180th Infantry attacked and reached (Y-6794) and (Y-6591). The 20th Armored Division crossed DANUSE River and passed through 42nd Infantry and 45th Infantry Divisions. CCA reached AICHACH (Y-5090) and secured bridge in town intact. CCB reached the GLONN River vicinity (Y-6689).

XXI U. S. Corps: The 253rd Infantry of the 63rd Infantry Division relieved in position by 141st Infantry (36th Infantry Division). The 254th Infantry closed in assembly area at ROTHERSURG. The 255th Infantry (motorized) advanced to (Y-3346), and was being relieved by 142nd Infantry (36th Infantry Division). The 8th Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division maintained positions at (Y-3655) and (Y-3261). 12th Infantry crossed WELTACH River. The 22nd Infantry moved across WERTACH River and assembled at GRABEL (Y-2959). The 3rd Infantry Division passed to control XXI Corps. The 7th Infantry moved south along LECH River towards AUSBURG (Y-3182). The 30th Infantry crossed LECH River and moved south along LeCH River towards AUGSBURG and continued advance east to (Y-3977). The 15th Infantry cleared AUGSBURG and garrisoned town. CCA of the 12th Armored Division crossed LECH River and advanced southeast to FURGEN (Y-3642).

VI U. S. Corps: The 409th Infantry of the 103rd Infantry Division occupied SCHONGAU (Y-3617). The 410th Infantry advanced to LECE River and was held up by blown tridge vicinity LECHBRUCK (Y-2905). The 411th Infantry assembled

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in LANDSBERG (Y-3444) area. The 71st Infebry of the 44th Infentry Division followed the advance-of CCB, 10th Armored Division and reached FUSSEN (D-2389), VILS, AUSTRIA (D-1787), (D-2493) and (D-1599). The 114th Infentry reached BERG (D-1291), STEINACH (D-1289) and (D-0988). The 117th Cavelry Reconnaissance Squadron maintained contact with I French Corps on the Division right rear. 101st A/B Divisions 506th Parachute Infantry moved into Corps area and assembled in LANDSBERG (Y-3444). CCA of the 10th Armored Division reached SCHONGAU (Y-3617) and (Y-296045). CCB reached LECH River at FUSSEN (D-2389) and elements also reached (D-1987). CCR followed CCA and assembled in SCHWAB BRUCK (Y-3218) area. The 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron screened division left flank between SCHONGAU and LANDSBERG.

First French Army:

CG, First French Army issued orientation directive Number 12; By penetrating simultaneously into the ALGAU area by BREGUENZ and by LLMENSTADE, to surround as rapidly as possible the VORLBERG MASSIF by concentric actions arriving at LANDECK; and to open the road to BOLSANO by the upper valley of the INN, MAUDERS and the valley of the ETSCH.

I Corps: 1 Db progressing some 15 kilometers captured ROT (X-7127), HAUERZ (X-6830), WURLACH (X-6226) and BENGATREUTE (X-5119) arriving in front of LEUTKIRCH (X-7216). 4 DAM achieved destruction of enemy forces in the pockets west of TUTTLINGEN and in the erea ENGENSINGEN: 8,000 prisoners were taken in the last four days, also a considerable amount of materiel. 9 DIC completed mopping up of the erea north of

II Corps: Mopping up of the western part of the SWABIAN JURA pocket was practically finished.

D A ALPS: Nothing to report.

A D ATL: Nothing to report.

29 .- Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 7th Infantry of the 3rd Infantry Division moved rapidly along axis MERING (Y-4168), MAURENDORF (Y-5362) to FURSTENFELD (Y-6159) seized bridge and reached GUNZENHOFEN (Y-5366). The 30th Infantry secured bridge across AMPER River at (Y-6764) and reached (Y-7167), GROBEAZELL (Y-7061) and MAISACH (Y-6264). The 222nd Infantry of the 42nd Infantry Division with 2nd battalion (motorized) advanced to (Y-7579) and (Y-7469), remainder of regiment followed clearing pockets of resistance and moved to assembly area (Y-7269). The 242nd Infantry with 3rd battalion (motorized) advanced to (Y-6471), remainder of regiment followed clearing pockets of resistance and closed in assembly area vicinity (Y-6471). The 157th Infantry of the 45th Infantry Division advanced southeast to DACHAU (Y-7670) and reached (Y-7468) and (Y-7668). The 180th Infantry advanced to (Y-8176) and (Y-8068). The 179th Infantry advanced to (Y-9069) and (Y-9071). CCA of the 20th Armored Division secured bridge at AICHACH (Y-5090) and continued attack to south, captured bridge at (Y-6865) and reached (Y-7165). CCB advanced to (Y-8465) and assembled vicinity (Y-8669). CCR moved to forward assembly area in the vicinity of PETERHAUSEN (Y-7685). The 106th Cavalry Group proceeded advance of 45th Infantry Division along route PFAFFENHOFEN (Y-7899) - (Y-7994) - (Y-8592) - GARCHING (Y-9169), also secured NEUFAHRN (Y-9175) and MIMTRACHING (Y-9376).

XXI U. S. Corps: The 255th Infantry of the 63rd Infantry Division moved to assembly area in the vicinity of GUNSBURG

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(Y-5757). Remainder Division assembled in the vicinity of ROTHENBERG. The 141st Infantry of the 36th Infantry Division crossed LECH River at (Y-\$552) and moved to assembly area vicinity #EHARLEM (Y-5520). The 142nd Infantry initiated movement across LECH River on bridge at (Y-355). The 143rd infantry closed in assembly area vicinity GUNLSUNG (Y-5757). The 12th Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division crossed LECH River at (Y-3355) and advanced southeast and reached GRISFANBERG (Y-4947), ECHING (Y-5148), ZANKANRAUSAN (Y-5150) and GRAFRATH (Y-5452). The 22nd Infantry crossed triver in the vicinity of (Y-3355) and reached SCHONDEISING (Y-2663) and AUGSBURG (Y-3479). CCA or the 12th Armored Division crossed the LECH River and moved on axis PENZING (A-3746) - WEILHEIM (Y-5521) - MURNAU (Y-6003) and reached OBERAU(D-5690). CCB moved along western edge of ALER SEE and reached UNITAUSEN (Y-5523). CCR moved to assembly area in the vicinity of WEILHEIM. The 92nd Reconnaissance Squadron made reconneissance to the northeast along general line ST HEINRIGH (Y-7020) - UNIT STEINBACH (Y-7710). The 101st Cavalry Group moved along the AMER SEE to the vicinity of DIESDEN and then around southern tip of AMER SEE and reached SELFELD (Y-5842).

VI U. S. Corps: The 41th Infantry of the 103rd Infantry Division crossed the LECH River and advanced south to UNITER AMEMERGAU (D-4796). The 409th Infantry followed 10th Armored Division and reached PARTENKIRCHEN (D-5482) and SAULGRUB (Y-4702). The 410th Infantry crossed the LECH River and reached BUCHING (D-3195), TRAUCHGAU (D-3293) and STEINGADEN (Y-3403). The 71st Infantry of the 44th Infantry Division reached (D-2975), (D-1387) and (D-2087). The 114th Infantry protected Corps right flank with bettalions at EEMPTION (A-0593), WERTACH (D-0193) am (D-0298). The 117th Cavalry Squadron continued to screen Corps right flank keeping contact with elements of I French Corps. The 101st A/B Divisions 506th Parachute Infantry relieved elements of the 41th Infantry (103rd Infantry Division) in LANDSBERG area, protecting Corps left flank. CCA of the 10th Armored Division crossed the LECH River south of SCHONGAU (Y-3717) and reached PARTENKIRCHEN (D-5483). CCB crossed the LECH River at FUSSEN (D-2289) and advanced to BISHLBOCH (D-3073).

First French Army:

I Oorps: After an advance of 45 kilometers, 5 DB crossed the Austrian border south of WANGEN (A-0158), while on LAKE CONSTANCE it captured FRIEDRICCHOREN (C-3196). On its left 1 DB occupied LEUTKIRCH (A-7216), ISNY (A-7303) and after having poured through KEMPTEN (D-0406) drove into the ILLER Valley, arriving before LAMENSTADT (C-9638).

DAALPS: 1st DMI held line along the NERVIA River from (S-8895) south to the coast at (S-3887). In the central sector reached DEMONTE (N-6547).

A D ATL: Nothing to report.

30.- This headquarters published Amendment "G" to Letter of Instruction Number Fourteen (Annex 2).

Seventh Army:

XV U. S. Corps: The 3rd Infantry Divisions attack continued from the bridgehead across the AMPER River. The 7th Infantry



reached STARNBERG (Y-6840) - MUNICH highway. The 30th Infantry cleared that portion of MUNICH in zone, captured \$\frac{9}{9}\$ bridges intact across the ISAR River and began movement over the river. The 15th Infantry moved to assembly area vicinity (Y-6167) in division reserve. The 232nd Infantry of the 42nd Infantry Division moved to the vicinity of (Y-7562) in division reserve. The remainder of the division engaged in MUNICH, cleared the city in zone, captured several bridges intact over the ISAR River. The 45th Infantry Division cleared MUNICH except for snipers, established garrison positions in the city and send patrols across the ISAR River. The 20th Armored Division advanced south toward MUNICH as far as AMPER River then division was halted on Corps brder to permit infantry to pass through. The division then assembled in area north of MUNICH. The 22nd Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division cleared scattered enemy pockets in zone, maintained contact with elements of the 3rd Infantry Division on left and reached the ISAR River east of (Y-7943). The 12th Infantry captured KLOSTER ST OTTILI (Y-4649) and reached LOISACH River in zone, captured 3 bridges intact. The 36th Infantry Division advanced 35 kilometers in zone to reach OBERAU (D-5690) and BAD TOLZ (Y-8614). The 141st Infantry prepared to attack BAD TOLZ. CCA of the 12th Armored Division assembled in the vicinity of HECHENDORF (Y-6101). CCB held up at (Y-7209) by blown bridges over the LOISACH River. CCR cleared the area between the AMMER SKE and WURM SKE, then assembled vicinity STARNBERG (Y-6840).


VI U. S. Corps: The 71st Infantry of the 44th Infantry Division followed advance of CCB 10th Armored Division to LERMOOS (D-3871). The 114th Infantry continued southeast to WEISSENBACH (D-1975), FORCHACH (D-1572) and (D-1471), where a road block temporarily halted advance. The 324th Infantry protected Corps right flank from BENG (D-1291) to KEMPTEN (X-9305). The 409th Infantry of the 103rd Infantry Division advanced south behind CCA, 10th Armored Division to the vicinity of (D-6082), where a road block halted the armor. The Infantry then continued to KLAIS (D-6482). The 410th Infantry remained in the BUCHING (D-3195) - TRAUCHGAU (D-3298) area and reconnoitered side roads through the mountains toward ETTAL (D-539b). The 41th Infantry assembled in the vicinity of FARCHANT (D-5486). The 107th Cavalry Squadron patrolled Corps flank in the KOHLGRUB (Y-4801) area. CCB of the 10th Armored Division, after overcoming defended road blocks, ppshed south and southwest to (D-3366). CCA leading elements reached (D-6082). CCR and remainder of CCA assembled vicinity PARTEMENTICHEN (D-5382). Progress hindered by mountain terrain and obstacles.

First French Army:

I Corps: After capturing LINDAU (C-4685) 5 DB reached BREGENZ (C-5180) where it met heavy resistance. Further east it took WEILER (C-7799) and STAUFEN (C-7286). 1 DB occupied the whole ILLER Valley up to ILMERSTADT (C-9688) where SS troops were putting up strong resistance.

D A ALPS: 27th Alpine Division reoccupied PETIT ST BERNARD Pass.

A D ATL: OLERON Sector: Landing on the Island of Oleron was started at 0600B. The two landing waves debarking on the GATSAU Point (Y-2396) met light resistance. By 0825B the initial bridgehead had been secured as planned. In the



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HEADQUARTERS 6th ARMY GROUP

APO #23, US ARMY

:Date: 3 Apr 45: :Copy Number: B-714

3 April 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 13.

: CG Seventh Army, CG First French Army.

1. a. See Current Intelligence Summary.

b. The Allied Armies have as their objective the division and destruction of the enemy forces by a thrust on the axis KASSEL - LEIPZIG, making a junction with the Russian forces in the vicinity of LEIPZIG. To accomplish this the 21st Army Group continues its advance without pause to the general line River LEINE and BREMEN and will thereafter advance to take the River ELBE and be prepared to carry out further operations beyond the ELBE. 12th Army Group, after completing the mop up of encircled enemy forces in the RUHR, will, in conjunction with 21st Army Group, attack toward LEIPZIG to reach the River ELBE and be prepared to conduct operations beyond the River ELBE.

c. First TACAF (Provisional) cooperates with and supports 6th Army Group. Its organization for combat and plan for operation will be issued separately.

2. 6th Army Group will protect the right flank of 12th Army Group West of the BAYREUTH (0-7556) area where it will connect with 12th Army Group and be prepared to advance on the axis NUREMBURG - REGENSBURG - LINZ to prevent the consolidation of German resistance in Southern GERMANY.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between 12th and 6th Army Groups: Present boundary extended from MEININGEN - COBURG - BAYREUTH (all to 12th Army Group).

b. Between Armies: Present boundary West of SPEYER - SPEYER (to First French Army) - HICHELFELD (R-7670) - HILSDACH (R-3627) - LAUFFEN (S-0454) (all to Seventh Army) - thence along NECKAR River to STRUTTGART (to First French Army).

c. South Flank: No change.

3. a. Seventh Army:

(1) Advance rapidly in zone to the line LUDWIGSERG - CRAILSHEIM' - NURELBURG - BAYRLUTH; cut the autobaim between BAYRLUTH and NURLMBURG; and capture NURLMBURG. Protect right flank of Third Army, making connection with Third Army in BAYRLUTH area.


(2) Extend ground reconnaissance to the line: STUTTG/RT (exclusive) - JALEN (S-7329) - WEIFZENBURG (T-3653) - SULZBACH-ROSEN-BERG (T-9008) - MARKTREDWEITZ (T-1265).

(3) After capturing NURGHERO, be prepared to adv. nce to the Southeast on the axis NUREMBURG - REGENSBURG - LINZ.

b. First French Army

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, U.S. ARMY

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B 774

16 April 1945

: CG Seventh Army

PART I

1. a. See Current Intelligence Summary.

b. 21st Army Group continues its operations to defeat the Germans to the

 \underline{c} . 12th army Group will launch a powerful thrust with the Third army to join hands with Russians in the DaNUBE Valley and seize SALZBURG.

 \underline{d}_{\star} . First TACAF cooperates with and surports 6th army Group. Its organization for combat and tactical plan will be issued separately.

2. 6th army Group initiates strong offensive action up the valley of the NECKAR River at the earliest possible date for the purpose of destroying the German 19th army in the STUTTGART - BLACK FORIST area and preventing its escape to the East. Its advence on the left will conform to that of the main offensive of the 12th army Group. It will protect the South (right) flank of 12th army Group and occupy Western AUSTRIA and that pert of GERMANY within its zone of action.

a. Between 12th and 6th army Groups: West of OPPENHEIM (inclusive) no change - DAHMSTADT - WUNZBURG - ANSRAGH - FREISING - DORFEN - ROSENHEIM (all to 12th army Group). This boundary becomes effective as soon as Third army can complete: relief of forward elements of Seventh army Northeast of the new boundary and as soon as Seventh army en remove its installations now northeast of the new boundary. Seventh army will have unrestricted running rights on that pert of the main highway: ANSBACH - WEISZENBURG - INGOLSTADT - MUNICH, within 12th Army Group's zone of action.

b. Between First French Army and Seventh Army: West of STUTTGART (inclusive) no change - Waldenbuck (S-0305) - TUBINGEN (W-9792) - thence along NECKAR River to ROTTWELL (W-6752) - BLUMMENFELD (W-7212), thence due south to Swiss Border (all to Seventh Army). As soon as STUTTGART is captured Seventh Army will have unrestricted running rights on the main highway through STUTTGAR, running south to TUBINGEN. In order that First French Army may continue its advance to the southeast in strength this boundary will be subject to change immediately upon defeat of the 19th German Army in the BLACK FOREST area.

3. a. Seventh Army.

(1) Complete regrouping rapidly and launch initial main effort on right, southwest up the Valley of the NECKAR River with a corps strong in armor and of high mobility. Seize the communication center formed by the triangle TUBINGEN - BALLINGEN - SIGMARINGEN, thereafter exploiting to the West, and south as far as the SWISS Border and assist First French army in destroying that portion of the German 19th army in the BLACK FOREST area. 13th Aibborne Division is available for employment in this operation in accordance with previous plans and instructions. If 13th Airborne Division is used in an airborne role prior to 23 april First Allied airborne Army will be given 72 hours prior notice; thereafter First allied Airborne army will be given a minimum of 48 hours prior notice.

(2) Establish contact with Third army without delay and arrange for relief of elements of Seventh army by Third army Northeast of the new boundary

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- (3) Conform the advance of the left flank with the advance of Third Army and protect right (south) flank of 12th army Group. M intain contact with CG Third army for the purpose of coordinating this action.
- (4) Isolate AUGSBURG and MUNICH and thereafter advance rapidly south blocking the exits of the BRENNER PASS leading north from the INNSERUCK area in zone of action.
 - (5) See sub-paragraph x.
 - b. First French army.
- (1) Continue strong action between the RHINE and the BLACK FOREST and clear East bank of the RHINE.
- (2) Conform action in the STUTICART area to the advance of the right of Seventh army, enveloping STUTICART and capturing it from the west; coordinate this action with Seventh army.
- (3) Destroy elements of the German 19th army in the BLACK FOREST crec, seal the SWISS Border in zone in accordance with previous instructions, complete regrouping rapidly and be prepared for further advance to the southeast in a new zone of action.
- (4) Protect right (south) flank of Seventh army and right (south) flank 6th army Group.
 - (5) See sub-paragraph x.
- x. (1) Success in destruction of the German 19th army in the STUTTGART-BLACK FOREST area before it can escape to the SCHW.BISHER JURA will depend in a large measure on:
- (a) Close timing of the advance by First French army to capture STUTTGART with the launching by Seventh army of its main effort up the Valley of the NECKAR River. A premature advance by First French army in the STUTTGART area will be prevented by the Commanding General, First French army, who will maintain close liaison with Seventh army in order to accomplish the proper timing.
- (b) The speed and weight with which the main effort up the valley of the NECKAR River is launched by Seventh army and the maintenance of close lisison between this effort and the attack of First French army to capture STUTTGART. The Commanding General Seventh army will be responsible for keeping First French army fully informed in this regard.
- (2) Seventh army will assist First French army in the capture of STUTTGART by a blocking action from the cast within its zone of action.
- (3) A new directive will issue upon completion of clearing of the BLACK FOREST area.
 - 4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.
 - 5. No change in Current Signal Instructions.

PART I

- 1. After the distribution of Part I to limited addressees, the following messages were disputched as modifications:
- a. Message BX-13135 dated 20 april 1945 paraphrased as follows:
- (1) Seventh army First French army boundary is changed as follows: West and north of STUTTGART (inclusive) no change thence along the NECKAR River to junction with FILS River and thence along NECKAR River to ROTWELL (3-6652)(all to Seventh army exclusive of ROTWELL) ROTWELL SIGMAFINGEN (X-1144)(both to First French army).
- (2) Instructions in basic letter directing Seventh army to exploit south of the boundary set forth in par. (1) above between the points of ROTWELL SIGM.RINGEN are revoked.

Top Secret ...

- E. Message BX-13260 dated 22 ..pril 1945 paraphrased as follows:
- (1) The following temporary boundary change agreed upon between the Seventh army and the First French army is confirmed:

North of REUTLINGEN no change - from REUTLINGEN (X-0989) thence along in to Bammertingen (X-1062) and SIGM, FINGEN (X-1043) (all to First French Army).

(2) The following bound ry between Seventh army and First French army will become effective on a date to be announced after the capture of STUTTGAT:

West of LAUFFEN no change - from LAUFFEN slong RR to ASFENG (S-0235) - FJ (Autobahn) at (R-938211 thence along autobahn to RJ at (S-0911)(all to Seventh Army) METZINGEN - DESTINGEN (X-1993) - MUNSINGEN - BEHNGEN - REINSTETTEN (X-6448) (all to First French Army) - KEMPTEN - HOFFEN (D-2279) (to Seventh Army). Seventh Army will have equal running rights on all roles north of the LAISRUHE-STUTTGLET railroads. On the autobahn between the autobahn junction west of STUTTGLET railroads. On the autobahn between the autobahn junction west of STUTTGLET and BEANHAUSEN the First French Army will have equal running rights.

- (3) Paragraph $3\underline{a}$ (1) of Letter of Instructions Number 14 assigning mission to Seventh army is cancelled.
- (4) Advancing southeast the First French arry will occupy that part of GERMANY in Zone, block the passes in Western AUSTRIA between LAKE CONSTANCE and HOFEN and seal the SWISS border in accordance with previous instructions.
- (5) Armies will expedite necess my action to establish boundary set forth in par. (2) above, and will promptly effect limison with each other for this purpose.
- C. Message BX-13351 dated 24 April 1945 paraphresed as follows:
- (1) First French army will advence with strong mobile forces to repidly seize BREGENZ-FELDKI CH area scaling the AUSTHAN SWISS border and there fiter be prepared to continue the advance to capture LaNDECK (V-4144).
- (2) The Seventh army will advance rapidly with the main effort on the right, with strong mobile forces to block the passes into AUSTIA along the GEREAN border in zone preventing the excape of the withdrawing enemy from the north, and thereafter dispatch strong mobile forces to seize the HUNSBIUK-BEREA PASS area and thereafter be prepared to assist in the capture of LAUSECK by First French army.
- (3) Armics will prepare plans for resupply by ir. ..t 251100E april (% dnesday) army Commanders will report to Commanding General, 6th ad Hq to discuss this operation.
- D. Message BX-13610 dated 28 april 1945 paraphrased as follows:
- (1) Effective 272400 B april 1945 the following bound ry is established between 12th/6th army Groups:
- (2) Beginning at a point on the FLANCO-GELMAN International Boundary at (#28555) to a point at (#2866) thence along the Mastern and Northern LANDKAIESE boundaries of BERGZaBERN, LANDAU and SPEYEL to a point on the BRINE liver at (#25591)(all inclusive to First French army) thence north along the east bank of the BRINE liver to (##4640) a point on the present 6th/12th army Groups boundary thence as before.
- E. Message BX-13629 dated 28 April 1945, paraphrased as follows:
- (1) 12th/6th army Group boundary is: OFENHEIM-BALMSTLDT-VULZBURG-ANSELCH-FREISING (all to 12th army Group) EDLING-PAIEN (to 6th army Group) ST JUMANN thence along road to KETZBUHEL BRAMBURG LIENZ (to 12th army Group). Boundary is subject to adjustment in detail between Third and Seventh armies.
- (2) armies concerned are authorized to communicate direct for boundary detailed adjustments. Final adjustment will be reported to this headquarters. Boundary changes necessary to take advantage of the tactical situation in order that major objectives in southern kedoubt be seized quickly are also authorized between Seventh and Third army. This headquarters will be notified promptly of such changes.

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SECRETA

I. Wesser BY-13676 duted 28. pril 1945 party and is isticus!

Effective at once the boundary between the Seventh army and First French army is modified as follows:

- (1) No change west of LAUFFEN (S-0353) from LAUFFEN thence slong RR to LUDWIGG-BURG (S-0633) and KCKNUESTHEIM (S-0630) (with mershalling yerds inclusive) - MULHAUSEN (S-0928) - WALBLINGEN (S-1526) (all to Seventh army) - FLOCHINGEN (S-2313) (to First Pr French army) - thence southwest along the NECKAR River to its junction with the present boundary at (S-125020) - thence as before.
 - (2) The following will be for the unrestricted use of Seventh army:

autobahn from ASPERG at (S-0235) to AJ (R-9321) to stream crossing at (S-2009).

HR from KONN/ESTHEIM to PLOCHINGEN and WALBLINGEN.

From junction with autobahn at S-0129 Highway No. 10 to PLOCHINGEN.

From KOLNWESTHEIM Highway No. 27 to MJ with Highway No. 10 at (S-0526).

From RJ with Highway No. 10, Highway Number 14 at (3-0824) to WALBLINGEN

From RJ at (S-098240 Highway east of and pralled to NECKAR River to PLOCHINGEN.


- (3) As prescribed in message EX-13260 dated 22 April, Seventh Army will retain joint use of railroads and roads north of and including autobahn from STUTTGART to KARLSKUHE.
- G. Message BX-13776 dated 30 april 1945 paraphrased as follows:
- (1) The present boundary between Seventh army and First French army is extended forward of HOFEN (D-2279) as follows:

HOFEN - HOLNEACH (D-0666) - HAGENAU (C-9553) - KAPP (V-2536) - NAUDERS (V-3317) all inclusive Seventh Army.

- (2) In addition to the INNSETUCK BLENNET PASS area, Seventh army will capture the LANDECK (V-3944) area.
- (3) When assigned objectives are seized, recommaissance forward will be made immediately and rapidly, and contact between armies on their interior flanks will be made within the Redoubt area.
- (4) The Seventh army will be prepared to move to the east with its east Corps, and assist Third army after copture of the INNSERUCK - HAENNER PASS area and clearing the valley of the INN southwest of AUFSTEIN (E-3497).
- H. Message BX-13823 dated 1 May 1945 paraphrased as follows:
- (1) The coordinates of HCFEN contained in paragraph 1 of BX-13776 should read: HOFEN (D-1081).
- I. Message BX-13946 dated 3 May 1945 paraphrased as follows:
- (1) The 6th Army Group will capture SalzBURG and seize the BRUCK (E-86) MaDSTADT area and occupy that part of AUSTALA in its zone in addition to its previous mission. The boundary between 6th and 12th army Groups follows:


No change northwest of FREISING (inclusive) - MUHLDOAF - thence along the INN River to its confluence with the Salzach River (to 6th army Group) - Salzach CHEMEN (to 12th army Group) - BAD ISCH - SCHLADMING - MAUTERNDOAFVILLACH (all to 6th army Group). Boundary between armies no change.

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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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





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


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


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




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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED **FIRST** GENERAL SURVEY. l. The retivity of the C.I.S. as noticeably decreased during this pariod. No specific instructions seem to have been given in case of a deep allied advence and the majority of agents arrested had no assigned b. Former about 12 ders are almost all hostile to Nazism because of the absorption of the About by the SD and are for the moment inactive. Many how attempted to rating to the country, hiding as hermlags civilians. The About chiefs, associally those returned from the Eastern front, are noping for eventual hostilities between the Allies and Russians to be mait the continuation of the About. SECURITY CONTROL OF CIVILIAN POPULATION. l. The 42nd CIC Detenment reports that road block check points to prohibit the circulation of civilian personnal have been menned by German civilians. The use of this persons has worked to a distinct advantage. Such personnal has taken its assignments seriously. In many instances, German civilians turned over to the 42nd CIC Detectment SS personnal attanting to evade century. 2. CIO agants stoned a vahiel cont ining five men in civilian elethins vie Tittmening (V-7453), 10 sky whose only identification before with "Ersetz Soldbuchs", showing near, dits of birth, rank, data of entry into "chrmicht and data of discharge, but they bore typical "affen SS blood-groun tittooing, and hid some laffen SS scuipment in the vahiels. They carried a total of 12,000 poorly countainfait durks in 50 serk notes, which they aloned was their must ring out pay and that they believed it to be senuin currency. The money was printed on very poor-grade of the without wat remark and all bearing the same a riel number, 2-06047727. 3. During an investigation on 8 day 1945, it was found that a sprious thrat the shearity existed in the Therman The 17 SS Division "Goots von 8 rliching n' ned sure ndard to the American forces. The SS enlisted personal was kent in so nelly guard dewenges; the SS officers was a radiated to keep bill to of their own choice. Military Government authorities was not or sent in the town and ourse regulations was anknown. We are sult the giveling population was frightened and was related to the term of civilians found themselves being ordered about by SSTW rooms. Proof wishing to conserve with the Allied occupation forces was assembled. There is traced and the situation is under control. KINDEL, expecity of 2,500 to 3,000.
LINDSU, expecity of 1,000.
KURISRUE, expecity of 5,000 to 8,000.
BUDEN BUDEN, expecity of 800 to 1,000.

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In addition, each division and corps has sot up a detention where suspects are detained before they are sent to these priming to sent to these primings.

SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS (LIBERATED TERRITORIES)

Nothing to report.

RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS (GERMANY)

- 1. There is little evidence of widespreed resistance groups other than the Werewolf. The relatively few reported instruces of Werewolf activity appear to represent the efforts of small, isolated groups, either inspired by redio propagands or by the efforts of an individual who may have been indectrinated initially by an organization but was no longer ander any contralized control. At present there seems to be an overwhelming sentiment among the German people that further resistance is futile.
- 2. It may be also that the Werewolf is actually stronger than the slight present activity indicates but that its real activity will not begin until occupational troops will be spread more thinly and the population will be less happy about the disappearance of the Nazi influence.
- 3. A discovery of an important arm cache was made in a forest near St. Georges which contained miscellaneous explosives and antipersonnel mines.
- 4. Gunther Mannerz, who surrendered to MG, Kempten (X-9205),
 3 May in the hope of compromising his organization to secure peace
 stated he was a special courier for a newly-formed organization called
 EISA, operating in Gau Wurttemburg. This organization was ordered into
 being by HIMMLER in January 1945 on a nation-wide basis, for the purpose of continuing the SD underground, terrorizing the population and
 preventing it from cooperating with occupation authorities and killing
 all those who threatened the existence of the organization. The group
 is under the leadership of Hauptsturmfuehrer RENNDORFER (cover name
 REINHART) and includes 122 mm and 40 woman who are divided into groups
 of not more than five, with a complex system of message conters and
 chain of commend. The headquarters has connections with a higher scholor
 and contact will be made with all Werevolf groups, the SD, Gestape and
 Sipe. The same informant told of an additional and possibly related
 organization SONDERVERGINDUNG, which is being organized as a national
 naws and intelligence agency, in order to gather a complete picture
 of life in occupied Germany morals of the people and troops, collaborators with the Allies, those working with Military Government, CIC,
 Security Police atc.
- 5. On 15 April 1945, ten (10) Hitler Jugend were arrested at lensheim, Auerbach, all of whom were reported by informants to be constic Nazis and each of whom had sworn to kill on American soldior. They had received the following instructions as to how they should be ave after the occupation of American troops:
- a. To wait for orders which would be furnished secretly conrning acts of sabotage, killing of Allied Soldiers, atc.
- b. To remain good National Socialists and never to accept nother dectrins whatever the Americans should try to make them believe and to suppress all attempts at re-education. These boys had also accept d instructions in the handling of various weapons such as bistols, if its and hand granedes. One of the boys made a speech in which he is a ship that there were taked his bitter-end distance as a satisfact, the fight.

RELATIONS BETWEEN CI STAFFS AND PERSONNEL AND LOCAL AUT CRITIES AND POLICE (LIBERATED TERRITORIES)

Nothing to report.

ATTITUDE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND POLICE TO CI STAFFS AND PERSONNEL (GERMANY)

Reports indicate that the local police appointed by Military Covernment have been operating satisfactorily throughout the area and, where called upon, have shown a willingness to cooperate with CI staffs and personnel.

RELATIONS BETWEEN TROOPS AND CIVILIAN POPULATION (LIBERATED TERRIFORIES ONLY)

Nothing to report.

F. SPECIAL CASES OF CI INTEREST

- 1. WAGNER, alias WINTER, alias WALTER; Lt.; (SHAEF Pink Card 49472), Chi of Section III F 3 of the Dijon S.D., then an officer in F.A.LT. 358 which later became FAK 314; where he was chief of the Belfort Office and then chief of the LORRAGE Office. Sent to SM, First French Army rear.
- 2. DUERR, Hans clies BERGER; Faldwabel; essistent to WAGNER in Dijon, then Chief of the office of FAT 353. Sont to SM, First French Army rear.
- 3. FIRMIN, Christian: After having served 2% months in the L.V.F., joined the R.N.P. where he was active (carried on probagands, assisted the S.S., aided in making arrests among the Macuis). Joined the Brandenburg Division and became an agent recruiter. Sent to B. DOC Paris to be tried.
- 4. FOURMEAUX, Pierre Eugene eless FREMOND ali s CAMUS Jean, alias FERNAND; S.D. agent in Paris charged with prosecuting Jews whose papers were not in order, then an agent of FMT 357. Sent to SM, First French Army rear.
- 5. DONDELINGER, Edmind alias Dr. Linger; Luxembourgien; agent of NOSEK of the S.D. in Paris, then Director of Radio Information (Informations Radiophoniques) at STUTIGERT. Case mending.
- 6. X----, Abwahr Officer who belonged to Sections I and III of Abwahr Ost; gave himself up. Given to T.R.
- 7. X----, G.I.S. Agant left behind with a radio trensmitter. Given to T.R.
- 8. ROGAT, Maurice sliss LUCAS, Reymond alies LURICE. Deport do France by the Swiss Federal Police ofter having crossed the German Swiss border elahdestinely, he admitted having been diven a mission by POINSOT. He was supposed to gether administrative information, information on travel control, and to contact a number of the Dijon Police. Case pending.
- 9. DIZTAN, Paul. Condemned in 1942 for an attempt against the sourity of the State. Freed by the Germans, he join d the Waffen S. Attended the espionage school at Oberkirch. Did not corry out by missions. Surrender d voluntarily to the French troops. Case anding.

10. VALENTIN, Harmann. Mamber of the Sondarkommando HAGENDÓRN. urrandorad voluntarily to Franch troops. Sant to S.M., First Franch rmy rear.

11. MAIZACHER, Fritz alias WALZ. (SHAEF Pink Cord 48465). Chief

11. SEIDEL, Elza. Worked for the military administration; admits ing received a mission from a IC officer of the 18th S.S. A.K. raished the Allies information on the Warswolf Kommandos in the area.

12. GERSTLAUER, Karl. Chief of the S.D. at Altkirch; took part in the deportation of Alsatians. Hed built up an informant network, a certain number of whom were not already known. Sent to S.M., First French Army rear.

at LCRRACH where he continued his activities. Sent to S.M., First French Army rear.

14. DEMANCE, Bernard Pierre Albert. Worked at Sigmeringen on propaganda directed towards foreign workers and prisoners. Arrested while attempting to return to France. Admits having been contacted by LAGARDERE (Sonderkommando H.GENDORN) with a view to carrying out a radio mission in France. Returned to France for trial.

15. PUJOL, Elodia. S.D. agent at CHAMBERRY; followed her lover, a German officer, into Germany, together with DEM NGE had accepted a mission into France in order to be able to return to France. Sent to B. DOC Lyon for trial.

16. DELBREIL, Paul; P.P.F., member of the Group D'Action; followed the P.P.F. into Germany and took a course in an espionage school and then in a sabotage school. Sent to S.M., First Franch army rear.

17. D'HUMIERES, Andoin; Milician; instructor at the Milice Court (Tribunal D'Honneur) at Ulm. Turned over to S.M., First French Army

18. KNAUT, Heinrich; secretary to Dr. UNSERBERG alias GIB.RD of AST Lyon. Sent to S.M., First French army rear.

19. DUPUIS, Rene Andre. Member of the L.V.F., belonged to the Kondor network. Sent to S.M., First French army rear.

20. BRECHBUHLER, Firtz. Mayor of Ostheim (Heut-Rhin, Alsace). Followed the Germans during their retreat. Transferred to B. DOC Mulhouse for further investigation.

21. SAILLY, Michel. Milicien; member of Brandenburg Division. se pending.

22. TURGY, Jean; G.I.S. agent; admits having carried out a litary reconnaissance mission. (Gasolina, munitions, supplies, etc.). rned over to B. DOC Strasbourg for trial.

PRO-ALLIED AND ANTI-NAZI ORG.NIZATIONS (GERMANY ONLY)

1. Small anti-Nazi groups are now in existence. Most of these operated and largest are the FAB (Freiheits Aktion Bayern-Fredom for varia) which gained control of Munich's broadcasting facilities for varial hours on 30 April, and the Bayerian Auxiliary Police. The tear undertook to patrol the streets and attempted to propagandize a civilian populate to maintain order and refrain from looting. The organizations were instrumental, in some instances, in securing a surrender of towns and have been generally cooperative with ocpaying troops, both in maintaining order and informing on persons of interest. FAB is under invastigation to determine possible political appiration or use as a cover for former high Nazis.

ALLES EN

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED 264.55 2. There are two somewhat larger and older groups, in of which the TURICUM. A Hans BETT, of Mittenwald (D-6577) claims to have length of the founders of this organization in 1940 and that some of the members were active as early as 1933. Purpose of it is to facilitate Allied control after victory and to promote German understanding and cooperation. BENTZ states that the group engaged in passing important military information to the Allies while the were was still in progress, that the organization should now number about 2,000, though most of the members are as yet unknown because of the scaret menner of organization, deaths, etc. and that there was a parallel organization formed in Switzerland in 1940 by a Dr. I. C. MEYER, Zurich. 3. The Free Austrian Movement in Tyrol is a composite of several resistance groups brought togeth r by a Dr. Gunther, a native of innsbruck, whose statement indicates that, although he joined the Nazi Party prior to Hitler's advent to power, he was not a supporter of the regime and was, in fact, on the Gestape "Want.d" list. He began to organize an Austrian r sistance novement personally and through agents in 1941-42. In April 1945 he came to Innsbruck to consolidate the various resistance groups in this area. His group wears brassards in Austria's colors. l. Upon arrival of .merican troops all children would be taken from their parents and shipped to the United States as slave laborers, which resulted in some families hiding their children until satisfied that the rumor was ill-founded.

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RESTRICTED PART II. MILITARY SECURIT

GENERAL SURVEY.

1. Military security remained at a high level throughout the period. In spite of the large area covered, the previous concentration in that area of hostile civilians, and the thinly spread actuarity forces, only one major mess of possible sabotage was affected. A general relexation of security consciousness followed the cossition of hostilities. A new threat to the security of personnel is seen in the friendly attitude of the German population.

2. In March of 1945 the G.I.S. give its different services instructions for the setting up within Germany of we network of staybehind agents who were to function after the retrect of the German troops. The agents were to be aspecially required among young women, stadisly train defor this purpose. The rapid retreat of the troops did not allow time for these agents to receive their schooling but nevertheless requirement had taken alone and therefore there are persons on German soil who have had contact with the G.I.S. and who might eventually receive missions.

B. SECURITY OF INFORM TION.

1. The Burgerm ister of Geenwent (S-4839) found and turn dower to 307 CIC offile binder containing secret correspond need lost by an Allied officer was recovered from a German officer Ph. Four vanieties of the 93 Arad. Fa. Bn. were abushed on 21 april nor 25 probable (S-3214) and a number of all seified documents lost.

2. CIC Ditachments have stressed the neutralization of civil commanications systems, many of which were left in operation during the fact moving situation. Two radio transmitters, now replant and secondary endeath were located in a bank rest friedburg. The installation was previously as d by NSDLP for communication with Berlin. The scalement was removed by Signal Corps troops.


C. SECURITY OF MATERIAL

1. During the finel d ys of the fighting, telephone lines were from antly out. This can be attributed to acts of distruction on the part of an my military personnel midden in regions not yet antirely class due, rather than to acts of atry-behind school grassiants.

2. On 4 My 1945 a triple explosion thich caused the death of 120 persons occurred in a berrocks accounted by Russi n Displaced P resons in Off aburg. The explosive were not up of wooden boxes contains and for ir reid of family, the bottom of which a nowder thing, the color of and had been also death a clockwork detenator. Sons of the explosive were also found in his a running from a water that. The attention of everyon was drawn to the possibility of the explosion of such equipment in occupied areas.

5. Upon ant ring Wingblen th. 42 SIO Dat. recaived information of sarial bombs alored blong highways ant ring the town. Investigation revealed 15 fund bombs (250 kg) had been alored order to the grivel of troops and that determine was alonged to be recommissed by ling-terminers later. Six persons, one a German soldier in civilian clothes, were accepted a naving halord in the placing of the charges, and rethe supervision of the order appearability (who had flod) who received his order from an anidantified Luftweff officer.

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
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED RET SECRET PART III - FRONTIER SECURITY 1. GENERAL SURVEY (1) German-Swiss Border: Posts have been established at LORGACH, DONAUESCHINGEN, CONSTANCE, LINDAU, DORNBIRN, FEIDKIRGH. AUTHORIZED CIVILIAN TRAVELLERS DISPLACED PERSONS g. Estimated numbers of Suthorized Displaced Persons ellowed to cross frontiers: SECRET

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED Guarding of the border is divided into 5 zenes: The prohibited zone has been totally evacuated only in the pocket at SCHAFFELUTE because of the difficulties of guarding the area. Elsewhere the evacuation was restrict d to persons who have resided in the zone less than 1 year. This total execuation has not been corried out because of the secondaic difficulties it would have counsed and above all in order not to interfers with the interests of the numbers of sies elitions in the zone. For exemple, at RHENFELDER an important electrical country was espital, direction, and personnel are Swiss, distribute now react only to Germany but also to Switzerland which herealf experts ourt of the power to France. Inspections have shown that the control boots and the petrols we consciontiously corrying out their duties, but that there was still much to be done in the way of putting up borb wire barriers and laying mines to delineate the zon. This is due to the lock of transportationed to bring the necessary material to the blocks where it is to be all the control of the property of the control of the property in the control of the property in the property of the prope RELATIONS WITH ALLIED FRONTIER CONTROL AUTHORITIES. It is possible that a small number of individuals sight have succeeded in crossing the borders in saits of the proceeding taken.

These cases are exceptions and the number will discrete as the work is curried out and as the units of and with the guarding of the border receive more instructions concerning their task.

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The following report of Counter-Intelligence interest has been extracted from reliable sources.

REPORT ON ATTITUDE OF PEOPLE IN HEIDELBURG


The following is a list of observations concerning the attitude of the people of Heidelberg as reported by a confidential informant. This report is divided into two phases, viz, the attitude of the people immediately after the American occupation, and the attitude of the

A. Immediately after American occupation.


- 2. The people were surprised and estendished that they were not immediately enslaved by the americans after the American Forces occupied Germany, because they had been told through German propaganda that the americans would enslave Europe, killing off the women and children.

- The German people felt that the behavior of the American soldiers was correct and just.
 The German people greatly admired the construction of the wooden bridge across the Nocker River and also the fact that they were permitted to use this bridge. They thousant that they would be drefted to build the bridge and not permitted to use it. During the construction of the bridge, many German people were heard contrasting the American soldier and the German soldier, and they admired the individuality and initiative of the American soldier and saw that he knew his perticular job and that he could and did work without the constant and usual shouts of commands as is found in the German Army.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED '6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT 6th Army Group Front Line at Time of Surrender (061200 B Hours) of Army Group "G" Along the Swiss - LICHTENSTEIN - AUSTRIAN Border at C 3653, C 4150, BLUDENZ (Z 8346), RANKTEIL (C 4554), C 4460, C 4864, DORNBIEN (C 5269), C 5275, C 6482, C 6982, C 7386, IMMENSTADT (C 8686), MITTELERIC (C 8261), C 9271, HINDELANG (C 9881), GRAN (D 1281), D 0164, "ELZAN (C 9252), D 0759, D 1261, BODEN (D 1858), D 2058, NAMLOS (D 2156), D 1567, EHNBICHL (D 2478), D 2775, UNTERCARTEN (D 3672), D 3468, D 3163, D 2958, D 2753, V 4851, PERFUCHS (V 3844), OFSTEIG (D 4161), D 3663, GRISEN (D 4279), D 5480, KRUNZBACH (D 6280), D 5065, D 5563, D 5160, D 6457, INNSBRUCK (D 4279), D 5480, KRUNZBACH (D 6280), D 5065, D 5563, D 5160, D 6562, KINDL (E 2083), (D 7556), W 0643, VITIFENO (T 0415), REFENERO (T 1126), D 7956, D 9562, KINDL (E 2083), T 1985, E 1079, D 9467, MUHLAU (D 7961), D 6860, D 6264, SCHARNITZ (D 6771), D 6661, TALLGAU (D 6786), Y 1300, MURBACK (Y 8802), Z 0902, Z 1907, Z 3009, Z 3103, PICHL (E 1885), E 2083, WORG (E 2685), OBERNDORF (Z 3700), Z 3820, UBERSEE (Z 5525), Z 8423, Z 8417, Z 7617, Z 7615, BAD REICHENHALL (Z 8515), Z 9113, Z 9304, BERCHTESGADEN (Z 9606), ST LEONHARD (Z 9817), SALZEURG (Z 9925), LAUFEN (Z 8841), BURCHAUSEN (Z 7964), Z 8770. (Z 7964), Z 8770. b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHULZ). Surrendered unconditionally at 061200B Hours. (1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH) The semblance of organization heretofore maintained by First German irmy disappeared during this period and surrender was made of piecemeal units when the end arrived. The army was completely impotent in the face of Allied thrusts as the end arrived. The army was completely impotent in the face of Allied thrusts as far east as SALZBURG and south beyond the Italian border. Thatever resistance the enemy still offered in the northern approaches of the ALPS between TALCHEN SEE (D 79) and KUPSTEIN (E 3395) became futile when our drive through the INN Valley threatened At the end of the period the only divisions still capable of temporary organized resistance werd 38 SS Grenadier Division under LXXXII Corps, holding along the INN east of MUHLDOFF (Z 5372); 407 Mobilization Division and 17 SS Panzer Grenatier Division, both withdrawing south of the INN River under control of XIII SS lorps. The following First irmy divisions were decimated to less than 500 combat lorps. The following First irmy divisions were decimated to less than 500 combat infantry effectives and were considered destroyed for all practical purposes: 9, 19, 16, 79, 212, 553 Volksgrenadier; 198, 416 Infantry; 2 Mountain; 151 Field Training; and von HOBE Divisions. to cut off these positions. LXXXII Corps was responsible for the right and XIII SS Corps for the eft half of the army front. There is no evidence of the existence of XIII army During the last phase First lamy lost approximately 230,000 prisoners of war. Most of these were from a large array of miscellaneous units and from service suffits. This total also accounts for the destruction of the majority of the army's invisions. 9 Hungarian Infantry Division surrendered intact with approximately 9,000 thristons. 9 Hungarian Infantry bivision surrendered intact with approximately 9,000 has and is included in the above total. The combat infantry strength of 17 and 38 Divisions, 407 Mobilization Division, and of other divisional rammants was estited to be 7,000. orps which was previously overrun. Captured documents confirmed the enemy's intention to defend the so-called Redoubt" area. Army Group 3 was ordered to retreat to the ALPS. However, it was beadly disorgenized them it reached the mountain bastion that, even with favorable min, a successful stand was out of the question.

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(Z) Nineteen German irmy (CG: Lt. Gen. BR.ND.

Wine to otherway for teamy being able to rally its tarassed forces, lost he biggest part of the divisions till at its disposal. The bray put up a very feeble efense of the northwestern part of the lipine area.

Not a single Nineteenth Army division was capable of effective defensive action. The following divisions all have a combat infantry strength of less than 500: 47, 139, 245, 257, 559 Volksgrenadier and 465 Mobilization Divisions. Sport from miscellaneous units, These constitute the only combat forces at the disposal of the Army. Their combat infantry effectives were estimated to total 3,000 men. The Army lost approximately 100,000 prisoners during the period.

Nineteenth Army was completely isolated by the meeting of illied forces south of the RRIBER Pass. With hostile troops to its front, hear, and right flank, and STITZERLUD on its left, the Army surrendered.

More recently agents mentioned the larry staff as moving south from BREGENZ, probably into the heart of the ALPS. Furthermore, a captured document placed the First Indian Legion under Twenty-fourth larmy. This legion was identified southeast of Lake CONSTINZ along the Swiss border.

The units under command of T stity-fourth immy never amounted to more than a skeleton force of low-grade, missel ansous outfits, most of which the enemy was wary of committing to action. However, these units were absorbed by the Nineteenth German irmy during the last days and only the staff of Twenty-fourth irmy remained at the time of eapitulation.

3. 6TH 'RMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

The surrender of General von VIETINGHOFF, German Cormander in Chief Southwest, and SS General TOLFF, Supreme Commander of SS and Police in Italy, became effective at 1200 hours GMT on 2 May. "Ith this capitulation, hostilities on the 5th irmy Froup Alpine Front officially consed.

There was little activity on the Albine Front during the period. The energy withtrawal began in the coastal area with the departure of the 34 German Infantry Didision on the might of 23/24 april. It was followed by 5 German Meuntain Division
and the Italian "ONTE ROSA and LITTORIO Divisions which began their departure on
the night of 24/25 april. The decay withdrawal in the area from the coast to
solfornewree (K 4503) was completed between 23 april and 27 april. The units were
to move to BOLZANO by way of TRENT, the days being allowed for completion of the
sove. One battalion of the 100 Mountain Regiment had managed to reach T 6177 by
38 Abril but there it surrendered in toto. The remainder of 5 Mountain Division
and 34 Infantry Division had arrived in the TURE area by 29 april. Blocked by
Partisans, the city was bypassed on the west and the major period beth divisions
oved north toward IVREA (J 2270). Harrassed by Partisans and cut off from Germany,
with divisions assembled south of IVREA and awaited the Allies. "Attempts by the
artisans on 3 May to obtain a surrender were fruitless as the Germans wished to
arrender to regular forces.

The two Italian Divisions, LITTORIO and MONTE ROSA disinterrated after leaving or positions on the Franco-Italian border, their members surrendering to Partisens

OPER'TIONS

a. SOUTHERN GERMANY

As the period opened, all organized r Sistance in the Black Forest, the bian Jurn, and on the Konstanz Poninsula coased. Only disorganized small groups enemy delayed the Allied push east. The entire north shore of Lake CONSTANZ and secity of FRIEDRICHERIPM (C 3196) was cleared on 30 April. Small enemy groups in back to BREDRIC (C 5281) and HOZENTIDT (C 8788) where attempts were and to be the passes linding into the Austrian panhandle. Both tewns were cleared by 2 and everconing ineffective exposition, friendly forces pushed south along the lies berder and along the lies berder and along the lies berder and along the lies berder. By 4 May BLUDENZ (Z 8348) Manual Constant and the lies berder and along the lies are the lies berder and along the lies are the lies berder and along the lies are the lies ar

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hoon occupied.

LXXX Corps, with only remnants of few divisions remaining, fell back the Austrian alps, attempting to delay and to block the passes behind them. On 1 May, Lieutenant General FRINZ BAYER (CG LXXX Corps) and his Chief of Staff, Colonel DISTLIN were captured, thus ending the career of LXXX Corps. Allied forces pushed south along the LZCH and OBERAU Valleys, overcoming difficult terrain, roadblocks, and demolitions. GEMISCH (D 5582) was reached on 29 April. At FUSSEN (D 2389) Fieldmarshal "THEEM RITTER VON LZEB was captured and at GEMISCH Fieldmarshal WILHELM LIST was taken prisoner." South of MITTER LIST was taken prisoner. South of MITTER LID (D 6577) the approaches to the Inn Valley were defended by fanatical Hitler Youth and other small groups. Numerous obstacles retarded progress. Negotiations for the surrender of INNSERUCK failed but Allied forces met little resistance after entering the Inn Valley and INNSERUCK was occupied against negligible opposition on 3 May. From here, allied forces pushed rapidly south, schuring the ERENDER Pass and linking up with other forces pushing up from Italy on 4 May. Advances were also made along the Inn River and by 4 May TORC (E 2685), to the east, and INST (D 2753), to the west, had been reached against little opposition.


By 28 ipril, the First German impy had lost iNGSBURG and its battered forces were deployed on a north-south line along the LECH River and east along the DINUBE River. From this line, enemy infantry with tank support fought delaying actions back toward MINNICH. Only light and scattered contact was made by friendly units in the IMMER (Y 54) and IMMER (Y 62) Lakes region as the northern suburbs of MINICH were reached on 29 ipril. The Dachau Concentration Camp (Y 7569), containing 32,000 political prisoners, was defended by 300 SS troops. These were overcome and the camp was liberated at 2920008 irril. During the night, enemy artillery fire was placed on the town of DICHIU. Resistance in MUNICH broke during the afternoon of 30 ipril and by midnight, the entire city had been cleared. Thus MUNICH, the cradle of Naziism, fell to the victorious illied forces.

Beaten remaints fell back as friendly units advanced south and east from MUNICH. Armor driving down the Autobahn reached the Inn River at Z 2721 against negligible resistance. At Y 9049, 100 planes in good condition were captured and at Y 9754, 10 jet type planes were taken as little contact was made southeast of MUNICH. At Bid TOELZ on 1 May, Fieldmarshal GERD VON RUNDSTEDT, the epitome of Junker aristocracy, became the illies' foremost prisoner of war. On the same day, the infamous Admiral HORTHY of Hungary also was made prisoner. The 9 Hungarian Infantry Division surrendered to friendly units at Z 2155 on 2 May. The advance east along the foothills of the LPS met only light and scattered small arms fire. ACHERT (Z 1927) was taken during the evening of 2 May as the Germans, having heard of HITLER'S death, prematurely celebrated the end of the war. A push south from ROSENHEIM (Z 1927) along the Inn River reached MORG (E 2685) on 4 May where a juncture was made with forces driving along the Ill River from the west. SALZHURG (Z 9524) surrendered as Allied troops raced east along the Autobahn, reaching that town on 4 May. While SALZHURG was being occupied, another column sped southward against little opposition to capture BERCHTESGIDEN (Z 9506). HITLER'S mountain retreat, DER BERCHOF, was reported on fire as capturing units approached.


b. LPINE FROM

Southern Zone: On 28 'pril, friendly troops on the coast fell back from SORDICHER! (S 8986) to VENTIMICH! (S 8587); the line of forward troops then run through TEND! (N 8820) and along the RQIA to its mouth on the coast east of TENTIMICH!. To the north, VINADIO (N 5647) was bypassed and the following day contact was established with elements of the Central zone at PliNCHE (N 5148). Meanine, on 28 April, fighting was reported in CUNEO between German troops and Partisans. The town was declared clear the next day. On 30 April an Allied reconnaissance courted LIMONE (N 8833) reached the north end of TENDE tunnel (N 8731). The enemy remained quiet until the surrender on 2 May.


Central Zone: At the beginning of the period, DEMONTE (N 6647) and BESTRIERES Pass (H 3922) were reached and a junction was effected with southern troops to PINNCHE. A prisoner of war reported that the general withdrawal from the central tree began on 24/25 April. On 29 April OULZ (K 5414), BARDONNECHE (K 4318), CESANNE K 5203), and the main villages of the QUEYR'S (P 47) region were occupied. In the URIN area, elements of the 34 Infan ry Division were fighting northwest of the city on 30 April. The next day, the division was reported bypassing TURIN in a move to the northwest on the route: ORBASSANO (H 9222), RIVOLI (H 9029), CASSALE (I 0934).



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


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3 April 1945 Snemy activities in Forward areas, and Units in Contact. Along the front from BANE to BENGREA to SENTIMARY, elements of 15 higher formations may be contacted. From Fouth to North, the following units have been identified: 6. 905 Volksgrenadier Sivision - higher head quarters controlling miscellaneous 7. Division RABBARNS - Feed quarters controlling fortress units formerly in the MERCHANT Line. 8. 47 Volksgrensdier Division - badly battered remnants which escaped from the 11. 719 Volksgrenadier division - considered destroyed. 12. 169 Volksgrenatior Division - still trying to reform after its destruction and total overall strength of all these units (including MEGERIAD line, training units, and field formations) is estimated at a maximum of 40,000/t0,000. Of these, no more than 3,000 10,000 can be accounted cumbat infantry effectives with any degree of mobility. the artillery strength includes an estimated 9 Rattallons in the SIRGERIND line with me mobility, some 10 divisional artillery battalions with little mobility, and appointmentally 15 mixed John Sattalions. As in the case of the infantry, lack of mobility will prevent concentration and effective use except from prepared positions. There are an estimated 20 tanks and SP guns available to the enemy in this area. more may be encountered in the vicinity of the panzer base at PFORZERM. The overer, no armored formation presently available. trategio Reserves here are no organized tactical units available as strategic reserves for this. Training units and hastily formed battalions may be brought up from the ingress of southern Germany, but only on a limited scale. In any case, they will be coment units rather than tactical formations and will at least be counterbalant



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HEADY TE STHARM CROUP Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 .PO 23, U. S. Army :By Authority of :CG, 6th Army Group :Initials: //:Date: 7 April 1945:

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 29

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 7 April 1945

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. SUMMARY OF THE ENERY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Army Group G controls two armies which have totally inadequate forces and, in addition, very weak flank contacts between themselves and with the adjoining armies. It is also confronted with the impossible task of holding every inch of German soil in order to prevent those penetrations into THURINGIA and BAVARIA which would demonstrate to the German people the useleness of further struggle.

The encirclement of Army Group B and the RUHR has created a military situation more unfavorable, if possible, than presently exists in South Central Germany. The result will be that Army Group G: priority for reinforcements will continue to be secondary. Only 'enrkreis XIII and VII remain to be combed out. The arrival, or even the reconstitution, of large armored forces daily becomes less of a potentiality as the productive capacity of the nation shrinks.

Seventh German Army, showing signs of some strength and organization only in the THURINGIAN Forest, is too weak in mobile forces to hold intact its thin, crust like line against releved and more determined Allied actions. The left flank of the army, extending to the vicinity of NURNEERG - URZEURG, is continuing to rall back after the capture of ACHAPTENBURG. The primary task of the army now is a maintain a cohesive front and contact with its flank neighbor. Its mission is to protect the great industrial center of DREJDEN - LEIPZIG - ERFURT.

First German Army has not received enough mobile forces to cut off the US bank units reaching CRAILSHEDI (S 7062), nor even sulficient effective infantry forces to organize positions which bear some relation to each other. Its left boundary has undoubtedly been shrunk to the area of STUTTGART from the Rhine River to order to assume a more positive control of its lower formations. The rapidly apanding front line becomes daily more brittle and, with enemy's uncertainty as the stability of his right flank, preservation of the army will be the only also no possible.

Nineteenth German Army, which only last week was under Army Group G, has and oubtedly returned to an independent army status responsible only to C in C Test. Coupled with its responsibility for reforming three divisions, it has found French and US forces approaching terrain features whereby its SIEGFRIED Line positions and the Black Forest were slowly being turned or at least outflanked. Certainly the army cannot hope to receive troops and reinforcements of any important size which will enable it to maintain its present positions. Slow disintegration will bring about its end.

b. Capabilities

The enemy is completely restricted to a single capability: to delay his defeat.


Enomy forces south of the line FULDA - ERFURT are incapable of preventing further large areas of the homeland from being overrun by Allied forces. Thile armor is surficient concentration is unavailable to combat friendly tank spearheads, the





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U M C L A S S I F I E D



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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED BERET 2. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRO.T (South The order of the course of the second of the course of the The known corps under this Army Group are reduced to four in number as a result of Mineteenth Army taking over XC and LXXX Corps west of the Neckar River. They are XIII Corps, XIII SS Corps, LXXXII Corps, and LXXXV Corps. The continued existence of LXXXIX Corps is doubted. 352 Volksgrenadier Division [CG:) was not contacted during the period. It is believed that chatever remained of its combat elements was overrun at the end of the last period at LLDUERN (N 1810) in our rapid drive toward (1) Seventh German Army (CG:) (Left Flank Units) 6 SS Mountain Division (CG: 3S Maj. Gen. ERENNER). A battle croup of this division was identified on 5 April south of FULDA. Prisoners state that this is a struggler group of 2-300 men this brokped from the east bank of the kinne between the Main and Lahn River. They are presently consolidated under sormand of 11 Mountain Regiment. The rest of the division was pocketed in the vicinity of N 09. 159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY), 1209
Volksgrenadier Regiment of this division was absorbed by 256 Volksgrenadier Division.
The rest of 169 Division, bolstered by some miscellaneous units, is still believed
to be operating independently south east of "ILDFLECKEN in area N 59. However, there
are indications that it is moving northeast via COBURG (O 2989). Organic 2 Panzer Division (CO: Col von LAUCHERT). An undated captured document reveals that some remnants of the division are absorbed by 256 Volksgrenation Division. Nevertheless, the division still appears to be operating independently as evidenced by the identification of 38 Panzer Engineer Battalion (2 Pz Div) on a ceril. The divisions present location is believed to be in area N 48. Combat 35 Volks, remadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. ELLM) distinguished itself in its stablern defense of ASCH FFERBURG from there it withdrew only after prolonged and coorly fight. Casualties were severe but were balanced by replaceints. At the end of the period, the division was holding a sector around N 4070 and had combut infantry strength of approximately 700. 255 Volksaremadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) appears to distill ope using independently despite previous reports of cannibalization. 1209 elksgremadier Regiment of 159 Volksgremadier Division, identified at N 2970 on april, is claimed by a prisoner to be under command of 256 Volksgremadier Division. addition, the division stable ad up some elements of 2-Panzer Division (by captured canent). No organic elements of 256 Volksgremadier Division were identified during a period. Remnants of 256 Volksgremadier Division and of absorbed units are timated at 1,200 combat infantry effectives. 416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER). Remnants of this livision were reported-fighting under 47 Volksgrenadier Division east of KARLSRUME. This conflicts with earlier statements and documentary evidence placing the different and headquarters and remnants in the ABCHLFIMBURG area. Since no recent contact with divisional elements has been made in the KARLSRUME area, it is probable that only scattered combat units were, in fact, subordinated to 47 Volksgrenadier Division. 416 Infantry Division staff is still in the general region of N 56. RESTRICTED SECRET

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(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

Through skillful coordination of the skeletal divisions remaining at its disposal with a large number of replacement, miscellaneous general headquarters, and Volkesturm units, First Army was able to temporarily reconstitute its forces sufficiently to make them capable of limited defensive actions. Though still too mask to block a full-scale Allied thrust, the army is capable of staging limit decounterattacks against armored spearheads and of extracting a fairly hack price for our capture of strategically wital features. A much more determined defensive attitude, particularly on the army's left flank, was evidence of the effort at roors misation that is taking place.

409 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Ggn. KLEIKNI) has administrative control over all remaining Tahrkreis IX replacement units. 15 replacement battaliens of Tahrkreis IX ere identified during the period by Seventh and Third US Armies. To of them (88 and 383 Granadier Replacement Battaliens) were absorbed by 1209 Volksgrenadier Replacement, 159 Volksgrenadier Division. Some were apparently subordinated to the field divisions, and yet another group of battaliens had the independent mission of defending part of the LOHR (N 3156) region. The commitment of some battaliens as a group suggests the possibility that 400 Divisional St fi was in operational as well as administrative command. However, it is more likely that the staff of one of the destroyed field divisions eventually assumed the operational command of its contribution. Present combat infantry streight of tehrkreis IX units facing 5th Army Group is estimated at 2,000. A few more battaliens, at best, remain to be committed.

413 Mobilization Division (CG:) is in administrative command of the remaining Chrkreis XIII training and reducement units. A group of these, including the ETULINGSN Mon-comissioned Of iter school, is committed east of URZBURG in area N 63. Certifices XIII has been milked of most of its replacement units during the past month. It is doubtful that more than a few are still uncommitted. Combat infantry strength of Certifices XIII units focing 6th Army Group is estimated at 1,500.

(a) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX JMON)

212 Volksgroundier Division (CG:). On 29 March, the division as reported to have been absorbed by 246 Volksgroundier Division. However, elements were identified on 4 April at N 5209. Furthe more, prisoners state that about 2,000 replacements were received from 'chrkreis XII and from B.WARIA. A part of these probably equate with Regiment BAYREUTH (Strength: 6-700) and Battle Group with. The division is presently located south of 'URLEUR'S in area N 50 - N 60. In view of recent casualties, combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,000.

9 Volks remadier Division (CO: Col. MOLE) was practically destroyed in the P LATIMIE. On 6 April the following identifications were made: 57 Volksgroundier Regiment at 3 4491; 116 Volksgroundier Regiment and 9 April from stragglers, those represent the first contact with the division east of the Reine. As yet no details regarding reorganization and replacements are available. Combut infantry strength is tentatively estimated at 1,000.

(b) XIII Corps (CG: ')

Lt. Gen. COUNT von ORIOLA, Commanding General of XIII Corps, was captured on 31 March. A captured document dated 29 March located the Corps Corpand Post at S 2172 and puts 16, 19, 246, 553 Volksgrenadier, and 17 59 Panzer Granadier Divisions under XIII Corps control. 16 Volksgrenadier Division has left the Corps while 719 Volksgrenadier Division has come under corpand of the Corps.

19 Volksgrandier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITAMINER) committed its remmants in area S 39 at the start of the period. Later, these were reported absorbed by 2 Mountain Division. 19 Volksgrandier Division, weak from the outset, lest 1,700 prisoners test of the Rhine after 13 March. 2 Mountain Division was enriched by not more than 300 combat infantry effectives. These are all that are believed to have survived the deback test of the Rhine River.

SECRET

IT 55 Inzer Grehadier Division (CO: CO: MENNO MERC).

CRETeceipt of con_derable, replacements from FRACU. and ALTKIRCHEM, the division assembled the bulk of its units at B D MERCHYHEEM (N 4700) on 1 April.

Most of the new personnel was very young and insufficiently trained but had a high morale. The division is now committed north of HEILBRONN in area S 17, where both 37 and 38 SP Panzer Grenadier Regiments were identified on 7 April. An united captured document shows 6:3 Tank Battalion as attached. 17 35 Division has always had a high replacement priority and its refittal is probably well under vay. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,500.

719 Infantry Division (CG:). Elements of this division were contacted in the KARLSRUFE area as late as 4 April. However, a shift to the east apparently took place, because on 5 April Battle Group KREBs, containing the remaints of 719 Division, was identified at R 9972. This battle group, incorporating the remaining combat infantry effectives of the division, is believed to contain about, 400 men.

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEMER) was decimated in its futile attempt to contain the OPPENHEIM bridgehead on the Rhine. 1119 and 1120 Volksgrenadier Regiments were identified at 5 2090 on 5 April, confirming the division's presence in this area. On 6 April, remains of both of these regiments were reported absorbed by 1121 Volksgrenadier Regiment. Each regiment had a commitment strength of about 500 combat effectives. At present, divisional combat infantry strength is not above 600.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) is currently holding the line around EPPINGEN (R 8560) flanked by elements of 2 Mountain Division on both sides. However, prisoners stated on 6 April 5 at division was to withdraw east of the Neckar River. 305 Grenadier Regiment was identified on 31 March, 308 and 326 Grenadier Regiments on 2 April at R 6683. 305 Grenadier Regiment, which was committed for the first time since its lengthy reformation at KARLERUEE, was stated to have 5-600 combat effectives. The other regiments, battered in the FALATIMATE, are less well off. Divisional combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,400.

c. Nineteenth Army (CG:

(a) LXXX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. BAYER)

2 Mountain Division (CG: Maj. Gen. UTZ) was last identified on 5 April, at which time it was operating in two battle groups. The first, including elements of 136 Mountain Regiment, was contacted at S 0665; the second, including 137 Mountain Regiment, at R 7062 and R 7565. Several conflicting reports of reshuffling within the division remain to be clarified. The alsorption of 19 Volksgrenadier Division by 2 Mountain Division is confirmed. Some replacements are also known to have been received from AUSTRIA. Nevertheless, the division is still believed to be in poor shape. Its comb.t infantry strength totals a proximately 1,000.

246 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Brig. Gen. KULBEE) is operating in small battle group formations west of HELLBRO.N, around area R 9560. No reports of replacements have been received and the division is still believed to be extremely depleted. Combat infantry strength is judged at 400.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (OC: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN).
nas not been identified since the beginning of the week. Its depleted state and lack
of contact would indicate that the division is either dissolved or out of line for
refittal; 696 Grenadier Regiment of 340 Infantry Division, previously reported
attached to 559 Division, was decimated toward the end of March and the combat elements of the division have not been identified since. Organic combat infantry remants of 559 Volksgrenadier Division amounted to about 400 after the SAR-PALATIMATE
Campaign.

(b) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERUEN)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Sen. BOCK) was considerably attengthened by the absorption of remnants of 79 Volksgrenadier and elements of 347 and 416 Infantry Divisions. In a dition, 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment was reorganized at HOCKENNEIM (R 5980) with convalencents and recent inductees, raising its strength to 400. On 31 March, the division was ordered to retreat to the line BROCHALL (A 5259) - MUNICIPEM (R 7158) - MENZINGEN (R 7460). It has since been forced to withwais left flank somewhat further south and is currently holding from R 7053 to INCLUSION. Prisoners state that the Anti-Tank Battalion has lost all its pieces and the tag Artillery Regiment is very depleted. Combat infantry effectives

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257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) rebuilt two regiments (457 and 466 VGRs) with replacements that arrived from DRESDEN. Each regiment has two battalions with an average company strength of 80-100. However, the number of companies per battalion is varying. The division was reidentified for the first time since the SALR-PLATILITE operation on 2 April at LEOPOLDSHAFEN (R 4655). It is now responsible for the line from south and south-east of KRISKUEE probably attending as far west as the Rhine River. Combat infantry effectives total around 1,500.

le Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MODEKEL) was partially rehabilitated by the absorption of remnants of 905 Volksgrenadier Division. 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment also received replacements from 476 Grenadier Replacement Dattalion, DRESDEN. The division is responsible for the line from EINGERTEN (R 5850) to R 7053. Its combat infantry strength is judged to be 1,200.

Division RAESSLER (CG: Brig. Gen. RAESSLER) has not yet been contacted and is still believed to be manning defenses along the Rhine in the RASTATT area. Combat in antry strength estimate is 600.

905 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:). The entire remnants of this division were absorbed by 15 Volksgrenadier Division.

(c) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. GRIMMEISS)

The Corps remains responsible for the sector from KARLSRUHE to

area V 69.

a sector along the Rhine, north and south of KEML (*10596).

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECK ENV) is still located in the ETTENHEIM area (70561). It is probably reforming there.

(d) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. KEPPLER)

This Corps still controls the southern part of the BASLE -

MARLSRUHE line.

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von OPPEN) no change,

Brigade BAUER (CO:) also reported as a Panzer Brigade, is claimed by good sources to be located between 805 Mobilization and 716 Infantry Divisions.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) was located by a reliable source in the MUELHEIM (V 9112) area. It is believed to be reforming there. It is probably simultaneously responsible for a sector along the Rhine in that region. The division is said to contain a large proportion of Volkssturm troops and is not believed to be far advanced in its reorganization.

1005 Brigade (CO:). More recent reports cast doubt on the resibility of 1005 Brigade's equation with Brigade BAUER. In one case, a good sourcementions both independently and at different locations.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. ECKSTEIN ?). A reliable source places the division north of the Swiss border with headquarters possibly at LOERRACH. The division is stated to contain much Volksstuem personnel. Equipment is claimed to be generally poor. Its readiness for action as a division is far from complete or satisfactory.

d. Twenty-Fourth army (CG: Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

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No change in mission has yet been ascertained.

RESTRUCT

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED ENEMY STRENGTH OFFOSITE 6TH AFTY GROUP Combat Infantry Effectives of Divisional Units: * Reserves: (Estimated) Tanks and JP Guns: (*) Excluding miscellaneous non-divisional units.
(**) Including only elements facing 6th Army Group. 3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FROMT (Alpine Front) At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 5th Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CENTONIX (C 4728), NT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080), VILLAROGER (H 4692), BESSAMS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3528), BRIANCON (P 3998), CHATEUAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCHLORETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MATRIN (N 5020), GRILLALDI (S 8088). a. Enemy Dispositions Information from partisans confirmed the presence of I Battalian 100 Mountain Regiment (5 Mtn Div) and III Battalian 4 Alpine Regiment (Littorio Div) in the BARDEN OHE area. Prisoners of war identified the VARESE Battalian (4 Alpine Regt, Littorio Div) in the vicinity of PETIT of BECARD. The 4 Alpine Regiment in the ADSTA Valley is being reinforced by a training battalian of 800 convelescents from VERCHAI (J 65). The movement of elements of the MONTE ROLD Division into the French order region has continued and should be nearing completion. Rumors of the departure of 34 Infantry Division from the constal region have not be a confirmed by prisoner of war interrogation. RESINCTED

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RESTR'CTE

4. OPERATIONS

a. RHIME FROM

The front along the Rhine from BASIE to KARLSRUHE remained relatively in - active. Artillery fire was very light and patrols infrequent. The enemy was apparently no longer anxious concerning Allied intentions along this portion of the front.

b. SOUTH CENTRAL FRONT

At the beginning of the period, stubborn resistance was being encountered South of the Neckar River in the HARDT Woods. Opposition was light East of the ODEN ALB while determined enemy forces operating under 36 Volksgrenedier Division and 416 Infantry Division continued a stubborn defense of the ASCHLFFENBURG area. Early on 31 March, a new Allied bridgehead was established opposite SPEYER against negligible opposition and rapid advances followed.

In the Rhine Valley, advances south and east were being made against light resistance. East of the ODEN ALD, the enemy undertook an effective delaying action as battered divisions were being hurried into line. These units were augmented by replacement units and miscellaneous battle group formations moved west from Mehrkreise. XIII and IX. The bulk of these units took up positions and established a line along the Neckar to its junction with the Jagst River (S 0571) - east along Jagst to B.D IMRGENTHEIM (N 4701) - north to KOENIGAHOFEN (N 4407) area - east to railroad (N 7813) - north along railroad to MARKITERIET (N 7421). By 3 April, Allied forces encountered stubborn resistance along the line's entire length. The determined defenders of ASCHAFFENEURG were outflanked by rapid friendly advances in the SPESSART. Completely surrounded, the city was no med up by 3 April; the enemy having suffered an estimated 4,600 casualties, MARISHUEE and KLINGENBERG (S 0359) were cleared on 4 April.

By 5 April, increased resistance from SIEGFRIED Line positions developed as French forces pushed to ard RASTATT and PFORZHEIM. Stubborn opposition continued to be offered in the area from HEILBROIN to "UNZBURG. Breaches of the Neckar Jagst line at NEKARGARTACH (S 0764) and vicinity S 0974 met sherp enemy reactions, clearly evidencing the enemy's concern over any southward expansion. The bridgehead across the Main at OCHLENFURT (S 6720) was strongly opposed. Heavy fighting witnessed the US troops pregress in "URZBURG. On 5 April, the town was bypeased and ROTTENDORF (N 6535) was reached without opposition. The Main River was crossed from west to wast, on a damaged bridge at KITZLIGEN (N 7429) against light resistance. To the corth, the advances through the SPEASART continued against scattered delaying actions and armored spearheads had driven east to SUHL (J 0927) and GOTHA (J 0864).

On 7 April, the advance of friendly troops was sloved as strong resistance as encountered south of MORSCH (R 4040) and ETTLINGEN (R 4938). The enemy still offered determined resistance on the east and south side of the Neckar-Jagst River lines respectively. However, the enemy in the vicinity of DONZEACH (S 4389) was apparently thin as Allied armor on 6 April broke through for a 25 mile run to the import at communications center of CRAILSHEIM (S 7062). At the end of the period, there were indications of an enemy build-up in rear of the CRAILSHEIM breakthrough that resistance was stiffening in the southwest approaches to SCH/EINEURT (N 7762), and OUTHEIM (H 7709) were reached.

c. ALPINE PRONT

Enemy forces stubbornly opposed Allied attempts to capture a bunker two silometers from HOLPICE of PETIT ST BERMARD on 31 March. Superior forces, however reduced the bunker, taking 32 German and 4 Italian prisoners. Attacking again on 5 April, the enemy was forced to relinquish the Fort of MT FROID. Prisoners taken in this action were 21 German and 1 Italian. A snow storm caused considerable difficulties during attacks on enemy positions, on 6 April, in the vicinity of MT SAMIS. A friendly cruiser off CLP MARTIN (S 7584) was bombed on 1 April by a jet propelled plane. Mortar and artillory fire was generally Hight and scattered, the sentral and southern zones receiving the major portion. Enemy introls were reported aborth of SOMPEL (S 7498), at POIMIN (N 4635), and east of NEVACHE (K 3711) during poriod.

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ATLANTIC FRONT

In the LA ROCHELLE Pocket, an enemy reconnaissance party of company strength was active on 3 April near FERRIERS (T 5342) and NUALLE (T 4841). Enemy concentrations were reported at VERILES (T 4538) and SERIONY (T 4346). The following day, trations were reported at VERILES (T 4538) and SERIONY (T 4346). The following day, tenemy reconnaissance in force caused friendly outposts between ST JEAN (T 5346) and FERRIERS to withdraw. After an artillery duel, those same positions were regained. A good source reports the arrival at LA ROCHELLE of small groups of enemy troops and equipment from LORIENT and ST NAZAIRE. The enemy in the ROYAN and GRAVE pockets are generally quiet. However, artillery was unusually active from the ROYAN pocket was generally quiet. However, artillery was unusually active from the ROYAN pocket on 3 April when 100 rounds were fired.

5. COMMUNICATION

3. 0

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Coverage of enemy movements was limited throughout the current period by operational difficulties and weather conditions. Observations of rail traffic were the most significant, revealing traffic headed for the front from STATIGART early in the week and the locus of activity shifting subsequently to the NURNBERG area.

On 31 March, 10-12 trains were seen moving north and west from STUTTGART and traffic was also seen throughout the SINSHEIM-BRUCHSAL-BLETIGHEIM area. Similar trends were reported on 1 April with moderately heavy traffic again seen in the vicinity of STUTTGART. The indications were that the Germans were attempting to bring up small replacements of troops and supplies to check Allied advances in the KARLSRHEE - HEIDELBERG area. This appears logical in view of the large number of military areas and supply installations in and around STUTTGART. Scattered road movement in this period was largely eastbound out of HEILERONN and URRZBURG. movement in this period was largely eastbound out of HEILBRONN and WURZBURG.


In the latter half of the week, NURNBERG seemed to replace STUTTG AT as the center of activity as Allied forces approached the former city. On 5 April, a total of 13 trains were seen between NURNBERG (0 4200 and AUGSBURG (Y 3380) and 3 military trains loaded with motor transport were sighted on the north-south line through DONAUMORTH (T 2318). Intense rail activity was also sighted on lines leading west from NURNBERG, particularly on the NURNBERG - HALL axis. Some of this traffic, particularly on the north-south lines, appeared to be normal, since these are the only main lines for enough removed from the expanding battle area to permit routine supply and troop movements and what little economic traffic is carried. routine supply and troop movements and what little economic traffic is carried. It is likely, however, that the heavy movement on the lines leading to the west was direct supply to the front from the NURNBERG area.

B. Effects of Allied Air Attacks

In the past week, Allied air attacks shifted from enemy transportation to supplies. With the rapid forward movement of Allied ground forces, the enemy must rely on his supply installations close to the front lines rather than on long haul transport to maintain his troops. Even small losses of material at these forward points could result in serious tactical difficulties. These attacks by Allied air forces not only included depots and dumps, but also attacks on rail centers which have been operating as enemy railheads.

Fighter bomber attacks at the beginning of the week covered a large number of small marshalling yards on the fringe of the battle area. These operations were paralleled by medium bomber attacks on HEILBRONN marshalling yard, quay, and sidings and on the rail centers at CRAILSHEIM and MUNZBURG. In the past the enemy has established his railheads as near the front line as possible in order to save on motor transport or horse-drawn hauls to the front lines, and it is likely that these attacks deprived front line troops of weapons, ammunition and vehicle

Several important supply depots within fifty miles of the battle area were also hit. A number of installations for motor transport repair and storage in the STUTTGART area were included in this operation, as well as the large ordnance depot at TUBLINGEN (W 9795). Although further from the battle area, the Eight Air Force bombardment of 5 April of the extensive ordnance depot at INGOLSTADT, in the MUNICH-LUGSBURG area, was significant. This TUBLINGEN depot is probably a collecting and



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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARRY GROUP Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 23, U. S. Army 6th Army Group : :Initials:_ :Date: 14 April 1945: WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUILLRY NUMBER 30 14 APRIL 1945 FOR THE WEEK ENDING 1. ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION A. Enemy activities in Forward Areas and Units in Contact. With the enemy lines in a generally fluid condition along the entire Vestern Front, there is left some semblance of order only on the front of the US 6th Army Group. With & relatively huge rest, area still under his command in this zone, the enemy has been able to maintain fairly good organizational control of his dwindling The 6th US Army Group is feeing the remnants of Army Group G (First and Seventh Armies) and the Mineteenth Army. Along the Rhine and east to STUTTGART the Mineteenth Army controls approximately 8,000 Fortress troops with 8 artillery bat - talions and 8,500 combat infantry effectives organized into 10 nominal divisions, supported by 40/50 tanks and SP guns. The mobile artillery consists of 20 divisional battalions, including anti-parentt, retilem is around support relations. bettelions, including Anti-aircreft Artillery in ground support role. First Army, from STUTEGART to the NUMBERG area, controls 15,000 combat infentry effectives in 9 divisional formations supported by approximately 100 SP guns and tanks. The mobile artillery is estimated at 20 battalions, including dual purpose Anti-aircraft guns. geventh Army, from the NURLHERG eres to the BAYREITH area, has 6 nominal divisions totalling 5,000 combat infantry effectives with approximately 40 TP gus and tanks. Mobile artillery is estimated at 11 battalions, including Anti-sircroft mins. All line divisions are receiving reinforcements, but the rate of attrition / keeps actual enemy strength at a fairly constant figure with diminishing quality. (1) Enemy Forces Opposing 6th US Army Group artiliery Battalion COMBAT HIFALTRY Nine teenth First 28,500 B. Enemy Forces on the Vestern Front The number of nominal divisions along the remainder of the Western Front is 34, of which 19 are surrounded in the RUHR pocket. Mone of these troops could disengage rapidly enough to move to the 6th US Army Group front. RESTRICTED GL 13 NOV 1945 SECRET

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C. Strotegic Reserves

1. GER ARY (including DE MARK)

There are no known organized divisional reserves withing Germany. Contact with the so-colled administrative divisions (a.g. 409, 413. 407) controlling miscellaneous ersatz and training units in the military districts, was forced on the enemy as our lines advanced against their home bases rather than through any movement on their part. A few "mamo" battlegroups (e.g. FAMURG, FRAIGONIA, TRURIIGIA, DONAU) were made up of better quality personnel from those localities, but that source is now also practically exhausted. The training areas of "chrkreis V, VII, XIII, and "VIII, within the zone of advance of 6th US Army Group, will contain a substantial number of combed out personnel who can serve to keep the front line units at fair strength. Morever, their lack of mobility and material will decisively limit their use.

2. NORWAY

Of the 12 divisions in NORWAY, it is now estimated that none can affect the battle on the 6th US gray Group front. Junction of the american and Russian Armies will close their route of approach completely.

3. ICALY

of the 24 divisions in ITALY, it is estimated that a strategic withdrawal could free 10, at the rate of 2 divisions per month under favorable transportation conditions. However, a Russian advance west of Vienna coupled with Allied pressure in ITALY could prevent movement except on the extremely limited BREGIER pass line.

4. RUSSIAN FRONT

The feilure to hold VIENTA cost the enemy not only his last effective mobile force in South East Germany (Sixth SS Panzer Army), but also forced the commitment of an estimated 3 divisions from Italy and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Russian successes in the North and Center have probably permitted strengthening of their forces on the Austrian - Czechoslovak front. It is believed that this front must still enjoy a priority over the Southwestern German front. Therefore, it is highly improbable that any divisions would be released from Austria to the Western Front.

D. Movements and Defenses in Rear Areas.

1. Movement

Road and rail facilities are sufficient in all of Southern Garmany to provide the enemy full freedom of movement, given the means of transportation. Good rail and road mets provide several alternate routs within the area, even after access to it may have been closed. However, the shortage of means of transportation and the approach of practically continuous good bembing weather will rapidly cut down his already limit d mobility.


2. Defenses

Manmade defenses are available to the enemy in the Siegfried Line along the Rhime, to some extent along the Swiss Border, and most probably ficing the Czechoslovak border. None of these should present any serious difficulty to allied advances in a southerly direction.

E. CONCLUSIONS

The imminent junction of the American and Russian Armies in the DRECDEN area will divide the enemy armies in Germany into two main bodies. The northern armies will deteriorate rapidly in strength, being left with no large source of reinforcements and in terrain unfavorable for defense. In addition, they will be dependent entirely on present stocks of material. Finally, they will be subject to immediate encirclement and subsequent partition by strong Allied armored columns.

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6th ARLY GROUP FRONT (South Central Gormany)

c. GEUTENBEUTH (0 5371), EISLAIN (0 5070), HOLLFELD (0 5454), BABERG (0 2547), UNT STEINBACH (0 0247), DOTTENHEIM (0 0009), RUCK RT HOFEN (S 7696), CREGLINGEN (S 6699), BLAUFELDEN (S 6280), KIRCHEEIM (S 0350), BIETINGHEIM (S 0240), FFORZHEIM (R 7032), SCHOMBERG (R 6621), SPROLLENHAUS (R 5611), BUHL (R 2910, ONSBACH (R 2100), ZIEROLSHOFEN (R 1201), South along Rhine to border of Switzerland.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gon. HAUSSER)

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY). The division's contemplated move to the northeast did not materialize complately, as allied pressure forced the commitment of divisional elements in the BALEERG area. The division put up only scattered resistance against our crossings of the Main River north of BALEERG. Its sector includes the region to the north of the town. Other elements of the division were reported still further north, at J 1547, on 11 April. The division's strength was raised somewhat by the inclusion of several miscellaneous battle groups. Combet infantry strength of divisional units on our front is 600.

2 Panzor Division (CO: Col. von LAUCHERT). A captured document dated 2 April showed showed the composition of the division to be as follows: 304 Panzor Grenadier Regiment (BG JUNG, 59 and 71 PG Repl Bns and 300 Fz Repl Bn), Battle Group SCHLUECHTERN, 2 Panzor Grenadier Regiment (1 and 15 PG Repl Bns, BG DOERR, BC PANDOERFER), a German Air Force Jacger Battalion, as Fanzor Engineer Battalion. Attached were 8 Company 410 and 6 Company 1056 Volks Artillery Corps, Tank Co MIDFLECKEN and 257 Tank Destroyer Company. Elements of the division were identified north of SCH EINFURT on 8 and 9 April. They are now believed to held a sector in the LICHTENFELS (0 3777) area. Elements of Panzor Regiment BRANDENBURG are also part of 2 Panzer Division. Combat infantry strength of the division is estimated at 1.000.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gon. HAHM)

256 Volksgronadior Division (CG:) was practically annihilated during the period. Brigadior General FR.NZ, its former commanding general, was captured with his Chief of Staff and Artillery Commander. FR.NZ stated that only about 100 combat infantry effectives remained. These had been committed between 2 Pancor and 413 Mobilization Divisions. It had the mission of helding the Scale Eivor lino

36 Volksgroundier Division (CG: Brig. Son. ELLM) kept all three groundier regiments in close con act throughout the period. Some elements are trapped then friendly troops surrounded SCH EINFURT. The rest was again in denger of being cut off as the result of allied crossings on the Main River on both divisional flanks, at N 8561 and N 9361. However, the remains of the division escaped to the SAMBERG area where it was for a second time, within a week, harshly treated. The division attempted to maintain its strength by cannibalizing battle groups, but casualties were heavy in all regiments. Combat infantry strength of remaining units is approximately 900.

416 Infantry Division (36: haj. Gon. FFLIEBER). All major units of this division were identified on 9 April along the Main south of SCH MINFURT. General PFLIEBER was said to be organizing mattle groups and to be integrating those with the few remaining organic elements of the division. The resulting conglomeration had the mission of defending the Main River, particularly to prevent a breakthrough to SCH MINFURT. Our attacks, which were not by a considerable opposition, forced a withdrawal to a line running from N 8652 to N 8740. The combat infantry strength of the remaining forces is shout 700. of the remaining forces is about 700.

413 Mobilization Division (CG: M.). Gon. BGRNERAM) continues to administer Mchrkreis XIII replacement units. Many of these were identified on our front during the period. Some of them were absorbed by field divisions. One group is committed under operational command of 413 Division between CGBURG and BAMBERS. Armored and mobile units are under command of Batale Group MASSENBACH (see below). Initial strength of some of the battalions was as high as 900, but casualties were severe, especially in view of the peer calibre and insufficient training of the personnel. Combat infentry strength of ohrkreis XIII units presently committed under tactical control of 413 Division is approximately 1,500.

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Bettle Group MASSENBACH (COs Col. MASSENBACH) is also known as "Penzor Verbend XIII." It is comprised of arbords and sobred repredient antis of Chrkrois XIII. Those are committed directly east of ANZBURG in the general area N 82 - 83. There appears to be no operational dependence on 413 Mobilization Division. Combat infantry effectives amount to around 1,200.

(1) First Gorman Army (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHULZ)

The First German Army reacted strongly in order to create an orderly Order of Battle situation out of chaos. Numerous miscellaneous units, mostly newly arrived replacements were put under the centralized control of its divisions both in line and in receive. The divisions of the army 9, 16, 79, 212, 246, 553, and 719 Volkegrenadier, 2 bountain, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier and 409 wholization all did satisfactorily and have created a fairly stable line in their sectors of operation. They have managed, so far at least, to delay in an orderly fashion.

(a) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS. Aj. Gen. HAX SIMON)

409 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KLEKAP) continued to exercise administrative control over the remaining Jehrkreis IX replacement units. Almost all replacement battalions known to belong to Jehrkreis IX were contacted during the past two periods. Many of them were absorbed by field divisions in a speed-up of the orthodox replacement system. Others were committed independently in the general area of Q 04. Similar to Jehrkreis XIII, most of these battalions had a relatively high initial strength but suffered heavily due to inexperienced personnel and inadequate defensive proparations. The units' mobility is particularly poor. Combat infantry effectives of Jehrkreis IX outfits that are operating independently total about 2,000.

79 Volksgronadier Division (CO: Col von HORE) had been virtually destroyed in the SAAR-FALATINATE. A few remnants of 179 Artillory Regiment, consolidated in Battle Group MOSCKEL, were met near the Main bend south-east of MURZBURG. They are presently holding in area N 91. The reorganization of the rest of the division was claimed to be planned. The divisional staff was reported in the general vicinity. Its chief function was to gather and control straggler groups. Strength of elements now in line is about 200. The commitment of reinforcements is to be expected.

19 Volksgronadior Division (CG: Brig. Gon. BRITZELLAYR) was contacted on 11 April when Battle Group RUECKER (73 VGR) was identified at \$ 5965. The division had been practically unnihilated and romnants were reported absorbed by other units. Its refittal is probably very incomplete and combat infantry strength is judged at 1,000.

212 Volksgronadior Division (CG) now functions as a staff coordinating its own romnants with a variety of battle groups (principally BG BAYREUTH, BG SACHS, and SS BG DUERNAGEL). Possibly some of these are destined to become organic divisional elements. The division put up an extremely stubbern fight on the left flank of our CRAILSHEIM salient. Its determined counterattacks, in combination with 9 Volksgronadier Division, forced our withdrawal from this area. Comb.t infantry effectives, including these battle groups, add up to approximately 1.800.

9 Volksgronadior Division (CG: Brig. Gon. KOLE) lest heavily in its powerful counterattacks against the CRAILSHEIM salient. 116 Volksgronadior Regiment temperarily ceased to exist when its remmants were subordinated to 57 Volksgronadior Regiment. 36 Volksgronadior Regiment has long been reported as referming but has not yet been contacted. 2 Alpine Regiment, composed of 98 and 99 Reserve Mountain Battalions in GARMISCH and SONTHOFFEN, is believed to be attached to the division. Combat infantry strength, including the Alpine Regiment, is about 1,200.

(b) XIII Corps (CG:)

553 Volksgronadior Division (CG: Brig. Gon. HUETEKER). Some alements of the division are still believed to be helding along the Neckar River south of HEILBRONN. The staff, however, shifted eastward and is now responsible for the line south of the Kocher River lines with determination. Its strength was belstered by the absorption of several battle groups. Regiment acceptable in probably attached. Including this attachment, but excluding elements remaining in the HEILBRONN area, combat infantry effectives add up to about 1,500.

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iv so renter Grandier Division (CO: SS Col. KLINGENBELG) is once again in relatively good shape, having received a large number of replacements from the depot units of 1, 9, and 12 SS Penner Divisions. Nest of these are extremely young. However, their fanaticism compensates for their age and lack of training. The division stubbernly contested our crossings of the Jagst and Kocher Rivers. It was supported by a number of tanks and assault guns probably belonging to 653 Tank Battalion (GH.). Combat infantry strength, including the attached Battle Group HORD, is estimated at 2,500.

246 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KUEHNE) shifted its few remaining elements to the east. It was responsible for a fairly short sector at the confluence of the Neckar and the Jagst, later of the Neckar and the Kocher Rivers. There are still no reports of replacements from this division. Combat infentry strongth is estimated at 400.

2 Mountain Division. (CGr Maj. Gen. UTZ) was given responsibility for the defense of HEILERONN, a mission which it executed with considerable elan. Only at the end of the period did Alliei forces manage to clear the town. The division was supported by several tanks and self propelled guns and by three Schrkreis V replacement battalions. The division has not been contacted since the full of HEILERONN. Its combat infantry strength, including these battalions, is about 1,800.

719 Volksgrendier Division (CG:) still has only a few remnants to is name. These are committed south of HEILBROWN along the Mechan around S 0555. No replacements have been reported and combat infantry strength is still carried at 400.

c. NINETELNIH GERMAN ARLY (CG: SS. Lt. Gen. KEPFLER)

Reacting to the Allied advance the Mineteenth Army reinforced its right flank by shifting the 716 Infantry Division from the lower Black Forest to the FFORZHEIM area and by committing a new arrival, the reconstituted 106 Infantry Division, proviously destroyed on the Eastern Front.

Mineteenth Army presently has control over three Corps: XVIII SS, LXIV, and LXXX Corps.

(1) LXXX Corps (OG: Lt. Gon. BAYER)

559 Volksgronadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN).

Remnants of this division were recontacted in Eattle Group LEIER on 6 April. In addition to this battle group, the staff apparently controls some elements of 55% Volksgrenadier Division and two lohkrois V replacement battalions. These new hold a sector from 8 0551 to 8 0345. Combat infantry offectives total not more than 1,000.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) is fighting with its back to the Neckar in the general area S 04. Its status has remained bisically unchanged as replacements were approximately sufficient to balance ensualties. Combat infantry offectives are estimated at 1,400.

47 Volksgronadior Division (CG: RAJ. Gon. BORK) now consists of two organic regiments and the Pusilier Battalien. The division has stayed in loose contact throughout the period. It was reported to have come under command of 16 Volksgronadior Division. This, however, lacks confirmation. The divisional sector is in area R 9637. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,000.

16 Volksgronadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL). A captured document dated 2 April shows that 225 Volksgronadier Regiment also absorbed elements of 137 Meuntain Regiment (2 Mtn Div). 221 Volksgronadier Regiment is composed of the old I Battalien 223 Volksgronadier Regiment, 325 and 460 Replacement Battaliens. Unit GUGELBERGER contains Wohrkroke Battalien 111 and 16 Fusilier Battalien. 223 Volksgronadier Regiment is apparently dissolved. The division is responsible for the line east of FFORZHEIM, in area R 73 - 83. Combat infantry strength amounts to about 1,200.

(2) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gon. GRIMEISS)

716 Infantry Division (COr Col. HAFNER) lost its 726 Gronadier Regiment to 106 Infantry Division. 716 Division, uncontrated since the end of the COLMAR pecket campaign in February, has been partially rehabilitated by the absorption of Landeschuet ., Volkasturm, and other miscel cous units. The vision's main line of row stance was given in a captured assument as

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED 25.2 REST FFOREXECT to MENURY (R 6328). This corresponds very closely to the line currently held by the division. Combat infuntry effectives are estimated to be 1,500. 257 Volksgrendier Division (CG:) received considerable replacements from the Volkssturm and combed out its own service troops. The division put up a rather fe ble defense as it was pushed southward from south-east of KARLSRUHE to south-east of RASTATT during the week. Its sector was curtailed in the west by the commitment of 106 Infantry Division. Brigadier General SHIDEL, the former division commander, was killed in action. The Engineer Buttalion was committed as infantry. The divisional Assault Gun Company was reduced to 4 Jagdganther. Combat infantry strength is about 1,500. 106 Infantry Division (CG:) made its debut on the Jestern Front last week. It had been destroyed in the east a d was partially reconstituted by the absorption of 725 Grenadier Regiment of 716 Infantry Division, 728 Volks grenadier Regiment of 708 Volksgrenadier Division, and miscellaneous units from the Black Forest. Included in these is XVIII Grenadier Eattalion OBERRHEIM, of 8 Grenadier Regiment CHERRHEIM, proviously reported in Britials EAUER. Fossibly all of Frigues BAUER has been absorbed by 166 Division. The division forms Minoteenth army's anchor to the Rhine. So far its performance has not been inspiring. It fell back readily under Allied pressure. Divisional combat infantry effectives add up to about 1.500. Division RASSSIER (D: Brig. Son. RAESSIER) is still out of sontact. As the sector which it was believed to held him been everrun by friendly troops, the division's continued existence is doubted. (3) AVIII SS Corps (00:) 708 Volksgronadior Division (CO: Col. FLECK ENN) is known to have lost its 728 Volksgronadior Regiment to 108 Infantry Division and elements of its Engineer Eastwallen to 405 Reserve Division. These indications foint to a dissolution of the division. 405 Debilization Division (33: Brig. Son. SERSER). A document emptered on 13 april shows the division to contain 4, 10, and 14 from dir Assiments OFFREEDIV and elements of 708 Engineer Settation. If, as was believed, the division is responsible for the right bank of the Whine in the WHML region, its early commitment is to as expected. Combat infantry strongth is estimated at 1,500. 805 lobilization Division (CG: Brig. Son. von CFFEM). No change. 1005 Friends (79: .) the change.

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(Combat Infantry Effectives of Divisional Units)

Ninotoonth Gorman Army 'First Gorman Army Seventh German Army

28.500

Roserves: (Estimated)

Minotoonth Gorman Army

Tanks and SF Guns.

Seventh German Army

180-190

3. 6TH ARLY GROUP FRONT (Alpino Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpino Eront wore as follows: Chimcolk (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080), VILLIROGER (H 4692), BUSSAMS (H 5270), MT FROID (H 4255), MT TLEOR (K 3522), BRIANDON (F 3898), CMLTEULU UEYRAS (F 5382), CUILLESTRE (F 4170), BLRCELOMETTE (F 4341), ISOLA (M 4635), ST MIRTIN (M 6020), AUTION (M 7412), GRIMLDI (S 8088).

I GENERAL

The enemy's attitude on the light Front forming defended. Noted improved atmospheric conditions and his desire to obtain information on alice intentions and dispositions may account for his increased a trel activities. hile abstraining from any aggressive patrolling on the northerness flank (MONT SLIME), he displayed increased initiative in the ST. BERNIRD area, trying to advance his outpost line into French territory. In the central sector, his patrol activities were centered southwest of LONT GENEVARE.

II ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

The defensive mission to held the lipine Front is entrusted to elements of two German Divisions (5 Mtm Div and 34 Inf Div) and two Italian divisions (LITTORIC and holder ROSA Divs). At the exception of the 34 Infantry Division which is helding its own sector, elements of the 5 Mountain Division are intermingled in the control and northern sectors with elements of the LITTERIC and MONTE ROSA Divisions.

34 Sorman Infantry Division is occupying the southern sector from GRIBLDI to STREATH VESUBIE with two regiments in line (253 and 107 GR) and one regiment '80 GR) in reserve. In addition, the 34 Replacement Battalien and 34 Engineer Battalien have been identified in that area during the period.

LITTCRIO Division. The 3rd Regiment, supported by an AT Company, is helding a portion of the central sector from ST MARTIN YESUBIE to LARCHE while the 4th Regiment intermingled with elements of the German 100 Meuntain Regiment is helding the northern sector (Col. Du St BERNARD).

MONTE ROSA Division is strutched along a wide front from CoL DE L. G.LISE to the MCCROLIO River, intermingled with elements of the Serman 100 and 85 Mountain Regiments (5 Mtn Div), helding the control sector with two regiments, reinforced by the FOLIGRE Farachute Regiment.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED It is not quite clear as to how much of the division has remained on the Alpine Front. Elements of the division were withdrawn in January (the 4th comagnies of the 1/85 and II/100 Mountain Regiments). Elements of the 100 Mountain Regiment are still being identified in the northern sector (ST BERNARD) and in the central sector (between B.REONIECHL. and COL DE L. G.LISE). According to P/s, the division has also under its command two "Gobirgsmachrichten Abtollungen" in addition to the 95 aufklaerungsabteilung. These units, however, have not been identified as yet. hufklaorungsabtoilung. These units, however, h ve not been identified as yet. III ENERY INTENTIONS .. ND C..P. BILITIES The enemy's attitude indicates his determination to hold on the Alpine Front, in order to protect the right flank of his divisions still fighting in the Appenines. He obviously did not feel secure enough to entrust the defense of this important flank to the It lian Command and Italian units. He therefore chose a compromise solution by using Italian units intermingled with German, retaining the German central of the trent, however. hile holding the present line, the enomy is engaged extensively in building defenses in the rear areas, especially along the axis of ponetration le ding into the LOBERDY Plain through the PETIT ST BERRURD, NONT CENIS, MONT GENEVARE and COL DE LARGINE. According to reports of the French SRA, the remainder of the HONTE ROS. Division, until lately located on the PENITHE Front, has been transferred to the FIEDONT area. This change indicates the enomy's intentions to increase the Italian garrison, passibly in view of a further withdrawal of German units which might be badly needed alsouhere in case of a general withdrawal from the PENNINES. The merule of the Italian troops is definitely at a low obb. German units display on the whole a better fighting stamina, although German priseners of war taken lately also show an increased war weariness. This may be partially explained The enemy's capabilities on the ...lpine Front are strictly defensive. In viou, however, of the questionable value of Italian units and the signs of lowering of morals among German units, the defensive empability of the enemy will be gradually restricted and he may be reduced in the near future to the problem of 4. MESTERN FRENCH FORCES .. EMERY ACTIVITIES IN FOR ARD AREAS AND UNITS IN CONTACT. There are approximately 30,000 well equipped and supplied troops located in the 6th Lamy Group area on the Mestern Atlantic Front. This total is made up of 15,000 combat infantry effectives, 9,000 artillery and miscellaneous troops; and 6,000 non-combatant troops. These troops are distributed as follows: FOINT DE GR.VE ROY.N LA ROCHELLE ILE DE OLERON ILE DE RE 8,500 13,500 3,000 15,100 LIGHT-MEDIUM MEDIUM-HEAVY AMTI-AIRCRAFT (over 155 mm)

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483 2 33

The mixed enemy garrison of German ground, air and naval personnel have been retrained to fit into the newly created dituation. The sttitude of these troops varies from a strong determination to resist to a desire to desert. However, it is believed that control over all can be managed for some time.

Opposition can be expected to be strongest in the LA ROCHELLE sector, where opposition can be expected to be strongest in the LA ROUNELLE Sector, where the garrison has been carefully trained for some time, and reinforcements have recently arrived from ST NAZAIRS. Defensive action in all sectors in the 6th Army Group zone will be initially marked by an enemy withdrawal from his outpost positions to his main defense line for a stand.

Food stocks in the areas are adequate for about two months without further replenishment. However, his ammunition supply can be adequate for a maximum of 15 days of intense fighting.

1. Reserves

The only possible reserves available to the enemy are the garrison troops of ST NAZAIRE and LORIENT. They total about 23,000 and 25,000 men respectively. These troops can be made available in our area only by employing small craft on the sea. However, a serious reduction in the total garrisons of either would make each untenable in the face of available Allied forces. Also the question of supply redistribution will be of paramount importance if a transfer of forces should take place between the garrisons in the Western Atlantic Sector.

2. Conclusion

It is estimated that no large forces will be made available from the ST NAZAIRE and LORIENT Garrisons to augment the troops now in 6th Army Group zone. The enemy's main defense will be based on the well constmicted perimeter positions around the critical points.

B. MOVEMENT AND DEFENSES IN REAR AREAS

1. Torrain of LA ROCHELLE Area.

The area occupied by the German armed forces in LA ROCHELLE covers approximately 400 square kilometers. This district is well protected in the north by the swamps of LA SEVERE and in the south by those of DEFOURAS. In the east, swamps valleys run clong both sides of the CURE and the AIGREFEUILLE. A ridge-line running northwest-southeast disides the entire two portions and southing the state of the contract of t running northwest-southeast divides the ar.a into two portions and constitutes the only possible axis of attack on the sector.

2. Movement

The rear areas of the enemy controlled sections of Western France are very small and there is little need for meter transport. Communications between all those garrisons in Western France will be carried out by ship as no land communications exists between them.

3. Dofonsos

(1) POINTE DE GRAVE

The land approach to the POINTE DE GRAVE is defended by an antituak ditch, wire and a mine field stretching from the vestern bank of the Girende River to the ATLANTIC and completely cutting the defended area from the land. These are supported by anti-tank guns and automatic vespens. Little concrete is present in this defense line. However, the nature of the termin permits only a few routes of approach, and these are well defended by strong points. The ATLANTIC or at is defended by a number of easomated coastal batteries and undermater obstacles. Apart from a few guns on the northern tip, and a few field pieces, these will not be able to interfere with an attack on ROYAN.

(2) ROYAN


The land approaches to ROYAN are defended by a line of outposts, backed by a bolt of minofields completely surrounding the term of ROYAN proper and anti-tank ditch and much wire. Those are supported by a number of artillery strong-points.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED Minefields are report d surrounding the entire peninsula, and a number of strongpoints are distributed through its northwestern area. Undermator obstacles and a number of casemated coastal batteries defend the sea approach. Several heavy batteries on the POINTE DE LA COUBRE (No.) tip of peninsula) have been reported altered to fire on a 360 angle. Ground sources have later reported them as having been removed. (3) LA ROCHELLE LA ROCHELLE is protected against a land attack by an anti-tank ditch doubled by mine fields and barbed wire. Further support is gained by a number of pillboxes, casemated enti-tank guns, and strong points. In the north, several canals form natural anti-tank barriors. A number of pillboxes and artillery casemates form additional strongpoints within the perimeter of the defended zone. There is an additional defense belt cutting off LA PALLICE from the rest of the LA ROCHELLE area. This consists of mine fields, wire and short lengths of anti-tank ditches supported by artillery strongpoints. The coastal defense is defended by casemated artillery and underwater obstacles. (4) ILE D'OLERON Similar to TLE DE RE, this island is protected by under water obstacles and casemated and field batteries distributed along its coast. These are mostly 75 mm, 105 mm, and 155 mm guns. There are no heavy batteries on the island. (5) ILE DE RE The defense of this island is aided by underwater obstacles, and casemated coastal and field batteries well distributed along the entire coast. These are mostly of 75 mm to 105 mm caliber with a few 155 mm guns. However, the northwestern tip has several batteries of heavy guns.

Complete isolation of the garrisons in the Atlantic ports delimits the enemy's carabilities. "ith no possibility of reinforcements or freedom of maneuver, the enemy can only resist the siege by manning his prepared defensive positions. The enemy may be expected to resist strongly in order to protect these submarine bases, but his will to resist should crack before he has expended his full

SECTION 19

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RESTRICIEU

COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Although poor weather hindered observations at the opening of the current period, clearing skies afforded good coverage of enemy activity throughout the greater part of the week. Persistent allied advances forced the enemy to shift his previously used routes for trrop and supply movements to roads and railroads further to the east.

Marshalling yards and rail lines throughout the BAMBERG (0 2649) - AUGSBURG (Y 3580) - REGENSBURG (U 2055) area were reported active on nearly all days of the period, but it did not appear that any large scale connected rail moves were taking place. In fact, except for the 11th of April when most of the movement seen on the NURNBERG - REGENSBURG rail line was to the southeast, it seemed that only normal two way traffic of supplies and reinforcements was being maintained. However, the widespread vehicular activity observed throughout this seme area on 9, 10 and 12 April presented an entirely different picture. In this case it was obvious that the bulk of traffic, which was largely horse-drawm, was moving east. Each of this activity appeared to be of a civilian nature, possibly indicating large scale evacuation throughout this region. The fact that several large groups of pedestrians were seen moving in an easterly direction along roads in this sector on these same days adds to the belief that many civilians are flooing this area. On 10 April, a total of approximately 300 horse-drawn transports was observed moving mostly northeast in the vicinity of DONAUMORTH (T 2417) and on 12 April about 600 other vehicles, the greater part of which were civilian horse-drawn carts, were seen moving east in the area centering about SCHESSLITZ (0 3559). Some military vehicles and scattered troop conveys appeared to be intermixed with those civilian transports.

Moderately heavy rail and road activity was noted throughout the STUTTGART - AALEN (T 7328) - ULM (X 6880) area on 10 and 11 April probably representing the movement of some reinforcements and supplies for enemy forces in that region. Light fighters also spotted heavy road traffic moving wost toward STUTTGART during the night of 8 - 9 April and aerial recomnaissance reports of 9, 10 and 11 April revealed widespread activity in the STUTTGART, AALEN and ULM marshalling yards. The heaviest military activity was seen in this sector on 11 April when 3 military rakes, 10 groups of scattered because and 6 scattered trains were sighted on the STUTTGART - ULM line.

7. EFFECTS OF ALLIED AIR ATTACKS

Tactical and strategic air forces both operated in the Sixth Army Group area in the past week. These attacks, which were carried out on a large scale and over a wide area, hit the enemy at his most vulnerable points: Oil, ammunition, and ord-nace. In addition to bembardment of specific supply targets, a number of marshalling yards were hit, all of which have been shown by recent reconnaissance to be centers of rail activity.


host of the important FOL storage dopots in southern GERMANY were included in the program of attacks. In the opinion of the Combined Strategic Targets Committee on Oil, the virtual elimination of gasoline producing and refining facilities has greatly increased the importance and activity of storage capacity, and the air operations of the past wook should have a significant effect on the enemy's already serry gasoline position. The Eighth Air Force hit four major active FOL depots well to the east of our front and may have affected enemy operations against the Russians as well as against the advence from the west. Medium combers of First Tactical Air Force attacked the two most important active depots close into the Stath Army Group front, GEISLINGEN (S 5505) and EISSENHORN (X 7970), with considerable success. Following the attack on GEISLINGEN on 10 April, smoke was seen to a height of 1,000 fort, and large explosions were experienced over EISSENHORN.

Two of the enemy's largest ammunition installations in southwest GERMANY were severally blasted by medium bembers. The storage area at KLEIN ENGSTINGEN (X 1677), south of REUTLINGEN (X 0983), was twice more attacked following the bemberdment of the provious week. Photographic cover shows 460 hits within the area, with extensive damage to shelters, warchouses, relling stock, and the read and rail network. Large tennages were also dropped on STRASS ammunition depot and filling plant in the ULM (X 6780) area. This depot is reported to have leaded 70 - 100 rail cars daily, or the equivalent of about 1500 tens. Photographic cover had shown it be be an elaborate complex of military buildings, warchouses, barracks, and at least 100 ammunition shelters. A filling-assembly plant is also believed to be operating in the


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RESTRUCTION


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
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
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17 Junio

HEAD WARTERS 61: ARMY GROUP Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO 23, U. S. Army

19 April 1945

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (Nineteenth German army)

A. Beny Activities in Forward Areas and Units in Contact.

Wineteenth German Army has a sector responsibility extending from the Swiss Frontier, slong the Rhine, thence present front line to an area approximately 10 kilometers west of SCHWABISH HALL (S 4659). The army has three corps (XVIII SS Corps, IXIV Corps, and IXXX Corps) controlling elements of 14 higher formations. From south to north the following units have been identified.

1005 Brigade - An administrative unit controlling 4-5 infantry battalions
with a total combat infantry strength of approximately 1,250.

2. Brigade BAUER - Previously a part of 805 Mobilization Division controlling 4-5 infantry battalions with a total combat infantry strength of 1,250.

3. 405 Mobilization Division, Combat infantry strength 1,500.

4. 106 Volksgrenadier Division. Combat infantry strength 1,400.

5. V Luftwaffe Brigade. Combat infantry strength 800.

6. 257 Volkagrenadier Division. Combat infantry strength 1,200.

7. 716 Volksgrenadier Division. Combat infantry strength 800.

8. 16 Volksgrenadier Division. Combat infantry strength 1,200.

9. 47 Volksgrenadier Division. Combat infantry strength 1,800.

10. 719 Volkagrenadier Division. Combat infantry strength 800.

11. 559 Volksgrenadier Division. Combat infantry strength 1,200.

2. 246 Volksgrenadier Division. Combet infantry strength 1,400.

13. 189 Volkagrenadier Division. Combat infantry strength 1,500.

14. Unidentified Division. Combat infantry strength 1,500

TOTAL

17,600

The total overall strength of all Nineteenth Army units (including SIEOFRIED LINE, Iming units, and field formations) is estimated at a maximum of 45,000/50,000. These no more than 11,000/13,000 can be accounted combat infantry effectives with degree of mobility. In addition garrison troops totaling 4,000 man may be found now IOSEURG and STUTTGERT.

The total artillery strength is estimated at 26 bettalions (including 6 artillery falions in STEGFRIED Line positions). As in the case of the infantry, lack of dity will prevent any simple concentration or effective use of this total for of battalions except from previously prepared positions.

There are an estimated 35-40 tanks or 3P guns available in the entire army. There also no indications of an armored formation becoming available to this army.

Strategic Reserves


There are no organized tactical units available as strategic reserves for this.

Training units and hastily formed battalions may be brought up from Webricreis or XVIII but only on a limited scale. In any case, they will be replacements units

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED than new tactical formations and will be at least counterbalanced by the rate Mineteenth Army is restricted to the sole capability of self-preservation. It can be effected only by a partial withdrawal of the limited forces available in the Black Force and attempts to stabilize its right flank or possible prearranged positions in the rear with those forces remaining, aided by limited low quality reinforcements. Reinforcements will hardly equal the rate of attrition. The restricted mobility of his fairly sufficient forces and lack of sufficient supporting troops Will compel him to wage positional warfare which will be ineffective against any substantial breaches made in his crust line. The direction of any possible divisional or unit reinforcements must go to First German Army which has a higher priority as it is covering the approaches to MUNICH and AUGSBURG, from a direction which is more suitable to exploitation. /s/ Eugene L. Harrison EUGENE L. HARRISON Brigadier General, 030 A. C. of S., G-2

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 :CG, 6th Army Group :Initials: 1.3.5. APO 23, U. S. Army :Date: 21 April 1945: WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 31 21 APRIL 1945 Army Group G under its new commanding general, Lieutenant General SCHULZ, had insufficient forces to man properly its entire front from east of STUTCART to the Thuringian Forest. The shifting of some forces from west to east, although temporarily strengthening the junction between First and Seventh Armies, so reduced the effectiveness of its forward positions in the SCHTARISH HALL (3 4658) area that a deep penetration was made on this flank of the Army Group. A gap has been created in this vicinity. The effects of this penetration will probably result in the driving back of the Army Group as far as the Danube River providing its partition and partial destruction does not ensue in the meantime. The difficult POL situation and lack of adequate motor transport presently existing in this area have greatly restricted the enemy's ability to maneuver. He has been forced to defend selected strongpoints, more in the nature of blocking positions, rather than attempt the establishment of a coordinated defense line. The rate of attrition in these rapid actions is continuing to be almost equal to the rate of reinforcements and garrisons encountered in Allied routes of advance. Certainly Army Group G can have no other mission than to stand and defend the rapidly shrinking Reich. To give it the mission of protecting approaches to strategic areas would compel it to wage a war of maneuver which is yet further removed from its Seventh German Army was forced to yield much ground along its entire front. The arrival of tanks for 2 and 11 Penzer Divisions and numerous training units for the infantry divisional staffs under its cont ol cannot permit any change in its defensive attitude. The southward withdrawal of First German Army threatens to so weaken the forces protecting the flanks that Beventh Army is threatened with the necessity for independent operations. First German Army was corrying out a general withdrawel along its entire front at the close of the period. During the week, the army not only continued to receive numerous reinforcements but also carried out considerable regrouping. 2 Mountain Division moved into the ANGRAGI (T 0682) area where it incorporated elements of Division ALTER. 17 SS Panzer Grenedier Division was withdrawn from the HEILBROWN sector and placed in Army Group reserve subject to commitment for the defense of AMERISERO, but failed to arrive in time. 198 Volksgrenadier Division moved from Fineteenth army to First Army to replace 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division. To add greater strength to the right flank of the army, two newly formed regiments under command of 719 Volksgrenadier Division also appeared southeast of NUERNEERG. command of 719 Volksgrenadier Division also appeared southeast of LULRUBERG. These attempts to create order were inadequate against the deep penetrations being made along its entire front. The lunge by US mobile forces completely split the sector of the front held by 198 and 553 Volksgrenadier Divisions and a breach deep into the army rear areas existed at the close of the period. Numerous prisoners the Danube Riv r line.

Sincteenth German Army has been unable to produce any scittional forces to cope with the French exploitation tactics in the Black Forest. This resulted in encirclement of STUTTG.RT from the west, in conjunction with US troops driving down from the east. The bulk of Mineteenth Army is threatened with annihilation, as its formations are being divided into small ineffective groups. 257 Volksgrenadier Division was split by the French drive to HORE (W 7063); in the area of PFORZHEIM, 2 regiments of 716 Volksgrenadier Division were surrounded and wiped out. 16 Volksgrenadier Division yielded its anti-tank battalian for the defense of MUNICIPAL 210111

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in 19 april elements of 47 Velkagran dier were identified attempting to withdraw from the pocket and on the next day available enemy forces were exerting most of heir effort to seep the escape routes open while attempting to salvage as much ossible.

The tesk of holding the Allied drive towards the south is too large a burden for a weak Army Group and a thrice destroyed army. The enemy may hope to delay along the SUABIAN Alps and FRANCON LAN Hills. However, the post ions are already being turned from the west. The only defense line possible to protect BAVARIA is the Danube River line.

Troops in sufficient numbers cannot be made available from the Russian or Italian Fronts until the MANICH area has been reached. With the initiative clearly in Allied hands, the lack of mobility of enemy forces presently on our front, and the unavailability of reserves will leave the enemy unable to prevent our savance.

2. 6TH ARMY GROUP FROMT (South Central Cermany).

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th Army Group were as follows: LAUTER CIEN (T 8093), MEDIARKY (T 7082), FENCHT (T 5092), INCHELBURG (T 5076), CRILLY ELI (S 7082), STL DOWN (S 8587), SGL DEPISCH CRUPD (S 5024), SALACH (S 4711), MIRCHERLIN (S 2606), OPER-URB.CH (S 8525), MINISTRUBEN (S 2232), HOPFICHERN (S 1043), INNCHINGEN (R 9829), LECTRED (R 3023), BOLLINGEN (R 9310), SIELHINGEN (R 1109), REUTLINGEN (X 0989), DETTENMED (M 7380), BALINGEN (W 8464), VILLINGEN (W 5340), MULBIS (W 4185), TENNISCH (W 0547), SASBACH (V 9048), South along Rhine to Swiss border. South along Rhine to Swiss border.

36 Volksgrenedier Division (CG:) kept all three grandler regiments in close contact throughout the period. The division fell back from SCHMENDIURT to the NURRIBERG area, offering ineffective delaying action. Taking up positions east of the city, it joined with other units in offering stubbern opposition. All major elements of the division were last contacted scutheabt of NURRIBERG on 19 April. The division continued to absorb miscullineous units but casualties were heavy in all regiments. The combat infantry strength of the division is difficult to estimate but is carried unchanged at 900.

SS Division NIBELUIGE. (CG:) was first reported to be forming about 25 March in the FRIEURG area of the Black Forest but it was withdrawn
mortheast to help meet the threat to the NUER BLRG-BLYKUUR area. The assembly area
of the division was shown by a captured map to be east of GRAFALMORR (F 0132) at
P 1934. On 19 april, a prisoner from the division was taken at 0 6392. The strength
of the division has as yet been undetermined due to insufficient information.

- - (a) DXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HJFM)

17 SS Penger Gregadier Division (CO: 33 Col. BCSCHMUN) was relieved in its old sector about 14 April to reorganize briefly and then to be
committed in a more crucial area further to the east. (contract document revealed
that it was intended for the defense of NURREBERG. Both Fanzer Grenadier Regiments
and several auxiliary units were identified east of NURREBERG on 18 April. The
division is now helding to live SE of that city from m T182 to T 4362. Supported
by 653 Tank pattellion the division launched several unsuccessful small scale
auxiliary due to the proposed several unsuccessful small scale
section april 4 to the proposed lust week. Its combat infantry strength
is estimated to the proposed several unsuccessful small scale



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719 Volks, chadier Division (CG:) left the HEILBROW area analy in the week and was encountered again, north of NULKEBERG where 766 Volksgrenadier Regiment was first identified. This regiment, shown by captured documents to be 719 Division's third organic regiment, some from BERLIN to join the division in the NULKEBERG area. 697 Grandier Regiment, previously part of 342 Infantry Division, is also reported as part of 719 Division. These regiments had a commitment strength of about 1,000 each but have sustained severe casualties in recent fighting. The division is presently disposed on a line running due south from the city to orea T 4562. In conjunction with 256 Volksgrenadier Division, 719 Division forms a spur in the Allied East-West front. Such a position is untenable for any length of time, and both divisions must choose between retrest or annihilation. Some remnents of 416 Infantry and 352 Volksgrenadier Divisions are committed in the same area and are believed to be under command of 719 Volksgrenadier Division. Including these, the division's combat infantry effectives total 1,500.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:). Divisional elements were identified offering stubborn resistance in the ancient defenses of the inner city. After losing practically all its combat troops, 250 Division staff seems to have assumed command of elements 1210 and 1211 Volksgrenadier Regiments, formerly of 159 Volksgrenadier Division, and of some miscellaneous units. Combat infantry strength of this group amounts to approximately 1,000.

(b) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

Division von HORE (CO: Co. von FORS) equates with the old Battle Group MASSENBACH or Pancer Verband XIII. Colonel MASSENBACH was relieved of his command due to inefficiency. The new commander was previously with 79 Volksgrens-dier Division. Division von FORE contains mobile and a mored replacement units of Tehrkreis XIII. These are organized in Resiments HOLZHORE, ETTZ, and hELLBOOM, such of which has three battalian size battle groups. Attached to the division is Panzer Battalian VIRRIG, reported to have 24 Mark V and VI tanks. Division von HORE is committed east of AUSE CH (T 0661) in general area T 27. Combat infantry strength is now estimated at 1,500.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Maj. Gen. UTZ) was bolstered considerably by the absorption of 1 alpine Regiment. The latter came from austria where it was formed from convalescents, Gorman air Force consonnel, and strugglers. 2 Alpine Regiment had be a identified last week in the CRAILS EIM area. 2 Mountain Division shifted cast from the MAILS ROIM region and is now conditted south of ALSAGE in area T O6 - T 16. It was in this area that 1 alpine Regiment and several auxiliary units appeared at the bettinning of this period. It had two battalions and was fairly well off in regard to atrength and equipment. The original units of the division suffered heavy losses, but the addition of the alpine Regiment balances these. Combat infantry strength total about 1,800.

slo Division on (60: Reis. Cen. Res (182). This division equates with Division R. T. T.R. of R.R. T.R. T.R. T.R. T.R. T.R. of such control at a cler groups. It is consisted a hoterogeneous assortment of such south-west of R. O. in orea of P. Their combatinisatry strength is roughly 1,500.

212 Volksgrenadier Divisi n. (CG:) has been reorganized on the numbered regiment 1 basis. Battle Group Sacis become 316 Volksgrenadier Regit. Battle Group Rein ald 500 Volksgrenadier Regiment. The composition of 403 degrenadier Regiment is not known. The division has two ertiliery battalions, ipine Regiment was either aborted by or attacked to 512 Volksgrenadier Division. edivision withdraw in a southeasterly direction and is now located around TLSTAIN (S 7082) in area 3 76. Combat infantry strength including 2 Alpine Regit, is estimated to 1,800.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED (c) MIII Corps (CG ') 9 Volksgrennder Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KCLE) also withdrew blong a southe astern axis and is now holding west of CRAILSHIN in area 3 66. The division had a relatively unaventful week, and encualties were not heavy. I Alpine Regiment, previously attached to the division, is now under command of the Volksgrenndier Division (see above). Without it, combut infantry strength is approximately 553 Volksgrenedier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER) retreated southward in a fairly orderly fashion until our armored breakthrough toward SCHONEDORF (S 3125) - GOPTIMEN (S 4114) outflenked its positions. This left 553 Volksgrenedier Division as the only divisional formation between SCHONEDORF (A 1141) and GOPPINGER, an impossibly long sector even for a good division. Occubet infantry strength of organic elements is about 800. c. Mineteenth German Army (CG: was split into three separ to portions by lighthing allied thrusts. LVIII SS Corps was left with insufficient forces to held the Black Forest and Rhine fronts. as it was virtually cut off from the remainder of Hineteenth Army. LLXX Corps with elements of LMIV and MIII Corps under its containd was desperately trying to extricte its forces from the STUTTCAMT pocket. LTIV Corps was left with one weak division (257 VG Div) and miscellaneous Volksstarm and replacement units to attempt to hold a north-south line somewhere east of the Necker. (a) LOOK Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. RAYER) 198 Infantry Division (CG: Rrig. Gen. TARKE) had moved east at the beginning of the period to take over the sector vacated by 17 ST Panzer Grenadier Division. It is now located along the cost side of the pecket north of SCHORDOFF. Divisional combat infantry effectives and up to roughly 1,500. 246 Volksgren dier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. MIRIE) is composed of three regimental battle groups and an artillery battery. These remnants were withdrawing rapidly at the end of the week. They were last located in area S 23. Combat infantry strength is assigned at 1.900. Combat infantry strength is assimated at 1,200. E 559 Volksgrenedier Division (CC: Brig. Gen. von der MULLIAM)
remained in the same general area south of HELLIAMA. Contact was generally loose
throughout the period, and cosmulties were correspondingly light. Combat infantry
strength is still carried at 1,000. 47 Volkagrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was operating with two organic regiments and some suxthing units north of STUTTGLAT. When the threat of our encircling movements become apparent, some divisional elements were hastily shifted to the KRAZERN (S 2607)-GOTTRICH (S 4114) area. However, their defense there was insufficiently propred and consequently unancocasaful. Earlier rumors of the division's absorption by 16 Volkagranadier Division agree unfounded. Some replacements were received from former elements of 347 Infantry and 559 Volkagranadier Divisions. Combat infantry effectives how total approximately 1,800. 716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. TRONFETER). Reports that 726 Grenadier Regiment of this division had been absorved by 106 Infantry Division were negated by the identification of this regiment in the 715 Infantry Division sector. The old 736 Grenadier Regiment has also been reconstituted from local resources, as well as 706 Grenadier Regiment Which first become a regiment of 716 Infantry Division in Docember 1944. The division draw chiefly on Wehrkrais V replacement pools and on Landesschuetzen units to replanish its cambat units. 706 and 726 Grenadier. Regiments were both encircled south of FFORZERN and practically wixed out by French forces on 19 April. Divisional combat infantry effectives amount to around 800.

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
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED 16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. Moschil) was committed set of STUTTGART in area R 82. In reaction to our attack, it disengaged there and taged a futile counterattack on the flank of the western armored specified in area 80. The division is still in fair shape with organic combat infantry strength talling 1,200. 455 Mobilization Division (CG:) is a Mehrkreis V adminis - trative staff controlling replacement units. It was recently reported in STUTTGART, its home station. It is probable that the division staff has held back some such units for the defense of the city and its surroundings. Approximately 2,500 troops may have been gathered for this mission. Combat intention affections being somewhat may have been gathered for this mission. Combat infentry effectives being somewhat lower. (b) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. GRIMERICS) 257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) has so far avoided pocketing as it withdrew southeastward under light pressure. The division put up only scattered delaying resistance during the period. It is currently the only major formation that could capose the eastward expansion of our spearhead to the Swiss frontier in the ASCHAFFELEURG region. Such a task is obviously beyond the division's capabilities. Its present combat infantry strength is estimated to be (c) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. KEP LE?) 106 Infantry Division (GG:), which absorbed the bulk of 708 Volksgrenadier Division and elements of 805 Mobilization Division, spent the week in rather feeble delaying action as it was pushed south through the Black Forest. Toward the end of the period it was spread very thinly along the east-west line between FREUDENSTADT and OFFERBURG. Especially in its present battered condition, the division is certainly incapable of effective resistance. It is supported by remnants of German Air Force Brigade OBERGHAIN, but even including this brigade, combat infantry strength does not exceed 1,200. 405 Reserve Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEEGER) was contacted south of KEHL during the period. It is composed of three OBERRELIN Grenadier Regiments (IV, X and XIV) which were constituted from local Security, Landesschuetzen, and Volkssturm units. Included in the division is 291 Rottelion zbV, previously under command of 805 Mobilization Division. 405 Reserve Division is being pushed south down the Rhine Valley. Its combat infantry strength is approximately 1,200. Unidentified Division. An unidentified division staff controlling approximately 6 - 9 infantry battalians in located east of FREIBURG. The unit is not believed to have completely formed as yet nor to have the normal complement of divisional supporting weapons or troops. Its combat infantry strength is estimated at 1500. d. ENERGY STRENGTH OFFOSITE 6TH ARMY GROUP
(Combat Infentry Effectives of Divisional Units) Nineteenth German Army First German Army 30,500 Available Reserves (Estimated) Mineteenth German Army First German Army TOTAL 30,500

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Tanks and SP Guns:



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OFERATIO'S - SOUTH CENTRAL FRONT

Strong resistance in the BLDEN Plain and Black Forest at the beginning of the period gave way as OFFENBURG (# 1586) and KEHL (# 0697) were taken on 15 April LIV Corps fell back offering only scattered opposition until 17 April when a stand was attempted north of LAHR (# 0970) and across the hills of the Black Forest. A spirited counterattack forced friendly units from NONDERTHIER (# 0272). The stand was only temporary, however, as Allied forces resumed the advance arminst weak and disorganized resistance. FREUDENTADT (# 5094) was taken and by the end of the period, the Rhine Plain had been cleared as far south as the KAISKSTUHL. East of the Black Forest, Allied spearheads driving foward the Swiss border had occupied WILLINGEN (# 5340) and SCH ENNINGEN (# 5940). The battered remnants of LKIV Corps were now hopelessly split and unable to offer any organized opnosition while XVIII SS Corps controlling Rhine River defenses had become virtually cut off.

LYXX Corps held firm along the Enz River between PFORTHERM and the Neckar River. Friendly forces seemed less interested in this portion of the front while to the west, Allied forces pushing south through the Black Forest were outflenking the Enz River line. East of the Neckar River, XIII Corps defended subbornly. Counterattacks and artillery fire held the line infact until 17 April when a slow and well organized withdrawal was begun. Enemy illusions were shattered on 19 April as an Allied armored spearhead from the west captured TUBINOEN ("19791), crossed the Neckar and reached REUTLINGEN (X 0690). This action again split the remnants of LXIV Corps. Simultaneously, another Allied spearhead drove south from HAIL (S 4558), between 198 and 553 Divisions, dividing XIII Corps into two portions. By night fall, the advance had crossed the Rems River at LORDH (S 4323) and the Fils River west of GOPPINGEN (S 4013), securing intact bridges at both locations. Thus, all of the units of LXXX Corps and portions of LXIV and XIII Corps were rapidly being enclosed in what was doumed to be the STUTMART pocket. In an attempt to prevent the catustrophe, 16 Volksgrenedier Division was shifted southwest to the "HIDERG" (R 7403) area to attack the flank of the TUBLICEN spearhead. Meanwhile, 47 Volksgrenedier Division was dispatched south to the KIROHEDIN (S 2506) area where it attempted to hold an ascape gap for the trapped elements which were hurriedly retreating southward.

Between HALL and NEUSTADT (0 0812), the enemy maintaining a defensive attitude throughout the period, was forced to withirm under pressure. The Aisch River line was stubbornly defended on 15 April by the enemy dug in along its south bank. The defense appeared well coordinated and received considerable artillery support. However, the following day, Allied units press of forward and the enemy resumed a vell organized delaying action, falling back slowly. ROTHRIBURG (5 7889) was cleared of energy on 17 April and NUERCHERG (0 4000) was being approached from the northwest as the XIII SS Corps continued to offer registance, using towns as stronggoints, By the end of the period, ANSHACH (T 0682) had been cleared and CRAILSHEIM (S 7062) had been reached as the First German Army fell back in an attempt to cover its exposed left flank.

BUBERG (0 2648) was cleared on 14 April after short but heavy fighting in which the enemy lost 20 tanks, 8 - 88 mm guns, and 400 hilled and wounded. Advances cust toward BAYREUTH (0 7556) and south toward NUMERIES progressed rapidly in spite of strong opposition at scattered points. BAYREUTH was cleared by Allied forces from the northwest on 14 April and the eastern outskirts of NUMERIES were reached on 17 April. The defense of NUMERIES was carefully planned and 17 SS Penwer Grenadier Division, 256 and 36 Volkagrenadier Divisions, elements of 719 Infantry Division, and 667 Assault Gun Brigade were allocated for the task. These units defended the city famatically and although Allied forces approached the city from three sides, very house was stubbornly defended. By 19 April, the enemy in NUMERIESC had been forced into the walled city where remnants held out until late 20 April when it was cleared except for sniper fire. Meanwhile, advances south and east of the city continued to meet strong opposition with continued counterattacks and considerable artillery of the Although the city of NUMERIESC had been lost, the first German Army was determined to prevent an Allied drive south toward MUNION.

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
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED a. ATLINTIC FRONT (1) ROTAN ZONE The operation which cleared the ROYAN sector took off at dawn, 14 April with an attack on the east side of the area. The enemy promptly withinew his outposts. These positions upon being occupied by fariendly troops were brought under fairly heavy artillery fire. By the end of the day MERICHES (Y 4357) was taken and the front line ran from that place to BRIE (Y 4280). After a nic t of strong enemy artillery fire and small counterattacks friendly infantry advanced on 15 April along highways 730 and 150 to reach ROYAN at 2000b, while armor reached the north and west edges of the town. Troops noving up the ARVERT Peninsula on 15 April penetrated northwest of LA TREMHADE (Y 2992) and on the following day against sporadic resistance, took LTS MATHES (Y 2996) and STANLES (Y 3387). On 17 April the SAUJOT-LA TREMHADE road was free, and during the night of 17/18 April LA TREMHADE and RCHOE LNS WAITS (Y 2897) were taken. By this time the operation had reached the mopping up phase, with a large number of enemy troops holding out in the CONRE Forest at the northwest extremity of the peninsula. Manualle, Admiral MICHAELIS and 60 stalmarth defended the last bunker in the south at POLITILIAC, just west of RCYAN. By 0700B of 18 April all pockets had surmendered and at 0830B resistance officially came to an end at ROYAN. Approximately 6,000 prisoners were captured. The line at the beginning of the period can roughly East-West across the GRAVE Peninsula north of MAYAM (Y 3248). MAYAM was under enemy artillary fire throughout 14 April, while northwest of the town friendly forces occupied PONT DE ERELE (Y 3047), whence they crossed the PERG marshes on the following day to occupy the ground south of VINSAC (Y 3650). During 16 April the advance occupied TALAIS (Y 3550), where the enemy began a last-ditch stand, fighting fiercely to the east of the town. The town itself was attacked by intense artillary fire throughout the night of 16/17 April. On 17 April, however, SOULAC (Y 3061) was reached and at noon the next day IA VERDON was attacked from the west and south, and was taken at L3008. Against desperate last-minute resistance the peninsula was cleared when the last blookings, teinied by fonatical officers, surrendered at 20008 on 20 April. blockhouse, defended by fanatical officers, surremdered at 2000B on 20 April. b. ALTHE FRONT (1) SO'TH ZONE


The enemy quietly evacuated the AUTHION Range (Vic N 7413) on 15 April, falling back to a strongly-mined line of pillboxes cast of the 'Reys River. COLDA' BASSA (N 8010) was counterpticked on 15 April, and the next day the enemy retook COLDA BASSA (N 8010) was counterpticked on 16 April, and the next day the enemy retook COLDA BASSA area friendly troops occupied MAURIAN (N 8111) on 17 April, and moved northward up the slope to seize PEXURPE Ridge, where a German counterattack was repulsed on the following lay. On 19 April a stronger enemy counterattack with artillery preparation failed against PEXURBE positions, while friendly troops pushed acuth and cast along the spurs of the COLDA BASSA and took Fort MARTA. Farther to the north L'NOFER Reduc (N 4839) had been taken on 14 April; here the Italians wainly scunterpattacked on 17 April and patrol clashes occurred at the place during 19 April. South of the Col of MONTGENEVER(K 4502) much work and traffic was in widence during the period, with heavy explosions heard on 16 April.

(2) NORTH ZONE


Works and activity mere observed on NT FROID (H 9255) and in the ETHT MT CENIS has throughout the period. In the PETHT ST HERMARD Pass occasional fortar and shell fire characterized the period, some digging activity in progress on 19 April.



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L A S S I F I E D

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SUPPLY OF THE ENERY SITU TION 13 NUV 1945 a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation That portion of C in C UEST'S command (Mineteenth Army and First German Army) opposite 5th Army Group failed to receive sufficient reinforcements during the week to aid in either the reestablishement of a front line or even to replace the approximately 78,650 odd troops lost as prisoners of war suring the period 21-25 Avril, exclusive of permanent casualties. The inability of the enemy to halt the eastward drive towards UIM and KEMPTEN rolled up the Suabian Mountain positions and turned the Danuba River line. This drive coupled with advances to the south through the places mentioned above effectively disorganized and practically destroyed Mineteenth Army. Further to the cost, friendly armor has broken contact between Seventh and First German Armies. This was the situation most to be avoided by Army Group G. The result is that First lumy is practically isolated and must first an independent action with exposei flanks for the defence of MINIOS.

First German Army was unable to find suitable connected termain fortunes made the defence of MINIOH.

First German Army was unable to find suitable connected termain factures upon which it could reestablish a front line against unrelenting Allied pressure. Its rearward progress has continued for the second successive week. The appearance of Vlassov Russians and Hungarian troops in front line positions could not offset the very great need for artillery pieces, ammunition, motor transport, and tanks. The position forced upon First German Army, isolated by the deep wedge driven into its right flank and the disintegration of the Nineteenth Army on its left flank, will compel its early withdrawal to the Austrian Border. The army will be forced back to cover the city of MINIOH, but due to the unavailability of any cross corrilors of strong natural defensive positions in the vicinity, the city will fall rapidly. However, Himmler, who is reported in INVICH, may urge a final German "Sacrifice" for this Nineteenth German Army suffered a tremendous and over helming defect at the hands of the fast moving First French Army. The ranks of the enemy army were cut into numerous pockets and then individually morped up. The r te of attrition was so high that the enemy's capability of restoring its ranks was not possible of fulfillment. Mineteenth Army will probably have the doubtful bonor of being the first enemy army to arrive in the so called "Redoubt" area. It will probably have the mission of manning the few defensive positions already constructed in the SRECTY-INSTRUCK area, as well as that of constructing new defenses. The remnants of Mineteenth Army, after having lost approximately 50,000 prisoners of war during the past week, can only hope to delay their day of capitulation.

b. Capabilities

The enemy may be allowed only two actual capabilities:

(1) He can surrender unconditionally.

(2) He can continue his senseless impolation, fighting hopelessly from isolated strongmoints as hit lines disintegrate.

The overwhelming military defeat of the German armies north of the Danube and the Black Forest, the dwindling resources both of man and material remaining to the my, and the increasingly obvious war-weariness of the civilian population all bine to make a political capitulation imminent. The hold of the Nazi everlores in the Wehrmacht and the people is definitely weakening, marticularly in BLVARIA.

Civilian finds himself in a position of fighting for the protection of his home possessions not against the Allier, but against the function who will not or may accept defeat. As for the German soldier, prisoner of war status has become tainly more inviting than the prospect of further resistance under conditions of teme privation.

Should the Nazis choose to resist, whether through a blind but monumental th in ultimate victory or through simple fear of their own fate, their resistance I be short lived. The north-south valleys of BAVARIA offer no tenable defensive

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tions and will serve is avenues into AUSTRIA. His inferiority in guns, supplies, Mity and total lack of in support are so complete that even field laces met be repliced. Furtish activity now in the development of defensive positions AUSTRIA denotes a religious in the waited too long to make the Matianal Redoubt foot. The enemy is militarily completely defeated; he will be allowed neither gite nor truce, choose whichever one he will.

6TH ARTY CROTP FRONT (South Central Germany

8. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces oppsoite 6th Army Group were as follows: INCOLSTADT (T 7124), NEUBULG (T 5421), DINKELHAUSEN (T 5111), FEICHING (T 3312), AUGSBULG (Y 3277), PEITLIG (Y 3815), FUSSEN (D 2289), VILS (D 1687), KEMPTEN (X 9304), MEMINIGEN (X 8234), EROLZHEIN (X 7345), FIGCHBACH (X 5740), WALDSEE (X 5126), UBERLINGEN (X 0608), KONSTANZ (C 0796), RADOLFZELL (W 9204), WORHUNGEN (W 8303).

- b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHULZ)
 - (1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

Some semblance of organization was maintained by First Army's three corps as they fell back offering scattered delaying actions. LXXXII Corps on the right flank gained 36 Volksgrenadier Division and elements of 38 SS Division MIBHUMCEN as these units were severed from Seventh German Army by the Allied drive toward LINZ. 416 Infantry Division also came under LXXXII Corps upon falling back to the REGENSEURG area. 719 Infantry Division, formerly carried under this corps, gave up its remnants to 416 Infantry Division and its number to 405 Reserve Division in the Black Forest. 256 Volksgrenadier Division remenants have been dropped because of a lack of contact. XIII SS Corps, having lost 416 Division, undertook some shifting of divisions but kept its organization essentially intact. XIII Army Corps gained the remnants of 196 and 19 Infantry Divisions while giving up 9 Volksgrenadier Division staff of which departed for the MULICH area. Resistance of fered by the divisional units was aided by replacement and miscellaneous bettle group formations.

(a) LXXII Corps: (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

36 Volksgrendedier Division (CG:), renowned for its skill in refilling its renks with miscellaneous units, remained in contact throughout the week. Its positions were completely outflanked by the Allied thrust along the Grech border. The division, disposed south-east of REGENSRURG, could hardly lope to contain this spearhead. Its combat infantry strength is estimated at 800.

416 Infantry Division (CC: Maj. Gen FILISGER) was reconstituted by the absorption of elements of 719 Volksgrenadier Division and of other miscellaneous units. The division was responsible for the defense of MCCHASBURG, and later, for the Denube line immediately south of that city. It managed to aclay Allied progress but was unable to provent our crossing of the Danube at several points. Divisional combat infantry effectives are estimated to be 1,000.

38 33 Grenadier Division "NIR LUNCEN" (CC:) was formed in the Black Forest in March by special order of the Fuehrer. It has three Grenadier Regi - ments numbered 95, 96, and 97. They are composed chiefly of Hitler Jugend personnel. The division was known to have been lurking belied the front for some weeks. Elements was identified on 27 April at U 1245, probably foreshedowing the commitment of the balk of the division. The division's period of formation was extremely short, and the calibratic certainly below previous 38 standards. Combat infantry strength is tentatively estimated at 2,500.

17 38 Panzer Grenadier Division (CP: SS Col. BOSCHHARN) retreated relight south from the NADBARKT area and is now committed on both sides of INGOLSTADT 7125). Context was relatively light as the bulk of the divisions withdraw behind ereening force. Remaints of 382 Volksgrenadier Division operating in the same eral area as 17 33 Division are believed to be under command of the latter. Indian these, combat infantny strength is about 2,000.



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XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. M.X SIMON)

212 Volksgrenadier Division (OG: Brig. Gene URICH or ULLICH). Hements of this division were cut off north of DILLIGER (T OCO). The rest membered withdraw and is now committed in the same general area as 79 Volksgrenadier Division (T 21). In view of the traped elements and other casualties, combat infantry effectives now total ne more than 1,200.

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KOLB) was reported by agents to have left the front for MANICH. Lack of contact during most of the week supported such claims. However, on 27 April elements of the division were identified in the DOLUMOLRIH area. It is conceivable that these are autoruinated to snother division while the 9 Volksgrenadier Division staff is, in fact, in MANICH. Combat infantry strength is still estimated at 1,000.

79 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. REIMERE) surfered very severe casualties in its engagements during the previous period. Some prisoners estimated divisional combat strength as low as 200. [opever, some reorganization did take place, elements of "Division" von FORE as well as miscellaneous units being used as fillers. The division is presently in contact in area Till. It is still extremely depleted, and combat infantry strength is about 700.

Battle Group von HOME (CO: Col. von HOME) is operating to the south of 79 Volksgrenadier Division with which it is closely affiliated, and to which it is known to have lost at least two nomin 1 battalians. Battle group von HOME's combat infantry strength is estimated to be a growing tely 1,00.

(c) XIII Corps (CG:

Maj Gen von CLAER, commanding general of AIII Corps, was captured by US troops on 23 April. He succeeded Maj. Gen. GRAF von CRICL, who had been

19 Volksgrenedier Division (CC: Brig. Con. BRIT MULAYR) re-appeared during the period on the German NIII Corps front. It narrowly escaped our trep south of UIM, whereupon it would north-east to the AMGERG erea. The division is still disorganized, and combat infantry strength does not exceed 500.

151 Field Training Division (00: Bris. Gen. Back) was identified by 1307 and 1306 Field Training Regisents wast of ANGENIO on ad Arril. Little is known of the composition of the division exact that the revisionly district 560 Volksgrenedier Division provided the steff and probable service personnel is well as the cadre. Tentative combat infantry strength estimate is 2,000.

198 Indentry Division (CG: Brid. Cen. Bardh) calvaged some elements from the JTUITGART pocket and the trap south of SIM. Prisoners claim that the division's disorganization is complete. Remments are now located south of AUCSBURG. Their comb t infantry strength is not more than 500.

553 Volksgrenedier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUSTER) retreated southward to east of VIII, where elements were cut off by our spearheads. 1121 Volksgrenedier Regiment was identified with 559 Volksgrenedier Division to which it was stated to be attached. 553 Division was badly disormanized by its harmed retreats, and combat infantry strength is now estimated at 500%.

At the end of the period, Nineteenth army was in a state of complete meastion, comparable in many ways to its condition when it escaped from the CCIMER fet in early Fabruary. XVIII SS Corps, composed of 1066, 719, 352, and 89 Infrantry ision, was completely destroyed. The numbers 713 and 352 helds to a assigned to 405 and 605 Divisions researctively as the divisions took a heat broath. IXIV ps was left without a single divisional unit as only remnents of 257 Volkage mailer ision escaped from the SCH ABLAI JURA. Focket. The meaner resistance to allied funces in the corps sector was offered by miscellahoous battone to allied funces in the corps sector was offered by miscellahoous battone formations. At Corps also suffered heavy losses. The major portion of the Corps was estroyed the SCHMABLAN Jura pocket. However, the Corps headquarters along with remnents of 246, 559, and 47 Divisions escaped. The Corps was rebuilt to some degree by the little of the reformed 189 Volkage mailer Division, the organization of replacement its under 465 Division staff, and the convitant of miscellahous Russian units. SECRET

LXXX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. BAYER)

(() (1)

Miscelleneous Russian Units. The Volunteer Cadre Division, a busian unit that, until recently, was stationed at MIENSINGER, was identified during the period. It is organized into four battle groups - LOERGES, LNGE, WRUCK, and DANIELEKE. The division was first committed in area X 39 - X 49 about 22 Aprilament present location is not known, but the division is beliaved to have retreated to the south-east and to be in the general area Y 10. Initial combat infantry strength was approximately 2,200, but many prisoners including a high percentage of deserters have been taken and the present estimate is 1,300.

Also contacted were elements of 650 Russian Infantry Division. This is enother of the series of Russian units formed at NULLSHGEN during the last months. Nost of it was reported on the Eastern Front and it is believed that the few companies identified at X 0844 on 22 april represent the only part of the division that remained in the west. Their combet infantry strength is judged at 500.

169 Volksgrenedier Division (CC: Gen. ULIMER) moved north from the southern part of the Eleck Forest to be committed for the first time since its destruction in the COLMAR Pocket in early February. It was encountered on 21 April on the eastern shoulder of the STUTTGART pocket in tree 3 52. Two of the division's three regiments (1212 and 1213 Volksgranddier Regiments) had been reformed on a three three regiments (1212 and 1215 volksgrenedier Regiments) and been reformed on a three battalian basis with about 100 men per company. I large part of the personnel is Russian and the rest of the groups are also of low culibre. The division was soon forced to withdraw toward UHA. There its hopes for a defense were dispelled as the city's positions were outflanked from the south. The division had to retreat once again, and what remained of it nerrowly ascaped the closing allied pincers south of UHA. These remaines are now believed to be in line in area D.09. The possibility of a close link between 189 Volksgrenedier Division and the Volunteur Cadre Division (Paceign) was indicated as prisoners of both write alasted Campan UHARD as their (Russian) was indicated as prisoners of both units claimed General ULIMER as their commander. Combat infatry strength is now estimated at 1,000.

465 Mobilization Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HOFFMANN), the second Wehrkreis V mobilization division, was contacted, also for the first time, during this period. As was to be expected, it controls an array of Wehrkreis V replacement units. These are committed in the area of X 90. 223 Volksgroundier Regiment of 16 Volksgroundier Division is now also under 455 Nobilization Division. Combat infentry attentity tradition is about 1 500 strength, including the latter, is about 1,500.


257 Volksgrenedier Division (CC:) suffered very severe cesualties and was pocketed east of TURINGEN (* 9792) at the beginning of the period. Elements managed to find their way back to the German lines and were met again in the MENITUREN (K 8834) region of 27 April. These are believed not to exceed 400 combat

246 Volksgrehedier Division (CC: Brig. Gen. KURHE) was identified by some elements in the NURMANASH region. These are the survivors of the two successive pockets - the first at STUTGART, the second in the SCHABLAN ALPS. The division had been weak even before these escapades. Now not more than 300 combat infentry effectives are believed to remain.

559 Volksgrensdier Division (Brig. Cen. von der MUSIEEN) had a fate very similar to that of 246 Volksgrensdier Division. It too, was contucted south of MERIE CEN after two close escapes. 1125 and 1126 Volksgrensdier Regiments had both been reorganized during the previous period and 1121 Volksgrensdier Regiment of 553 Volksgrensdier Division was attached to 559 Volksgrensdier Division. However, insulties were very heavy, and combat infantry strength of remnants is estimated at


47 Volksgrenedier Division (CG: Mej. Gen. BOHK) is in the same stegory with both 246 and 559 Volksgrenedier Divisions. Only a small part of the ivision survived the chase from STUTTGRAT to the REMEMINGE: - KAIPTEN zone. Prior to be breakthrough, the division's third regiment, 115 Volksgrenedier Regiment, had sen reformed, and the 147 Field Replacement Battalion was claimed to have 1000 men. ow, however, not more than 500 center infantry effectives are thought to remain.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED PESTRICTED ten the France-Italian front to begin the night of 25/24 april. By 27 april, mithdrawal was complete from the coast to MONTGEREVRE (K 4503). Friendly forces pursuing the departed enemy, delayed by minus and demolitions, were unable to establish any contact. In the AOSTA Valley and the MONT CHIE region some German troops remained in position on 27 april but all indications pointed to an early departure. Is in many previous instances, the order for withdrawal had been given too late. All main escape routes from North Italy had been gut off by allied capture of VERCIA, and by the Partison activity in TURIN and MILLY. Consequently, the ultimate disposition of the divisions of LCCV Corps is uncertain. b. ENERY DISPOSITIONS LXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHLEN.ER) 34 Infantry Division - German (CG: Brig. Gen. von LIEB) departed from the coastel area where it had gradually lost ground to friendly units which pushed to the ROYA River. On 26 april, contact was completely lost as friendly forces pushed forward up to ten miles in the coastel area, the cavence being impeded only by mines and demolitions. On the same day, the division was reported passing through ALESSALDRIA (J 70). LITTORIO Division - Italian (CG: Gen. TITO GOSTO) abundaned its positions in the L.ROIE Pass after expending its stocks of artiller; ammunition on 25 April. Advance friendly elements approaching CONEO (N 85) from the west on 27 April were unable to regain contact with the division. Other elements of the division (4 Alpine Regt) disposed in the GCTA Valley were still in contact as withdrawal from this portion of the front had apparently not been complicate. MONTE ROS. Division - Italian (CG: Gen. C.RLONI) was formerly deployed along a wide front from COL DE LA CALISE (B 67) to GUILLESTEE (P 47) along with elements of 5 Mountain Division. The MONTE ROSA Division withdraw toward TURN and contact had been lost by 27 April. 5 Mountain Division - German (CO: Col. STEETS) was deployed in the central sector (SUS, Velley* and in the northern sector .OST, Velley). This division had not abandoned its positions completely on 27 April. On that day, an enemy patrol was sective at RET.(RIET (H 4298) in the ACT, Velley. To the south, nearly 600 rounds of artillery and marter fire were received at MCIT GETIS (H 45). This indicated that final departure from the CMS, Velley was imminent. I reliable source reported the bulk of 5 Mountain Division in the TURIN area on 25 April.



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Southern zone: On 22 April the enemy pressed unsuccessful counter-attacks at the PEZURBE Ridge (N 8312); while keeping up a harassing artillery fire on How! (N 8004) and SOSPEL (S 7398). Attacks on PEZURBE Ridge were resumed the following day, and friendly positions on NT GROWANDO (S 7895) were surrounded by the easy who, however, withdrew of his own accord at midnight. During the night 23/24 April enemy artillery fell on MENTON (S 7796), and threughout the day of 24 ipril 500 rounds fell in SCSPEL, REVIL and CASTELLER (S 7890). The next night MENTON and CASTELLER received 200 more rounds, while other indications placed the enemy's intention to withdraw beyound a doubt. On 25 ipril friendly forces occupied SACREE (N 8410), FONTIN (N 8412), AIROLE (S 8497), and VENTIMIBLIA (S 8597), the Germans falling back apparently to SIN RENO (T 0090). Contact was lost between Likele and the coast as friendly progress was slowed by heavy mining and demolitions as well as bed weather. On 26 April ERIG! MARITTIMA (N 8917) and TENDA Pass (N 82) were cleared, the Department of ALPER MARITTEES completely liberat 4; the tempo of the enemy's withdrawal was increasing.

Central zone: Period opened with launching of operation which on 22 April captured MEYRONNES (P 5651), PONTIVE and lower ST 0URS (P 5652), encircling Upper ST 0URS; a Ski Company took LURCHE (N 3365). The following day Upper ST 0URS (P 5654) and adjacent positions were abandoned by the enomy. On 25 April enemy activity diminished markedly in area south of LURCHE Pass, though north of the pass the enemy continued to hold. April 24 and 25 were marked by intense artillery activity, the enemy apparently unloading his stocks of armunition: 60 rounds of 149 mm and 75 mm fell on LURCHE on the 24th, while BRIWOON (P 4097) received 380 and 75 mm fire. ST 0URS, LURCHE and MEYRONNUS received 30 rounds li9 mm on 25 April On 26 April friendly troops entered LURCHE Pass, MT GUNEVARE (K 4503) and CESANNEE (K 5205).

Northern zone: On 21 April the energy seized FCRGLE Pass and a friendly OF in the Mont CEMIS area. Next day a strong patrol was sent against a friendly strong-point at HORTIEDE. From 21 to 25 April energy works and activity were in evidence in MT CEMIS, MT SLING and BARDONNECHE regions, but on last named date German retreat from MT CEMIS became apparent with prodigal expenditure of mortar and artillery shells (including 250 rounds of 149 mm), the sound of heavy demolitions and the abandoment of its positions by the 11th Co of the EDOLO Battalion. The intense artillery fire continued up to 1730B of the following day, then various positions in the FREJUS area (K 42) were found unoccupied.

c. ATLANTIC FRONT

Activity during period was confined to patrolling, virits by lone Recce planes (on 21, 23 and 25 April) and some artillary fire, which fell:


21 April in LA GIOCRE (T 4826) and FURROUVED (T 5022 23 April in LE THOW (T.4826) 24 April in GALON D'ON (Y 3294).


CONTUNICATIONS

· Tactical Reconnais ance


Intermittent cover, occasioned by breaks in the generally unfavorable weather which provailed through ut the week, revealed moderately heavy rail activity in the 1904 area and a continued flow of enemy road truffic to the south and southeast ling the 5th Army Group front.

Marshalling yards and rail lines in the MUNICH-MUGBBURG-BUGILOE triangle were tire on 25 and 25 varil and indications pointed to the probability that HUCHLOE serving as a switching point for troops and supplies rowing to and from the state area. A large concentration of railroad cars was seen on the BUCHLOE-ICH line on both 24 and 25 April and another group of about 800 cars was sighted the MUNICH-BUD TOLZ line on the 25th. Marshalling yards in the MUNICH-INNSBRUCK a showed moderately heavy holdings and considerable activity themsever cover of a sector was available. However, the activity seen in this area is by no means prising. In view of existing circumstances, it is to be expect a that concentrated dover should reveal some activity in this realatively small area, which represente only remaining portion of the enemy's once extensive communications system.







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RET on 9 nrib the 36th and IC3rd Infantry Divisions were charged with recurity of portions of 7th army area. The arma was divided between the divisions, each being under direct command of army and charged with: Insuring the security of the operating railroads, main supply roads and petroleum and lines; control of displaced persons; distrained and solice of the civilian population; establishing a Prohibited Frontier Zone; support of Military Government; and destruction or mattralization of arms and cananition which might be used against fewenth from. 2. Numerous reports were received prodicting organized demonstrations and sabota a on 20 for, littler's Birthday. No unusual events were observed that day. 3. 514 CIC Det epprehended 412 members of the "chrmacht in civilien clothes who appn initial clostioning enied membership in the German Army. Then of them stated that their commanders had returned their Tehroess; and that they had been ordered to dispose of their Soldburns by berning, to obtain civilian clothes, and if possible, to rejoin their unit at a later date. 4. Displaced Person travel in 7th army Service area has greatly decreased, except for organized D? movements. German Nationals are traveling throughout the area largely disregarding travel restrictions although numerous arrests have been made for trial before M.G. Courts. The unavailability of troops for trivel control within the Army Area has made the datailed control of civilian travel during this period impossible. 5. 307 CIC Dat reports that W zi officials and blacklist persons who left cities before allied occupation are now being found in small outlying villages throughout the area. f. /t 1730 on 1 April a civilian disturbance occurred in Weinheim (M7606) when some r fugues and local civilia a attenuted to enter a macaroni factory to obtain food. .. small group of men from H and S Co, 290 Ener C Bn. was or enized to break so the riot. 7. In First Franch irmy area contacts have been established between Public Security and S. L., and all individuals of interest to our Special Corvince are established by handed over to us.

Presently there are two interests in the second over the second 5. It was pressing point, deleusing stations have been created are all displace corrects out from a france are compelled to pass. for being estated in cases, toy are examined by Stofficers. SUBVERSIVE ORGINILLTIONS (LIB No T.D TEMPITORIES) RESIST NOE OR : MI TIONS (GET LAY) 1. The lost prominent resistance group and the only one which to be indicated alemned arganization is the MARTOLF. Evidence uncovered indicated that planding started in 1944. Radio broadcasts would insate that frontly efforts are being made by the Germans to create that organization of youthful sabotours. The chief aim appears to one of psychological workers. Ernst NEUN-HEM and Gregor HAHN, SD into abor handed by 514 CIC Dat in Neustadt and learned the purpose class of the MARTOLF organization while ettending sabotage school "Spezialle Kamoftrapoen" at Hassfurt, Baveria, where they were an about work course in the use of makeshift sabotage devices lizing material left by the retreating Parament. Students were

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED istructed to act as TEREWOLF organizers. MURT 1000B, 17 year old in member was apprehended at Hamburg by 26 012 Det on information to at was trying to organize a TERE OLF group. 188 310 Det arrested two boys on 13 April who admitted being asked to join the TERETOLF. a. 44 Inf Div reports that three 15-year old boys were opporehended on 31 forch in vic Bensaein M6420) having in their possession a pistol and four mend renaces. The boys stated that they were members of a group of 250 boys in that locality who were sworn to kill American soldiers. Wembers 256 Engr 3 En observed children turying ges mask containers filled with agg-granades on a hill at N5009, near Uffenheim. 3. Small squads of CIC agents have been formed from the 200 CIC Det to be sent to villages and towns reported possible centers of clandestine activities. 4. First French / ray reports a Garman Maguis organization in the Emmendingen area. This organization is convert of two structs of 14 man each. There is also a woman's branch, whose numbers have taken an oath to avenge meaters of their families who are victies of the war. The woman who is the leader of this latter branch is heared SI-HEDR. They are reported to have two fold sloply centers and some asmunition dumps hear Lallock and SI-Main and SI-Main a D. RELATIONS BOT IN CI STAFFS ID CONSOLUTED LOCAL OFFICIALS OF POLICE (LABOR TELD REPRINCELES) ATTIFUDE OF LOCAL OF MONITIES AND DOLLED TO SI ST FFS AND PERSONNEL (GERMANY) 1. The attitude of local authorities to CIC Staffs has been respectful and cooperative in all cases. 2. Preliminary outline reports of conditions in 25 towns observed by the 514 CIC Dat between 2 and 16 while 1945 displayed a decile, frightened and obsequious mannle, still stunned by the impact 3. In the city of Renmelburg following a partial withdraws: from the area by German troops a functival citizen attended to rally a civilian "army" against the marican troops. He was snot by an unknown German on the main street. 4. Two reports of political unrest in the 7th irmy Service Area are investigated by the 307 CIC Dat. One group of allowed anti- axis was believed to be starting a loves at against those individuals wholding public offices who belonged to the Mazi Porty. All sustats were investigated and warmed that the Military Government would tolerate opposition from any group. Second group was seeded-aconfiscating and accraing food, distributing it to ex-soldiers ding in the woods and to party made a still in the city. The stock food has been saized and the loader of the movement arrested by **聚料往**漢

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5. 63d CIC Det reports that in almost every community SS troops by two or three would-be desertors from the lehrmeent as a warning.

6. In Lorch, east of Torms, 300 worm mero reported to have contorist the German Commandant with the threat of death at their hands the did not leave town with his troops. The town was not defended.

7. 42d CIC Dat reported that in a town north of Schweinfirt the inhebitants stoned the German soldiers in an effort to make them leave the town so it would not be reveged.

8. A survey of the town of Aschaffenburg conducted by 307 CIC revealed that enthusiasm for the Party and been decreasing for some time. I document found by 215 CIC Dat in the Aschaffenburg ED office described the morele emong troops and civilians in the area as very poor and scathelia.

B. RELATIONS SETTED TROOPS AND CIVILIAN POPULATION (LIBERATED TERRITORIES ONLY)

Nothing to report.

F. SPECIAL CASES OF CL INTEREST

1. Espionago.

2 4 2 3 7

"a. BTHTTES, Jean (Hens), alias ETROER, Menri. Organizer of stay-behind W/T network in the Rhineland. BEHERED confessed to 307 CIC that he was a Sonderficherer "K" in Absence I H. A German National; 49 years old; resident of Kaisersleatern. He formerly worked as interpreter and evaluator of Abwehr intelligence for Asts/Miesbaden, St. Germain, lagors and Nest/Keisersleatern. His present mission was to establish three W/T exonts in the Rhineland (see pers. b, c, d below), and a network of satellite informers. Case to SCI.

b. MCRRY, Ludwig, alias "MINTENS". Discharged Wenrmacht Signal Corps E.M. Residence: 8 Tirolfatrases, Reisersleutern. W/T agent installed by SEPERS. To SCI.

c. GRESTAR, Paul, elics "KORN". Discharged Wehrmacht Signal Corps E.M. Rasidenca: 4 Wasstanthal, Einod-Zweibrucken. Employed in Mayor's office. W/T agent installed by BURRES. To SCI.

d. KODYLER, Hermann, alias 'BRDYNER'. Discharged "ehrmacht Signal Corps E. L. Residence: Oberweiler, near 'olfstein. "/T agent Installed by BSIEES. To SCI.

e. Won Prunkrem, Alexander. Generalmajor in German army (ratired) sporehanded by ERI CTO D.t; Ralandl in Ast/Menover from 1936 to 1938; C of the Brandentur Division from 1948 to 1944; close associate and personal friend of dmirel CANARIS, under whom he worked in Berlin from 1942 to 1944; Ven Prunkrem, IN was involved in an attempt on HTLER'S life on EC July 1944, was errested by the SD on 1 Sout and brought before the ROMA. He claims to have been held in the ROMA trison for three menths, and to have been released from prison in lastrin on 30 Jan 1945. We also states that he classed to be a member of the German Army on 14 Sept 1944. To SCI Paris.

f. MRIAA, Erwin. Confossed espionar's egent. Mitler Jagend ember; Gara a national le years old; residence; 67 Hermann Coering trasse, Altanweld. BRISM has brought to a Cantrin KOLS of Kampfaruppe TRINSEL, who ordered aim to produce his friend MMLLEP, Joseph Alois she a below. Confessed to the 4th CID Det that KOLS gave them both he mission of proving the lines to Teuberbischefsheim to find out rom civilians in the town the number and type of American troops,

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whiches and installations in the area, as well as anything else of interest. BRILM and MULLER were both given passes signed by KOLB stating that they were civilians on a reconnissance mission and should be allowed to pass German posts. The pass was found in their possession KOLB has since been apprehended. BRILM was tried and condemned to death by court-martial. Execution pending review of trial.

g. MULLER, Joseph theis. Confessed espions an ent. Hitler Jugend mamber; German national; 15% years old; residence: 24 Cohlegate: Strasse, Jegersburg, Homburg. Accomplice of BRIAM, Erwin (above) and confessed with him to 4th CIC Det. Tried and condemned to death by court-martial. Execution pending raview of trial.

h. BARTH, Robert, alias BRAUEF, Robert. Confessed W/T espionable and the German National; residence: 265 Adolf Hitler Strasse, Dudwiler; druggist, typesatter and proofreader. Arrested by 513 CIO Det on 30 March 1945. In addition to a Kennkarte he was cerrying an Anmeldung and an Entlescangsschein, both false. BARTH claims to have been a Communist sings 1929, to have been inducted into the German Army at the beginning of the war, to have deserted and been taken prisoner by the Russians in 1942. Released, he was recruited for an espionage mission by the Russians and rectuted into Germany where he operated in Berlin for six weeks antil his arrest by the Gestapo. He states that he was made to keep contact with Moscow during his imprisonment. This contact was broken in May 1944, when B.RTH was recruited for an espionage mission by the Gestapo after threats against himself and his family. He received instruction in radio operation and code. BATRH's present mission was to report all American military activity in the Sambrucken-Dudweil rerea, as well as civilian political developments affecting the war, decame to the cree in November 1944, and since the end of February 1945 he has lived in Dudweiler. He had been a not in resular contact with Berlin and had transmitted some reports on civilian political developments. To SCI.

i. HASQUENCPH, alies CHATEMOIS, sent over by P.G.R. of Loerrach, with mission of restablishing contact with agents in France, has been turned over to B.DOC Mulhouse to be prosecuted before a Military Court.

j. DUFLOG, abort. "affine SS, 6th Brandebourg Co. Arrested in the End DIA area as he had just cross a the Raine, together with other agents, in order to fulfill an intelligence mission in our lines. Handed over to territorial B.DOC to be prosecuted before a Military Court.

k. GOERIG, Pierre. DIERINGER Pierre. Former Hitler-Jugend members. Attended a soy-training course at the HI DEFREICH school, whence they succeeded in escening to Guebwiller a few days before liberation. Did not report their previous activity. Handed over to B.DOC Colmer to be prosecuted before a Military Court.

1. DUPONT, Louis, glims PER AULT, Daniel. Agent of the SANDRIN team ("by-bresselle DIJO2") Int to Germany and mede-clandestine crossing back through Switzerland. Joined the army. Hended over to cerritorial B.DOC to be prosecuted before a Military Court:

2. Sebotage

e. W/RISTER, Edouard. Lisutement in the German Army; 20 bers old. Arrested wearing civilian clothes by 70 CIC Det on 24 erch 1945 at a rendezvous with his driver, Fritz MJCKE, on his way to camoufleged cave of the German Resistance Movement on the outskirts f Saarbrucken. The cave, a former air raid shelter whose real entance was demolished, is an elaborage underground installation of even rooms with concrete floors, plank or brick wells and equipped the electric lights, medical supplies, water storage tanks, German

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED Tany rations, beds, cooking facilitys, SS uniforms, civilian clothing, arms, munitions and demolition material. Demolition in thrial confisted of (astimated) 100-1b boxes of unidentified substance. WallSTER that he was informed of the cave by three SS men who requested thim to dispose of the one remainin civilian in Secretariate who know of the cave's existence. According to AHLSTER, the SS men told him that they were a 3-man scued of "Varnichtungstruppen" who were to remain in American-held territory and execute substage. Two of them had attended a sebstage school. They claimed that there is a center for "V troops in Valdmoor, between Wankirchen and Kaisersladtern. "AHLSTER had served under Dr. DISTRIC (SS Obersturmcannfunker and Commandant of Serverucken, since Sect 1944, and in Decamber was also make Fuchrerkurier and used a W/T see with which he aleims to have releyed code messages for SS and Wahrmacht units and to have destroyed before his arrest. "AHLSTER and AUCHE were turned over to Third army due to change of army boundaries. b. JARCZYK, Richard. Confessed schotage and espionage agent.
Obergefreiter in 36 VG Div, IV Bn. Polish National (Volksdeutscher since 1941); 37 years old. JARCZYK was a pointed assistant to 45 in tow of Bruckweiler and was considered a likely appointed for mayor when apprehended by 42d GIC bet on 29 Merch 1945. We confessed that his present mission was to schotage US Army sauit ant and supplies, to kill US soldiers at night, to report troop movements, and strength and insignic. Information was to be to nomitted to Willi JARCHI, Alias Milli", 12 Schafferstrasse, Tirmsons. JARCHYK had attended two sebotage and demolition schools in February and Merch 1945. We obtained civilian clothes from a German woman on 22 Merch. Twenty-one other persons have been given similar missions. Tried by court-martial; executed 23 April 1945. A PMB poster based on the execution has been given wide dissemination. due to change of Army boundaries. e. TZYNSKI, Misezyslaus. Conf seed substance agent. Polish
Netional; 22 years ald; number of German army since farch 1943, now
Obergafraiter. Surrendered to 3rd Div troops on 15 Daril. He confessed to 3rd CIG Dat that he was one of 28 sebetaers, divided into
four groups, who crossed the lines with the primmy mission of destroying gasoline dumps, and the secondary mission of blowing as unattended tanks, helf-tracks and tracks, and of weyleying assessagers
to obtain their documents. This mission was to last fourteen days,
efter which they were to return to the nearest German division, using
the pessword "PAD". Group 1, to which TZYNSKI belonged was essigned the
eres of about 50 kms running along the highway from Nurnburg (7-4200)
to Bemburg (0-2549). Each man of the group carried 5 kilegroms of
olestic explosive; 2-3 magnatic clean mines; 1 Russian green org granade;
1 phosphorus bomb (for use on gas damps); 1 nuti-personal mine.
Individuals were araid with an English machine pistol; a small pistol,
asually of foreign make; a combat whife and bress knuckles. Group
asignant consisted of 46 200-pramasticks of German dynamite; a
consisted of 46 200-pramasticks of German dynamite; a
constity of steel whre tire-destroyers; 27 fountain-pen detonators.
Take and brown, timed for 2 and 4 hours; 8 to 10 German dynamite; a
constity of steel where tire-destroyers; 27 fountain-pen detonators.
Take group also carried three maps of the area in which they were to
ork. All 28 of the soldiors were dressed in green and brown spotted
amoughless suits, green or blue-green combat jackets and ornts undereth, regular German army shoes or boots, green German army caps.
Whill stated that he had volunteered to attend a subordage achool at
exter, Germany, where he took an eight-week c area in sebatage.

These out with equipment at Zonlinhatta, TZYNSKI and the 27 other men
to sent to an infantry division near Bembirg (0-2549) and were then
for sent to an infantry division near Bembirg (0-2549) and were then
to sent to an infantry div 3. Other Cases. n. Dr. Weinrich von FAULHABER (on "wented list") was found nging, deed, in the cell of the 67th AMA P joil, Mannheim, to which L. C. Resid

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED d been returned the proceeding evening after an interrogation by a CIC Detachment. The night proceeding the suicide he admitted the of Standartenfuhrer in the Saland instigation of an anti-Jewish rom' in Mannheim in 1938. b. Hermann LORENZ, Captain and Chief of the Schutzpolizei in St. Ingbert, suspected of being involved in SD matters; counitted suicide 23 Mer 1945, being found deal in his name by agents of the 63d c. Heinrich CROHE and his wife, of Oberschafflanz, committed suicide after an initial interrogation by mambers of the 67d CIS. Detechment. CROHE was a Gastapo agent. d. On 19 for the secret files of the Kriminaltschnistes Institut of the Secretty Police (Sigo) were found in a sefect Schloss Frankenberg (N 8015) by the 2940th Engr Technical Intelligence than essisted by a detail from the 307th CIC Detrehment. Numerous documents indicating plans for future substrate Were found. One document signed by SKOPZENY, sought information on poisons suitable for liquor. d. Ernst KOERNER, Kriminglassistent of the Gestage Aussanstelle in Darmstedt, stated that the Esplance Tehnol at Benshulm was headed by BOETM and amphasis was placed on esplance and stbotage instruction to foreign collaborators, French, Polisa, Russian, etc. The period of instruction vas 5 to 6 wasks. One group was headed by a French lewyer, Des HTH. All the members of this group were registered as employees of the MERCK corporation in Larmstedt. PRO-ALLIED AND ANTI-NOZI ORG NIZATIONS (GERMANY CNLY) 1. An anti-Nazi organization named "Galb Rot" was ancountered in Pirmasans. It is believed to be baraly local, vary locally organized. Its two loaders are unimportant people. Members along to be Specialist 2. 36 CIC Det reports that the only pro-llied group observed so fer which seems to have any degree of organization is the Z.... (Zentr ler Aktionsausschuss) Group. Jembers of this Group alain that it is composed of party members of the Social Democrat, Canter and Democratic parties, which have definitely opposed the Nazi regime since its inception. Leaders of this group have rendered assistance to 3d CIC Det. in identifying and operahending former Nazi leaders. 3. Gernardt UNGERL-ND interrogated b 44th CIC Dat claimed to be sember of a resistance movement. Inborer in Bayerische Jotorenwerk tory, UNGERL-ND claims to be one of the first members of an underland group who were opposing ditler and Nazism, and alless to the record of the first members to the members in this factory. The movement has no name members have an eluminum tog (five pointed star and number on the arse) and a password "MUNCHEN V R DIE H UNCT OF DER BENEGUNG:" 1. Many sources reported the runor that on Hitler's birthday, April, a general uprising of subversive German elements would ocinio occupied German territory, using around force and subotage, and id coincide with a counter-attack by the German Armies. According sivilian reports, each member of the VERIMOLF was supposed to kill allied soldier at any risk, as a present to the Fachrer. 20 oril and without incident. Other rumors reported: That Gen. HIGENHOWER his H; in Heidelburg; that fitter has fled to Japan; that Gearing been shot and killed; that Goobbels slit his arteries and commitsuicide, and in the ditter had tare toned "secret-weapon" action inst Mannhelm on or before 20 April 1945. SEGRET

PART II. MILITARY SECURI

GENERAL SURVEY.

- 1. Military security has been reasonably good throughout the period. Although a number of cases of possible sabotage, chiefly in the Army Service Area of Seventh Army, and several cases of wire cutting, determined to be sabotage, have occurred, the enemy has been unable to deal a major sabotage blow in spite of the thinly spread security forces and the fact that even cursory screening of the overrun population as a whole has not been possible.
- 2. In the Seventh Army Area, enlargement of Line of Communication Security troops by assignment of the 44th AA Brigade to that role, strengthened the guarding of dumps and installations. Anti-sabotage training has reached at least 90% of the L of C troops and will continue until completed.

SECURITY OF INFORMATION:

- 1. Interrogation of an enemy battalion commander captured by 14th Armd Div indicated that the lack of adequate information relative to the make-up of the American attacking forces, and "their disposal and probable points of attack, made the defense of the area to the rear of the Siegfried Line virtually impossible".
- 2. A map of an unknown German headquarters of the entire Western Front captured by 36th Inf Div. showing the order of battle of both German and Allied forces on or about 18-20 March reveals that the Germans had made numerous major errors regarding Seventh Army: The 71st Div was not identified, the 14th Armd Div was located far from its actual position and the 44th Div listed as on the line, actually was in reserve. XIII Corps which was located in the vicinity, was placed under Seventh Army.
- 3. CIC Detachments remain on the alert for signal communications available to the civilian population or the enemy. Reports show neutralization of telephone systems found in operation in many towns. Unassembled radio equipment found in the Headquarters of SA at Darmstadt was turned over to Signal Corps.
 - 4. No cases of violations of AR 380-5 were reported.

SECURITY OF MATERIAL

- 1. At about 0620 hours 17 April 1945 about 30 tens of TNT together with some composition 'C' and an undetermined number of mines exploded at the US Army Ammunition Dump, Wurzburg. Investigation by 307 CIC revealed that the guards on duty, of whom one is missing and one seriously injured, saw no evidence of direct enemy action. A check is being made of all civilians and DP's in the vicinity and of the circumstances surrounding the haulage of the explosive from Maiserslautern to Wurzburg. No evidence pertaining to the cause of the detonation has been found.
- 2. At ap roximately 1330A 20 March 1945 the Kur Hotel in Mieder-bronn (Q 9339) was demolished by explosion. Troops of the 38 Cav Recn Sqdn occupying the hotel suffered 25 casualties, 8 of whom are reported dead. Investigation by 206 CIC Det revealed that the hotel had been mined by German troops prior to retreat.
- 3. A train of German ammunition exploded in the railroad yard at schaffenburg (N5401). Results of investigation are as yet unknown.
- A fire which resulted in the burning of 15 railway box cars (six containing full gasoline cans, two containing empty gasoline cans and seven containing rations) on the evening of 7 April at the Frankenthal railhead was investigated by 307 CIC Det. It is considered probable that tracer bullets fired by American soldiers set off the ire. It was recommended that all civilians living in areas adjacent sire. It was level the silheads be evan

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
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- 5. On 2 April at Erbach, several box cars and a locomotive were sased and allowed to move down grade, crashing through a blown idge and blocking the main supply route for several hours. Investion revealed that the most probable explanation for the occurence that the cars were accidently uncoupled by American soldiers who been examining the train prior to the accident.
- 6. The Engineer Technical Intelligence Team attached to XXI Corps seported that the 4th Engr C Bn, 4th Inf Div found a cache of 50 enemy demended demolition mines hidden under a manure pile in the village of mubach (M6618). The mines weigh about 15 lbs each, consist of a cast mubatance resembling cement and are encased in a rough sheet metal
- 7. On 8 April three charges of unexploded demolitions were found under a bridge at Einsielerhof (Q9492) by members of Hq Co, 3d Bn, 65th Inf Regt.
- 8. Investigation by 206 CIC of wire cutting in Mosbach revealed that the Redwood-Watson line had been shorted at two places by the insertion of a needle or pin, and at another point cut by a sharp instrument and the severed ends hidden behind a picket. CIC concluded that the sabotage had been committed by a trained operator and is the "nuisance" type of sabotage taught to Hitler Jugend members.
- 9. Wires of the 10th Armd Div were found cut in the vicinity of S415893. This was a definite case of sabotage, since the ends had been scraped and tied together with bare copper wire in order to cause a
- 10. At 2000A on 31 March a spiral 4 telephone cable installed; used and maintained by the 540 Engr C Gp was discovered out of order. A check of the line revealed that it had been severed by a clean cut at a point where it crossed railroad tracks near the town of Asselheim (M3008).
- 11. On 7 April two boys were apprehended at Flomersheim (M4301) by Co I, 65 Inf Regt, efter they were seen to have thrown a flaming rag at a box car containing gasoline. The flame was quickly extinguished. CIC investigating.
- 12. Security surveys of supply installations and Headquarters continue to improve security measures. 44 M. Brigade CIC have surveyed 45 installations during the period. The screening of all civilian employees of Army installations is being continued. In one case where sufficient CIC personnel were not awailable for the screening of a large number of railred employees the MG authorities prepared and printed a Personal History Questionnaire which was distributed by Transportation Corps officers to railway employees. After completion the questionnaire will be returned to the nearest CIC Office for exmination and borderline cases will be disapproved or investigated further. urther.
- 13. First French Army reports that during the night of April 2nd to 3rd, telephone wires were cut in Alsace between SCHWOBSHEIM and LIDENHEIM.
- 14. Several important dumps intended for German sabotage teams eve been uncovered in First French Army Area. These dumps were elaberetely hidden or dug in quarries and contained complete sets of exlesives, detonators, fuzes, slow matches, Bickford fuze, grenades, arious types of bombs (especially with traction wire primers) and ight arms ammunition.


SECURITY OF PERSONNEL.

1. No cases of subversion occurred during the period. Reports from MI, Wer Dept. indicated that one officer was potentially friendly the enemy and upon investigation steps were taken to have officer consferred from the eater.

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GETERAL SURVEY

a. During the period 1-15 April the Interrogation Centers indicated errested and questioned the numbers of persons listed below:

These figures include only persons ectually apprehended and brought into the Interrogation Centers for questioning and screening and do not include the hundreds of refuses or Displaced Persons who were refused permission to cross the frontier and sent to the netrest center for Displaced Persons. The total of 567 persons actually arrested as border violators during this period, included Polish and Russian refusees, French Mationals, escaped German Prisoners of War, German soldiers attempting to flee in civilian clothes, and German Nationals attempting to enter France disguised as refugees. The vast majority of these cases have no CI value.

. After preliminary investigation, approximately forty persons were found to be of some CI interest and were brought to the Master Interrogation Center at Sarraguaminas, France, for further questioning by CIC-SM-5eme Bureau personnel. Bloven French nationals, who were suspected of being enemy gents and were considered dingerous to the security of the allied Nations, are still in custody.

c. The Border Control Te m of Seventh Army is supervising the activities and operation of approximately 4,250 Allied troops engaged in Frontier Security operations:

- (1) The First Zone, consisting of that portion of the Soor Basin within the Seventh army zone of responsibility, is presently being occupied by the lat and 4th Ens of the French 26th Rogt, who are directing dynas traffic control stations.
- (2) The Second Zone covers that territory in Germany within five kilometers of the France-German Border, where elements of the 36th Inf Div maint in and oper to 27 Traffic Centrol Stations on a 24-hour basis.
- (3) The Third Zone consists of the cety-1 geographical boundary teelf where the 2nd Bn of the French 106th Inf Regt operate Frontier ontrol Posts, under the immediate supervision of the CIC Control Team.
- d. The Seventh Army Border Control Term is at the close of the briod operating four Interrogation Centers located in Scarbrucken, arreguemines, Rohrbach, and Bitche.

DISPL CED FERSONS.

n. Estimated number of authorized Displaced Persons allowed to oss frontier:

- (1) Out or Germony 41,000 (Estimate is for 7th Army only)

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
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED PROHIBITED FRONTIER ZONE. By agreement with 6th Army Group G-2, the prohibited zone along this border will include all German territory south of the road:

BASEL-RHEINFELDEN-SACKINGEN-WALSHUT-THIENGAN-STUHLINGEN-BLUMEN-FELD-SINGEN-RADOLFZELL-LUDWIGSHAFEN-FRILDRICHSHAFEN-LINDAU. This entire zone will be evacuated and bordered to the North by a barbed-wire fence and a mine-field. It will be guarded by sontries and patrols with order to shoot at any person travelling within this zone. Pending completion of the operations, the troops have been ordered to send off the border by any means at their disposal, until the above mentioned dispositions can be applied. 5. RELLTIONS WITH ALLIED FRONTIER CONTROL AUTHORITIES. 6. GENERAL CONTENTS RESTRICTED .KE!

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XXI Corps 3rd Inf Div	5 13 5 14 4 12
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45th Inf Div 63rd Inf Div 100th Inf Div	2 13 4 14 2 10
103rd Inf Div 10th Armd Div 12th Armd Div	4 9 3 11 4 14 6 7
N 13th .rmd Div 14th 1rmd Div C L , TOT L Seventh US Army	$\frac{4}{5} \frac{10}{16} - \frac{10}{16}$
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The following report of Counter-Intelligence interest has beenextracted from reliable sources.

HOME-MADE SABOTAGE EQUIPMENT (1)

- 1. Abwehr II used to include instruction in the home-made manufacture of sebotage equipment in their training courses.
- 2. An attempt was therefore made in the United Kingdom to impose counter-measures which would prevent enemy agents purchasing the common chemicals from which they were instructed to make their sabotage equipment. Saboteurs were instructed to purchase such chemicals mainly at chemist shops (drug stores).
- 3. These counter-measures were difficult to impose and even more difficult to enforce. They involved a restriction on the amount that any individual could purchase of certain specified chemicals, and the central recording of certain categories of purchasers' names. At the same time, publicity was given to the fact that these regulations were enforced and it is known that Abwehr II were worried by this publicity. It is doubtful if the actual restriction had much effect but the publicity given to them acted as a deterrent, and made about Hi doubtful about which chemicals to recommend to saboteurs for purchase in the U.K.
- 4. The manufacture of sabotage equipment from raw materials that can easily be purchased is not a technique which is suitable for the short-range saboteur of the type parachuted into France during the last few months. In such cases it would be better to provide the saboteurs with professionally-made equipment which could be easily carried about and easily initiated. This is in fact what the German Sabotage Service did.
- 5. During the occupation of Germany however, conditions will be different and will resemble those in the United Tingdom which have been referred to above. Consequently stay-behind saboteurs in Germany are already being instructed in the manufacture of home-made sabotage equipment. So far four mixtures have been recommended:

Name of Chemical	German Name	Proportions by Leight to be Used in Mixture
Potessian chlorate Sugar	Kaliumchlorat Zucker	
Potassium chlorate	Kaliamenlorat Automobilol	
Ammonium nitrate Aluminium Naphthalene	Ammoniumnitrat Aluminium Naphthalin	90 5 5

These three dixtures are all high explosive. The first is bomewhat unstable. Potassium chlorate is a well known antisentic and light be purchased as such. Ammonium nitrate is used as a fertilizer. Aluminium, in the form of aluminium dust, is a component of paint. Aphthalene could conveniently be obtained in the form of moth balls.

6. The fourth mixture is:

Name of Chemical

Urotropin
Citric acid
Hydrogen peroxica

German Name
Proportions by Weight
to be Used in fixture

Urotropin
Zitronensaure
Sarantian accordance

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED mointle! BRET This mixture, which almost certainly requires alcohol in one for a of another for assaultcture, is a hore-made detonator (blasting can) filling. As detonators must contain very sensitive mixture size, by definition, this mixture is dangerous. Urotropin is sometimes prescribed for stomeon ailments, while hydrogen peroxide is a well known antisentic. It is not known for certain what excuse could be given for purchasing citric acid, though it is quite possible that one could be devised. one could be devised. 7. One of the German Sabota e Services, Abwehr II, recommended many of its saboteurs to manufacture incendiary and high explosive bombs from easily obtained chemicals. Potassium chlorate (Kaliumenlorat) Ammonium Nitrate (Ammoniumnitrat) Urotropin (Urotropin) in this order of priority. Those concerned with counter-intelligence should discuss with the appropriate divisions or branches the possibility and practicability of controlling access to these chemicals, and should note that the existence of powders in the possession of suspects is further grounds for suspicion. 9. Summary. a. Possibility of controlling access to Potassium chlorate, Aumonium nitrate and Urotropin. picion.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED The following report on Heidelberg University was prepared by wenth Army CIC as a result of their investigation of twist investigation of twist investigation of their investigation of ST TUS OF UNIVERSITY AT TIME OF ALLIED OCCUPATION The last senseter of courses held at the University lasted from 1 November 1984 until 15 March 1985. The term had been scheduled to the 188 February, but was extended because of the interruptions due to air task alarts, etc. At the time of the Allied occupation the next semester had not yet begun. No classes are in progress at the uni-Nestor: Teal CC: HTT.EM.ER (fled)
tice Pector: Fagen FETRLE (fled)
Yearly Leader: Karl SC: HD.WBER (Arrested)
Teans: Theology - Theodore ODENWALD (Arrested)
Law - Eagen ULMER
Medicine - Johann Daniel ACMELIS
Liberal Arts - Reinhard HERRIC
Natural Science
and Methematics - Uda 'EGNER (arrested)
Social Science - Walter THOME (arrested) The Rector, SCHMITTHENNER, a notorious Nezi, who is also Minister of Education for the "Land" of Baden, left Heidelberg 25 March 1945 for RITTALISAU in the Black Forest. Before leaving Schmitthenner designated Regner to function as Rector at once and Johann HOOPS, retired Trofessor of English, to function as Rector after the arrival of the Americans. Hoops was, undoubtedly selected for this post because he was not a Maci party pamber, and because he is a narmless old The university files have been in large measure transferred to TAUBERBISCHOFSHEIM, Baden, and nearby MESSELHAUSEN. This was stated to be as protection against air raids. There were 2320 students in attendance at the winter semester. 1080 were women and 1240 were men. University statistics show that the following foreign students were present: United States 3, Belgiens 7, Bulgarians 11, Danes 2, French 9, Greeks 3, Irenians 2, Itelians 2, Croats 3, Serbians 7, Dutch 10, Norweigan 36, Rumanian 1, Spenish 2, Bolivian 1, Seede 1, Swiss 5, Turk 3, Russian 1, Hungarian 2, Esthonian 7, Irakian 1, Latvian 5, Syrian 1, Lithuanian 4. In addition there were 16 so-called "hon-German national but German speaking" students. There were also 13 Onechs. The total of foreign students was thus roughly 155. Medicine The headcherters of the Nazi students organization for the Gau was located in the Old University building. The Nazi Heidelberg University students organization also had its headquarters in the old university building. The leader until November 1944 was Hanns Erich SCHROETTER, who was also Gau student leader. He has decreted in the Wehrmacht. His successor as student leader at the University, Hans FUSICKEL, has also decreted. His successor as Gau Student Leader, one ANGST, was reportedly killed in the Volkssturz resistance. SECRET SECRET

With the close of university courses March 15, most of the students restable apparation to Restor, Volume to the students dents of Heidelberg remain in the neighborhood. A few students remain at Heidelberg, hoping to take this or that examination that they have not completed.

INVESTIGATION OF FACULTY

Interrogation of pro and anti-Nazi faculty members has given considerable information concerning the Nazi activities in the University.

The Nazis deprived the university of its traditional autonomy, self-government, and academic freedom. They closely observed and controlled activities at the University. Nazi student organizations controlled the students.

The Rectorship was formerly held for one year only and rotated among the principal professors of the different schools. The Nazis made the Rectorship permanent and Paul SCHMITTHENNER, a violent Nazi, had held that position since 1938.


The SD was very active in acquiring information on faculty mambers. And the whole faculty was very effectively under the control of the SD and Gestapo. The burning of the books of individual professors

The SD Leitstelle in Heidelberg was located at 13 Rohrbacherstrasse. In 1944, SD official DENZER, fnu, was succeeded by Ernst TOLENZ, who had lived for some years in Japan as a journalist. Tolenz seems to have exercised a more thorough supervision of Heidelberg University than his immediate predecessor, organizing periodic meetings with members of the faculty and also with the student leaders and their "miterbeiters", for the discussion of university activities and personalities. Towards the middle of February 1945, Tolenz, seriously ill with tuberculosis, was succeeded by Van den Driach, fnu, who has since fled from Heidelberg. A certain TOCHTER MAN, fnu, who also fled, exercised an active SD control over the student affairs in Heidelberg, in close collaboration with Gau Student Leader Angst and Student Leader Foelckel, both of whom were the last men to occupy these positions. Both have fled. Phillip BUSCH, SS Sturmhauptfuehrer, who also worked in SD Leitstelle, Heidelberg, has fled.

The following university professors, known to have attended neetings at SD headquarters, have been arrested:

Prof. Dr. "EGNER, Udo, Dean of Natural Science and Mathematics Department, Professor of Mathematics, born 4 June 1902 at Barlin, residence Eichendorffstrasse, Heidelberg, arrested in his name on 4 Abril 1945, 1800, as a probable security menage and for his affiliations with the SD. On 22 March 1945, brior to leaving Heidelberg, Prof. Schmitthenner, Recotr, appointed Wegner as Debuty Recotr, with instructions to close the University if necessary. "egner blaced Dr. Heinz MAIER-HIBBNITZ, Dozent in Natural Science, in charge of the university files sent to TAUBERBISCHOFSHEIM, where they were blaced in the Franken-tichula. The remaining files, instruments, and leboratories were blaced in the Schlosseloster at Messelmasen, under the care of Professor Ludwig ESCH. "egner was a member of the SD council which discussed matters pertaining to Meidelberg University. The council held its meetings at SD Headquarters at the Rohrbatcherstrasse in the "Haus der Arbeit". The Department "Steats und Wirtschaftswissenschaften" of which Professor THOMS is Dean, came under the sutervision of Prof. TEGNER who was in charge of all war essential institutes, of which some of the more important are listed below under Professor THOMS.

In a secret letter "EGNER is addressed as an Aussenstellenleiter and Vertrauensmann (trusted man) of the Reich Research Council of Reichsmarschal COERING, and is ordered into the Volkssturm of the



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The Junior faculty and Hackback to the Jack the Junior faculty and Hackback to the JS Dos 1 FeMD, been 21 formery 1805 at a state the sense of the JS Cakarst dar, Will thing; prested in his how an 5 April 1945 as an SS Huptsturmfuchter and 3D I former t. Schmidhuber aftered the NSDAF 1 May 1933 and entered the 33 1 June 1933, where he attained the rink of Hauptsturmfuchter. In 1935 Schmidhup, r.w.s. made attained the rink of Hauptsturmfuchter. In 1935 Schmidhup, r.w.s. made attained the rink of Hauptsturmfuchter. In 1935 Schmidhup, r.w.s. made attained the rink of Hauptsturmfuchter. In 1935 Schmidhup, r.w.s. made attained the rink of Hauptsturmfuchter. In 1935 Schmidhup, r.w.s. made attained the SD Council which discussed matters pertaining to the Heidelberg University. Schmidhuber gives the following names of persons attending the meetings: Himself, Thoms, Wegner, Cdenwald, Krieck. Meetings-were attended by SD official Tollen, who was succeeded by Vandenreisch. Subject claims that his entry into the Wehrmacht in 1938, from which he was later discharged, severed his SS connections. However, a letter dated 13 July 1943 to his wife asking her to turn in her husband's uniform, which would be returned after the war, indicates that he was still in the SS at this date.

Prof. Dr. DUKEN, H. Johann, Professor of child diseases, School of Medicine, born 12 January 1689, Brake, Oldenburg; residence 4 Quinckerstrasse, Heidelberg; arrested in his home on 4 April 1945 as an SS Obersturmfuehrer and SD informant. Entered MSDAF in 1933 but was expelled early in 1934 because his wife was not of pure Aryan origin. Was in the SA from 1933 to 1934. His first wife died in 1934. In February 1934 Subject received a personal appeal from HIMTIER to aid in the formation of Hochschulen in Germany, to which he acceded, but was only called on a few times as an advisor. He was reinstated in the NSDAF in 1937. He entered the SS in 1935 and was given the honorary title of Obersturmfuehrer. Subject claims he was in conflict with the SS and was punished, but was again placed in the good graces of the SS when the war started in 1939. The 3D sent letters to Subject asking him for his opinions about certain individuals. According to Subject, he was at SD Headquarters only twice, where he met BUSCH, Phillip, an SD official with the rank of Sturmhauptfuehrer in the 33. Subject and his wife have each admitted that they had contemplated committing suicide together with their five small children, in the event of "certain circumstances", which Subject would not elucidate. It was apperent that their greatest fears concerned Communism. Subject's wife stated that they did not wish their children to be brought up in "untruth".

Prof. Dr. ODENWALD, Theodor, Dean of School of Theology; Prof. of Theology; born 6 June 1889, Tauberbischofsheim, Baden; residence 32 Dantestrasse, Heidelberg; arrested in his home on 4 April 1945 as an 8D Informant and exponent of psuedo-religious Nazi mysticism. Entered the NSDAP 1 August 1937. Was an SD Informant and Vertrauensmann and admits he made Gestapo reports about individuals. Subject was a member of the 3D Council which discussed matters pertaining to Heidelberg iniversity. ODENWALD gives the following names of persons attending the meetings: Himself, Prof. Walter Thoms, Prof. Karl Schmidhuber, Frof. Eugen Kruppke and Prof. Jeorg Mollier.

In order to acquire a substantial quantity of information on the faculty, detailed questionnaires were submitted to all the full progressors at the university. One copy of each of the questionnaires has seen left with Capt. Hinckley, Military Government, Heidelberg, and it is hoped they will be turned over to such Allied Education Scard as may ome to study the university.

REMARKS ON CLMERAL POLICY CONCERNING THE UNIVERSITY

Discussion with meny professors and observation of conditions at the University suggest the following policy in handling the University of Heidelberg. These suggestions may also be of some value in formutating the policy to be used with other Universities in Germany.

A fundamental reorganization is necessary. But legal forms ould be closely followed and the hand of the Allied military not black present. This is necessary in order that the University will be received the Germ people as their twn institution based to the mic freedom. Only ader these inditions can all university function RESTRICLED -1-

The university is a corporation which, however 1953 the faculty was viricommendations with regard by the government. Under the university placed under the faculty members he new constitution for the faculty is as followed by the government of the faculty is as followed by the government of the faculty by the government of the faculty by the faculty by the faculty by the government of Mazism have made unsuit a board might have trouble

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positive influence in the development of a democratic attitude the German people.

The university is a public (governmentally owned and controlled) corporation which, however, has had large measure of autonomy. Before 1930 the faculty was virtually self-perpetuating and most of its recommendations with regard to the university were automatically adopted by the government. Under the Nazis academic freedom was suppressed and the university placed under a very thorough governmental control. Many of the faculty members have commented on the desirability of adopting a new constitution for the university.

In order to re-establish Heidelberg as a free university a possible procedure is as fellows:

As soon as Germany has a government of its cwn (approved by the Allies), that government could dissolve the existing faculty and abrogate the existing constitution of the university. This procedure would have the advantage not only of removing all those with the Nazi taint from the faculty but also of removing teachers whom fifteen years of Nazism have made unsuited for teaching in a free university but whom a board might have trouble in removing under certain specific charges.

The German government could then select a nucleus of anti-Mazi professors (with "aid and counsel" of the Allied education board). A number of anti-Mazi professors who might serve as the core of such a group have already been contacted. These professors are already discussing emong themselves the problem of university reorganization and are available as a useful group for the Allied education board to contact. The group, which is listed below, is in possession of a paper in English and German stating that they are available for such work:

Martin DIBELIUS (Theology), Bergstrasse 115. (Chairman of group

Karl Heinrich BAUER (Medicine), Roederweg 8.

Ernst KNOLLING (Medicine), Kapellenweg 22

Karl FREUDENBIRG (Natural Science), Wilchenstrasse 21.

Wolfgang GENTITER (Natural Science), Noeril. Pancramastrasse 16.

Johannes HCOPS (Liberal Arts), Klingenteichstrasse 13.

Renatus HUFFILD (Theology), Rellossweg 21.

Kerl JASPERS (Liberal Arts) (but suspended by the Nazis 1933 - Floork 66.

Alexander MITSCHERLICH (Medicine) Im Gabelacker 13 (Secty of Group)

Curt OLHE (Medicine), Bergstrasse 64.

Gustav RADBRUCH (Law) (Suspended by Pazis in 1993), Friesenberg 1

Otto RECENBOGEN (Liberal arts) (Suspended by Nuzis in 1935), kleinschmidtstrasse 36.

Alfred TEBER (Social Science) (Suspended by Mazis in 1933)
Bachstrasse 24.

The names of other professors, suspended by the Nazis, are as

Harmann RANKE, Egyptologist, suspended 1937; living at Bollschweil, Ueber Freiburg.

August CRIESTFACH, suspended 1937; living at 'cortherstrasse 3, Potsdam.

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Bugen TAEUBLER, suspended 1934, living in the United States.

Ernst LEWY, Jurist, suspended 1935, living in Seattle, Wash. US.

Hermann HOPKE, Anatomy, suspended 1937, living at Langemerch-platz (Heidelberg)

Hans V. ECKARDT, Journalist, suspended 1937, living at Irschen-hausen Weber Ebenhausen Bei Muenchen.

The nucleus of professors selected by the government could select other professors (of established professional reputation who are unquestionably advocates of academic freedom). This group (of perhaps thirty) could then draw up a new constitution for the university. The provisions of the constitution could be discreetly checked by the Allied education authorities and the constitution formally approved by the German government. From then on the University should be virtually autonomous. At least the German government should not meddle thereafter with the aspects of university work which the tradition of scademic freedom indicates should be left alone.


The group of professors who drew up the constitution could then proceed with the employing of a complet faculty and university staff. Their work would not carry the sitgma of a purge because it would be a constructive work in hiring teachers who measure up to certain standards thus avoiding the stigma inevitably attaching to a purge. At the same time it would give more thorough results than a purge because teachers whose usefulness as teachers has been vitiated by fifteen years of Nazism could be omitted from the new faculty even though they had not been active in the Gestapo, SD, or S3.

A positive effort might also be made in the selection of new teachers to obtain many (at least temporarily) from for ign universities. Representative professors from English, American (including Latin America) and other foreign universities could be brought to Heidelberg and other Gorman Universities. They could be a very helpful influence in guiding the faculty in its difficult years immediately


The mental attitude of the faculty members mikes such action desirable. Even the anti-Mazi professors have been so long in contact with the Mazi regime and methods and the German tradition that they are not mentally equipped to lead in the teaching of democracy. Although they resisted becoming imbued with the worst features of the Mazi ideology, they were so long out of touch with democratic ways that it may take them some time to become adjusted to the new situation. One professor spoke with some pride of the old German army (pre 1938) even shough he roundly condemned the Mazi-dominated army.

The anti-Nazi professors are still obviously living under the hadow of the Nazi regime and have not yet lost their fear of the Gestapo. Considerable association with American and other foreign processors might be of substantial aid in the recrientation.






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PART I. CIVIL SECURITY.

GENERAL SURVEY.

- l. Tactical surprise was achieved in the attack launched 15 March by Seventh Army. Interrogation of officer prisoners indicated they had expected to be attacked but had no knowledge of where, when and the strength of assaulting forces. Several complained of the poor quality of intelligence received from higher neadquarters, thereby indicating that German agents had encountered difficulty in accomplishing missions or had been inactive. At least one agent faked intelligence reports to his commander, for which he had received a medal (See Part II, par B 2). Large numbers of Russian and French workers and prisoners of war have been encountered in the Saar, as well as German soldiers in civilian clothing. Towns were destroyed or badly mauled and Germans of military age were few. 1. Tactical surprise was achieved in the attack launched 15 March of military age were few.
- 2. Security control of civilians in France in Seventh Army area presented few problems during the period. With the passing fear of enemy action the only reason for unrest has been the desire to return to a "business as usual" status. The number of serious circulation violations decreased while petty violations increased. Action is being taken to expedite the repatriation of approximately 1400 essential workers into the rear Corps and Army service areas to increase French food production.
- 3. In the area of the First French Army enemy infiltration agents are being sent through the lines at Strasbourg and from the SD Post at Constance across the Swiss border. In the main these agents are Frenchmen destined for missions in the interior of France. They have been found to be poorly prepared and with little enthusiasm for their
- It is reported that the Germans have organized a new group of perachutists recruited from among the Francist elements and destined to be parachuted into France to regroup former collaborators.
- 5. The Rhine, although difficult to cross is neverthless being used for passage of agents. It seems that this route was prepared before the collapse of the Colmer pocket, by sinking cables which serve as guides for rubber boats.

SECURITY CONTROL OF CIVILIAN POPULATION.

1. Travel Control.

- a. As a result of the increasing threat of infiltration from the rear by parachute espionage and sabotage agents, travel control road blocks and patrols have been deployed in greater depth and attempt. The being made to increase the facilities in the Army service area. The latter is made difficult by the lack of availability of military or local resistance personnel and the desire of Gendarme officials to maintain the majority of their forces in Alsace.
- b. The transition of the FFI into the Voluntaires du Rhin tas not affected the roadblock system. Contact was made with representatives of the X Military Region authorities, and the same number of personnel (585 FFI members) were placed at the disposal of Corps and Div CIC Detachments for manning roadblocks.
- c. VI Corps reports that civilian circulation, which was very slight during January due to the weather, has greatly increased during February. During the last period covered by this report, roadblocks and patrols have screened 10,623 persons, of whom 292 were found to be traveling illegally or were found to be suspects.

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d. A request by civilian authorities to establish daily bus service for civilians with laissez-passer from Nancy to Luneville and St. Die has been approved. Local governments have been made responsible for daily checking of travelers and periodic checks will be made by 307 CIC Detachment. The transportation company has agreed not to accept passengers for other than the three towns specified.

e. In accordance with the decision by SHAEF to facilitate farming operations in Germany by ensuring movement of agricultural personnel and transport, G-5 has arranged for the issuance of farmers' passes in Germany authorizing travel from homes to specific farms not exceeding 6 kilometers.

2. Communications.

a. Transmission of Mail by Civilians

(1) Mail service in the 42 Division sector in France was limited to official mail only, by order of the Division CA officer. 42 CIC detachment, in coordination with CA, checks all mail entering this sector and turns over for delivery only official mail.

(2) All travel violators in 42 Division area (in France) recently have been searched and almost without exception have been found to be carrying mail for other persons to be delivered at their destination. Also many persons travelling with proper papers have been found carrying mail.

(3) To curb the practice of carryin civilian mail by unauthorized persons, VI Corps has had notices printed stating that this practice will be severely punished. Each pass-issuing agency distributes this announcement to all laissez-passer applicants.

b. XV Corps Communications Survey

Survey of the French communications, postal and telephone, in the XV Corps sector was conducted by the 215 CIC Detachment during the period to ascertain the present status of civilian communications. No permission had been given for opening mail and railway telephone systems for private communications. Official mail was being carried by postal officials from one commune to another, and spot checks en route revealed no other material, such as personal letters, on the persons of carriers. Railway telephone system for the dispatching of trains are in working condition from Sarrebourg to Sarralbe and Remingen, but on neither line are they accessible to other than railway personnel who have been reinstructed that the lines are to be used only for railway business.

3. Miscellaneous.

a. The French Government within the VI Corps area, working through the Securite Militaire and National Gendermerie, effected a considerable number of arrests during the period. Although all of these individuals were of purely French interest, collaborationist and German nationals, the arrests resulted in the elimination of many potentially subversive persons.

b. Mayors in certain towns in XXI Corps area in France have asked that their Civil Police be released for farm work during the planting season. However, due to the importance of the police work, the mayors have agreed to keep them on police duty for several more weeks.

c. Security control exercised by L of C guards remained good. Eight apprehensions were made during the period: four for pilfering; two for lack of identity papers; one for lack of travel papers; one for possession of questionable identity papers.

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SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. RESTRICT

- Subversive Organizations Liberated Territories.
 Nothing to report.
- Resistance Organizations Germany.
 Nothing to report.
- D. RELATIONS BETWEEN C.I. PERSONNEL, LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND POLICE.

Relations continue generally good.

- RELATIONS BETWEEN TROOPS AND CIVILIAN POPULATION. (Liberal of Territories Caly)
- F. SPECIAL CASES OF C.I. INTEREST.
- 1. FONTAINE, Louis, alias Dr. DELANDRE, Louis. French national, Confessed agent of Abwehr III KGF (Security in PW Camps) of Ast XII (Wiesbaden). Apprehended on 24 February at a roadblock in Forbach. FONTAINE had no present mission, but confessed to 70 CIC Detachment that his past missions had been of three types:
- a. PW Camp security, involving intelligence on persons suspected of aiding prisoners to escape into France.
 - b. Agent provocateur work.
 - c. Counter-subversive work. (Case to S.M.
- 2. LABLIN, Gilbert. Agent of the 8th Co, Brandenburg. Captured when accomplishing a mission of intelligence in our lines. Admitted he had already made numerous missions, either against the Macuis, or for intelligence, or for sabotage.
- G. PRO-ALLIED AND ANTI-NAZI ORGANIZATIONS. (Germany Only).
 Nothing to Report.
- H. RUMORS
- 1. In Hochfelden there was a short-lived rumor about 10 March that American troops contemplated the use of gas. Investigation disclosed that the rumor started when a truck convoy passed through the area loaded with tanks of acetylene gas for an Engineers unit. Explanation was made and the rumor was killed.
- 2. 512 CIC Detachment has reported the rumor that a German soldier was found dead in a fox-hole near Colmar with civilian clothes in his knapsack. On his person he had French repatriation papers or FFI papers. CIC investigation failed to substantiate.
- 3. A rumor existed among civilians that a diphtheria plague is spreading from Forbach. Intercepted letters also indicated that this rumor has been widely spread.

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Nothing to report.

Resistance Organizations - Germany.
 Nothing to report.

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- 1. Seventh Army reports satisfactory military security. Security training continues and checks have shown good results. XXI Corps reports numerous PW interrogations stating that the attack of 15 March defice we are the charge in the process of the contract c complished strategic surprise.


SECURITY OF INFORMATION.

- 1. The pastor of a Catholic church in La Petite Pierre told his parishioners on 11 March that impending novements of Allied troops in the area would permit the refugees there from the Wingen-Rosteig area to return to their homes in a few days. When interviewed by 42 Division CIC the pastor said that he did not realize the seriousness of such statements and had done so only to raise the spirits of his parishioners.
- 2. 70 Division CIC Detachment apprehended Grenadier Werner EHRHARDT, reported by a German deserter, Nicholas SCHULER, to have made numerous successful line crossin s. EHRHARDT surrendered in civilian clothes, carrying his uniform of Soldbuch, after liberation of Grande Rosselle ((2567). Dual interrogation of EHRHARDT and SCHULER indicated that EHRHARDT had not accomplished the successful line-crossings reported but had hidden on the German bank of the Rosselle River in the home of an uncle, and had faked reports of his reconnaissance missions. He had been promoted and awarded the Iron Cross, first class, for the faked information, which had been obtained chiefly from his organization's files. (Prisoner of war).
- 3. 514 CIC Detachment reported that a complete roster of the 180th Inf Regt had been found by a civilian, Louise OHREL. The roster was returned to the proper authorities. The CIC Detachment was unable to place the responsibility for the loss of the documents, and the case has been referred to 45 CIC Detachment for completion.
- 4. A study was made of security of information transmitted by electrical means, pertaining to the administration and coordination of troop movements to and within Seventh Army area. The study included a survey by 307 CIC Detachment of all functions of service troops, MP and TC, in connection with movements of troops, and an analysis of communication equipment and security measures by Signal Corps. As a result of the findings, steps were taken to improve the security of such movements.
- 5. An investigation was made by 307 CIC Detachment to determine the security of a Division moving into Seventh Army area in covering shoulder patches, bumper markings and other visible indications of the unit's identity. Security measures were found to be satisfactory.

SECURITY OF INFORMATION.

- 1. 1150 Engr C Group reports the finding of an enemy Schu mine in vic of bridge at (449563. The fact that the bridge had recently been repaired by Engineers indicates that the mine had been placed after the area had been cleared.
- 2. MITU 10 is continuing to give demonstrations in enemy sabotage methods and counter-sabotage measures to troops.
- 3. The First French Army reports the following telephone line sabothee cases:
- a. On 28 February, in Colmar, Edouard MEYER was arrested.
 He admitted that he had cut telephone wires which were strung through his property. He has been turned over to BSM/Colmar.

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
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED PART III - FRONTIER SECURITY GENERAL SURVEY. a. The travel control section 307 CIC Detachment is assisting in coordinating the disposition of road blocks and French infantry on border control duty. Team "DD" 495 CIC Detachment, augmented by SM/SA personnel, is establishing border control interrogation centers in the general vicinity of Forbach (Q3965), Sarreguemines (Q5156), Bitche (C7750), Wissembourg (R1548) and Lauterbourg (C3241). b. When Division rear boundaries cross the border, Seventh Army TC will place traffic control points on main supply routes adjacent to the border and, assisted by border control personnel, will check trains, convoys and other government vehicles for illegal passengers. Plans are being completed for passage of the border into the Army Service area and Com Z area. c. 2 Regts of Franch troops, the 26th and 146th, have been provided the French 21st Region Commender to assist in border control of that region. Negotiations are in progress with the 10th Region for another French regiment to cover the remainder of the frontier under Seventh Army control. B. C. D. E. F. No comprehensive figures available at date of closing this report. able at date of closing this report. d. Franco-Swiss Frontier. (1) The Franco-Swiss frontier is closed. In the First French Army zone, two crossing points are authorized: DELLE and ABBEVILLER. The ST. LOUIS station is permissible for official personalities. Passes for crossing the frontier are granted only after visa of Bureau de Sacurite Militaire, First French Army. Territorial B.S.M. have stationed a detachment at each crossing point. (2) CIC/FS posts - none (3) Allied Expeditionary Force frontier guards - none (4) G-5 Frontier Control Posts - none (5) Allied Frontier Control personnal - (See (1) above) (6) Allied Frontier guards - nothing to report AUTHORIZED CIVILIAN TRAVELLERS. Nothing to report. DISPLACED PERSONS. Nothing to report. PROHIBITED FRONTIER ZONE. Nothing to report. RELATIONS "ITH ALLIED FRONTIER CONTROL AUTHORITIES. Nothing to report.

Since this area is bounded by the natural barrier of the Rhine and is the forward zone to the sector held by First French Army, the question of frontier guards has not yet arisen.

GENERAL COMMENTS.

Franco-German Frontier.



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The 'fallowings Items of Counter-Intelligence interest have been acted from reliable sources.

The situation in Munich is described by reliable travellers from The situation in Munich is described by reliable travellers from that city as being tense. The place is overcrowded with refugees from presden, Berlin and the east with the resulting deterioration in the food situation. In the workers' districts, the shortage of food is particularly acute where housewives are generally unable to obtain more than a fraction of the food to which they are entitled on the ration cards. There is much communist activity. The Munich authorities are finding it increasingly difficult to organize the town as a new government center, as the Gestapo there has been weakened through the transfer of several units to Vienna and Berlin.

Because the police are no longer strong enough to ensure their safety, the Munich Gauleiter in his capacity as defence commissioner issued a secret order to all the Party offices warning the party leader not to circulate in certain parts of the town after darkness. This order, after admitting "certain resentment noticeable among workers against the Nazi movement and its leaders", recommended certain measures with the objective of gaining greater confidence of the workers. One of these measures is the confiscation of food from the rich for distribution by the NSV to the poor. It should also be repeatedly stressed by Nazis propaganda that the Nazis are on the side of the poor. In the Baverian Ministries of Finance of the Interior, the general confiscation of all fortunes above 10.000 RM has been under general confiscation of all fortunes above 10,000 RM has been under consideration for some time. The Reich government may already have received tentative proposals along these lines, but it is considered that it is unlikely that the Nazis will go to such lengths at the present time.

During February, more than 2,300 officials arrived in Munich from Borlin and more are expected. The Reich government has taken over three large hotels and a number of important business houses have been requisitioned and their tenants thrown out.

The government confiscated three well-known castles near Munich, which are being prepared to receive more distinguished members of the Reich administration.

There are more frequent reports about the banditry and the partisal activity from different parts of the Reich. Tales are often told by travellers about their trains being derailed by partisans (foreigners) who rob the freight cars. Himmler authorized "all armed German officials" to use firearms when the opportunity arises to exterminate the foreign terrorists. They are to shoot on the least suspicion and not to wait for trouble. This was used by a considerable number of Germans as a pretext to shoot foreign workers they did not like. Most partisan activity is to date carried on by Poles and Russians.

The informant was told by a high official of the German Ministry the Interior that at least 100,000 foreign workers had left their bs. Nobody knows their present whereabouts. Many are believed in the description of the Allied fores. It was stated by the official at measures were being taken to meet the situation, but he was eptical about their success. He admitted that there were signs chaos in certain branches of his administration, stating that the census of the police forces had been necessitated by the fact at two "false" policemen were discovered staging sabota e at the inster railway vards. It would take several weeks for the census nster railway yards. It would take several weeks for the census be carried out, and even then it would probably prove impossible verify all cases owing to the destruction of the files in the bomber. It was concluded by the official that the time was soon coming in hundreds of people would probably tour Germany pretending to be vernment officials. The organization for the Gestapo was going to oces, which threatened the efficacy of the present terror regime.

In other Berlin ministries disorder prevails particularly the nistries of Finance and Supplies 7

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED APO 23. U. S. Army :CG, 6th Army Group : :Initials: (Ut)rc : :Date: 31 March 1945: WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 28 FOR THE WEEK ENDING 31 MARCH 1945 1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION 13 NOV 1945 a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation Army Group G, after its overwhelming defeat in the SAAR-PALATINATE, has been able to organize cohesive resistance only at a few widely scattered critical points deep behind the conquered river barrier. Its twenty-eight divisions, of which at least eleven must now be accounted destroyed, left 62,000 prisoners of war west of the Rhine. In addition, 52,000 prisoners were taken from its non-divisional units. Similarly staggering losses in heavy weapons and transport equipment, coupled with the almost complete disorganization evident in the retreat across the Rhine and the denial of an opportunity to gain a respite, have prevented and will continue to prevent effective regrouping and refitting. These same factors further minimize any enemy capability to launch more than local counterattacks against the 6th Army Group. . Army Group G not only failed to contain the GERNSHEIM (M 5430) bridgehead, but, even more fatal, found itself incapable of guarding the FR.NKFURT SCH.FFEBURG gateway to the KESSEL corridor. The resultant exposure of Ermy Group B's flank and rear will end with the encirclement and destruction of that command, leaving General HUSSER dependent on only his own resources to stave off a similar fate. He must now defend all approaches to NUREMBERG and MUNICH with forces which are already too thin for their 200 mile front. As long as the High Command continues to follow its policy of throwing all its resources against the most imminent threat, H.USSER will enjoy a second priority at best and must make shift with hastily organized training and convalescent units. Their necessarily piecemeal commitment as stopgaps will render them ineffective. Only strong armored formations in strength sufficient to blunt our own armored thrusts could make positional warfare even a temporarily successful possibility for the enemy. There are none to be had, unless some panzer divisions could be disengaged from the Eastern Front. Seventh German Army now enters its third week with an exposed right flank. Its repidly extending area of responsibility has so spread its divisions that they are able only to man potential BASTOGNES and critical terrain features. The lack of ile or armoured reserves make it vulnerable to wide outflanking tank drives when - its infantry is pinned by strong contact with Allied forces. It is definitely and the powers of this Army to reestablish contact on its right with the Fifteenth Army. Should it lose contact with the First German Army. on the south, Seventh collection of divisional numbers will be wiped from the map. First German Army retreated across the Rhine in obvious need of both time and forcements. On the contrary, it was immediately called upon to supply troops the previously vacant KARLSRUEE-CEAMRSHEIM sector of the SIEGFRIED Line and ting forces for the WORMS-ASCHAFFENBURG area. This dissipation of already gior strength has overtaxed its ability to hold the key Rhine Valley cities and has of of the ODEN ALD features. Its mission to protect the avenues leading to set is likewise doomed to failure as long as the necessary mobile reinforcements unavailable. Mineteenth German Army, reduced to a training command after its defeat, has the last resource for Army Group G. The advance of Allied divisions is forcing it the necessity to become operational before it has had time to replace the or drained by the armies to the north. With a temporarily static front along

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED 111 the Rhine of over 100 miles manned by troops whose positional duties will render them ineffective once their strongpoints have been bypassed, the Nineteenth Army is equally in danger of having its right flank rolled up and of subsequent encirclement. To carry out its mission it can depend only on a few new recruits from the interior of Germany, since Wohrkreis V has already been exhausted by previous drafts, and on the convalescents who fill the camps in its area. The present state of 553 volksgronadier Division, which spent two months reforming at PTORZHEIM, is indicative of what will be met. In general, the lack of trained troops in the various arms and services will not permit the preduction of balanced formations even for the few battered staffs now trying to regain some effectiveness in the Upper Rhine area. Twenty-fourth Army continues its training and defensive missions along the Swiss border. The turn of military events is effectively destroying the "National Redoubt" for want of both territory and personnel. Any retreat into the mountains of southesstern Germany will hardly be voluntary on the part of the German leaders. In fact, this projected ultimate concentration area is much more likely to terminate as a expectation again and concentration camp aroa. b. Capabilities The enemy is completely restricted to a single capability: to withdraw into the interior of Germany before our advancing forces. Army Group G is faced with the almost insurmountable task of containing Allied armor spearheads directed deep into the heart of South Central Germany. Nineteenth army must attempt to prevent the rolling up of the SIEGFRIED Line in BADEN from the rear. The almost completed encirclement of Army Group B and the deep penetrations beyond the forward positions of First Parachute Army threaten to expose all Northern Germany, west of a line KASSKI-HANOVER. Any troops made available for the western front must be directed to the north to carry out at least blocking attempts. Thus, Army Group G and Nineteenth Army must carry on in their extending areas with extremely few replacements. Finally, the lack of armor in reserve forshadows the enemy's future loss of large areas of military productivity which in turn will further reduce his ability to resist. Immobile troops may hold in a few scattered areas, but they will be isolated and cleaned up with only minor difficulties. SECRE!

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6th ARMY GROUP FRONT (Odenwald Front)

a. At the close of the period, the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th cany Group were as follows: GEINHAUSEN (N 0379), KAHL (M 9146), ASCHAFFENBURG (N 0054), REISTENHAUSEN (N 1331), FERBACH (N 3720), TAUBERBISCHOFSHEIM (N 3815), MALLAU (S 0598), MOOSBRUNN (R 8692), SPEYER (R 5080), South along Rhine to BASLE (A 8783).

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)

The rapidly expanding front of Army Group G and the need for rearward displacement of higher headquarters in the face of Allied advances, has caused some confusion as to the exact locations of specific corps. However, LXXXIX (CG. Lt. Gen. HOMENE), XX (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN), LXXXII (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHN), XIII (CG: Lt. Gen. von ORIOLA), XIII SS (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON), LXXX (CG: Lt. Gen. BAYER), and LXXXV (CG: Lt. Gen. KNIESS) Corps are believed to be still under the control of First German and Seventh German Armies.

The reason for listing some of the divisions considered destroyed for all practical purposes, is to indicate troops or remnants of units involved in defensive fighting in widely scattered sectors.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) fought stubbornly in its SIEGFRIED Line sector east of HOMBURG until the withdrawal of the remnants of First and Seventh Armies across the Rhine was completed. Due to the protection afforded by strong defensive positions and the short route of withdrawal, casualties were light by comparison with other Army Group G divisions. The Division lost only 900 prisoners. Consequently combat infantry effectives are estimated at approxi—mately 1,000. At the end of the period the division was holding the east bank of the Rhine, from KRNISCHIME to shout P 5022 the Rhine, from KARLSRUHE to about R 5072.

) (Left Flank Units) (1) Seventh German Army (CG:

2 Panzer Division (CG: LAUCHERT) formed a few weak battle groups out of the personnel that it extracted from the SA R-PALATINATE. These are now in line north of ASCHAFFENBURG in the BUEDINGER WALD (N OS). All tanks are believed to have been lost east of the Rhine where 1,500 prisoners of 2 Panzer Division were taken. Combat infantry strength is judged at 400.

6 SS Mountain Division (CG: SS Maj. Gen. ERENNER) managed to pull its fast shrinking units out of a number of successive traps. The division lost 1,400 prisoners during the SA-R-PALATINATE operation. Last contact was reported in the vicinity of H 0307 where about 1,000 combat infantry effectives are believed to ave been gathered.

5 Parachute Division (CG) was committed at KOBLENZ until Rhine crossings by our troops obliged it to withdraw via the CIESSEN area where divisional alements were pocketed. Units which escaped were moved south east to the general area M 9895. Recent losses have been heavy and present combat infantry strength is attimated at 600.

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) was virtually estroyed in the EAD KREUZNACH-WORMS region where it lost 2,400 prisoners. Remmants are gathered and sent into line north of ASCHAFFKIBURG in the general area N 07. That infantry effectives are estimated at 300.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELIM) succeeded in hdrawing its depleted units across the Rhine between MANNHEIM and KARLSRUHE. the reassembling there, the division moved to the north-cast and was committed mediately south-east of ASCHAFFENEURG. The following identifications were made on March: 165 Volksgrenadier Regiment at N 0251; 87 Volksgrenadier Regiment at 0447; 36 Reconnaissance Battalion. The division lost 2,000 prisoners in addition many dead and wounded during the course of operations west of the Rhine after March. Present combat infantry strength is estimated at 700.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) gathered a number stragglers which were assembled in area N 1244 for commitment at ASCHAFFENDUNG.

Advisional remnants appear to be still operating under command of 36 Volksgrena ar Division. However, the divisional staff is believed to be in contracted the last of its own remnants and of the remains of 255 Volksgrenadier Divisional RESTRICTED

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untry Division lost 3,500 prisoners during the final stages of the SAAR-PALATINATS maign. Combat infantry strength is judged at 300.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CC: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) was identified by a prisoner of Headquarters Company who stated that divisional remnants were collected at ASCHAFFENBURG on 27 March from HEIDELBERG and were told to report to 416 Infantry Division in area N 1244. This indicates that remnants of the two divisions were merged prior to their probable subordination to 256 Volksgrenadier Division. Almost 3,000 prisoners of this division were taken during the last two weeks. Even after the conversion of service troops, not more than 400 combat infantry effectives remain.

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

After the shattering blows received by the First Army in the SAAR - PALATINATE and during its retreat across the Rhine, seven of its divisions were virtually destroyed, the rest decimated. The Army was unable to offer anything but scattered opposition against our advances east of the Rhine. Opposition was generally centered around localities and non-combattant arms of the Wehrmacht and the Volkssturm were committed as infantry to reinforce the total inadequate regular combat troops. Without substantial replacements in both man and material and with combat troops. Without substantial replacements in both men and material and without receiving a substantial breathing spell the Army cannot hope to stem the Allied

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) crossed the Rhine in widely scattered streggler groups. Some of these were reassembled and are now located in the woods in area R 6182. Their commitment in the Rhine Valley south of MANNIEIM appears imminent. Combat infantry strength of all salvaged elements is stimated at 800. The division lost over 1,600 prisoners in the SAAR-PALATINATE operation.

Division RAESSLER (CG: Brig. Gen. RAESSLER) succeeded in with-drawing a part of its amalgam of units from the MISSEMBOURG region. These are be-lieved to be manning defenses along the Rhine from KARLSRUHE to RASTATT. The di vision lost 1,400 prisoners and its present combat infantry effectives are estimated at approximately 600.

· 553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER) was contacted as elements of 1119, 1121 Volksgrenadier Regiments and 553 Fusilier Battalion were identified in the vicinity of M 8321 on 28 March. At the end of the period, the division was believed to hold a sector from MILTERERG (N 1024) to AMOREACH (N 0717). Prisoners stated that, prior to its latest commitment, the di-rision had been reforming in the KARLSRUHE area. The division remained out of contact since the end of January. However, the extent and sources of replacements have not as yet been ascertained. Combat infantry strength is not believed to proceed 1,500.

352 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) was virtually destroyed again in the SAUR-PALATINATE. It netted over 2,500 prisoners during the past two weeks.

Permants now committed in the MALLDUERN area (N 1810) do not add up to more than 00 combat infantry men.

246 Volksgrenadier Division (CG; KUEHNE) continues to lay claim to nominal existence as it staved off complete annihilation by assembling some ragglers into a battle group formation that was identified at M 7618 on 28 March. mbat infantry strength of this unit is estimated at 400.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: Col. KLINGENBERG). Elements are identified at HANAU (M 8571) where they staged a counterattack on 27 March. A diable source locates elements in the GERMERSHEIM (R 4669) - MIESLOCJ (R 7078) area. a divisions disorderly retreat from the SAUR region suggests the possibility that lements are located in both areas. The division lost 3,000 prisoners and organic that infantry strength is estimated at 500 including recovered stragglers.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUERLEN) was ely destroyed in the BAD KREUZNACH region. Regiments were collected in Battle ps SCHUETZ and SATTLER and were committed east of HEIDELBERG. The 696 Grenadier

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the iment of 340 Infantry Division which was reforming in DARMSTADT when we crossed the Rhine, and was therefore unable to join its division engaged on the RMIGEN widgehead, became attached to 559 Volksgrenadier Division. Including 696 Grenadier Regiment, divisional combat infantry strength is estimated at 900. 4,600 prisoners of 559 Division were captured west of the Rhine.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EARTEL) crossed the Rhine fairly early and managed to escape, organizationally intact, although it lost 2,400 prisoners. Appearently the division regrouped south of MANNHEIM, and elements were contacted in the HEIDELBERG area, where 198 Fusilier Battalion and 235 Artillery Regiment were identified on 30 March. Divisional combat infantry effectives are estimated at approximately 6-800.

719 Infantry Division (CO:) lost 3,700 prisoners in the SAARRRUCKEN pocket and in its retreat across the RHIME. Among others, Major Gen. GAEDE, its commander, was captured. Such remnants as have been reassembled are committed in the Rhine Valley, south of MANNHEIM. The infantry combat effectives of these remnants are estimated at 400.

905 Volksgrenadier Division (CC:) was one of the last units to withdraw from its West Wall positions east of the Rhine. Severe casualties were suffered during this prolonged defense, including 1,300 prisoners taken since 15 March. The remnants, probably some 400 combat infantry effectives, are disposed along the Rhine north and south of SPEYER.

(3) Nineteenth German Army (CG:

It is accepted that the Defence Command OBERPHEIN has been dissolved and that its functions have been taken over by Nineteenth Army, subordinated to Army Group G.

Consequently Nineteenth Army exercises control over the units manning defenses along the Rhine from BASLE to KARLSRUHE. The LXIV and XVIII SS Corps continue to assume responsibility for the two sectors south of KARLSRUHE. The 189, 708 and 716 Divisional Staffs represent a future defensive power of the army and are presently believed in the process of rebuilding. A fairly reliable source reports that headquarters of a Brigade BAUER are located at KANDERN (V 9402). It remains to be seen whether the Brigade equates with 1005 Brigade which is carried in the same general area.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Lt. Col. JUNGE). Combat troops and some service personnel of this division were absorbed by 338 Infantry and 16 Volksgrenadier Divisions at the end of February. The staff, however, remained in the Black Forest. It is presently believed to be receiving a few young recruits, convalescents, Volkssturm and to be picking up stragglers to reform the division.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER). After its defeat in early February, this division had to sacrifice its remaining personnel to help rehabilitate 159 Volksgrenadier and 198 Infanty Divisions. Its staff is believed to have stayed in the Black Forest where like 189 and 708 Volksgrenadier Divisions, it is probably rebuilding its subordinate units.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. GRIMMEISS)

The Corps is responsible for the northern portion of the BASLE -

Phine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596).

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKTEN). Supply establishments (Ib) of this division were located by agents at ETTENEIM (W 0561). It is probable that the division which had been cannibalized by other units is reforming in this area.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: ...)

This Corps holds the southern part of the HASLE-KARLSRUHE sector.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED (g) ENEMY STRENOTH OPPOSITE 6TH ARMY GROUP (First and Nineteenth German Armies) Combat Infantry Effectives of Divisional Units: * Seventh German Army First German Army 6,600 Nineteenth German Army 4,000 TOTAL 15,500 Reserves: (Estimated) First German Army 1,000 .TOTAL 16,,500 Tanks and SP Guns: Seventh German Army First German Army Nineteenth German Army TOTAL 85-110 (*) Excluding miscellaneous non-divisional units. 3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front) At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: GHAMONIX (C 4728), MT_ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080), VILLAROGER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (F 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088). a. Enemy Dispositions Identifications by prisoners of war confirm the presence of II Battalion 100 Mountain Regiment (5 Mtn Div) and VARESE Battalion (4 Alpine Regt, LITTORIO Div) in the PETIT ST HERNARD region. While 5 Mountain Division has provided a sonsiderable number of March Battalions for other front, the division is still present in sufficient strength to effectively control the Italian units on the front. Fair sources report that additional elements of the MONTE ROSA Division are being moved from the Appenine Front to the French border region. This follows the trend of movement of Italian units into the area to aid or gradually take over from the German units. The enemy has been content with limited activity. Diversionary raids have been infrequent. Artillery exchanges and normal patrolling have characterized the activity of the front. No reports of withdrawals from the front have been bstantiated. RESTRICTED-

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The Rhine front from BASIS to SPEYER remained relatively inactive. The enemy of daily patrols and raiding parties across the River for intelligence purposes to harass Allied troops. Approximately 100 men using nine boats crossed the cast of MARCKOLSHEIM (V 8652) during the early hours of 26 March but withdrew cast hours later. On 28 March about 30 Germans were engaged in the vicinity of MASHEIM (W 0186). and the strong to 2 Tarrow were soon Edition was unsuccessful-furtheded by an enemy group. A patrol of nine Germans dressed as American williams entered (MISWASER (V 9051) on 29 March, and questioned inhabitants, reserving to themselves as a control party. Artillary and mortar fire was light and sattered during the beginning of the period, however, it was increased to moderate pard the end of the period. COLMAR received some 240 mm railway fire from enemy and located in the KAISERSTUHL on several nights toward the end of the period.

b. SOUTH-CENTRAL FRONT

As the period opened, the last remaining process of organized enemy resistance west of the Rhine were being liquidated. 257, 905 and RAESSLER Divisions had held stubbornly to fortifications in the HIESTAID and were the last of the forces of Army Group G to withdraw across the river. By 25 March mopping up along the west bank had been completed but stregglers and scattered groups of enemy continued to be found in rear areas throughout the period. Many German officers had left their units with hopes of making good their escape but found themselves completely out off. Included among these were Lt. Gen. FRANZ SENSITIES, Commanding General of 212 Infantry Division, along with his Chief of Staff, and Lt. Gen. GAEDE, Commanding General of 719 Infantry Division.

Not pausing in the pursuit of the depleted German Armies, Allied forces established a bridgehead on the east side of the Rhine early 23 March. Initial advances cleared TREBUR (M 4847) and LERERM (M 5040) against only scattered opposition. The rapid expansion of the bridgehead engulfed DARMST DT and reached ASCHAFFENBURG (N 0253) which was entered late 25 March. Bridges over the Main River were taken intact at STOCKST DT (M 9554) and HANAU (M 8572). FRANKFURT was entered the following day. Py this time the enemy had mustered sufficient miscellaneous units to offer some, although ineffective, oppositions to Allied advances. Counterattacks were undertaken in the ASCHAFFENBURG area and heavy opposition was being seconntered in HANAU and FRANKFURT. At the same time replacement and antiaircraft bettalions offered moderate opposition to further Allied crossings of the Rhine in the IORMS area.

With the bulk of the potential enemy resistance overcome at the river line, Allied forces expended eastward and southward to the west shoulder of the ODEN ALD and the Neckar River respectively. A committee of citizens surrendered MANNHEIM on the Neckar River respectively. A committee of citizens surrendered MANNHEIM on the Neckar River parents forces had withdrawn under cover of light artillery fire. The Neckar River having been opposition in this area continued light and scattered. The Neckar River having been orossed, HEIDELBERC was cleared on 30 March against almost negligible resistance. Weanwhile, the enemy fought an unsuccessful delaying action in the ODEN ALD. By the end of the period the ODEN ALD had been cleared but the enemy remained very sensitive in the ASCHAFFENDURG region. Here remnants of miscellaneous divisions operating under 36 Volksgrenadier Division and 416 Infantry Division offered repeated contarattacks and contested strongly all attempted advances. South of the ASCHAFFENDURG area, the Main River was crossed and advances east were practically unopposed.

Allied units proceeding north from the FRINKFURT-HINAU area joined forces with ther units from the PEALCIN Bridgehead. GIESSEN was taken and by the end of the criod, friendly troops were nearing PADERBORN, KASSEL, and EISENUCH.

c. ALPINE FRONT

Enemy forces on the FRINCO-IT LLIN border were engaged in improving defensive esitions and some patrol activity. Hill 2655 vicinity PETIT ST BERNIRD, which was coupied by Allied forces on 23 March, was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy strol on 24 March. In the same region, one German and 13 Italians were captured on the during a light engagement. Friendly forces withdrew due to unfavorable work continued on the defenses in the MONICENIS Pass, ARMES Pass, and PETIT HEALTH regions. At llery fire was generally light 1 scattered RESTRICTED

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Activity in the Atlantic pockets was confined to only and automatic weapons fire and several patrol of the enemy continued work in the vicinity of ST VIV approximately one company constructed defenses along the continued to the ROYAN pocket. IA ROCHELLE had less activities are region. revious periods.

MINICATIONS

Tactical Reconnaissance

Visual reconnaissance throughout the period was g eather, but even when fairly good coverage was ava-very little rail or road activity was observed. Rhine between MAINZ and MANNHEIM forced enemy act Rhine Valley to shift to routes further east with has Rhine Valley to shift to routes further east with hab of activity. From here north-south lines through the 24th and 25th and the limited movements seen set of moves to the east. Throughout the BLACK FOREST with was sighted along the ROTT-EIL-STUTTLART, OFFEN LATT-FREUDENSTADE lines on these same days but observe the set of the second secon ttered to warrant any definite conclusions.

Light rail activity was seen in the KARLSRUHE-MAN arch and 2 military rakes were observed at GRABEN (R 55 ards in this area showed moderately heavy loadings on 2 wards in this area showed modelately this sector althoughout this sector althoughout this sector althoughout was sectivity was at a minimum throughout this sector althoughout was sectively was secti what appeared to be camouflaged motor transports was see along both sides of the road southeast of DURLACH at R :

STUTTCART marshalling yards and rail lines leading reported active on both 24 and 25 March probably indications of the main focal points for incoming and outgoing GREMANY. Always a large communications center, its important of the light of recent events since American advances with the property of the other large cities throughout the property of actually taken many of the other large cities throughou

Heavy barge activity on the Neckar was noted whe and as many as 1,000 barges were seen between HEIDELSES Scattered motor and horse drawn transports were seen al MACH and as far east as WURZBURG with most of the


Effects of Allied Air Attacks

Communications


Although poor weather in the latter part of sedium bombers and greatly limited fighter bomber oper seding were used to considerable advantage to block rated and reinforcements to the sedium of the sedium supplies and reinforcements to the sedium of the s

Aside from the rail line nearest the Rhine nterdiction, the enemy had three main entrances to the new March and EBERRACH. The line through HEIDELL ridge north of ERUCHSAL on 24 March and by damage to ek. The central line was cut at the Neckar by the CKARGEMUEND bridge, while the main north-south line GERBACH was interrupted at five points as of 27 Marchidges. Thile it was not anticipated that enemy raily to the contract of the contrac his interdiction of the battle area must nevertheles trickle the traffic which did manage to get through; the STUTTCART-HEILBRONN line must have been effected BIETICHEIM bridge, or by shuttle operations on either


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. SIXTH US A MY GRO P FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite Sixth US Army Group were as follows: VOLKIREN (Q 3573), FORRACH (Q 3965), ST ARNUAL (Q 4667), RIMLING (Q 6555), HOTTVILLE (Q 7253), ALTHORN (Q 7640), PFAFFENHOFFEN (Q 9027), DRUGHERER: (R 1517), thence south along the Rhine to the Swiss border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: So Gen. HAUSSER)

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The threat created by the Allied bridgehead South of TRIER and the probable demands for divisions by higher headquarters upon First Army has compelled the army to continue the redisposition of its available forces. 6 SS Mountain Division was extended northward to cover the sector vacated by 2 Mountain Division early in the period and was itself later withdrawn from contact. 2 Mountain Division was sent to the SAARBURG (L 1413) area to reinforce the badly batter d 256 Volksgrenadier and 416 Infantry Divisions. This was considered insufficient by the enemy as he also brought in 49 Infantry Division which had been resting and refitting for over nine weeks. In addition a battle group of 11 Panzer Division was left behind in order to eradicate the initial bridgehead over the Saar River. The sector vacated by 6 SS Mountain Division was taken over by elements formerly part of 245 Infantry Division operating as an independent battle group on the right flank; by the rehabilitated 16 Infantry Division of sneeteenth Army in the central sector, and by a westward extension of the 36 Volksgrenadier Division. sector.

6 53 Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER). During the early part of the period this division expanded its sector to the right to effect the relief of 2 Mountain Divisions in the BITCHE area. Then on the night of 27/28 February it too was relieved by some miscellineous units, 16 Infantry Division and by a shift of 35 Infantry Division sector responsibility to the west. The division made only a fair showing during its early tour of duty in this area. However, after gaining some experience and receiving a large number of roinforcements the unit fought well. Last identifications were as follows: III/12 55 Mountain Regiment at Q 8237 on 24 February; II/12 55 Mountain Regiment at Q 7449 on 28 February, and 11 55 Mountain Regiment at Q 7539 on 24 February and at Q 7837 on 28 February. The division has not yet left the First Army area. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 3,200.

245 Infantry Division (CO: Col. WAGNER). The continued presence of this unit in our sector is doubted. The elements of the division identified in the BITCHE area 2 7750 have been detached from the division for sometime. Recent prisoner of war statements indicate that no attempts were made to reinforce or regranize the division since its abortive commitment in December. The remnants of the division, totalling 1,000 combat infantry effectives at the time, were then organized into a few battalions and later subordinated to other units in line. The two elements formerly part of the division which have been identified to date are the 1/955 Volksgrenadier Regiment (previously subordinated to 35 Volksgrenadier Division) on the right and a 300 man battle goup "LOETZE", composed of elements of 935 Volksgrenadier Regiment (previously subordinated to 47 Volksgrenadier Division) on the left. The sector occupied by these units is between 2 7354 and 2 7444.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) is responsible for the sector from the Moselle River to L 2421. All regiments of the division were identified during the period in the area L 1512 and L 1714. On 27 February Volksturm units were also found operating within the divisional area, probably as reinforcements, he organic divisional elements have been decimated as a result of recent operations lest and east of the Saar River. Losses in prisoners of war from 11 February to 22 shruary amounted to 1,400. Present combat infantry strength is 500.


49 Volksgrenndier Division (CG:) was identified at L 2412, on 7 Febru ry through prisoners of war yielded by 150 Volksgrenndier Regiment. This is the only unit of the division identified to date. The extent of the divisional regamization is unknown. However, it is believed that only elements have arrived in the area south of TRIER. Combat infantry effectives are unknown.

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416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) must be considered as virtually destroyed as the result of its recent engagements. Several battalions were over run and others were precite lly annihilated as they tried to retreat across the Saar. ...mong the prisoners were 2 regimental and several battalion commanders. Runnants committed in area L 1906 do not exceed 300 combat infantry effectives.

Major General PFLIEGER is indicated as having taken over command of the battle group of 11 Panzor Division which stayed behind after the bulk of the panzor division left for COLOGUE area beginning its nove on or about 13 February. The unit remaining had approximately 18 tanks. The fate suffered by this battle group is unknown.

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNIESS)

Corps headquarters was reported at HABACH (Q 438878).

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gon. GAEDE) appears to have extended its already drawn out front to assist the remnants of 416 Infantry Division. The divisional front is now believed to extend from L 1902 to SARLAUTERN (Q 2880). The division remained unidentified during the period, probably due to the fact that it is occupying SIEGERIED Defenses east of the Sarr. There is some indication that II Battalion 723 Grenadier Regiment, list identified south of SARREQUECTEN on 26 February may have returned to its present unit. Division combat infantry strength is still 3,500.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) contracted to the west to make way for the commitment of 559 Volksgroundier Division. 347 Division now holds from SA REAUTERN (Q 2880) to FORB.CH (C 4066). Last identification s were: 860 Groundier Regiment at Q 3966, 26 February; 861 Groundier Regiment at Q 3965, 1 March and 880 Groundier Regiment at C 3965, 28 February. A large part of the division's forces are fighting in the northern portion of FORBACH which has been stubbornly defended. In the remainder of the sector contact was light. 67 Reconnaissance Battalion is no longer in the area having been identified in the SAURBURG sector with its parent unit, 2 Mountain Division. The anti-tank units listed under 1347 Infantry Division last week have probably come under command of 559 Volksgrenadier Division.

The divisional Anti-Tank Battalion is organized along the line of the new 1945 Table of Organization. Due to losses, only 8 assault guns (75 mm) still remain, and on the basis of prisoners statements, combat infantry strength is lowered to 1,600 plus 300 for the attached 12 Landesschutzen Battalion.

(c) XIII S Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

559 Volksgrammdier Division (CG: Brig. Gen von der MUEHLEN). It is now clear that the division was relieved by 2 Mountain Division around 18 February in the BITCHE area. Uniting only long enough to assemble, the division marched west to take over a sector directly south of SAARBRUECHEN between 347 and 19 Infrarry Divisions. The sector of the division extends from 2 4066 on the west to 2 4966 on the east. Identification were: 1126 Volksgrammdier Regiment on 26 February, at 2 4257; 1127 Volksgrammdier Regiment on 25 February, at 2 4769 and 2 4468. A prisoner of war of 1126 Regiment believes the both battalions of 1125 degiment have now been reformed. However, the second battalion-h.s not yet been contacted. Other prisoners state that several divergencies from the new table of organization exist. Instead of regimental anti-tank companies, anti-tank ucasions resaid to be within the battalion he vy companies. Furthermore, the division is said

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to nave two reconnaissance troops made mobile with bicycles and armed with machine guns. The assault gun company, part of the anti-tank battalion, suffered losses and now has only six 75 mm assault guns remaining. Probably attached to the division are 486 Anti-Tank Battalion, 5/XVII Anti-Tank Company, and 103 Tank Destroyer Brigade. Prisoners captured from this division during the past period made the first refer ences to Volkssturm personnel being made available to divisions in combat as reinforcements. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 2,400 including 400 attached effectives.

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. ERITZELMAYR) shortened its sector on both flanks and now holds the line between the Saar River (Q 4966) and Q 5560. The fighting in this area has slackened considerably, resulting in fewer contacts. Identifications made were: 74 Grenadier Regiment on 20 February at Q 5462; 119 Engineer Battalion on 27 February at Q 5264; and Fusilier Company on 26 February at Q 5363. Though a prisoner stated that 59 Grenadier Regiment, which had been virtually destroyed, was to be reactivated, the division is in very poor shape and combat infantry effectives are carried at 1,000.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CG: SS Col. KLINGENBERG) was recovering its balance after the heavy blows of the previous week. The division extended its right flank 2-3 miles to the west and now holds the sector from Q 5560 to Q 7354. Apart from small skirmishes contact was loose and the only identifications were: 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 6957; 28 Fabruary; 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 6456, 28 February and 17 SS Reconnaissance Battalion at Q 5658 on 2 March. The division staff is planning a defense in great depth as indicated by the preparations being carried out. The divisional C P has not only been withdrawn to Z/EIBRUCKEN, eleven miles behind the lines, but also a secondary defense line has been constructed three miles to the rear of present positions.

2 Comp my of 17 SS Assault Gun Battalion was identified west of the division sector, at 2 4567. It is thought that this company was detached and is serving as a XIII SS Corps mobile reserve. Prisoners draw attention to the division's successful ruse of using decoy tanks to draw our fire and to give the impression of great armored strength.

Approximately 200 replacements from the divisional replacement battalion were split between the regiments. 38 Panzer Gren dier Regiment is in the process of reforming its third battalion. Combat infantry strength, including these replacements, is estimated at 2,000 on the basis of detailed interregation. The division has lost 630 prisoners since 15 February.

(d) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MODENEL), last reported with the other survivors of ALACE in the Black Forest, became heir to 6 % Mountain Division's HARDT sector from Q 7444 to Q 8135. Identifications made to date are: 221 Grenadier Regiment at Q 7938 on 1 March; 225 Grenadier Regiment at Q 7444 on E March; and 16 Fusilier Battalion at Q 7738 on 2 March. Details regarding the division's present status are still lacking. It has be a ascertained that I Battalion EN Regiment is the former Battalion MORG (VI BN ODENECEIN) of 905 Mobilization Division. Due to the division's depleted state when it left ALBACE, other battalions by also have been grafted. It is interesting to note that, contrary to Volksgrenatier Divisional organization, paybook entries show that the former 1316 Reconnaisance Company was renumbered to 16 Fusilier Battalion. Combat infantry strength is liven tentatively as 1,500.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLEM) continued to lay in very light contact from 2 8235 to 2 9227. The division is utilizing this list interlude for its long overdue rehabilitation. The units from BALMGOLDER FALZ), promised for months, have finally arrived, incorporated in a 36 Division DERISCHURGS (Replacement) Regiment. 9 - 11 Companies of this regiment became II ttalion 165 Grenadier Regiment. That became of the rest of the Replacement adment is not known for certain. It is highly probable that it was used to reform Battalion 87 Grenadier Regiment identified on 2 March, and the regimental companies, as putting the division back on the standard 3 regiment - 2 battalion basis. entifications were: 165 Grenadier Regimental 2 8434 on 28 February; 87 Grenadier giment on 2 March; and 36 Engineer Battalion at 2 9028 on 1 March. The combat infirst strength of the division is now estimated at 2,000.

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(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) continued to hold its old sector from Q 9227 to just west of HAGUENAU (R 0224) with elements of all 3 regiments in line. Identifications were: 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 1 March at R 0124; 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 2 March at Q 9227; and 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 2 March at Q 9726. Prisoners of war state that 47 Volksgrenadier Division is to move to the SITCHE area. Though not likely, this is a possibility. Prisoners also report the arrival of some replacements from the divisional Replacement Battalion at SCHENZINGEN on 24 February. On this basis, strength is increased to 1,700.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) remained responsible for a sector including HAGUE AU (R 0224) and OBERHOF EN (R 0920). Activity was still at a minimum and the only identification made was that of 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 26 February at R 0523. I Battalion 2 35 Police Regiment and Battle Groups HARTIG and HELIMARN are still attached. The organic combat infantry strength of the division is 1,600 and the strength of its attachments total 400.

905 Mobilization Division (CG:) was not identified during the period. However, it is believed that the division is still helding the sector from R 1120 to the Rhine. A Battalion MORG, formerly under 2 33 Police Regiment, was identified in the sector of 16 Volksgrenadier Division. It appears that 905 Division has given up some of the units listed under its command as of 1 February. The line is held by not more than 800 men with a further 500 troops being held in reserve or manning positions east of the Rhine. Total combat infantry effectives total 1,300.

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

To date the Mineteenth Army has lost 2 Mountain, 16 and 189 Volksgrenadier, and 338 Infantry Divisions, the latter two divisions having been identified in the KREFELD area. Consequently only 159 and 708 Volksgrenadier, 198 and 716 Infantry Divisions and 106 Panzer Brigade remain under control of the Army and out of contact. Rail movements in the area indicate that 159 Volksgrenadier Division may be departing and tend to confirm the belief that 106 Panzer Brigade has gone.

It is significant that mone of the redeployed divisions were units under the control of LXIV Corps (708 Volksgrenadier, 198 and 716 Infantry Divisions). It would seem, therefore, that this Corps is destined to remain in the Black Forest area. Obviously, sufficient time has elapsed for all of the Mineteenth Army units which escaped from the COIMAR pocket to have been reorganized and absorbed sufficient reinforcements to make them capable of limited amployment. Although the recommitment of former Nineteenth Army divisions in other sectors was undoubtedly premature and caused by the exigencies of the situation, in no case should they be regarded as being totally impotent.

159 Volksgrenadiar Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) was last eported in the area FRELDENG-FUTTLIGEN area. The observed northward rail movements the line HADLACH-DOHLUL CHINGEN on 1-2 March may well equate with the departure of this unit from the Black Forest. It is the only defeated division of LXXII Corps ormarly in the VOLGES pocket which has not been recommitted on another sector of the front.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUM) is still believed to be refitting in the OFFENBURG area. Strength estimates for the remaining divisions are not contured at this time as the extent of replacements received and service personnel strained for infantry duty is not known. A figure of 1,200 combat infantry frectives is accepted for each division prior to commitment.

198 Infantry Division (CQ: Col. BARTEL) is located east of OFFERBURG (W 1585).

708 Volksgrenadier (CO: Col. BLECKWERN) is located north of ASLACH (W 2664).

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) is probably still in the

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED (b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH) The headquarters of this corps are believed to be at BADLN EILLER (V 9511). Its operational status is unchanged. c. DEFENCE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG:). No change in status. 405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) is still responsible for SIECFRIED Line defenses along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596). 30 SS Grenadier Division (CO: Col. SIEGLING). No further clarification of its actual existence is available. 805 Mobilization Division (CG:) remains responsible for SIEGFRIED Line defenses along the east bank of the Rhine north of BRISACH. 1005 Brigade staff (CO:) was reported in the NEUNBURG (V 8713) area and in imm diate command of the OBERRHEIN Regiment. In view of its number, it logically falls into the 405, 805, 905 series. It is a Jehrkreis V unit which may eventually be upgraded to a divisional status. Its present sector extends along the Rhine, north of LOERRACH (A 9590). d. T.E.TY-FOURTH ARMY (CG: 55 Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT) Status of this army remains unchanged. e. 600 Infantry Division (Russian) is still located at MUNSINGEN with no further details as to its organization having been received. f. ENDAY STRENOTH OPPOSITE SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Saar-Palatinate-Rhine Divisional Units in Contact and Reserve: (Combat Infantry Effectives) Saar-Palatinate Front 18,500 Rhine Front 4,000 Reserves: (Estimated) Saar-Palatinate Front 5,000 5,000 TOTAL Artillery Guns: Saar-Palatinate Tanks and SP Guns: Saar-Palatinate Front 140-160 Saur-Palatinate Front (Reserves) 50- 70 Rhine River Front 15- 20 205-250 SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICT Law Top 8 SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front) At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 4680), VILLAROGER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), ERIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONNETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), a. Enemy Dispositions Although there have been persistent reports that the MONTE ROSA Division is gradually relieving 5 Mountain Division, there has been no apparent major change in enemy dispositions in that sector. The identification of 100 Mountain Regiment of 5 Mountain Division in the ALLESAMDRIA area by partisans on 21 February does not coincide with the PV identification of that regiment on 17 February in the MOUNT BLANC area. The relief of German combat troops by the LITTORIO Division in the CUNEO area is possible explanation for the reported departure of 1000 German service troops from this area. That 34 Infantry Division continues to be in the area is evident from prisoner of var identification as late as 1 Merch area is evident from prisoner of war identification as late as 1 March. b. General The prevailing weather conditions during March will prevent the assumption of an offensive attitude by the enemy. However, it is to be expected that the enemy will continue to defend his present positions by sending out frequent parties for harassing and intelligence purposes.

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OPERATIONS

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Throughout the period, patrols continued to cross to the west bank of the Rhine in an attempt to ascertain friendly dispositions and intentions. His quest for information was materially aided by the improved weather conditions which permitted daily air reconnaissance of the Alsace region.

On 24 February a combat patrol from the 3rd Russian (Ukrainian) Depot Regiment, estimated at two platoons in strength, attacked friendly outpost east of MARCKOLSHEIM (V 8653). The patrol suffered heavy casualties from artillery fire and was forced to withdraw across the river leaving 23 prisoners in friendly hands. Moderate sucess was gained by the enemy raids when three friendly prisoners were taken on 25 February southeast of NEUF BRISACH (V 8736) and four additional prisoners were taken in the NIFFER (V 8301) area on 2 March. The enemy artillery fire was generally light along the entire Rhine front.

SAAR-PALATINATE FRONT

From the Rhine to the HARDT Mountains, the enemy's defensive attitude continued as field positions were improved and mines were laid between the HAGUENAU Forest and NEIDERBRONN (Q 9238) area by 47 and 36 Volksgrenadier Divisions. Reactions to friendly patrols proved the enemy alert while movements in rear areas indicated that a westward extension of divisional sectors was being carried out in the HARDT region. Artillery fire was comparatively light but during night 24-25 February, a 380 mm gun near HOFFEN (R 1536) and a 170 mm gun near BAFRENTHAL (Q 8442) placed five and seven rounds, respectively, on SAVERNE (Q 7215).

The extensive movements behind the lines in the HA OT Mountains sector resulted in the relief of 2 Mountain Division and later 6 SS Mountain Division. 6 SS Mountain Division temporarily assumed responsibility for 2 Mountain Division's sector until it in turn was also relieved. The change over was carried out by the employment of miscellaneous battle group formations in the BITCHE area (Q 7750), 16 Infantry Division, newly arrived from the Nineteenth Army, in the central sector, and by 36 Infantry Division which extended its right flank to the west. On the front our patrols found the enemy extended but alert, while friendly observation posts were harassed somewhat by artillery fire.

In the Saar Valley, 19 Infantry Division, offering moderate opposition with In the Saar Valley, 19 infantry Division, offering moderate opposition with small arms and artillery fire, was forced from BUBLIGEN (Q 4964) and BLIESRALSBACH (Q 5263) on 24 February. In an attempt to regain some of the lost ground, this division later in the afternoon mounted three unsuccessful counterattacks north of BLIESRALSBACH with infantry troops supported by armour. An additional attack was mounted on 27 February which also failed. After spending himself on these ventures, he was content to dig in and await the next friendly move.

559 Volksgrenadier Division and 347 Infantry Division, aided by Volkssturm, made repeated attempts to retake the high ground overlooking SAARBRUCKEN. Minor attacks and attempted infiltrations into woods east of STIRING-WENDEL (Q 4166) were only temporarily successful. At the close of the period, the enemy still held STIRING-PENDEL and the northwest portion of FORBACH as artillery and mortar fire exchanges become the produment activity. scame the predominent activity.

ALPINE FRONT

On 24 February the evemy repulsed a friendly patrol at K 4902 with strong small rms fire and on the same day, one of our outposts at K 4313 was subjected to some achine gun fire. The possible renewal of edemy attacks on AIGUILLE DEMINI C 5024) was indicated by the arrival of two supply convoys at REFUGES TURINO ARGARITO (C 5318). Activity in the coastal area was confined to harassing artillery

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WESTERN FRENCH FORCES

Enemy activity in the LA ROCHELLE pocket was concentrated in the northern zone. He carried out numerous reconnaissance missions in attempts to ascertain friendly troop dispositions. During this time, the Germans also completed their own retrouping and brought up supplies. Preparations were completed on 1 March and the attack was launched in the direction of ANAIS (T 5137) and ST JEAN (T 5346) with one battalion of infantry. By 0900A I Battalion 223 Grenadier Regiment had penetrated into ST JEAN and by 1130A fighting was in progress in ST SAUVEUR (T 5241). At the end of the day, as a result of friendly counterattacks, the enemy was forced to withdraw to a limit SUIRE (T 4845), 500 meters west of SOURDON (T 5044), BOIS DE BEAUREGARD (T 5042), 500 meters west of ST SAUVEUR (T 5241), ANAIS (T 5137).

In the ROYAN sector, the enemy's only activities were occasional exchanges of artillery fire and minor patrol activity. On 2 March, the POINTE DE GRAVE pocket became the scene of an enemy attack when 200-300 enemy pushed four kilometers south of MONTALIVET (Y 2747) before being contained by friendly forces.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A Tactical Reconnaissance

Renewed road and rail activity at key points throughout the SAAR-PALATINATE-BADEN areas were brought about by a further shuffling and movements of enemy units during the period. Activity in the region of the Black Forest on 25 February and 2 March indicated that additional military units of the Nineteenth Army were entraining and moving to the north toward the more active battle areas. Extensive traffic seen in the KARLSRUHE-HEILBROIN-NORMS area on 25 February appeard to be connected with some reinforcements or perhaps a unit arriving into the SAAR. The heavy activity observed on 1 and 2 March in the NEUNEIRCHEN urea and along the PIRMASENS-LANDAU line indicates that a unit withdrawal was in progress.

The OFFE BURG-FREIBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN line as well as the ROTT/EIL-HORB-STUTTGART line showed considerable activity throughout the period with definite indications that military moves were underway in the OFFEEBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN area. On 2 March, four military trains were seen on the OFFEEBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN line with the trend of movement being to the north. Rail activity in the DONAUE_CHINGEN area and in the area east of FREIBURG on both 1 and 2 March serves to confirm the belief that the resources of the Nineteenth Army are being further tapped for duty on more active sectors.

Heavy rail traffic was observed in the KARLSRUHE-HEILBROIN- ORMS area on 25, 27 February and again on 2 March. The marshalling yards in this sector likewise simultaneously revealed heavy loadings and considerable activity. Although much of this activity appeared to be normal two way traffic of civilian needs, commercial traffic, supplies and materiel, the direction of the military trains on 2 March indicated a move to the north towards MAINZ, traveling out of our zone.

In connection with the activity seen east of the Rhine on 25 and 27 February, it appears that some of this traffic carried reinforcements for the SAAR-PALATINATE where it was evident that arrivals had taken place early in the current period. In the NEUNKIRCHEN-SAARBRUCKEN area on 1 March several rakes of empty flat cars, as well as one loaded infantry type train, were seen, but cover of the following day revealed that these were ne longer present in same area. The fact that moderately heavy rail activity including some military trains, was noted in the ZIEIBRUCKEN-PIRMASENS area on 2 March leads to the possible conclusion that the railroad rolling stock which had been seen in the NEUNKIRCHEN area on the previous day was being used to make up the trains needed to move military traffic away from our immediate front.


B Status of Communications

Despite repeated concentrated attack upon their railway system, the Germans are still able to route their traffic through or around important rail centers as was indicated by the amount of movement observed throughout the period. The persistent cutting of enemy rail lines during the week did succeed in canalizing and even interdicting traffic on certain lines, but through traffic along these main routes was rapidly re-established. However, the unserviceable rail bridge at RASTATT


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
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
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
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED PART I. CIVIL SECURITY. GENERAL SURVEY. l. Enemy intelligence efforts appeared to continue at low ebb.

The attitude of the population remained friendly with decreased fear of German operations and in some localities, a complete indifference to the war is indicated. Security measures have been refined and increased during the period. 2. Bi-lingual "Laissez-Passer Militaires" have been adopted for the First French Army area with reported good results. SECURITY CONTROL OF CIVILIAN POPULATION. 1. Security control of civilian traffic has been strengthened throughout VI and XV Corps sectors. The stabilized situation has enabled the enlargement and refinement of the roadblock and patrol systems A total of 540 roadblocks controlling civilian traffic were in effect throughout the Seventh Army area at the close of the period. 2. VI Corps CIC in cooperation with G-5 has established a carte d'identite to be used for travel of farmers from their homes to their fields. The pass specifies the locations involved, is valid during daylight hours, and is not honored for other travel. 3. The static situation has led to the assumption by many civiliens that "the war is over" and minor violations of previously respected travel restrictions have increased. 4. Requests for authorizations to take French National Gendarmes into Germany have not as yet been approved. In the areas in Germany travel control measures must be accomplished with military personnel until French National Gendarmes or German Gendarmes are made available. 5. VI Corps CIC and Civil Affairs arranged with the Prefect in Strasbourg for the elimination of the previous unsatisfactory system of passes within the Corps area. As a result, a general circulation office aware of travel control regulations in the Corps area, has been established in Strasbourg. This circulation office has been supplied with rellow laissez-passer which it may grant for necessary travel in the corps area to the rear of the Division Security Line. The Prefect at Strasbourg has taken steps to promulgate travel regulations. 6. 63 Inf. Div. CIC reported the arrest of Kaethe STARK, German ional, 40 years old, resident of Auersmacher, Germany, and her ghter, Elli STARK, 15 years old who wore BLM uniform. Both had furhed civilian clothing to German soldiers with intent to aid these diers to escapa cepture. Both told a prearranged story about the ntity of the soldiers, but, when confronted with the true statements the prisoners, the mother protested that she did not realize the imt of what she had been doing. Both are awaiting tried by Military erroment Court. rnment Court. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. Nothing to report.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED RELATIONS BETWEEN C.I. PERSONNEL, LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND POLICE. 1. Relations between CI personnel and local authorities have remained excellent. 2. On 14 February a detachment of 40 Security Communications personnel (French Railway guards) arrived in VI Corps area and requested permission to relieve guards of 68 AAA Gp on 6 railway bridges. A check indicated that the group had no written orders. They were requested to return to Strasbourg for proper orders. 3. Early in the period it was learned that the CFIN Railway had established civilian train service from Nancy to Luneville, Saverme and Strasbourg. Two trains were scheduled daily in each direction. No security measures had been established and no credentials were required for purchase of tickets. Civilians arriving on the first train were screened and allowed to proceed. This service was later withdrawn. 4. On 25 February two German PWs were captured loitering near an ammunition dump in Seventh Army area. Interrogation revealed that the PW had been assigned by French authorities to a farm near the Seventh Army reer boundary for labor purposes. Action has been taken by G-2 to prevent the assignment of further PWs in Seventh Army area. 5. Four PWs reported to be in the same category as above, armed with pistols and rifles, entered a farm house and took food from a French femily. A search is being made for the group. E. RELATIONS BETWEEN TROOPS AND CIVILIAN POPULATION. 1. The visits paid by General De GAULLE to Mulhouse, Colmar and Strasbourg were occasions for enthusiastic demonstrations on the part of the civilian population.

2. The respectful attitude of the civilian population during a public ceremony in Luneville at which the Commanding General Seventh Army decorated French officers was followed by an exhibition of admiration for American forces when hundreds of people spontaneously followed the General and his staff to their destination in town.

Relations between military personnel and the French civilian population remain excellent.

4. The following report from 63 CIC is cooted as an early indi-pation of the relations between troops and German civilians.

The second phase of 63 Inf Div CIC operations for the eriod concerned the work in Germany in the towns of Hanweiler (~-5057), ilchingen (Q-4958), Auersmacher (Q-5060) and KleinBlittersdorf (Q-4962). hese small towns were, contrary to expectations, not completely evacated by the Germans. Evacuation was urged and the people threatened traitorous Germans for remaining, but between two and three hundred evertheless stayed behind. Among the group were several French, issien and Itelian nationals, and at least one German-American.


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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED The standard of the expected mutuar rear landard struct, and hurried calls for CIC assistance. Kleinblittersdorf, the largest of the towns captured, was still being mopped up on 23 February and thirty to forty civilians were sent back to Div stockade through PW channels. These presented an immediate problem, particularly because they were brought across the border where a different civilian policy is in effect. As Germans, they could not be turned over to local agencies as refugees after screening. 63 CIC Det returned the Germans to German soil and established a refugee camp in Rilchingen where screening was effected, and where the men are being held until the front advances. The camp was put under the control of two German Gendarmes, belonging to the Ordnungspolizei, who were given orders to allow no one to leave the camp and are made personally responsible for each individual. Careful interrogation of these ranking Gendarmes (Meistergendarme), both older men, revealed their willingness to cooperate, even to the point of weeding out suspicious elements. They remarked that if they were to be held personally responsible for the men under their supervision, they could not afford to have unreliable elements in their midst. The Gendarmes were given slips of paper addressed to American troops, establishing their right to the job entrusted to them. First results of this delegation of a thority have been satisfactory. Screening of suspects pointed out by the Ordnungspolizei resulted in the detection of two German sergeants of the Wehrmacht who had changed into civilian clothes the day before to avoid capture, one Alsatian Red Cross nurse who had served with the Wehrmacht until recently, and several members of a poorly organized Volksturm in Kleinblittersdorf. SPECIAL CASES OF C.I. INTEREST. See Annex No. 2. PRO-ALLIED AND ANTI-NAZI ORGANIZATIONS. (Germany Only). Nothing to Report. RUMORS. 1. First French Army reports a rumor persistent in their area to the effect that the United States intends to unite Alsace, Lorraine and Luxembourg as an independent state to act as a buffer state between France and Germany. 2. 63rd Infantry Div. reports that the evacuation of a small number of civilians from Frauberg (Q-5559) before the offensive, resulted in a flood of rumors to the effect that a mass evacuation was to be carried out along the whole front. The rumors did not appear to

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED PART III - FRONTIER SECURITY GENERAL SURVEY. a. First French Army reports that although units guarding the frontier in their area have been reinforced and new precautions against unauthorized entry have been adopted it must be admitted that the frontier can still be illegally crossed. b. On 5 February, a patrol of frontier guards found an abandoned jeep on the road from Worschwiller to Kiffis. The jeep had been seen on the previous day in Worschwiller, occupied by two men in OD uniforms who possessed identity papers written in English and were considered as Americans. A Thomson sub-machine gun and one Fl grande were found in the jeep. The search made to find the two men was fruitless. They may have been Germans belonging to a Stielau unit. c. On 11 February, a jeep carrying two men was stopped by the sentries at Delle. The two men fled. Inside the car were found among other things, a German tommy-gun and a pair of shoulder straps belonging to a German NCO. It was at first believed that the men were parachutists. The inquiry however showed that they were two Russian deserters of the Foreign Legion; they have been recaptured. 2. AUTHORIZED CIVILIAN TRAVELLERS. Nothing to report. 3. DISPIACED PERSONS. Nothing to report. 4. PROHIBITED FRONTIER ZONE. Nothing to report. 5. RELATIONS WITH ALLIED FRONTIER CONTROL AUTHORITIES. Nothing to report. 6. GENERAL COMMENTS. Nothing to report. S DO BRIDE

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Counter UNIT 6th Army Group Hq	CI Officers 6	PART IV Renoe Staff SCI Off. EM. 10 13	CIC Officers	CIC Agents	SM 2	CTED	
Seventh US Army Hq T H Corps VI Corps IV Corps	3	1 1	15 5 3 5	32 10 ′ 7 13	6 1 1	5 0	
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U TOTAL Seventh US Army	4	1 1	69	150	12	17 10	
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TOTAL First French Army		1 1			21	62	
Western French Forces			1*	4*	1	1	
44th AAA Brigade	10	12 15	75	180	38	80	
* Note: Included in							
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ANNEX 1.

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The following Items of Counter-Intelligence interest have been tracted from reliable sources.

A Swiss returning home from Berlin, says that the German rerugees in Dresden were most brutally driven out of the town by the SS. There are rumors that the Nazis are digging mass graves in certain eastern districts which they believe they can hold for some time. An appeal will be made later to the Red Cross, charging the Russians with the mass murder of German civilians.

Musy, the former Swiss Federal Councillor has reportedly moved his headquarters to Kreuzlingen, where he is inundated with requests from Jews seeking to obtain the liberation of their relatives from the concentration camps.

A sensation was caused in Berlin by the news of the Musy and Himmler negotiations and the ensuing liberation of a number of Jews. Several leading Nazis there are believed to be considering approaching the Allies with the offer of exchanging political prisoners for the guarantee of their own security. In Nazi circles Himmler's action has been strongly criticized. A letter of protest has been sent to both Hitler and Himmler by friends of Julius Streicher. One of the Letter's signatories, SA Gruppenfuhrer Hildebrandt, has since been arrested. Up till the present nobody has dared to accuse Himmler of trying to gain popularity outside the Reich, but these arrangements, which could be interpreted outside Germany as signs of weakness, have been sharply conself has refrained to discuss the matter. At the same time the suggestion that a large number of political prisoners should be released as a "grand gesture of Germanic greatness" was put forward to Hitler by other Nazis including, it is reported, Geering and Franck. Goering, during talks he has had with foreigners, maintained that he was responsible for this initiative.

The court-martial of four German prison camp commanders has been announced, for failing to fulfil their duties. During the evacuation of his camp from western Poland, one is reported to have intentionally allowed prisoners to escape. Nazi "officers for cultural affairs" attached to the respective camps denounced all four commanders. These officers are directly under Gestape control and frequently Gestape agent Thousands of prisoners, mostly Poles and British managed to escape, during the general confusion prevailing both during and after their arrival in reception areas. During the bombing hundreds of British and American prisoners escaped from the train, and are hiding out in the are between Berlin and Leipzig.

In Berlin preparations for defence still continue. The popuation is very depressed by them, as Berliners now realize what is still eft of their city will be transformed into ruins before the Nazis fiily lay down arms. In the Potsdam-Nauen sector west of the capital, ortification works are now being built. The evacuation of the governat and the party offices to southern Germany is continuing despite that assurances to the contrary. Certain industries even are being truly transferred elsewhere.

From the description of a recent journey from Danzig to Berlin a neutral business man is taken the following information:

Special authorization had been granted the Informant to use Wehrmacht transport facilities from Danzig to Schlawe. Authorizatio: however, cancelled at the last moment as a local Gauleiter had resistioned all the available cars for the evacuation of his and other officials families.

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The informant saw several hundred German soldiers and uniformed Party men collecting corpses on the coast between Zoppot and Gdynia. There were corpses piled on a side road which had been closed to citilians. The informant talked with a German soldier who stated that the bodies had been washed ashore from two large refugee ships from East Prussia which had been torpedeed or had struck mines. Some 5,000 persons were estimated to have been drowned.

Between Danzig and Stettin, the evacuation of food depots had completely failed. Trucks in hundreds had been sent to fetch potatoes, flour, meat, butter, but most of them had broken down owing to defects. This information was volunteered by a German army doctor, who suggested that sabotage was the likliest cause, as the majority of the truck's drivers were foreigners. He was not sorry about it, he added, as it would only hasten the Nazi's end.

The informant saw in Lauenburg and in Stolp, thousands of tons of potatoes waiting for the Russians to come and collect them. Further south, he was told, the situation was worse, as a certain amount of food stocks had been rescued from Stolp and other main line stations. At Stolp, nevertheless, he saw hundreds of freight cars laden with potatoes and sugar waiting for locomotives to take them away. In vain one old locomotive was trying to haul a large number of trucks out of the Stolp station.

The informent had arranged at Schlawe to continue the journey in the car of a German industrialist friend who had been given gasoline in order to evacuate blue prints from his factory. SS however, seized the car, throwing the blue prints on to the road. As he had been threatened with severe penelties if he did not reach Stettin in time with the blue-prints, the industrialist was very upset.

The informant and the industrialist finally decided to try and buy a cart and horse. After two days scouring of the countryside, they found a farmer who was prepared to sell an old horse for 500 grams of coffee, one kilo of tobacco, two suits, one overcoat, ten litres of various wines and liquers, 15 kilos of salted meat, and a number of house utensils and 12,000 marks.

From Schlawe to Stettin, the journey took six days.

A stream of refugees was passed by the informant.

Frequently, he saw people digging graves for relatives...for relatives who had died on the road.

Women shouting hysterically and children crying for food, were heard by this man. Also he saw old men sitting resignedly by the road-side, refusing to continue.

Broken down cars and a large number of busses which had been used for the evacuation, lined the roads. 80% of these busses had broken down the informant was told in Stettin.

There was no sign of any organization until Stettin. The Wehrmacht roads only were kept clear. There was more organization south of Stettin. BDM, NS Volkswohfahrt and other Perty organizations had established "Volkskuchen" scrving soup and bread. The reasons, however, tablished "Volkskuchen" scrving soup and bread. The reasons, however, the relief work functioned here, was the comparatively small amount why the relief work functioned here, was the comparatively small amount of refugees. There was utmost confusion further west, where streams of refugees from the east and the north east had collided with the refugees from Berlin streaming south.

In Bremen, there is a very active committee operating, comprised of representatives of various political viewpoints but mainly communists

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In the docky rds, and even in the main streets in the center of the town, posters are being put up. Quite openly pamphlets are being printed and distributed.

A letter was written to the local Nazi mayor by the committee suggesting—that he should prepare against the approaching day when the Nazis would be forced to yield to the popular movement. The mayor has been, ever since, trying to contact the committee with the objective of putting forward counter-proposals in order to save his own skin. The Gauleiter has not yet been informed of the letter from the Committee, and the mayor has also neglected to take the necessary police measures. The Police Chief in Bromen has also done very little to check anti-Nazi propaganda, apart from arresting the harbor master and a few members of his personnel.

The Nazis in Bremen are greatly depressed and disillusioned. They believed for a long time, the rumours of new secret weapons which would completely change the course of the war. This belief is now fast dwindling. Well known old-time Nazis openly complain that they have been duped by the leaders.

In Bremen, anti-Nazi business men who have long since regarded the war as lost, are making detailed preparations in order to meet postwar problems. By every means, they are trying to contact directly or indirectly their old connections abroad. Also they are looking for suitable personnel for the anticipated changed business conditions.

A considerable number of evacuees from Bromen, who had been living in Silesia, Poland and the Protectorate returned home last fortnight, mostly without permission.

A great number of river barges and other small craft have been sent by the Kiel canal to the Baltic coast between Danzig and Stettin in order to speed up the evacuation of people and goods. The army does not expect to be able to hold anything east of the Oder for any length of time. Now even troops are being withdrawn from the northern flank, which the German High Command until recently regarded as the starting point for the much talked of counter-measures. Owing to the Allied western offensive, the latter had been abandoned.

Goering mry be appointed the "defense commissioner for the Rhineland and the Ruhr", according to rumors circulating in Berlin Nazi circles.

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ANNEX 2


SPECIAL CASES OF C.I. INTEREST

The descriptions in this armex of persons believed to be engaged in espionage or sabotage have been obtained from enemy agents captured by the Seventh Army.

- 1. Further interrogation of X1(see CI Report No. 10, Annex #1), has revealed the following names of three German agents who are expected to appear in the American lines in a short time:
- a. DIMITRIEFF, Alex. Well trained radio operator, ready to be parachuted into France, very probably into the Paris area, where he will make arrangements to help Francistes and other wanted pro-Germans into hiding, as well as carry on radio contact. Comes from a rich White Russian family. Description: Age 21; lm74 tall; slim build; light brown hair; fine hands. Speaks perfect French, and probably Russian.
- b. VALEUR (fnu). Woman trained in espionage but not radio. Will be ready to leave about 1 Merch. Is not married, but has a lover, reputedly in the SD at Baden-Baden. Description: 1m72 tall; brown hair, badly peroxided; rather pretty, but very faded in appearance.
- c. PICARD (fnu). Radio operator, now ready to leave, probably for the Paris area. Description: lm65 tall; very delicate features; cowardly appearance; small head; black hair and eyes; never clean looking.
- 2. SM 163 furnishes the following information on two German agents who are believed to have crossed Allied lines into France in mid-February. Both were in Offenburg at Unich Hotel in early February. Were to cross lines in the following week, had espionage mission for SD Obersturmbannfuehrer POHL.
- a. X.....Ignaska. French national of Polish origin. Living at Metz; profession: violinist, saxophonist; last worked at Freiburg in Breisgau. Description: 25 years old; 6'l" tall; square shoulders; rectangular face; bony, angular cheekbones; sunken cheeks; brown wavy hair small blond moustache; wears long marine-blue coat. Speaks French with Slavic accent.
- b. ANDERS. Belgian, native of Brussels. Profession: musician last employed at Freiburg in Breisgau. Description: 22 years old; about 5'7" tall; medium build; blond hair; grey eyes; oval face; wore blue gabardine coat, blue scarf; went bare-headed.

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6th US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Sear-Rhine Front)

a, At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th US
they Group were as follows: VOIXINGEN (Q 3573), ST ARNUAL (Q 4667), RIMLING (Q 6555),
DITVILLE (Q 7253), ALTHORN (Q 7640), FFAFFENHOFFEN (Q 9027), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517),
thence South along the Whine to the Swiss border.

- b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)
 - (1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The increasing threat in the TRIER area, the depleted condition of 416 Infantry and 256 Volksgrenadier Divisions, the deteriorating condition on Seventh German Army front, compelled the First German Army to make further changes in its disposition in order to strengthen its right flank.

The 6 SS Mountain Division was committed south of TRIER on 6 March, between 2 Mountain and 256 Volksgrenadier Divisions. However, at the end of the period the 2 Mountain Division was reported extending its sector to the north, while the 6 SS Mountain Division was being withdrawn to be recommitted probably in the Moselle area.

Remnants of the 245 Infantry Division were absorbed by 16 Volksgrenadier Division and Divisional as well as 935 Grenadier Regimental Staffs were withdrawn about 26 February to Germany presumably to complete the reformation of a new division.

Considering that the First Army is left without any major unit in immediate reserve, which is badly needed on account of the thinly held front lines, the 198 Infantry Division may move into the Saar-Palatinate as Army reserve.

6 SS Mountain Division "NORD" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) in First Army reserve last week, was committed on 6 March in the area south of TRIER, at which place 11 and 12 SS Mountain Regiments have been identified. The commitment of the division in that sector strengthened the depleted units on both flanks, (2 Mtn and 256 VG Divs) as its 3,200 combat infantry effectives are capable of a strong defense action. However, the deteriorating situation in the north induced the enemy to withdraw the division at the end of the period for commitment in an area more immediately threatened.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG:)

Due to the general state of flux of the divisions in this Corps area, it is difficult to establish precise divisional boundaires. The Corps holds a line from South-East of TRIER (L 2827) to North of MERZIG (L 1900). The disposition of divisions from north to south is as follows: 256 Volksgrenadier Division, 2 Mountain Division and 416 Infantry Division.

6 SS Mountain Division is believed to have withdrawn from the Corps cone to the north and east of its former positions. The failure to identify further elements of 49 Infantry Division in the corps area suggests that either additional divisional units are being kept in reserve or do not, in fact, exist.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) was forced to the temperate of the second second

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. UTZ) proved itself aggressive despite its depleted ranks. Originally south of 6 SS Mountain Division, this division attended its sector to the north at the end of the period to provide for the withward of 6 SS Mountain Division. The division staged several spirited counterattacks in the ZERF (L 2412) area. Combat infantry strength totals 1,000.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) is being held in line despite its virtual annihilation. The division can be considered only in terms of remnants. Even with converted service troops, not more than 700 combat infantry affectives are believed to remain.

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719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen, GAEDE) continued to hold tenses from L 1900 to SARRIAUTERN (Q 2880). Contact during the week was very light; neequently new identifications are lacking. According to revised estimates served, division combat infantry strength is lowered to 2,000.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) stubbornly resisted all attacks in the FORBACH (Q 4066) area, but later in the period the direction lost its toehold on the northern part of the town. Its present sector extends from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880) to Q 4168. Last identifications were: 860 Grenadier Regiment, 6 March at Q 3768; 861 Grenadier Regiment, 4 March at Q 3172 and Q 3966; 880 Grenadier Regiment, 6 March at Q 4068; 347 Anti-Tank Battalion, 5 March at Q 3767; 347 Engineer Battalion, 4 March at Q 4167. Losses during recent engagements were considerable. Combat infantry strength now does not exceed 1,400. 400 is added for 12 Landes-schuetzin Battalion and the newly committed Alarm Companies HAHN and HESSE.

(c) XIII SS Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN) remained in its sector from north-east of FORBACH (2 4168) to the Saar River at Q 4966. Identifications here were: I Battalion 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 4168 on 8 March; 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 4470 and Q 4168 on 4 March; 2 4168 on 8 March; 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 4470 and Q 4168 on 4 March; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment has been out of contact since 26 February. I Battalion 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment is operating under 1126 Regiment while the 1125 staff is said to be in the TRIER area, forming a new regiment March Battalion IX, totaling 300 men, arrived at SAARBRUCKEN 1 March. Though originally destined to become II Battalion 1125 Regiment, it was used as a general replacement unit for the division. No additional information was available this week concerning the utilization of Volkssturm personnel as reinforcements for this division. 509 Volksgrenadier put up a determined though costly defense for SAARERUCKEN against our attacks on 3-4 March. Combat infantry effectives total 2,300 men including attached units.

19 Infantry Division: (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZEMAYR) kept its old sector which extended from the Saar River (2 4966) to Q 5560, while the division continued its defensive attitude, the following identifications were made: 73 Grenadier Regiment at Q 5165 on 6 March; 74 Grenadier Regiment at Q 5266 on 3 March; 119 Engineer Battalion at Q 5564 on 4 March; 19 Replacement Battalion at Q 4966 on 7 March; 59 Grenadier Regiment apparently has not yet been reconstituted in accordance with previously reported plans. 119 Labor Battalion, composed of 300 unreliable foreigners and their German guards, was attached to the Engineer Battalion. Several alarm companies, formed from the Division Combat Schools have been sent into line as Battle Group BEUINER. Two companies of 17 SS Assault Gun Battalion were identified operating in 19 Division territory. Combat infantry aggregate, including the alarm units, is estimated at 1,300...

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Col.*KLINGENBERG) made use of the quiet that prevailed in its zone (Q 5560 - Q 7354) to continue its reorgan - itation and improvement of positions. Identifications made were: 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 7256 on 5 March. A Battalion Swits, composed of personnel drawn from the divisional revoices, was also contacted on 8 March at Q 5956. III Battalion 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment has been reformed. Prisoners mentioned that, in the absence of the issault Cun Battalion (identified at Q-5065 on 4 March in 19 Division sector), amplimates the under the cuted extensively to simulate the scands of noving amount in the divisional area. Combat infantry strength is carried at 2,100. Indications were evident that increased anti-gas precautions are being taken. creased anti-gas precautions are being taken.

(d) XC Corps (CG:

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL) has in addition command of units which were previously part of 245 Division and are now located on the ight flank of its divisional sector. Consequently, the divisional area now extends from Q 7354 to Q 8036. Last identifications were as follows: 221 Volksgrenadier egiment at Q 7738 on 9 March; 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7541 on 9 March; 25 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7540 on March; Battle Group LUETZE (remnants 937 Grenadier Regiment) at Q 7451 on 6 March;

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and I Battalion 935 Grenadier Regiment at 0.7354 on 4 March. It appears that I Battalion 935 Grenadier Regiment and Buttle Group LUETZE are all that remains of the 245 Volksgrenadier Division. The staffs of the division and its units, according to prisoners, have returned to Germany. Aside from controlling these remnants, 16 Division has made use of all available sources to rebuild its line units. In addition to the incorporated Battalion MORG from 905 Mobilization Division, remnants of 189 Volksgrenadier Division were also absorbed. This was confirmed by prisoners from 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment who stated that remnants of 1212, 1213, and 1214 Volksgrena dier Regiments made up II Battalion 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment and that only the staff and cadre of 189 Division went to the COLOGNE area. Other replacements came from service units, air force, and the navy. As a result, the divisional combat infantry strength was increased to 2,100 including attached units.

36 Volksgrandier Division (CG: Brig. Gen: WEIJM) spent a generally quiet week in the sector Q 8036 to Q 9027: Only identifications made during the period were as follows: 87 Grenadier Regiment at Q 8236 and 118 Grenadier Regiment at Q 8928 on 8 March and 165 Grenadier Regiment at Q 8434 on 4 March: Further disposition of the previously reported Replacement Regiment was indicated by the conversion of I Battalion into I Battalion 87 Grenadier Regiment; The disposition of II Battalion of the Replacement Regiment remains uncertain. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,000.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) extended slightly to the west and now holds from Q 9027 to immediately west of HAGUENAU (R 0224). There was no indication during the period that the division would move to the BITCHE area as was previously planned according to prisoners statements. Units identified were: 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9328 on 7 March; 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9825 on 8 March. 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment has been out of contact since 1 March. Losses suffered during the period were negligible and combat infantry effectives total 1,700.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) continued to hold the line from HAGUENAU (R 0224) to OBERHOFFEN (R 0920). Activity was practically at a stand still, resulting in a complete lack of identifications of organic units during the period. A prisoner of war taken on 2 March stated that 3-400 mon romained in the Field Replacement Battalion. The integration of these men into the weakened regiments may be expected. I Battalion 2 SPolice Regiment was again identified in the division zone on 6 March at R 0622. Battle Groups HARTIG and HELDMANN are still accepted as attached to the division. Organic combat infantry strength is estimated at approximately 1,900, while attached units raise this figure to 2,300.

905 Mobilization Division (CG:) is responsible for the sector from R 0920 to the Rhine River. Regiment MARBACH was identified on 1 March east of ORERHOFFEN and a deserter from 51 German Air Force Battalion was taken at R 1222 on Farah, suggesting the battalions presence in this area. Combat infantry strength settimate remains unchanged at 800 on line and 500 in reserve or in positions on the east bank of the Rhine.

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

The critical situation that has beveloped on the Western Front north of the Moselle River during the past thirty days has siphoned all but two nominal difference from the Nineteenth Army. Only 198 Infantry Division at RASTATT (R 3528) and infantry Division remain in BADEN.

106 Panzer Brigade was identified on 3 March in the vicinity of COLOGNE.

Ever, its armour was not contacted. 708 Volksgrenadier Division is reported to have
an cannibalized by 198 Infantry and 416 Infantry Divisions. 159 Volksgrenadier Dision was contacted in the area north of the Moselle River at KAIL (L 6576).

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CC: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) was identified on March in the vicinity of KAIL (L 6576). Prisoners were taken from II Battalion 10 Grenadier Regiment and a captured map established the existence of I Battalion. isoners of war also state that the remainder of the division was to follow from the ichborhood of the Swiss border. The division was last located in the FREIBURG . WILINGEN area. Its combat infantry effectives are not very large.

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708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKWENN). Elements of a division have been absorbed by both 198 Infantry and 416 Infantry Divisions. isoners of war yielded by 416 Infantry Division stated that they were reinforcements om 748 Volksgrenadier Regiment. It appears that the staffs of the division have en left behind and are to be entrusted with the rehabilitation of the division at later data. later date.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM)

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) has moved to the vicinity of RASTATT (R 3524) from the area east of OFFENBURG (W 1585). Elements of 708 Volksgrenadier Division are reported to have been absorbed by 198 Infantry Division. Combat infantry strength is tenatively estimated at 1,500.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER). No new information regarding the divisions location has been received. Last carried in the KEHL (W 0596) region, its northward move is a distinct probability, Tentative estimate of combat effectives is 1,200.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH)

Its location and operational status remain unchanged.

c. DEFENSE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG: SS Lt. Gen. MAUR)

Status unchanged.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) continues to man defenses along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (10596).

30 SS Grenadier Division (CO: Col. SIEGLING). Due to complete lack of information over a period of more than a month the division is no longer carried in the Black Forest area.

805 Mobilization Division (CG:) is still responsible for SIEGFRIED positions along the Rhine north of BRIGACH.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO:). Controlling 7th Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN and other as yet unidentified units, is holding Rhine defenses north of LORRACH (A 9590) with headquarters in the vicinity of NEUENBERG (V 8713).

d. TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY (CG: SS Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

e. 600 Infantry Division (Russian) is still carried at MUNSINGEN pending further elarification.

f. ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6th US ARMY GROUP (Saar-Palatinate-Rhine Front)

Divisional Units in Contact and Reserve: Combat Infantry Effectives)

Saar - Palatinate Front Rhine Front

4,000

Reserves: (Estimated)

Saar - Palatinate Front Black Forest

2-3,000

TOTAL

23-24,000

Artillery Guns: Saar - Palatinate (Reserve)

Rhine River Front TOTAL

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6th US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CH MONIX (C 4728), MT ROLELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 4680), VILLAROGER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

Miles.

a. Enemy Dispositions

Information regrived indicates that the enemy has carefully executed a withdrawal of elements of 5 Mountain Division. It appears that the division staff and cadre remain in the area while the combat infantry strength of the division has been substantially withdrawn. Thus, the enemy has been able to drain personnel from the division for use elsewhere while maintaining German control over Italian units on the front. The 34 Infantry Division continues to hold the coastal sector with increased Italian support. The 8 Battery, 2 Artillery Regiment of the LITTORIO Division, in addition to the 2nd Separate Bersaglieri Battalion, have been identified as being under command of 34 Infantry Division.

b. General

Increased enemy activity in the high mountain areas has been permitted by improved weather conditions. Small raids by the enemy are to be expected for the purpose of creating a diversion and to increase his own prestige. No indications of general enemy withdrawal have been manifested.

4. OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

The enemys anxiety was evidenced by the harassing patrols which he continued to send across to the west bank of the Rhine. The numerous patrols reported in the CHALAMPE (V 8513) - KEMES (A 8398) region was indicative of his particular interest in friendly intentions in that area. Artillery fire was generally light with the STRASBOURG and CHALAMPE-KEMES areas receiving the major part. However, on 9 March between 0445A and 0620A approximately 2000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell in the area between the Rhine and the MATTER ALD (R 1317). Enemy air activity was on a reduced scale during the period, however, four aircraft, including jet planes were reported in SELESTAT-STR SBOURG area on 4 March and seven jet planes were reported south of MULHOUSE on 5 March.

SAAR - PALATINATE FRONT


The German LXXXIX Corps in the Rhine Valley and the XC Corps in the HRDT Mountains maintained a defensive attitude, but friendly patrols found the enemy on the alert. Movements in the 16 Volksgren dier Division sector on 3 March indicated continued regrouping while activity in the BITSCHHOFFEN (Q 9128) - GUMERECHTSHOFFEN (Q 9234) area on 5 and 7 March pointed to local reliefs. Artillery and mortar fire, although generally light and scattered, increased somewhat in the HAGUENAU area on 4 March and in the HARDT on 5 March.

In the SARR Valley, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division and 19 Infantry Division reined alert to attempted friendly penetrations. 559. Volksgrenadier and 347 Infantry
divisions offered stubborn opposition to renewed friendly attacks. After prolonged
louse to house fighting, FORRICH was finally cleared on 5 March. On the same day an
attimated 1,200 French, Russian, and Polish prisoners were liberated from a stockade
attimated TRIDEL (2 4166). Heavy fighting continued in STIRING WENDEL until 7 March
hen the factory section was cleared of enemy. To the west, the BOIS DE LA RESERVE
[9 3566) was cleared and 347 Infantry Division was forced slowly back to the Eastset railro d in the FORET DE FORRICH. Here the enemy dug in and was resisting
tubbornly at the end of the period.

ALPINE FRONT

Improved weather permitted increased enemy activity. Outposts were established on OL DE LA GALLE (H 67) and COL D'ARNA; (H 45). PETIT ST BERNARD (C 04) and MOUNT AND (H 45 regions were the scene of light infantry activity and occassional artillery and mortar fire. According to reports, an armoured train equipped with twelve 155 mm

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he was located in the SAN REMO (T 0089) tunnel. for the purpose of laying down way artillery fire on MENTON (S 78). However, these preparations were interrupted to March when the tunnel was bombed by friendly aircraft causing an explosion heard enty miles away.

ATLANTIC FRONT

In the LA ROCHELLE pocket on 3 March one company of enemy attempted an infiltration between friendly outposts at VENDOME 'T 4748) and COSSE (T 4549). Some movement of infantry and artillery toward THAIRE (T 4225) and AIGREFEUILLE (T 4729) on 4 March lent credence to prevalent rumors of enemy action. However, no action resulted, Following the 2 March attack south of MONTALIVET (Y 2747) in the GRAVE pocket; the enemy withdrew and friendly forces reoccupied old positions. Occasional exchanges of artillery fire and minor patrols characterize the activity of the period.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A Tactical Reconnaissance

Visual reconnaissance was greatly hampered throughout the current period by unusually bad flying weather. Only on 3 and 9 March was cover available, and even then it was by no means complete. Movements seen in the Saar on 3 March appeared to be a continuation of the activity noted in the PIRMASENS area during the latter half of the previous week and were probably connected with the move of 6 SS Mountain Division from the BITCHE area to ZERF (L 2413) where its units were identified on 6 March. On 3 March much activity was also observed along the FREIBURG-OFFENBURG line and marshalling yards at MAHLBERG (W 0666), LAHR (W 1072) and OFFENBURG appeared active.

Observations made on 9 March showed several hundred loaded motor transport noving north and east in the AUSSEN (Q 3696) area northwest of NEUNKIRCHEN. Some light motor transport activity moving south was seen between BAD DURKHEIM and LANDAU and several loaded flats were sighted in the vicinity of LANDAU. East of the Rhine, five stationary trains totaling 150 flats loaded with motor transport and guns were seen along the FREIBURG - KARLSRUHE - PFORZHEIM line. In the KARLSRUHE marshalling yards, four trains were seen facing north and three east. Much rail activity was reported in the STUTTGART area.

On both 3 and 9 March pontoon bridging activities were observed along the Chine between DRUSENHEIM (R 1618) and KARLSRUHE suggesting that preparations are underway to make more crossing sites available in this sector. More complete and recent information also reveals that numerous additional ferries are now in operation all along the Rhine. Exact location of these crossing is shown in Inclosure # 1.

B Status of Communications

Poor operational weather afforded the Germans an excellent opportunity to reir damage to rail lines and installations during the past week. Intermittent coverrevealed that facilities had been sufficiently repaired to permit the movement through traffic on some of the more important lines recently cut. Repairs to the S and BAD MUNSTER rail bridges likewise succeeded in opening additional lines to cough traffic.

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2


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
Inc - The Rhine Bridges
Inc - Enemy Disposition

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED 14:: 27:: DQUARTERS 6th US ARMY GROU Assistant Chief of Staff, APO 23, U.S. Army :CG, 6th Army Group :Initials: 188 :Date: 17 March 1945: FOR THE WEEK ENDING 17 MARCH 1 45 SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation The time remaining to Army Group G for its tenure in the SAAR-PALATINATE is rapidly diminishing as a result of the deep penetrations southward from the MOSELLE River to east of BAD KREUZNACH and to BINGEN. The present rate of reinforcements, without hope for any increase, can merely delay the debacle. Threatened breaches in the line will of necessity be reinforced by drawing on the limited available local reserves. The gathering and preservation of manpower along the Western Front must certainly be of the highest priority. A coordinated defense of the east bank of the Rhine River, south of MAINZ, will depend upon the ability of Army Group G to extricate itself from its present predicament. Army Group'G has the unenviable task of supervising two faltering armies, the German Seventh and First. The ability of SS General HAUSSER to maintain his forces intact will receive as supreme a test in the SAAR-PALATINATE as he experienced in the ARGENTAN-FALAISE pocket last summer. The present period has witnessed a transfer of forces from the south, placing more dependence on the SIECFRIED Line, and the commitment of one of his reserve units. in the BAD KREUZNACH area where the obvious mission is to block the drive of U.S. Armored Divisions from cutting his lines of communication far to the rear. The importance of holding our effort in this area in order to protect RHINE crossings must be weighed against the threat existing in the TRIER-MERZIG area, where a concerted Allied effort might very well roll up the MOSELLE River line and outflank the HUNSRUOK Hills. The Seventh German Army had its right flank pierced to BINGEN-BAD KREUZNACH without having the opportunity to reorganize its forces already badly battered in the EIFFL. Its mission to cover the right flank of First Army appears to be almost 6 beyond possibility of fulfillment. The paucity of troops available was clearly demonstrated by the hasty dispatch of 198 and 559 Infantry Divisions to BAD KREUZNACH in a blocking role. This disposition will offer only a temporary respite as the entire gap created is not possible of cover with forces available. Indications that the enemy failed to appreciate US intentions or strength was illustrated by the sending of 12 SS Mountain Regiment of 6 SS Mountain Division from the DIEBLICH (L 8190) area to the SCHEIDEN (L 2507) area. The First German Army made obvious its lack of depth at the close of the period by withdrawing its main position into the SIEGFRIED Line. Its mission will be to maintain a secure left flank on the SIEGFRIED Line in order to preserve crossing sites for possible withdrawals across the river. The withdrawal of 559 Infantry Division from east of SAARBRUCKEN into temporary Army or Army Group reserve further seakened its front. The responsibility for the defense of the SIEGFRIED Line between SAARLAUTERN and ZWEIBRUCKEN is known to have been sectionally allocated to divisions sently in the area. The assistance possible to First Army by Fortress and Volkssunits is confined to those troops already in the positions. The critical situon developing on its right flank compelled not only the commitment of local rewes but also required aid from its neighbor.

The Nineteenth German Army was reduced to absolute impotence as its last ining combat division, 198 Infantry, departed on 16 March for the battle area. Capabilities In the SAAR-PALATINATE the capabilities of the enemy were further restricted the advance of US forces to the BAD KREUZNACH area. The major question facing the may is still the method by which he may get fullest use of the limited forces maining at his disposal. The enemy may attempt to establish a defensive line approximately southwest on the bend of the RHINE to the SIEGFRIED Line. A position south from BINGEN along NAHE River to the vicinity of SAARLAUTERN would have been most favored by terrain, in the north flank dropping gradually south between the MOSELLE and the HUNSRUCK un-allied pressure. The loss of BAD KREUZNACH will force the enemy to anchor the thern flank further south on the RHINE, near WRMS if possible, shortening the se of the defensive triangle. In any case, the road net from KAISERSLAUTERN to the INE must be protected as the final avenue for escape. INE must be protected as the final avenue for escape.

Execution of this capability will necessarily depend on the enemy's ability hold his lines. Troops must be spared from the west wall positions in order to rengthen the north flank and the junction of it to the SIECFRIED Line. There is doubt that the enemy will eventually be forced across the RHINE, if only because his inability to reinforce present positions. General HAUSSER can we many Germans he wished to leave in RESTRICTED.

th US ARMY GROUP FROMT (Sear-Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th US
Group were as follows: VOIXLINGEN (Q 3675), South Bank of SAAR River to
BACH (Q 4969), BISCHHISHEIM (Q 5169), REICHHEIM (Q 6060), DIETRION (Q 7766), Camp
BITCHE (Q 6051), MOUTERHOUSE (Q 7943), PHILIPPSBOURG (Q 6743), GUMERECHISHOFFEN
B234), HAGENAU (R 0424), SCHIRRHOFFEN (R 1423), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517), thence South ig the Rhine to the STISS BORDER.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS GEN HAUSSER)

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) previously located in the RASTATT area (R 3524), was identified West of BAD KREUZNACH (M 0834) on 16 March. Prisoners stated they had come from the KARLSRUHE area where the division absorbed remnant of 716 Infantry Division. Having had over a month in which to recuperate from its last engagement, the division should be in fair shape by German standards. Its planned reorganization according to the Infantry Division 1945 pattern and its absorption of elements of 708 Volksgrenadier Division have been previously mentioned. Combat infantry strength is tentatively estimated at 2,000.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN), last identified in its old sector South of SAARBRUCKEN on 12 March, was withdrawn of 14 March and its sector shared by the adjoining 347 and 19 Infantry Divisions. What mission the German Command had envisaged for the division has not been established. In any case, the Allied breakthrough South of the Moselle River forced its domnitment South of BAD XPELDMCH at M 0834 on 16 March. Organic combat infantam of fall XPELDMCH at M 0834 on 16 March. of BAD KREUZNACH at M 0834 on 16 March. Organic combat infantry effectives totalled 1,800.

(1) Seventh German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FELBER)

2 Panzer Division (CG: LAUCHERT) was not contacted after its with-drawal south of the Moselle. According to an unconfirmed report, a single prisoner (possibly a straggler) was taken in the REMAGEN bridgehead on 16 March. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1500; supported by approximately 10 tanks.

(a)...LXXX Corps (CG: Gen der Inf BAYER)

79 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) brought one regiment Sou from the vic L 3342 to consolidate its remnants in defense of RIOL (L 3233). Identifications were: 208 Grenadier Regiment on 11 March at L 2946, 12 March at) brought one regiment South L 2828, 226 Grenadier Regiment on 15 March at L 3233. Combat infantry elements do t number more than 750.

212 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: SENSFUSS) was untouched in the clearing of the COCHEM pocket. The division was last identified in position in the area near MEUNAGEN (L 3040) but no identifications were made during this period. It is estimated that 1400 combat infantry effectives still remain.

560 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: BADER) is in the area near RNKASTEL (L 5348). Indications are that the division was forced to form into ttle groups of approximately 100 men each. The only identification made during a period was that of 1130 Grenadier Regiment on 11 March near L 5348. Combat antry effectives are carried at 500.

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: KOLE) has not been contacted ince 7 March and is located South of the MOSELLE. A new 36 VOLKSGRENADIER REGIMENT is being formed at WILDFLECKEN (N 59) on 9 March, while remnants of 352 Infantry vision were used to bolster the other regiments. Some replacements were picked up m 2 Panzer Division. The division is believed to have a combat infantry strength 1000 effectives.

246 Infantry Division (CC: KUEHNE) as retreating East to-ard the MOSELLE when contacted on 12 March. Identifications include: 464,67365 for Regiment at L 3765 on 11 March; 352 Grenadier Regiment at L 4450 on 12 march. ts combat infantry effectives total 1400.

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(b) XIII Corps (CG: Gen Lt GRAF von ORIOLA)

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. den BUERCKY) attempted to hold a line extending along the South bank of the MOSELLE from BURGEN (L 7578) to COCHEM (L 5872). Identifications were 1210 Volksgrenadier Regiment at L 6976 on 11 March; 1211 Volksgrenadier Regiment at L 7280 on 11 March, vic L 7781 on 12 March, at L 7678 on 13 March. Ineffective in its defense, the division has been pocketed by our drives across the river and by the westward expansion of our armored spearhead. Average battalion strength was said to be 250 on 13 March. Combat infantry bffectives are estimated at 900.

6 SS Mountain Division (CG: Maj Gen ERENNER), heralded by elements of 506 SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion moved both its regiments to the area East of ERODENBACH (L 7981) about 11 March from vic L 2828. Our attack South of TRIER caused a change of plans and 12 SS Mountain Regiment returned South to SCHEIDEN (L 2705) on 14 March. 11 SS Mountain Regiment was left only to be swept aside by our armored drive. Identifications in the Northern sector were: 11 SS Mountain Regiment at L 8580 and L 8281. Remnants of combat infantry effectives left in this area total approximately 800.

- (2) First German Army (CG: Lt Gen OBSTFELDER)
 - (a) LXXXII Corps (CG:

General HAFM was relieved of his command by Gen HAUSSER personally and an SS officer is stated to have taken his place. The Corps continued to hold a sector from East of TRIER (L 2827) to North of MERCIG (L 1900). The disposition of its divisions remained substantially unchanged with remnants of 256 Volksgrenadier its division holding the northern sector, 2 Mountain Division the central and remnants of Division holding the northern portion of the sector. Toward the end of the period 12 SS Mountain Regt of 6 SS Mountain Division was identified in support of the impotent 416 Infantry Division.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig Gen FRANZ) consolidated its remnants into several small battle groups that lack any semblance to a divisional organization. They were supported by some small, static units. This conglomeration managed to put up a fair defense against Allied attacks. Combat infantry strength of divisional remnants does not exceed 500.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig Gen UTZ) weakened by several abortive counterattacks without sufficient heavy weapon support, was forced to give way to continued pressure in the SCHWARZWALDER HOCHWALD region. Both organic regiments were identified on 13 March. Combat infantry effectives total 1,000.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj Gen PFLIEGER) was also forced to withdraw its much battered remnants. An indication as to the importance the enemy attached to the divisional area (North of MERZIG) is gleaned from the fact that both attached to the divisional area (North of MERZIG) is gleaned from the fact that both attached to the divisional area (North of MERZIG) is gleaned from the fact that both attached to 5 SS Mountain Regiment of 5 SS Mountain Division were committed in the SCHEIDEN (L 2705) 58 SS PGR) of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division were committed in the SCHEIDEN (L 2705) area. Remainder of 416 Infantry Division is estimated at 600 combat infantry effectives. Attachments increase the total to 2000.

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt Gen KNIESS)

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig Gen CAEDE) was more fortunate than the division on its flank. Protected by strong SIEGFRIED defenses on the East bank of the SAAR, the division remained in only loose contact. The identification of 719 Field Replacement Battalion at R 3075 on 13 March suggests that the division was obliged to extend its sector to the South and now holds from L 1900 to VOLKLINGEN (Q 3175). Combat infantry strength is 2,000.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj Gen TRIERENBERG) had to extend its sector to the East, taking over some of the area vacated by 559 Volksgrenadier Division. 347 Division withdrew to SIEGFRIED Line positions along the north bank of the SAAR, abandoning its bridgehead South of that river. The sector now extends from VOLKLINGEN (2 3175) through SAARERUCKEN (2 4770). 860, 861, 880 Grenadier Regiments,

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Artillery Regiment, and 347 Engineer Battalion were identified in the case and 15 March. The organic combat infantny strength total of 1,300 is raised to 600 by attachment of 12 LANDESSCHUETZEN Battalion.

Tarico XIII Corps (CG: Maj Gen MAX SIMON)

IS Infantry Division (CG: Brig Gen ERITZEIMAYR) expanded to the Test to take over responsibility for the Eastern portion of the sector vacated by 509 Volksgrenadier Division. 19 Infantry Division now holds from exclusive SAAR-RUCKEN (Q 4770) to Q 5862. The division is in poor shape and was unable to prevent one penetration to the SIEGFRIED Line at Q 5471 on 16 March. On 15 March, 73 Grenadier Regiment was identified at Q 5067 and Q 5166; 74 Grenadier Regiment, 119 Ahti-Tank and Engineer Battalions at Q 5364; 719 Artillery Regiment at Q 5266. 59 Grenadier Regiment has not been contacted since its destruction on 23 February. Elements of 18 Werfer Brigade are operating in the divisional area as 21 Verfer Regiment was met at Q 5567 on 15 March. 17 SS Assault Gun Battalion, previously reported as operating under 19 Division, has returned to its parent unit. Though 200 replacements were received from the division combat school on 12 March, combat infantry effectives do not total more than 1,200.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Col KLINEENBERG) put up a determined defense but had to withdraw slightly under strong pressure. It now holds from 2 5862 to 2 7559. Last identifications (15 March) were: 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at 2 6457 and 2 6956; 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at 2 5561; 17 SS Engineer Battalion at 2 5957; 17 SS Recommissance Battalion at 2 5661; 17 SS Assault Gun Battalion at 2 6658. III Battalion 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment was contacted at SCHEIDEN (L 2705) on 14 March, indicating that the enemy failed to appreciate our intentions. It appears that Volkstrum men were used to release some divisional service personnel for combat duty. This expedient raised division combat strength by about 300. However, recent losses and the detachment of one battalion effected a reduction of overall strength to 1,900 combat infantry effectives.

· (d) MC Corps (CG:

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MCECKEL) put up only spotty resistance against our attack and was unable to prevent the capture of BITCHE. The division is responsible for the line from 2 7559 to 2 8442. On 15 March the following identifications were made: 221 Volksgrenadier Regiment at 2 8037, 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment at 2 7549. 16 Fusilier Rettalion was contacted at 2 7842 on 16 March. The attached I Battalion of 935 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified at 2 7467 on 17 March. Casualties lowered the divisional combat infantry strength to 1,900 including the two attached battalions formerly part of 245 Infantry - Division.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig Gen MILIM) proved to be thinly spread in its sector from Q 8442 to Q 9133. Resistance was scattered and airly light. The following identifications were made on 15 March: 118 Volksgrenader Regiment, 268 Artillery Regiment, and 36 Engineer Battalion at Q 8630; 87 clasgrenadier Regiment at Q 8536. It was determined during the period that II Batton 36 Replacement Regiment, the disposition of which had been vague, was abted by 118 Volksgrenadier Regiment. Allowing for casualties, present combat mantry strength is 1,800.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt Gen HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrengdier Division (CG: Maj Gen BORK) was taken by surse by our recent attack. I Battalion 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment was captured
act and their reaction to the attack was generally confused. At week's end the
laion held from Q 9133 to R 0224. Last identifications, made on 15 March, were:
Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9229, 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9527, 47
there Battalion and 147 Anti-Tank Battalion at Q 8929. The identification of the
lifer Battalion is of particular interest inasmuch as it points to reorganization
the division in accordance with the Table of Organization for the Infantry Divin 1945. Deducting known losses, combat infantry effectives total 1,500.

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257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig Gen SEHEL) resisted with termination and gave ground only under strong pressure in its sector from R 0224 R 1423. Identifications made on 15 March were: 466 and 477 Volksgrenadier Regiments and 257 Artillery Regiment at R 0920. 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment and 257 insilier Company at R 0420; I Battalion 2 SS Police Regiment (attached) at R 0623. Impact infantry strength new amounts to 1,800 including 200 for attachments.

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905 Mobilization Division (CG:) now holds the sector from 1 1423 to the Rhine. Contact in this area was generally light and the only identification made during the period was of 905 Fusilier Company at R 0920 on 15 March. The constitution of such an organic auxiliary unit may be a forerunner to an upgrading of the division as in the case of 405 Reserve Division. Combat infantry strength is still carried at 800 on line and 500 along the East bank of the RHINE or in reserve.

(3) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt Gen RASP)

By this time Nineteenth Army has lost all the major units under its command while in the COLMAR Pocket. It may very well be that the Army staff remains in the Black Forest to assume operational command of the units along the RHINE in the event of an Allied crossing, thus complementing the OMERRHEIN Defense Command's administrative functions. In any case, it is obviously an Army staff which C in C West has in reserve, whose ultimate disposition is not yet clear.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col HAFNER), last reported in the KEHL (W 0596) area, was stated by prisoners of 198 Infantry Division to have been absorbed by that division. Though the division's rehabilitation in the future is a possibility, it can be written off for the present.

(a) <u>IXIV Corps</u> (Lt Gen THUMM)

The Corps continues to be responsible for a portion of the SIEGFRIED Line in the STR.SBOURG area.

- (b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt Gen REINEFARTH)
 - No change in status or location.
- (4) DEFENSE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG: SS Lt Gen MAUR)

No Change Reported.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj Gen SEECER) remains in positions along the Rhine, north and south of KEML (W 0596).

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig Gen von OPPEN). Prisoner of war statement that General von OPPEN commands this division confirms previous indications that the division was identical with the Divisional Group "NEUF BRIS.CH".

531 Penal Battalion (zbV) was identified in the divisional sector, but its relation to the division is not known.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO:) remains North of LORRICH (A 9590) introlling 7 Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN and some still unidentified units.

- (5). Twenty- Fourth Army (CG: SS Lt Gen HANS SCHMIDT)
 No change reported.
- (6) 600 Infantry Division (Russian) is still carried at MUNSINGEN. There been no recent identifications or confirmation of its location.

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RESTRICTED chesenthe I 159 MY STRENOTH OPPOSITE 6th ARMY GROUP (SAAR-PALATINATE-RHINE Front Divisional Units in Contact and Reserve: Combat Infantry Effectives) Sear - Palatinate Front First Army Seventh Army 12,500 15,500 4,000 Rhine Front Reserves: (Estimated) Sear-Palatinate Black Forest 31,000 - 31,500 Artillery Guns: Saar-Palatinate Tanks and SP Guns: Saar - Palatinate Saar - Palatinate (Reserve) 135 - 155 Rhine River Front 180 - 210 TOTAL 3. 6th US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front) At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (0 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 4680), VILLAROGER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088). a. Enemy Dispositions. Italians units, interspersed with the remaining elements of 5 Mountain Diviion, now man the bulk of the positions on the front. Of the German units, 100
ountain Regiment Elements are confirmed in positions at MONT CENIS (H 4565), and
aRDONNECHIA (K 8418). A new replacement battalion has been added to the forces of
5 Mountain Regiment East of AIGUILLES (H 4603). Prisoners of war state that the
ntire LITTORIO Division has been accounted for holding positions along a sector of
he front. In the coastal sector, 34 Infantry is still in control. However, 80
infantry Regiment has not yet returned from its Anti-Partisan acrounted north of
MPERIA. A possible indication of some future movement from the area was the observaion of large numbers of stationary railroad cars on sidings between CUNEO (N 8655)
and ERA (0 1485), early in the period. The increase in the number of patrols and attempts at ambushing friendly trols in the Northern sector confirms the enemy's extreme anxiety concerning our esent activities and future intentions. This anxiety was also shown earlier in the riod in the Southern sector of the Alpine Front. There are as yet no definite incations of German withdrawals from the Franco-Italian border. OPERATIONS RHINE FRONT The enemy continued his nuisance raids over the RHINE River without any reater success than he experienced in the past period. Early in the period, a minor nemy infiltration was repulsed in the WANTZENAU (R 0706) area. Of particular interset was the area near W 0489 where a series of enemy landing attempts were frustrated in March 11 after he had previously tried to put patrols across the river just south 4. C. 株件

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that points Artillery fire was generally light and scattered throughout the

SAAR-PALATINATE FRONT

During the period preceding the .llied attack on 15 March, the enemy demonstrated no particular activity. Friendly patrols encountered a normally alert enemy all along the line. West of the H.RDT Mountains, several enemy patrols averaging about 25 men in strength were easily repulsed without their having accomplished any positive results. However, the enemy's main anxiety was obviously in the HAGUENAW area, where our patrols met intense all weapons fire.

On 12 March, an illied limited objective attack to enlarge the MODER bridge-head caused immediate reaction with a relatively strong but unsuccessful counterattack coming on the night of 13 March. Still appreciating the major Allied threat to be in the HAGUENAU area, a gradual withdrawal was effected west of the HARDT under cover of heavily mined terrain and continuous sniper fire. 559 Volksgrenadier Division and elements of 17 SS Division were released from their positions on the

The illied attack beginning early on 15 March evidently achieved complete tactical surprise. Light to moderate resistance, spotty contact, and numerous thick mine fields canalizing friendly maneuver characterized the opening phase. Our secondary attack met determined resistance, as had been expected, in the CAMP D'OBERHOFFEN (R 0821) area while 257 Division fought a house-to-house retreat in HAGUENIU. After having been initially driven back, both 47 and 36 Divisions rallied nation. After having been initially driven back, both 47 and 36 Divisions rallied to counterattack unsuccessfully with armor in support. BITCHE was bypassed on the north and subsequently entered without opposition, as 16 Division withdrew. 17 SS Division, which was engaged in releasing some units from the line, was able to offer only light resistance before it retreated to its prepared positions. Its Assault Gun battalion continued to carry out its general support role by covering forward positions during the withdrawal, with strong effort at WEISKIRCH (Q 7157) and VOIMUNSTER (Q 7259).

Between the valley of the BLIES and SAARERUCKEN, Allied tactical surprise was counterbalanced by strongly prepared defensive positions, based on towns and strongpoints screened by extensive minefields. The initial impetus of the attack was absorbed only at the cost of sacrificing the enemy garrisons obviously left to cushion the blow, while the bulk of the enemy forces sought the protection of the STEGFRIED Line.

At the close of the period, all indications pointed to a general withdrawal all along the line into the WestWall. A rtillery fire became sporadic as both air reconnaissance and prisoners reported enemy columns moving hastily back. By noon of 17 March, enemy opposition was apparently disintegrating and the outer defenses of the SIEGFRIED Line were already being penetrated.

ALPINE FRONT

The enemy was particularly active in the northern and central sectors.

endly patrols were ambushed near ERIANDON (P 3998) and LANSIEROURG (Z 5241). At
T BLANC (C 4723) and PETIT ST. BERNARD (C 4500) enemy groups were observed workon defenses. Artillery fire was only scattered in the coastal area. Otherwise
usual quiet prevailed along the entire front.

ATLANTIC FRONT

Enemy patrols were normally active in the La ROCHELLE zone. One unsuccess1 attempt was hade to envirole a friendly OP East of LA PREUILLE (T 4724). Some
Incentrations of troops, and supplies, were reported in areas T 3844 - 4538. At
WAN light machine gun fire was received in the vicinity of Y 4772 and enemy artilTry was reported in the area of Y 4773. Some water activity was noted for on 14
urch an enemy boat approached CHAPUS (T 2901) and fired several volleys. In addien an enemy tug towing a barge was attacked northwest of ILE D'AIX by a friendly
dip which forced the abandonment and capture of the barge.

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rements consisted of heavy traffic in the ST. VIVIEN (Y 3655) vicinity cops moving in the area of Y 3751. In addition, some enemy traffic be SAS Y 3751 and GAYAC was observed on 14 March.

OTTO WIND

Observations during the period were facilitated by excellent weather and sytensive cover. Rail movement within the Black Forest area and in the Saar Felatinate were on a small scale. However, moderate to heavy activity was observed in the eastern Rhine Valley and on the rail lines, MOSEACH (0385) - STUTTGART. Which road activity was seen in the areas STUTTGART - KARLSRUHE - RASTATT - OFFENEURG FREUMENSTADT, and in the SAAR - PALATINATE.

On 14 March, 21 scattered trains were seen throughout the Black Forest moving in all directions. There were also moderately heavy loadings in the FREIBURG archalling yards on the same day. On 14, 15, and 16 March a total of four large chicular convoys and groups of horse drawn transport were observed moving in a orthward direction from the area RASTATT - OFFENBURG - FREUDENSTADT. This indicated hat a possible major military move was under way from this region.

There was a military train reported at PFORZHEIM on 10 March and another on March. In addition, some 90 flats loaded with motor transport or tanks were objected in the DURLACH (R 5345) area. Further to the north limited military activity as reported at HEIDELBERG and DARSTADT. The moderately heavy rail activity objected on the north-south line through HEILERONN revealed limited military activity ith one military train sighted at LUDWICSBURG on 15 March. The trend of traffic on its line was north in the direction of ASCHAFFENBURG.

Except for the 3 loaded military rakes observed in the ST MENDEL area on 13 red, military rail activity in the SAAR - PALATINATE was negligible throughout the riod. An accumulation of rolling stock was noted in the western Rhine Valley on March, especially in the yards at LANDAU, NEUSTADT, and EDENKOBEN (R 2877). In sect contrast to the rail movement, the road activity was very pronounced throughthe period. There were strong indications of enemy withdrawals to points north the SIEGFRIED Line on 13 - 15 March inclusive, and it appeared that the movements in SAARLAUTERN - PIEMASENS areas had ZWEIERUCKEN as their focal point. On 16 red, a 300 vehicle convoy was moving East from BINGEN just prior to the arrival of forces on the NAHE River. There was also a trend of vehicular movement towards assembly of the Rhine River from area LANDAU - BAD DURCHEIM on the same day.

Pontoon and ferry activity continue along the Rhine between DRUSENHEIM and ISRUHE and reports of 16 March show that many of the bridges and crossings along river are protected by an increased number of barrage balloons.


Status of Communications

The Third Army's sudden drive to BAD MUNSTER has cut off the north-south line KAISERSLAUTERN to BINGEN and in addition threatens the route from KAISERSLAUTERN DAS. With the one RUDESHEIM rail bridge unserviceable, it is evident that the 's communications not in this area has received a telling blow. At the present it appears that the east-west line from MEUNKIRCHEN through KAISERSLAUTERN is only main line left to the enemy in the SAAR. However, previous bombings, is shout this area have so weakened the lines and taxed the repair facilities of demans that it is extremely difficult for the enemy to repair the lines properly offer to move trains along the lines still remaining in his hands in the Saar. of the Rhine, persistent cutting of lines leading from KARISRUHE continues to of the Rhine, persistent cutting of lines leading from KARLSRUHE continues to own the movement of trains along the Rhine Valley.


Inc - The Rhine Bridges Inc - Enemy Disposition

EUGENE L. HARRISON Brigadier General, G.S.C. A. C. of S., C-2.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED main p P. HHILL HEADQUARTERS 6th IIS ARMY GROUP Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 :CG, 6th Army Group :Initials: 17.2 APO 23, U. S. Army :Date: 24 March 1945: WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 27 24 MARCH 1945 FOR THE WEEK ENDING SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION 13 NOV 1945 a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation Army Group G has been reduced to merely an expression as a result of its plete and overwhelming defeat in the SAAR-PALATINATE. The process of destruction of Army Group G started with the annihilation of Nineteenth Army in the VOSGES Pocket. The forced assumption of supervision of Seventh Army early in March failed to infuse the Army Group with sufficient revitalizing strength to avoid its present fate. The beaten enemy has been almost completely evicted from west of the Rhine with losses estimated to have exceeded 75% of the combat effectives and approximately 50% of the total military personnel initially located in the area prior to the attack. His losses in tanks, guns, equipment and supplies were at a proportionate level. In addition, strategic territory has been yielded by the enemy. Army Group G under SS General HAUSSER can hardly hope to gain new recuperative powers or changes in obvious missions. The right flank of the Army Group borders Fifteenth Army's flank on the Lahn River, with its left flank extending to the vicinity of KARLSHUHE; Its primary mission of defending this long stretch of the Rhine River was already made dubious of accomplishment as a result of a successful Allied crossing north of GERNSHEIM (M 5430). Its main effort will now be to contain this new breach. Enemy forces available for this task are insuf - ficient in numbers and are presently in a greatly disorganized state. The arrival of divisional units will not be numerous or immediate as a strategic threat of large proportions exist in the REMAGEN bridgehead area and the crossings of the Lower Rhine in vicinity of WESEL will of necessity have priorities exceeding those in our area. Unit reinforcements will continue to be piecemeal and will be Seventh German Army during the previous period had its right flank pierced by a rapid US armoured thrust. During the present period a swift exploitation of the above success; plus the collapse of First Army's flank, resulted in the reduction of the army to a few remnants retreating over the Rhine into the arms of LIESHADEN. The army will be hard pressed to maintain the right flank of the Army Group even on the River line for only remnants of 6 SS Mountain and 198 Infantry Divisions known to have crossed the river between BINGEN and MAINZ. Additional bits and pieces no doubt escaped, but they are not large and cannot hope to be a soordinated force for some days. To say that the army has a mission would only serve to color its title. Its capabilities are restricted to either total destruction or further withdrawal into the province of RESSE. The First German Army has a new commander, Lt. Gen. FORRISCH.—He was commerly Chief of Staff of Army Group F in the BALKANS. The army successfully witherew into the SIECFRIED Line and maintained a firm left flank binged on the Rhine liver until the very end. However, the failure of its right flank to hold out saled not only the doom of Seventh Army but also allowed the SIECFRIED Line to be colled up from the rear. What remains of the army is merely a shell. The army annot hope to be revived by replacements from the interior of Germany. Its esuscitation can be only at the expense of divisions from other fromts. The Nineteenth and Twenty-fourth German Armies continue their defensive cles in BADEN and along the Swise border respectively. RESTRICTED

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b. Capabilities

The enemy is completely restricted to a single capability: to withdraw into the interior of Germany before our advancing forces.

He is faced with the task of containing simultaneously several bridgeheads. In our area, he must specifically prevent the Allies from outflanking the ODEN/ALD and seizing the FRANKFURT area in order to block the southern approaches to KASSEL. The disorganized state of his troops and the insufficiency of presently available reinforcements do not permit listing this as an enemy capability. Reinforcements of sufficient strength and quality for such a possibility could be drawn only from another front or from NOR/AY. In neither case could they arrive in time.

The bulk of the defeated remnants eventhed from the SAAR-PALATINATE may most probably be deployed between MAINZ and MANNHEIM in the hope of delaying the fall of DARMSTADT and protecting the road to KASSEL. Since the SIEGERIED Line extends to the vicinity of GEMMESHEIM and there is not so imminent a threat to the KARLSRUHE area, it would be logical to extend the responsibility of Nineteenth Army as far north as MANNHEIM. In such case, Nineteenth Army could use its partially prepared static forces to receive the remanents of First Army and join in the defense of the river lines to the east in the direction of the Allied advance.

In any case, the initiative is entirely in the hands of the Allies. The enemy can only try, and without hope of eventual success, to delay the final surrender.

2. 6th ARMY GROUP FRONT (Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th Army Group were as follows: along the Rhine River from KOBLENZ (L 8895) to LUDI/IGSHAVEN (R 5296) thence to SPEYER (R 5180), IGGELHEIM (R 4385), FRIESBACH (R 3976), LINGENFELD (R 4572), KUHARDT (R 4360), LEIMERSHEIM (R 4458), SCHAIDT (R 2551), NEUBURG (R 3743), thence elsewhere along the Rhine River to the Swiss Border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)

(Since the correct alignment of Corps and Divisions are unknown at the present time, for the sake of convenience these units are listed according to their last known subordination.)

Seventh and First German Armies have very likely taken over jurisdiction of areas east of the Rhine opposite their former sectors. Of the Corps, LXXXIX Corps is reported as north of MAINZ, while XC Corps still controls 905 Volksgrenadier, 257 Volksgrenadier and the RAESSLER Divisions in the area GEMMERSHEIM-KARISRUE, Unlocated Corps include: XIII, XIII SS, LXXXII, and LXXXV. The divisions listed below have suffered extremely heavy casualties and for all practical purposes must be be considered destroyed,

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. UTZ) was destroyed during the period in the SAUR-PAIATILITE, seven weeks after having suffered a similar fate in the VOSGES Pocket. Over 1,000 prisoners had been taken by 17 March. Then the division was last contacted at KASTEL (I 4407), its disorganized remmants were fighting a in alarm companies that did not total more then 300 combat infantry effectives.

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: KOLB) was used to cover withdrawals over the Moselle at the beginning of the period at ZELL (L-6158). Remnants were last contacted at L 8725 and L 7731 on 20 March. During the last days, the end came to the division. However, a new 38 Volksgrenadier Regiment is known to be reforming at ILDFLECKEN and may soon reappear east of the Rhine.

79 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Lt. Col. HOBE) was last contacted attempting to salvage at least 1,000 men by permitting small groups to infiltrate toward the Rhine from the area of KRIEBSFEID (M 1323). Much of 212 Grenadier Regiment had been caught on the run from L 7113 to L 7621 on 19 March, while 226 Grenadier Regiment may have gotten remnants across in the vicinity of SPEYER. Of its total of 2,000 on 15 March, not more than 300 combat infantry effectives remain.

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159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) was swept to the southwest by our armored drive. Elements were scattered between BAD ERBUZNACH and points on 20 March. Few remembers of its 1,500 (16 March) men could have escaped over the Rhine. Combat infantry effectives number approximately 500.

212 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) was thoroughly destroyed when fallen upon by Allied troops near SIENH.CHENE/CH (L 8122). Upon learning that escape routes to the Rhine could not be found, commanding General (Cen. SENSFUSS) shot himself. Remnants of the division amount to 200 combat infantry effectives.

246 Infantry Division (CG: KUEFNE) elements of this division were last identified in the vicinity of L 7731 near KIRNON 20 March. Not more than scattered remnants are believed to have survived.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) tried to forestall the inevitable by staging a counterattack in its sector east of TRIER at the beginning of the period. Results of the attack were disasterous as artillery preparation and heavy weapons support were totally inadequate. The division resorted to the drafting of Volkssturm to fill in gaps, but these too, were insufficient. Last contact with all major units was on 20 March in area L 7626 - L 8516. Not more then 300 combat infantry effectives are believed to have escaped across the Rhine.

416 Infantry Division (CC: Maj. Cen. PYLIEGER) drafted Volkesturm men to fill some of the ranks in its sadly depleted units. Ultimately this expedient proved to be of no avail. What remained of the division was bedly mauled in the Allied breakthrough to ST MENDEL. Stragglers were picked up in the NEUSTADT area on 23 March. No effectives combat infantry strength ds believed left among remnants which escaped across the Rinne.

on 17 March. PN's state that the unit yielded its last 150 men to 352 Infantry Division on 8 March. However, the last rammants were destroyed in a pocket west of NORMS on 21 March.

(1) Seventh German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FELBER)

The subsequent exploitation of the US breakthrough to BAD KREUZNACH during the previous period and the collapse of LXXXII Corps early in the week greated a void on the left flank of First German Army whereby the annihilation of this army was made certain. LXXXIX Corps had transferred to Seventh Army about 13/14 Marrh but it was eventually withdrawn to the east bank of the Rhine between KOBLENZ and MAINZ where it is presently located. XIII and LXXX Corps were located along the Moselle River prior to their forced withdrawal. Reinforcements plus cadres from the remnants of escaped divisions can contribute little to Seventh Army's strength.

2 Panzer Division (CG: LAUCHERT) began its attempt to stem the flood of Allied armor with a four hour fight at BAD KREUZNACH (M 0938) on 18 March, where elements of 3 Panzer Regiment and both Panzer Grenadier Regiments were at M 1636 and between M 3727 - M 4330 on 20 March. Divisional remmants crossed the Rhine between CRMS and MANNHEIM. Its combat infine antry effectives may number 400, while guns and tanks are believed destroyed and/or abandoned.

6.55 Mountain Division (CG: Maj. Gen. ERENNER). Our simultaneous drives caught both pieces of this divided division off guard. Along the northern Mosalls, 11 SS Mountain Regiment was pressed against the Rhine. However, it was able to cross and later play a small part in the defense of MAINZ. 12 SS Mountain Regiment and other elements moved in the SCHLEIDEN (L 2706) area were well-nigh destroyed in the rout. Total combat infantry effectives are approximated at 400.

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

On 6 March Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER was replaced as Commanding General of First German Army by Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH, formerly Chief of Staff of Army Group F. The army under its as commander fared little better than Seventh German during the period and for all practical purposes can be considered destroyed. The maintaining of a firm left flank in the SIEGFRIED Commander of the start of th

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Of the chirteen divisions in First Army at the beginning of the period three nivisions (258 VO, 416 Int, and 2 Mth Divs) are considered destroyed. The remaining tens divisions (719 Inf; 347 Inf; 19.Inf, 17 SS PG, 16 VG, 36 VG, 257 VG, 905 VG, 47 VG, and RAESSLER Divs) all suffered extremely heavy casualties in men and equip-

(a) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gent PETERSEN)

Upon the departure of LXXXIX Corps, XC Corps assumed control of 56 Volksgrenadier, 257 Volksgrenadier, 905 Volksgrenadier, and RAESSLER Divisions with the task of holding the SIEGFRIED Line and denying us the approaches down the Rhine Valley. It was successfully performing its mission up to the time its rear became threatened. Whereupon, it was forced to withdraw over the Rhine River in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE at the close of the period.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. UELIM) withdrew the bulk of its units into the defenses of SIEGFRIED Line northwest of WISSEMBOURG, by 22 March under the covering actions of 165 Volksgrenadier Regiment supported by some Volkssturm troops. From these positions, the division fought with much determination. Orders were subsequently issed to the troops to make their way over the Rhine individually and by any available means. Combat infantry effectives of organic units is 800.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SKIDEL) is one of the stronger units left to the enemy. It exchanged sectors with 905 Division, and assumed responsibility for the vital left flank of the First Army, anchored on the Rhine. This flank had to be held at all costs to keep open an escape gap for what remained of Army Group G. This mission was accomplished as the division managed to hold its SIECFRIED Line positions, until the end. The losses in manpower, however, were considerable as close contact was maintained throughout the period. Present combat infantry strength is estimated at not more than 1,000.

Division RAESSLER (CG: Brig. Gen. RAESSLER) was discovered to have been lurking behind our front for some time and to have been responsible for the manning of SIEGFRIED defenses in the Rhine Valley, north and north-east of WISSEMBOURG. As our attacks forced the withdrawal of 905 and 257 Division to the SIEGFRIED Line, elements of Division RAESSLER became interpressed among the two. The following divisional organization is given in a captured document dated 1 March: BG HIEMMALD controlling: Fortress AT Bn 502, Fortress AA Bn 802, Volkssturm Ens 40/1 and 40/5, 5 and 6 Cos Fortress AT Regt XVIII, 3 Co Fortress Cadre Bn 112. BG OTTERBACH controlling: 52 GAF Bn, Volkssturm Bn 40/47, 4 Co Fortress Cadre Bn 112. BG LESBERG controlling Landesschutzen | Bn 1015, Volkssturm Bn 40/7, Fortress MG Bn 58, 2 and 3 Cos Fortress AT Regt XVIII, 2 Co Fortress Cadre En 112. Staff Fortress Arty Regt 1245 controlling: 1304, 1503, 1507 Fortress Arty Bns. Of these the following were identified during the week: 112 Fortress Cadre Battalion, elements XVIII Anti-Fanks Heglingt, 52 German Air Force Battalion, 58 Fortress Machine Cun Battalion, 40/3, 40/7, 40/47 Volkssturm Battalions. Present combat infantry effectives among these units total approximately 1,000.

905 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) switched positions with 257 Volksgrenadier Division to take over a sector north-east of WISSEMBOURG. Several prisoners claimed that the division has been upgraded to Volksgrenadier status. This is supported by the identification of a 905 Fusilier Company. The composition of the division is as follows: Regiment MARRACH (Bas SCHMIDT and TREDVILER), Regiment GIESECKE (Bas SARNOV and WEXTAND), Artillery Unit SCHILLER, 905 Fusilier Company, and an Engineer Battalion. Regiment MARRACH was last identified at R 1652 on 21 March, Regiment GIESECKE on 20 March, 905 Fusilier Company at R 1553 on 22 March, Deducting losses sustained during a week of costly fighting, the division is now estimated at 800 combat infantry effectives.

- (b) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHN)
- (c) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNIESS)
 - (&) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Major Gen. MAX SIMON)

719 Infantry Division (CC: Brig. Gen. CAEDE) pulled out of its SIEGFRIED positions after the deep Allied penetrations north and south of its sector (SAARLAUTERN MERCIG) had had them untenable. Some elements were trapped by the Allied junction in the HOMBURG area, but straggler identifications were made in the

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SERSIAUTERN area on 22 March. Combat infantry strength of divisional units that

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIBRENEERG) lost heavily in our initial assaults. When the precariousness of the situation became apparent, the division withdrew by echelons. By 19 March all regiments had been pulled out of line, leaving only miscellaneous fortress units to delay the friendly advance. Mevertheless, elements of the division were caught in the pocket north of SARRICKEN and not more than 500 combat infantry effectives escaped capture or

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZEIMAYR) resisted strongly during the early days of the offensive. It was ably assisted by numerous miscellaneous units including local Volkssturm Battalions. 59 Volksgrenadier Regiment is now known to have been dissolved, and the remainder of the division suffered heavily in men and material during its withdrawal. GHQ units were sacrificed in order to aid in the departure of the divisional remains over the Rhine. However, elements were pocketed in the area of ST INGRERT (Q 5476) and gathered up. Escaped combat infantry effectives total 500.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CG: SS, Col, KLINGENBERG) was still in contact on 20 March but had incurred heavy casualties up to that date. Its route of withdrawal was from a position northwest of BITCHE to north of PIRAGENS. After having lost 1,300 prisoners on 20 March, the SS officers appropriated units in the vicinity in order to bolster the ranks. For example 6 SS Mountain Replacement Battalion from 6 SS Mountain Division was forced into service on the line after it had been en route to its parent unit and the remments of I/935 VCR and I/937 VCR of 16 Volksgrenadier Division were formed into Battle Group GUGERBERGER. This novel exhibition of initiative was very temporary in its effect. At present, only remmants of 37 and 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiments exist. Divisional combat infantry effectives are estimated at 600.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MORCKEL) fought with determination from SIECFRIED positions south of PIRMASENS. Heavy casualties were sustained during a week of costly fighting. The division started its withdrawal to the Rhine on or about 20 March, when Allied advances south of KAISERSLAUTERN threatened its axis of retreat. Present combat infantry strength is juaged at 700.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was split up at the beginning of the period and was employed in the familiar stop—gap fashion. 104 Regimental Staff, controlling I Battalion 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment and II Battalion 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment, shifted westward. The former was committed at SAARBRUCKEN and the latter north of ST VENDEL. 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment was don't toward the BAD KREUZNACH salient, whese it was identified at M 2830 on 20 March. It probably crossed the Rhine between MAINZ and WORMS. II Battalion 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment was last contacted in its old area at 2 9527 on 15 March, I Battalion 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment at 2 9532 on 18 March. If the divisional staff ever manages to reassemble these far-flung elements, they will not total more than 800 combat infantry effectives.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen von der MUERIEN)
suffered disastrously after having been caught in the pincers of our armored drive,
complete chaos resulted when contact was lost between the troops and their commander
on 18 March, 1126 Grenadier Regiment had elements at L 6346 and also Q 3690 which
illustrates the manner in which its forces had become separated. On the same day,
1127 Grenadier Regiment had troops at M 0734 and the next day at L 6406. While both
regiments were identified in the M 3021 ared on 21 March, the division's final
muling in the area west of the Rhine occurred later in the period in the vicinity
of WORMS. It is estimated that some 400 combat infantry effectives reached the cur-

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col, BARTEL) had been reformed from elements of 716 Infantry Division, at KARLSRUME from where two of its regiments were sont on 16 March to stem our amored drive. One regiment (326 GR) was committed in the area south-east of SIMMERN (L 8556) on 16 March and its subsequent withdramal route took it south-east across the Nahe River and then north to BINGEN, where it crossed the Rhine. 300 Grenadier Regiment was first contacted east of BAD GREIZMACH (M 0938) and withdraw toward MAINZ, as did 305 Granadier Regiment. After having lost 600 men in two days prior to 18 March, the division is estimated to have easier 1600 campa infantry eff

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(e) Yolkseturm. Ten Volkseturm battalions were contacted during this d which had been recruited from GAU WESTMARK. In addition, documentary evidence d that a policy had been adopted to utilize 25% of the younger men as reinforcefor divisional units. The average strength of these battalions is 400.

Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

It. Gen. RASP was taken ill early in March and was replaced by Lt. Gen. INSTRIBER, the former commander of First German Army. It is very likely that insteadth Army has extended its sphere of responsibility as far north as MANNHEIM. Massench as the SIEGFRIED Line defenses extend to the area of GENEREREM and the creas around the cities of SPEYER and MANNHEIM are known to be fortress areas, wich an extension would create no change in the purely static defensive mission of Uniteenth Army.

- (a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM). Mission and location unchanged.
- (b) XVIII SS Corps (CC: SS Lt. Gen. KEPPLER). It has been discovered by a captured document that SS Lt. Gen. KEPPLER former commander of XIII SS Corps replaced SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH as Commanding General of XVIII SS Corps during February. The former commander of the corps is believed to have gone to the Eastern Front with HUMMLER.

Mission and location unchanged.

(d) DEFENSE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG: SS Lt. Gen. MAUR)

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) remains in positions along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596).

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von OPPEN)

1005 Brigade Staff (CO:

No Change.

(e) Twenty-Fourth (CG: SS Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

No Change reported.

(f) 600 Infantry Division (Russian) Failure to receive any additional information concerning the existence of this division, beyond the single documentary report received early in February, is sufficient grounds for dropping the unit.

(g) ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6th ARMY GROUP
(Army Group C and Nineteenth Army Fronts)

Divisional Units on Army Group G Front: Combat Infantry Effectives; Army Group "G" Front Nineteenth Army Front

10,000 4,000

TOTAL

14,000

Reserves: (Estimated) Army Group "G" Front Nineteenth Army Front

1,000

TOTAL

15,000

Tanks and SP Guns: Army Group "G" Front Nineteenth Army Front

80-100 10- 10 90-100

TOTAL

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED The advent of more favorable weather conditions has permitted the enemy of cerry out extensive for our outpost line. Despite the persistence of rumors concerning imminent withdrawals from the front, the enemy's status que concinues to be upheld. There has been no perceptible change in enemy dispositions on this front, fwenty-five prisoners were captured north-east of BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080) on SI March, of this number half proved to be Cormans, the remainder were italians. Since an even distribution among combat troops indicated more widesproad use of the Corman nationals in the manufacture scoops indicated more widesproad use of the common strict in the MONTE SOCA Division's MONREGAND Battalion, north-west of MONT CENIS location of the MONTE SOCA Division's MONREGAND Battalion, north-west of MONT CENIS was made by FW interrogation. s. Enemy Dispositions At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT RESERVITE (Z 4091), BESSANS (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5860), MILARGER (K 5582), BESSANS (H 5860), MILARGER (K 5582), GRIMALDI (S 8086), HARCHONETTE (H 4641), ISOLA (M 4635), ST MARTIN (M 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8086). 3. 6th APAN CROUP FROMT (Alpine Front) RESTRICTED **新年 新城**丁

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OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

The sector along the Rhine River as far north as DRUSK-HERM (R 1517) continued be quiet. Enemy nuisance raids which averaged one per day were continued to the RASBOURG area. On 18 March, a friendly patrol to the east bank of the river south of MARKT DAM (A 8890) had a very weak enemy reaction. Other than the 18 rounds of reilway artillery which fell on COIMAR on 17 March, artillery and mortar fire was extremely light.

SAAR-PALATINATE FRONT

At the beginning of the period, the German First Army was being forced by our attack to conduct a general withdrawal to the SIEGFRIED Line, in the Rhine Valley and the HARDT Mountains areas. The enemy executed this move so rapidly that contact was lost for a time before being regained on 18 March at LAUTERBOURG (R 3241). West of the HARDT, the enemy was stubbornly resisting from prepared positions which he had earlier occupied. The Allied thrusts toward ST 'ENDEL (Q 5997) from the east and BAD KREUZNACH (M 1038) from the north forced the transfer northwards of 47 Volksgrenadier Division from the eastern HARDT area.

By 19 March it became obvious that the SIEGFRIED Line positions in the SAAR Valley were being hopelessly outflanked. Then began the withdrawal of 719 and 347 Infantry Divisions which accounted for the lack of opposition to our crossing of the Infantry Divisions which accounted for the lack of opposition to our crossing of the Saar River, west of SAARERUCKEN. Meanwhile, elements of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division were shifted to the NEUNKIRCHEN (Q 6083) area where a counterattack was staged in order to temporarily maintain a route of escape. SAARERUCKEN (Q 4671) and HOMBURG (Q 7181) were cleared against negligible opposition and ST INCHERT (Q 5576) was found unoccupied on 20 March. The momentum of the coordinated offensive in the SAAR-PALATINATE had, by this time, reached its full swing. Allied Forces from the north took LANDSTUHL (Q 8890) and KAISERSLAUTERN (Q 0394) and the German First and Seventh Armies were in full and definite retreat. Extrication of the remaining enemy forces was attempted by a turning movement hinged on PIRMASENS (Q 9167) and a withdrawal to a line along the weetern HARDT. In the Rhine Valley, 257 and 905 Volksgrenadier Divisions exchanged sectors but continued to offer stubborn opposition. Artillery fire also increased in this area in a determined effort to hold SIEGFRIED positions in the also increased in this area in a determined effort to hold SIEGFRIED positions in the Rhine Valley. Although 16:Volksgrenadier Division fell back in the face of over powering opposition, 36 Volksgrenadier and RAESSLER Divisions held strongly and succeeded in regaining some lost ground in the vicinity of LUD IGS INKEL (Q 9553).

Aided by the SIEGFRIED Line, the defenders of the BIEN ALD held firm on 21 March, launching unsuccessful counterattacks in the STEINFELD (R 2250) area. In the north, however, the advancing Allied Forces had cleared the Rhine as far south as ONEYER, the advancing Allied Forces had cleared the Rhine as far south as UNLIGSHAFEN, had taken the vital communications center of NEUSTADT, and had cut off emaining units in the HARDT by severing the main line of retreat at ANN EILER 2 1667). On 22 March 36 Volksgrenadier Division began a withdrawal and the forces maining could not prevent our breaching the line in the region of DORRENBACH 1654). The breakthrough that followed removed all doubt as to the fate of the maints still left in the HARDT. On 22 March, LANDAU was taken and the MAXIMILIANNAU idge (R 4148) was reported unserviceable. Friendly troops found the SPRYER Bridge (R 4148) was found destroyed the next day. The pivot in the MAXIMILIA Bridge (R 4769) which was found destroyed the next day. The pivot in the MAXIMILD Forest was held by 257, 905 and RARSSIER Divisions until the very end of the riod when resistance west of the Rhine had practically collapsed. The front line runs along the Rhine River except for scattered groups in the GEMERSHKM area.

ATLANTIC FRONT

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Activity in the Atlantic pockets was confined to the usual exchange of artillery e and normal patrolling. Some truck movement was reported in the northern portion the LA RECHELLE pocket on 20 March and in the AIGREFEVILLE (T 4729) region on 22 oh. ST VIVIEN (Y 3653) was the center of interest in the GRAVE pocket where my working parties were observed throughout the period.

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Heavy petrols and raiding parties were particularly active during the period in the first sector. On successive days CH-LET DE L'HORTIERE (K 4650), ERIANCON activation and the passes at PETIT ST BERNARD (Z 97) and PETIT MOUNTERIS were the theory and the passes at PETIT ST BERNARD (Z 97) and PETIT MOUNTERIS were the theory and the passes of the section of the secti

5. COMMINICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Clear weather prevailed throughout the period on all days except 21 March, thus making possible excellent coverage of enemy movements throughout the 6th Army throughout area. All out withdrawals along the roads within the SAAR-PAIATINATE marked and entremely heavy activity seen in this area throughout the week. The little fail movement that was seen west of the Rhine likewise showed an easterly trend. Coverage revealed heavy barge and pontoon activity along the Rhine and showed heavy rail traffic on lines radiating from KARLSRUHE on 18 and 19 March. Later in the week, very little rail movement was seen in the eastern Rhine Valley. However, traffic continued on the north-south rail lines in the HEILERONN area throughout the period. Extensive rail activity was also noted in the Black Forest region during the week with two-may traffic being especially noticeable on the ROTTIELL-STUTTOART and OFFERENCE.


Hundreds of motor transports, horse drawn wagons, motorcycles and vehicles of all types clogged main and secondary roads in the SAAR-PARATINATE as the enemy frantically tried to salvage troops and equipment from the rapidly disintegrating pocket formed by Third and Seventh Army troops. Uith only one or two rail lines open, very limited rail scitivity was possible and most of the traffic was, of necessity, forced onto the roads. In the KAISERSLAUTERN-BAD DURKHEIM-MEUSTADT area sparorimately 1500 vehicles of all kinds were seen on 20 March and 500-200 others were sighted on 21 March throughout the PIRMASENS-BERGABERI-LANDAU region. Large consentrations of demolished vehicles littered east-west roads from FRANKINSTKIN to BAD DURKHEIM and from ANNIKILER to LANDAU on both of these days as Allied aircraft continued to pound fleeing convoys on their way toward the Rhine. Permanent rail and road bridges, pontoon bridges, farries and barges, all were in readiness to insure the passage of withdrawing troops over the Rhine. As Allied troops kept advancing, however, one by one the large permanent type bridges were blown until at the close of the period none were left standing.


Main lines of retreat for enemy forces trapped within the pocket west of the Rhine followed roads running east from KAISENSLAUTERN to NEDSTADT over the bridge at SPIKE and roads from PHEMASENS to LANDAU and across the river at CHEMINSHEIM. However, temporary crossings all along the river from VORMS to KARLSKUHE were active in transporting troops.

Good coverage of 18/19 March revealed extensive rail and road traffic throughout the KARLERUHE-STUTTMENT-EMERICAL DARMST DT area with indications that two scratch formations were being gathered to hold the eastern banks of the Rhine two MANNHKIM to KARLERUHE against U. S. crossings. At the close of the current priod, however, movement along lines running from KARLERUHE to the north appeared have diminished greatly, and it became evident that the Germans were relying upon stermate lines further east to move their troops and supplies. The EMERBACH - TOTTCART line was very active with 2-way traffic on 19 and 23 March and heavy barge tetivity was seen on the Neckar River from HELLERONN to HEIDELBERG on all days except 19 and 20 March.


Indications are that lines throughout the Black Forest were also used for rerouting traffic to and from the Rhine Valley. The ROTTWELL-STUTTGART line showed
irked activity on every day of the period and although 2-way traffic was sighted, it
seems logical to conclude that this line together with the OFFENEURG-DONARDSCHINGEN
route, which was also consistently notive throughout the week, is being used to
service enemy forces in the threatened Rhine Valley area particularly in the vicinity
of KARLSKHER.

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





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SECTION I, NARRATIVE

CHAPTER X

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505. During the last days of April General Milburn's maneuver was pinching out General Haislip's XV Corps which had been the pivot of the Army maneuver. General Haislip instead of facing South, was facing the gap at SALZBURG from Northeast of General Milburn's left and astride MUNICH with his front lines. 6th Army Group East boundary at that time was just to the West of CHIEM Lake. SALZBURG was in the zone of action of the Third Army, which was still North and Northeast of General Haislip's left. It became quite apparent that the boundaries between Army Groups should be hanged and that General Haislip should head for SALZBURG along with the left of General Milburn's Corps. They were mich closer of the Third Army and the SALZBURG Pass had to be sealed of quickly towerth Army concurred.

506. On 1 May, General Devers directed action necessary to throw Seventh Army's left against SALZBURG. That whole transaction was handled by telephone between 6th Army Group, 12th Army Group and SHAEF and cleared up in one day. (225) Within 24 hours all the arrangements that were necessary to change the maneuvers of the two Army Groups had been completed and all of the action to implement them had been taken, even down to most of the divisions. That was made possible only by talking over the secret telephone with scrambling device in double-talk and by handling many of the details by cub planes. Just to reach a decision required a meeting of the minds of five commanders and some of their principal staff officers. The volume and speed of communication required is evident from General Jenkins' three-page memorandum to the Chief of Staff, dated 2 May, with subject, "Staff Action Taken to Secure Change dated 2 May, with subject, "Staff Action Taken to Secure in Boundary Between the 12th and 6th Army Groups". (225) Perusal of this memorandum and consideration of the vital necessity of getting the operation under way immediately show beyond question that the time that would have been lost in writing out and encoding and decoding the scores of messages required would have been fatal to the success of the operation. This is not an argument against general use of code for highly classified messages. It is simply an exceptional case emphasizing the value of voice scrambling installations to save time without sacrifice of adequate security.

507. From the point of view of 6th Army Group, the decision which gave the SALZBURG area to Seventh Army is probably the decision that brought about the collapse of forces in South Germany. General Milburn and General Haislip were able to move into the former zone of Third Army by an open flank and get to SALZBURG in nothing flat. Without this decision, the Germans

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
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
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in front of Third Army's right flank would have poured into the ALPS area through the SALZBURG Pass and it would have been very difficult to get them out.

508. On 1 May there was received the following Order of the Day issued by the Supreme Commander:

"To every member of the AEF:

"The whole Allied Expeditionary Force congratulates the Seventh Army on the seizure of MUNICH, the cradle of the Nazi beast. (Signed: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER)"

509. On the evening of 1 May General Devers gave a dinner for six U. S. Senators and six members of the House of Representatives on tour of inspection of the newly liberated German concentration camps. Next morning the group was flown to the concentration camp at DACHAU. A brief description of this camp is included near the end of this chapter.

510. On 2 May Staff Memo Number 25 was issued as follows:

I -- "OFF LIWITS" AREAS

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All cafes, bars, taverns, soda fountains, restaurants, hotels, private homes, theaters, dance halls, barber shops, not requisitioned and used by the Allied Armies are placed "Off Limits" to all Military personnel.

II - ESTABLISHMENT OF WAR CRIMES BRANCHES

The establishment, pursuant to letter, Headquarters ETOUSA, 000.5 OpJA, dated 24 February 1945, subject, "Establishment of War Crimes Branches", of a War Crimes Branch in the Judge Advocate Section, this Headquarters, is hereby announced.

511. On 2 May Administrative Instructions Number 14 were issued revising the procedure for supply and evacuation by air. (226)

512. On 3 May the 3rd Infantry Division made a spectacular advance of 38 miles reaching the Austrian frontier 4 miles West of SALZBURG. (DR 4 May)


513. Also on 3 May Administrative Instructions Number 15 were issued calling for weekly report of undrawn ammunition credits.

514. The following events pertain to the date of 4 May.


a. The following promotion policy was announced as shown below:

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l. The following is quoted from letter, Headouarters ETOUSA, file AG 210.2 MPO-GA, dated 22 April 1945, subject: "Promotion of Officers".

"It is the policy of the Theater Commander that relative parity shall exist between lower echelons and higher headquarters as regards time spent in grade by officers prior to promotion to the next higher grade."

2. This headquarters will soon publish the limiting time in grade for this headquarters which will be that of combat officers of Seventh Army. All section chiefs will withhold all recommendations for promotions pending publication of this policy. (227)

b. A Medical Section was established as a Special Staff Section of the headquarters under Colonel Oscar S. Reeder, as Surgeon. Previously medical members of the staff had been operating as a sub-section of the G-4 Section. (228)

c. A letter was sent to the Army Commanders dealing with the use of military and civilian supplies and facilities in Germany. (229)

d. A bulletin was also issued dealing with credit for battle participation. (230)

e. About this date there was received a copy of a letter from General Sir Mosley Mayne, writing from India Office, Whitehall in appreciation of the kindness and hospitality shown Indian ex-prisoners liberated by American troops, as well as care of the sick. This was appropriately transmitted to the troops concerned. (231)

515. On the afternoon of 3 May General Devers was informed by SHAEF that Field Marshal Kesselring had asked General Wolff, who was in command of the surrendering German SS Troops in North ITALY, to find out with whom he should deal regarding a surrender of the German forces in the AUSTRIA area. General Devers directed General Barr to send a cable to AFHQ asking them to have Kesselring informed that he should deal with General Devers, Commanding General, 6th Army Group. In the cable Kesselring was told how his representatives should approach the Allied lines and where they should come through the Allied lines. General Devers, in the meantime, directed General Barr and General Jenkins to draw up terms of surrender. They were assisted by Colonel Torrielli of the G-2 Section. The terms were drafted on the night of 3-4 May and received minor amendments as a result of General Staff consideration the next morning.

516. General Devers, in the meantime, took a copy of the terms and went forward to the vicinity of the XV Corps Command Post. That afternoon, about 1500 hours, General Devers directed


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General Jenkins to proceed at once to Headquarters VI Corps and give a copy of the terms of surrender to General Brooks and tell him that it would be the general form of the terms of surrender that he should use in negotiations which he was then carrying on with representatives of the German Nineteenth Army. The weather was too bad for flying so General Jenkins had to The weather was too bad for flying so General Jenkins had to drive. He left at 4 o'clock and arrived at 0150 in the morning of 5 May. He found VI Corps G-2, G-3 and two French officers oin consultation over the terms which should be presented. General Jenkins left right after breakfast for HARR, BAVARIA, just East of MUNICH, Command Post of XV Corps, to meet General Devers, for General Barr had called and directed him to proceed with the original copy of the terms of surrender which were to be presented to Kesselring. After arriving at HARR it was found that instead of Kesselring surrendering it was the Commanding General, Army Group "G".

517. The following description of the surrender was prepared by the Public Relations Section from accounts furnished by General Jenkins and Lieutenant Colonel Lodge.

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
With General Devers at XV Corps Headquarters at HARR were Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch, commander of Seventh Army; Lieutenant General Wade Haislip, then Corps Commander XV Corps; Major General John O'Daniel, 3rd Division commander; Brigadier General Edward S. Ott, Artillery Officer, XV Corps; Brigadier General Menoher, Chief of Staff, XV Corps; Brigadier General Reuben E. Jenkins, G-3, 6th Army Group, and Lieutenant Colonel Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., head of 6th Army Group Liaison Section.

Shortly after noon, word finally came that the German delegation had arrived at the meeting place at the edge of town. General Devers directed his party to proceed at once by automobile to meet the delegation.

Scene of the historic meeting was the museum-like structure, used as a studio-factory for huge statues intended as decorations for Nazi stadia. With its tremendous ceilings and highly-polished black marble floors, it provided a strange setting for what was to be the end of resistance to General Devers' armies.

As General Devers and his party approached, the German delegation outside the building came to attention. No salutes were exchanged. Photographers and motion picture cameramen requested General Devers to assemble his party for pictures. After the pictures were made, led by General Devers, the group solemnly entered rich metal doors as four German guards stiffly saluted, and turned into the surrender room, to the right. A massive, natural wood table, three inches thick, monopolized the center of the room. Appropriate huge chairs were at either end and on the sides. General Devers sat at one end, facing the

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door, with the other generals standing in order of rank on his right.

General Devers seated the American officers and immediately handed a copy of the terms of surrender to General Menoher and directed him to deliver it to the Chief of the German delegation. General Foertsch requested and was granted thirty minutes time in which to study the document.

It was a grim group that quietly awaited the return of the German delegation. Stenographers and interpreters were seated at tables in the corners, as were photographers. General Devers, wearing the short olive drab jacket with no decorations, talked quietly with the other generals.

When the half-hour was up, General Foertsch, slightly stooped, appeared in the doorway. He bowed stiffly. The American delegation sat and looked at him. There was no exchange of greeting. The German was directed to sit at the end of the table opposite General Devers. The interpreter, an American Lieutenant, seated himself on General Foertsch's left, between him and General Menoher.


General Menoher then requested that Foertsch's staff of eight officers be admitted to the room. The six senior officers were directed to sit at the table, on their commander's right, and the other two sat on chairs against the wall. General Menoher then introduced General Devers' party in the order of their seating. The Americans remained seated during the introduction. The Germans were then introduced by General Foertsch, who rose. Each German officer rose and bowed to General Devers when introduced.

Looking steadily at Foertsch, General Devers asked him if he had read and understood the terms of surrender, pointing out that certain parts of the terms, such as the exact area involved and the effective date and hour remained to be filled in. Foertsch replied in the affirmative, adding that there were several observations he wished to make which he felt would be of mutual benefit both to the Allies and to Army Group "G".


Then, speaking distinctly, Foertsch took up the paragraphs of the surrender document, one by one. Often beginning his statements with the phrase, "I deem it my duty to point out..." he made several suggestions involving minor changes. He declared, for example, that the German troops were so scattered and his communications so disrupted that it would take more than the suggested number of hours to get the surrender news to them. Regarding the ammunition and weapons dumps to be established, he asked if they could be guarded by armed German soldiers, pointing

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out that "disorderly elements" might steal weapons and disrupt law and order. He said he hoped that all officers and military police might keep their sidearms to keep order. He stressed the number of refugees and the lack of food in his area.

General Devers answered each of these suggestions, giving his views. Boundaries were settled, the time schedule established.

There was a pause. Looking coldly at Foertsch, General Devers said, grimly, "There must be no misunderstanding on this point. This is no armistice - this is unconditional surrender. Do you understand that?"

Foertsch stiffened. His facial muscles worked and he flushed. After nearly a minute, he controlled himself and said, "I can assure you, Sir, that no power is left at my disposal to prevent it."

It was approximately 1430B hours when General Devers, General Patch and General Haislip symbolically signed the agreed terms of surrender, after which General Foertsch symbolically affixed his signature.

The meeting ended. General Foertsch and four members of his staff were driven, preceded and followed by American military police, to XV Corps Command Post, where they ate lunch in a private room. After a brief informal discussion, General Devers and his party drove to the XV Corps Command Post, leaving General Jenkins and Lieutenant Colonel Lodge behind to correct the terms of surrender so they included the minor changes agreed upon.

Shortly after 1500 hours, General Jenkins and Lieutenant Colonel Lodge were driven with the rewritten terms to XV Corps command post, where they presented them to General Devers for review and signature. General Devers, then General Patch and General Haislip signed the original and one copy of the instrument. General Jenkins was then directed to present the original document to Foertsch who was in the command post and to give the German representative the duplicate copy after obtaining his signature to the original. Then General Jenkins, accompanied by General Menoher, presented the instruments to Foertsch, who was in General Haislip's office. Foertsch took the original document and read it, assisted by one of his staff officers whenever he found the English difficult. Foertsch remarked in an aside that his suggestions had been incorporated. He affixed his signature and rose, handing the original to General Jenkins, who gave him the duplicate copy, bearing the signatures of Generals Devers, Patch and Haislip.

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The German staff, which had been standing during this brief last act to the surrender meeting, stiffened to attention, watched Foertsch bow to the two American generals, then followed him from the room.

One phase of the surrender agreement that all American, French and German forces involved would cease forward action immediately and remain in place pending further orders. Foortsch requested that one of his officers be furnished a liaison plane to fly direct to headquarters. Weather, however, prevented flying over the Alps that afternoon. Instead, the German officer was dispatched to SALZBURG in a plane, and there he was joined by an American officer with a radio set and two jeeps, furnished by General O'Daniel. The American officer accompanied the German to Army Group "G" Headquarters deep in the Alps, and established communications between the Germans and their conquerors.

The war was over for hundreds of thousands of soldiers. It ended soon thereafter for all the soldiers in Europe.

Surrender terms follow:

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- l. It is agreed that the territory covered by this instrument includes the areas bounded on the East generally by the line: KIRCHBERG (inclusive) RIED (inclusive) FRANKENMARKT (inclusive) FREUDENTHAL (inclusive) SOUTH CORNER ZELLER SEE RADSTADT (inclusive) OBERDRAUBERG (exclusive) PLOCKEN PASS (exclusive), on the South by the Italian and Swiss frontiers, on the West by the River RHINE, and on the North by the present Allied front line, which are under the jurisdiction of General Schulz. All German military and para-military forces in this area are under command of General Schulz. All these forces, including General Schulz, are bound by this instrument and shall be subject to such other specifications as may be applied hereafter by the authorities of the UNITED NATIONS.
- 2. All forces, including all para-military forces, under command of General Schulz, shall cease unconditionally all acts of hostilities towards forces of the UNITED NATIONS not later than 1200B hours, 6 May 1945.
- . 3. All such forces under command of General Schulz, except as indicated in Annex A, shall disarm themselves immediately and remain in their present areas retaining all mess and transportation equipment, food and forage necessary for self maintenance and subsistence until directed otherwise by authorities of the Armed Forces of the UNITED NATIONS.

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4. Concentration of all equipment and personnel as prescribed in Annex A will be effected not later than 1200B hours, 8 May 1945, after which time offensive ground and air action will be taken by the Allied Forces against all unauthorized movement of forces affected by this instrument. Other instructions indicated in Annex A will be carried out promptly.

5. This instrument is independent of, without prejudice to, and will be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of the UNITED NATIONS and applicable to Germany and the German Armed Forces as a whole.

6. The official language of this instrument shall be the English text.

Signed and agreed at HARR, BAVARIA, this 5 day of May 1945.

ANNEX "A"

l. Pending further orders all officers and not to exceed one hundred other ranks per division may retain their rifle, machine pistol, pistol, or other sidearm for internal security purposes. All such armed personnel will wear a 3-inch white arm band above the left elbow for easy identification. All other arms, weapons and ammunition of whatever nature will be placed in dumps of appropriate size in convenient locations in areas occupied by companies, troops, batteries, and other detachments of a comparable or smaller size. Appropriate guards will be posted on all such dumps to insure their security pending further disposition as directed by authorities of the Armed Forces of the UNITED NATIONS. All military equipment such as telephone, telegraph and radio equipment, motor vehicles, horse-drawn vehicles and other means of transport (both ground and air), and other movable military impediments not needed for execution of these specifications will be similarly assembled and guarded in convenient locations pending their further disposition. All such dumps will be kept clear of lines of communication and axes of advance required by the Allied Forces.

- 2. All weapons and equipment will be deposited in dumps with breech blocks, bolts, sights and/or other operating mechanisms intact.
- 3. Having disposed of all weapons, ammunition and combat equipment of whatever nature, all forces under command of General Schulz will stand fast in their respective areas until given further direction by authorities of the Armed Forces of the UNITED NATIONS, and will keep clear of all highways, railroads, trails and other routes of advance which may be required by Allied Forces.

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
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4. By hour and date indicated in paragraph 2 this instrument, General Schulz shall furnish the Commanding General, 6th Army Group, an order of battle of all major units, including Allied Prisoner of War Camps, concentration camps and similar installations under his command, and as soon as possible shall furnish the Commanding General, 6th Army Group, with a complete troops list showing by unit designation, type, strength and location, all elements of his command affected by this instrument.

5. All minefields within areas controlled by General Schulz shall be plainly marked immediately by signs and shall be outlined with white tape or other suitable means which are readily identifiable. All mines, booby traps and other types of demolition charges shall be removed from all highways and railroad bridges, tunnels, overpasses and underpasses on all lines of communication and from all buildings and means of transport, highway, rail and air, within the areas controlled by General Schulz, and all such mines, booby traps and other means of demolitions so removed shall be rendered harmless; those mines, booby traps and other means of demolitions which cannot be removed and rendered harmless immediately shall be plainly marked and placed under guards.

518. General Brooks completed negotiations with representatives of the German Nineteenth Army at INNSBRUCK on the 5th and accomplished the surrender of the Nineteenth Army, but it appears that the instrument of surrender of the Nineteenth Army was signed after General Foertsch had already surrendered the entire Army Group "G" to General Devers. So, although General Brooks' instrument was binding on the Nineteenth Army, it was actually superseded by the instrument executed by General Devers. The Nineteenth Army had been cut up badly and apparently did not know the condition of the First Army. It seems probably they had hoped that the First Army would be able to get through. General Foertsch stated that communications were practically nil in their entire area and that nobody knew where their troops were. Unquestionably, General Brandenberg of the German Nineteenth Army did not know that General Foertsch, Commanding the First German Army, was surrendering his (General Brandenberg's) command at the direction of General Schulz, who was in command of Army Group "G". At the meeting with General Foertsch, General Foertsch did not indicate that General Brandenberg had any idea of surrendering his Army to the VI Corps. This seems clearly indicative of the complete breakdown of communications between Armies and Army Group "G".

519. The daily "Redline" dispatch for 5 May is paraphrased as follows:

Only limited progress was made by the I French Corps yesterday as the infantry troops relieved the armored

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
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
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units. The town of RANKWEIL (C4554) south of GOTZIS (C=4460) was captured. Further east in a 6 mile advance infantry crossed the Austrian border to reach C 8361.

In the VI Corps elements of the 44th Div captured IMST (D4753) and MILS (V4851) further south. Elements of the 103d Div contacted elements of the 88th south of the BRENNER Pass at VIPITENO (W0515). Other elements of the same Div contacted the 142 Inf (36th Div) at WORG (E2685) while advancing down the INN River.

In the XXI Corps the lOlst Airborne Div assumed command of the sector of the 4th Div. The 36th Div spread across the whole Corps front made good gains southwards advancing up to 12 miles at some points. The 12th Armd Div, its last elements being relieved by the 36th Div, is now in reserve.

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Resistance collapsed in the XV Corps and the Austrian frontier was reached or crossed along the SALZACH RIVER. Crossings were made at TITTMONING (Z7653) and BURGHAUSEN (Z7964) by the 86th Div, now under operational control of Seventh Army and at LAUFEN (Z8840) by CCA of the 20th Armored. The 20th Armored also relieved cavalry elements in SALZBURG. Elements of the 106 Cav Gp, 3rd Div, and the 2nd French Armd Div entered BERCHTESGADEN (Z9506). The remainder of the 2 DB is in the vicinity of DIESSEN(_5233).

68,634 was the total PW count for the Seventh Army yesterday.

The contact with 88th Division of Fifth Army mentioned above was made at 1051 hours 3 May. VIPITENO, ITALY is about seven miles Southwest of the crest of the BRENNER Pass. BERCHTES-GADEN was taken between 1200 and 2200 hours 4 May. (232)

520. At 0001 B hours, 6 May, Tactical Headquarters 6th Army Group opened at KAUFBEUREN, GERMANY. (233)

521. On 6 May the I French Corps continued mopping up operations in the ILL Valley. No hostilities were reported in the Seventh Army zone. 44th Division troops contacted elements of Fifth Army at RESIA Pass Southwest of LANDECK, XV and XXI Corps were assembling their divisions. (DR 7 May)

522. On 8 May General Devers issued Order of the Day Number 4, and on 9 May there was received the Order of the Day of the Supreme Commander, a copy of a personal message to General Eisenhower from his Majesty King George VI, as well as a message to General Devers from General Marshall, Chief of Staff. These fine documents are reproduced on the following pages.

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP APO 23, U. S. ARMY

8 May 1945

ORDER OF THE DAY)

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TO: All Officers and Enlisted Men and Women of the Units Comprising the 6th Army Group.

The enemy has been vanquished.

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The unconditional surrender by the German High Command of all German land, sea and air forces in Europe is an acknowledgment of unqualified defeat; and, for the armies of the Allies, the most significant victory in the annals of the World.

On the 6th Army Group front there have been military achievements so notable that they justify the highest commendation.

On each battlefield our arms and our men have proven themselves superior to those of the Axis Power; and this superiority is found, unquestionably, in the individual soldier as well as in our armies, divisions and smaller units. Outstanding leadership, determination and courage have been ever present.

History will evaluate the campaigns in which you have participated: The landing of the Seventh Army, including French Army "B", on the beaches of Southern France; The conquest of Mediterranean ports and other important cities; The march of more than 400 miles to the Vosges Mountains; The liberation of more than one-half of France; The decimation of the enemy and the capture of more than 90,000 prisoners. In leadership, daring and speed this campaign is unequalled.

The Winter campaign through the Vosges, a military feat never before attempted, brought the Seventh Army and the First French Army to the Rhine and well into the Siegfried Line. This potently affected the outcome of the war.


The extension of the 6th Army Group sector to cover approximately one-half of the Western Front, and the consequent defensive campaign, made military history by its brilliant execution.

The elimination of the Colmar Pocket, the successful assault on the Siegfried Line, the crossing of the Rhine, the conquest and exploitation of enemy territory -- are responsible in a substantial measure for the total collapse of German resistance.


Also, I have in mind the elimination of enemy pockets on

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both sides of the Gironde Estuary -- a brief and brilliantly executed campaign, by our Army Detachment of the Atlantic, This made the great port of Bordeaux again available to France, while the offensive operation of the Army Detachment of the Alps resulted in an additional threat to the enemy by penetrating Italy.

These campaigns were supported with extraordinary and highly commendable ability by the service forces in support of this Army Group.

You have assisted in liberating and safeguarding countless human beings; you have taken a large part in ending the Axis threat of world despectism; you have helped to wrest the ideals of civilization from oblivion; and, finally you have reached the goal for which many of our splendid officers and enlisted soldiers gave their lives. This conslusive victory will stand soldiers gave their lives. This conslusive victory will stand as a cenetaph, an immutable monument to your fallen comrades, and will form a substantial foundation on which, with God's help, the United Nations will build and enduring peace and a happier and more fruitful world.

/s/ JACOB L. DEVERS JACOB L. DEVERS General, USA Commanding

SUBJECT: Order of the Day by the Supreme Commander

To every member of the AEF&

The crusade on which we embarked in the early summer of 1944 has reached its glorious conclusion. It is my especial privilege, in the name of all nations represented in this Theater of War, to commend each of you for valiant performances of duty. Though these words are feeble they come from the bottom of a heart overflowing with pride in your loyal service and admiration for you as warriors.

Your accomplishments at sea, in the air, on the ground and in the field of supply, have astonished the world. Even before the final week of the conflict, you had put 5,000,000 of the enemy permanently out of the war. You have taken in stride military tasks so difficult as to be classed by many doubters as impossible. You have confused, defeated and destroyed your savagely fighting foe. On the road to victory you have endured every discomfort and privation and have surmounted every obstacle ingenuity and desperation could throw in your path. You did not pause until our front was firmly joined up with the great Red Army coming from the east, and other Allied Forces, coming from the south.

Full victory in EUROPE has been attained.

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Working and fighting together in a single and indestructible partnership you have achieved a perfection in unification of air, ground and naval power that will stand as a model in our time.

The route you have traveled hundreds of miles is marked by the graves of former comrades. From them has been exacted the ultimate sacrifice; blood of many nations—American, British, Canadian, French, Polish and others—has helped to gain the victory. Each of the fallen died as a member of the team to which you belong, bound together by a common love of liberty and a refusal to submit to enslavement. No monument of stone, no memorial of whatever magnitude could so well express our respect and veneration for their sacrifice as would perpetuation of the spirit of comradeship in which they died. As we celebrate victory in EUKOPE let us remind ourselves that our common problems of the immediate and distant future can be best solved in the same conceptions of cooperation and devotion to the cause of human freedom as have made this Expeditionary Force such a mighty engine of righteous destruction.

Let us have no part in the profitless quarrels in which other men will inevitably engage as to what country, what service, won the European war. Every man, every woman, of every nation here represented, has served according to his or her ability, and the efforts of each have contributed to the outcome. This we shall remember--and in doing so we shall be revering each honored grave, and be sending comfort to the loved ones of comrades who could not live to see this day.

(Signed: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER)

The following personal message has been received by General EISENHOWER from his Majesty King GEORGE VI.

Eleven months ago, you led the Allied Expeditionary Force across the English Channel, carrying with you the hopes and prayers of millions of men and women of many nations. To you was entrusted the task of annihilating the German Armies in western EUROPE, and of thus liberating the peoples whom they had enslayed.


All the world now knows that, after fierce and continuous warfare, this force has accomplished its mission with a finality achieved by no other such expedition in history.

On behalf of all my peoples, I ask that you, its Supreme Commander, will tell its members how deeply grateful we are to them, and how unbounded is our admiration for the courage and determination which, under wise leadership, have brought them to their goal of complete and crushing victory.

I would ask you also to convey a special message of congratulations to my own forces now under your command.


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Throughout the campaign, they have acquitted themselves, in all services, with a valour and distinction for which their fellow-countrymen will forever hold them in honour.

The following personal message has been received by the Army Group Commander from General Marshall, Chief of Staff:

The American Armies on the Western Front have given the nation and history a magnificent demonstration of power and efficiency, of initiative, determination, and gallantry. Each Army has a record of outstanding achievements. Throughout the long campaign in countless actions the Corps and Divisions have displayed battle skill of the highest type and have carried the fighting forward with constantly increasing momentum until the enemy's power to resist has been destroyed.

The leadership of the Army Groups, the Armies, and the Army Corps has demonstrated military competence of the highest order. The aggressive fighting and teamwork of the Divisions, the Regiments, and the Battalions, have been outstanding, and down in the ranks, the Company Officers and non-commissioned Officers and the Private soldiers have given AMERICA a wonderful example of courage, fortitude and complete devotion to duty.

The staffs and organizations which have provided the supplies and communications for the Armies and cared for the wounded have performed their duties with admirable efficiency.

You have successfully completed a military undertaking without parallel in history. Your contribution to this great epoch of AMERICA will exert a profound influence on the future of this country.

 $523 \, \cdot \,$ Our final extract from the G-2 Estimate of the Situation bears the date of 8 May.

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

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Army Group G comprising Nineteenth and First German Armies surrendered unconditionally to 6th Army Group with effect from 1200B Hours, 6 May 1945. No alternative had been left the enemy Army Group. Its rear was exposed by the capitulation of German Forces in Italy effective at 1200B Hours 2 May. In addition, the rapid friendly advances into the valleys of Wostern Austria had split its remaining area into several segments. The unpreparedness of defenses and the scanty forces ordered to hold the approaches into the mountain fastnesses of Western Austria clearly indicated that the formation of a redoubt area was merely a belated thought and meant to have been a haven for only a selected few.

Actually the military defeat of Army Group G had been

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accomplished in the drive through the SAAR-PALATINATE and across the Rhine. Lieutenant General SCHULTZ was never able to present a cohesive front after the initial rout of his First Army by the US Seventh Army. The rate of attrition in manpower continued so high that there never was the slightest possibility of the enemy's keeping sufficient bodies on the line, let alone trained soldiers.

The total disorganization of Army Group G was apparent in the plight of its armies. Nineteenth Army, pocketed time and again by First French Army's highly mobile forces, reached the ALPS without a single divisional formation and was reduced to fighting from a series of promptly isolated strongpoints. First Army yielded more than 200,000 prisoners of war between 28 April and 4 May. Both Armies had lost all organizational cohesion to the point where there was no longer a possibility of coordinated action even between their lowest formations. The capability of defense itself had disappeared, as the rotreat turned into a rout. In most cases, opposition by the enemy was due solely to his having been overtaken or surrounded by advancing Allied forces.

There is no question of the complete destruction of Army Group G_{\bullet} The total annihilation of its motley components was forestalled by its surrender. As it was along the entire front, so in the zone of the 6th Army Group, the German Wehrmacht was incontestably defeated on the battlefield.

6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT

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6th Army Group Front Line at Time of Surrender (061200 B Hours) of Army Group $^{11}G^{11}$

Along the Swiss - LICHTENSTEIN - AUSTRIAN Border at C 3653, C 4150, BLUDENZ (Z 8348), RANKWEIL (C 4554), C 4460, C 4864, DORNBIRN (C 5269), C 5275, C 6482, C 6982, C 7386, IMMENSTADT (C 8686), MITTELBERG (C 8261), C 9271, HINDELANG (C 9881), GRAN (D 1281), D 0164, WELZAN (C 9252), D 0759, D 1261, BOLEN (D 1858), D 2058, NAMLOS (D 2166), D 1567, EHENBICHL (D 2478), D 2775, UNTERGARTEN (D 3672), D 3468, D 3163, D 2958, D 2753, V 4851, PERFUCHS (V 3844), OPSTEIG (D 4161), D 3663, GRIESEN (D 4279), D 5480, KRUNZBACH (D 6280), D 6065, D 5563, D 5160, D 6457, INNSBRUCK (D 7556), W 0643, VITIPENO (W 0415), BRENNERO (W 1126), D 7956, D 9562, KUNDL (E 2083), E 1985, E 1079, D 9467, MUHLAU (D 7961), D 6860, D 6264, SCHARNITZ (D 6771), D 6681, WALLGAU (D 6786), Y 1300, MURBACK (Y 8802), Z 0902, Z 1907, Z 3009, Z 3103, BICHL (E 1885), E 2083, WORG (E 2685), OBERNDORF (Z 3700), Z 3820, UBERSEE (Z 5525), Z 8423, Z 8417, Z 7617, Z 7815, BAD REICHENHALL (Z 8515), Z 9113, Z 9304, BERCHTESGADEN (Z 9606), ST LEONHARD (Z 9817), SALZBURG (Z 9925), LAUFEN (Z 8841), BURGHAUSEN (Z 7964), Z 8770.

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b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHULZ). Surrendered unconditionally at 061200B Hours.

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

The semblance of organization heretofore maintained by First German Army disappeared during this period and surrender was made of piecemeal units when the end arrived. The army was completely impotent in the face of Allied thrusts as far east as SALZBURG and south beyond the Italian border. Whatever resistance the enemy still offered in the northern approaches of the ALPS between WALCHEN SEE (D 79) and KUFSTEIN (E 3396) became futile when our drive through the INN Valley threatened to cut off these positions.

At the end of the period the only divisions still capable of temporary organized resistance were 38 SS Grenadier Division under LXXXII Corps, holding along the INN east of MUHLDORF (Z 5372); 407 Mobilization Division and 17 SS Grenadier Division, both withdrawing south of the INN Hiver under control of XIII SS Corps. The following First Army divisions were decimated to less than 500 combat infantry effectives and were considered destroyed for all practical purposes: 9, 19, 36, 79, 212, 553 Volksgrenadier; 198, 416 Infantry; 2 Mountain; 151 Field Training; and von HOBE Divisions.

LXXXII Corps was responsible for the right and XIII SS Corps for the left half of the Army front. There is no evidence of the existence of XIII Army Corps which was previously overrun.

During the last phase First Army lost approximately 230,000 prisoners of war. Most of these were from a large array of miscellaneous units and from service outfits. This total also accounts for the destruction of the majority of the Army's divisions. 9 Hungarian Infantry Division surrendered intact with approximately 9,000 men and is included in the above total. The combat infantry strength of 17 and 38 SS Divisions, 407 Mobilization Division, and of other divisional remnants was estimated to be 7,000.

Captured documents confirmed the enemy's intention to defend the so-called "Redoubt" area. Army Group G was ordered to retreat to the ALPS. However, it was so badly disorganized when it reached the mountain bastion that, even with favorable terrain, a successful stand was out of the question.

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. BRANDENBERG)

Nineteenth Army, far from being able to rally its harassed forces, lost the biggest part of the divisions still at its disposal. The Army put up a very feeble defense of the northwestern part of the Alpine area.

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Not a single Nineteenth Army division was capable of effective defensive action. The following divisions all have a combat infantry strength of less than 500: 47, 189, 246, 257, 559 Volksgrenadier and 465 Mobilization Divisions. Apart from miscellaneous units, these constitute the only combat forces at the disposal of the Army. Their combat infantry effectives were estimated to total 3,000 men. The Army lost approximately 100,000 prisoners during the period.

Nineteenth Army was completely isolated by the meeting of Allied forces south of the BRENNER Pass. With hostile troops to its front, rear, and right flank, and SWITZER-LAND on its left, the Army surrendered.

(3) Twenty-Fourth German Army (CG: Maj. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

This Army was for a long period guarding the Swiss frontier east of BASEL against the eventuality of an Allied violation of Swiss neutrality.

More recently agents mentioned the Army staff as moving south from BREGENZ, probably into the heart of the ALPS. Furthermore, a captured document placed the First Indian Legion under Twenty-fourth Army. This legion was identified southeast of Lake CONSTANZ along the Swiss border.

The units under command of Twenty-fourth Army never amounted to more than a skeleton force of low-grade, miscellaneous outfits, most of which the enemy was wary of committing to action. However, these units were absorbed by the Nineteenth German Army during the last days and only the staff of Twenty-fourth Army remained at the time of capitulation.

3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

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The surrender of General von VIETINGHOFF, German Commander in Chief Southwest, and SS General WOLFF, Supreme Commander of SS and Police in Italy, became effective at 1200 hours GMT 2 May. With this capitulation, hostilities on the 6th Army Group Alpine Front officially ceased.

There was little activity on the Alpine Front during the period. The enemy withdrawal began in the coastal area with the departure of the 34 German Infantry Division on the night of 23/24 April. It was followed by 5 German Mountain Division and the Italian MONTE ROSA and LITTORIO Divisions which began their departure on the night of 24/25 April. The enemy withdrawal in the area from the coast to MONTGENEVRE (K 4503) was completed between 23 April and 27 April. The units were to move to BOLZANO by way of TRENT, the days being allowed for completion of the move. One battalion of the 100 Mountain Regiment had managed to reach T 6177 by 28 April but there it

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surrendered in toto. The remainder of 5 Mountain Division and 34 Infantry Division had arrived in the TURIN area by 29 April. Blocked by Partisans, the city was bypassed on the west and the major portion of both divisions moved north toward IVREA (J 2270). Harrassed by Partisans and cut off from Germany, both divisions assembled south of IVREA and awaited the Allies. Attempts by the Partisans on 3 May to obtain a surrender were fruitless as the Germans wished to surrender to regular forces.

The two Italian Divisions, LITTORIO and MONTE ROSA disintegrated after leaving their positions on the Franco-Italian border, their members surrendering to Partisans.

4. OPERATIONS

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a. SOUTHERN GERMANY

As the period opened, all organized resistance in the Black Forest, the Swabian Jura, and on the Konstanz Peninsula ceased. Only disorganized small groups of enemy delayed the Allied push east. The entire north shore of Lake CONSTANZ and the city of FRIEDRICHSHAFEN (C 3196) was cleared on 30 April. Small enemy groups fell back to BREGENZ (C 5281) and IMMENSTADT (C 8788) where attempts were made to block the passes leading into the Austrian panhandle. Both towns were cleared by 2 May and overcoming ineffective opposition, friendly forces pushed south along the Swiss border and along the Iller River. By 4 May BLUDENZ (Z 8348) MITTELBERG (C 8261) had been occupied.

LXXX Corps, with only remnants of few divisions remaining, fell back into the Austrian Alps, attempting to delay and to block the passes behind them. On 1 May, Lieutenant General FRANZ BAYER (CG LXXX Corps) and his Chief of Staff, Colonel KOESTLIN were captured, thus ending the career of LXXX Corps. Allied forces pushed south along the LECH and OBERAU Valleys, overcoming difficult terrain, roadblocks, and demolitions. GARMISCH (D 5382) was reached on 29 April. At FUSSEN (D 2389) Fieldmarshal WILHELM RITTER VON LEEB was captured and at GARMISCH Fieldmarshal WILHELM LIST was taken prisoner. South of MITTENWALD (D 6577) the approaches to the Inn Valley were defended by fanatical Hitler Youth and other small groups. Numerous obstacles retarded progress. Negotiations for the surrender of INNSBRUCK failed but Allied forces met little resistance after entering the Inn Valley and INNSBRUCK was occupied against negligible opposition on 3 May. From here, Allied forces pushed rapidly south, securing the BRENNER Pass and linking up with other forces pushing up from Italy on 4 May. Advances were also made along the Inn River and by 4 May WORG (E 2685), to the east, and IMST (D 2753), to the west, had been reached against little opposition.

By 28 April, the First German Army had lost AUGSBURG and its battered forces were deployed on a north-south line

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along the LECH River and east along the DANUBE River. From this line, enemy infantry with tank support fought delaying actions back toward MUNICH. Only light and scattered contact was made by friendly units in the AMMER (Y 54) and WURM (Y 62) Lakes region as the northern suburbs of MUNICH were reached on 29 April. The Dachau Concentration Camp (Y 7569), containing 32,000 political prisoners, was defended by 300 SS troops. These were overcome and the camp was liberated at 292000B April. During the night, enemy artillery fire was placed on the town of DACHAU. Resistance in MUNICH broke during the afternoon of 30 April and by midnight, the entire city had been cleared. Thus MUNICH, the cradle of Naziism, fell to the victorious Allied forces.

Beaten remnants fell back as friendly units advanced south and east from MUNICH. Armor driving down the Autobahn reached the Inn River at Z 2721 against negligible resistance. At Y 9049, 100 planes in good condition were captured and at Y 9754, 10 jet type planes were taken as little contact was made southeast of MUNICH. At BAD TOELZ on 1 May, Fieldmarshal GERD VON RUNDSTEDT, the epitome of Junker aristocracy, became the Allies' foremost prisoner of war. On the same day, the Admiral HORTHY of Hungary also was made prisoner. The 9 Hungarian Infantry Division surrendered to friendly units at Z 2155 on 2 May. The advance east along the foothills of the ALPS met only light and scattered small arms fire. ROSENHEIM (Z 1927) was taken during the evening of 2 May as the Germans, having heard of HITLER'S death, prematurely celebrated the end of the war. A push south from ROSENHEIM (Z 1927) along the Inn River reached WORG (E 2685) on 4 May where a juncture was made with forces driving along the Ill River from the west. SALZBURG (Z 9524) surrendered as Allied troops raced east along the Autobahn, reaching that town on 4 May. While SALZ-BURG was being occupied, another column sped southward against little opposition to capture BERCHTESGADEN (Z 9506). HITLER'S mountain retreat, DER BERGHOF, was reported on fire as capturing units approached.

b. ALPINE FRONT

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Southern Zone: On 28 April, friendly troops on the coast fell back fron BORDIGHERA (S 8986) to VENTIMIGLIA (S 8587); the line of forward troops then ran through TENDA (N 8820) and along the ROIA to its mouth on the coast east of VENTIMIGLIA. To the north, VINADIO (N 5647) was bypassed and the following day contact was established with elements of the Central zone at PIANCHE (N 5148). Meantime, on 28 April, fighting was reported in CUNEO between German troops and Partisans. The town was declared clear the next day. On 30 April an Allied reconnaissance toward LIMONE (N 8833) reached the north end of TENDE tunnel (N 8731). The enemy remained quiet until the surrender on 2 May.

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Central Zone: At the beginning of the period, DEMONTE (N 6647) and SESTRIERES Pass (H 3922) were reached and a junction was effected with southern troops at PIANCHE. A prisoner of war reported that the general withdrawal from the central area began on 24/25 April. On 29 April OULZ (K 5414), BARDON-NECHE (K 4318), CESANNE (K 5203), and the main villages of the QUEYRAS (P 47) region were occupied. In the TURIN area, elements of the 34 Infantry Division were fighting northwest of the city on 30 April. The next day, the division was reported bypassing TURIN in a move to the northwest on the route: ORBASSANO (H 9222), RIVOLI (H 9029), CASSELLE (J 0234). Friendly forces did not pursue. The commanding general and 5,000 men of the 34 Infantry Division declared willingness to surrender 2 April, but the following day they refused to surrender to the Partisans.

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North Zone: The enemy launched raids on ROC NOIR (H 4362) positions on the night of 27/28 April, following up by attacks in strength on FORCLE Pass (H 46) and friendly positions south of PETIT ST BERNARD (C 4401). These attacks were repulsed and the enemy expelled from the PETIT ST BERNARD area on 29 April. At the same time, Partisan forces encircled an enemy salient on MONT CENIS (H 4457) and BUSSOLENO (H 6240) and SUSE (H 5340) were occupied. Thereafter positions remained quiet until the general surrender.

524. General de Lattre in BERLIN issued his Order of the Day Number 9 as follows:

ORDER OF THE DAY NUMBER 9

Officers, non-commissioned officers, Corporals and men of the First French Army.

The day of victory has come. I have had the pride to sign in BERLIN in the name of FRANCE, in your name, the solemn document of GERMANY'S surrender.

Worthy of the confidence of our Supreme Chief General DE GAULLE the Liberator of our country, you have, by your efforts, your eagerness, your heroism, returned to our fatherland its rank and its greatness.

Brotherly united with the soldiers of the resistance, side by side with our Allied comrades, you have, wherever you have met him, torn the enemy to pieces.

Your flags fly in the heart of GERMANY.

Your victories mark the milestones of the French revival.

With all my soul I express to you my gratitude. You are entitled to be proud of yourselves and of your achievements.

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Let us piously safeguard the memory of our dead. Generous companions fallen in the field of honour, they joined in sacrifice and glory our shot hostages and our martyrs.

Let us celebrate your victory: May victory, shining victory of spring giving back to our FRANCE youth, strength and hope.

Victorious soldiers, your children will learn of the new achievements the fatherland owes to you.

BERLIN May the 9th, 1945. LE General DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY Commandant en Chef LA Premiere Armee Française.

(Signed) J. DE LATTRE.

525. For news, the civil population of the 6th Army Group area were chiefly dependent upon radio, proclamations and posters and upon a 6th Army Group newspaper, "Die Mitteilungen", prepared by the Psychological Warfare Section. (234)

526. Campaigns involving such an extended and rapid advance as 6th Army Group had made since 15 March demand logistical support of a high order to match the tactical leadership involved. The Transportation Sub-Section of G-4 has prepared the following summary of transportation:

Activities during the period 15 March to 8 May 1945.

l. General: Following a period of comparatively static operations, the period considered in this paper was one of rapid advance. Starting with the breaching of the Siegfried Line, it included the advance to the Rhine, the crossing of the Rhine and the subsequent advance deep into Germany and Austria culminating in the unconditional surrender of all hostile forces on our front. Owing to the rapidity of advance, all transportation means were strained to their utmost to accomplish the supply of troops. By a combination of effective planning and vigorous operations, all transportation demands were met so that the advance of the troops was not impeded due to transportation difficulties.

2. Rail: a. At the beginning of the period rail lines had been pushed well forward and were in operating condition to Sarralbe and Saverne in the Seventh Army front and to Strasbourg and Mulhouse in the First French Army front. Studies had been made as to routes that could be utilized in the direction of advance to permit the maximum support of the Armies. Since the primary objectives were north-eastward, the routes picked for primary rehabilitation were those extending from Sarrable and Sarreguemines to Homburg - Kaiserslautern and Worms; and from Saverne and Haguenau to Wissembourg - Landau and Worms. Engineer and Railway troops were positioned to repair lines when they were uncovered and studies were made to determine the probable extend of damage.

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b. As soon as Seventh Army had advanced sufficiently, the repair of the railway lines was commenced. Through the frontier zone of the Siegfried it was found that enemy demolitions were heavy. Beyond Homburg and Wissembourg respectively, enemy demolition was not serious but some damage had been caused by our bombing.

c. The rail line Sarreguemines - Homburg - Kaisers-lautern - Worms was completed to Frankenthal (near Worms) on 3 April. The line Haguenau - Wissembourg - Landau - Worms was completed to Frankenthal on the same day. Operation of trains in a limited way was started at once thus providing delivery of supplies to Army's dumps at Frankenthal by rail.

d. The construction of a single track railway bridge across the Rhine connecting Ludwigshafen and Mannheim was commenced 4 April and completed 23 April. A second single track railway bridge at Karlsruhe was commenced on 6 April and opened for operation 5 May.

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e. On the east bank of the Rhine work was commenced to open a line northeastward from Mannheim to Darmstadt and Wurzburg but this work was discontinued when the shift of boundary gave Darmstadt and Wurzburg to the Third Army. Thenceforth our efforts were diverted to the opening of rail lines to the southeast, principally the line Mannheim - Heilbronn - Stuttgart - Ulm - Munich. The line was opened to Heilbronn 25 April and to Stuttgart 6 May with a maximum capacity of 4,000 tons a day. At the close of active operations, this line was being extended to Ulm and Munich. Secondary lines on the east bank of the Rhine in the First French Army area were being operated by German civilians and a railway bridge across the Rhine at Strasbourg was planned.

3. Highway: a. In order to support the operations of the Armies in the European Theater of Operations, beyond the the limits of the assigned army motor transportation, the plan known as "XYZ Plan" was prepared by ComZone. This plan was made well in advance and all interested parties acquainted with its provisions. It provided for the withdrawal of truck companies from ports and various installations of the Communications Zone for employment with the Advance Sections in the logistical support of the Armies. The plan was in three phases. Phase "X" prepared for 10,000 tons delivery to the Armies on a two day turn around or 20,000 tons on a one day turn around. Phase "Y" prepared for a 20 percent increase insuring delivery of 12,000 tons on a two day and a one day turn around respectively. This was a flexible plan whereby additional tonnage as outlined above could be distributed equally between all the American Armies in the ETO. In case of equal distribution the available number of 2½ ton equivalent companies supporting each army would be as follows: phase "X"

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30 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton equivalent companies, "Y" - 36, and "Z" - $42\frac{1}{2}$ - $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton equivalent companies.*

b. Within 24 hours after the breakthrough of the Siegfried Line in the 6th Army Group area, "XYZ" trucks were rolling into Germany supporting the Seventh Army. On 25 March there was equivalent of 17 - 2½ ton cargo truck companies and 2 - 4,000 gallon bulk POL tank truck companies operating under the "XYZ" plan. On 30 April the "Y" phase (under its equal distribution of truck companies to Armies) was placed into effect with 36 truck companies for the support of the 6th Army Group, and on May 1 the "Z" phase based on the equal distribution of the truck companies to the Armies was put into operation. These additional companies together with CONAD regular assigned companies brought the total to the equivalent of 60 - 2½ ton cargo and 3 - 3,000 gallon bulk POL tank truck companies delivering supplies to the Seventh and First French Armies. These truck companies were in addition to truck units assigned to the Armies.

- c. During the period 1 April to 8 May, inclusive, XYZ delivered 151,946 tons to First French and Seventh Armies and evacuated 133,983 POW's and 13,832 Displaced Persons. The Seventh Army trucking facilities during this period handled 152,144 tons. The distances supplies were hauled by truck from advance railheads and pipcheads during various stages of the advance ranged from 75 to 300 miles.
- d. The location of advance railheads and pipeheads which supplied the Armies during the advance, and the dates trucking operations commenced from these points, are of historical importance. Sarreguemines railhead commenced trucking operations 24 March and the POL pipehead at this point 29 March, Wissembourg railhead 2 April, Frankenthal Mannheim 7 April, Sandhofen pipehead 17 April and Heilbronn railhead 25 April.
- e. Truck operations and traffic in general were hampered somewhat due to demolitions over many of the main highways. Traffic had to be routed over secondary roads in certain areas until bridges were restored. However, the Engineers did an outstanding job opening up and maintaining routes of communication. During the 54 day period of the campaign 236 bridges of various types were constructed in the Seventh Army area and a total of 59 bridges in the First French Army area. In both areas a total of 112 temporary bridges were dismantled after use, being replaced by other bridges.
- 4. Crossing of the Rhine: One of the outstanding features of the whole campaign was the job done by the Engineers in constructing bridges across the Rhine. Railway bridges across the
- * There are 48 trucks in a truck company.

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Rhine have already been referred to, in paragraph 2. The first highway bridge, a heavy ponton bridge 1046 feet long, at Worms, was constructed in the record time of 9 hours and 12 minutes after the crossing had commenced. This bridge was capable of handling 40 ton loads. 13 days after our forces had established a bridgehead across the Rhine, the first fixed highway bridge was completed at Germesheim. On 10 April, 8 mighway bridges of various types were spanning the Rhine.

5. Air: In spite of maximum efforts of rail and road, the final phase of the advance made necessary the extensive use of air transportation. The Armies under command of 6th Army Group received 3760 tons by air during the period 1 April to 8 May. These supplies were carried in transport aircraft and medium bombers to fields in the vicinity of Crailsheim, Wurzburg, and Goppingen as part of the regular supply program. One emergency supply mission was carried out on 9 and 10 April in addition to the scheduled supply.

The foregoing account is of interest and value as an example of successful logistical planning and execution permitting unchecked advance and exploitation, forcing early enemy surrender without opportunity for his occupation and serious defense of the National Redoubt area. This can be compared with the situation during the month of October and early November when 6th Army Group forces were stalled not so much by enemy resistance as by the necessity of waiting for the accumulation of adequate supplies, and a supply and transportation system-capable of supporting major operations hundreds of miles from the base ports.*

527. In this spring campaign the bulk of the hauling was by the splendid teamwork of rails, pipeline and motors. The air-lift was of importance in meeting sudden emergencies but the tonnage handled was less than 2% of the total. It was on the return trip that the planes were most indispensable, evacuating the wounded quickly and comfortably thus avoiding the overcrowding of forward hospital facilities.

528. Toward the end it was of little consequence that, under the XYZ plan, port operation was impeded to some degree since, in general, sufficient material to finish the campaign had already flowed from the ports into the channels of supply. It may be asked whether this careful and elaborate XYZ planning was really necessary to keep the advance from stalling. The answer is found in Seventh Army Weekly G-4 Periodic Report for the period ending 5 May from which paragraph 2 d (2) (j) and (k) are quoted below:

2. STATUS OF SUPPLY.

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- d. Quartermaster.
- * See paragraphs 65 to 67.

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- (2) Class III on hand end of period.
 - (j) Days of supply of POL (does not include Solid Fuels) On Hand 1.7. Desired or authorized days of supply, 7 plus 1 day operational.
 - (k) The average daily receipts of 661,242 gallons of gasoline from the Base Section did not balance the average daily issues of 690,168 gallons. In addition to this loss, a further reduction of reserves was due to the turning over to the Base Section of the Army railhead at HEILBRONN containing 1991 long tons which left 1.7 days of supply on hand at the end of the week. The dispersion of this small reserve of gasoline over 10 supply installations has resulted in some of these supply installations operating with either a very small reserve or no supply on hand which necessitates the uninterrupted deliveries each day from the Base Section to insure issues to the troops to meet daily requirements. Delays in receiving daily shipments during the week have resulted in the supplies at some installations being completely exhausted and have either delayed issues to troops or required their going to other supply installations a considerable distance in the rear in order to secure their immediate requirements of gasoline.

Average daily receipts of diesel fuel were 20,240 gallons as compared to issues of 14,100 gallons. No issues of coal have been made.

Status of Class III supplies in the Army area for the week is as follows: (DWLT).

 On Hand
 Daily
 Daily
 On Hand

 Start
 Receipts
 Issues
 Close

 7793
 2314
 2674
 4533*

(*) 1991 long tons turned over to CONAD.

Thus it is evident that the XYZ plan was barely sufficient to achieve success. Looking back to the situation in October it appears somewhat more difficult of solution because the number of truck companies in the theater was inadequate for the task at hand. Also a number of French units on the DRAGOON Troops list were found to have shortages in motor transport. (249) As an emergency measure at the direction of Seventh Army the motor transport of units landing in Southern FRANCE was

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required to make one trip to the front loaded with ammunition or gasoline before being turned over to its organization for normal use. While this procedure was of considerable temporary value its effect was not sufficiently sustained to enable the divisions to continue their advance.

529. On 11 May the following personal messages to General Eisenhower were published to the personnel of Headquarters 6th Army Group:

a. Message from the President, HARRY S. TRUMAN:

In recognition of the unconditional and abject surrender of the Nazi barbarians please accept the fervent congratulations and appreciation of myself and of the American people for the heroic achievements of your Allied Army, Navy and Air Forces by their sacrifices, skill and courage. They have saved and exalted the cause of freedom throughout the world. All of us owe to you and to your men of many nations a debt beyond appraisal for their high contribution to the conquest of Nazism.

I send also my personal appreciation of the superb leadership shown by you and your Commanders in directing the valiant legions of our own country and of our Allies to this historic victory.

Please transmit this message to the appropriate Officers of your command and publish it to all Allied Forces in your theaters of operation.

b. Message from the Secretary of War:

In this first moment after one of the greatest military victories in all history, I find it most difficult to express to you in words the thankfulness which fills the hearts of millions of your countrymen for all that the victory means to them.

In this great hour of victory I join with all peace loving peoples of the world in sending my most heartfelt thanks to you, your staff and commanders, and to every member of your Allied Armies.

c. Message from the Secretary of the Navy:

The US Navy sends to you and your Commanders its congratulations and admiration for the superb accomplishments of the American Armies in achieving in conjunction with our Allies the destruction of Nazi GERMANY.

To you personally goes my unbounded admiration for a great accomplishment in terms of military strategy,

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leadership and above all those qualities of will, patience and tact which have earned for you the unswerving support of our own forces and those of our Allies.

d. Message from Admiral KING:

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On behalf of the Officers and men of the US Navy, I extend hearty and sincere congratulations to you and all Officers and men under your able command on the victory attained in Europe.

The unselfish devotion to duty demonstrated by your forces will serve as an inspiration to renew our determination to hasten the day of victory over JAPAN.

e. Message from Admiral NIMITZ:

The smashing victory of American and Allied arms over GERMANY ends the reign of brute force and terror in Europe. Millions of the world's people are beholden to you and the superb forces under your command for the restoration of their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

The victory confirms the wisdom of our world strategy which required the use of the bulk of our strength against GERMANY while holding JAPAN and driving them back when possible. Now the whole overwhelming weight of our force can be turned upon our treacherous enemy in the Pacific. JAPAN deserves and from now on will receive our united and undivided attention.

My sincere congratulations to you, your staff and all the men of your command on the completion of a formidable task supremely well done.

f. Message from her Majesty the Queen of the NETHERLANDS:

Please accept my most sincere congratulations on the great and decisive victories which have caused the final downfall of a powerful and ruthless enemy. Together with me and my peoples, grateful thanks to you and all the Armies under your Supreme Command, who, by their unflagging bravery and sacrifice, have brought about the triumph of our common cause and the liberation of the NETHERLANDS.

g. Message from the Prime Minister of CANADA:

I sent to you and to the forces under your command the heartfelt congratulations of the Government and people of CANADA upon the final defeat of the military might of Nazi GERMANY to which defeat the AEF's contributed so decisively. We are indeed proud that CANADIANS had so worthy a place in the great company of the forces of

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liberation which under your Supreme Command have achieved so complete a victory.

530. Also on 11 May, General Barr presented awards to members of this headquarters, at HEIDELBERG, GERMANY. (235)

531. On this same date telephoned instructions were received from G-3, SHAEF, that King Leopold of Belgium, who was then in Seventh Army area, was to be denied a press conference planned for that afternoon unless approved by the Belgian delegation at the King's headquarters. The Chief of Staff, Seventh Army was included in a 3-way conversation and received these instructions direct from SHAEF. (236)

532. On 14 May a meeting was held at HEIDELBERG attended by Commanders and staff officers principally concerned in the transfer of Seventh Army. As a result, the following cable was dispatched to SHAEF on 15 May:

Command of Seventh Army and responsibility for its area passes from 6th Army Group to 12th Army Group at 0001B hours 16 May 1945, in accordance with agreement reached between Commanding General, 12th Army Group and Commanding General 6th Army Group. Please confirm as a matter of urgency.

The transfer was confirmed by SHAEF cable FWD-21559, same date.


533. It may appear strange that Seventh Army was transferred to 12th Army Group at this particular moment but it should be remembered that 6th Army Group had been assigned the redeployment training command job and had to get on with it. In addition, the 'ECLIPSE' Plan being carried out by 6th Army Group was actually 12th Army Group's plan because 12th Army Group was scheduled to take over the entire area of American forces in Germany.

534. It was felt that it would be a good thing if all of that responsibility could be transferred to 12th Army Group as soon as possible. 12th Army Group felt the same way, partly because the surrender of Army Group "G" also involved the troops on the front of the Third Army, which was under 12th Army Group. Though the surrender of the entire German Army may have cured some difficulties, the problem of coordination of effort of the Third and Seventh Armies still remained and it would be better to have them under one headquarters. 12th Army Group did not want to take over the First French Army at this time, however, because the occupational areas of the French had not been settled, and as soon as they were settled, control of the First French Army would pass to the French Government. General Devers agreed to retain responsibility for the First French Army for a least a short time. It was agreed that 6th Army Group would retain control over the

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Alpine Front Command for the same reason, since it was expected that this command would pass within a few days to the control of the French Government. (250)

535. Under date of 15 May the Statistical Section prepared and issued an excellent statistical pamphlet with title "6th Army Group Record of Progress" containing voluminous statistical information with the many advantages of graphical presentation. This pamphlet is included as Document Number 157.

536. On 17 May a letter with subject "Utilization of Labor in Germany" was sent to First French Army. Headquarters 12th Army Group letter of 8 April with the same subject was inclosed for compliance. (238)

 $537 \, \cdot \,$ On 18 May Staff Section Roster Number 12 was published and is included as Document Number 158 $\! \cdot \! \,$

538. On 19 May, with appropriate ceremony, General Devers presented the Legion of Merit to Brigadier General Ralph C. Tobin and Lieutenant Colonel Edouard A. Du Souzy, and the Bronze Star Medal to eighteen individuals. (240)

539. General Orders Number 34 were issued on 19 May and announced awards to twenty-four persons. (241)

540. The first group selected for return to the United States under the point system was announced in Special Order Number 60 dated 20 May. It included one officer and forty-nine enlisted men.

541. On 21 May General Orders Number 36 were issued announcing the award of the Bronze Star Medal to fifty-one individuals. (242)

542. On 22 May there was issued a "Report of Public Relations Officer 6th Army Group 15 August 1944 to 15 May 1945". (243)

543. On 25 May, with appropriate ceremony, General Devers presented the Bronze Star Medal to thirty-one members of the Headquarters. (244)

 $544. \,\,$ Paragraph 2 of Staff Memorandum Number 34, dated 26 May 1945 is quoted below:

2. The Psychological Warfare Section, this headcuarters, closed at 0001B hours, 25 May 1945.

545. On 26 May General Orders Number 38 were published announcing the award of the Bronze Star Medal to three members of the headquarters. (245)

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546. On 27 May General Orders Number 39 were published announcing the award of the Bronze Star Medal to seventy members of the headquarters. (246)

547. On 29 May, with appropriate ceremony, General Devers presented the Bronze Star Medal to twenty-seven members of the headquarters. (247)

548. Also on 29 May General Orders Number 40 were published announcing the award of the Bronze Star Medal to fifty-three members of the headquarters. (248)

549. In mid-March information was received by the Chief of Staff that a training command would be established in this theater for the purpose of training units that were to be redeployed directly to the Pacific or indirectly through the United States. It was expected that 6th Army Group would be assigned the mission. On 25 March, at PHALSBOURG, Colonel Miles W. Brewster from the G-3 Plans Section of ETOUSA briefed General Devers and his staff on Theater Redeployment Planning and stated that the theater Tentative Basic Plan assigned the mission of Redeployment Training of all units, except those assigned or attached to USS TAF, as a responsibility of 6th Army Group.

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550. It was decided that a small group of officers from 6th Army Group would be sent to Headquarters ETOUSA in PARIS to read into the picture and to prepare plans and necessary directives for the new problem which would confront the 6th Army Group on VE day. Accordingly, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Whitfield P. Shepard, and five other officers were selected and ordered to ETOUSA.

551. Upon arrival in PARIS on 1 April, study of the redeployment training problems and implications commenced. An analysis of the Redeployment Flow Chart, dated 5 April 1945, indicated that 6th Army Group would be responsible for the training of 3,360 units varying in size and type from divisions to small detachments of only several men. Preparation of plans for the training of combat units and those service units organic to combat units presented no great problem.

552. Representatives of Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces came to ETOUSA and were consulted on the problems they had met in training in the Zone of the Interior. The various Special Staff Sections of Headquarters, Communications Zone were also consulted. As plans began to shape up additional specialized officer personnel were required and studies of requirements for training areas were made. The 6th Army Group Basic Plan for Redeployment Training was submitted to Headquarters ETO on 10 May and was approved by General Bull. Plans were progressing most favorably and the final draft of the 6th Army Group Training Memorandum Number 1 was completed. This

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memorandum was based on AGF, ASF, and War Department training programs and directives.

553. On 18 May a new Redeployment Flow Chart dated 14 May 1945 was received. An analysis of the chart indicated that the total number of units that could come under control of 6th Army Group for training was only 723, most of which were service units, as compared to 3,360 previously determined. This reduction in units was due to a tremendous speed up of the shipment of units from the theater as well as a decision that units scheduled for strategic reserve would remain under control of the Army of Occupation and ComZone until shipping for return to the States was available.

554. As a result of the reduction of the number of units available for training, General Eisenhower decided that the establishment of a special headquarters responsible for redeployment training was unnecessary. Instead it was decided that each major command would be responsible for training those units assigned or attached which were to be redeployed. Accordingly, on 2 June a conference was held at ETOUSA at which all major commands were represented and at which the G-3 ETOUSA announced the new policy on Redeployment Training. After turning over the material they had prepared to other appropriate headquarters, the 6th Army Group Redeployment Planning Staff was dissolved and returned to HEIDELBERG.

555. An eye-witness account of the DACHAU CONCENTRATION CAMP:

As illustrator for the 6th Army Group Headquarters history I visited the concentration camp at DACHAU, GERMANY from about 1100 hours to 1700 hours 3 May 1945. I made the trip in company with First Lieutenant Trufant Foster, Information and Education Officer, Special Troops, Headquarters 6th Army Group.

Approaching the camp outside of the town of DACHAU we saw a sign pointing in two directions. It read that the men were to be taken to the left entrance, the mothers and children to the right. The air already was filled with the smell of lime and the unforgetable smell of the dead. Facing us was a big grey building with a grey wall, about 10 feet high, all around it. To the left of this building end wall were fifty (50) rail cars, most of which were "40 and 8's" with 4 open cars. In at least 40 of the cars including the four open ones, there were dead, starved, emaciated bodies lying in every conceivable position. They wore striped suits (prisoner's uniform) parts of which seemed to have been torn from their bodies in their death throes, thus revealing that wax-like skin of the dead. In a plot of grass, opposite the train, were three dead SS guards, evidently beaten to death, because there were terrific bruises all over their bodies. They were dressed in civilian clothes which were partly ripped from their bodies. One of

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the bodies had part of its skull ripped open but in general they looked very well fed compared to the starved dead bodies of their victims opposite them in the train. Ironically enough we noticed a stone statue of a German soldier in front of this train of death with the following words inscribed at the bottom "Deutchland uber Alles".

From here we went to the entrance of the concentration camp where the men were taken. As we entered we saw two enormous three story buildings facing us. They looked sinister and had that unholy grey color which seemed to be dominant throughout the camp. That horrible stench of death seemed to cling to us from the moment we entered. The building to our left was the headquarters and the one in front of us the bath where all the prisoners were bathed before being taken to their "living quarters". Behind this building we could see the enormous smokestack of the crematorium. We walked past these two buildings and into the camp proper.

The camp is divided into two parts. For convenience sake and for lack of a better name I will call them the living part, where the prisoners lived and worked, and the dead part, where the prisoners were killed and burned systematically. A most divided them.

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We visited the living part first. Before we entered, we were warned that typhus plus other diseases were prevalent and entrance would be made only if we had received typhus shots recently. We had received these shots recently and so we felt safe in entering. The first thing we saw was a large open place. On the left were rows of one story houses. Each row was marked with a sign "Block" and the number following it. In front of us was a soccer field with built up sides of earth. On one of these built up sides, lying side by side were 50 dead men and boys. Each one wore the striped uniform of the prisoners. They looked as if they had been shot.

We left the open space and entered one of the houses and then one of the rooms. The room we saw was approximately 11 feet square and 10 feet high. In it were four (4) triple decker bunks (each bunk measured about the same as our U.S. Army cots). This meant that there were 12 bunks in this room. Each bunk was occupied by no less than 3 to 4 persons, meaning that there was an average of 45 to 48 underfed, sick, and diseased people in one room. There was one small window. The room was occupied by these people when we looked in. They looked beyond any help and were dying. The stench was horrible and we had to leave very quickly to keep from vomiting. We left the area as some Russians and Poles were having their big celebration over their liberation in the big open space. Before we were allowed to leave the living section we were promptly DDT'd (sprayed with powder against lice).

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We crossed the most and entered the dead section, better named the human death factory. We walked into a fenced in portion of ground which housed the crematorium.

The rooms where the bodies were kept were about 10 feet high and 17 feet square filled 3/4 full with layer upon layer of human bodies. They were piled as you would pile cord wood ready for burning. The stench was horrible. In back of this crematorium were pile upon pile upon pile of clothes all neatly arranged in bales. The coats were separate, the pants separate, and so on. We could see little childrens' clothes and shoes, girls and women's dresses, shoes and hats. The piles of clothing (less shoes) were put side by side to occupy a space approximately 200 feet long, 10 feet high and 4 feet wide. The place where people were shot was right next to the crematorium. We saw a big blood spot on each side of the earth bank.

We went through an entrance opposite the one we had just entered and saw the kennels where the dogs were kept. One dog was lying dead outside of its kennel. It had been shot. It was a big brute capable of killing any man.

Before we left, a Dutch officer showed us a copy of the extermination order directed by Himmler.

Facts about the camp: (Information received from MP Officer at gate)

- 1. Although the camp facilities could not accommodate more than about 15,000 without overcrowding, as many as 65,000 inmates have been jammed into its confines at one time.
 - 2. It has approximately 35,000 inmates now. (3 May 1945)
 - 3. They are Russian, Polish, French, Italian and Dutch.
 - 4. The camp has been running since 1933.
 - 5. 135 people were burned daily.
- 6. Inmates are political prisoners 20%, criminals 40%, others 40%.

This is the information we received from some of the inmates.

The first inmate we talked to was a Pole. He had been in the camp for two years. He told us that the bodies we saw on the train were Jews whom the authorities in camp wanted to get out before the Americans came. Himmler had directed that all damaging evidence should be gotten rid of and all the prisoners exterminated. However the Americans came sooner than was expected. In regard to the SS guards lying dead opposite the train he said that they had tried to mingle with the prisoners

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after the Americans came, in order to avoid detection but some of the prisoners recognized them and killed them. In regard to the German people who lived near the camp, he said, that when a trainload of victims was brought into the camp, they laughed, jeered, and threw stones at them.

The second inmate was a Dutch underground worker who was our guide in the living section. He has the responsibility to keep order among the prisoners now. He told us that when the prisoners first entered the camp and noticed the crematorium smokestack belching smoke, the SS guard in charge of them would say "You are now entering Dachau through the gate but you will leave through there" pointing to the chimney. Pointing to the 50 dead bodies of the men and boys b; the soccer field the Dutch inmate said that it was part of the SS work. After showing us the living overtone he told us that 135 to 150 inmates ing us the living quarters he told us that 135 to 150 inmates are still dying daily and would continue to do so for at least three weeks. He told us that the prisoners got very little food. One loaf of bread, which was part sawdust, was divided into 10 equal parts. One part sufficed for 4 prisoners per day. However, if the prisoner was a hard working prisoner he got one-half of one part per day. They were fed an ounce of oleo-margarin a wook. Hard workers got it twice a week. One form of punishment was hanging prisoners by their thumbs for 5 or 6 hours. When they were finally taken down they were handed a pick or a shovel and told to get to work. Their arms were useless and of course could not hold the pick or shovel. Then they were shot for refusing to work. Another example of cruelty was forming the prisoners in a circle around their work. An SS guard would take one of the prisoners hats and throw it away. Then he would turn to the prisoner and order him to retrieve it. As the prisoner moved away from the circle he was promptly shot for "attempting to escape". The reason for this cruelty and wanton killing was explained as follows. Most SS guards, before they were made into the elite troops, were criminals. They were put in this camp to annihilate as many "inferior" people as possible. The rule was that every SS guard would get a 3 day pass for every 10 men that died under his care. The deaths increased decidedly at Christmas time.

The third inmate was a Dutch officer. He had been in the camp for one year. He told us that typhus disease was injected into the prisoners to see how they would react and also in search of a cure. This officer was injected with typhus but he was found immune so he was given the job of working in the experimentation house.

A 45th Division guard told us that there were still many SS guards in among the prisoners disguising themselves as such. However they were gradually being recognized.

/s/ M/Sgt Jack Bessel

556. The following is quoted from Military Government Summary Number 31 for the week ending 10 May:

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The last phases of the rapid advance resulted in the uncovering of many more displaced persons, Allied prisoners of war, and concentration camps. The liberated began to move as soon as possible and only those in concentration camps stayed put to any degree.

The major problem during the week, however, was the control and supervision of the concentration camps at Dachau, Allach, Aichach, and Bernau. Fairly typical of the group, and by far the largest, was the camp at Dachau. When uncovered, many in the camps were starving and the health conditions and death rates were appalling. Despite all that the DP teams can do, the camp is still overcrowded.

The camp is now under the jurisdiction of Seventh Army with special DP teams supplemented by MG personnel, two medical evacuation units, and typhus teams. A typhus quarantine is in effect and very little movement can take place for two weeks.

There are reported to be approximately 1,000 cases of typhus, in addition to 800 cases of advance tuberculosis. Dysentery is rampant, Many corpses remained unburned or unburied when the camp was occupied, but disposal of the bodies has started.

On 29 April, the date when the Seventh Army overran Dachau, there was a camp population of 31,432, including 4,528 Russians, 9,082 Poles, 2,539 Jews, 3,918 French, 2,184 Italians, 2,907 Slovenes, eight British, and six Americans.

According to records discovered in the camp from 1933 until the present date, deaths amounted to approximately 40,000 from a total of 125,000 inmates. During 1945, for example, the following monthly report of deaths was listed:

January	2,888		
February	3,977		
March	3,668		
April	2,626		
1-3 May	139		

The great number of deaths in 1945 was reported to be due primarily to typhus and starvation.

557. Relative to the figure of 40,000 deaths obtained from camp records the following considerations are of interest:

a. The camp was established in 1933 and so had been in operation about 12 years or 144 months. The monthly average for deaths in the first four months of 1945 was, according to the records, 3,289, which was claimed to be considerably higher than the overall average. If we cut this rate to less than 1/3, or to 1,000 per month, the total would still be about 144,000.

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b. The crematorium was constructed or enlarged to a capacity of 135 per day, presumably for use, not ornament. Let's assume that in general it was not operated at full capacity but say at an average rate of 100 per day. At this rate 144,000 bodies would have been burned in 1,440 days or in less than 4 of the 12 years the camp was in operation.

c. The official investigation of the Dachau concentration camp for Headquarters 6th Army Group was made by War Crimes Team Number 6823 under Colonel David Chavez, Jr. However the personnel of this Board were assigned to Seventh Army and Seventh Army was transferred to 12th Army Group prior to rendition of their report which should accordingly be available in the records of Seventh Army and 12th Army Group.

558. On 2 May General Devers had entertained at dinner a number of prominent representatives of the Press who had come from the United States to view with their own eyes and report on conditions at the German concentration camps then being uncovered. Following dinner two large maps were displayed, the first showing operations of the Army Group and the second, the current situation in more detail. The General gave an informal briefing with reference to the maps and then invited questions and informal discussion. He pointed out the splendid performance of the Sherman tanks in the decisive mobile operations then in progress and was applauded for his praise of the 442nd Infantry whose members are of Japanese descent. As the party broke up one guest was overheard to remark to another that he thought it the best briefing they had enjoyed during their trip. To obviate the need for taking notes, briefs of the Army Groups operations were distributed. These are quoted below as they provide an excellent quick review to refresh one's memory on the sequence of main events.*

2 May 1945

Brief of 6th Army Group Operations

1. Landing in Southern France.

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Under command of Seventh Army, Operation "DRAGOON" began 15 August with VI US Corps composed of the veteran Third, Thirty Sixth and Forty-Fifth Divisions making the assault landing. French Army "B" came ashore in the wake of VI Corps rapid advance northward, turned westward and by 28 August had captured Toulon and was mopping up in Marseilles. With Task Force Butler speeding northeastward towards Grenoble, VI Corps continued up the Rhone Valley. Before reaching Grenoble TF Butler turned west and attempted to block the Rhone Valley in rear of the retreating Germans in the Valence area where a stiff fight ensued and heavy casualties were inflicted upon the enemy. Meanwhile, strong French forces had advanced up the west bank of the Rhone to protect Seventh Army's left flank. After the Valence battle,

*Personal observation.

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the advance continued rapidly northward.

2. Sixth Army Group Assumes Command.

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Moving from St Tropez where the first headquarters was established on 31 August to Lyon, Sixth Army Group assumed command of "DRAGOON" forces on 15 September. French elements became First French Army when 6th Army Group took command. Main body of our forces was generally along the line DIJON-BESANCON. Patrols of the 1 DMI of French Army "B" and 2 DB, French division of XV Corps, established contact at SOMBERNON on 11 September. On 14th September firm contact was made between the two divisions SE of CHAUMONT. After contact with XV Corps was made, French Army moved to right of Seventh Army. First French Army was directed on the axis BESANCON-BELFORT while VI Corps was advancing on axis VESOUL-ST DIE. XV Corps, composed of 79th US Infantry Division and 2nd French Armored Division, was transferred to the 6th Army Group on 29 September in the LUNEVILLE area. Late in October three new US Divisions, 100th and 103rd Infantry and 14th Armored debarked at Marseilles and were assigned to 6th Army Group.

3. Offensive to Close to the Rhine.

On November 13, Seventh Army, composed of the VI and XV Corps, began operation destined to breach the SAVERNE Gap and capture Strasbourg by 23 November. On November 14, First French Army's offensive against BELFORT GAP began and MULHOUSE was captured on 22 November.

4. Ardennes Offensive.

After capturing STRASBOURG, Seventh Army turned north and had reached the Franco-German border when the German ARDENNES counteroffensive upset operations. Seventh Army sideslipped to the left, taking over a Corps' sector from Third Army, thereby weakening its front and shelving temporarily its offensive. On 1 January, a strong German attack was hurled against Seventh Army in the HARDT Mountains and made some headway before being stalled. These operations, however, made it necessary for Seventh Army to withdraw to the Moder River Line which it occupied while operations were underway to reduce the Colmar Pocket.

5. Colmar Pocket Offensive.

With the 3rd US Division under command, the French II Corps launched an attack southward on 22 January to join up with French I Corps attacking towards the north to reduce the Colmar Pocket. Operations did not progress as rapidly as expected and the XXI US Corps with the 28th and 75th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions were sent in to bolster the attack. When the XXI Corps came into the picture 3rd US Division went under

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its control. With this added strength, German resistance was broken and the west bank of the Rhine south of Strasbourg was cleared of enemy on 9 February. Following this operation, the entire XXI Corps was transferred back to Seventh Army.

6. Breaching the Siegfried Line.

Rested and refitted and strengthened by addition of 63rd, 42nd Infantry, and 10th Armored Divisions, Seventh Army launched an attack against the Siegfried Line 15 March as Third Army an attack against the Siegfried Line 15 March as Third Army are resulted to the moselle River through the drove from the north from across the Moselle River through the Saar Palatinate. Aided by the rapid advance of Third Army, Seventh Army rapidly closed to the Rhine River in its zone while making preparations to make an assault crossing across the river at the same time. All organized resistance west of the Rhine River ended 25 March.

7. Crossing the Rhine and Advance to East.

As Third Army advanced on Frankfurt from its bridgehead across the Rhine, Seventh Army, spearheaded by the 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions, established a bridgehead over the Rhine on 25 March. Progress was rapid and Seventh Army elements relieved Third Army units along the Main River on 27 March. Advancing eastward, Seventh Army moved north of Nuremburg to the Bayreuth area where it was turned southward, directed on Munich. First French Army made an assault crossing of the Rhine on 31 March and advanced southward on KARLSRUHE.

8. Turn Southward.

Seventh Army turned southward at BAYREUTH, captured Nuremburg on 18 April while First French Army was advancing down the Rhine plain and extending into the Black Forest area. After taking these objectives, the armies regrouped on the run and continued a relentless pursuit of the shattered German Forces with Seventh Army capturing ULM on 24 April and Munich on 1 May as First French Army sealed the German-Swiss border on 25 April and reduced organized resistance in the Black Forest area on 27 April.

9. Operations into Western Austria.

Directed to occupy the mountainous region of western Austria to prevent the formation of the much talked about German National "Redoubt", 6th Army Group directed Seventh Army to continue southward with fast, mobile forces to seize INNS-BRUCK and LANDECK to block passes into northern Italy while First French Army was instructed to seize the highly important BREGENZ-FELDKIRCH hinge of the "Redoubt" along the Austrian-Swiss border. BREGENZ was captured 2 May and progress continued to the south in the French sector. Seventh Army advanced well into the Alps and was only three miles from the important

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east-west communication link of the INN River in the INNSBRUCK

Entry of 6th Army Group units into western Austria means an advance of over 900 miles since the landing in southern France 15th August 1944.

2 May 1945

Brief of G-4 Problems - 6th Army Group

The planning for a major landing of allied forces in Southern France started in Algiers in December 1943. The early planning was undertaken by the staff of General DEVERS who was then the Commanding General of NATOUSA. The entire coast line of Southern France from Spain to Italy was examined in detail. One of the major factors leading to the selection of the assault area on the Riviera was its proximity to the great port of Marseille, the use of which we knew would be necessary to import the tonnage required to support a major force such as the 6th Army Group. Marseille, being an artificial harbor, was subject to almost complete destruction, and it was known in advance that all the quays were heavily mined and that block ships were already in position. Had the Germans been completely successful in the destruction of the port of Marseille, a severe limitation would have been imposed on the advance of the combat troops. Fortunately, because the port was captured at an early date by French forces, the destruction of the port was not complete. Apparently some of the wires to the mines had been cut by Allied bombing. The port of Marseille was totally unusable on the date of its capture. Two months later berths for 29 Liberty ships were available as well as coaster berths, tanker berths, and LST hards. At the same time the harbors of DuBouc, Toulon, Cannes, and Nice were reopened. Each involved clearing mines, removing wrecked hulks, and rebuilding extensive facilities. The port of Marseille now has 60 alongside berths with a capacity of 25,000 tons per day. Over 2,500,000 tons of cargo, 180,158 vehicles, and 491,000 personnel have passed through the port.

During the campaigns in North Africa and Italy the greatest single limitation from the G-4 standpoint was port capacity. Having captured and rehabilitated France's greatest port, the off-loading problem was solved, but there remained a tremendous and complicated problem of overland transportation from the port area to our forward troops who advanced in such a spectacular rate after their landing in France until they made the junction with General Patton's Third Army north of Dijon in France. The armies supported themselves by truck haul from the beaches, supplemented by air drop, until the capture of Grenoble, 172 miles inland. Rail rehabilitation commenced as soon as the troops moved inland from the beaches and the first locomotives went into operation 23 August 1944, only 8 days

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after D-day. Rail service was opened into Lyon, Dijon, and Besancon 21 September 1944. A system of 1,166 miles of line was open for operation by 1 November 1944 (at the time the front had stabilized in the Vosges).

In the United States the G-4 problems are principally production and shipping. The pressure was always on "to get the stuff on the boats." The fact that, with the principal exception of ammunition, the forces of the 6th Army Group have not suffered from shortage of supplies is a tribute to the production capacity of the home front. The principal G-4 problem in the theater is the distribution of available supplies where they are needed and when they are needed. This is one activity in which we cannot work in compartments. The G-4 Section of divisions, corps, armies, and army groups all form a team who work in close conjunction with the base sections of the communications zone to insure an orderly flow of munitions and supplies to the combat troops. Once the major problems of offloading capacity at the ports was solved, the major engineering resources of all forces in the theater were thrown behind the rehabilitation and reconstruction of roads and railroads which the enemy had thoroughly destroyed, knowing full well in this manner he could slow down our rate of progress and delay the final day of his defeat.

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The amounts of supplies and equipment that are required to support a modern group of armies is amazing. Without laboring the point of the expense of this war, the following figures will indicate in a general way the scope of the requirements that have been laid down on the continent and already consumed by the armies of the 6th Army Group:

411,000 tons of ammunition.
410,000 tons of rations.
650,000 tons of POL which is approximately 204
million gallons.
250,000 miles of telephone wire.

Since the landing of forces now comprising the 6th Army Group on the shores of Southern France on 15 August 1944, more than 411,000 tons of ground force ammunition has been expended. This is an average of more than 3½ million pounds every day which is being hurled at the Germans. All types and sorts and sizes of shells and projectiles are included from the 111 grain carbine bullet to the giant 360 pound 240mm Howitzer projectile.

One of the most important problems faced by the Supply Services of 6th Army Group was providing the soldiers of the "best fed, best clothed, and best equipped army in the world," with sufficient cold climate clothing and equipment to meet the extreme damp-cold conditions encountered in the Vosges Mountain area. Based on the previous winter's experience in

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Italy, the QM Service had made plans for the supply of some 70,000 sets of special cold climate clothing, plus some 7,500 sets of ski and snow shoe equipment including mountain climbing items. In addition every combat soldier in Seventh Army was provided with a pair of Shoepacs plus two pair of felt insoles and four pairs of ski socks. It can be truthfully said that these items materially reduced the incident of tronch foot and improved the efficiency of the combat soldier.

Since landing in Southern France, 6th Army Group forces rushed up the Rhone valley, across the Marne and Moselle Rivers, breached the Saverne and Belfort Gaps, and the Siegfried Line, crossed the Rhine River and swung southeast again to capture Munich and are now cleaning out the remaining points of resistance in the Austrian Alps. Those forces have covered a distance of over 900 miles in less than 9 months, following a retreating enemy whos proficiency at destruction of communication facilities is unsurpassed. To move forward the supplies and equipment required to press the attack on the enemy, it has been necessary to rehabilitate 2,196 miles of railroad, rebuild 609 railroad and highway bridges ranging in size from minor bridges over small streams to major engineering projects such as the bridges over the Rhone and Rhine Rivers. The most as the bridges over the Rhone and Rhine Rivers. striking example of engineering work was probably the Rhine crossing. Here the Germans had demolished every bridge yet 9 hours and 12 minutes after the crossing had been commenced, the 85th Heavy Ponton Battalion had built a ponton bridge at Worms 1046 feet long capable of carrying 40 ton loads including tanks across the river. This was the fastest time that the Rhine had ever been bridged in all of its history. By 23 April a railroad bridge was carrying trains across at Mannheim. Today 2 railroad bridges, 9 highway bridges, including 5 floating bridges, in the 6th Army Group area are in use hauling supplies across the Rhine to the front.

One of the most outstanding achievements, one most characteristic of American technique and one never before known in any war and not known to other nations in this war, is our use of pipelines. 484 miles of 6" pipeline and 604 miles of 4" pipeline have been built and are delivering 1460 tons per day of petroleum products to the French-German frontier and 440 tons per day to the Rhine. This includes only pipelines from the south coast of France.

A further G-4 responsibility is that of evacuation of casualties. Patients that cannot be retained in army hospitals are evacuated to the rear areas for further treatment in general hospitals. Approximately 140,000 patients have been evacuated from the armies since the 6th Army Group landed in Southern France. Of these 85,000 were American and 55,000 were French patients. Whenever possible patients are evacuated by air in order to expedite their movement to the general hospitals in the rear. Except when the weather does not permit transport

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aircraft to fly, the major portion of the sick and wounded troops can be evacuated by air. For example, until very recently all patients have been evacuated from east of the Rhine by air using approximately 30 airplanes per day.

For every combatant soldier at the front, there are a much larger number in rear areas in direct support. For each frontline division of approximately 14,000 troops, there is an equal number of supporting and service troops in the army itself, so that the divisional slice for the army is about 28,000. There are an additional 12,000 service and supporting troops in the communications zone for each division in combat so that the total theater slice or average per division is about 40,000 troops. From these figures it is clear that by far the largest number of troops in an active theater are engaged in work that is essential to military operations but involves no actual contact with the enemy.

By way of summary, it should be emphasized that since the army group is a tactical headquarters, the mission of its G-4 section is to translate the tactical requirements into such form that the logistical resources in support of the armies are used to the best possible advantage for the support of operations. The G-4 section of this army group has no troops or supplies directly under its control, but it does form part of the team that keeps the forward troops the best fed and the best clothed army in the world.

 $559.\ \, \text{G-4}$ activities for the month of May are summarized below in an extract from the G-4 After Action Report:

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES OF G-4 SECTION 6TH ARMY GROUP FOR THE MONTH OF MAY

The first of May brought about the first unmistakable signs of a complete crumbling of the German Army in Southeastern Germany. Munich fell to the Seventh Army and, except for a few small units of fanatical SS troops, the Germans showed a disinclination to continue the fighting. On 6th of May, Army Group "G" surrendered unconditionally to General Devers and thus ended the European War for 6th Army Group and its subordinate commands.

The first week in May was a period of extreme difficulty in maintaining already over-extended supply lines. As the troops pressed on faster and faster in the face of diminishing resistance, trucks were forced to travel longer distances and to haul heavier loads to maintain necessary supply support. Ammunition expenditures fell off to almost nothing, but the need for gasoline increased greatly.

Railheads east of the Rhine were reached by way of a temporary fixed railway bridge across the Rhine at Mannheim

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which was opened 23 April and by a second bridge at Karlsruhe which was opened 4 May. By the 7th of May, rail rehabilitation had been substantially completed west of the Rhine River and some progress had been made east of the Rhine. Heilbronn was opened as a railhead 25 April. Stuttgart was reached 7 May.

With the end of the war an accomplished fact, 6th Army Group headquarters began to devote its full energy to the next task, that of redeployment training. Within the G-4 Section it was necessary to analyze new duties and responsibilities and to plan a complete staff reorganization.

Throughout the second week of May the Communications Zone rapidly withdrew much of its service unit support from the now quiescent 6th Army Group front and concentrated its full efforts on its tremendous task of redeployment. Ammunition allocations were terminated, deliveries of new tanks and other ordnance major items of equipment were stopped, and the supply support of the 6th Army Group settled down to the routine issuance of rations, gasoline, and a few Class II and IV items.

One of the major problems confronting 6th Army Group forces during the month of May was providing rations for Prisoners of War, Allied Prisoners of War, and Displaced Persons. Captured German stocks were low. The German Army in the 6th Army Group area had received no issues from higher headquarters since February.

The supply of the First French Army was changed by the termination of hostilities. Issues of some Class II and IV major items were stopped and the French were supplied only maintenance. Instructions went out to the French to turn in items loaned on an operational basis.

U.S. service unit reorganization and/or augmentation was stopped except in cases where changes would be consistent with the redeployment program.

On 15 May the Seventh Army was transferred to the 12th Army Group. This move relieved 6th Army Group of any U.S. administrative responsibility and was accomplished to place Seventh Army under its occupational headquarters and to free 6th Army Group of duties other than those incidental to Theater Redeployment Training. The fact that the international division of Germany between the United Nations had not been decided complicated the transfer of the French commands. It was decided by SHAEF that 6th Army Group would retain the two French commands, First French Army and Army Detachment of the Alps, then under its jurisdiction pending settlement of the French Occupational Zone.

On the 28th of May 6th Army Group received a telegram from SHAEF which stated that this headquarters would not conduct

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redeployment training as had been anticipated and would receive further instructions. The month of May ended prior to the receipt of further instructions and prior to the determination of the French Zone of Occupation in Germany.

560. For the information of those who may be interested in the maps themselves in addition to the situation map photographs an index map of the sheets concerned is included as Document Number 168. A voluminous set of maps in scale of 1; 100,000 showing 6th Army Group front lines, boundaries and CPs day by day has been prepared and sent to SHAEF for transmittal to the War Department through ETOUSA. A duplicate set was prepared for the records of the Army Group Commander. These maps, however, do not include the detailed information with respect to lower units that is shown in the situation map photos.

561. The total number of situation map negatives used is 204. Prints from all of these are included in the six master copies which include the document file. In other copies the number of situation map and other photos is somewhat reduced in order to save weight and bulk and because of the limited photographic supplies and services available.

562. Probably the most important item in the narrative for the month appears to receive the minimum of attention and emphasis. It is not a map, paragraph, or even a sentence, just a figure in the G-l summary under the heading "Killed in Action", Because this is a headquarters history and stresses the leadership, planning, and logistical achievements of General Devers and his staff, the reader may have gained the impression that members of the Headquarters feel that they are primarily responsible for success achieved and have given little thought or credit to the fighting man. If you had lived and worked at the headquarters for a time you would know that the realization was general that no matter how fine the leadership, how complete the enemy information and swift and sure the planning for operations and supply, the actual holding and advance of the battle lines depended finally on individuals giving their utmost in skill, strength, stamina and courage. Of these the killed and maimed are in a class above all others on the basis of personal contribution to victory.

563. Actually the concern of the headquarters for the figure "killed in action" was very real, all pervading and unceasing. Principally it was expressed in the sustained endeavor to expedite and enhance the success of operations so that the month of May was the last to include battle casualties in this theater; but in addition, a vast amount was accomplished to keep casualties as low as possible before surrender. Actions were taken to increase the strength of Seventh Army from 3 up to some 14 divisions in an effort to spread out the load and permit, the relief and rotation of units essential to the maintenance of alertness and efficiency and which accordingly saves

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lives. Unceasing action was taken to secure more artillery and other supporting combat and service units and to augment the supply of ammunition and needed equipment and supplies of all kinds since these, too, have a direct and important bearing on casualty rates. Again, in the withdrawal from the Siegfried Line to the MODER River line a limited amount of ground was traded for lives and the integrity of units.

564. Memorial Day ceremonies were held in the Headquarters Quadrangle. They included prayer, music, an address by General Devers, the placing of a flowered wreath and the sounding of taps. General Devers address follows:

MEMORIAL DAY ADDRESS

By General Jacob L. Devers

Wednesday 30 May 1945

On October 5th 1944, near Castillon, France, Technician Fifth Grade Eugene F. Patenaude of the Special Service Force was told that several soldiers of another company had been seriously wounded by an exploding mine. Voluntarily, he organized litter teams to undertake their rescue. Fully realizing the dangers involved, and without regard to his own safety, he started with his men down a mountainside towards the minefield. In complete darkness and a driving rain they reached the wounded men and began the slow, dangerous work of evacuation. Patenaude's leadership was abruptly ended when another mine exploded. The wounded men were saved; the man who saved them sacrificed his life.

Today is Memorial Day -- a day set aside in reverence to honor the memory of Technician Fifth Grade Eugene F. Patenaude.

On the 22nd of October 1944, in France, Captain Alexander M. Patch III led his infantry company as the spearhead of a regimental attack against high ground held by the enomy. To accomplish its mission the company had to leave the protection of a wooded area and advance along an exposed slope, in the face of withering fire. With utter disregard for his own safety Captain Patch moved at the head of his men, constantly inspiring them by a magnificent display of courage and leadership. He was painfully wounded, but refused to be evacuated for medical aid. Weakened by pain and loss of blood, for more than two hours he remained at the head of his company. Not until the regimental objective was in sight did he permit himself to be given aid. It was too late; a gallant captain gave his life in the cause of his men and his country.

On this Memorial Day we have gathered to honor the memory of Captain Patch.

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One day last year on the raging Atlantic an American troop transport was torpedoed. Amid the blast and flames of the explosion, some of the life boats were destroyed, and in the confusion there were soldiers without life preservers. There were four chaplains aboard the transport -- Catholic, Protestant and Jewish. They gave their life preservers to four soldiers. With arms joined and a hymn on their lips, the four chaplains went down with the ship.

This is a day of memorial for those chaplains, whose courage and gallantry were so tremendous that we stand before them in humility and awe.

I can not think, today, of row upon row of nameless crosses -- of statistics in a cemetery. Nor can you. Each of you will remember some individual friend or comrade who gave the last true measure of devotion. It is for him that you are here. It is his particular memory you honor.

Among Sixth Army Group troops in this campaign, 23,303 have been killed in action. Another 107,583 have been wounded; the number missing is 15,266. Each one of these was someone's comrade -- someone's son, or husband, or father. In each of their homes today there is mourning and memoriam. Our mission today is to insure, for all time, that this memoriam is not only for today.

It was an American soldier who said, of his comrade, that "each of us some day must die; but not all of us can die for a cause." The warm red glow of their memory should, and must -- every day of our lives -- be the eternal flame that will forever kindle the bright light of the cause they died for.

Our tribute to these men cannot be paid here. It must be paid in our preservation of the freedom and of the ideals they died to save. The rights of the individual; the sanctity of the home; the preservation of the family; freedom of religion, of speech, of assembly, and of the press; eternal vigilance on behalf of the oppressed and the under-privileged; racial and religious tolerance; freedom from fear and from want -- these are the treasures our comrades give to us today, to treasure and preserve that their deaths be not in vain.

Today is Memorial Day but, to the dead we honor, this is not the target day on which their eternal sights are fixed. That day will come often to each of us. It will be every day that we live as responsible citizens of our democratic America; it will be every day that we lend a hand to the underdog, every day that we fight regimentation and oppression; every day that we exercise our right to vote; every day that we work and strive to maintain the integrity of ourselves, our homes and our families; every day that we speak one word or do one deed in defense of the institutions that will keep us free and great.

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Every day must be Memorial Day.

We owe it to our dead.

565. Extracts from the G-1 After Action Report 1 through

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31 May are give below:	U.S. FORCES	FRENCH FORCES	TOTAL
Killed	91	284	375
Wounded	471	481	952
Missing	68	28	96
Captured	2		2
Total Battle Casualtics (through 11 May)	632	793 -	1,425
Non-Battle Casualties in- cluding Sick(Hospitalized).	5,409	45,454	50,863
Total Casualties	6,041	46,247	52,288
Sick and Wounded returned to Units	6,688	19,260	25,948
Balance (Loss for Month)	Gain 647	26,987	26,340
Reinforcements received	3,230	12,951	16,181
Balance-Gain or Deficiency for the Month	Gain 3,877	Loss 14,036	Loss 10,159
T/O Strength of Command	339,988	376,046	716,034
Assigned Strength	340,257	413,327	753,584
Actual Strength	324,533	360,545	685,078
Infantry Shortage	864	7,994	8,858
Prisoners of War Captured during the Month	268,995	72,409	341,404
Prisoners of War Captured (Cumulative)	679,613	268,883	948,496

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SECTION II

REFERÊNCES

REF NO.	DATE & FILE NO.	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	DOC NO.
225.	Hq 6 AG G-3 2 May 45	Staff Action Taken to Secure Change in Boundary Between 12th & 6th Army Groups.	150.
226.	Hq 6 AG Adm Instr #14 2 May 45	Supply and Evacuation by Air.	151.
227.	Hq 6 AG Staff Memo #26 4 May 45	Policy for Promotion of Officers.	
228.	Hq 6 AG G.O. #28 4 May 45	Announcement of Special Staff Section(Med) & Aptmt of Chief	
229.	AG 400.12/3 SGS- 0 4 May 45	Use of Military and Civilian Supplies & Facilities in Germany.	152.
230.	Hq 6 AG Bulletin 4 May 45	Battle Participation Credit.	153.
231.	AG 330.13/3 -0	Letter from Mosley Mayne of India.	
232.	6 May 1945	Information from War Room staff, Major Barkeen.	
233.	AG 370.5/6 A-0 4 May 45	Establishment of Tactical Hq 6 AG at KAUFBEUREN, GERMANY.	
234.	Hq 6 AG Newspaper 9 May 45	Die Mitteilungen, 6th Army Group Newspaper.	154.
235.	Hq 6 AG G.O. #31 10 May 45	Awards and Decorations.	155.
236.	Hq 6 AG G-3 11 May 45	Telephone conversation with G-3 SHAEF, Reference King LEOPOLD. To C/S.	156.
237.	15 May 1945	6th Army Group Record of Progress.	157.
238.	AG 430.2/3 D-0 17 May 45	Utilization of Labor in GER- MANY. To CGs w/Incl 230.14 (G-4 Misc) Hq 12 AG dated 8 April 45 same subject.	

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REF NO.	DATE & FILE NO.	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	DOC NO.
239.	18 May 1945	Staff Section Roster Number 12.	158.
240.	19 May 1945	List of Citations given.	159.
241.	Hq 6 AG G.O. #34 19 May 45	Awards and Decorations.	160.
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249.	25 May 1945	Interview Colonel O. H. Saunders, Heidelberg.	
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251.		Europe Index to 1:100,000 Map Series.	168.

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
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DAT							
N1	ght 3	00	Ay •	ori	1-		3rd and 45th Divisions take and occupy MUNICH.
1	May.						Operation INDEPENDENCE completed. (Western FRANCE)
2	May.					•	One CC 12th Armored and elements 4th Division made 25 mile advance along autobahn toward SALZBURG.
2	May.						36th Division troops captured Fieldmarshal von Rundstedt at breakfast, BAD TOLZ.
3	May.						103rd Division, VI Corps, entered INNSBRUC
							3rd Division, XV Corps entered SALZBURG and BERCHTESGADEN. SALZBURG surrendered to 121st Cav. Sq.
5	May.						44th Division occupied LANDECK. German Army Group G surrendered unconditionally to 6th Army Group at HARR, BAVARIA. Also German Nineteenth Army surrendered to VI US Corps at INNSBRUCK, AUSTRIA.
7	May.		٠				Admiral Doenitz surrenders all German military, Naval and Air forces to the three Allies, U.S., Britain and U.S.S.R.
8	May.						British VE Day. President Truman and General Eisenhower make victory speeches.
9	May.						0001B hours official date and hour of cessation of hostilities under the surrender terms. This was May 8 in U.S.
9	May.						Russian Victory Day.
14	May.						Final collapse of German resistance agains Russians in Czechoslovakia.



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CHAPTER XI

JUNE 1 TO JULY 20, 1945

565. The combat operations of 6th Army Group have been covered in the preceding chapters. However there remain a few matters of considerable interest and value to be covered in this chapter. Foremost in importance as a lesson for future guidance and to provide detailed factual data for staff and school studies is the ammunition study, "The Effect of Ammunition Supply on Operations of Sixth Army Group," Paragraph 577. In addition, there are included an account of the "Transfer of Area Control in Germany and Justria between U. S. and French Headquarters," Paragraph 580, an account of G-5 (Military Government) activities for the period, Paragraph 585, and brief details of the deactivation of the Headquarters.

566. All previous chapters have had the benefit of careful review by the principal General Staff Sections. In the case of this chapter, completed after the inactivation of the Headquarters, such review has been impractible. However, much of its material has been furnished by the Staff Section having primary interest, and the ammunition study, prepared by the C-3 Section, has been coordinated with C-4 and Ordnance.

567. This was an appropriate period for completing the award of decorations earned during 6th Army Group's significant year of operations. The majority of the awards made during June are covered in General Orders as follows:

G.C.	DATE	DOCULENT NO.
41	1 June	170
42	3 June	171.
44	6 June	172
45	10 June	173
47	14 June	
51		175

Dates of presentation are indicated in a series of ten lists included as Document No. 176.

'568. On 5 June General Orders Number 43 announced the assignment of Lieutenant Colonel Roy K. Fairman as Public Relations Officer vice Brigadier General Tristram Tupper, transferred.

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569. On 6 June Colonel Carroll T. Newton was designated Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 vice Brigadier General Clarence L. Adcock, transferred (General Orders 46, 12 June).

570. On 11 June there was received a SHAEF message which is extracted and paraphrased below:

1. Submission of certain operational data, details of which follow, is required by Mar Department:

2. Each U.S. Army Group, Army, Corps, Division, Task Force, Provisional Unit, Cavalry Reconnaissance Group or other separate Command which occupied a sector on the front will prepare and submit the following data to the War Department through command channels.

A. Maps with scale of 1:100000 showing thereon for each day as of 2359 hours from 6th June 1944 to 11 May 1945:

and left.

dates).

3. Sector occupied or ground captured.

dated items as follows:

ments to Corps.

List of all attachments and detachments of RCT's and combat commands.

5. Casualties suffered and prisoners captured by campaign, I.E.

A. From 6th June to 24th July 1944. B. From 25 July to 14 September

21 March 1945.

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3. Key personnel of originating units will check the maps and reports for accuracy before submission through channels. Higher Headquarters will check these maps and reports when received for completeness and, in the case of battle service under that Headquarters, for accuracy as well.

when under 6th Army Group will submit their maps and reports through channels to Seventh Army, 6th Army Group, and thence to 12th Army Group.

5. 1 August 1945 is target date for delivery of all maps and reports to AGWAR.

6. Before submission, Historical Section, ETOUSA, will make final check of maps and reports.

Work on this voluminous project was begun at once and the necessary Army Group maps and records were completed during the month of June. Reference to these maps is made in Chapter X, Paragraph 560.

571. Staff Section Roster Number 13 was published 18 June. (260)

572. In response to a request from the editor of "The Military Review" a brief and well written account of 6th Army Group Operations with special attention to logistical problems was completed on 21 June by Lieutenant Colonel W. E. Little, Chief, Flans and Operations Branch of the G-4 Section: (261)

573. On 26 June Colonel Marry D. Easton, Jr., was appointed Acting A.C. of S., G-l vice Major General Ben M. Sawbridge, transferred and Colonel Jonathan C. Semman was appointed Secretary General Staff vice Lieutenant Colonel William J. McWilliams, transferred.

574. On 30 June Major General David G. Barr assumed command of 6th Army Group and Brigadier General Whitfield P. Shepard was appointed Chief of Staff (G.O. 56 and G.O. 59).

575. On 7 July G-3 submitted a final report of 113 pages with covering letter as follows:

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SUBJECT: Final Report.

TC. : The Chief of Staff.

1. The attached document is submitted as a Final Report, in narrative form, of some of the more important activities in which this office had a primary interest during operations of Headquarters 6th Army Group from its organization to 30 June 1945. No effort has been made to cover in detail or even mention many things of a minor nature, especially if they have no real historical value. Effort has been made to cover most items of major interest, which have historical value, in sufficient detail to indicate dates, actions taken, the reasons therefor, and the results produced, along with such correlative items as are pertinent and of interest. It will be noted that, except in one case, reference to the means and methods employed by 6th Army Group to deceive the German is omitted. It is believed that these matters should not be disclosed in this document.

2. In preparing this report effort has been made to deal with all activities by phases, and chronologically where possible. Every effort has been made to insure that facts such as dates, actions, reasons and results are correctly recorded and substantiated by records of this headquarters. However, conjectures, opinions and the like, which are readily identified in this report, do not necassarily represent the official records of this headquarters or the views of any officers or troops of this headquarters other than myself and the officers of the Flanning Staff and Committee who collaborated in the compilation of this report. While it is not intended that this report should be considered as a history of 6th Army Group operations, it is intended that this report should amplify and supploment broadly the G-3 aspects of the History of Headquarters 6th Army Group which has been produced as a separate document; and it should be read in this light.

3. Time available has procluded presenting this report in as carefully chosen language and with the editorial nleety desired. Readers should bear this fact in mind when analyzing this report.

h. E. JENKINS Brighdior Gonoral, G.S.C., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

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576. The G-3 Section had been enlarged in anticipation of the task of redeployment training and when this responsibility was removed there was available a considerable reservoir of highly qualified personnel for the preparation of this final report. In addition to amplifying certain G-3 aspects of the Headquarters History the report serves as a condensation of G-3 information into one volume whereas in the History G-3 information is distributed among several volumes and integrated with material pertaining to other Staff Sections. The approved distribution list of the G-3 Final Report is included in the document file. (262)

577. There follows the ammunition study mentioned in the opening paragraph of this chapter. Such a study had been under request for several menths but as originally prepared by the G-3 Section it was first published in the G-3 Final Report, time being unavailable for coordination with the G-4 and Ordnance Sections. Before inclusion in the Headquarters History, however, this study was thus coordinated and approved by the interested sections with the incorporation of the "Freemble" and a few minor additions and explanations throughout the text. The study as here presented is supported by a comprehensive document file which is not available in the G-3 Final Report. While the study deals mainly with Artillery Ammunition, similar shortages were the rule in certain types of Infantry Ammunition, notably that for the Slam and 60mm mortars, where the last round of a "Day of Fire" might well be in the air before the first had reached its target; and mortar platoons were broken up because the available ammunition did not warrant holding them together.

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Animunition has been a controversial and debatable but interesting subject for 6th Army Group and for these who were destined to become a part of 6th Army Group, ever since Force 163, later to become Headquarters Seventh Army, first started computing ammunition requirements for the assault in Southern France in a small building in Oran early in 1944. It has been a problem since the first day of attack in the "soft underside" when the cry was raised that too much ammunition and not enough gasoline had been shipped, since 3,000 tens a day were being loaded at Marseille without sufficient transportation to move it from the port area, where nearly 40,000 tens were loaded at quays, and which eventually grew to ever 100,000 tens in the base depots. It has been a problem since D-Day when the best unloading records have been inaccurate and when units drew ammunition from beach dumps with little or no attempt to inform depot offices. It has caused concern since some thousand rounds of morter ammunition which had been shipped as flatting were discharged in Sardinia shortly before D-Day, and many thousands of rounds of 4.5 cun ammunition were returned to the U.S. in the haste'to turn ships around. It has been interesting since the joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the use of the VT fuze for the first time against terrestial targets on 18 December 1944 to help stem the tide of the German breakthrough in the Ardennes, since American troops found that German mines were more effective than their own, and at times they had to plant them five deep to produce satisfactory results, since so many malfunctions occurred on the 4.2" chemical morter HE shell that firing had to be done by a langard from bohind revetments. These events and happenings are connected with the success and failure in the execution of supply plans and with the success or failure of our material and ammunition as compared with that of the enemy. However, this study deals merely with one aspect of the ammunition picture i.e., from the G-3 viewpoint. It should be

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1. GENERAL

The availibility of artillery ammunition plays a most important role in determining what operations can be undertaken. During the operations of 6th Army Group, the lack of an adequate ammunition supply had an important effect on the operations that were undertaken. The amount of ammunition that can be expended in any given operation is directly dependent on future resupply possibilities. A field commander cannot expend the ammunition on hand to the best advantage unless he is assured of an adequate and timely resupply. This chapter will discuss in detail the effect of the ammunition supply situation on the operations undertaken by 6th Army Group.

2. D-DAY to 30 SEPTEMBER 1944.

The artillery ammunition for this phase of the operations was set up in the "DRAGOON" plan and was phased into Southern FRANCE through the beachheads and the ports in accordance with the anticipated requirements and the increase in the gun list.

- (a) To provide this supply, the resources, including reserves, of the MEDITERRANEAN Theater of Operations were divided on a gun list basis between the 5th Army and the DRAGOCH troop list.
- (b) Ammunition requisitions for the DRAGGON operation were also placed on the UNITED STATES for loading in ships to be discharged in Southern FRANCE after D plus 30.
- (c) The amounts of amountain planned for the early phases of the operation were adequate.
- (d) The rapid advance of the troops inland made difficult transportation problem and the troops did not receive all of the ammunition that they might have used.
- (a) During the latter half of September, resistance stiffened, causing an increased domand for artillery ammunition, so that the tonnage of ammunition reaching the front line units was barely sufficient to support the pressure it was desired to maintain against the enemy. No ammunition tonnage was available to create stocks in the forward areas, other than small ASP's.

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(f) Frier to 15 September 1944, 7th Army was in command of the entire operation including French units. The artillery officer of the 7th Army controlled the allocation of the ammunition between U.S. and French troops. When 6th Army Group assumed command, it immediately became necessary to allocate artillery ammunition between the 7th Army and the First French Army in order to insuse an equitable distribution of combat resources and to facilitate orderly transportation arrangements. At this time the line of communications extended from the southern French port of MARSELLE and the beaches east of TOULON to the facthills of the VOSCES MOUNTAINS, a distance of 425 to 500 miles.

- g) To allocate emmunition it is necessary to know:
- (1) What quantities are immediately available?
 (2) What the resupply rate will be for several months in the future?
 (3) The operations, current and future, that

Complete information (1) and (1) was not eveilable in late September 1944, due to incomplete riving a records of French units, incomplete ship unleading records, incomplete havings and issue records.

(h) The allocation of artillery ammunition for the period 26 September to 15 Cotober was based on the best information at hand on available artillery armunition. These data were furnished by the Artillery Criber 7th Army and included all artillery ammunition in the ADP's, back to the southern ports, and some in shius in the jorts. Due to transportation difficulties, positive assurances could not be obtained from the supply agencies as to whether it could all be unlocated from the shi s and moved to the front promotily. The following operational factors were taken into account:

(1) Mission of 6th Army Group: To maintain constant pressure on the energy.
(2) Missions assigned to 7th Army and First French Army were equal in importance and the relative difficulties and resistance facing the two were considered to be equal.
(3) Future plans for crossing the KillE and

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED (1) Use of same rate per gun per day in con-puting quantities for each Army. Additional guns arrivend during the period were considered. (2) Although a per/gun, per/day rate was used in computing the quantities, the totals only were furnished to the Armies.

(3) Army commanders were instructed that they must create their own reserves and build up amounties stocks for future operations from the allocations. (i) Because the expenditure during the first bonth of the operation had been less than anticipated, the gun day rates, used in calculating the allocation for the period 26 September to 15 October, were the highest ever possible in the 105mm HOW and 155mm HOW; but for the other two main weapons, the rates were lower. They were:

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missions and difficulties of the two Armies were considered to be equal, therefore, equal gun day rates were used in computing the allocations for both Armies and for the First Airborne Task Force on the Franco-Italian border.

- (b) During early October, studies of the artillery ammunition requirements for crossing the RHINE and breaching the SIEGFRIED LINE were completed. Information was furnished to SOS NATOUSA that it was anticipated that, at some period during November, the Army Group would expend thirty days of supply of ammunition, at the MTO day of supply (see MTO D of S Column (2) Table 4) during a period of ten days. This information was furnished in order to permit the supply agencies to take the necessary action to insure that the ammunition would be available, and that the expenditures during the ten day period would not create a critical ammunition shortage immediately thereafter.
- (c) During the latter part of the month Headquarters MTOUSA Advance provided the data requested early in October, on the standing of the 5th Army Group with respect to ammunition allocated to Southern FRANCE by SOS, MATOUSA, also on the expected arrivals of ammunition from the U.S. These data made it possible to make adjustments during the allocation period 1 to 10 November. Again the missions and difficulties of the Armies were considered equal and equal gun day rates were used in computing the allocations. The gun day rates decreased because the actual ammunition arrivals for November were not as pradicted, and it was necessary to spread some of the quantities arriving in October over the whole month of November, instead of the first half.
- (d) On 28 October, a meeting was held by the Artillery Section, G-3, and Ordnance Subsection, G-4, with representatives of the Army Artillery Officers and Ordnance Officers and the Ordnance Officer MINUSA Advance. At this meeting details were settled concerning the system for allocating and controlling the ammunition available to the Army Group. The system in brief consisted of the following:
- (1) MTGUSA Advance to furnish timely information to the 6th Army Group on the available ammunition, to include confirmed quantities of ammunition arriving during the month and estimated figures for ammunition arrivals during the succeeding two months.
 - (2) The Army Group to establish its allocations

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as credits for the various Armies and forces with Hdq MTOUSA ADV. These credits to remain good until drawn by

(3) The Armies or forces to call forward their armunition to the army areas as required.

(A) 6th Arry Group to establish any other restrictions, limitations or special provisions regarding the employment of ammunition by instruction to the Armies.

(e) During October it became apparent that it would be necessary to allocate ammunition by type within the respective calibers in order to bernit proper distribution of projectile and func types, whereas heretofere only complete rounds by caliber had been allocated. Unbalanced shipments and shipments of unrequisitioned types in an attempt to clear the ports had produced a serious maldistribution. Adjustments for over-shipment of particular types were made in the allocations for the period 1 to 10 November.

(f) During October the transport tion capacity increased and constant pressure was placed or ammunition movement in order to provide the required build-up of ammunition for the offensive to be launched in mid-hovember. The rate of which the necessary ammunition could be accumulated in the forward areas determined the date when this major coordinated attack could be launched. Although constant pressure assist the German Forces was being minimumed, expenditures were held to the minimum during this period in order to expedit the ammunition build-up.

(s) During this period the Army Group hold no true reserve of ammunition forward of Base Depots. Some shall quantities of ammunition were not allocated, but these were regarded as however must inaccur class in availability figures. The creation of an Army Group Reserve at this time was impracticable because:

forts was allocated to the Armies to build up supplies for current and immediate future needs.

(2) Armies were being supplied out of the Southern Ports and no Communication Zone Section stocks had yet been built up in the forward areas. No tennage could yet be spared for building such forward dumps.

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(3) Any reserve held by the Army Group could only have been held in the Southern Ports and with a rail travel time of 7 - 10 days to the Armies it would have been unwieldy to segregate an Army Group Reserve.

(4) A backlog of unloaded ammunition ships at this time, in effect, provided a reserve.

4. 12 NOVEMBER 44 to 15 DECEMBER 44:

(a) At the beginning of this period ammunition had been built up in forward areas permitting the launching of the coordinated offensive planned for mid-November. To start this battle, ammunition as follows, per piece, was available to the Armies:

Type	Rounds Per Fiece 7th Army	Rounds Per Piece 1st French Army
105mm HOW	1526	1179
155mm HOW	585	848
155mm Gun	820	510
8" HOW	428	715

All of this ammunition had not yet reached the forward area but it was now possible to move the balance forward by the time it would be required.

(b) It is well to note at this point that up until the receipt of the paraphrase of AGMAR Hessage MX 58633 all ammunition expenditure planning had been on the assumption that the War Department was capable of supporting the operation with a Var Department approved MTO Bay of Supply per weapon. See Column (2) in Table 4. The authorized level of ammunition for MTO was 75 days of supply. MTOUSA Advance requisitioned on this basis although generally the stockage actually on the ground in the theater did not reach this amount. This was due to delays caused by the charmel of submitting and method of this requisitions. The result was, that part of the 75 days of supply was generally afloat. About this time the Army Group was informed that the situation would be relieved schewhat by permitting the supply services to requisition on anticipated consumption, and thus fill the water part of the pipe line.

(c) On 11 November a paraphrase of ACWAR Message WX 58633 was received. (See Tab. A Section I Amm. Consumption and Regmt. Analysis, 6 A.C. 23/11/44 in Document file.) (Document 180)

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This message indicated that beginning in January the ammunition support available from the War Department would be considerably less than the ETO or MTO day of supply particularly in the 105mm HOW and the 155mm HOW, which constitute the bulk of the artillery support. This message was received first with incredulity and then with amazement. The Armies under 6th Army Group had just been reinforced and were now fully deployed prepared to strike powerful blows at the enemy. The available resupply predicted for the first four months of 1945 as compared to the ETO and MTO days of supply is tabulated as follows:

Type	ETO day of Supply	MTC day of Supply	Resupply potential average 1 Jan to 30 April.
105mm HOW 155mm HOW 155mm Gun 8" HOW 240mm HOW	25 25 25 20 7	50 35 30 25 15	18 15 15 13 5.5 11.0*
8" Gun *5.	15 5 for January, Fe	15 bruary, 11.0 L	arch, April.

It can be seen from the above that the possible artiblery support would be greatly reduced under these resupply rates. Reduction amounting to 64% for the 105mm HOW, 57% for the 155mm HOW, and 50% for the 155mm Gun. The effect of these drastic reductions in expected amountion supply had a tremendous effect on the planning of operations.

(d) On 23 Movember Major General Bull, C-3 SHAEF, and Major General Clay from Washington visited 6th Army Group Headquarters to confer on the implications of the drastically reduced ammunition resupply. Generals Bull and Clay were furnished with a study, 6th Army Group Ammunition Consumption and Requirements Analysis, dated 22 November 1944. (263). The conference held with Generals Bull and Clay was attended by the Army Group Commander, Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff G-3 and G-4. The following is quoted from paragraph 2 of the Armunition Consumption and Requirements analysis:

"2. Discussion. Artillery ammunition, like other combat resources, directly affects the magnitude, scope and timing of operations that can be conducted. When

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ammunition supplies are short it has the effect of making it not possible to employ all the troops simultaneously "in an offensive role. It restricts the timing of operations because ammunition must be accumulated to launch a major action. It reduces the possibility of taking immediate advantage of weaknesses in the enemy's dispositions. It has an undesirable psychological effect on troops and commanders."

- (e) It now appeared that the ammunition supply for the next six months consisted of the quantities which had already been committed to shipment to the Southern ports in November and December, and thereafter the extremely meager resupply as predicted by the War Department for the first four months of 1945. In this connection reference, is made to the line plotted at the appropriate level on the attached expenditure charts showing the comparison of the resupply rates predicted by the War Department with actual expenditures. This line is marked on the chart by (1), (2) and (3). The ammunition which had been reduisitioned in anticipation of the RHINE crossing, and because of the increased weapons list of 6th Army Group, was scheduled to arrive in late November and December. This amounted to considerable quantities of ammunition. It was now plain that this ammunition constituted the only offensive ammunition resources that would be available to the Army Group for many months to come. Information on the reduced future rates of supply was furnished to the Commanding General, Seventh Army, on or about 12 November. This information was furnished only in general terms to the 1st French Army at this time.
- (f) 6th Army Group launched its major offensive on 13 November 1944 when Seventh Army began the attack. Expenditures reached a high level throughout Seventh Army for 3 to 5 days. After the line was broken and the exploitation initiated, expenditures dropped considerably. The Artillery Officer of Seventh Army exercised rigid control over artillery ammunition within the Army because it was anticipated that the fight and pursuit would continue, and that, upon reaching the SIECURIED LINE and the RHINE, artillery ammunition in large quantities would be required to permit immediate attack to overcome these obstacles.
- (c) In the First French Army, which started its attack on 14 Movember 1944, expenditures immediately reached a high scale and continued at a very high rate several days after the progress of the troops had stopped. Lavish

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expenditure on the part of First French Army continued unabated until 21 November 1944 and then it slackened only slightly. At this point it became necessary to inform the CG First French Army that all available ammunition that could be supplied to it for current operations had been made available, and that it was not possible to support continuously such expenditures. By 28 November 1944, it became necessary to furnish some additional ammunition to the First French Army from the meager reserves held by 6th Army Group. It also was necessary to make considerable quantities of ammunition available to First French Army that constituted part of the December supply. Henceforth until 31 December 1944 artillery ammunition was allocated to the First French Army for specific operations only in order to prevent excessive consumption from destroying the offensive power of the Army Group as a whole.

(h) During early December the progress of Seventh Army toward the North was highly satisfactory and it was planned to force the SIECFRIED LINE and then cross the RHINE. Although Seventh Army still had considerable quantities of ammunition available to it, it was allocated a major share of the ammunition. However, these large quantities were held under control of 6th Army Group until released for specific operations. This was done to insure that Seventh Army had credited to it all the ammunition that it could possibly move into the forward areas. The Communications Zene had not yet established any ammunition stockages in the forward areas; therefore, it was incumbent that the Armies have suple credits in order to insure timely movement of the ammunition forward. Analysis of the ammunition position of the Army Group as of 10 December revealed that, provided First French Army was placed in a defensive role along the RHINE, sufficient light and medium artillery ammunition would be available to support a continuance of the Seventh Army's penetration of the SIEGFRIED LINE and the crossing of the FMINE and a move toward KASEL. For the heavy artillery the desired quantities of ammunition would not be available, and under the predicted resupply rates would never be available, consequently any operations undertaken must accept the handicap of restricted heavy artillery support. During the whole period the actual expenditures were greater than during the previous two periods because of high expenditures by the First French Army

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5. 16 DECEMBER 1944 to 16 JANUARY 1945.

(a) Seventh Army had reached and penetrated the Franco-German border by 16 December 1944 and was making excellent progress thru the SIEGFRIED LINE. The artillery ammunition available to Seventh Army was sufficient to continue the penetration, close to the RHINE, cross, and defend a bridgehead. The German ARDENNES counteroffensive upset operations. Seventh Army sideslipped to the left, taking over two corps sectors from Third Army, thereby weakening its front and shelving temporarily its offensive. The First French Army had reached the RHINE except for the COLMAR pocket.

(b) Representatives of 6th Army Group were called to SHAEF for an ammunition meeting on 20 December 1944, at which time it was announced that SHAEF was assuming control of all ammunition resources in France as of 1 December 1944. Note that this was retroactive. Until the visit of Generals Bull and Clay and the final action taken by SHAEF, 6th Army Group had been able to consider that all artillery ammunition coming in to southern ports was available to 6th Army Group. SHAEF in assuming control proposed to exercise this control by establishing a maintenance day of supply for each weapon and certain reserves per weapon for which ammunition was in short supply. This maintenance day of supply was in reality the available day of supply for each weapon and was calculated by considering as available all stocks then in CCMZONE and SOLOC and the expected future supplies from the United States to 1 May 1945. After determining the deployment weapons list, the available ammunition was prorated for the period 1 December to 1 May 1945 into two categories:

(1) A 10 day reserve for each weapon to be controlled by SHAEF.
(2) A daily supply for each weapon.

The results of these calculations were shown on a series of graphs. (See memo to C/S, Subject: Ammunition Supply, 24 December 1944.) (264) The rates shown were somewhat better than the resupply predictions shown in the AGWAR cable WX 58633 discussed in Para 4(c) above. This was due to spreading out of the existing stocks in the theater, particularly the stocks in SCLOC which had been considered as available to 6th Army Group, and some additional quantities made available by the War Department as a result of General Bull's visit, on the subject, to

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Washington in late November 1944. Representatives of 6th Army Group received this information on 20 December in Paris and were told that the information was preliminary, and that no written confirmation would be made for the time being. The recommendations of the Army Groups were desired as to. desired as to:

small?

too fast? (3) Such other recommendations as the Army Groups desired to make.

Making the assumption of control retroactive to 1 December 1944 placed the 6th Army Group in the position of already having overdrawn its share of ammunition for December. 6th Army Group had already allocated ammunition to the Armies for December and this ammunition had been largely consumed. The unexpended balances were required to execute the assigned missions. In response to the informal request for recommendations, the 6th Army Group concurred in the general scheme with exceptions in substance as follows. (See Message BAX 25299, 25 December 1944.)

held at Army Group level.
(2) Creation of theater reserve was too
abrupt causing unnecessary dislocation in tactical and

abrupt causing unifecessity around a ammunition plans.

(3) Keeping computation of rates in whole numbers of rounds resulted in the reserves being considerably in excess of ten days.

(4) 6th Army Group had already allocated and largely expended its December ammunition. It would be placed in the position of being overdrawn on its share initially. The difference was requested from the proposed initially. The difference was requested from the proposed SHAEF reserve as an immediate allocation to prevent the Army Group from being overdrawn on 1 January 1945. (For complete details see staff study from G-3 to Chief of Staff dated 24 December 1944.) (264)

(c) The request for a special allocation from the proposed SHAEF Ammunition Reserve was not granted. SHAEF selected another solution. The calculations were revised and the system put into effect as of 1 January 1945 rather than as of 1 December 1944. The revised rates were announced in SHAEF Message S-73227, 31 December 1944 which placed

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the system in effect. The plan was in substance as follows:

(1) A maintenance day of supply for each weapon in the theater. This maintenance day of supply is generally referred to as the SHAEF maintenance rate. This rate is plotted on the expenditure charts at the end of this study and marked "SHAEF RATE."

(2) A SHAEF ammunition reserve of 7 days of maintenance supply for each weapon in the theater was established.

established.

(3) A reserve of 27 maintenance days of supply for each weapon in the Army Groups. This 27 days of supply was to be controlled by the Army Groups and to provide the necessary Army reserves.

The maintenance day of supply had been computed by taking into account all the ammunition in Army ASP's as of 31 December, all ammunition in Communication Zone and SOLOC installations, and the expected resupply from the War Department. The SHAEF maintenance day of supply, for the most critically short types, as announced 1 January 1945 was as follows:

Type		Rds/Wpr
57mm Gun HE 81mm Mortar Lt. 105mm HOW M2 an 105mm HOW (Tank 155mm HOW HE 155mm Gun HE 8" HOW HE 8" Gun HE	d M7, HE	0.7 6.0 26.0 8.6 19.5 13.0 5.5 11.9
240mm HOW HE		4.7

(d) The establishment of this system in effect recaptured all ammunition in Army ASP's and made an equal redistribution on a weapon basis. The establishment of the SHAEF maintenance day of supply had the effect of providing a guarahteed rate of ammunition resupply to the Army Groups, While the rates were not as high as were desired, they were better than the resupply rates predicted by the War Department in November. This system provided a definite assurance of what the ammunition supply would be for 1 January to 1 May and provided a sound basis for ammunition expenditure planning.

(e) Prior to the receipt of the message establishing

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the SHAEF rate it had been necessary during the last few days of December to make the ammunition allocation for the period of 1 to 10 January. This had been done based on the maintenance day of supply information furnished to 6th Army Group's representatives at the conference on 20 December in Paris. Equal gun day rates were used in making the allocation to both Armies. Adjustments were made for the small differences in rates in the allocations for the period 21 - 31 January.

- (f) In order to make an adjustment in the credits which had been established with SOLOC it was necessary to determine the amount of ammunition in the Army ASP's and in transit to the Army ASP's as of the close of business 31 December. These data were collected and agreed to by the representatives of the Armies and SOLOC and adjustments were made in the ammunition credit standing of the Armies effective as of the close of business at SOLOC's dumps 31 December. While this was largely a paper transaction, it was necessary in order to establish definitely and finally the ammunition standing of the Armies and of the Army Group.
- (g) With respect to the distribution of the 27 days of maintenance supply constituting the Army Group Reserve the following was decided: Twelve maintenance days of supply for the weapons of each Army or Force were stocked in the Army ASP's. In the case of Seventh Army and the 44th Brigade (FRANCO-ITALIAN Border), this ammunition was released to the commanders as their contingency reserve. In the case of First French Army, the 12 maintenance days were stocked in First French Army ASP's but control of the ammunition remained with Commanding General, 6th Army Group.
- (h) On 20 December, 6th Army Group was definitely placed on the defensive and troop distributions were adjusted in depth accordingly. This called for reductions in the stocks of ammunition in the forward areas. The relocation of ammunition stocks was carried out by the Armies under the directive issued by 6th Army Group.
- (i) During late December and early January plans were made for the reduction of the COLMAR POCKET. Additional amounts of ammunition had to be made available from 6th Army Group reserve to the First French Army in order to mount the COLMAR POCKET reduction. A number of Seventh Army troops participated in this operation under operational

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control of the First French Army. The weapons of these troops were supplied from the resources of Seventh Army. Ammunition was made available to the First French Army and to Seventh Army for the reduction of the COIMAR FOCKET as follows:

Type		Rds/Wpr
105mm HOW 155mm HOW 155mm Gun 8" HOW		700 400 250 100

(k) Ammunition expenditures during this period were less than during the previous period. See attached expenditure charts. It must be noted that offensive action stopped shortly after 16 December 1944. Expenditures were held down until the German attack of 1 January 1945 and the expenditures of the period were largely accounted for by firing to stop this counteroffensive. Seventh army expended approximately 50% of its share of the 27 days reserve in addition to the maintenance rate.

6. 17 JANUARY 1945 to 14 MARCH 1945.

(a) As this period began, preparations were underway to reduce the COHMAR FOCKET. Additional troops and artillery were attached to 6th Army Group bringing much needed ammunition. Ammunition had been set up for the Armies to reduce the COHMAR PICKET as stated in Fara 5 (j) above. Seventh Army was now being attacked only in restricted areas and could begin to save and reconstitute its reserve.

(b) The offensive against the COIMAR FOCKET began on 20 January. Some initial advances were made but the attack quickly begged down on the south. The ammunition set up for the French was quickly expended and on the 23rd First French Army requested additional ammunition for the I French Corps on the Southern side of the pocket. Some additional 105mm HOW and 155mm HOW ammunition was made available on 25 January 1945, for movement from the ASP's to the gun positions from the 6th Army Group Reserve stocked in the First French Army ASP's. This was done to insure availability of ammunition near the guns in case of German counterittacks. Authority to expend was held by CG, 6th Army Group.

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concentration camps must be given the same treatment as that accorded to United Nationals displaced persons, and that they must be so treated. This was in connection with reports that such persons were being forced to rely upon their own resources and often had to beg food from the German authorities.

"The First French Army continued to conduct military government in its area of Germany in a realistic manner. A levy was made by the French upon the German population in June to furnish clothing and bedding for French prisoners, deportees and homeless persons in France, and in at least one kreis under French control the Germans were required to deliver up all Wehrmacht horses, with complete harness, and all horse-drawn Wehrmacht vehicles. (See Appendix 6.) A memorandum on the wearing of uniforms by Germans, containing some interesting suggestions, was written by General de Larminat of the First French Army.

"A new duty was placed on Military Government in occupied countries by Change No. 1 to Operations Memorandum No. 17, Hq. ETOUSA, stating that bomb and shell disposal not affecting military installations would be a responsibility of MG, and that indigenous services were to be used for such work.

of Public Health in the U.S. Zone, visited HEIDELBERG in the interests of reopening the Medical School of HEIDELBERG University, to relieve a serious shortage of doctors in Germany. He discussed the matter with Dr. Bauer, leading member of the medical faculty, and inspected clinics, hospitals and other facilities. He was accompanied by Lt. Col. Robert F. Rogers, chief of the Public Health Division, G-5, this headquarters.


"The health of the German people in this area continued to be satisfactory. The spread of typhus in the 6th Army Group area was being controlled, and the existing precautions continued.

"Colonel Farkman and Lt. Col. Mitchell Wolfson, chief of operations, G-5 Section, together with Maj. Frank J. Morris and Capt. Arthur M. Davis, were placed on temporary duty with SHAEF and left on 20 June for an extensive tour of inspection of Military Government detachments in the U.S. Zone, reporting to SHAEF on the status of military government as they found it.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED from outside 6th Army Group. Operations during the saving period must not require ammunition in excess of $\frac{1}{2}$ SHAEP's. Accordingly ammunition was allocated on the following basis for the period 1 February to 10 March: l SHAEF Rate to First French Army SHAEF Rate to 44th AAA Brigade (Alps Front) SHAEF Rate to Seventh Army Unallocated ammunition was held under Army Group control to rebuild the Army Group Reserve and create stocks for future offensive action. (h) After the conclusion of the COIMAR FOCKET Operation, 8 February 1945, the expenditures of First French Army along the RHINE dropped to very low levels. The First French Army was able to save and build up a considerable stock of ammunition from its reduced allocations during the period 11 February to 30 March. However, it was necessary to forbid general artillery duelling across the RHINE and the small expenditures were limited to harassing fire and in support of patrol actions. ROUNDS FER GUN n. Desired Available TYPE

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Army Group Armies would be established with CONAD, and that CONAD would arrange direct shipments to the Armies from depots in other advance sections. Thus 6th Army Group's Armies had only one COMZONE agency to deal with on ammunition.

This system was not satisfactory for the conditions of 6th Army Group for the following reasons:

- (1) COMZONE had no forward depots in the areas in rear of 6th Army Group and ammunition stocks that were within 36 hours rail time of the Armies were very small
- (2) Experience had shown that under existing conditions and organization the only way to insure forward movement of ammunition was to allocate it to the Armies so that they would call it forward in their tonnage.
- (1) In determining forward availability to make the allocation for the period 21 31 March COMZONE disregarded the credit system in force in 6th Army Group and regarded ammunition as obligated only if covered by an Army transportation request. When the data on the allocation to 6th Army Group for the period 21 31 March was received it was not clear whether the quantities included 6th Army Group's reserve and other unallocated amounts accrued under the SHAEF Rate or not. If the quantities given did include the Army Group Reserve (which had now been completely reconstituted) then the allocation was short of the SHAEF Rate for March. Conflicting interpretations were received by telephone and it became necessary for two officers from the Artillery Section, G-3, and an Ordnance officer to go to COM ZONE where they spent several days recomputing for the benefit of COMZONE the quantities of ammunition due 6th Army Group under the SHAEF Rate from 1 January 1945 to 31 March 1945. As a result COMZONE agreed to modify its allocation to 6th Army Group and provide it with the ammunition due under the SHAEF Rate. Having obtained a correction from COMZONE, and then having determined what ammunition credited to our Armies had not been covered by transportation requests, it was possible to readjust again the credits of the Armies to give them their proper standing.

This revised system did not function well due to the fact that allocations from COMZONE were habitually late in arriving and the channels for getting the credits established and the ammunition moving were devious. In

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order to insure the movement of ammunition under existing conditions 6th Army Group found it necessary to prepare and announce its allocations from 5 to 10 days in advance using its unallocated reserve to cover the credits established.

7. 15 MARCH 1945 to 7 MAY 1945.

- (a) In early March 1945 SHAEF directed the execution, about 15 April, of Operation "INDEPENDENCE" to open the scuthwestern French port of BORDEAUX. The ammunition requirements for this operation had been previously studied. A conference was held with representatives of Western French Forces at PHALZBURG on 24 March. At this meeting the quantities of artillery ammunition to be furnished were settled. The Artillery Officer and the Chief of Staff of the Western French Forces requested large quantities of 155mm Gun ammunition. To provide the agreed amount it was necessary to commit a portion of the 6th Army Group Reserve in this caliber and some other calibers to mount this operation.
- (b) During March some additional quantities, over the 1 SHAEF Rate, of artillery and mortar ammunition were furnished to Army Detachment of the Alps (French Forces on Franco-Italian Frontier) to conduct some minor offensive operations. These were in support of cover plans designed to assist 15th Army Groups offensive by retaining German divisions in Western Italy during the period 10 20 April.
- (c) By 27 March the Seventh Army had crossed the RHINE and was making excellent progress on the east bank. Due to the collapse of German resistance west of the RHINE, the expenditure of the large quantities of ammunition that had been expected west of the RHINE and in crossing the RHINE had not occurred. Therefore, the ammunition position of Seventh Army was excellent at the end of March. In the ammunition allocations from the period 1 10 April very little ammunition was allocated to Seventh Army and the First French Army was given the full SHAEF rate for its gun list as it was scheduled to cross the RHINE and advance to the South and East from SPEYER-GERMESHEIM Area. The unallocated ammunition was held under Army Group control inasmuch as it was not certain whether these resources would have to be thrown behind Seventh Army or First French Army. The immediate needs were amply taken care of by the amounts on hand and the allocations for 1 10 April.
 - (d) During April the advance of both Armies was

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rapid and the fequirements for available ammunition could easily be met. The principal ammunition problem was one of truck transportation to move the requirements forward from railheads. The disintegration of the German Army reduced the requirements for artillery ammunition and this condition continued until the cessation of hostilities. The expenditures for the period 1 April to 7 May decreased (see Expenditure Charts).

8. STATISTICS.

(a) Ammunition Expenditures.

The average daily expenditures of 105mm HOW M2, 4.5 inch Gun, 155mm HOW, 155mm Gun, 8" HOW, 8" Gun, and 240mm HOW ammunition for all weapons in 6th Army Group from 15 August 1944 to 7 May 1945 are shown by the allocation period on the charts attached as Inclosure #1. The expenditures are highlighted with notes to show the relation to actual operations. Also shown are the average weapons per period in the Army Group. Each chart contains a summary giving the following expressed in rounds per weapon per day averaged for the entire campaign:

- (1) Expended (total expenditure prorated on gun per day basis).
- (2) 6th Army Group Reserve (average part of each available gun day of supply required to build up the Army Group Reserve).
- (3) ASP (average part of each available gun day of supply required to build up ASP stockage and provide distribution).
- (4) In transit (average part of each available gun day of supply required to fill the pipeline to the Armies from Southern French ports).
- (5) Available (total ammunition available to 6th Army Group during the campaign, 15 August 1944 to 7 May 1945. From this quantity, ammunition was allocated to the Armies, 6th Army Group Reserve was maintained, ASP's filled and pipeline from COMZONE dumps and Southern Ports to ASP's filled). The average daily expenditures plotted on the charts are listed on the Tabulation of Expenditures attached hereto as Inclosure #2. The figures shown in the summary on each chart are listed in the tabulation attached hereto as Inclosure #3.

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(b) Day of Supply.

A comparison of the various days of supply that 6th Army Group encountered with the actual quantities supplied are shown in Table 4. Table 5 is a tabulation of the SHAEF maintenance rates. It will be noted that none of the days of supply were actually met.

9. COMMENTS.

(a) Effect of Ammunition Shortage.

Artillery ammunition like other combat resources directly affects the magnitude, scope, and timing of operations that can be conducted. When ammunition supplies are short it has the effect of making it not possible to employ all the troops simultaneously in an offensive role; it restricts the timing of operations because ammunition must be accumulated to launch a major action; it reduces the possibility of taking immediate advantage of weaknesses in the enemy's dispositions; it has an undesirable psychological effect on troops and commanders; and it precludes the use of artillery in deceptive maneuvers and restricts its use to support of the actual attack only. The most critical factor in regard to expenditures is future supply. If the resupply rate is low then operations must be spaced far apart whereby the enemy gains time to dig in. A large amount of ammunition is always required to make a breakthrough. 6th Army Group experienced all these effects during the period of the operations. (Note: See Documents as follows: Doc. 180, Sec III, Ammunition Consumption and Requirements Analysis, 6th Army Group, dated 23 November 1944. Doc. 181, G-3 Memo to C/S, "Subject Ammunition Supply," dated 24 December 1944. Doc. 182, Memo, G-3 Artillery Officer, Subject: "Possibility of Ammunition Supply," to 6th Army Group, Joint Planning Staff, dated 1 February 1945.)

A precise quantitative evaluation of the effect of the inadequate ammunition supply cannot be made, but it is the opinion of this Headquarters that a supply in general approximately 1/3 greater than that furnished would have saved many lives and shortened the war.

(b) Day of Supply.

It will be noted that the ammunition available to 6th Army Group for the period of the operation, 265

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days, did not equal any of the days of supply that were either approved or recommended by either ETO, MTO, or the War Department. The fact that the campaign was successful must not be taken as proof that the supply of artillery ammunition was enough. There may be possibility for discussion as to what a proper day of supply should be, but the history of the campaign is incontrovertible proof that the amount furnished was not enough. A larger artillery ammunition supply in the hands of our skilled Field Artillery would have reduced our casualty list, killed more Germans, and brought the fighting to a quicker end. To take the view that the supply furnished was enough is to place a price in dollars and sweat on men's lives.

10. LIST OF CHARTS AND TABULATIONS:

- (a) 7 Expenditure Charts, 1 for each Caliber.
- (b) Table 2. Ammunition Expenditures.
- (c) Table 3, Ammunition Summary.
- (d) Table 4, Comparison of Days of Supply.
- (e) Table 5, SHAEF Maintenance Rates.


11. LIST OF AMMUNITION STUDIES FILED IN DOCUMENT FILE:

- (a) Ammunition Consumption and Requirements Analysis, 6th Army Group, 23 November 1944. (263)
- (b) Memorandum to C/S, Subject: "Armunition Supply," dated 24 December 1944, from G-3. (264)
- (c) Memorandum to Joint Planning Staff, Subject: "Possibility of Ammunition Supply," from G-3 Artillery Officer. (265)
- (d) Illustration of G-3 Section (Arty), 6th Army Group method of maintaining Ammunition and Expenditure Records. (266)


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
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
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


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
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





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
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
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
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		AUMUN AUMUN	VITION MAINTENA (SHAEF RAT	CE RATES		ESTRICTED		-
			(SHAEF RAT	Ε)				
T H		ITEM	JAN 1	FEB 1	MARCH 1	APRIL		
IS		57mm Gun, AT HE SABOT	(4.3) .7	(13.2) 9.6	1.0	(1.0)		-
P		APC	3.6	3.6	3.6			
A G E		60mm Mortar HE Ill	(4.76) 4.6 .1	(4.96) 4.6 .3	(4.96) 4.6 .3			
1		Mb .	.06	.06	.06			
S U N		81mm Mortar HE (Lt) HE (Hv)	(11.2) 6.0 2.9 2.3	(10.9) 5.7 2.9 2.3	(10.0) 5.0 2.8 2.2	(8.0) 5.0 2.0 1.0		
C L A S		75mm How HE w/M48A2 HE w/M54 HE-AT	(27:7) 25:0 - .7 2:0	(27.7) 25.0 - .7 2.0	(27.7) 25.0 -7 2.0			
I F I E D		75mm Gun HE w/148A2 APC	(6.9) 4.3 2.1	(6.9) 4.3 2:1	(6.9) 4.3 2.1			
		76mm Gun, T & AT HE w/M48A2 HE w/M48A2 APC WP	(13.4) 8.3 5.1	(13.4) 8.3 5.1	(13.4) 8.3 5.1			
		3" Gun, AT HE W/MA8A2 HE APC	(19.0) 8.9 3.3 6.8	(19.0) 8.9 3.3 6.8	(19.0) 8.9 3.3 6.8			
		90mm Gun AA HE w/T74 HE	(6.5) 1.2	(6.5)	(6.5)			
		HE APC	4.8	4.8 .5	4.8			
Table 5 (Sheet 1)								
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578. On 10 July G-4 completed a pamphlet comprising a number of tables, charts, and situation map photos to show Seventh Army Comsumption Rates for Class I, II, III, IV and V Supplies for the period 4 November 1944 to 12 May 1945. A copy of this pamphlet was filed with A.G. Records, 6th Army Group.

579. Also on 10 July the G-2 Section submitted a 67 page final report with covering letter as follows:

SUBJECT: Final Report.

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TO: Chief of Staff, Headquarters 6th Army Group, APO 23, U.S. Army.

1. This document, submitted as a Final Report, outlines in general the activities of the G-2 Section. Details have been avoided in order to present as clear a picture as possible, in condensed form, essentials which are readily assimilated.

Complete details which cover G-2 operations will be found in the following publications:

a. Weekly Intelligence Summary.

Nos. 1 - 33, 25 September 44 to 8 May 1945

b. Periodic Counter Intelligence Report.

Nos. 1 - 14, 9 October 1944 to 30 May 1945.

c. "T" Force Report: "STRASBOURG to MUNICE with T Force." 3 June 1945.

These documents are a part of the historical and permanent records of Headquarters 6th Army Group.

EUGENE L. HARRISON Brigadier General, GSC A. C. of S., G-2

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580. Transfer of Area Control in Germany and Austria between U.S. and French Headquarters.

On 21 June SHAEF sent out a warning order in the form of cable S-92156 (267), which outlined the probable French zone in Germany and required that plans be drawn for the transfer of area control between U.S. and French forces. Austria was mentioned in the message, but the information was incomplete. The cable directed that impending moves be closely guarded. Because of this last proviso, 6th Army Group could not bring the French First Army into the planning phase but on the 25th of June called a conference at HEIDELBERG of all U.S. elements concerned. Representatives of the 12th Army Group, Third, Seventh and Fifteenth Armies, together with ADSEC, CONAD, COMZONE, OISE Intermediate Section and IX Air Force were present.

pwith the understanding that it would be a joint 6th Army Group - 12th Army Group plan, which would be submitted to SHAEF for approval. This was done on the 26th together with a set of questions which had arisen in the conference, but could not be answered at the Army Group level. The next day SHAEF Cable S-93452 (268) directed planning be initiated with the French without delay and authorized direct arrangement be made between 6th and 12th Army Groups, Having received neither approval nor disapproval of its initial plan, 6th Army Group went on the assumption that it would be approved in principle. Therefore on the 29th, a meeting was called at HEIDELEERG to present to representatives of the First French Army the basic plan and secure their comments. Austria was discussed only in the most general terms at this time for some doubt still existed as to the command set up there. Minor changes requested by the French were sent to 12th Army Group and SHAEF for incorporation in the basic plan. U.S. Armies were now directed to initiate planning directly with the First French Army basing their plans on 6th - 12th Army Group basic plan. This order resulted in a series of conferences held between First French Army and the U.S. Armies concerned. The first of these was held on 2 July at BAD NAUENAHR with the Fifteenth Army. During the night of 1 - 2 July SHAEF Cable S-94542 (269) had been received by the Army Groups. This cable directed executive action be taken on the SHAEF planning cable 93452 but instead of allowing 21 days for the transfer as in the Army Group plan it ordered the operation be completed by 10 July.

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582. This new information was given to both Fifteenth Army and the French by a 6th Army Group lieison officer shortly before the conference opened. The speed-up put the French in an embarrasing position for they had arrived at the meeting prepared to discuss with Fifteenth Army a much slower time table. However, an agreement was reached with the proviso that six U.S. truck companies, additional rail facilities, certain running rights east of the RHINE, and POL deliveries in the Fifteenth Army area would be made by the U.S. Otherwise a delay of eight days could be expected. 6th Army Group was able to make the necessary arrangements for the transportation and POL requested, thus assisting the First French Army in meeting its 10 July deadline. The new cable had also clarified the Austrian situation so that when representatives of the First French Army met at LINDAU with representatives of the Seventh Army, on the 3rd, and the Third Army, on the 4th, agreements for transfer not only in Germany but also in Austria were drawn up.

583. The entry of advance details, Military Government teams, and assumption of command by the occupational units went according to schedule, except for the taking over of border control in TRIER and the assumption of command of the Kreis of OBERWESTERWALD which were delayed until the 12th. At noon, 10 July, Detachment of the Alps Command was transferred from 6th Army Group to the French High Command.

584. On 14 July SHAEF was dissolved. The final Order of the Day is quoted below:

"To all members of the Allied Expeditionary

"The task which we set ourselves is finished, and the time has come for me to relinquish the combined command.

"In the name of the United States and the British Commonwealth, from whom my authority is derived, I should like to convey to you the gratitude and admiration of our two nations for the manner in which you have responded to every demand that has been made upon you. At times, conditions have been hard and the task to be performed arduous, no praise is too high for the manner in which you have surmounted every obstacle.

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Force:

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"I should like, also, to add my own personal word of thanks to each one of you for the part you have played, and the contribution you have made to our joint victory.

"Now that you are about to pass to other spheres of activity, I say goodbye to you and wish you good luck and God speed.

"Dwight D. Eisenhower"

Thus ended a period of outstanding leadership.

585. Because emphasis during the period shifted from military operations to military government it is believed appropriate to include extracts from the Historical Report, G-5 Section, 6th Army Group, for period 1 June 1945 through 16 July 1945, as follows:

"Supervising and assisting the First French Army occupied the attention of the G-5 Section, 6th Army Group, from 1 June 1945 until the section was officially closed on 16 July 1945. During the latter part of this period the section was also busy in winding up its affairs.

"This procedure included reassigning personnel to other duties in the ETO or in the United States, turning over property and responsibilities to other organizations, assisting in the transfer of area control between the French and U.S. forces.

"Throughout the period there was a steady outflow of personnel, until in the final week a mere handful remained on duty at this headquarters. The services of the officers and enlisted men of the section were in demand by higher headquarters, some being sought by several organizations, an indication of the high opinion held by the Army of the section's record of performance.

"The plan for the transfer of area control in Germany between the French and the U.S. forces, with completion date of 10 July, was drawn up by G-3, 6th Army Group, with the help and concurrence of the other staff sections, was approved by SHAEF and adopted by the other organizations concerned.

"The plan called for the retaining by the U.S. of transit rights and rights of occupancy and instal-

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lations necessary for continuous support of U.S. forces of occupation and for U.S. troop movements to and from Germany, and rights to maintain in the French zone U.S. troops necessary to operate the U.S. facilities.

"It also specified that captured or requisitioned German equipment and material essential to military operations should be removed by the respective forces upon withdrawal, including civilian motor transport necessary to the operation of Military Government detachments. All other indigenous stocks, equipment and facilities were to be left in place.

"A transitional period of not more than seven days, during which MG teams designated to take over the respective areas involved in the transfer could move in and become oriented, was provided for.

"The First French Army officially advised this headquarters that at 1200B hours, 10 July 1945, the new French areas in Germany and Austria were completely occupied, and command taken over in every area.


Dutch and Luxembourgers displaced persons in the 6th Army Group (First French Army) area were repatriated, except for a few who did not wish to return home for the time being. Arrangements were completed for the repatriation of Russians from the area, but movement had not reached full volume largely because of lack of transportation. The Russians and other eastern Europeans were collected in centers convenient for shipment, ready to be sent home as soon as possible.

"Arrangements were also completed for repatriation of Italian DFs in the First French Army area, shipment beginning about 10 July.

"In accordance with directives from higher authority, the collection and segregation was begun of stateless persons, and those whose repatriation might be deferred for some time, principally Poles, Balts and Jews from Germany, Roumania and Hungary.

"Displaced persons in the First French Army area as of 7 July 1945 totalled 120,252, including by nationality:

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to hand over materiel and equipment under its control, and in helping the First French Army to take over for itself the procedures of civilian supply. Hitherto this work had been done for the French by the G-5 civilian supply officers of this headquarters.

"The same was true in regard to Military Government trucks. Sixth Army Group had set up the truck system for the French and had furnished U.S. personnel to supervise it. The truck companies which had been operating with the French were now turned over to them, and assistance was given to enable them to obtain some additional companies.

"Civilian supplies which this headquarters had stored at COLMAR were removed to STRASBOURG and the warehouse returned to the French. The warehouse at STRASBOURG was to be turned over to the French together with approximately 3,000 to 4,000 tons of supplies, and the remaining civilian supplies were handed to the Seventh Army. Some 3,000 to 4,000 tons of supplies held in CONAD depots for the account of 6th Army Group were turned over to U.S. Forces, European Theater.

"Because of the First French Army's occupancy of VORARLBERG and TIROL in Austria, this headquarters continued its arrangements for civilian supply in those regions. G-5 personnel estimated the requirements and laid on sufficient supplies to meet them. The food situation in the two Gaue was critical, because the regions, normally deficit areas, now contained great numbers of United Nations DPs, German civilian refugees and members of the surrendered German forces, all of whom were dependent upon local food.

"For Gau VORARLBERG it was estimated that 1,500 net long tons of flour, 60 tons of sugar and 38 tons of soap would suffice until the end of August, and these amounts were called forward. Beginning in September the French occupation forces would have to obtain any necessary civilian supplies through their own channels.

"The estimated monthly requirements of Gau TIROL were 3,000 tons of flour, 125 of sugar and 100 of soap, and these amounts were laid on by the 6th Army Group G-5 personnel, to continue monthly unless and until discontinued by higher authority.

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"By SHAEF letter and cable and by 6th Army Group cable, First French Army was authorized to increase rations for miners to 3,000 calories for surface workers and 3,400 calories for underground workers, in order to increase coal production. Authorization was further granted for the transfer of imported wheat and flour, if necessary, to provide food for miners. The authorization was granted, however, only upon condition of satisfactory increased production—temporarily set at a minimum 10 per cent.

"Any imported wheat or flour for coal workers was to be turned over to the highest German official, or his authorized representative, in a Province or Land, and quantitative receipts were to be obtained from him. The German authorities were to be notified that such transfer of supplies must not prejudice either prices or method of payment later to be determined. The wheat/flour was to be transferred to distributors at the prevailing official prices for domestic wheat, and the amounts received held in special wheat blocked accounts.

"To meet a serious shortage, this headquarters arranged for 100 tons of coal to be shipped from the Saar for civilian allocation in STUTTGART during the first week of July.

"For the rest, G-5 activity consisted largely of passing on to the First French Army orders and instructions from SHAEF and other higher headquarters. Of these the most noteworthy instance was a change in denazification procedure. SHAEF issued, 11 June 1945, a cable on the subject, as follows (paraphrase):

"It has been reported that SMARE Directive AG 014.1-1 (Germany) of 24 March 1945 is being interpreted in such a manner that freezanization of German administrative machinery is being hampered.

"It is believed that a careful reading of this directive will indicate that such an interpretation is beyond its intent. It is desired, therefore, that the directive be studied carefully and executed in accordance with its intent, in such a manner as not to make impossible the establishment of administrative machinery.

"It was decided at this headquarters that the 6th Army Group denazification directive of 30 March 1945

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(see March historical report) no longer could obtain in view of the new SHAEF order, and so the 30 March directive was rescinded, and the First French Army was directed to proceed under the SHAEF paper of 24 March.

"In so advising the French Army this head-quarters stated:

"'It is recognized that a strict application of the existing directive has created difficulties in the reorganization of the German administrative machinery. It is believed that a careful reading of the SHAEF directive will lessen those difficulties in some messure.'

(See May 1945 historical report.)

"In furtherance of the denazification policy 6th Army Group passed down the SHAEF directive of 9 June 1945 prohibiting the use of Nazi emblems on official stationery, forms, passbooks, etc.

"Other G-5 instructions issued during the period to the French Army included:


"Authorization to direct the German authorities to continue to pay subsidies necessary to prevent increases in prices of foods and other essential foods and services, as a means of implementing the existing system of price control.

"Warning, in connection with receipt of a report that Military Government in SIGMERINGEN was considering the reopening of schools to teach certain subjects, that SHAEF requires that no schools may be reopened without permission from the Supreme Commander issued through command channels, and that all textbooks used in German schools will be supplied by SHAEF or specifically approved by the Supreme Commander.

"Directions to the German authorities to feed in factories one meal daily for heavy and very heavy workers, but that these meals must not raise the aggregate amounts of rationed foods permitted for these categories above the levels permitted by SHAEF letter of 25 January 1945 on the control of distribution and rationing in Germany.

German nationals having official military release from

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"The dispersal of the G-5 Section and its Military Government Personnel Pool continued during June and was completed on 16 July. Officers and enlisted men were transferred to the European Civil Affairs Division or to SHAEF, later Hq. USFET, or to the U.S.

"In accordance with a request by the War Department, orders were expected momentarily transferring Colonel Parkman to duty in the Civil Affairs Division, Washington."

586. Following a final ceremony for the award of decorations on the morning of 18 July, Generals Barr, Jenkins and Lenzner left the Headquarters en route to the U.S., while the band played "For He's a Jolly Good Fellow" and other appropriate music. This left the Headquarters without general officers. General Devers, then in the U.S., had expected to return as head of a General Board to study the lessons of the campaigns in ETO but, instead, had been selected for command of the Army Ground Forces.

587. General Patch had been transferred from command of the Seventh Army to command of the Fourth Army in the U.S. and had been replaced by Lt. General Wade H. Haislip as CG Seventh Army. General Haislip assumed command of Headquarters, 6th Army Group, pursuant to the following order:

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP AFO 23, U.S. Army

18 July 1945

GENERAL ORDERS

Assumption of Command

By direction of the Fresident, announced in General Orders Number 156, Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, current series, the undersigned, in addition to other duties, assumes command of Headquarters 6th Army Group effective 16 July 1945.

(Signed) Wade H. Haislip (Typed) WADE H. HAISLIP Lieutenant General, USA Commanding

Distribution: "Special"

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588. The following message was sent to interested agencies on 23 July:

"REFERENCE EX-71071 USFET, HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY AND SPECIAL TROOPS 6TH ARMY CROUP ARE INACTIVATED EFFECTIVE TWENTY JULY BY USFET GENERAL ORDERS ONE SIX EIGHT DATED TWO ONE JULY. HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP CEASES OPERATIONS AT TWENTY FOUR HUNDRED HOURS TWO THREE JULY. REPRESENTATIVES OF HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL TROOPS 6TH ARMY GROUP MAY BE CONTACTED THROUGH HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY. SIGNED HAISLIP."

589. The inactivation of Headquarters 6th Army Group was recorded as follows:

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP APO 23, U. S. ARMY

GENERAL ORDERS)

25 July 1945

NUMBER

INACTIVATION OF HEADQUARTERS, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, AND HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL TROOPS

The following VOCG dated 20 July 1945, are hereby confirmed and made a matter of record:

"PAC Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater General Order No. 168 of 21 July 1945, Headquarters, Headquarters Company, and Headquarters Special Troops, 6th Army Group, are hereby inactivated."

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HAISLIP

PMARSON MENOHER, Brigadier General, GSC Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

bt. Col., AGD Adjuvant General

590. Records were forwarded to Inactive Records Branch, APO 319, per Circular 60, Hq. ETOUSA, 1945.

591. Conclusions. Rather than to save all conclusions and lessons learned for the final paragraphs it has been the policy to point out at the time such matters as seemed to call for more than a simple recital of the facts.

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This has been with the idea of using to the maximum the early experience of the Headquarters as one of the guides to its later operations. Therefore only a very few additional conclusions appear to be needed to round out the History:

a. The organization and size of the Headquarters has proven generally appropriate and adequate for the tasks at hand although it was eventually found desirable to organize separate Ordnance and Medical Sections.


b. The atmosphere of willing and cheerful cooperation fostered by General Devers paid big dividends in the amount and quality of work accomplished.

c. The value of an Army Group Headquarters is measured both from the Supreme Headquarters above and the Armies below. Its value to the higher headquarters is practically automatic, in that it reduces the number of subordinate commands to deal with and handles a vast amount of detail that would otherwise devolve on the higher headquarters. Being close to the Armies and having few rather than many to deal with, the Group Headquarters is naturally better able to look after their needs than is the Supreme Headquarters, but there is a danger which, if overlooked, would almost certainly render the Group Headquarters a liability rather than an asset so far as the Armies are concerned. Being in the chain of command it is necessary for Army Group to receive directives from the higher headquarters and translate them into appropriate instructions to the Armies with added detail and provision for coordination. Any time taken to do this must be subtracted from the time available to the Armies for their own planning and issuance of orders.

This matter of time is usually very critical indeed, and if an Army Group were to await directives from above before the initiation of planning at its own and lower headquarters it would certainly cause delay or confusion or both to an extent that might well offset all the good it could do in other ways.

The text includes examples of the value of constant study and advance planning by staff sections and the Joint Planning Staff which, in conjunction with the preparation of alternate plans when indicated, made it possible to anticipate and at times influence the plans

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
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
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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP APO 23, U. S. ARMY

GUFERAL ORDERS) : NUMBER 41)

1 June 1945

I — AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL, FIRST OAK LEAF CLUSTER. By direction of the President, under the provisions of army Regulations 600-45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the First Oak Leaf Cluster to the Bronze Star Medal is awarded to the following named individuals for meritorious achievement in connection with military operations:

KINGSLEY S. ANDERSSON, 0-15450, Colonel, CE, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 5 September 1944 to 25 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Hastings, Michigan.

WENDELL B. SELL, 0-23069, Lieutenant Colonel, CAC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 25 December 1944 to 11 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Redlands, California.

STANLEY 7. DZIUBAN, 0-21738, Lieutenant Colonel, CE, Headquarters 6th Army Froup, from 17 September 1944 to 25 hay 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Yonkers, New York.

JAMES R. McNEAL, 0-154038, First Lieutenant, AGD, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 14 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in Italy, Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Atlanta, Georgia.

II -- AWARD OF THE BROWZE STAR NEDAL. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the Bronze Star Medal is awarded to the following named individuals for meritorious achievement in connection with military operations:

VILLIAM R. TATSON, 0-8354, Colonel, IGD, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 9 September 1944 to 12 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Eustis, Florida.

OSCAR S. RELDER, 0-20086, Colonel, MC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 9 September 1944 to 2 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Charleston, South Carolina.

WILLIAM I. WILSON, 0-5754, Colonel, CRD, Headquarters 5th Army Group, from 20 February 1945 to 8 May 1945 in France and Germany. Entered the United States Military Academy from Dubuque, Iowa.

JOHN N. HUTCHISON, 0-352232, Lieutenant Colonel, Inf., Headquarters 5th army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Hemphis, Tennessee.

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GO No 41 Hq 6th AG 1 June 45 cont'd

GEORGE S. WATSON, 0-272590, Lieutenant Colonel, SC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 1 October 1944 to 1 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Fond du Lac, Wisconsin.

FRANK E. PELLEGRIN, 0-909613, Lieutenant Colonel, AUS, 6th Information and Historical Service, 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Omaha, Nebraska.

BENJAMIN L. NATTINGLY, 0-317065, Lieutenant Colonel, CWS, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 1 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Akron, Chio.

RAYMOND E. BENNETT, 0-369778, Major, Inf., Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Bangor, Maine.

LAWRENCE G. HOOVER, 0-1283431, Major, Inf., Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Washington, D. C.

FREDERIC O. VICKHAM, 0-341568, Major, SC, Headquarters, 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Jefferson City, Missouri.

RAY J. DAVIES, 0-455587, Major, QMC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 9 September 1944 to 7 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Albuquerque, New Mexico.

KENNETH T. SMITH, 0-358132, Major, GSC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 1 December 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Talahassee, Florida.

J. N. JACKSON, Jr., 0-311245, Major, CAC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 22 February 1945 to 7 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from New Salem, Pennsylvania.

VILLIAM F. AHBE, 0-487445, Major, SC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 5 November 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Los Angeles, California.

SAMUEL M. BLUMBERG, 0-1003675, Captain, ADC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 1 September 1944 to 15 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Collingdale, Pennsylvania.

ALLAN A. HOWELL, 0-1295217, Captain, Inf., Headquarters 6th army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Drexel Hills, Pennsylvania.

JOSEPH E. SCHMIDT, 0-1290484, Captain, Inf., Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Camden, New Jersey.

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GO No 41 Hq 6th AG 1 June 45 cont'd RESTRICTED

MITCHELL C. TACKLEY, 0-455833, Captain, QMC, Headquarters 6th army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Malone. New York.

JOHN H. WILLIAMS, 0-517621, Captain, Inf., Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 1 October 1944 to 10 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Tampa, Florida.

CHARLES H. TAYLOR, 0-2052340, Captain, JAGD, Headquarters of Army Group, from 10 January 1945 to 1 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from New York, New York.

JERRY R. WILKS, 0-1000073, Captain, aGD, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 24 September 1944 to 7 April 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

CARL G. ZIMERMAN, 0-1844976, Captain, SC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

ROBERT G. BEAUMONT, 0-2046368, Captain, SC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 21 August 1944 to 9 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Monterey, California.

EDWARD G. HEIDER, 0-452742, Captain, ORD, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 7 February 1945 to 31 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Chattanooga, Tennessee.

LEE LYON, 0-455713, Captain, ORD, Headquarters oth Army Group, from 23 November 1944 to 31 May 1945, in France and Sermany. Entered the service from Minneapolis, Minnesota.

HAROLD H. SOURS, 0-1590284, First Licutenant, QNC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 15 October 1914 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

PAUL M. KOBER, 33119031, Master Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 9 January 1945 to 27 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Washington, D. C.

GEORGE W. GAUSING, 35260847, Technical Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 12 August 1944 to 1 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Newport, Kentucky.

JOSEPH A. LAMB, 34535401, Technical Sorgeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Croup, from 1 November 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Gainesville, Florida.

HARRY E. MURPHY, 37216990, Technical Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 1 april 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Wichita, Kansas.

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GO No 41 Hq 6th AG 1 June 45 cont'd

CARL B. MITCHELL, 38180649, Technical Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 1 April 1945 in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

PETER F. CONSIDINE, 32213282, Technical Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 5th Army Group, from August 1944 to May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from New York, New York.

BURTON S. KLEIN, 36368063, Technician Third Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 13 August 1944 to 9 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Chicago, Illinois.

HOWARD N. HEASLEY, 35321290, Technician Third Grade, Headquarters Company, 5th Army Group, from 21 August 1944 to 20 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Cleveland, Chio.

JAMES E. FARMER, 35168035, Technician Third Grade, Headquarters Company, 5th army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Indianapolis, Indiana.

EDTARD M. SPROTL, 31357426, Technician Third Grade, Headquarters Company, 5th Army Group, from August 1944 to 1 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Boston, Massachusetts.

TILLIAM S. BROWNE, 32776852, Technician Third Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from August 1944 to May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Flemington, New Jorsey.

WILLIAM F. BURGE, 31018495, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 20 August 1944 to 9 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Boston Massachusetts.

JAY L MCHULLEN, 10600709, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Cleveland, Ohio.

LECHARD M. MIICHELL, 39451530, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters Company, 5th Army Group, from 20 August 1944 to 9 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Sandpoint, Idaho.

DAVID B. JOSE, 35553095, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 8 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Tolodo, Ohio.

JETERUL E. SMITH, 39323372, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th army Group, from 15 August 1944 to 1 January 1945, in France. Entered the service from Hood River, Oregon.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED GO No. 41 Hq 6th AG DENNIS H. CANTTELL, 34378193, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 9 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Sneedville, Tennessee. HENRY TOM SMITH, 34504113, Tochnician Fifth Grade, Hoadquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 15 August 1944 to 1 January 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Groggneville, Tennessee. BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS: DAVID G. BARR, Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff. OFFICIAL: J. L. TARR, Colonel, AGD, DISTRIBUTION.

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP APO 23. U. S. ARMY

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 42)

3 June 1945

I — AWARD OF THE AIR MEDAL, FIRST OAK LEAF CLUSTER. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the First Oak Leaf Cluster to the Air Medal is awarded to the following named individuals for meritorious achievement while participating in aerial flight:

CECRGE N. JOHES, 14171905, Master Sergeant, AC, 167th Liaison Squadron, during the period 22 October 1944 to 12 March 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Hattiesburg, Mississippi.

THOMAS B. MERRYMAN, 20368057, Technical Sergeant, AC, 167th Liaison Squadron, during the period 9 December 1944 to 12 March 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Lynchburg, Virginia.

II — AWARD OF THE AIR MEDAL. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the Air Medal is awarded to the following named individuals for meritorious achievement while participating in aerial flight:

WALTER S. SHERMAN, Jr., 0-674861, Captain, AC, 167th Liaison Squadron, during the period 29 August 1944 to 14 April 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from 7est Palm Beach, Florida.

METHAN W. WOCLERY, 0-674884, Captain, AC, 167th Liaison Squadron, during the period 29 August 1944 to 16 February 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Brooklyn, New York.

JOSEPH C. GALLICK, 0-735771, First Lieutenant, AC, 167th Liaison Squadron, during the period 26 February 1945 to 26 March 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Chicago, Illinois.

JOSEPH D. MCRTON, 11056773, Master Sergeant, AC, 167th Liaison Squadron, during the period 28 September 1944 to 28 February 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Luneburg, Massachusetts.

ROBERT L. PRATT, 18114617, Technical Sergeant, AC, 167th Liaison Squadron, during the period 28 September 1944 to 27 February 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Houston, Texas.

JAMES P. TILLIN, 17115198, Technical Sergeant, AC, 167th Ligison Squadron, during the period 28 September 1944 to 22 February 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Chicago, Illinois.

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HARRY A. RAY, 36377646, Technical Sergeant, AC, 167th Liaison Squadron, during the period 28 September 1944 to 22 February 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Chicago, Illinois.

WILLIAM G. RIEGER, 16049683, Technical Sergeant, AC, 167th Liaison Squadron, during the period 28 September 1944 to 14 March 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Wyandotte, Michigan.

JOHN R. OLSON, 37117797, Technical Sergeant, AC, 167th Liaison Squadron, during the period 28 September 1944 to 20 February 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Des Moines, Iowa.

CLYDE O. STONE, 18040079, Technical Sergeant, AC, 187th Liaison Squadron, during the period 28 September 1944 to 28 February 1945, in France and Germany: Entered the service from Sherman, Texas.

JAMES H. McFARLAND, 33107524, Technical Sergeant, AC, 167th Liaison Squadron, during the period 28 September 1944 to 9 March 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania.

SIDNEY C. JOHNSON, 18177222, Technical Sergeant, AC, 167th Liaison Squadron, during the period 28 September 1944 to 17 March 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Denison, Texas.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR Major General, GSC Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

J. L. TARR Colonel, AGD Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP APO 23, U. S. ARMY

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 44)

6 June 1945

I - AVARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL, FIRST OAK LEAF CLUSTER. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the First Oak Leaf Cluster to the Bronze Star Medal is awarded to the following named individual:

ROBERT PRIEUR, Major, French Army, 211 Batallion de Ponts Lourds, First French Army, for meritorious achievement in connection with military operations from 22 September 1944 to 1 February 1945, in France. Entered the service from Port Lyautey, French Morocco.

II — AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the Bronze Star Medal is awarded to the following named individuals for meritorious achievement in connection with military operations:

WILLIAM S. RAMEY, 0-1001030, Captain, AGD, Special Troops, 6th Army Group, from 18 December 1944 to 2 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Indianapolis, Indiana.

JAMES A. JOHES, 0-1031567, Captain, Cav., Special Troops, 6th Army Group, from 15 October 1944 to 12 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Collingswood, New Jersey.

HAROLD SUSSMAN, 0-496264, Captain, MC, Wedical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 9 September 1944 to 15 March 1945, in France. Entered the service from Hoboken, New Jersey.

ROLF E. LARSSON, 0-1298723, Captain, Inf., Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 15 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Brooklyn, New York.

CARMIN B. ALIBERTS, 31002968, Master Sergeant, Headquarters Battery, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 18 November 1942 to 15 March 1945, in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France. Entered the service from Everett, Massachusetts.

HENRY J. CSTEPHEYER, 12188787, Master Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 21 August 1944 to 9 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Intered the service from New York, New York.

WHEY H. SOUR, 17146069, Master Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 1 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Grand Junction, Colorado.

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LUCIEN A. FRELIN, 6902528, First Sergeant, CAC, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 30 November 1942 to 12 May 1945, in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France. Entered the service from New York,

FREDERICK C. McDERMOTT, 11020371, Technical Sergeant, CAC, Headquarters Battery, 68th And Gun Battalion, from 1 November 1943 to 15 December 1944, in Italy. Entered the service from Boston, Massachusetts.

JOHN H. VILKERSON, 33093927, Staff Sorgeant, SC, 3157 Signal Service Company, from 12 February 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Roanoke, Virginia.

RICHARD J. PRENNERT, 15354907, Staff Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 15 Septembor 1944 to 1 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Niles, Michigan.

ROBERT MURDOCK, 33125864, Staff Sergeant, 4458 Quartermaster Car and Truck Company, from 11 September 1944 to 15 April 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Portsmouth City, Virginia.

RICHARD S. PHILLIPS, 36184186, Staff Sergeant, 4458 Quartermaster Car and Truck Company, from 7 June 1944 to 15 April 1945, in North Africa, Italy, France and Germany. Entered the service from Hartford, Michigan.

JAMES A. SUTTLE, Jr., 35132919, Staff Sergeant, 4458 Quartermaster Car and Truck Company, from 11 September 1944 to 15 April 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Cincinnati, Ohio.

JOHN A. REAVIS, 37731424, Staff Sergeant (then Technician Fourth Grade), Special Troops, 6th Army Group, from 30 November 1944 to 12 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Fort Scott, Kansas.

CLYDE KING, 6987132, Staff Sergeant, CAC, Battery D, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 23 January 1944 to 12 March 1945, in Italy and France. Entered the service from Fixer, Kentucky.

DANIEL B. MIAL, 32372058, Technician Third Grade, 16th Finance Disbursing Section, from 1 October 1944 to 12 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Troy, New York.

JOSEPH H. DANNUMBERRG, 12049259, Technician Third Grade, 3158 Signal Company, from 15 September 1944 to 10 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Wilmington, Delaware.

PHILIP G. RICHTER, 33400337, Sergeant, 249 Signal Operations Company, from 21 November 1944 to 15 January 1945, in France, Entered the service from Quakertown, Pennsylvania.

EUGENE F. SPECHT, 38154327, Technician Fourth Grade, 16th Finance Disbursing Section, from 1 December 1943 to 12 May 1945, in Italy, France and Germany. Entered the service from Piedmont, Oklahoma.

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GO No 44 Hq 6th AG 6 June 45 cont'd

WILLIAM A. JORDAN, 39035228, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 15 August 1944 to 1 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from San Francisco, California.

FRANK J. LANGER, 32235440, Technician Fourth Grade, 163 Signal Photo Company, from 15 November 1944 to 12 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Tronton, New Jersey.

REX V. SKEEL, 37426789, Corporal, Headquarters Battery, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 1 October 1944 to 30 April 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Stout, Iowa.

BROADIE E. STEVENS, 34466819, Corporal, CAC, Battery "C", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 1 November 1943 to 15 March 1945, in Sicily, Italy and France. Entered the service from Durham, North Carolina.

EDWIN L. KOSCIELNIAK, 11017581, Corporal, CAC, Headquarters Battery, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 18 November 1942 to 12 May 1945, in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France. Entered the service from Adams, Massachusetts.

PHILIP A. COYLE, 32111555, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters Battery, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 18 November 1942 to 12 May 1945 in North Africa, Sicily, France and Germany. Entered the service from New York, New York.

ALBERT G. BLAIS, 20141795, Technician Fifth Grade, CAC, Headquarters Battery, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 18 November 1942 to 12 May 1945, in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France. Entered the service from Laconia, New Hampshire.

ROY V. SAUTER, 34055926, Technician Fifth Grade, SC, 495 Signal Heavy Construction Company, from 8 November 1942 to 9 May 1945, in North Africa, Italy, Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Hillsborough

FELIX N. GABORIAULT, 31008873, Technician Fifth Grade, CAC, Headquarters Battery, 68th AA Gun Battalion, from 18 November 1942 to 12 May 1945, in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France. Entered the service from Central Falls, Ehode Island.

ERMEST D. VAMSLAGER, 35539747, Technician Fifth Grade, CAC, Battery "A", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 1 November 1943 to 13 March 1945, in Italy and France. Entered the service from South Bend, Indiana.

CHARLES G. SNOW, 39682385, Technician Fifth Grade, 163. Signal Photo Company, from 15 November 1944 to 12 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Salt Lake City, Utah.

RAYMOND H. DOWNING, 34929104, Private First Class, 163 Signal Photo Company, from 16 November 1944 to 12 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Monroe, Louisiana.

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GO No 44 Hq 6th AG 6 June 45 cont'd

III -- AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL - RECISSION OF AWARD. So much of Section II, General Orders Number 41, this headquarters, 1 June 1945, as pertains to the Award of the Brenze Star Medal to WILLIAM R. WATSON, 0-8354, Colonel, IGD, Headquarters 6th Army Group, is rescinded.

BY CONMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:

OFFICIAL:

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DAVID G. BARR, Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff.

J. L. TARR, Colonel, AGD, Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP APO 23, U. S. ARMY

GENERAL ORDERS)

10 June 1945

NUMBER 45

I — AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the Silver Star is awarded to the following named individual:

MERRITT H. HURSH, 0-336225, Major, Infantry, T Force, 6th Army Group, for gallantry in action 22 November 1944 at Strasbourg, France. Major Hursh, as commanding officer of the infantry battalion assigned to T Force for the Strasbourg operation, was subjected to extremely heavy fire from enemy troops deployed in ambush. Upon one occasion, Major Hursh, although wounded, did not seek safety until he had dragged two wounded soldiers to shelter and had deployed his troops for combat. At another point, he completely exposed himself to aid a wounded officer, being able to do so only after rushing a German sniper position. His leadership and skill contributed to the speedy and successful Intelligence Assault on Strasbourg and reflects high credit upon himself and the armed forces of the United States. Entered the service from Wenomah, New Jersey.

II - AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL, FIRST CAK LEAF CLUSTER. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 500-45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the First Oak Leaf Cluster to the Bronze Star Medal is awarded to the following named individuals for meritorious achievement in connection with military operations:

MITCHELL C. TACKLEY, 0-455833, Captain, QMC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to g May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Malone, New York.

RAY J. TADLOCK, 0-1002736, Captain, AGD, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 4 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Quannah, Texas.

III — AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 500-45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the Bronze Star Medal is awarded to the following named individuals for meritorious achievement in connection with military operations:

EDWARD E. BCMAR, 0-504142, Lieutenant Colonel, AUS, Headquarters 15th Army, from 15 September 1944 to 1 April 1945 in France and Germany. Entered the service from Washington, D.C.

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ALBAIN MARKE REME GASQUET, Lieutenant Colonel, French Army, Headquarters Army Detachment of the Alps, from 1 February 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France.

GEORGE F. HATKINS, 0-233005, Lieutenant Colonel, FA, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 24 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Governors Island, New York.

ROGER SCHICE, Lieutenant Colonel, French Army, Headquarters Army Detachment of the Alps, from 1 February 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France.

ANDRE LE BRAS, Major, French Army, Headquarters Army Detachment of the Alps, from 1 February 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France.

JEAN DUBEAU, Major, Field Artillery, French Army, Army Detachment of the Atlantic, from 1 November 1944 to 10 March 1945, in France.

HENRI CHARLES XAVIER GUIGARD, Major, French Army, Headquarters Army Detachment of the Alps, from 1 February 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France.

RAYMOND J. RAFFAELI, 0-387589, Major, CAC, Headquarters 62th AAA Gun Battalion, from 15 August 1944 to 30 April 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Yonkers, New York.

BRUNO L. TRAVELLETTI, 0-505390, Major, M.I., Allied Liaison Service, from 14 July 1944 to 21 March 1945, in North Africa and France. Entered the service from Chicago, Illinois.

WILLIAM N. GALLOWAY, 0-917247, Captain, FD, 16th Finance Disbursing Section, from 14 January 1945 to 1 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Phoebus, Virginia.

IRTH F. KEEL, 0-1165023, Captain, AGD, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 1 November 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Cincinnati, Chio.

LESTER D. Mc.ILLIN, 0-1168373, Captain, FA, 827th TD Battalien, from 29 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in Germany. Entered the service from Ruthven, Iowa.

CHARLES L. BOCKER, 0-886435, First Lieutenant, AUS, 970th CIC Detachment, Headquarters oth army Group, from 19 October 1944 to 4 April 1945, in France. Entered the service from Orange, Texas.

CAMFIELD M. HIMES, 0-1997928. First Lieutenant, AUS, 970th CIC Detachment, from 21 November 1944 to 21 March 1945, in France. Entered the service from Frederick, Maryland.

JOSEPH T. KELLEY, 0-2046549, First Lieutenant, CE, 1734th Engineer Utilities Detachment, from 30 November 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from New Canaan, Connecticut.

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JOSEPH VIDAL, 0-1081766, First Lieutenant, CAC, 427th CIC Detachment, from 22 September 1944 to 15 March 1945, in France. Entered the service from Los Angeles, California:

WILLIAM A. KEDA, 0-1691727, First Lieutenant, MAC, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gum Battalion, from 1 November 1943 to 15 March 1945, in Italy and France. Entered the service from Brooklyn, New York.

ERICH ROSENVALD, 0-576103, First Lieutenant, Air Corps, Headquarters MIS, ETOUSA, from 25 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in Germany. Entered the service from Cincinnati, Ohio.

ORVILLE K. TESKE, 0-1825936, First Lieutenant, FA, 827th TD Battalion, from 28 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in Germany. Entered the service from Sacramento, California.

PAUL H. RIESS, 0-2001143, Second Lieutenant, Headquarters, MIS, ETOUSA, from 25 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in Germany. Entered the service from New York, New York.

FRANCIS X. CONLON, W-2111463, Chief Warrant Officer, Headquarters 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 18 November 1942 to 8 May 1945, in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, France and Gérmany. Entered the service from Bronx, New York.

HERVEY A. VAN NUYS, Special Agent, 970th CIC Detachment, United States Army, from 23 December 1944 to 4 April 1945, in France. Entered the service from San Francisco, California.

LEROY A. WOOLLETT, Jr., Special Agent, 970th CIC Detachment, United States Army, from 22 September 1944 to 22 March 1945, in France. Entered the service from Laredo, Texas.

WILLARD B. EXMER, 6819271, First Sergeant, 251st Signal Heavy Construction Company, from 20 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Newark, New Jersey.

JACK CLARK, 39398539, Master Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 13 October 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Sacramento, California.

CHARLES F. HEMKUS, 12004858, Master Sergeant, 251st Signal Heavy Construction Company, from 10 November 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Albany, New York.

DANIEL ADAMYCK, 20329919, Technical Sergeant, 495th Signal Heavy Construction Company, from 8 November 1942 to 8 May 1945, in North Africa, Italy, Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Pottsville, Pennsylvania.

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GO No 45 Hq 6th AG 10 June 45 cont'd

HAMILTON P. BURNARD, 33022757, Technical Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 31 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Wilkesbarre, Pennsylvania.

BERNARD A. CARDIA, 33072580, Technical Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 15 August 1944 to 1 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

CHARLES W. MANDER, 33637031, Technical Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 25 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Alexandria, Virginia.

JAMES D. HAYS, 39304041, Staff Sergeant, 4458th Quartermaster Car and Truck Company, from 11 September 1944 to 15 April 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Portland, Oregon.

HENRI A. LA BONTE, 6146897, Staff Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 1 January 1943 to 1 May 1945, in North Africa, Italy, Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Lewiston, Maine.

WILLIAM J. SCHMIDT, 33050704, Staff Sergeant, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 18 November 1942 to 8 May 1945, in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France. Entered the service from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

WILLIAM J. McGAFF, Jr., 32037925, Technician Third Grade, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 18 November 1942 to 8 May 1945, in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France. Entered the service from Syracuse, New York.

TIMOTHY W. PASMA, 33060368, Technician Third Grade, Press Camp Detachment, 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Rockville, Maryland.

JACQUES COLOMAR, Sergeant, French Army, French Military Mission, 6th Army Group, from 15 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

JAMES J. LAVERY, 32111613, Sergeant, Battery "C", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 22 February 1944 to 3 April 1944, in Italy. Entered the service from Brooklyn, New York.

JOSEPH MORRIALE, 32082914, Sergeant, Battery "D", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 22 January 1944 to 12 March 1945, in Italy and France. Entered the service from New York, New York.

FRANK P. NORMAN, 31003221, Sergeant, Battery "D", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 23 January 1944 to 8 March 1945; in Italy and France. Entered the service from Boston, Massachusetts.

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GO No 45 Hq 6th AG 10 June 45 contid

STEPHEN PLISKO, 11019712, Sergeant, Headquarters Battery, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 18 November 1942 to 15 March 1945, in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France. Entered the service from Danbury, Connecticut.

EVERETTE L. ROSS, 6984582, Sergeant, Battery "D", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 22 January 1944 to 12 March 1945, in Italy and France. Entered the service from Yamcraw, Kentucky.

FRANCOIS J.A. ROUTHIER, 11015188, Sergeant, Battery "D", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 23 January 1944 to 25 September 1944, in Italy and France. Entered the service from Concord, New Hampshire.

CHARLES W. RITER, 39111671, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 22 September 1944 to 16 April 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Oakland, California.

RICHARD M. VERRILL, 31204984, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 15 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in Corsies, France and Germany. Entered the service from Buffale, New York.

ANTHONY A. VILLANO, 32181981, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 15 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Newark, New Jersey.

JOHN W. GORDON, 35268405, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 1 February 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Dayton, Ohio.

NORMAN G. TURNER, 36630328, Private First Class, Battary "A", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 1 November 1943 to 15 March 1945, in Italy and France. Entered the service from Chicago, Illinois.

IV - AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL - RECISSION OF AWARD. So much of Section II, General Orders Number 41, this headquarters, 1 June 1945, as pertains to the award of the Bronze Star Medal to MITCHELL C. TACKLEY, 0-455833, Captain, QMC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, is rescinded (See Section I, this order).

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:

OFFICIAL:

J. L. TARR, Colomel, AGD,

DAVID G. BARR, Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff.

Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NUMBER 47)

14 June 1945

I — AWARD OF THE SILVER-STAR. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the Silver Star is awarded to the following named individual:

JAMES A. LARES, 0-1291482, First Lieutenant, Infantry, T Force, Headquarters 5th Army Group, for gallantry in action on 22 November 1944 near Dagsburg, France. Braving heavy fire from by-passed enemy positions and well placed snipers, Lieutenant Leres entered Strasbourg to establish a forward command post and make contact with the infantry battalion assigned to T Force. Having accomplished this mission, and realizing the necessity for getting information to elements still at Luneville, he made a hazardous trip through the Vosges Mountain Passes, many of which were still held by strong groups of by-passed troops. Just East of Dagsburg he was fired upon and was able to proceed only after he had stalked and killed two of the enemy who were armed with automatic weapons. By his courage, determination and unselfish devotion to duty, Lieutenant Leres contributed greatly to the success of the Strasbourg Intelligence Mission. Entered the service from New York, New York.

II - ATARD OF THE BRONZZ STAR HEDAL, FIRST OAK LEAF CLUSTER. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 500-45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the First Oak Leaf Cluster to the Bronze Star Medal is awarded to the following named individuals for meritorious achievement in connection with military oper tions:

JONATHAM.O. SEAMAN, 0-19385, Colonel, FA, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 2 April 1945 to 8 May 1945 in France. Entered the United States Military Academy from Washington, D. C.

HENRY D. DASTON, Jr., 0-293822, Colonel, CSC, Headquarters 5th Army Group, from 2 April 1945 to 8 May 1945 in France. Entered the service from Shreve-port, Louisiana.

ROY K. FAIRIAN, 0-900823, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 2 April 1945 to 8 May 1945 in France. Entered the service from Frinceton, New Jersey.

JOSEPH M. BARRECCT, First Ligutement, French Army, Military Mission, First French Army, From S ptember 1944 to May 1945, in Fr nee and Germany.

FRANCOIS F. FALCO, Varrent Officer, French Army, Hilitary Hission, First French Army, from 10 October 1944 to 5 May 1945, in France and Germany.

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GO No 47 Hq 6th AG 14 June 45 cont'd

III -- AVARD, POSTHUMOUS, OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL. By direction of the President under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, 22 September 1945, as amended, the Bronze Star Medal is awarded, posthumously, to the following named individual:

GILBERT MARGGER, Lieutenant, French Army, for meritorious achievement in connection with military operations from 15 September 1944 to 15 March 1945 in France.

IV -- AVARD OF THE BRONZE STAR EDAL. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the Bronze Star Medal is awarded to the following named individuals for heroic or moritorious achievement in connection with military operations:

JACK W. CHAPMAN, 0-20616, Colonel, CE, Headquarters 5th Army Group, from 1 April 1945 to 8 May 1945 in France: Entered the United States Military Academy from San Antonio, Texas.

FRANK W. HETLETT, 0-311137, Lieutenant Colonel, NC, 11th Medical General Dispensary, from 1 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Migni, Florida.

JOHN F. JOHNSTON, 0-482954, Major, DC, 11th Medical General Dispensary, from 1 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Indianapolis, Indiana.

EDVIN F. N CDY, 0-341984, Major, CAC, Headquarters 58th AAA Gum Battalion, from 18 November 1942 to 15 March 1945, in Forth Africa, Sicily, Italy and France. Entered the service from Lebanon, New Mampshire.

PIERRE AUGUSTE JEAN ALLEMANE, Hajor, French army, army Detachment of the atlantic, from February 1945 to May 1945 in France.

JEAN ALBERT STOFFT, hajor, French Army, Army Detachment of the Atlantic from February 1945 to Nay 1945 in France.

ROBERT E. LARTZ, 0-539153, Captain, NC, 11th Medical General Dispensary, from 1 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Sharon, Pennsylvania.

PAUL J. PHILLIPS, 0-1544846, Captain, NaC, 11th Medical General Dispensary, from 1 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the Service from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

SYDNEY STOEN, 0-1636704, Captain, SC, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 24 June 1944 to 8 May 1945, in North Africa, Italy, Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Brigantine, New Jersey.

ROBERT J. LYNCH, 0-418264, Captain, CaC, Battery D. 68th Aan Gun Battalion, from 1 November 1943 to 15 March 1945, in Italy and France. Entered the service from Tampa, Florida.

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EDMUND R. STUREK, 0-269475, Captain, Infantry, Headquarters Special Troops, 6th Army Group, from 20 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in Italy, France and Germany. Entered the service from Omaha, Nebraska.

FRANK A. HUTSON, Jr., 0-1551230, Captain, ORD, 6851st Headquarters Detachment, Liaison Service, from 21 February 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from New York, New York.

CHARLES TELL, Captain, French Army, from 22 January 1945 to 25 March 1945, in Franco.

BARNEY GOLDMAN, 0-1587280, Captain, QMC, 4458th Quartermaster Car and Truck Company, from 12 October 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Trenton, New Jersey.

TRUFANT FOSTER, 0-1578478, First Lieutenant, Cuartermaster Corps, Headquarters 5th Army Group, from 14 January 1945 to 8 May 1945 in France and Germany. Entered the service from Brooklyn, New York.

JACOB L. BERNHEIM, 0-1636036, First Lieutenant, SC, 3201st Signal Intelligence Service Detechment, from 28 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

JEAN AMBROSI, Commissaire de la Surete aux Armees, from 23 February 1945 to 20 March 1945, in France.

FRANCIS J. SILVENT, 33088652, First Sergeant, 11th Medical General Dispensary, from 2 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Sugar Notch, Pennsylvania.

LEONARD J. SLACK, 32181933, Master Sergeant, Headquarters Special Troops, 6th Army Group, from 14 August 1944 to 15 April 1945, in Italy, Corsica, France and Germany. Entered the service from Trenton, New Jersey.

DELMAR R. SCOTT, 38050042, Waster Sergeant, 6th Information and Historical Service, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 15 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Houston, Texas.

ELVIN H. REED, 20704175, Master Sergeant, 6836th Visitors Bureau, from 24 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Council Bluffs, Iowa.

ROBERT J. GCLUECE, 16020132, Technical Sergeant, 3157th Signal Service Company, from 31 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Marinette, Wisconsin.

WILLIAM R. MATTHEWS, 11016070, Technical Sergeant, 3201st Signal Intelligence Service Detachment, from 17 February 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Rutland, Vermont.

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JOSEPH F. S. MTIANI, 31065802, Technical Sorgant, 6836th Visitors Bureau, from 24 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Bridgeport, Connecticut.

ANTHORY CILIDEE, 31070299, Technical Sorgeant, Hoadquarters Special Troops, oth ary Group, from 28 October 1944 to 8 may 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Pawtucket, Rhode Island.

JOHN T. MALIDON, 20834875, Technical Sergeant, 98th Army Ground Forces Band, from 8 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

CARL BAUISH, 6983149, Staff Sergeant, CAC, Battery D, 68th Au. Gun Battalion, from 6 March 1944 to 12 March 1945, in Italy and France. Entered the service from Lost Creek, West Virginia.

HARRY BERLIN, 33065323, Staff Sergeant, 11th Medical General Dispensary, from 2 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Baltimore, Maryland.

LOREN OZIAS, 37421255, Staff Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 25 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in Germany. Entered the service from Fort Des Moines, Ioua.

RCBERT G. COSCROVE, 31305117, Staff Sergeant, Handquarters Special Troops, 6th Army Group, from 12 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Winthrop, Massachusetts.

BERN.RD A. IMGS, 32167654, Staff Sergeant, 251st Signal Heavy Construction Company, from 20 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Belleville, New Jersey.

EMERALD 7. MOORE, 20823603, Staff Sorgeant, 98th Army Ground Forces Band, from 8 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Alva, Oklahoma.

JOHN W. McNAHON, 34531079, Staff Sorgeant, 1734th Engineer Utilities Dotachment, from 15 December 1944 to 1 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Sarasota, Florida.

MACK H. SINGLETON, 32350676, Tochnician Third Grade, 3201st Signal Intelligence Service Detachment, from 11 February 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Enid, Oklahoma.

DORUS M. OVERMAN, 37466942, Technician Third Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th army Group, from 1 March 1944 to 8 may 1945, in North Africa, Italy, Franco and Germany. Entered the service from Shenandoah, Iowa.

GORDON M. SERTELSON, 39313359, Technician Third Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 24 February 1944 to 8 May 1945, in North Africa, Italy, France and Germany. Entered the service from Pocatello, Idaho.

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MICHAEL J. SCHNEIDER, 32567723, Tochnician Third Grade, Headquarters Special Troops, 5th Army Group, from 15 November 1944 to 7 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Newark, New Jersey.

CHARLES GINDIN, 37585223, Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 27 November 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Minneapolis, Minnesota.

PAUL H. DOWNELL, 32235630, Sorgeant, 6836th Visitors Bureau, from 25 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Union, New Jersey.

SAMUEL E. MARSEE, 35170348, Sorgoant, 450th Military Police Company, from 7 December 1944 to 30 April 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Petersburg, Indiana.

LUIGI DIAMO, 31445363, Sorgeant, Hoadquarters Special Troops, 6th Army Group, from 1 Soptember 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Providence, Rhodo Island.

LUTHER D. PUGALUE, 6984585, Sorgeant, Battery D, 68th And Gun Battalion, from 22 January 1944 to 12 March 1945, in Italy and France, Entered the service from Lumar, West Virginia.

FRANKLIN G. SURRATT, Jr., 34508537, Sorgoant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 27 December 1944 to 8 New 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from High Point, North Carolina.

FRANK P. LISARTI, 16025203, Technician Fourth Grade, 98th Army Ground Forces Band, from 8 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Chicago, Illinois.

JAMES E. VILLIANSON, 36159323, Tochnician Fourth Grade, 98th Army Ground Forces Band, from 8 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Kalamzoo, Michigan.

EDWARD J. ROCHE, 31354206, Technician Fourth Grade, 11th Medical General Dispensary, from 2 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Roxbury, Massachusetts.

WILLIAM C. HUTCHISON, 34684244, Technician Fourth Grade, 11th Hedical General Dispensary, from 2 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Concord, Georgia.

ABRAHAM ETKINS, 32644190, Technician Fourth Grade, 11th Medical General Dispensary, from 1 December 1944 to 8 Mey 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Brooklyn, New York.

JOSEPH J. DE SANTIS, 32734619, Tochnician Fourth Grade, Hoadquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 5 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Rochester, New York.

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THRODORD BRYDON, 32594709, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters Special Troops. 5th Army Group; from 15 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Newark, New Jersey.

LOYD T. WORLEY, 14046957, Tochnician Fourth Grade, 6th Information and Historical Service, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 20 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Huntsville, Alabama.

DAUGHTOM C. IDSTIR, 34032016, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th army Group, from 1 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany: Entered the service from Sugar Grove, North Carolina.

MANUEL GALLEGOS, 39270481. Technician Fourth Grade. 1734th Engineer Utilities Detachment, from 12 January 1945 to 1 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Los Angeles, California.

IVAN L. SLUSHER, 39576325, Corporal, Battery C, 68th Ava Gun Battalion, from 1 November 1943 to 15 March 1945, in Italy and France. Entered the service from Tinchester, Indiana.

JAMES G. MCPHERSON, 32351790, Corporal, Battery D. 68th Ada Sun Battalion, from 16 December 1943 to 29 December 1943, in Italy. Entered the service from New York, New York.

STEPHEN J. DICH, 32892866, Corporal, 11th Medical General Dispensary, from 2 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Queens Village, New York.

WHILLEY M. ALLEN, 34214194, Technician Fifth Grade, 11th Medical General Dispensary, from 2 December 1944 to 8 May 1949, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Greenville, South Carolina.

JOSEPH A. CASSANO, 32429815, Technician Fifth Grade, 6th Information and Historical Service, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 15 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from New York, New York.

LEGNARD E. WCCDALL, 35670695, Technician Fifth Grade, 6th Information and Historical Service, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 15 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Cincinnati, Ohio.

JAMES E. PORTUESE, 12066616, Technician Fifth Grade, 98th Army Ground Forces Band, from 8 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Poughkeepsie, New York.

ARTHUR H. GRUNDHOFER, 37327681, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 15 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Saint Paul, Minnosota.

HOTARD A. PENTELL, 32772566, Technician Fifth Grade, CAC, Headquarters Battery, 68th And Gun Battalion, for heroic achievement in connection with military operations on 26 February 1944, near anzio, Italy. On 26 February 1944, at about 2100 hours, an ammunition dump located about 350 yards from

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from the Battery Noter Park was set ablaze during an enemy bombardment. Once on fire, the already exploding ammunition dump became a target for enemy artillery. Realizing that the Battery's vehicles were liable to destruction or serious damage, Corporal Pennell (then a Private First Class), with shells bursting around him and further endangered by exploding ammunition and flying fragments, removed them from the exposed area to one of comparative safety on his own initiative and with utter disregard for his own personal safety. By this calm act of bravery under extremely hazardous conditions he undoubtedly saved valuable government property and narrowly escaped personal injury. Entered the service from Teaneck, New Jersey.

SALVATORE F. PAUCIELLO, 32910403, Private First Class, Headquarters Special Troops, 6th Army Group, from 15 November 1944 to 7 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Newark, New Jersey.

LOUIS R. BARRETO, 32653651, Private First Class, 98th Army Ground Forces Band, from 8 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from New York, New York.

ROY W. ELLSTORTH, 11020412, Private First Class, Battery D, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 16 December 1943 to 29 December 1943, in Italy. Entered the service from Woburn, Massachusetts.

EDGAR A. HATFIELD, 6984560, Private First Class, Battery D, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 16 December 1943 to 29 December 1943, in Italy. Entered the service from Ransom, Kentucky.

FRANCIS L. FERRY, 32287993, Private First Class, Battery D, 68th And Gun Battalion, from 16 December 1943 to 29 December 1943, in Italy. Entered the service from Windsor, New York.

LLOYD H. HUPHREY, 37381406, Private First Class, 450th Military Police Company, from 1 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany. Entered the service from Iberia, Missouri.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR, Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. L. TARR, TO Colonel, AGD, Adjutant General.

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QUARTERS STH ARMY GROUP APO 23, U. S. ARMY

25 June 1945

I — AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL, FIRST OAK LEAF CLUSTER. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the First Oak Leaf Cluster to the Bronze Star Medal is awarded to the following named individual for meritorious achievement in connection with military operations;

PIERRE C. PAMART, Commandant, French Army, from 15 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

II - AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL. By direction of the Prosident, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600 45, 22 September 1943, as amended, the Bronze Star Medal is awarded to the following named individuals for heroic or meritorious achievement in connection with military operations:

JEAN DE DRIESEN, Lioutenant Colonel, French Army, from 3 April 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

HENRY J. ALET, Commandant, French Army, from 18 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

PIERRE GAYET, Chef de Bataillon, French Army, from 1 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

LEO. GIRARD, Chef de Bataillon, French Army, from , February 1945 to 9 March 1945, in Franco.

CHARLES LEFEVRE, Commandant, French Army, from 29 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in Germany.

JEAN E. TEISSIER, Chef de Bataillon, French Army, from 15 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

CHARLES C. RORERTS, C-451387, Major, CAC, 6851st Headquarters Detachment, Liaison Service, from 15 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

ROGER C. ZOLLER, Major, French Army, from 10 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

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CHARLES M. DRUMMOND, Jr., 0-399933, Captain, CAC, Battery "B", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 4 September 1944 to 15 October 1944, in France.

HAROLD W. DUAC, 0-330958, Captain, Inf., Headquarters Battery, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 18 November 1942 to 15 March 1945, in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and Franco.

ALBERT FRIBOURG, Captain, French Army, from 15 February 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

RAYMOND HUPPERT, Captain, French Army, from 15 October 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Gormany.

RODNEY S. KEPLEY, 0-1295237, Captain, Inf., Headquarters Special Troops, 6th Army Group, from 26 August 1944 to 15 December 1944, in France.

JOSEPH J. ABERNETHY, 0-2055431, First Lieutenant, CMP, 450th Military Police Company, from 1 July 1944 to 8 May 1945, in North Africa, Italy, France and Germany.

LECN B. ALLISON, 0-1308581, First Lioutenant, Inf., 4458th Quartermaster Car and Truck Company, from 15 January 1945 to 1 May 1945, in France and Germany.

EUGENE H. BOOHER, 0-1558120, First Lieutenant, Ord., 4458th Quartermaster Car and Truck Company, from 16 October 1944 to 1 May 1945, in France and Germany.

CASTELLI, First Lieutenant, French Army, from November 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France.

MARVIN EISENBERG, 0-551187, First Licutenant, Inf., 6836th Visiter: Bureau, Hoadquarters 6th Army Group, from 5 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

WILLIAM F. FINUCANE, Jr., 0-1047116, First Lieutenant, CAC, Bathery "D", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 1 November 1943 to 15 March 1945, in Italy and France.

DAVID F. KLING, 0-1000795, First Lieutenant, AGD, Headquarters ℓ th Army Group, from 17 November 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

ERNEST E. McMILLAN, 0-1051686, First Lieutenant, CAC, Battony "A", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 26 December 1943 to 15 March 1945, in Italy and France.

ARCHIE D. PERSICHINI, 0-2053991, First Lieutenant, Signal Cours. 3299th Signal Service Company, from 5 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

WARREN C. REYNOLDS, 0-2011127, Second Licutenant, CAC, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 1 November 1943 to 15 March 1945, in Sicily, Italy and France.

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THOMAS H. GREER, W-2126059, Chief Warrant Officer, 98th Army Ground Porces Band, from 4 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

FRANCOIS JEAN GUITTER, Adjudent Chof, French Army, from November 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France.

GERMAIN BACKES, Marochal-des-Logis Chef, French Army, from 18 Soptembor 1944 to 8 May 1945, in Franco and Gormany.

LOUIS GUINSBURG, Marechal-des-Logis Chef, French Army from November 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France.

HENRI PIERRE CHALLAMIN, Marechal-des-Logis, French Army, from November 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France.

HANS A. AABEL, 35486267, Technical Sergeant, 3299th Signal Service Company, from 1 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, 31087091, Technical Sorgeant, Headquarters Battery, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 1 November 1943 to 15 March 1945, in Sicily, Italy and France.

JOSEPH J. CINACLIA, 42044299, Staff Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 18 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

COMMIE E. DAVIS, 34077929, Staff Sergoant, 4458th Quartermaster Car and Truck Company, from 9 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

THOMAS F. DUNY, 33484678, Staff Sergeant, Medical Detachment, Special Troops, 6th Army Group, from 1 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

FOUNTINE F. ENDRIZZI, 698807, Staff Sergeant, Battery "A", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, for heroic achievement in connection with military operations on 20 January 1945, in France. Volunteering his services as forward observer to accompany an Infantry patrol, Sergeant Endrizzi demonstrated remarkable courage in performing a particularly delicate and hazardous assignment. Making his way through perilous mountain slopes and snow-covered terrain past the enemy lines, he established contact with the Infantry CP, directed, adjusted and effected fire upon enemy installations. By his efficient observation and calculations under the most disadvantageous of combat conditions, he directed fire which demolished machine gun positions and pill boxes and disorganized enemy personnel. His courage and devotion to duty, with disregard for his own personal safety reflected great credit upon himself and the military service.

EVERETT S. SALISBURY, 32013749, Staff Sergeant, 6851st Headquarters Detachment, Liaison Service, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 15 November 1944 to 2 May 1945, in Corsica and France.

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RICHARD E. SHAFFER, 6988094, Staff Sergeant, Battery "A", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, for heroic achievement in connection with military operations on 20 January 1945, and 24 January 1945, in France. Sergeant Shaffer volunteered to observe enemy positions and to bring direct fire upon the located positions. Making his way through perilous mountain slopes and snow-covered terrain, through and past the enemy lines, he established contact with the Infantry (F, directed, adjusted and effected fire upon enemy installations. Through his efficient observations and calculations, under extremely hazardous and most disadventageous combat conditions, he directed fire which demolished machine gun positions and pill boxes and disorganized enemy personnel in one instance, and destroyed two machine gun positions and disorganized enemy troops guarding an adventageous pass in another. His courage, his expert observations, and his devotion to duty reflect great credit upon himself and the military service.

RCBERT J. TUCKER, 31003145, Staff Sergeant, Battery "A", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 6 July 1943 to 28 February 1945, in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France.

JOHN A. ZEIGENFUSE, 3370720, Staff Sergeant, 4458th Quarternaster Car and Truck Company, from 15 September 1944 to 15 April 1945, in France and Germany.

WALTER H. HEINSIUS, 32208076, Technician Third Grade, 16th Finance Disbursing Section, from 9 February 1944 to 25 May 1944, in Italy, and from 14 January 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

FRANCIS P. 0'CONNOR, 31077112, Technician Third Grade, 6836th Visitors Bureau, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 29 September 1944 to 8 Nay 1945, in France and Germany.

JIMMIE N. POTTS, 38020566, Tochnician Third Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 1 August 1944 to 7 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Gorgany.

WILLIAM SIMONS, R-2797420, Technician Third Grade, 46th Signal Fe any Construction Battalion, from 15 March 1945 to 8 May 1945, in Germany.

EDWARD M. COUSSENS, 36179725, Sorgeant, 450th Military Police Company, from 1 July 1944 to 8 May 1945, in Italy, France and Germany.

DAVID E. DAHLIN, 18232215, Sergoant, 6836th Visitors Bureau, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 30 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

JOHN W. DURKIN; 32355428, Sorgeant, 4458th Quartermaster Car and Truck Company, from 11 September 1944 to 15 April 1945, in France and Germany.

ALBERT NAVATTO, 32072825, Sergeant, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 6 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

DONALD A: WAIT, 36328928, Sergeant, 450th Military Police Company, from 1 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in Italy, France and Germany.

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HARCLD B. BAUM, 35117747, Technician Fourth Grade, Medical Detachment, Special Troops, 6th Army Group, from 9 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

ARNOLD R. CHRISTENSEN, 31008073, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters Battery, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 1 November 1943 to 15 March 1945, in Sicily, Italy and France.

PETER J. DEMETER, 32987484, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 16 November 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

JOSEPH ITZKOTITZ, 42032222, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 18 August 1944 to 7 May 1945, in Corsica, France and Germany.

LEONARD KILIAN, Jr., 32208000, Technician Fourth Grade, 16th Finance Disbursing Soction, from 9 February 1944 to 25 May 1944, in Italy; and from 14 January 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

JOHN L. KLIM, 31094501, Technicien Fourth Grade, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 8 Soptember 1944 to 7 May 1945, in France and Germany.

ATTILIO MOLINARI, 32861571, Technician Fourth Grade: 6836th Visitors Bureau, Headquarters 6th Army Group, from 7 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

WILLIAM C. CHEN, 19097684, Technician Fourth Grade, 16th Finance Disbursing Section, from 1 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, in Italy, France and Germany.

JOSEPH S. GURKA, 33354484, Corporal, 4458th Quartermaster Car and Truck Company, from 1 October 1944 to 15 April 1945, in France and Germany.

WALTER A. KNUDSEN, 37173863, Corporal, 4458th Quartermaster Car and Truck Compant, from 11 September 1944 to 15 April 1945, in France and Germany.

ANGE SERUEL, Caporal-Chef, French Army, from November 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France.

FRANK F. REED, Jr., 13133311, Corporal, Battery "A", 68th AAA Gum Battalion, from 27 February 1944 to 26 January 1945, in Italy and France.

ALBERT A. CARCLLO, 39612190, Technician Fifth Grade, 16th Finance Disbursing Section, from 1 February 1945 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

RICHARD J. DULLE, 35669713, Tochnician Fifth Grade, Medical Detachment, Special Troops, 6th Army Group, from 1 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France and Germany.

EUGENE J. MOSER, 37466871, Tochnician Fifth Grade, Battery "D", 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 22 January 1944 to 15 March 1945, in Italy and France.

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EDWARD J. OBERT-THORN, 33050837, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters Battery, 68th AAA Gun Battalion, from 1 November 1943 to 15 March 1945, in Italy and France.

BARTLETT J. BROOKS, 42037368, Private First Class, Headquarters Company, 6th Army Group, from 20 November 1944 to 7 May 1945, in France and Germany.

GEORGES EMILE PORCHER, Conducteur lere Classe, French Army, from November 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France.

JACQUES DUPONT, Conductour, French Army, from November 1944 to 8 May 1945, in France.

III — AWARD OF THE MEDICAL BADGE. Under the provisions of WD Circular 66, 1 Warch 1945, as amended, the Medical Badge is awarded to the following named individuals:

HENRY P. CCHAN, 0-479412, Captain, MC, 109th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division.

ALFRED J. OSCLIN, 0-282120, Captain, MC, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion.

HAROLD SUSSMAN, 0-496264, Captain, Mc, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion.

WILLIAM A. KEDA, 0-1691727, First Lieutenant, MAC, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion.

WILLIAM J. SCHMIDT, 33050704, Staff Sergeant, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion.

WILLIAM J. NcGAFF, Jr., 32037925, Technician Third Grade, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion.

McCLUNG, GORDON F., 33008854, Technician Fourth Grade, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion.

WILLIAM E. BURLBAUCH, 37055760, Corporal, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion.

THOMAS W. BURTON, 13127306, Technician Fifth Grade, Medical Detachment, 68th

ONDRO L. HILL, 35408108, Technician Fifth Grade, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion.

JORDAN J. NARKEWICH, 31003359, Technician Fifth Grade, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion.

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JAMES M. ARMSTRONG, 37296379, Privato First Class, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion.

CLARENCE J. DECKER, 36502960, Private First Class, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion.

BERNARD MARSHALL, 36341942, Private First Class, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion.

PRIER SCHILLING, 36872618, Private First Class, 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division.

HERBERT WALLACE, 14017929, Private First Class, Medical Detachment, 68th AAA Gun Battalion.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,

Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

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J. L. TARR, Colonel, AGD, Adjutant General.

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Individuals Decorated 1 June 1945

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Colonel Faul G. Kirk, Inf., 0-201090, Hq 6th Army Group Colonel Hubert W. Gollins, CE, 0-6877, Hq 6th Army Group Colonel James L. Beynon, FA, 0-17605, Hq 6th Army Group Colonel Charles C. Adams, III, FA, 0-344130, Hq 6th AG Ll. Col. John E. Wadsworth, FA, 0-313321, Hq 6th AG Ll. Col. John E. Wadsworth, FA, 0-313321, Hq 6th AG Kajor Edward S. Sell, Jr., IGD, 0353568, Hq 6th Army Gp Captain Samuel W. Blumberg, ADC, 0-1003675, Hq 6th AG Captain Frank J. Morris, AUS, 0-52454, Hq 6th AFMY Gp Captain George R. Faucette, AdD, 0-100041, Hq 6th AG Captain George Wolf, Ord, 0-379558, Hq 6th Army Group 1st Lt. Arthur W. Davis, AUS, 01895460, Hq 6th Army Group 1st Lt. Arthur N. Davis, AUS, 01895460, Hq 6th Army Group 1/Sgt Kenneth R. Tubbs, 33111314, Hq 6th Army Group 1/Sgt Rorman H. Curtis, 36713030, Hq 6th Army Group 1/Sgt Rorman H. Curtis, 36713030, Hq 6th Army Group 1/Sgt Fred W. Brocha, 39182290, Hq 6th Army Group 1/Sgt Fred W. Brocha, 39182290, Hq 6th Army Group 1/Sgt Fred W. Brocha, 39182290, Hq 6th Army Group 1/S Howard H. Heasley, 35321290, Hq 6th Army Group 1/S James J. Reilly, Jr., 33028453, Hq 6th Army Group 1/S James J. Reilly, Jr., 33028453, Hq 6th Army Group 1/S James J. Reilly, Jr., 33028453, Hq 6th Army Group 1/S Howard H. Heasley, 35321290, Hq 6th Army Group 1/S Howard H. Beasley, 35321290, Hq 6th Army Group 1/S Howard H. Shepherd, 3643802, Hq 6th Army Group 1/4 James E. Phipps, 33401013, Headquarters 6th Army Group 1/5 Herd H. Shepherd, 3643802, Hq 6th Army Group 1/5 Herd H. Shepherd, 3643802, Hq 6th Army Group 1/5 Herd H. Shepherd, 3643802, Hq 6th Army Group 1/5 Herd H. Shepherd, 3643802, Hq 6th Army Group 1/5 Herd H. Shepherd, 3643802, Hq 6th Army Group 1/5 Herd H. Shepherd, 3643802, Hq 6th Army Group 1/5 Herd H. Shepherd, 3643802, Hq 6th Army Group 1/5 Herd H. Shepherd, 3643802, Hq 6th Army Group 1/5 Herder H. Walker, 35384470, Hq 6th Army Group 1/5 Herder H. Walker, 35384470, Hq 6th Army Group 1/5 Herder H. Walker, 35384470, Hq 6th Army Group 1/5 Herder H. Walker, 35384470, Hq 6th Army Group 1/5 Herd

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Individuals Decorated 4 June 1945

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Colonel William I. Wilson, Ord, C-8754, Hq 6th Army Group Lt. Col. Roy K. Fairman, Inf, O-900823, Hq 6th Army Group Lt. Col. John N. Hutchison, Inf, O-352232, Hq 6th Army Gp Lt. Col. Robert P. Rogers, MC, O-484658, Hq 6th Army Gp Lt. Col. Robert N. Denniston, Inf, O-324890, Hq 6th Army Gp Lt. Col. Robert N. Denniston, Inf, O-324890, Hq 6th Army Group Major James E. Davidoff, CAC, O-361858, Hq 6th Army Group Major Jean Cattier, CE, C-1112073, Hq 6th Army Group Major Frederic O. Wickham, Sig, O341568, Hq 6th Army Gp Major Hay J. Davies, QMC, O-455867, Hq 6th Army Group Major Hay J. Davies, QMC, O-455867, Hq 6th Army Group Major Faul F. Graig, AUS, O532888, Hq 6th Army Group Captain Howard N. Dailey, CMF, O-410592, Hq 6th Army Gp Captain Howard N. Dailey, CMF, O-410592, Hq 6th Army Gp Captain Howard N. Dailey, CMF, O-410592, Hq 6th Army Gp Captain Howard N. Dailey, CMF, O-1796361, Hq 6th Army Gp Captain Howard N. Dailey, CMF, O-1796361, Hq 6th Army Gp Captain Howard N. Dailey, CMF, O-1796361, Hq 6th Army Gp Captain Howard N. Dailey, CMF, O-1796361, Hq 6th Army Group M/Srt Donald O. Bickham, 5969886, Headquarters 6th Army Group 1/Srt Feter F. Considine, 32213282, Hq 6th Army Group 1/Srt Feter F. Considine, 32213282, Hq 6th Army Group 1/S Hyman N. Tress, 32435429, Headquarters 6th Army Group 1/S Hyman N. Tress, 32435429, Headquarters 6th Army Group 1/S Jackson B. Leverette, 34313379, Hq 6th Army Group 1/S Jackson B. Leverette, 34513379, Hq 6th Army Group 1/S Jackson B. Allan, 33668766, Headquarters 6th Army Group 1/S Jackson B. Allan, 33668766, Headquarters 6th Army Group 1/S Jackson B. Allan, 33668766, Headquarters 6th Army Group 1/S Jackson B. Allan, 33668766, Headquarters 6th Army Group 1/S Jackson B. Allan, 33668766, Headquarters 6th Army Group 1/S Jackson B. Allan, 33668766, Headquarters 6th Army Group 1/S Jackson B. Allan, 33668766, Headquarters 6th Army Group 1/S Jackson B. Allan, 33668766, Headquarters 6th Army Group 1/S Jackson B. Allan, 336687867, Headquarters 6th Army Group 1/S Jackson B. Leverette, 35578

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED HEUTHOLLU Individuals Decorated 5 June 1945 BRONZE STAR MEDAL Lt. Col. Alfred T. Coleman, Jr., 0-385977, Eq 6th Army Gp
Lt. Col. Benjamin L. Mattingly, CWS, 0-317065, Eq 6th AG
Lt. Col. George S. Wetson, Sig, 0-272590, Eq 6th Army Gp
Lt. Col. Wendell B. Sell, CAC, 0-23069, Eq 6th Army Group
Major Raymond E. Bennett, Inf, 0-369778, Eq 6th Army Group
Major Thomas J. Bee, AGD, 0-885018, Eq 6th Army Group
M/Sgt Paul M. Kober, 33119031, Headquarters 6th Army Group
M/Sgt William F. Pelzer, 35681225, Eq 6th Army Group
T/Sgt Carl B. Mitchell, 38180649, Eq 6th Army Group
T/3 Burton S. Klein, 36368063, Headquarters 6th Army Group
T/3 Barr E. Miller, 32114381, Headquarters 6th Army Group
Sgt Louis B. Marinano, 32259171, Headquarters 6th Army Group
T/4 Wichael M. Cregg, 35573062, Headquarters 6th Army Group
Cpl John F. Strunk, 35263357, Headquarters 6th Army Group
Cpl Meil D. Loynachan, 37585314, Headquarters 6th Army Group
T/5 Dennis H. Cantwell, 34378193, Headquarters 6th Army Gp
T/5 Cecil E. Smith, 34437602, Headquarters 6th Army Group

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED Individuals Decorated 7 June 1945 Colonel Oscar S. Reeder, MC, 0-20086, Hq 6th Army Group
Lt. Col. Edward J. Gully, FA, 0-159210, Hq 6th Army Group
Major Kenneth T. Smith, GSC, 0-358152, Hq 6th Army Group
Major Albert L. Nowicki, CE, 0-314330, Hq 6th Army Group
Captain Jerry R. Wilks, AGB, 0-1000073, Hq 6th Army Group
Captain Robert G. Beaumont, Sig, 0-2046368, Hq 6th Army Gp
Captain Carl G. Zimmerman, Sig, 0-1844976, Hq 6th Army Gp
Captain Charles H. Taylor, JACD, 0-2052346, Hq 6th Army Gp
Lst Lt. Edward R. Korzenowski, SC, 0-1639270, 3299th Sig.
CWO Albert C. Salansky, W-2108386, 16th Fin Disb. Section
M/Sgt Henry J. Ostermajer, 12188787, Hq 6th Army Group
1st/Sgt Romeo J. Galloni, 32007953, 450th MP Company
T/Sgt Joseph A. Lamb, 34535401, Headquarters 6th Army Group
T/Sgt George W. Gausing, 35260847, Hq 6th Army Group
T/Sgt Lester D. Posner, 16093358, Headquarters 6th Army Gp
T/3 Chester Hobbs, 35740564, Headquarters 6th Army Group
T/3 Chester Hobbs, 35740564, Headquarters 6th Army Group
T/3 Chester Hobbs, 35740564, Headquarters 6th Army Group
T/3 Chester Bolans, Jackson, Jr., 34651728, Hq 6th Army Group
T/3 Edward M. Sprowl, 31357426, Headquarters 6th Army Group
Sgt Francis A. Murray, 32154171, 450th Eilltary Folice Co.
T/4 Robert S. Berlin, 32882060, Headquarters 6th Army Group
T/5 John D. Ferguson, 37705350, Headquarters 6th Army Group
T/5 Leonard M. Mitchell, 39451530, Hq 6th Army Group
T/5 Leonard M. Mitchell, 39451530, Hq 6th Army Group
T/5 Leonard M. Mitchell, 39451530, Hq 6th Army Group
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T/5 Leonard M. Mitchell, 39451530, Hq 6th Army Group
T/5 Leonard M. Mitchell, 39451530, Hq 6th Army Group
T/5 Leonard M. Mitchell, 394515404, Headquarters 6th Army Group
T/5 Leonard M. Mitchell, 394515404, Headquarters 6th Army Group BRONZE STAR KEDAL

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Individuals Decorated 9 June 1945

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Lt. Col. Robert L. Finley, AUS, 0-535630, Hq 6th Army Gp
Major Edward F. D'Arms, SR, 0525295, Hq 6th Army Group
Captain Bernard Rubenson, Cav. 0-362774, Hq 6th Army Gp
Captain Edward G. Heider, Ord, 0-452742, Hq 6th Army Gp
Captain Harold Sussman, MC, 0-496264, 68th AAA Gum En
Captain Allan A. Howell, Inf, 0-1295217, Hq 6th Army Gp
Captain Mitchell C. Tackley, QMC, 0-455833, Hq 6th AG
Captain Arthur G. Robertson, Inf, 0-1305316, Hq 6th AG
Captain Lee Lyon, Ord, 0-455718, Headquarters 6th Army Gp
M/Sgt Wiley H. Gower, 17146069, Headquarters 6th Army Gp
M/Sgt Wiley H. Gower, 17146069, Headquarters 6th Army Gp
M/Sgt Lucien A. Frelin, 6902528, 66th AAA Gun En
T/Sgt Frederick C. McDermott, 11020371, 68th AAA Gun En
T/Sgt Charles W. Mander, 33637031, Hq 6th Army Group
S/Sgt Marven K. Eggert, 39381355, Hq 6th Army Group
S/Sgt Marven K. Eggert, 39381355, Hq 6th Army Group
T/3 William S. Erowne, 32776852, Headquarters 6th Army Gp
T/4 Archie E. Harju, 37.299142, Headquarters 6th Army Gp
T/4 Archie E. Harju, 37.299142, Headquarters 6th Army Gp
Cpl Broudie E. Stevens, 34466819, 68th AAA Gun En
Cpl Rex V. Skeel, 37426789, 58th AAA Gun Bn
T/5 Francis F. Hollis, 32.21522, Hq 6th Army Group
T/5 Albert C. Blais, 20141795, 68th AAA Gun Battalion
T/5 Francis F. Hollis, 32.21529, Hq 6th Army Group
T/5 Albert C. Blais, 20141795, 68th AAA Gun Battalion
T/5 Francis G. Snow, 39682385, 163d Sig Phote Ce

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Individuals Decorated 11 June 1945

BRONZE STAR MEDAL (FIRST OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

Captain Ray J. Tadlock, AGD, 0-1002736, Hq 6th Army Group

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

ERONZE STAR MEDAL

Col. Joseph W. Betch, MC, 0-20864, Hq 6th Army Group
Col. Frank W. Hewlett, MC, 0-31137, 11th Gen Disp
jor John F. Johnston, DO, 0-482964, 11th Gen Disp
ptain Faul J. Fhillips, MAC, 0-1544846, 11th Gen Disp
ptain Robert E. Larts, MC, 0539153, 11th Gen Disp
ptain Bobert E. Larts, MC, 0539153, 11th Gen Disp
ptain Sydney Stoem, SC, 0-1636704, Hq 6th Army Group
ptain Irwin F. Karm, AGD, 0-1165025, Hq 6th Army Group
ptain William S. Ramey, AGD, 0-1001030, Hq 6th Army Gp
ptain Helf E. Larssen, Inf, 01298725, Hq 6th Army Gp
ptain Helf E. Larssen, Inf, 01298725, Hq 6th Army Gp
t Lt. Harcha H. Sours, QMC, 0-1890284, Hq 6th Army Gp
d Lt. Andre H. Mercier, French Army G-1 Increment
t/Sgt Francis J. Silvent, 33086522, 11th Gen Dispensary
Sgt James D. Hays, 39304041, 4458 QM Car & Truck Co
Sgt John A. Reavis, 37731424, Haadquarters 6th Army Gp
Sgt Hobert Murdock, 33125864, 4458 QM Car & Truck Co
Sgt Richard S. Phillips, 36184186, 4458 QM Car & Truck Co
Sgt James A. Suttle, Jr., 35132919, 4458 QM Car & Truck Co
Sgt John H. Wilkerson, 33093927, 3211 Sig Service Group
3 Joseph H. Dannenberg, 12049259, 3158 Sig Service Co
5 Daniel B. Mial, 32372068, 16th Finance Disbursing Sect
3 Timothy W. Fasma, 33060368, Headquarters 6th Army Gp
4 Charles W. Rider, 39111671, Headquarters 6th Army Gp
4 Richard M. Verrill, 312049484, Hq 6th Army Group
4 Anthony A. Villano, 32181981, Hq 6th Army Group
4 Edward J. Roche, 3135206, 11th General Dispensary
4 William C. Hutchinson, 34684244, 11th Gen Dispensary
5 Roy V. Sawyer, 34055926, 495th Sig Hvy Constr Company
5 Not V. Sawyer, 34055926, 495th Sig Hvy Constr Company
5 William M. Allen, 34214194, 11th Med Gen Dispensary
5 Roy V. Sawyer, 34055926, 495th Sig Hvy Constr Company
5 William M. Allen, 34214194, 11th Med Gen Dispensary

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Sajor Joseph R. Galloway, Inf, 0-387918, Eq 6th Army Group
Sajor Vernon N. Simmons, Jr., SC, 0-452969, Eq 6th Army Up
Sajor Honer M. Sordoy, SC, 0-392514, Eq 6th Army Group
Saptain Hoches B. Bordoy, SC, 0-392514, Eq 6th Army Group
Saptain Hoches D. Dack, Inf, 0-1395257, Eq 6th Army Up
Saptain Hoches D. Mac, Inf, 0-1295257, Eq 6th Army Up
Ist at Enrest L. McHing, Add, 0-1051686, 6eth Army Up
Ist at Enrest L. McHing, Add, 0-1051686, 6eth Army Up
Ist at Enrich C. Hermon, CAC, 0-104716, 6eth Army Up
Ist at Sajor D. Macker, 51003145, 6eth Army Up
Ist at Sajor D. Macker, 51003145, 6eth Army Up
Special Manternest J. Lemon, 970th JC Letachment
Jost Bobert J. Macker, 51003145, 6eth Army Up
Special Manternest J. Lemon, 970th JC Letachment
Jost Bobert J. Macker, 51003145, 6eth Army Up
Special Manternest J. Lemon, 970th JC Letachment
Jost Bobert J. Macker, 51003145, 6eth Army Upoup
Special Manternest J. Lemon, 970th JC Letachment
Jost Bobert J. Macker, 51003145, 6eth Army Upoup
Special Manternest J. Lemon, 970th JC Letachment
Jost Bobert J. Special J. Spe BRONZE STAR MEDAL

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED Individuals Decorated 26 June 1945 BRONZE STAR MELAL Lt. Col. Jean de Driesen, French Army
Major Charles C. Roberts, CAC, 0-451387, 6851 Hg Det, Ams
Major Jean Peletier, French Army
Captain charles M. Brummond, Jr., CAC, 0-339933, 68th AAA dun on
Captain Joe K. Robinson, CMC, 0-205464, Hg 6th Army croup
let Lt. Sylvester W. Bracy, Aug, 0-1002804, Hg 6th Army croup
let Lt. James S. Arthurs, Ca., 0111826, Hg 6th Army croup
let Lt. James S. Arthurs, Ca., 0111826, Hg 6th Army croup
let Lt. James S. Arthurs, Ca., 0-1653179, 98th Sister colet Lt. Jasob L. Bernholm, Cc. 0-1836036, 32018t SI, Int cer
let Lt. Joseph J. Abernethy, Cap., 0-2053431, 450th Mil Folice
let Lt. Archie D. Persichini, SC, 0-2053431, 450th Mil Folice
let Lt. Archie D. Persichini, SC, 0-205391, 323th Sister colet Lt. Archie D. Persichini, SC, 0-205391, 323th Sister colet Lt. Archie D. Persichini, SC, 0-205391, 323th Sister colet Lt. Archie D. Persichini, SC, 0-205391, 323th Sister colet Lt. Archie D. Persichini, SC, 0-205391, 323th Sister colet Lt. Archie D. Persichini, SC, 0-205391, 323th Sister colet Lt. Archie D. Persichini, SC, 0-205391, 323th Sister colet Lt. Archie D. Persichini, SC, 0-205391, 323th Sister colet Lt. Archie D. Persichini, SC, 0-205391, 323th Sister colet Lt. Archie D. Persichini, SC, 0-205391, 323th Sister Colet Lt. Archie D. Persichini, SC, 0-205391, 323th Sister Colet Lt. Archie D. Persichini, SC, 0-205391, 323th Sister CoSister Charles C. Calledon, 3348367, 323th Sister Colet Lt. Archie D. Robert C. Sassand C. Shaffer, Scott Archie CoSister Charles C. Calledon, 317475, 325th Sister Sister Colet College C. Shaffer, Scott Archie College
College C. Shaffer, Scott Archie C. Shaffer College
College C. Shaffer, Scott Archie C. Shaffer College
College C. Shaffer, Scott Archie C. Shaffer College
College C. Shaffer Lt. Col. Jeun de Driesen, French Army Major Charles C. Roberts, CAC, 0-451387, 6851 Hg Det, Aug

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**				
THE EMPLOYMENT				
CONFIDENTIAL		G -1 (ca	nt'd)	
				Date of Rank
Bishop, Kennedy H.	01691455	Captain	AGD	1 Apr 45
Weigle, Julian M.	01582252	1st Lt	QMC (-+-ha)	15 Apr 44
Chapiewski, George M.	(Russian)	lst Lt	(atchd)	17 Aug 44
Anderson, Thomas F.	Vi2127458	.000	UUA	11 mg 44
		G - 2		
HARRISON, EUGENE L.	015265	Br Gen	GSC ACofS, G-2	8 Jan 45
Erskine, David G.	015766	Colonel	GSC	12 Aug 42 24 May 45
Maulsby, William E. Jr. Randolph, Innes	017718 0900550	Colonel Lt Col	MI	11 Feb 42
Torrielli, Andrew J.	0313442	Lt Col	FA	17 Jun 44
Bearce, Herrick F.	0357611	Lt Col	Sig C	1 Dec 44
Frankel, Henry	0303771	Lt Col	Inf	1 Dec 44
Denniston, Robert N.	0324890	Lt Col	Inf	1 May 45
Hobbs, William C. Jr.	0286467	Lt Col	Cav	1 Jun 45
Westerman, Paul C.	0279917	Major	Inf QMC	25 Sep 42 7 May 44
Draper, John R. Jr. Montgomery, Richard A.	0397276 0294445	Major	Cav	16 Dec 44
Lindsey, Paul C.	0408320	Major	CAC	1 Jun 45
Wolf, George	0379558	Major	OD	1 Jun 45
Chicos, Peter G.	01013602	Major	Inf	1 Jun 45
Zimmerman John " Jr.	0334178	Captain	FA	1 Jun 44
Reisberg, Sidney Karsten, William F.	01309966	Captain	Inf	15 Nov 44
Karsten, Villiam F.	0920882	Captain	AUS	16 Dec 44
Schick, George E. Heilman, Marlin G.	02046585 02046357	Captain Ca p tain	Sig C AUS	16 Dec 44 16-Jan 45
Brown, Theodore	0460156	1st Lt	Inf	1 Jun 44
Carey, Robert C.	01311480	1st Lt	AGD	15 Aug 44
Bachman, Virgil J.	W2119744	CWO	USA	6 Jul 43
		G - 3		
JENKINS, REUBEN E.	011658	Br Gen	GSC ACofS, G-3	25 May 44
Fooks, Nelson I.	016919	Colonel	Inf	15 Sep 43
Vittrup, Russell L.	017681	Colonel	GSC	24 Oct 43
Bender, Arthur H.	016611	Colonel	GSC	13 Dec 43
Heath, Louis T.	018060	Colonel	FÁ	22 Jan 44
Starr, William T.	0251467	Colonel	GSC	15 Oct 44
Cralle, Maury S. Beynon, James L.	017279	Colonel Colonel	GSC FA	8 Mar 45 8 Mar 45
Seaman, Jonathan O.	019385	Colonel	FÁ	23 Apr 45
Singles, Gordon E.	018522	Colonel	Inf	27 Apr 45
Huffer, John W.	0900204	Lt Col	AC	2 Jan 43
Coleman, Alfred T. Jr.	0385977	Lt Col	Inf	11 Oct 43
Barco, Ernest T.	0381566	Lt Col	FA	1 Feb 45
Allcorn, Ford E.	0324720	Lt Col	FA CAC	20 Mar 45
Sell, Wendell B. Ream, Edward F. Jr.	023069 0272716	Lt Col	FA	1 Apr 45 1 Apr 45
Woodbury, Julian T.	0321945	Lt Col	CAC	1 May 45
Sinnott, Roger J.	0323330	Lt Col	Inf	1 May 45
			JAI	CONFIDENT
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CONFIDENTIAL							
	A G (cont'd)						
Tadlock, Ray J. Dockx, Francis Kling, David F. Hull, Benjamin F. McNeal, James R. Krizan, Emil J. Wood, Raymund F. Heasley, Howard N.	01002736 0492664 01000795 01540539 01540538 W2115700 W2131404	Captain 1st Lt 1st Lt 1st Lt 1st Lt 1st Lt WOJG WOJG	AGD TC (atchd) AGD AGD USA USA	Date of Rank 16 Feb 45 11 Sep 43 16 Feb 45 1 Apr 45 1 Apr 45 28 Apr 43 1 Jun 45 1 Jun 45			
		I G					
Watson, William R. Sell, Edward S. Jr.	08354 0353568	Colonel Lt Col	IGD Insp Gen	5 Aug 42 1 Jun 45			
		JA					
McLean, David S. Henry, Frederick T. Dickson, Lewis M. Taylor, Charles H.	012472 0515166 01017322 02052346	Colonel Major Major Captain	JAGD Judge Adv JAGD JAGD JAGD	1 Feb 42 15 Mar 45 1 Jun 45 1 May 45			
		ENGINEER					
WOLFE, HENRY C. Collins, Hubert W. Dziuban, Stanley W. Bunger, Howard P. Stoneman, Walter G. Wood, Richard H. Nowicki, Albert L. Evans, Frank A. Ogden, Robert S.	011349 08877 021738 0910872 0453224 0502226 0314330 01100972 01015448	Br Gen Colonel Lt Col Lt Col Major Major Captain Captain	USA Ch.Engr CE CE CE CE CE CE CE CE	15 Sep 42 30 Oct 42 26 Nov 43 1 Nov 44 1 Dec 44 1 Apr 45 27 May 44 1 Apr 45			
		SIGNAL					
LENZNER, EMIL McElroy, Robert J. Saari, Leonard V. Bierman, Philip V. Watson, George S. Mcllory, Robert R. Johnson, Robert M. Domras, Max R. Litler, William P. Vivegel, Joseph E. Stamons, Vernon M. Jr. Harrison, Samuel E. Ziwaarman, Harry E. Jr. Davis, Kenneth G.	015810 0901597 0250456 0265081 0272590 0320984 024498 0363000 0902013 0393497 0452969 0288149 01634500 0924492	Br Gen Colonel Colonel Lt Col Major Major Major	USA Ch.Sig Off Sig C	14 Nov 44 1 Oct 44 10 Mar 45 1 Apr 44 1 Oct 44 1 Oct 44 16 Feb 45 16 Apr 45 1 Jun 45 17 Jun 44 1 Dec 44 1 Dec 44 16 Feb 45 LNEGLANOO			
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CONETO ACTUAL							
CONFIDENTIAL		SIGNAL (cont	ia)				
CONFIDENTIAL		SIGNAL (COM	, u,	Date of Rank			
Ahbe, William F.	0487448	Major	Sig C	16pr 45			
Brown, James Jr.	0358851	Major	Sig C	1 May 45 1 May 45			
Knight, Morris S. Nordby, Roger M.	0268042	Major Wajor	Sig C	1 May 45			
Gilden, Murray	01635930	Captain	Sig C	17 Aug 44			
Ward, Paul A.	0491056	Captain	Sig C	15 Oct 44			
Eaton, Sperry A. Dowell, Edwin E.	0503244	Captain	Sig C	16 Jan 45 16 Jan 45			
Longerich, Harry	01639320	Captain	Sic C	16 Jan 45			
Beaumont, Robert G.	02046368	Captain	Sig C	16 Jan 45			
Tatosian, Menoog C.	02046367	Captain Captain	Sig C	16 Jan 45			
Van Raalte, Thomas Z. Landsiedel, Robert R.	01639767 01643780	Captain Captain	Si; C	1 May 45			
Taylor, Robert S.	0477306	1st Lt.	Sig C	15 May 44			
eintraub, Morton	01645479	1st Lt	Sig C USA	1 Oct 44 1 Jun 45			
Van Swearingen, Ellis F.	72131403		USA	1 oun 4)			
		ORDNANCE					
Wilson, William I.	08574	Colonel	OD Ch.Ord Off	1 Feb 42			
Ballard, Levi	0183165	Lt Col	, OD	1 Nov 44			
Rockwell, Lawrence D.	0904388	Major	QD	1 Nov 44 26 Jan 43			
Heider, Édward G. Summers, Louis C.	0452742	Captain Captain	0D 0D	20 Jan -44			
Hutson, Frank Jr.	01551230	Captain		16 Dec 44			
MEDICAL							
Reeder, Oscar S. Batch, Joseph V.	020086	Colonel Lt Col	MC Surgeon	7 May 44 29 Dec 42			
Wilkinson, Charles F. Jr	. 024316	Lt Col		20 au 44			
	PUBI	LIC RELATIONS					
Fairman, Roy K.	0900823	Lt Col	Inf Pub.Rel Off	28 Jun 44			
LeVien, John D. Cowgill, Donald R.	0363928	Lt Col 2d Lt		17 Sep 44 26 Feb 45			
Sorkin, Marvin	01999541	2d Lt		26 Feb 45			
Lamb, Joseph	12131406	OJG		1 Jun 45			
	MEORN TICK	AND CANSORSHIP	Det CH. NT				
Bennett, Haymond J.	0369773		Inf	7 Oct 44			
Gillett, Cortland I. Howell, Allen A.	0900655	Captain Captain		17 May 43			
Lemieux, Elzear J.	01500503			17 Aug 44 27 Aug 44			
Lemieux, Elzear J. Sellers, Doyle D.	01002524			1 Feb 45			
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RES THE 5th MY GROUP, FR. DCE ND GER 1944-15

By Lt. Col. Wendell E. Little, G.S.C. Chief, Plans and Operations Branch G-4 Section, 6th Army Group

- I. Planning for the issault on Southern France.
- 1. Decisions reached at the Teheran Conference in 1943 provided for the opening of the second front with a two-pronged assault on Fortress Europa during the Spring or Summer of 1944. The main assault in Northern France, known as OVERLOAD, was assigned to General EISENHOVER as Supreme Commander of the United Nations forces in Europe. The Southern France operation known as LIVIL and later as DRLGOON, was given to the Mediterranean Theater. The primary responsibility for the Southern France operation, for which the first plans were drafted in Ligiers during December 1943, was assumed by the U.S. officers in the Mediterranean Theater. Some of these officers later were selected for key positions in Headquarters 6th, rmy Group.
- 2. The original allied strategic plan for the landing in Southern France was designed to accomplish the maximum diversion of enemy troops from the OVERLORD forces being landed in Northern France. For this reason, the selection of the time, scale, and place of the DMLGOON assault was closely coordinated with Supreme Headquarters. Ilied Expeditionary Forces, (SHLEF). The delay in launching the assault on Southern France, necessitated by the continued priority of the battle in Italy, prevented the DRLGOON operation from fulfilling its original diversionary mission, but the large bodies of enemy troops destroyed after the landing and the rapid advance up the Valence and Rhone valleys, emphasized the tactical and strategic soundness of the operation.
- 3. In addition to the planned tactical diversion of enemy forces, logistical factors argued strongly in favor of the Southern France operation. There were more trained and equipped divisions in the United States than could be landed and supported through the Northern French ports. Many of these troops could fight the Germans by using a completely separate line of communication through the Southern France ports. To organize and direct the tectical operations of the Southern Group of Trains and to supervise initially the operation of the Southern Line of Communications was the purpose for which Head-quarters 5th Tray Group was activated.

II. The Functions comm ...rmy Group.

- army group headquarters, General J.COB L. D.VERS and his staff drow upon their experience with and knowledge of three irmy Groups that had operated in the Mediterranean Theater. Where General D. VERS had been the Commending General of N. TOUS... These were the 18th and 15th irmy Groups and the illied irmies in Italy (i.i.I) which had fought the Germans in Tunisia, Sicily and Italy under the command of Field Marshals (then Generals) M. NTGOMERY and i.LEX.NDER. Valuable ideas on proper organization and operation of an irmy Group were obtained from 12th irmy Group which was already operating in France. Search of the Field Service Regulations and other war Department publications failed to reveal any more detailed statement of the functions and method of operation of an irmy Group beyond the rather general description in paragraphs 123-129 of FM 100-15 Field Service Regulations.
- 2. From these sources there developed a general outline of 6th Army Group's functions. It was a tactical unit responsible for the interpretation and implementation of strategic directives received from the Theater Commander. Being tactical, the Army Group was, in theory, not concerned with supply or administrative functions except on matters of policy and the allocation of supplies and equipment in short supply which would effect its operational role.
- 3. 6th irmy Group assumed commend of the DR.GOON forces on 15
 September 1944. It that time the forces consisted of the Seventh
 U.S. irmy and the First French irmy commended by Lt. Gen. ILEX.NDER
 M. P.TCH, U.S.... and Gen. JEIN DE L.TTRE de T.SSIGNY, respectively.
 Those troops were disposed along the France-Italian border and on the
 main front between the Swiss border and Dijon, France. The initial
 contact had just been made near Chaument, France, between the
 OVERLOND forces from Northern France and the DR.GOON forces from
 Southern France. Both irmies continued the advance to the north
 until late October when the front was stabilized along the Western
 edge of the Vosges Mountains.

III. Outline of Activities of the 6th rmy Group Forces.

l. During Soptember and Octobor the great port of Marseille and other Southern France ports, as well as the main rail lines connecting the Mediterranean with the forward combat areas, had been rehabilitated so that by early November ample facilities were available

for the supply and accustion of the rmics. November the 6th rmy Group leunched an offensive that resulted in breaching the Saverne Gap and the capturing of Strasbourg by the Seventh U.S. rmy and the breaching of the Belfort Gap and capture of Mulhouse by First Prench rmy. After ortanning one severne Gap and party one first allied army to reach the Rhine River, the Seventh U.S. rmy turned north in the alsace Plain and by Mid-December had fought its way almost through the Siegfried Line positions in the Hardt Mountains.

- on 16 December 1944, Supreme Headquarters issued orders for the 6th Army Group to cease offensive operations and side-slip to the left, to take over a corps sector from the Third U.S. Army which was moving north to help stop Von Rundstedt. Initially, Third Army continued the responsibility for supply and evacuation of all troops in the transferred corps sector until Seventh Army could take over one isting Third Army installations. Since Third Army had already located part of its stock of critical items in this area, arrangements were made for the continued use of specified dumps in that area by the Third Army.
- 3. Having been stopped in the Ardennes, Von Rundstedt took advantage of the thinly held Seventh Army sector and hurled a second strong offensive through the Hardt Mountains in early January. As a result the Seventh Army withdrew from the Siegfried and Maginet Lines to prepared positions along the Moder River on the Alsace Plain.

 From these positions the enemy's strong and determined efforts to recapture Strasbourg were thwarted. The defensive role of the armies during late December, January, and February required large amounts of defensive supplies such as mines, sand bags, and barbed wire. For the first and only time, defensive materials became critical items so that it was necessary for the Army Group to allocate these items on the basis of the tactical urgency.
- 4. The details of the successive defensive positions which were to be held by the 6th army Group forces were published by the army Group Headquarters in December, 1944. These orders provided that the forward movement of supplies would be limited to the absolute minimum and army reserves east of the main defensive positions were limited to not in excess of one day of supply. This required the retrograde

movement and relocation of the main army supply dots and other installations west of the Posses Meuntains. It bridges, supply dumps, equipment, and installations (both allied and enemy) forward of the main defensive positions were propared for destruction and armies were instructed to insure complete destruction of all supplies and equipment that could not be removed if threatened with capture by the enemy. Fortunately, it was necessary to destroy only small amounts of our own equipment, principally damaged but reparable tanks and vehicles that could not be evacuated before the withdrawal to the Moder River line.

5. Having stopped the Gorman offensive in the Hardt Mountains, the 6th Army Group turned its attention to clearing the German 19th Army from the Colmar area where strong defensive positions had been developed between the Rhine River and the Vosges Mountains north of Mulhouse in the upper Llsgce Plain. In order to clear the Colmar pocket, which was entirely within the zone of the First French army, the XXI U.S. Corps consisting of the 3rd, 28th, and 75th U.S. Infantry Divisions and the 12th U.S. Armored Division was transferred from the Seventh U.S. Army to the operational control of the First French Army but the responsibility for the supply and evacuation remained with the Seventh U.S. Army. The French Army had not sufficient service troops to handle an additional corps of four divisions and the rail tennage and supply levels had been allocated and built up between the Seventh U.S. Army and the First French Army on the basis of the supply of all American troops through Seventh Army channels. The Colmar pocket was cleared in early February, 1945 when romnants of the German 19th Army fell back to the east bank of the Rhinc.

6. From Docomber to 15th March, no major advance was made on the main front of the 6th Army Group, except for the Colmar operation. During this period, special attention was given to the organization of two separate commands which were to perform important missions on widely separated fronts in France. These were the Army Detachment of the Alps which guarded the Italian berder from the Mediterranean Sea to the Swiss border and the Army Detachment of the Atlantic which destroyed the German forces along the Gironde Estuary and opened the large port of Bordeaux in Western France.

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
7. On 15 March the Seventh U.S. Army, assisted by a French Task
Force on its right flank, launched a major offensive to breach the
Slogified Line and clear the Germans from the Saar. Aided by the
rapid advance of the Third Army, who were driving south from their
bridgehoods over the Moselle, the Slogified Aims and Frank and article
organized resistance west of the Rhine ended by 25 March 1945. That
night Seventh Army established a bridgehood across the Rhine and
pushed forward along the right flank of the Third Army, reaching the
Main River on 27 March and capturing Nurnburg on 18 April 1945.

8. The First French Army made an assault crossing of the Rhine in the vicinity of Speyor on 31 March and turned south to capture Karlsruho, Stuttgart, and complete the destruction of the German 19th Army in the Black Forest. Having taken these objectives, both Armies regrouped on the run and continued the destruction of the shattered German forces, with the Soventh Army capturing Ulm on 24 April; Munich on 1 May and on 4 May 1945, established contact in the Brenner Pass with the Fifth U.S. Army advancing north from Italy. Contact with the Fifth U.S. Army represented a re-union for the 3rd, 36th, and 45th U.S. Divisions who had loft the Fifth U.S. Army in August 1944 and sailed from Italy to make the assault on Southern France. Those veteran troops fought with the Seventh U.S. Trmy all the way across Franco, crossed the Rhine River north of Mannheim and turned south to form the upper jaw of the pincer movement that finally destroyed the enemy forces in German "National Redoubt" area. On 5 May General SHULTZ, commanding Gorman Army Group G, surrondered unconditionally to General DEVERS effective at 1200B hours on 6 May 1945. Two days later Grand Admiral DOENITZ surrendered all German land, soa, and air forces effective at 0001 hours 9 May 1945. IV. Organization of Logistical Support for the 6th irmy Group.


1. During the initial stages of operation DR.GOOM, the Seventh U.S. .rmy was responsible for unloading the supplies from the boats and transporting them forward to the combet troops. .fter the enemy had been cleared from Southern France, the responsibility for the supply and evacuation of the DR.GOOM forces was assumed by ComZone N.TOUS. who established an advance headquarters at Lyon, France to supervise the Base Section (DELT. B.SE) and the .dvance Section (COM.D) of the Southern Line of Communications. Operational control of the DR.GOOM forces of the 6th .rmy Group was transferred from

Suproro Alliod Comme. Jor, Moditorrahean Theater. Concrety Sir MAITL.ND H. ILSON) to Suprome Headquarters allied Expeditionary Force (General EISENHOWER) on 15 September 1944. The responsibility for the logistical support of the DR.GOON forces remained with Communications Zone. N.TOUSA, until 1 November 1944 when ETOUSA assumed this responsibility. The Advance Headquarters, ComZone, NATOUSA, was renamed Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC), and was made responsible to ETOUSA for the administrative support of the 6th Army Group and attached air forces.

- 2. As the forces of 12th Army Group (OVERLORD) and the forces of 6th Army Group (DR.GOON) reached the German frontier, the lines of communication from the Northern and Southern French ports reached the point of conflux in the Metz-Nancy-Luncville area in France. Tactical situations often dictated the shift of large combat forces between army groups and major boundary adjustments in the forward areas. The need for swift and flexible communication zone support capable of shifting its weight as required by the tactical situation was emphasized by the counter-action taken by the Supreme Commander to meet Von Rundstedt's Ardennes offensive. With the merger of both the Northern and Southern lines of communication, it was apparent that Headquarters SOLOC had outlived its purpose and on 12 February 1945, this Headquarters was abolished and ComZone ETOUS/. assumed direct responsibility for the supply of all U.S. forces in the theater and for such French forces as were entitled to logistical support from U.S. sources. The chart at figure 1, shows the principal command, administrative, and supply channels affecting the 6th Irmy Group after the merger of SOLOC and ComZone, ETOUSA.
- the development of logistical plans and advise to the Army Group Commander on the administrative espects of his tactical decisions. The organization established for this purpose is shown by the chart at figure 2. It was the Army Group Commander's policy that the headquarters staff be as small as possible and that administrative details be held to the minimum. Is part of a conscientious effort to follow this policy, five Special Staff Sections were incorporated into the G-4 Section. These consisted of from two to four efficers of each service who acted as Technical Advisors on special problems that cross. Ifter several months' experience, the Ordnance and



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Modical Sections was established as separate setions similar to Signal and Engineer.

V. Some G-4 Problems, 6th Army Group.

1. Logistical Support of French Forces

6th Army Group were composed of French troops. The many complicated problems inherent in the logistical support of the armed forces of one nationality from the resources and supply system of another, required greater administrative detail in the Army Group G-4 Section than would have been necessary had all forces been of the same (1) nationality. In accordance with the ANFA agreement, the U.S. undertook to equip and supply during combat against Germany an agreed list of French troops known as Rearmament Program Units. The scale of supply of authorized French troops was assentially that of corresponding U.S. type units. Supplies which were available locally and items poculiar to the French diet, such as brandy, wine, and elive oil were not furnished from U.S. sources. There were other basic differences in concept of supply procedure, but these were resolved by extensive ligison between the French forces and the Army Group and by mutual effort to understand common problems.

b. The exploitation of the initial assault in both Northern and Southern France was greatly assisted by the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) and other resistance forces. Many of these troops desired to continue the fight against Germany, but unfortunately, they were not equipped adequately for vigorous military operations nor was any procedure or system established to meet their daily supply requirements. The presence in the forward combat area of a considerable number of French troops for whom no logistical support was available created a difficult G-4 problem, since supplies and equipment could be provided from U.S. sources for the Rearmament Program Units only. By a combination of U.S. rations provided on the authorized troop basis, and local food products, the French Commends of the 6th Army Group managed to keep their troops adequately fed. Less success was attained in the provision of adequate clothing and equipment for the Mon-Rearmament Program Units. Limited amounts of

(1) For a statement on the G-4 problems that may arise incident to the supply and evacuation of more than one nationality, see "Functions and Operations of G-4 Division, North African Theater of Operations", The Military Review, February 1945, Vol XVIV, No. 11.

supplies and equipm wore made available from ritish Home Guard stocks, but these did not arrive in the Army area until the worst pert of the winter 1944-45 had passed.

2. Logistical Planning.

a. One of the major responsibilities of an Army GroupHeadquarters is the planning of future tactical operations. This is
especially important for the G-4 Section because communication.

facilities must be built or repaired and supply dumps must be established well in advance of actual tactical operations. A Joint Planning Staff at 6th Army Group consisting of representatives of each of
the General Staff Sections and the air advisor to the Army Group
Commender was charged with developing tactical plans including a
proper analysis of logistical factors to cover possible contingencies that might face the Army Group Commender and to outline on a
planning basis the possible courses of action that might be taken.

b. As a corollary of the work of the Joint Planning Staff, the G-4 Section produced from time to time a document entitled, "G-4 Estimate of the Situation". This was not issued at periodic intervals, but was prepared in advance of each major phase of operations in order that the Army Group Commander, his staff, and other appropriate agencies might have current advice and information on the status of logistical support of 6th larmy Group forces. The "G-4 Estimate of the Situation" contained a statement of the current tactical situation and mission of our forces, probable axis of advance, an estimate of the amounts and special types of supplies and materials that might be required, a statement of the extent of availability of logistical support, and a conclusion of the extent to which the proposed operations could be supported.

3. Evacuation of Casualtics.

a. The Army Group prescribed only general policies of evacuation of the sick and wounded from the Armies and major commands. The armies normally made local arrangements with the Communications Zone or the air force agencies for rail or air evacuation of casualties. For American treeps sufficient general hospitals were established in the Communications Zone. While the First French Army had the necessary medical and hospital facilities normally attached to an army, it was dependent on the hospital facilities under the control of the French Filitary Regions for its long-term cases. Approximate-

ly 125,000 American and 67,000 French patients or evacuated from the army zones during the period of active military operations of the 6th Army Group.

4. Allocation of Supplies and Equipment.

by 6th Army Group were artillory ammunition, Class IV Engineer and Signal supplies, cold-climate clothing and equipment, and major ordnance items and assemblies (including vehicles and guns). Other routing supplies were furnished through normal supply channels direct to the armies and other major commends without reference to the Army Group, although the allocations of daily rail tonnage and transfer of truck companies, which were closely controlled by the Army Group, had a material affect on the rate of supply of routine items. Allocations of artillary ammunition which was in critical short supply were made (by number of rounds) every 10 days based on the tactical situation and mission of each army or force. Based on the experience of the provious winter in Italy, 6th army Group made advance plans that rosulted in its forces having limited amounts of special cold-climate clothing for the extreme damp, cold-weather encountered in the Vosges Mountains. These items were allocated on the basis of the location of the troops and tactical missions of the forces. Class IV supplies, major ordnance items and assemblies were allocated among the armies and other major commands on the basis of availability, reported combat losses, and the relative importance and requirements of the

b. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of its forces, it was necessary for the Army Group to maintain current information on supply status, not only of the combat forces, but the everall theater supply position as well. Each army or other major command submitted daily supply status and weekly G-4 periodic reports which after consolidation at the Army Group were forwarded to SH.EF for information of that Headquarters. Copies of these reports were also furnished to the Communications Zene in exchange for copies of reports from the Communications Zene in exchange for copies of reports from the Communications Zene showing the everall theater status of supplies. In this menner, the Army Group was able to correlate the requirements of the combat forces with the supplies and equipment that were evailable in the theater and make allocations of critical supplies on the besin of tectical requirements.

5. Transports on Support of Combat Opers ons.

- control of logistical resources by priority allocations, the army Group influenced the rehabilitation and operation of transportation facilities by fixing priorities for rehabilitation of the main rail routes and by supervision of the allocation of daily rail tonnage foliveries to the armies and other major commands. There were many transportation problems, especially in connection with railway operations, with which the army Group was vitally concerned but over which no direct supervisory control was exercised. The shortages of motive power, rail cars, repair facilities, and railway operating personnel were the primary concern of the Communications Zone.
- attempted to destroy the transportation facilities along the main routes. The main transportation lines normally followed natural corridors which did not, especially after the front reached the Verges Mountains, correspond to the axis of advance of a single army. Furthermore, major changes in the tactical mission of army or army Group required guidence and direction from the army Group level to insure that effort was not wasted in reconstruction of unimportant supply routes. For this reason, the army Group prescribed priorities for rail routes in the forward areas which served as a general outline plan for rail reconstruction by both the engineer resources of the Armies and major commands, as well as the Communications Zene engineer resources working in the forward areas.
- always sufficient to meet completely the needs of the forces.

 Ilthough the Communications Zone and Military Railway Service were responsible for furnishing and transporting the supplies and equipment to the Armies, these agencies looked to the Army Group for a general indication of priority for the allocation of available tennage among the forces. Periodic priority of movement (POM) meetings were initiated by 6th Army Group and attended by G-4 representatives from the Armies and Communications Zone sections in order to allocate available rail tennage for the ensuing period. In this manner, the weight of the available logistical support was balanced in accordance with operational priorities and broad tectical requirements. This series of meetings continued while the Army Group was supported by

20L00 but was discontinued, as no longer necessary, when the two main lines of communications marged and Headquarters, SOLOC was abolished.


- d. Truck transportation always bears the brunt of the The ability of the tactical commander to exploit his initial breakthrough depends in large measure on the skill with which every available truck (including T/E vehicles of all units) is used for the forward movement of supplies. After the landing in Southern France, the enomy was driven northward over 300 miles before the main railread up the Rhone Valley was restored. Every available truck that would opcrate was hauling supplies from the beaches to the forward troops. To support the general offensive in the Spring of 1945, the truck transportation plan took every available truck from port operation and other rear area installations for use in the forward movement of essential supplies for support of our advancing troops. Without this plan, the war in Europe might not have ended in May, 1945. The function of the Army Group was to assist the Armies and Communications Zone in planning their respective requirements for truck transportation and for shifting the weight of the transportation resources of the whole theater in accordance with teetical and administrative requirements.
- c. The development and use of pipelines in this war was most characteristic of American technique. Liquid petroleum products tonnage constituting almost one-third the daily/requirements of the ..rmiss could be moved through the pipelines, thereby releasing to that extent available transportation facilities for non-liquid requirements. While the Army Group exercised no direct control over pipeline construction, the broad advance tactical plans developed at the Army Group, influenced considerably the actual pipeline construction program of the Communications Zone. The technique of large-scale supply by air was developed in the latter stages of the operations in Germany. Here again the irmies or other forces made arrangements direct with their associated tactical air forces for resupply by air. In case air supply domands were made by several armies or forces under the array Group which exceeded the air supply capacity, the army Group fixed priorities which were followed by the air force agencies in supplying the air transport domands. 123

VI. Summary.

- 1. During the nine menths when the 6th army Group was respons1010 for a large sector of the Western Front in France and Germany.

 its forces killed or captured just under a million German soldiers
 and efficers; its armies made two of the longest and fastest advances
 on the Western Front. They raced all the way from the beaches of
 Southern France to the Vosgos Mountains and then breached the heavily
 defended Belfort and Saverne Gaps to reach the Rhine River ahead of
 all other allied forces. After assault crossings of the Rhine River,
 the main 6th army Group forces drove southeast capturing Nurnberg and
 Munich, the Cradle of Naziish, and continuing on into austria, reaching the Brenner Pass to participate in a reunion with the Fifth army
 forces when they had left in Italy nine menths previous.
- 2. The logistical problems overcome in supporting the advancement these major forces for more than 900 miles in less than nine menths were shormous. They were multiplied many fold by the cunning and ingenuity of the enemy who attempted to destroy all key transportation facilities. These logistical problems were evercome by teamwork of the armies and ComZone sections. Routine day by day problems were influenced only indirectly by the army Group. The army Group's greatest contribution from the G-4 standpoint was the guidance furnished the armies and the ComZone sections for the establishment of the main supply routes and installations. The tactical and logistical plans of the army Group provided the Communications Zone with an outline around which detailed plans were developed and executed for the logistical support of the army Group forces.
- 3. Headquarters 6th Army Group composed primarily of U.S. personnel was in the unique position of exercising operational control of the First French Army and two French Army Detachments. Many of those troops landed on the beaches in Southern France and energetically drove the enemy from their hemoland. The administrative problems incident to operational control and logistical support of the French forces were involved and complicated, but each American efficer and man in the 6th Army Group Headquarters felt amply repaid for his offerts and reciprocated the feeling expressed in a message from the

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED HEAD UARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP G-3 SECTION 7 July 1945 SUBJECT: Final Report, G-3 Section. : The Chief of Staff. 1. Final Report, G-3 Section, is submitted herewith. 2. It is recommended that the following distribution be approved: General J. L. Devers Colonel J. L. Beynon Colonel J. O. Seaman Major General D. G. Barr and 17 others Brig. General W. P. Shepard 1 Brig. General R. E. Jenkins 3 Brig. General S. L. Harrison 1 War Department USFET Command & General Staff School 2 SHARE 12th Army Group G-1 G-2 0-4 AG Historian Colonel R. L. Vittrup Colonel A. H. Bender Colonel L. T. Heath Golonel M. S. Gralle' Colonel N. I. Fooks Golonel W. T. Starr Colonel G. E. Singles S/R. E. JENKINS
T/R. E. JENKINS
T/R. E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, GSC.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 9/7/45 ATC/hote

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HendylinhTend SIXTH AMMY UNDUP OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF APO 23

23 November 1944

MEMORAGIAM TO: Major General A.R. Bull Major General Audius Clay

1. In compliance ith chaif message as 655-2, isb (A), ammunition data has been collected, analysed and presented on the following.

SECTION I - Effects of Los Future hate of Supply.

The effect of the lo future rate of supply is to reduce the artillerty support below that which has been previously available and below desirable levels. It shows up operations by making long saving periods necessary. It makes it impossible to employ all available troops in offensive action simultaneously. Additional discussion and comparative data are presented in Section I.

SECTION II - Employment Possibilities of Current Amounttion Resources

Taking the Seventh army plan for the Phine crossing and assuming that the other forces of diath army Group are relegated to relatively inactive roles, it will be possible to support the Seventh army plan with five units of fire in the for and areas and a further five unit. of fire resulty available by 13 December. The date when the last rounds of the second five units of fire will reach the forward area will depend on ship unloading and rail transport time. It is possible to meet the requirements of the seventh army plan for semunition for the supporting seasons up to include the 15% mm How and, in addition, there ill be substantial amounts available for other forces. It is to be noted that this support is available for they one army to cross the Rhine.

SETTION III - Programme Date.

Charts, tabulations, memorands are presented and ing the experience of birth army Group. Attention is especially invited to the methods of employment of the limited amounts of ammunition.

EXCTION IV - Resuons to be Deployed in Future Months.

A list is given showing the seapons to be deployed during the period November to April inclusive with the estimated expenditure rates for the period. These expenditure rates are days of supply amounts that are considered nocessary to develop the full offensive power of the armies. Shen small-

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ler rates of supply are furnished the offensive capabilities of the troops are reduced.

SECTION V - Date on Current Resources of Assunition.

Here presented are charts showing the current assumition resources that have been committed to Sixth Army Group.

- 2. Discussion. Artillery amunition, like other combat resources, directly affects the magnitude, scope and timing of operations that can be conducted. Then communition supplies are short it has the effect of making it not possible to employ all the troops simultaneously in an offensive role. It restricts the timing of operations because ammunition must be accumulated to launch a major action. It reduces the possibility of taking immediate adventage of weaknesses in the enemy's dispositions. It has an undesirable psychological effect on troops and commanders.
- 3. It is recommended that ammunition be supplied at the expenditure rates shown in Tab A of Section IV. These rates are the amounts that should be supplied per weapon per day for all the weapons in the Army Group in order to develop the full offensive power of the troops. These rates are:

Ras/ .espon/day

81 MM Mortar 90 MM AA Gun, 100% Terrestrial fire	1 5
90 MM AA Qun. 50% Terrestrial fire	5 2 1 2
90 MM T.D. Gun	. 1
105 MM How M3	2
105 MM How M2	5
105 MM How M4 (Tunk) used M2 Amm.	5 2
155 MM How ML	. 4
155 MM How M1917-18	4
4.5 inch Gun	4
155 MM Gun 161	3
155 MM Gun 1917-18	3
8 Inch Howitzer	3
240 MM How	44 44 33 33 34 22 24
8* Guil .	2

For the Army Group Commander:

Major General, G.S.C, Chief of Staff

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
Paraphrese of Message EX 65520, sent's by General Misenhower, dated 20 Nov 44 and received by 06, 6th Army Group 21 Nov 44.

It is essential that the ear Department be provided with the latest factual information on our emmunition situation. GLAI has recently came over from any pervice Forces and I have designated him to make a factual study of our assets and your expenditure estimates. I have also designated BULL (G-3) to develop the resulting strategical and tactical implications. Their findings are to be reported by them personally to General Makedalai in Weshington without delay.

From you they are to obtain the following data with respect to 90 mm terrestrial fire emmunition, 81 mm mortar, light emmunition and ammunition for all caliber from 105 mm up. For each month from Movember thru April both inclusive, the number of meapons in each category to be deployed and enguged and in addition the rate of fire per meapon per day for the same periods. Maso any additional information of value regarding expenditure experience to date, including ration restrictions.

Accuracy of information is of the greatest importance to ensure a successful factual presentation to the Mar Department. Bull and Clay will then be able to point out not only the exact supply situation but the effect of ammunition shortages on projected operations as well.

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LONT JIMT TOTAL (PROFESSION) TOTAL PROFESSION ROUGHEN/PROFESSIONS T/O MARCHE RESIDENCE FOR THE PROFESSION OF THE ADITAMUONO T/O . E.PUM Partion (E) 8 Inch Gunt January 28 (Note 1) Merch April :8 (F) 240 MM Howitzer: January 72 (Note 1) Rebruary 72 Merch ADTIL 90 buil 1: Includes total T/O weapons being transferred from Blouds to alvine (including French) in Southern Group of amiss. Mole 21 Incines tens as you firm 195 an norther he amountaion. MTs 3: Includes meximum quantities chanted ar one deep covitized shell for possible use of VI fuze. NOTE 4: This number of asagons is a4 greater than that shown in MICONA message LA 50938, 4 bovember. This is because the transfer of two das to contact France from Italy was tentative geneing firm Theater information regarding the deployment of british medium artillery .ith Fifth Army. On each of the above types, aspecially the newly calleder, total production is being focused to meet the combined requirement. of your theaters (less only minimum requirements for Facility areas). The rates of supply as shown are arrived at by arcticle that January consumption sould come from November production, February consumption from December production and so on. This is due to the shipping time a worker. Total theater stocks as of pretent date plus all firm commitments thru mid-November sere considered as Theater resources thru hovember of this year. Shipments now being made are based on retail to er than your expected expenditure rates. This is one to non availability of larger amounts. Shipments that will shortly come under your control plus the stocks in your Theater represent not only Theater stock, but tool U.S. resources to data. Our supply capabilities listed herein should be considered ith respect to your expenditures with full understanding that if your expense itures exceed the rates given acrein they must come from your present resources as they can not be replaced from here. The above supply rates


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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED are based on maximum forcasted production and immediate shipment to you in highest priority. As substantial increase in production is in eight although avery affort is being sade to this end. Succential production increases are offset to a large extent by increase in meanons basis. especially in motion, during the next 90 days. Replacement tubes and recoil mechanisms will not be sufficient to meet total requirements even on the basis of the limited ammunition shich will be available. chipment of deficient represent cannon to fire the argumition chipments referred to above cannot be accompliance even by stripping of expected respect from production of complete items. The requirements for complete item for initial insue and replacement ill determine the catent of the ping. Sant go of resoil memorisms can be saterially reduced by maximum use of rehabilitation facilities in UK and prompt return to Us of light in sames of an expected to repair. An early as possible you till be furnished lights and an other type of associated and amountain, particularly the heavy so expone and mortans. Forecasts are unlar graphestich devoting later self-of on artillary referred to above. These forecasts in transly you soon.

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
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED MINITION RE-UPPLY with any COMPANIONA 3.5" Gun 240 H 8" Oun 155 Jun 8" H Caliber 105 H 155 H Day of Supply 20 Day of Supply NATOUGA Housepoly Rate 18 Sir Army Croup Suivelent Cubs Emplied at Hote of 341 Mad Supply of MOULE N Equivalent Guns NaTOUan D/S % of MOULE D/S 45% \$ of 100 ... 1 to 76

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


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
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
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
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
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED above analy, addition, no ever,), the addition of the xV Corp. on the charles that contions division not been as I not to give the army.

Let e hy addition a maintain the stronger of the second in the contion. I though the like rish a maintain to a provide of maintain to second intional trade. I that it is a factor of a continuous second in a continuous second in the continuous second in the continuous second in a continuous second in a continuous second in the cont the shaled by the accessory to live the topo and countle extraction. The process of the shall be accessed to the state of the the state of the shall be accessed to the state of the shall be accessed to the state of the state of the shall be accessed to the state of the shall be accessed to the state of the state of the shall be accessed to the state of t

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED firing in order to built up for the operation no taking place. This necessitates curs like time place. It can rewrite many note target from receiving that at ention tany arrented. It can really do sont to lor receiving that at ention tany arrented. It can really do sont to lor receiving that at ention tany arrented. It can really do sont to lor receiving the attention of outply, buring the entire period, the caventh army and the mission of attacking the enemy in it. on. It was not no object to give adequate artitlery support to to corp. For continuous attack, and it took forty any of severe restrictions to built up sufficient stockage for the process coordinates push, estimated to require the days. Obviously, in a major attack, the Day of supply is imaginate, osing the extension, over a prolonged eriod in all types of operations. Active advisable to allocate for periods of not less than ten days, it was necessary to use much shorter periods, because allocations from higher head unries or for much shorter perious, because allocations from higher head unruers ore for a short periods, announced only a fe days in advance, and also because it as necessary to folio the operations closely. 4: Corps, like-its, were forced to allocate almost day by day, and to restrict seriously cortain units in order to permit others to support the t. cticul plan.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED IV CORPS Methods of Allocation and Assumition Control 1. AV Corps has sub-allocated to divisions and battalions exactly the amount of ammunition allocated to AV Corps by Army. Maliance was placed on units to provide or make their own reserve and savings. 2. On one eccusion (Oct 20-22) the counterattack took all savings. 3. Savings were several times taken from one unit to be given to another as the tactical need arose. 4. They was forced to take savings from the Corps (except for a nominal amount) in order to guarantee the present operation and continue for a reasonable period and thereefter, on a basis of the Model. "day of supply".

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RESTRICT

HEADQUARTEDS
SIXTH AGENT GEOUP
APO 23, U.S. AGENT
G-3 Section

23 November 1944

REPORT TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

On the afternoon of 22 Movember, I discussed the ammunition cituation with Major General E. H. Brooks, Commanding General VI Corps. General Brooks stated in substance as follows:


November, we see not able to attack ith more than one division at a time. The available assumition for each day as insufficient to uport the attack of all divisions at one time. As a consequence, e had to set up one division to attack and give it all the artitlery support for a day or more. When it began to make good progress, the Germans moved troops to meet it and se had to set up smather division to make an attack. Because a could not attack on the more from, it was possible for the Germans to move their troops to meet our thrusts. Had se been able to support an attack by said division at one time, the Germans could not have reinforced in front of all divisions and one or another of them some nave broken through an accelerate our progress. During this period it has impossible to fire artillery until it was absolutely certain that it was employed up inst the most viter targets. The general result has been that our savance has been very sice and it will centime to be slow as long as amount ton it short.

we are not getting enough Simm Mortor emandation or chough artillery amountion. We never have enough artillery one constituently when a division is out of the line, its artillery is usually in support of another division. Having to delay to accumulate amountion for an uttack makes it very difficult to take diventage of a premities and ventrages discount in the sharpy dispositions. We is continue to advance in spite of the shortage of amountion but our lay need illustration on its nor make the progress that is desirable. We have not been able to get air support because of the bad ofther and curing these times is amount have more amount ion and more artillary or therethan 1988.

The bed cather has restricted our object tion and made more unobserved fire necessary. Thus more amountains has been required for important deplicht targets and as have had to practically discontinue night harassing and inscribition fire. These fires are a great usign men they can be carried out on a sufficient acade a target as particles and the enemy scake all might and revent his orienty proportion to most our attack. The should have sufficient amountains to permit carrying out good harassing the interfection timing at hight

our progress to in be much fester if a on fund out it. I a

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-3 November 1944

Ammunition Consumption and Requirements Analysis

SECTION IV

1. n. A list of apapons to be deployed by Sixth army Group from November 1944 to April 1945, inclusive, is shown in <u>Tab A</u>. This list also shows the expected expenditure rates.

5. A copy of Sixth army Group Message EA 20158 giving Sixth army Group's requirements for 90mm AA gun amaunition. Teb B

c. Tab C shows a comparison of the allower and Milower Pays of Supply".

d. Statistics on amagnition expenditures of 5th army in Italy are shown in Tab $^{\rm D}$.

2. It will be noted that the ammunition expensiture rates shown on the seapons list, <u>Tab A</u>, are greater in some instances than both the study and MTOUGA "Days of Supply". This is particularly true in the heavier, longer range calibers. More ammunition is required in these calibers for the following reasons:

thus making these sempone extremely effective in all types of combat.

b. Thise heavier sepond strike desper into the enemy's defensive zone and make it possible to attack his done throughout its depth simultaneously. Then so attacked, the supporting elements such as artillery, command posts, supply installations, etc, can be attacked and destroyer at the most desirable time.

c. Experience has shown that in normal operations close air support cannot be used so close to the enemy's front line.

d. The precision calabilities of the 8° location in the 240mm howither make them capable of destroying enomy material and thus preventing its situares at to another delaying position. The enemy is having difficulty replacing material, and every chery gun destroyed directly reduces his artiflary capability.

e. The greatly improved testic I mobility of our neavier outlier, together its the proficiency and methods of the firing coupled its the Air OP, enabled the heavier expose to be used its great

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Facility and to keep up with the modile operations. In rapid pursuit, the use of 155m guns ofth first chearted by Air OP's has been extramely effective in interduction, the uncay's situationals. This in, rowed technique has increased the employment of the newiver cution for and reduced the number of days when they are not in action. Therefore, to take advantage of the power of these seponas, it is necessary in it they be supplied on the coads of the new amployment rather then on the older type of static employment.

3. It is therefore recommended that the "mayo of out ity as mount on the seponas list, Tho A, be provided.

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		SIXTH APO 23	ABMY (II B, U.S.	JAY.			
		-3	Section				00 N 10//
				~~			23 November 1944.
	Acti		AMMY OF		apons		
Caliber	Hor	Dec	Jan.	Zab.	Har.	ADE	Expenditure Rate
Alma Morter	1129	1291	1291				15
90mm AA Guns 100%							
Terrestial Fire	48	56	56	56	56	56	50
90mm AA Ouns 50% Terrestial Fire	144	144	144	144	144	144	25
90 ma Cun T.D.	36	36	50*	50	50	50	15
105mm How. M3	210	264	264	264	264	264	20
105m How. M2	750	768		876**		876	50
105mm How MA (Tunk)	1,2	,-			-1-		
Uses M2 Ammo.	42	66	66	66	66	66	20
155mm How. Ml	264	264	288**	300**	300	300	40
155mm How. M1918	72	72	72	72	72	72	40
4.5" Oun	36	36	36	36	36	36	40
155mm Gun Ml	84	84	84	84	84	84	35
155mm Gun M1917-18	48	54	60	60	60	60	35
8" Howitzer	60	60	- 60	60	60	60	30
240mm Howitzer	12	1.	12	.12	12	12	25
8" Qun	4	4	4	4	4	4	20
• 14 spare 90 To Bus in p gun power.							
** 2 Div. Arty	s added i	n Jan.	and 1	in S et			

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED (1) These expenditure rates are the rounds per gun per day necessary to be supplied to the Army Group for each piece wery day in order to develop the full power of the Armies in continuing offensive action.

Then less ammunition is furnished the potential power of the Armies to carry on offensive action is reduced in direct proportion.

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Paraphrase f message Ba 2015d dated al Nov. 44 from deneral bevers to should,

The following are daily requirements for ammunition for 90mm gume celled for in your 11 63050 of 13 Nov:

	-
HE 71 shell cavitized for Teach fune	1611
He 71 hell cavitical for 17426 or mily fuce	240
APC projectile ith #66 fule	289
WP moke chell	
HC amore shall	15
His 71 shell with M4,3-3 fuze	640
HE 71 shell dith Middle fure	5015
Shot 4-77	0
▼ 105 fuze., 159 each	


. The above requirements are based on the following:

50% 17426 and 50% M43A3.

b. 144 gunz used in combined role, FA and AA with daily rate or 10 round. In same percentages as a., above plus 25 rounds divided 24% TEOE6, 75 M40, 36 MP smoke and 15 APC.

c. 56 guns in Fa role, usily rate 50 rounds divided as in b. above plus 3# T105 fuzes.

d. 50 To weapons with dully rate of 15 rount divided 54% Mac, 50% APO, 10% T8086, 2% H.O. smoke, 4% WP smoke in 10% F105 fuzed, extra.




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· RESTOR		
Comparis n of MTO & MTO Days of	Supply of Ammunition	contid.
* EAPON	MTO D/S	ETO/ D/S
155mm Howitzer M1917-18 HE (M51 type fuze) HE (M55 type fuze) HE (M67 type fuze) HC dmoke WP Smoke Ges	2 26.7750 1.4875 1.4875 .7000 2.8000 1.7500	18.70 2.55 0.00 1.25 1.25 1.25
155mm How M17-16 Propelling White Bag	Charges 29.75	18.75
Green Bag	5.25	6.25
155um Howitzer Ml	35.0	35.0
HE (M51 type fuze)	26.7750	15.9375 3.1875
HE (M55 type fuze)	1.4875	2.1.50
Hi (M67 type fuze) HC Smoke	.7000	1.2500
WP LEOKS	2.800	1.2500
Gus	1.7500 35.0	1.2500 35.0
155mm How Mi Propelling Co.		
White Bag	21. 75	18.75
Oreen Bag	35.0	25.0
155mm Gun		
HE (M51 type fuze)	17.85	11.60
HE (M55 type fuze)	5.10	20
RE (M67 type fuze)		.50
HC groke	.60	1:45
Ges	مند	1.0
	33.0	25.0
d inch Howitzer	17.5	14.0
HE (M55 type fuze)	5.0	4.0
HE M67 type fuze)	25.0	٠
8 inch Her. Propelling and	20.0	14.0
White Bug Green Mass	5.0	0.0
	25.0	20.0

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do not represent the amount needed for operations but that which could be expended out of the very limited stocks. However, fifth Army has been able to make considerable progress with the limited amount of emmunition available, although, probably, more could have seen accomplished had larger stocks of ammunition been available. Brigadier General, U.S. Army 8 Incl.: Artiliary Officer. Incl il - Amno Expend - 3° gun. Incl iz - Anno Expend - 4.5° gun. Incl. #3- Anno Expend - 105-ma How. Incl. #4- Ammo Expend - 155-mm How. Incl. #5- Ammo Expend - 155-mm Gun. Incl. #5- Ammo Expent - 8" how. Incl. #5- Ammo Expend - 8" Gun. Incl. #8- Ammo Expend - 40-am how. DICTIBLITION: arty 0, affic arty 0, first army arty 0, Third Army Arty J, Mixth Army arty 0, Ninth Army Arty 0, Si th Army Go FA School, Pt till, Okia. 3-3 sess, AGF, Army Mar College, authington .5, D.C. Ord O, My fifth Army Col. Morse, G-3 Sec., Wer Lept., .rmy College, ashington 25, D.V.

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
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED CUNITION EXPENDITURE 3-12 TOTAL 5-14 July 25-3 4-13 14-23 24-2 3-12 13-22 23-2 N July July Aug Aug Aug Sept Sept Sept Oct Oct C 254.9 Pieces in Action 274.8 172.0 100.9 73.8 116.7 197.2 161.1 241.0 272.4 186426 186.4 S Pieces in Army 319.8 238.8 28.0 288.0 282.0 282.0 268.0 254.00 306.0 306.0 27726 277.2 251823 143929 51372 20045 26178 32961 36106 226701 207442 245566 1242125 12421.2 E ds per day gun in action 92.6 22.4 83.6 50.9 27.2 16.7 22.4 94.0 81.6 90.3 de per day 89.3 60.3 22.5 6.9 9.3 11.7 13.4 89.2 64.5 80.2 95.8 96.3 96.5 97.7 93.9 96.4 95.3 96.2 97.1 96.6 1197000 4.1 2.9 0.9 1.8 2.2 4.4 3.5 2.1 2.5 0.1 0.6 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0 0.0 0 0 . 0.2 . 0.0 129 0.0 0 0.9 29 2.0 2.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 . 0.1 0.0 0.2 . 94.9 87.6 95.9 2.0 5.0 12.4 0 0.1 Incl #3


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HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH ARMY GROUP ADV
APO #25, US ARMY
G-5 SECTION

24 December 1944


MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff
SUBJECT: Ammunition Supply

amber at SHAEF on Ammunition Supply. A study of the charts to Tab "A" shows that the rates of ammunition re-supply indicated therein were arrived at by taking all the ammunition in the theater on 2 December plus dues in for the next five months and arriving at a rate per gun per day for a 5 month period. The increasing weapons list was considered. All ammunition in the hands of the troops and Army ASP's and in transit to Army ASP's belongs to the Armies. Out of the lump sum of the ammunition a uniform daily rate of supply was computed. This was further reduced to provide for the SHAEF reserve. This in effect immediately established the SHAEF reserve from ammunition available in the theater rather than establishing the necessary reserve by a gradual buildup. While it is stated that SHAEF reserve desired is 10 days at the maintenance rate, keeping the maintenance day of supply figures in whole numbers of rounds has resulted in the SHAEF reserve being, in most calibers, in excess of 10 days.

- 2. The computations were made with December 2 as a starting date. Information was not received at SIX AG of the daily maintenance rate until 22 December. The SIX AG has allocated and committed to the Armics ammunition in excess of the amounts that would accrue to SIX AG, at the new maintenance supply rates for the month of December. The ammunition allocated to the armies and forces for December has been largely expended. The unexpended balance is required to carry out the missions currently assigned. Tab "3" shows the amounts allocated to the Armies in excess of the amount that accrues under the new maintenance supply rates for the month of December.
- 3. While it is possible to raise questions as to whether the amounts of ammunition in the hands of the various armies as of 1 December were equitable, whether ammunition in transit was equal, etc, these questions should not now be raised due to changed conditions since 1 December. It is believed that the points at issue should be kept as few and as simple as possible. Therefore, it is considered that the best solution is to request that the amounts shown in column 6, Tab "B" be allocated from the SHAEF reserve to Sixth Army Group for December in order that the Army Group's commitments can be met without disturbing the existing structure of tactical plans and ammunition allocation. If these amounts can be obtained from SHAEF, it will permit the SIX AG to have available for January, ammunition at the new maintenance supply rates.


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4. In the event that SHARP insists that the an in column 6 Tab "B" be returned to the SHARP reserve secondary this can be done by using allocation rates is as shown in Tab "C". a. Reference is made to paragraph to of Tab A theater reserve of 10 days at the maintenance supply is considered to be approximately correct. b. With respect to the question raised in paragraph 5b of Tab "A", it is considered that the theater P has been built up too rapidly. It was in fact created i ancously by taking ammunition in the theater to establic reserve. This is one of the reasons why it is necessary AG to request amounts from the theater reserve in order the transition from previous availability rates to the n tenance supply rates. The reserve should be created grait is considered that not more than half of the reserve be created from the ammunition on hand in the theater on December. s. Reference paragraph 5e. Other recommendations. The theater reserve should be divided proportionately between the 2 Army Groups and located to be readily accessible and at the same time located to permit its lateral movement if necessary. The reserves should be controlled at the Army Group level in order that the Army Group Commander may have control over the allocation of resources to control and influence the operations. If the theater reserve is held at SHAMP level it reduces that amount available to Armies because a reserve must be created at the Army Group level, otherwise, the Army Group Commander does not have control over the allocation of the combat resources for the accomplishment of the missions of the Armies. It is therefore recommended that SHAMP reserve be made available in preportionate share to the Army Group Commanders as a contingency reserve. 5. The ammunition required to earry out the coordinated attack on the ALSACE pocket will have to be expended regardless of whether it comes from the ammunition accruing to SIX AG in December, from SHAEF reserve, or from ammunition accruing to SIX AG during latter months of the five month period. In the event that SHAEF fails to grant our request for ammunition from the reserve at this time it will of necessity force down our expenditure rates during the later months of the period. 6. Recommendations to SHAEF containing comments and recommendations with respect to the theater reserve and containing a request for immediate allocation to 6th Army Group of the amounts of ammunition shown in column 6 of Tab "B" for December.




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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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			RESTRICT	5 n	
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+ 1 1 1/4	REQU	DATA CH RED	ORE DECEMBER	LLCCATIONS OVER-ALLOCATION	
(1) TYPE	(2) ETO Maint Rate	(3) Requested From Sharf Reserve	(4) SIX AG Armo for 31 day month	(5) Nonths to replace by reducing ETO rate 1/5	replace reducing
					by 1
105 HE	29	366,631	746,619	1.4	1.0
155 How HE	20	154,200	208,320	1.9	1.3
155 Gun	14	42,412	57,288	2.2	1.5
8" How		12,532	14,196	2.6	1.8
8" Gun	7	592	868	2.1	1.4
240 How	6	5,940	2,484	7.2	4.6
81 Mortar Lt HL	5	32,887	164,300	.6	•4
		ed that if t mounts alloc o relieve th		savings at the end h Army Group Armies illustrated above.	of and Fore

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
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Artillery and Merter Ammunition Maintenance Supply Rates is subject.

Reference is made to conference held at SHAEF on 20 December 1944, attended by representatives of this headquarters. At this conference graphs were furnished, showing the maintenance day of supply and proposed reserves for the period 1 December 1944 to May 1945. The proposed arrangements are concurred in with the following exceptions:

- (a) The bulk of the theater reserves should be held at the Army Group level in order to place in the hands of the Army Group commander control over the regulation of means for accomplishment of missions by the Armies and in order to permit him to influence the course of the action.
- (b) The creation of the theater reserve as of 1 becember from ammunition on hand in the theater is considered to be too abrupt and introduces unnecessary dislocations in tactical plans and ammunition locations. (allocations?) It is considered that the maximum amount taken from on-hand theater stocks for the reserves as of 2 becember should not exceed one-half of the proposed theater reserve.
- (c) The proposed reserve of 10 days of maintenance day of supply is considered to be approximately correct. However, it is noted that keeping the computations in whole numbers of rounds in the maintenance day of supply per gun results in the reserve initially exceeding by a considerable extent the proposed 10 cays.
- (d) Sixth Army Group has already sllocated ammunition for December. Most of these allocations have already been hauled and largely expended in recent offensive operations or are earmarked for the offensive to reduce the CULMAN pocket. Cumulative allocations during the month of December in excess of amounts which

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DRAFT

TO : First French Army, Personal for General de Lattre, personal

INFO: SIX AG REAR

Shortly after the conclusion of my conference with you of 22 December, I was informed of the reduced daily rates of ammunition resupply that have been placed in effect by SHAEF retroactive to 1 December. You will recall that at our conference it was agreed that certain ammunition support would be made available to you for a coordinated attack on the Alsace pocket. Due to the new supply rate to the "rmy Group being made effective as of 1 Dec. the amounts of ammunition used by the 6th Army Group to 31 Dec. will have exceeded the amounts authorized by large quantities. This excess consumption must be absorbed in January and succeeding menths. I must point out that high expenditure rates must not be permitted to dissipate your ammunition stock prior to the date of the attack. Therefore, it is essential that you husband your annunition prior to launching your attack. In computing the ammunition that would be available to you as of 1800 hours 25 December, allowance was made for 8 days of expenditure at the rates averaged during the period 8 to 17 Dec. inclusive. Expenditures on that scale for the additional 10 days before the attack cannot be supported without serious detriment to the ammunition for this attack. Accordingly I request that you impose the most strict discipline and control in order to prevent dissipation of the ammunition alletted to you for any purpose other than in support of the coordinated attack to clean out the Alsace pocket.

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DRAFT CABLE

SUBJECT: Recupply of Artillery Appunition.

To : CG, Seventh Army

INFO : Six AG Reat

At a conference at SHARF on 20 December, information was furnished to representatives of Sixth Army Group that the supply rate of artillery and mortar ammunition would be as follows for the period 1 December 1944 to 1 May 1945:

105mm How HE

E .

155mm How HE

20

1.55mm Gun

14

8 inch How

7

8 inch Gun

240mm How

7

240mm H

Slmm Mortar Light HE 5

At the same time it was announced that a theater reserve of 10 days maintenance supply at these rates would be established. Inasmuch as these rates of resupply are effective in December the ammunition allocated to you during the month of December considerably exceeds that which would accrue to you from these new maintenance day of supply rates. A request is being made on SHALF for ammunition from the theater reserve to make up the difference between these new maintenance supply rates and the amounts allocated to you. If this request is not granted, the ammunition made available to you during December in excess of the maintenance day of supply will have to be made up by reduced expenditures, below the above rates, during the months of January to April inclusive. In the event that SHARF furnishes the requested amounts, then the meximum quantity of summinition that will be available for future operations of Sixth Army Group will be those that accrue under the new maintenance day of supply rate. In the event that SHAEF does not grant the request for additional ammunition for

RESTRICTED them it will become necessary to reduce your allocation operations of Sixth Army Group as a whole, This information is furnished to you in order that you may be fully informed on the assumition supply situation. It is desired that full cognismee be taken of these factors in controlling expenditures of numition now available, to you.

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Classification Changed to 6TH AND U.S. FERS

The State of County Carlos Croup

Croup

Date 10 July 45 Initials

1 reprusey 1945

MEMO TO: Joint Planning Staff.

SUBJECT: Possibility of Ammunition Supply.

1. The following assumptions are made as a basis for determining the potentialities of the 6th army Group as regards artillery ammunition.

a. The COLMAR pocket is eliminated.

b. The Seventh Army remains on the defensive until the COLMAR pocket is eliminated.

- e. That upon the completion of the COIMAR pocket operation, the Seventh Army remains on the defensive, reorganizes, reequips, and rests, and that the First French Army does likewise, except for one division which will be accompanied by three battalions of 105mm How, two battalions of 155mm Hows and two battalions of GPFs, which are to be released from the First French Army, and that the Seventh Army artillery and the remaining French Army artillery sustain the defensive on one half of SHAEF resupply rates.
- d. That the Seventh Army will be composed of 10 Inf. Divisions, 3 Armd Divisions, and Gorps Artillery as assigned to Seventh Army at the present time (including units now with French Army and 44th AAA Brigade), plus that due in from U.K.

2.

(1) Type	(2) Rds per day		Col (3) In SHARP days	(5) Availa- ble from 30 days of ope- ration	(6) No of days to save diffe- rence Col 3 - Col 5
105 How M2	50	1500	50	900	30(Includes savings
4.5* Gun	40	1200	70	516	80 by Fr Army)
155 How	40	1200	52	696	22(Includes savings
155 Gun	33	1000	76	. 399	65(Includes savings by Fr Amay)
8" Bow	30	900	182	165	304
240 How	25	750	167	135	274
8" Gun	25	750	64	357	68

From the above table it will be seen that a delay in the commencement of the operation from 22 to 274 days will cover the time necessary to accumulate the recommended rates of expenditure for the operation. It will be noted that this table anticipates that the maintenance ammunition accruing to 6th army Group during the 30 days of the operation is physically available to be expended when desired.

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 If it is desired to begin the operation before the amunition is accumulated, there are two courses open for action:

a. If SHARF reconstitutes the 6th Army Group reserve after the Colmar operation, a portion of this reserve can be made available.


b. Request SHAEF to make available from its reserve ammunition in the amount of the shortages.

- 4. In the event that additional artillery is attached to 6th army Group to participate in an operation, ammunition must be made available with this artillery on a scale corresponding to table in paragraph 2.
- 5. In the event preliminary operations other than the COLMAR pocket are undertaken, and these operations require expenditures in excess of one half of SHAEF rate, then further delay must be anticipated in order that the ammunition can be replaced.
- 6. Savings at 50% of the SHAEF rate are the maximum that can be planned upon. During the actual period of the operation, First French Army should receive the SHAEF rate in order to have sufficient ammunition to create diversions and feints and to exploit any action which results favorably.
- 7. In addition to securing control of the samunition planned above, the bulk of it must be stocked within reach at the beginning of the general offensive. At the present time there is less than 1/3 of the desired amount in CONAD. CONAD has been requested to maintain a 30 day supply. In the event that additional artillery is made available to 6th Army Group, this situation will be further aggravated.
- 8. Conclusion. There will be insufficient emmunition available to properly support a major offensive by Seventh Army until at least 30 days after the elimination of the COLMAR pocket. Then, the ammunition available in the heavy calibers will be insufficient unless augmented from outside 6th Army Group. Operations during the saving period must not require ammunition in excess of 1/3 SEAEF's rate.

LOUIS T HEATH (Signed)
LOUIS T HEATH
Colonel, GSC
G-3 Artillery

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP G-3 SECTION

6th Army Group Artillery Ammunition Records

1. Record of Unallocated Ammunition.

All artillery ammunition was accounted for as shown in inclosure Number 1 (6th Army Group Actual Ammunition Standing with
COMZONE 20 April 1945). As soon as all allocations to subordinate
forces were made for the respective period, 6th Army Group's unallocated ammunition was determined. To the 6th Army Group unallocated ammunition at the beginning of the period the Common allocated ammunition at the difference between this quartity and the
allocations made to subordinate forces was the unallocated ammunition.

2. Allocations to Subordinate Forces.

allocations to all subordinate forces were computed as shown in Inclosure Number 2 (6th army Group Allocations for the region 11-20 april) and indicaure number 3 (astimated weapons list 11-20 april). The gun day rate (rounds per gun per day) for each respective army and major force was based on the availability of ammunition, resupply and the mission of the respective army of major force.

"3. Ex.enditure keports.

required to submit a Daily Ammunition Expenditure report giving the information as called for in inclosure Number 4 (Form 5.6-2.1.1-1.1). This report covered a 24 hour period listing total rounds by caliber and was required to reach this headquarters by 1200A the day following the period covered. Detailed instructions in English and French are given on the back of inclosure Number 4.

b. Periodic Ammunition Expenditure Report. All the armies and forces were registed in addition to the Belly Expenditure Report (Inclosure Number 4) to submit a Periodic Report giving information as called for in Form 3 G-ART-2A, Inclosure Number 5. This report was submitted so as to reach this heid warters 5 or 6 days after the end of the respective period (some as allocation period, normally each 10 days) and was considered as the firm expenditure record for the period, and wherever there were discrepancies between this report and the baily report (Inclosure Rumber 4) the Periodic Report (Inclosure Rumber 5) was considered as the official record.

c. The bove two reports were the only expenditure reports that were required by the artillery Section, (G-5) from the artillery forces in 5th army Group during the entire cemisign.

4. Consolidated record of expenditures.

The expenditures of the arries and major forces were toursted on the form as shown in inclosure number 6 (7th Army, reriod 11-20 April). Daily the expenditures as reported by 7th Army on form 5 G-A-1-1A (Inclosure number 4) were posted and accumulated until the reriodic accord (Inclosure number 5) was received for the period. As soon as the reriodic meport was received, only the final cumulative figure at the end of the period was corrected. A new balance of amunition available in 7th Army was obtained and othered over to the reports being kept for the subsequent period.


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to allutert Gener	-3 ection (Artillery) records have been turned over 1, 6th Army Group for safe keeping.
g. ene r	ecords are fixed as follows:
<u> </u>	SUBJECT
401	to 30 April 1945) (includes weapon list of eventh army, first french army and other oth army Group Forces.)
402	Geventh army Ammunition Status (periodic Seventh Army expenditure reports from 15 August to 7 April 1945 and Seventh Army ammunition balances from 31 October to 30 April 1945)
408	beventh Army correspondence file from October 1944 to may 1945.
404	First French Army ammunition status (correspondence file, periodic expenditure reports and ten day samunition belances from October 1944 to May 1945
405	Ammunition status of First Airborne Task Force, 44th Ann Brigade and Alpine front Command. (Correspondence file, pariodic expenditure reports and ammunition beloness from Cotober 1944 to May 1945.
406	Ammunition status of Army Det charact of the Atlantic. (Correspondence file and ammunition expenditure.)
407	Current equalities status. (Correspondence file, m terial not relative to Files 401 to 406 in-
406	tudy of artillery needs and ammunition.
409	ricid articlery and funk bestroyer personnel.
410.	from Janu ry 1945 to May 1945.
4.1	Com-Lord elipsections to 6th army Group from Rerch to any 1345.
418	eth are Group am unition standing from 1 Janu ry to 30 world 1945.
9.0	lie of iscell neous staff studies regarding
614	s.75" mortar.
	L. P. HANTS, Colonel, C. C., Artillery Officer
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
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	TO BE ACT	na and a		TABI	4 IL 1945		
Page 1 (1)	(2))	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Туре	ETC D/S (1 Sep 44)	oti arry in hallocated are on	cation to for 11-2 p	available	(6) Total Oth Arey Op All- ocations to	Unallocated
	Rds		10 dpr	for 11-2 p		forces for	(5) (6)
75mm Howitzer	(13.65)		27,377	37,430	64,807	14,003	50,504
HE W/PDF M48	7.05		-9,074 9,220	23,000	13,926 9,220	4,523	9,403
HE W/PDF M48 cav.	5.25		-2,794 0	0	-2.724	1,913	-3,007
HE w/PDF M54 cav.	0.90		27,356	13,900	41,156		32,669
	0.45		-5,33 <u>1</u>	630	-5,331 630	0	-5,331 -630
HE - AT			8,000	0	6 , 000	0_	್ರಿಂಂ
Canister		The second secon				10 500	61,351
Canister	10.00	100.0	12,673	67,200	79,873	18,522	
Canister 75mm Gun HE W/PDF M48 AINC		100.0 50.0	3,682 0	67,200 0 42,000	3,682 42,000	14,750	30,932
Canister 75mm Gun HE W/PDF M48 AINC	10.00	50.0	3,682 0 5,776	0 42,000 0	3,632 42,000 5,776	14,750 0 772	30,932 5,004
Canister 75mm Gun HE w/PDF M48 AINC HE w/PDF M54 HE w/FDF M54 APC HC Smoke	10.00 5.00 4.00	50.0 40.0 5.0	3,682 0 5,776 2,404 6,291	0 42,000 0 21,000	3,682 42,000 5,776 23,404 6,271	1/4,750 0 772 0 1 3,000	30,932 5,004 23,404 3,291
Canister 75mm Gun HE W/PDF M48 AINC HE W/PDF M54 APC HC Smoke WF Smoke	10.00 5.00 4.00 .50	40.0 5.0 5.0	3,682 0 5,776 2,404 6,291 -5,480	21,000 0 21,000 0 1,200	3,692 42,000 5,776 23,404 6,271 -1,280	1/4,750 0 77/2 0 3,000	30,932 5,004 23,404 3,291 -1,280
Canister 75mm Gun HE W/PDF M48 AINC HE W/PDF M54 HE W/PDF M54 APC HC Smoke WF Smoke	10.00 5.00 .50 .50 .50	40.0 5.0 5.0	3,682 0 5,776 2,404 6,271 -5,420	1,2,000 0 21,000 0 - h,200	23,682 42,000 5,776 23,404 6,271 -1,220	14,750 0 772 0 3,000 0 20,600	30,932 5,004 23,404 3,291 -1,280
Canister 75mm Gun HE w/PDF M48 AINC HE w/PDF M54 APC HC Smoke WF Smoke 75mm Gun HE w/FDF M48 (NC) HE w/FDF M48 (RC)	10.00 5.00 .50 .50 .50 10.00 4.50 1.00	40.0 5.0 5.0 100.00 45.00	3,682 0 5,776 2,404 6,271 -5,420 139,178 124,167 6,750	0 1,2,000 0 21,000 0 1,200 0 0 0	2,692 42,000 5,776 23,404 6,271 -1,220 139,176 124,167	14,750 0 772 0 3,000 20,600 17,320 3,300	30,932 5,004 23,494 3,291 -1,280 110,578 106,847 3,450
Canister 75mm Gun HE W/PDF M48 AINC HE W/PDF M54 APC HC Smoke WF Smoke 75mm Gun HE W/FTF M48 (NC)	10.00 5.00 4.00 .50 .50 10.00 4.50	40.0 5.0 5.0 100.00	3,682 0 5,776 2,404 6,291 -5,420 139,178 124,147 6,750 -9,006 11,110	0 1,2,000 0 21,000 0 1,200 0 0 0 0	2,682 42,000 5,776 23,404 6,271 -1,220 139,178 124,167 -6,750 -9,306	14,750 0 772 0 3,000 20,600 17,320 3,300 0 5,900	30,932 5,004 23,404 3,291 -1,280 110,578 106,847 3,450 -2,306 5,210
Canister 75mm Gun HE W/PDF M48 AINC HE W/PDF M54 APC HC Smoke WF Smoke 75mm Gun HE W/FDF M48 (NC) HE W/FDF M48 (RC) APC APC APC W/Frim M40 AP T-4 HYFER	10.00 5.00 .50 .50 .50 10.00 4.50 1.00 3.50	10.0 5.0 5.0 100.00 45.00 10.00 35.00	3,682 0 5,776 2,404 6,271 -5,420 139,178 124,167 6,750 -9,006 11,110 1,207	6 42,000 21,000 0 21,000 0 6 0 0	2,682 42,000 5,776 23,404 6,271 -1,280 139,178 124,167 6,750 -9,306	14,750 0 772 0 3,000 20,600 17,320 3,300 0 5,900 130	30,932 5,004 23,404 3,291 -1,280 110,573 106,847 3,450 -9,306
Canister 75mm Gun HE W/PDF M48 AINC HE W/PDF M54 APC HC Smoke WF Smoke WF Smoke 75mm Gun HE W/FDF M48 (NC) HE W/FDF M48 (RC) APC APC W/Frim M40	10.00 5.00 .50 .50 .50 10.00 4.50 1.00	40.0 5.0 5.0 100.00 45.00	3,682 0 5,776 2,404 6,291 -5,420 139,178 124,147 6,750 -9,006 11,110	0 1,2,000 0 21,000 0 1,200 0 0 0 0 0	2,682 42,000 5,776 23,404 6,271 -1,220 139,176 126,167 -6,750 -9,306 11,110	14,750 0 772 0 3,000 20,600 17,320 3,300 0 5,900 130 1,200 750	30,932 5,004 23,404 3,291 -1,280 110,578 106,847 3,450 -2,006 5,210 1,677


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


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
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	Page 3	* Change 3. SH	TR BE NC -	Ir- 351, 31 '	far 45 (1 ip	r - 1 'ay)	
	(1)	(2)	(3) 6 ATTRY Co	(4) COMEZONE	(5) Total	(6) Total 6 M	(7)
	Туре	ETO D/S	6 Army Gp Unallocated Ammo on	to 6 AG for	(5) + (4)	Allocations to forces	on 20 Ap
		Rds %	10 Apr	11-20 Apr		for 11-20Ag	0 - (
British Co.		(10 15)		1 to man	358.543	67,200	291,345
	155mm Howitzer (all)	(19.45)	318,243	10.300	THE RESERVE OF THE PERSON NAMED IN	A STREET, SQUARE, SQUARE,	SHIP SHIP
	HE MK lal or M102	* 17.5	90,966	. 0	90.966	12,600	78,96
	HE MK 141 or M102 WF MK II Al or M105	* 17.5 * .7	90 .9 66 31 .452	. 0	90 .9 66 91 .4 52	12,600 0	78,966 91,456
	HE MK LAI or M102 WP MK II Al or M105 HE M107	* 17.5	90,966 31,452 172,585	· 0	90 .9 66 31 .45 2 172.585	12,600 0 16,612	78,56 31,45 126,17
•	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK II A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav)	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5)	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957	0 0 34,000	90 .9 66 31.452 172.585 75. 25 7	22,600 0 21يومو 188 ₄	67,76
•	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK 11 A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,338	0 0 0 3 <u>4</u> ,000	90,966 91,452 172,585 75,957 -20,338	000,21 0 214,04 88148	-20,33
•	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK II A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110 EC M116	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5)	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957	0 0 34,000 0 2,800	90,966 31,452 172,585 75,957 -20,336 7,595	0 0 20,286 8,288 0	67.769 -20.339 7.575
•	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK 11 A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,338	0 0 0 3 <u>4</u> ,000	90,966 91,452 172,585 75,957 -20,338	000,21 0 214,04 88148	67,76 -20,33 7,52
rial.	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK II A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110 EC M116	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,333 4,7%	0 0 34,000 0 2,800	90,966 31,452 172,585 75,957 -20,336 7,595	0 0 20,286 8,288 0	67,76, -20,33 7,5%
ENTIAL	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK 11 A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110 EC M116 C1r Smoke	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7 1.25 (13.2) * 12.0	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,338 4,795 -3,174	0 0 34,000 0 2,800 3,500	90,966 31,452 172,585 75,957 -20,338 7,595	12,600 0 16,118 8,188 0 0	67,76 -20,39 7,57 32 88,37
FIDENTIAL	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK II A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110 E. M116 Clr Smoke	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7 1.25	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,338 4,7% -3,174	0 0 34,000 0 2,800 3-500 ho,222	90,966 31,452 172,585 75,957 -20,336 7,595 326	12,600 0 16,112 8,188 0 0	67,76 -20,33 7,5% 58,39 86,89
ONFIDENTIAL	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK II A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110 E. M116 Clr Smoke 155mm Gun HE	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7 1.25 (13.2) * 12.0	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,333 4,795 -3,174 67,221 63,830	0 0 34,000 0 2,800 3,500 40,222 40,222	90,966 31,452 172,585 75,957 -20,336 7,595 326 107,443 104,052	12,600 0 16,112 8,188 0 0 19,050	67,76; -20,33 7,5% 32 58,3% 86,65
CONFIDENTIAL	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK 11 A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110 E. M116 Clr Smoke 155mm Gun HE WF Smoke	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7 1.25 (13.2) * 12.0 * .7	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,338 4.795 -3,174 67,221 63,830 3,173	0 0 34,000 0 2,800 3,500 40,222 40,222	90.966 31.452 172.585 75.957 -20.336 7.595 326 107.443 104.052 3.173	12,600 0 16,112 8,188 0 0 0 19,050 18,000 1,050	67,76, -20,335 7,572 30,39 36,65 2,12
CONFIDENTIAL	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK II A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110 Ex M116 Clr Smoke 155mm Gun HE WF Smoke	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7 1.25 (13.2) * 12.0 * .7	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,338 4.795 -3,174 67,221 63,830 3,173 -282 500	0 0 34,000 0 2,800 3,500 40,222 40,222 0	90,966 31,452 172,585 75,257 -20,338 7,595 326 107,443 104,052 3,173 -282	12,600 0 16,112 8,188 0 0 19,050 18,008 1,050	67,76 -20,39 7,57 20,39 85,99 86,69 2,12 -28
CONFIDENTIAL	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WP MK II A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WP M110 EC M116 C1r Smoke 155mm Gun HE WP Smoke AP	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7 1.25 (13.2) * 12.0 * .7 0.50	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,338 4.795 -3,174 67,221 63,830 3,173 -282 500 28,916	0 0 34,000 0 2,800 3,500 h0,222 h0,222 0 0	90.966 31.452 172.585 75.957 -20.398 7.595 326 107.443 104.052 3.173 -282 500	12,600 0 16,112 8,188 0 0 0 19,050 18,000 1,050 0	67,76 -20,33 7,57 38 38,39 86,65 2,12 -28
CONFIDENTIAL	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK II A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110 Ex M116 Clr Smoke 155mm Gun HE WF Smoke HC Smoke AP 8 Inch Howitzer	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7 1.25 (13.2) * 12.0 * .7 0.50	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,338 4.795 -3,174 67,221 63,830 3,173 -282 500	0 0 34,000 0 2,800 3,500 40,222 40,222 0	90.966 31.452 172.585 75.957 -20.338 7.595 326 107.443 104.052 3.173 -282 500	12,600 0 16,112 8,188 0 0 19,050 18,008 1,050	67,764 -20,334 7,575 58,375 86,65 2,12 -28 50 20,17 27,25
CONFIDENTIAL	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK II A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110 E. M116 C1r Smoke 155mm Gun HE WP Smoke HC Smoke AP 8 Inch Howitzer HE MK 1A1 or M106	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7 1.25 (13.2) * 12.0 * .7 0.50 (12.0) * 12.0	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,338 4.795 -3,174 67,221 63,830 3,173 -282 500 28,916 30,501 1,585	0 0 0 34,000 0 2,800 3,500 h0,222 h0,222 0 0 0	90.966 31.452 172.585 75.957 -20.338 7.595 326 107.443 104.052 3.173 -282 500 39.512 38.290 1,222	12,600 0 16,138 8,188 0 0 0 19,050 18,000 1,050 0 0	67,76; -20,336 7,57; 38,39; 86,65; 2,12; -28; 50 26,47; 27,25; 1,22
CONFIDENTIAL	HE MK IAI or M102 WF MK II AI or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110 Ex M116 Clr Smoke 155mm Gun HE WP Smoke HC Smoke AP 8 Inch Howitzer HE MK IAI or M106 HE (cavitized)	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7 1.25 (13.2) * 12.0 * .7 0.50 (12.0) * 12.0 * (16)	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,338 4.7% -3,174 67,221 63,830 3,173 -282 500 28,916 30,501 1,585	0 0 34,000 0 2,800 3,500 40,222 40,222 0 0 0 10,596 7,789 2,807	90.966 31.452 172.585 75.957 -20.338 7.595 326 107.443 104.052 3.173 -282 500 39.512 38.290 1,222	12,600 0 16,112 8,188 0 0 0 19,050 18,008 1,050 0 11,040 0	67,769 -20,339 7,575 86,95 2,12 -28 50 26,47 27,25 1,22 8,63
•	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK II A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110 E. M116 C1r Smoke 155mm Gun HE WP Smoke HC Smoke AP 8 Inch Howitzer HE MK 1A1 or M106 HE (cavitized) 8 Inch Gun	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7 1.25 (13.2) * 12.0 * .7 0.50 (12.0) * 12.0 * (16)	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,338 4.795 -3,174 67,221 63,830 3,173 -282 500 28,916 30,501 1,585	0 0 34,000 0 2,800 3,500 40,222 40,222 0 0 0 10,596 7,789 2,807 6,834	90.966 31.452 172.585 75.957 -20.338 7.595 326 107.443 104.052 3.173 -282 500 39.512 38.290 1,222 9.595	12,600 0 16,138 8,188 0 0 0 19,050 18,000 1,050 0 0	67.765 -20.336 7.575 88.375 86.65 2,125 -20 27.25 1,22 8,63 3,19
•	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK II A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110 E. M116 Clr Smoke 155mm Gun HE WP Smoke AP 8 Inch Howitzer HE MK 1A1 or M106 HE (cavitized) 8 Inch Gun HE M103 or MK Series	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7 1.25 (13.2) * 12.0 * .7 0.50 (12.0) * 12.0 * (16)	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,338 4.7% -3,174 67,221 63,830 3,173 -282 500 28,916 30,501 1,585 2,761 2,761	0 0 34,000 0 2,800 3,500 40,222 40,222 0 0 0 10,596 7,789 2,807 6,834 1,390 5,444	90.966 31.452 172.585 75.957 -20.338 7.595 326 107.443 104.052 3.173 -282 500 39.512 38.290 1,222 9.595 4.151 5.444	12,600 0 16,112 8,188 0 0 0 19,050 18,000 1,050 0 11,040 0 960 960	67,764 -20,334 7,575 86,95 2,12 -28 50 28,47 27,25 1,22 8,63 3,13 5,64
•	HE MK 1A1 or M102 WF MK II A1 or M105 HE M107 HE M107 (cav) WF M110 E. M116 Clr Smoke 155mm Gun HE WP Smoke HC Smoke AP 8 Inch Howitzer HE MK 1A1 or M106 HE (cavitized) 8 Inch Gun HE M103 or MK Series AF MI XX 240mm Howitzer	* 17.5 * .7 (*17.5) () * 0.7 1.25 (13.2) * 12.0 * .7 0.50 (12.0) * 12.0 * (16) * 16	90,966 31,452 172,585 41,957 -20,338 4.7% -3,174 67,221 63,830 3,173 -282 500 28,916 30,501 1,585	0 0 34,000 0 2,800 3,500 40,222 40,222 0 0 0 10,596 7,789 2,807 6,834	90.966 31.452 172.585 75.957 -20.338 7.595 326 107.443 104.052 3.173 -282 500 39.512 38.290 1,222 9.595	12,600 0 16,112 8,188 0 0 0 19,050 18,000 1,050 0 11,040 0	78,566 31,466 32,466 126,17) 67,764 -20,336 7,572 326 88,372 86,056 2,122 8,63 3,19 5,64 5,63

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
NOTES

- a. In Column A, Number of Guns in action, will include the total number of authorized weapons of all units except those which have been placed in Corps or Army reserve.
- b. Column B, Rounds expended, will be the total round fired, including all types of rounds, WP, HE, etc., during the 24-hour period, for each caliber.
- c. Column C, Rounds on hand, will be the total number of rounds, including all types in each caliber, remaining on hand in the the using units of the Army, at end of 24-hour period.
- d. Column D, will include number of rounds of ammunition of all types by caliber on hand in ASPs at end of 24-hour period.
- e. This report may be submitted by teletype or courier, to reach Headquarters 6th Army Group by 1200A, the day following the period covered.


NOTA

- a. Colonne A: On portera sous la rubrique "Nombre de canona employes " le total de des dotations de toutes les unites, exception faite de celles qui sonten Reserve Generale de Corps ou d'Armee.
- b. Colonne B: Sous la rubrique "Depenses" on portera, par calibre, le total des coups de tout type (HE, WP, etc.) tires on 24 heures
- c. Colonne C: Sous la rubrique "Disponibilite" on portera, par calibre, par calibre, le total des coups de tout type disponibles dans les unites de l'Armee au bout de 24 heures.
- d. Colonne D: Disponibilités par calibre des depots de munitions en munitions de tous types au bout de 24 heures.
- e. Ce Compte mendu transmis par teletype ou par courier, devra parvenir au VIe Groupe D'Armees avant 12.00, le lendemain du jour pour lequel il est establi.

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NOTES

- Report will show the following for the end of each period;
 - Average per piece
 Average __% U/F (__rds = 1 U/F)
 Average percentages of type projectile,
 fuze, charge.
- b. Number of guns in action will include the total number of authorized weapons of all units except those which have been placed in Gorps or Army reserve.
- c. If any restrictions on expenditures have been in force the report will state period and amount of restrictions in rounds per gun per day.

REMARKS

(Under this heading unit may include any critical items, shortages, trends or comments, pertaining to the supply and expenditure of ammunition.) ***

- a, le reprort donnera les renseignemen find de chaque periode:
 - Moyenne par piece
 Moyenne 7 unite de feu (
 Fourcentage moyen du type de p
 charges.
- b. Le nombre de pieces en action compre total d'armes autorisees de toutes l l'exception de celles placees en res d'Armee ou d'Armee.
- c. S'il a ete necessaire de reduire les le rapport indiquera la periode penles reductions ont ete operees et le par piece et par jour.


REMARQUE

(Sous cet en-tete de ces articles esser mentionner les articles critiques, insu tendances ou commentaires se rapportant ou aux consommations de munitions).


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Incl #5 to Ltr AG 471/3 C-0, dtd 9 March 45, Hq 6th Army Group

THIS PAGE IS U. LASSIFIED THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED le rapport donnera les renseignements suivants a la find de chaque pariode: Report will show the following for the end of each period; Average per piece
Average % U/F (__rds = 1 U/F)
Average percentages of type projectile,
fuze, charge. Moyenne par piece Moyenne % unite de feu (__coups = 1 U/F) Fourcentage moyen du type de projectiles, fusees, b. Le nombre de pieces en action comprendra le nombre total d'armes autorisees de toutes les unites a l'exception de celles placees en reserve de Corps Number of gums in action will include the total number of authorized weapons of all units except those which have been placed in Corps or Army d'Armee ou d'Armee. reserve. c. 8'il a ete necessaire de reduire les conformations, le rapport indiquera la periode pendant laquelle les reductions ont ete operees et leur importance If any restrictions on expenditures have been in force the report will state period and amount of restrictions in rounds per gun per day. par piece et par jour. REMARQUES REMARKS (Sous ret en-tete de ces articles essentie e, l'unite peut mentionner les articles critiques, insufficants, les tendances ou commentaires se rapportant au ravitaillement der this heading unit may include any critical s, shortages, trends or comments, pertaining the supply and expenditure of ammunition.) ou aux consommations de munitions). r AG 471/3 C-0, dtd 9 March 45, Hq 6th Army Group



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RECEDIATE

Paraphrase of Message 3 92156, 21 June 1945

From SHARF to C.G. 6th Army Group

And Other Addressees

1. This is a warning Order for Immediate redistribution Forces into agreed occupational sones in GERMANY and AUSTRIA.

2. A coordinated movement involving GERMANY, AUSTRIA, BERLIN and possibly GERGHUSLOVAKIA on or about 1 July appears probable.

3. Recessary planning will now be initiated to implement such movement. Allied commanders in contact with Soviet Forces will insure that local coordination of movement is effected with them, and Army Groups will report plans to this Eqs as soon as possible including lines to be reached by certain hours and dates, and coordinating copies of these reports will be exchanged between all adjacent addressees.

4. During the withdrawal of our Forces from an area no indigenous civilians will be permitted to evacuate themselves with or in advance of our troops. United Nations displaced persons and those assimilated to them in status will be granted freedom of movement.

5. German troops now in the areas to be evacuated will either be withdrawn with our forces for later discharge or disposal or expeditiously disbanded in compliance with existing regulations. Some will be left.

6. Coincident with Russian withdrawal therefrom 12th Army Group will initiate plans to advance into the US Zone in AUSTRIA. Eastern boundary of US Zone is given as follows: For planning purposes from point W6534 Italian-Austrian International boundary thence southern and eastern boundaries of the Austrian States of SALZBORG and GERBONRU (still to be settled by negotiation) - to Austrian-Uzech international boundary (R1021).

7. Initially Shadin will be occupied on a tripartite basis and French elements will be brought in after reaching agreement their sector.

8. For planning purposes French to occupy zone in Obarahi as given below. This zone is still under negotiation.

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RESTRICTED

Message S 92156 (Con't)

Final boundaries will be given as soon as received. The state of WERTLEMBURG south of the following Kreis boundaries of MERTLEMBURG BOBLINGER-LWONBERG less that part of MERTLEMBURG NORTH PARTIES OF LINDAU in DAVARIA.

The area in the state of BADEN to the south of and including the areas of MASTATT. The Regierungs Besirke of TWIRK and MODLERS. The Regierungs Besirke of SAARLAND and IFLAX. That part of the state of HESSEN-MASSAU lying west of the RAINE, together with the Kreis of OBERWESTERTALD, WATERLAND, DETERLAND and SANKT GOARSHAUSEN.

in that area will stand fast and no movement will take place pending Governmental agreement.

nents in CZnChollovakia will be issued. 12th Army Group should plan on a withdrawal to the Czechoslovak-German border. However, CZnChollovakia may not be evacuated and if this is the case it will be necessary to stand fast on the present line and to make only such changes on the flanks as are required to conform to movements there. In this case, the coordinating line on the north should run generally from ALKENAU (PSSS) westwards to the Czech-German border south of Wildestein (PZSSS) and on the south pivot similarly to the line given in para 6 of this message.

11. Orders initiating movement will be issued by this ids later. At movement will be made until receipt of such orders. Information of these impending moves will be closely guarded.

RESTRICTED

Paraphrase of Message S-93452, 27 June 45

From SHAEF to 6th Army Group

And Other Addressess

l. Fellowing instructions are to be used as a masis for discussion with the French Chief of Staff for national defense with a view to their subsequent issue when agreed by the French and when ordered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They are furnished at this time for planning purposes only so that executive action may be taken promptly when ordered. All necessary preliminary discussions with the local Soviet and French authorities will, however, be initiated at once.

- 2. The following action will be taken commencing on 1 July 1945, or as soon thereafter as national zones in GERMANY, AUSTRIA, BRALLY and VIANA still under discussion have been agreed and promulgated.
- 3. By direct arrangement with appropriate Soviet commanders 21st Army Group will hand over those parts of the Russian zone in GERMANY now occupied by British Forces.
- 4. 12th Army Group by direct arrangement with appropriate Soviet commanders will hand over that part of the Russian zone in GERMANY presently occupied by Forces of the United States.
- 5. The above reliefs will be subject to the provisions of para 4 and 5 of 3 92156 of 21 June, as modified by \$3203 on (neither to all) dated 26 June, 1945.
- 6. 12th Army Group by direct arrangement with 6th Army Group will take over, and govern that part of the agreed United States zone in Germany presently occupied by French Forces. The transfer will be made in accordance with the joint 6 A.G.-12 A.G. plan to be furnished.
 - 7. Omitted.
- 8. U.S. Wilitary Government personnel will be withdrawn from the French zones in Univally when United States Forces there are relieved.

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RESTRICTED

Message S-93452 (Con't)

9. French Military overnment personnel will be withdrawn from the U.S. zone in GERMARY when the French Forces are relieved.

10. Exchanged PW's and disarmed enemy personnel in areas between United States and French Forces will be handed over in SITU. No indigenous civilians will be allowed to move. Freedom of movement will be granted United Nations displaced persons and assimilies.

11. Command of the First French Army and the Alpine Front Command will revert to the French Ministry of War on completion of the above reliefs between United States and French Forces.

12. U.S. and British headquarters sublike District will move their respective garrisons into agreed zones in BERLIN as already planned. French Elmistry of Sar will designate troops for the French garrison, its movement to BERLIN will be arranged by 12th army Group in coordination with COMZONE, 6th Army Group, and Shade Mission (France). National garrison commanders will coordinate with the Russians in BERLIN. In case the national zones are not determined by the date of execution of tals order the Franch Ministry of Mar is invited to send a French Control Council to the British and U.S. zones in DERLIN, to remain until such time as the French zone is finalised and French troops are available to enter it.

13. Umitted.

14. Completion of movement of national parrisons into BEREIN and VILKER will be reported to this headquarters at which time they will revert to wational Command.

15. In case the movements and reliefs herein directed are not completed at the time combined command of the Allied expeditionary Forces is ended, appropriate national commanders will be responsible for carrying them out.

RESTRICT

Paraphrase of Message 5 94542, 1 July 1945

From Shabi to 6th Army Group

And other addressees

1. Following 5 #3452 of 27 June the following executive action will now be taken.

that part of the United States Zone in Generally presently occupied by French Porces. Commencing on the 1 July, or as soon thereafter as movement can be coordinated between 6th and 12th Army croups.

3. 5th Army Group, by direct arrangement with 12th Army Group will take over with French Faces those parts of the French Lone in United Fresently occupied by United States Forces. Commencing simultaneously and proceeding concurrently with the relief in paradraph 2.

4. 6th Army Group and Commanding General, United States Forces in ASSIRIA will take over with French Forces that part of the French zone in ASSIRIA presently occupied by United States Forces, this by direct arrangement with 12th Army.

5. To ensure a smooth transfer military coverament personnel of the relieving nationality may precede the troops into their zone and military coverament personnel of the nationality being relieved, may remain for a short period after completion of relief as mutually arranged.

6. Provisional units attached to united states forces, derman prisoners of var and disarmed enemy personnel in areas which change hands between united states and remen forces, together with all stocks of indigenous foodstuffs earmarked for their use, will be anded over in SITA. We indigenous civilians or uncontrolled displaced persons will be allowed to move between zones in advance of or with the departing forces. The orderly repatriation of united mations displaced persons and assimilies will be continued.

7. Above reliefs will te completed as soon as possible and not later than 10 July.

- 1 -

RESTRICTED

Message S 94542 (Con't)

8. On completion of these reliefs or on the termination of Combined Command of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, whichever is earlier, command of the First French Army will revert to the French High Command. On 10 July, 1945 or on the termination of Combined Command of the Allied Expeditionary Force whichever is the earlier, command of the Army Detachment of the ALPS will also revert to the French High Command.

9. Per the purpose of conducting the above reliefs the French Zone in GERBANY is defined as follows:

A. In Bavaria the Kreis of LINDAU.

B. Southern part of the Province of MURTHISPING including SIGMARINGEN south of autobalm and railway connecting KARLSRUHE-STUTIGARI-ULM defined by the following Kreis boundaries ULM, GOPFINGE, NORTIGEN, BOSCHINGEN, LEC. BEAG and that portion of MUNSIGEM north-east of autobalm, inclusive to United States.

C. BADEN-BADEN, has TATT and Kreis of Bunk, all in the HEZINKE of KARLSHORE.

D. FREIBURG and BEZINKE OF KUNSTANZ.

E. SANKIGUARSHAVE, JHUUNTERLANK, UNTERWESTERWALD and Kreis of ObenWESTERWALD.


F. The districts of FREATHWATE, SAAR west of the MHINE, that part of the Province of HESSE situated west of the RLINE and the districts of COBLERY and TREVEL.

G. That part of the ContenZ district east of the

10. For the purpose of conducting reliefs in AUSTRIA, the French Zone in that country will be defined as the Provinces of Tibol and Volkarabalag.

11. 12th Army Group will adjust United States Forces into the proposed United States Zone in AUSIRIA which is defined as that part of the Province of OBERDONAL South of the Danube and the Province of SALLBURG. Execution of this movement will begin as soon as coordinated with the Bussians.

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SECRIAT-IA) (UNITE) UNIT Depenses journalieres et di Daily ammunition expenditur	CONFIDENTIA sponibilities en	munition	Date is pour une p	eriode de 24
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	A	В	c	D
Calibre et type Caliber and Type 2 2 2 3 1 240mm.HOV 2 75mm TANK 3 155mm HOV 11917/18 4 3-in. GUN 5 8-in. HOV 6 75mm HOV 7 155mm GUN 11917/18 8 90mm TD & AA w/148 FU 9 76mm TANK 10 8-in. GUN 11 105mm HOV 11 13 4.5-in. GUN 14 155mm GUN H1 RENARQUES: RETARKS:	Fombre de canons employes No. of Guns in action	Depenses on munitions a Rounds expended	Disponibilité en munitions dans les unites Rounds on hand by troops	Disponibilito en munitions dans let depots de l'Armee e Rounds on hand in Army ASPs
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DOCUMENT TO ROLL INDEX

Frame	Classification Number	Date Period	Vol.	Pt.	Title	Security Classification	Remarks
4 5	85.8	June-Sept/	44		8th Corps After Action Report	U	
16/ 5	87_01	Oct/44- Apr/45			6th Army Group Activities	U	
39		Dec/44- Feb/45				u u	
176		Mar-Apr/45				U	
56		Mar-May/45				U	
139		May/45				U	
2/7	87.01	June-Ju1/4	5		6th Army Group Activities	U	
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